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Essay Twelve Part One: Why All Philosophical Theories -- Including Dialectical Materialism -- Are Incoherent Non-Sense

August 2025: This Essay Is Currently Being Completely Re-Written And Re-Structured.

I Am Now About 95% Of The Way Through, Which Means It Should Be Finished By Early Spring 2026.

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However, if you are using Windows 10 or 11, IE11 and Edge unfortunately appear to colour these links somewhat erratically. They are meant to be mid-blue, but for some reason those two browsers render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and even red!

Finally, several browsers also underline these links inconsistently. Many are underscored boldly in black, others more lightly in blue! They are all meant to be the latter.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, again depending on the context; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; PB = Principle of Bivalence.]

As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack on HM -- a scientific theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary thirty-eight years ago. The difference between DM and HM, as I see it, is explained here.

Some readers might wonder why I have quoted extensively from a wide variety of DM-sources in the Essays published at this site. In fact a good 10-20% of the material in many of them is comprised of just such quotations. Apologies are therefore owed the reader in advance for the length and extremely repetitive nature of most of these passages. The reason for their inclusion is as follows: Long experience has taught me that Dialectical Marxists simply refuse to accept that their own classicists -- e.g., Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao --, alongside countless 'lesser' DM-theorists actually said the things I have attributed to them. That is especially the case after they are confronted with the absurd consequences that follow from their words. That remains the case unless they are shown chapter and verse and in extensive detail. Partial quotes, paraphrases and summaries in my own words they reject as "distortions", "mis-interpretations", "mis-representations", and even "manipulations". Furthermore, in debate when I quote only one or two passages in support of what I allege they are simply brushed off as "outliers" or "atypical". Indeed, in the absence of dozens of proof texts drawn from a wide range of sources (sampled across all areas of Dialectical Marxism), and reproduced in full, they tend to regard anything that a particular theorist has to say -- regardless of who they are, even if they turn out to be one of the aforementioned classicists -- as either "far too crude", "unrepresentative" or even(!) unreliable. Failing that they often complain that any such quotes have been "taken out of context". Many in fact object since -- surprising and sad though this is to say --, they are largely ignorant of the fine detail of their own theory, or, perhaps even worse, they simply haven't read the DM-classics! The only way to counter such attempts to deflect, reject and deny is to quote DM-material frequently and at length.

Furthermore, because of the highly sectarian and partisan nature of Dialectical Marxism I have also found it necessary to quote a wide range of sources from across the entire 'dialectical spectrum'. Trotskyists object if I quote Stalin or Mao; Maoists and Stalinists complain if I reference Trotsky -- or even if I cite "Brezhnev era revisionists". Non-Leninist Marxists bemoan the fact that I haven't confined my remarks solely to what Marx or Hegel had to say, advising me to ignore the confused, even "simplistic", ideas expressed by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Trotsky! This often means I have to quote the lot!

That itself has had the (indirect) benefit of revealing how much and to what extent they (the classicists and subsequent epigones across all areas of Dialectical Marxism) largely agree with each other despite sectarian rhetoric to the contrary, at least with respect to DM -- but not so much over how to apply it!

Some critics have complained that my linking to Wikipedia completely undermines the credibility of these Essays. When I launched this project on the Internet in 2005, there was very little material easily available on-line related to the vast majority of topics I could link to other than Wikipedia. In the intervening years alternative sites have become available (for example, the excellent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy), so I have been progressively replacing most of the old Wikipedia links with links to these other sources. Having said that, I haven't done so for some of the Wikipedia links -- for instance, those that are connected with geographical, historical, scientific, biographical (etc.) topics where they aren't dealing with anything controversial, at least as fellow Marxists might view them. In every case, I have endeavoured to avoid linking to Wikipedia in relation to key areas of my arguments against DM so that at no point do my criticisms depend exclusively on such links. [However, it will take several years to complete this change-over!]

In addition to the above (as readers can easily check if they consult the Bibliography and End Notes attached to each Essay), I have provided copious references to other published academic and non-academic books and articles (posted on-line or printed in hard copy) that further develop, amplify or substantiate anything I argue, claim, allege or propose.

Several others have complained about the sheer number of links there are attached to these Essays, because they say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly grumble about that since they believe everything is inter-connected, which must surely apply to Essays that attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those who find this does make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore the links(!) -- unless, of course, you want to access further supporting evidence and argument related to a particular point, or a specific topic fires your interest.

Still others wonder why I have linked to familiar subjects and topics that are part of common knowledge -- such as the names of recent US Presidents, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of popular films or the definition of certain words in common usage. I have done so for the following reason: My Essays are read all over the world by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't assume that something which is part of common knowledge in 'the west' is equally well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies', or any at all. Many of my readers aren't native English speakers, either, so any help I can give them I will continue to provide.

Finally on this specific issue, several of the aforementioned links connect to web-pages that regularly change their URLs or which even vanish from the Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent that they have changed or have disappeared, I can't possibly keep on top of this. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers informed me of any dead or incorrect links they happen to notice. In general, links to Haloscan no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.

In what follows, at least 30% of my case against DM and Traditional Philosophy has been relegated to the End Notes. This has been done to allow the Essay itself to flow a little more smoothly. Naturally, this means that if readers want fully to appreciate my case against DM (and Metaphysics), they should also consult this material. In many cases, I have added numerous qualifications, clarifications, and considerably more evidence to the material presented in the main body of the Essay. In addition, I have raised several objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that might even have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments and assertions, to which I have then responded. [I explain why I have adopted this tactic in Essay One.]

If readers skip this material, then my reply to any qualms or objections some readers might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments, references and clarifications. Since I have been debating this theory with comrades for well over thirty years, I have heard all the objections there are!

[Most of the on-line debates have been listed here. (Unfortunately, many of the links on that page have now died!)]

It is also important to add that phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" (etc.), used at this site (in connection with Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius). They are intended to highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. Up until recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run the system for the elite.**

However, that will become the main topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, readers are directed here, here and here for further details.

[**Exactly how these comments apply to DM will be explained in other Essays published at this site (especially here, here, here, and in this Essay). In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the core argument (but in this case written for absolute beginners) here.]

This Essay has been one of the most difficult to write for at least three reasons:

(i) It tackles issues that have sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest minds in human history. I hasten to add that I claim no particular originality for what follows, except perhaps its highly simplified mode of presentation and its political re-orientation. Much of it is in fact based on Frege and Wittgenstein's work, and to a lesser extent on that of other Fregeans and Wittgensteinians.

(ii) It is far from easy to expose the core weaknesses of Traditional Philosophy in everyday language, even though after well over fifty re-writes I think I have largely succeeded. [I have explained why that approach is important here.]

(iii) Unfortunately, those to whom this material is primarily directed (i.e., Dialectical Marxists) are almost all totally ignorant of Analytic Philosophy (particularly the work Frege and Wittgenstein -- in fact, many of them won't even have heard of Frege, fewer still will have read anything he wrote!). For that reason, I have tried as far as possible to keep the material presented below as basic and straight-forward as possible, free of academic complexity and needless technicality. As a result, this Essay isn't aimed at (non-Marxist) professional philosophers! In that case, those who would like to read more substantial versions of the approach to language and Metaphysics adopted at this site should consult the relevant works referenced in the End Notes (and in several other Essays on language published at this site -- for example, Essay Three Parts One and Two, Essays Four, Five, and Thirteen Part Three).

This might mean that many readers unfamiliar with Analytic Philosophy (especially the current that runs from Frege to Wittgenstein) will find the material presented below not just puzzling but far from easy to understand or even grasp its significance. That isn't meant to demean anyone who happens to be in that category. When I was new to Philosophy, that is exactly how I reacted; it took several months for me even to begin to understand this relentless and hyper-detailed approach to the subject. It is partly for this reason that I have added the remark readers will find at the end of these indented comments.

However, I have written this Essay largely with Dialectical Marxists in mind, which means I have had to make things as clear, straight-forward and basic as possible.

Apologies are therefore owed in advance to readers who know enough of Frege and Wittgenstein's work to make the ideas rehearsed below seem rather trite and banal, but, as noted above, members of my target audience aren't well-versed in this area of Analytic Philosophy, nor do they find it at all easy to appreciate the importance of this novel approach to theory, let alone grasp its significance.

In fact, many of them regard Wittgenstein in an entirely negative light -- as both a mystic and a conservative. [I have addressed and countered those allegations here, here and here.]

Incidentally, some might conclude that the ideas presented below are indistinguishable from the discredited theories put forward by the Logical Empiricists/Positivists. I respond to that erroneous inference here.

Also worth adding: the ideas presented below in no way affect the negative case against DM developed at this site, but they do help form the basis for a positive account of the origin of the dogmatic ideas that litter and hence cripple both Traditional Thought and Dialectical Marxism.

Finally, this Essay is much more repetitive than most of the others published at this site. Experience has also taught me that if the difficult ideas it contains aren't repeated many times over (often from different angles), they either tend not to sink in or their significance is all too easily lost. Unfortunately, that is especially so with respect to those unfamiliar with this 'way of doing Philosophy'.

On a more technical note: In this Essay, although I refer to the sense of a proposition (i.e., the conditions under which the sentence expressing that proposition is true and the conditions under which it is false), that is merely shorthand for the requirement of true/false bi-polarity for sentences expressing empirical propositions (i.e., propositions concerning matters of fact). This verbal contraction has been adopted to save on needless complexity in what isn't meant to be an academic exercise. Bipolarity (not to be confused with the so-called 'Law of Excluded Middle', or with the 'Principle of Bivalence') is taken to be a necessary condition for any (indicative) sentence to be counted as expressing an empirical proposition. [On this, see Note 5a0.]

[Henceforth, I will simply refer to a proposition being true or false, not the sentence expressing it being such. But it should be understood unless stated otherwise. Concerning my (presumed) appeal to, or my (supposed) use of, the LEM, see here and here.]

The subtle difference between these two ways of characterising the sense of a proposition -- or, indeed, what the sense of a proposition and what the LEM actually are -- is explained in Interlude Five, as well as here, here, and here. [See also Palmer (1996).] Once again, because this isn't meant to be an academic exercise, I have (on occasion) deliberately blurred the distinction between bi-polarity and the LEM. In addition, the reader's attention is also drawn to the difference between "non-sense" and "nonsense", as those two terms are used throughout this site. [Incidentally, my use of "sense" is explained here.] ⁰¹

I have also often blurred the distinction one would normally want to draw between propositions, sentences and statements since I don't want to become bogged down in technical issues in the Philosophy of Logic or the Philosophy of Language. Even so, it will soon become apparent that I prefer to use "proposition".

[On this, see Geach (1972b, 1972c, 1972d, 1972e) and Geach (1980), passim. Also see Glock (2003), pp.102-36, and Hacker (1996), p.288, n.65. (Nevertheless, it shouldn't be assumed that Geach would agree with everything the other two authors have to say, nor vice versa -- or, indeed, with anything posted at this site!)]

Throughout this Essay, I have used rather stilted expressions such as: "It is possible to understand an empirical proposition without knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false", as opposed to "It is possible to understand an empirical proposition without knowing whether it is true or false". I explain why I have adopted this odd way of expressing myself, here.

First of all, throughout this site I have used the term "Dialectical Marxism"; I have done so in order to distinguish Marxism from the 'dialectical aberration' that has completely dominated (and I claim has helped cripple) revolutionary socialism for over 150 years. So, the terms 'Dialectical Marxism' and 'Dialectical Marxist' refer to the mainstream 'Marxist' tradition that has accepted, in one form or another, the validity of DM and as a result has either applied it to all of 'reality' or has restricted it to social and historical development (i.e., where it has largely or even exclusively been inserted into HM). However, I distance Marx himself from this toxic amalgam -- to which conclusion many Dialectical Marxists have taken great exception (perhaps more so than anything else at this site!). Why that is so has been explained here and here. Furthermore, why this Hegelianised Hybrid (Dialectical Marxism, not Marxism itself) has been an abject failure for well over a century is explained here and here. [That argument has been summarised here and here.]

Second: Connected with an earlier point (about Analytic Philosophy), readers will also find I have largely operated with a greatly simplified picture of Metaphysics. An impression that might be given below is that metaphysicians confine themselves to the production of gnomic, single sentence statements of key ideas and precepts (such as "Time is a relation between events", or "To be is to be perceived"), and little else. Those who have read even a smattering of the subject will know that that would be a gross over-simplification, almost to the point of distortion and misrepresentation. On the contrary I am acutely aware that metaphysical systems (of the sort relevant to the aims of this Essay) are vastly more complex and involved than this, but the purpose of this site -- and especially this particular Essay -- is to focus on DM and the metaphysical statements its theorists come out with, which often tend to be of the single sentence type, or they appear as single sentence summaries of key ideas. [I quote several examples of the latter in what follows, and in other Essays -- particularly this one. Having said that, one definitive survey of Metaphysics does characterise it this way, as reducible to one-liners!]

As I have repeatedly said, the material below isn't meant to be a contribution to the academic study of Metaphysics, or even its history, but an intervention in revolutionary politics. It is for that reason the focus has been narrowed to the extent just mentioned. Anyone looking for a comprehensive survey of the philosophical weaknesses inherent in Metaphysics must therefore look elsewhere (although I have listed several academic books and articles in the Bibliography that provide just such a survey and critique). On the other hand, those who want to know why I have called DM a metaphysical theory, and why I have also labelled it incoherent non-sense, will find a reasonably solid -- and, I hope, convincing -- explanation set out below.

[In connection with the above, readers are also directed to this section, but especially this comment.]

Third: readers will soon notice that in what follows the word "reality" has often been put in 'scare' quotes. That doesn't mean I think the world doesn't exist, or that everything is just an 'illusion', a 'simulation' or even that language actually constructs the world! I am in fact indirectly highlighting the fact that I object to the philosophical use of this word. I explain why that is so here and here -- but in more detail throughout this Essay.

Fourth : Anyone puzzled by the unremittingly hostile tone I have adopted toward DM and Dialectical Marxism might find it instructive to read this first.

As of January 2025, this Essay is just over 183,000 words long; a much shorter summary of some of its main ideas can be found here.

The material presented below does not represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.

[The above details are now way out-of-date. They will be corrected when the current re-write and restructuring have been completed.]

Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections.

If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the "Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work, anyway!

I have adjusted the font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism (follow that link for an explanation); DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist depending on the context; MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, i.e., Lenin (1972); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]

(2) Demonstrate how and why all philosophical theories (and not just DM) collapse into incoherent non-sense (Part One);

(3) Show that Metaphysics and (derivatively) DM are ruling-class forms-of-thought (Parts Two and Three);

(4) (i) Trace Metaphysics and DM back to their origin in early forms of class society;

(ii) Connect Metaphysics and DM with 'world-views'/ideologies that were, directly or indirectly, promoted or patronised by successive generations of ruling elites;

(iii) Demonstrate that despite their many differences there is an easily identifiable thread running through all of the above thought-forms; and,

(5) Substantiate the accusation that DM is a fourth-rate form of LIE (Part Four);

(6) Expose the Mystical Christian and Hermetic origin of Hegel's thought and expose it for what it is: sub-logical and incoherent non-sense (upside down or 'the right way up') (Parts Five and Six); and finally,

(7) Show that the defence of ordinary language and common understanding is a class issue (Part Seven).

In addition, several Interludes have been created so that a few rather obvious objections and difficulties presented by the views promoted at this site might be addressed in more detail. In this Part of Essay Twelve the style of Philosophy developed at this site (what might be called, for want of a better term, "Linguistic Analysis") is no longer popular even among Analytic Philosophers. Its heyday was in the 1950s and '60s (but only in English speaking Universities and parts of Scandinavia), but even then it still wasn't predominantly accepted throughout the profession (for example, it was never widely adopted in the USA). Since then its popularity has declined even more markedly (for reasons that will be explored in Part Seven), to such an extent it is now considered an irrelevant back-water of Analytic Philosophy, much derided by the rest of the profession. I can't possibly deal with every objection levelled against the is approach to Philosophy, but I have addressed several of the more pressing and relevant issues in a number of these Interludes. However, with respect to those I haven't tackled I have added numerous references to a range of academic books and articles that have focused on them. They can often be found listed in the Endnotes.

All of this will make Essay Twelve easily the longest at this site, hence its division into Seven Parts. However, since my ideas on many of these issues are still in the formative stage much of this material will be published far more slowly than has been the case so far.

As indicated above, each of these topics will be tackled in various Parts of this Essay, but to address the first two we need to examine a rather odd theory (concerning the relation between matter and motion) promoted by Lenin in MEC.

M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972), p.318. Italic emphasis in the original.]

"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existence extending from stars to atoms, indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the last named. In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels (1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]

As will become increasingly clear, Lenin and Engels asserted a typical metaphysical theory. Of course, Dialectical Marxists reject characterisations like this of their words or their theory. Nevertheless, as we are about to discover in what follows, that repudiation will itself turn out to be a self-defeating error.

Before we can proceed we need to be a little clearer what the word "metaphysics" means. Engels and Lenin entertained a completely different understanding of this term compared with the meaning it has generally been given for over two thousand years. Plainly, if Lenin and Engels are right, and their re-definition proves to be acceptable, it would rather obviously mean DM isn't, and can't be, metaphysical.

"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.] For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the original; paragraphs merged.]

The vast majority of Dialectical Marxists I have so far read, studied or encountered (in print or on-line), in one form or another, endorse this -- a-hem, shall-we-say -- 'innovative re-characterisation' of Metaphysics (as we will see below and in Note 1a).^1a

From the above, Engels appears to believe that metaphysicians are committed to the following claims:

(3) Everything in metaphysical thought has been partitioned in and by "irreconcilable antitheses", which appear to be the result of an unrestricted application of the LEM.

(4) Metaphysics is largely the same as, or is expressed by, "commonsense", which works reasonably well in ordinary, everyday circumstances, but beyond that, in scientific or even philosophical contexts, it soon becomes "one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions", which means, among other things, its adherents can't see "the wood for the trees".

"A branch of philosophy dating back to the time of Aristotle, referring to the study of what is 'beyond the senses'. By the 16th century Metaphysics became synonymous with Ontology, the study of Being or Existence. For Positivism and most bourgeois philosophy today, Metaphysics is used in the sense given to it by Kant, concerned with objects which are 'not possible objects of experience.' For Hegel and later Marx, metaphysics is opponent to dialectics, for it deals with things or concepts abstracted from their interconnection with other things (concepts) and put into static 'self-identical' objects." [Taken from here; links in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

"As Engels said about commonsense -- 'Sound commonsense, respectable fellow as he is within the homely precincts of his own four walls, has most wonderful adventures as soon as he ventures into the wide world.' [Cornforth is here also quoting Engels (1976), p.26, but clearly using a slightly different translation -- RL.] And it is a fact that the usages of commonsense no longer suffice when we enter into philosophical discussion. On the contrary, obscurities and contradictions concealed within the commonsense standpoint then manifest themselves and have to be dealt with." [Cornforth (1959), p102. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. There is little point citing other DM-theorists since they all just quote Engels or paraphrase his ideas in their own words, adding little new. (In support of that claim I have added a few more such passages to Note 1a (link above), but anyone familiar with DM-literature will already be aware of this!)]

Unfortunately, neither Engels nor Cornforth bothered to tell their readers what they meant by "commonsense" (or even what "the commonsense standpoint" itself implied), but, as we have seen, that is just par for the course. Nobody seems to know what it means -- or, at least, no one seems to agree about its meaning, if it even has one! Nevertheless, given its supposed connection with ordinary human beings, it no doubt 'fully deserves' the negative press and severe criticism it has historically attracted, its alleged limitations loudly broadcast from the rooftops, its name 'justifiably' dragged through the mud by those keen to emulate age-old ruling-class contempt for working people, their lives and their daily experience. [In case anyone is unclear: I am being sarcastic, here! Why revolutionaries like Engels and Cornforth have joined forces with the class enemy by denigrating 'commonsense' is explained in Essay Nine Parts One and Two; it will be further explored in Part Seven of Essay Twelve. Finally, why it is a really bad idea to do this was explained in Essay Four Part One.]

On the other hand, if the above remarks by Engels, the Marxist Internet Archive and Cornforth turn out to be correct, DM can't be metaphysical.

But, as intimated earlier, any conclusion drawn along those lines would be seriously mistaken, and for the following reasons:

First of all, Engels offered his readers absolutely no evidence in support of these sweeping claims (for example, he cited no representative examples from the History of Philosophy). The vast majority of subsequent DM-fans have simply copied him -- and concerning the attempts made what those who at least try to support their claims about Metaphysics with evidence, such attempts can only be described as "pathetic". [Anyone who disagrees should send me their list of fifty or sixty quotes and citations from Traditional Thought (or from any other non-Marxist source!) that support what Engels had to say about 'commonsense' and Metaphysics. I'll wait...]

Second, there have been countless Philosophers and Mystics who believed that 'everything is both inter-connected' and changes as a result of a "unity of opposites". [On that, see here, here and here.] Of course, DM-supporters often classify such (compliant) Philosophers and Mystics rather loosely, often even as fellow-travellers who thought 'dialectically', not 'metaphysically'. However, it is perhaps more accurate to regard this (mystical) tradition as just another example of the ideas of the ruling-class that always rule.

Third, we have already seen that it is impossible to make sense of DM-criticisms of the LEM -- on that see here. That being the case, 'commonsense' (whatever it turns out to be!) would be well advised to stick with the LEM and reject the 'either-or' implicitly employed in and by the self-refuting demand that we either accept metaphysics or we accept DM -- a rigid and 'irreconcilable antithesis' if ever there was one!

Finally, in the Essays posted at this site, we have witnessed DM-theories regularly collapse into incoherence, so there is little room for DM-fans to crow about the 'superiority' of their theory over any other. Indeed, as Essay Seven Part Three shows, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

Independently of the above, Engels's re-definition of Metaphysics would end up classifying as non-metaphysical much of previous 'non-dialectical' philosophy. Even Plato would have admitted that things change (albeit if only with respect to 'appearances').

It could be countered that those remarks are seriously misguided themselves; only DM pictures things as fundamentally changeable, fundamentally Heraclitean, and only DM connects this with change through internal contradiction (etc., etc.).

Well, we have seen, here, here and here that that isn't the case. Even in DM, some things stay the same until or unless a sufficient quantitative change induces in them a commensurate qualitative change -- namely, and at least including, all those "essences" that Hegel borrowed from Aristotle, and which Engels then unwisely appropriated from one or both of them -- just as Dialectical Marxists also tell us that some things are 'relatively stable' (whatever that means!).

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex-pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-144. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"All rest is however relative, while motion and change are absolute. This is to be understood as an indication of the self-activity of matter, rather than in the sense that motion is possible without rest.... Any state is temporary and transient, and any thing or phenomena has a beginning and end to its existence. The motion of matter is uncreatable and indestructible. It can only change its forms. No single phenomenon or object can lose its ability to change or be deprived of motion under any conditions.... The source of the internal activity of matter lies within it, in its inherent potentiality for the perpetual changeability of its concrete shape and form of existence. Motion is absolute, for it is unrelated to anything external that could determine it. There is nothing else in the world except eternally moving matter, its forms, properties and manifestations...." [Kharin (1981), pp.62-63. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"To say that everything is in a constant process of development and change is not, of course, to deny that things can be relatively unchanging and stationary. It is, however, to say that rest is 'conditional, temporary, transitory [and] relative' whereas 'development and motion are absolute'...." [Sayers (1980a), p.4. Sayers is here quoting Lenin (1961), p.358, and not p.360 as he claims. Bold emphasis added.]

It is difficult to see how the above can be reconciled with the idea that "motion is the mode of existence of matter" and that everything is constantly changing. [See here for the supporting quotations from the DM-classics and lesser DM-clones that everything is constantly changing and exists in a state of change, as A and not-A.]

Be this as it may, Engels's view of Metaphysics is (yet again!) just a crude version of Hegel's attempt to re-write intellectual history. As Stephen Houlgate (inadvertently) points out:

"Metaphysics is characterised in the Encyclopedia first and foremost by the belief that the categories of thought constitute 'the fundamental determinations of things'.... The method of metaphysical philosophy, Hegel maintains, involves attributing predicates to given subjects, in judgements. Moreover just as the subject-matter of metaphysics consists of distinct entities, so the qualities to be predicated of those entities are held to be valid by themselves.... Of any two opposing predicates, therefore, metaphysics assumes that one must be false if the other is true. Metaphysical philosophy is thus described by Hegel as 'either/or' thinking because it treats predicates or determinations of thought as mutually exclusive, 'as if each of the two terms in an anti-thesis...has an independent, isolated existence as something substantial and true by itself.' The world either has a beginning and end in time or it does not; matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; man is either a rigidly determined being or he is not. In this mutual exclusivity, Hegel believes, lies the dogmatism of metaphysics. In spite of the fact that metaphysics deals with infinite objects, therefore, these objects are rendered finite by the employment of mutually exclusive, one-sided determinations -- 'categories the limits of which are believed to be permanently fixed, and not subject to any further negation.'" [Houlgate (2004), pp.100-01. Italics in the original; paragraphs merged.]

But, as has been argued elsewhere at this site, Hegel's own (dare I say it?) rigid dichotomy puts him in something of a bind. That is because he certainly believed that metaphysics was this but not that (i.e., it was either this or it was that, not both), which unfortunately means even he had to rely on or apply the LEM to make his point!

Of course, it could be argued that what he had to say wasn't a "judgement" about "the fundamental nature of things" -- but that objection itself must use or rely on the LEM to make its point. That is because it too assumes that that counter-claim is saying this but not that (again, that it is asserting either this or that, not both) about "the fundamental nature of things". Indeed, even Hegel's conclusions about the content of any metaphysical 'judgement' (i.e., that it says either this or that, not both) would require an implicit, or even an explicit, use of, or reference to, the LEM.

We can go further: any 'leap' into 'speculative' thought to the effect that this or that, or whatever, has been 'negated' must also involve an implicit (or explicit) use of the LEM, since it will either be the case, or it will not, that for any randomly-selected dialectical 'negation', it will have taken place or it won't. Naturally, that would reveal of Hegel's own remarks (and those of anyone who agrees with him) -- i.e., that Hegel either said this or he said that, not both -- were just as metaphysical as anything Parmenides or Plato came out with. That is, if we were foolish enough to rely on Hegel to tell us what "Metaphysics" means!

The conventions of ordinary language (partially codified in the LEM, in this case) aren't so easily side-stepped, even by a thinker of "genius".

It might now be asked: What marvellous solution of the antinomy concerning the origin of the universe did Houlgate manage to find in Hegel's work? Or any concerning the infinite divisibility of matter?

Well, that clears things up and no mistake! Thank goodness Hegel is on the case!

By now it should be abundantly clear that Hegel's ideas -- not science -- were the source of Engels's confused ruminations in this area. Having said that, what Hegel himself had to say about Metaphysics (in the Preface to the First Edition of The Science of Logic), oddly enough, actually agrees with what is said about it in this Essay -- even though Hegel also dropped a heavy hint that this other characterisation is obsolete, or so he thought.

"That which, prior to this period, was called metaphysics has been, so to speak, extirpated root and branch and has vanished from the ranks of the sciences. The ontology, rational psychology, cosmology, yes even natural theology, of former times -- where is now to be heard any mention of them, or who would venture to mention them? Inquiries, for instance, into the immateriality of the soul, into efficient and final causes, where should these still arouse any interest? Even the former proofs of the existence of God are cited only for their historical interest or for purposes of edification and uplifting the emotions. The fact is that there no longer exists any interest either in the form or the content of metaphysics or in both together. If it is remarkable when a nation has become indifferent to its constitutional theory, to its national sentiments, its ethical customs and virtues, it is certainly no less remarkable when a nation loses its metaphysics, when the spirit which contemplates its own pure essence is no longer a present reality in the life of the nation. The exoteric teaching of the Kantian philosophy -- that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which by itself generates nothing but fantasies of the brain -- this was a justification from a philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought. In support of this popular teaching came the cry of modern educationists that the needs of the time demanded attention to immediate requirements, that just as experience was the primary factor for knowledge, so for skill in public and private life, practice and practical training generally were essential and alone necessary, theoretical insight being harmful even. Philosophy [Wissenschaft] and ordinary common sense thus co-operating to bring about the downfall of metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without metaphysics -- like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies. Theology, which in former times was the guardian of the speculative mysteries and of metaphysics (although this was subordinate to it) had given up this science in exchange for feelings, for what was popularly matter-of-fact, and for historical erudition. In keeping with this change, there vanished from the world those solitary souls who were sacrificed by their people and exiled from the world to the end that the eternal should be contemplated and served by lives devoted solely thereto -- not for any practical gain but for the sake of blessedness; a disappearance which, in another context, can be regarded as essentially the same phenomenon as that previously mentioned. So that having got rid of the dark utterances of metaphysics, of the colourless communion of the spirit with itself, outer existence seemed to be transformed into the bright world of flowers -- and there are no black flowers [there are now! -- RL], as we know." [Hegel (1999), pp.25-26, §§2-3. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged. Minor typo corrected; I have informed the on-line editors.]

Of course, modern metaphysicians would laugh at Hegel's question "Where is now to be heard?", because Metaphysics (as it has traditionally been conceived) has returned with a vengeance since the 1970s and is, alas, alive and well and is currently being practiced in a University or College near you.

Independently of that, we have also seen that Hegel was the main source of the slippery reasoning (in 'dialectical thought') with which a reader has to wrestle time and again, the sort that 'allows' those who dote of this way of 'thinking' to ignore the contradictions and equivocations in their own theory while pointing fingers at others for the very same alleged misdemeanours and transgressions. [I have said much more about this Dialectical Character Defect in Essay Eleven Part One, as well as here.]

Nevertheless, Cornforth [in Cornforth (1950)], who should know better, offered his readers two main arguments that attempted to counter the standard view of Metaphysics (adopted in this Essay):

(1) He claims that the characterisation of Metaphysics current in the early 1950s originated with John Locke (p.94), even though he had already pointed out that the term was actually coined by Aristotle -- although Aristotle used the term differently (p.93). [And it also seems to be inconsistent with Hegel's depiction of Metaphysics, outlined above.] Cornforth made this connection because he wanted to argue that modern Philosophers reject Aristotle's search for the "essential nature of the real" (p.94), thereby deliberately running-together the ideas of contemporaneous Positivists he was attacking with the views of every modern (non-Communist) Philosopher! That conflation 'allowed' him to characterise 'the Positivist understanding of Metaphysics' as if it were held by every single non-Communist Philosopher.

First of all, even when Cornforth was writing this, only a tiny minority of Analytic Philosophers (never mind the rest of the profession) were Positivists, so this can't be a valid reason for rejecting the standard interpretation handed down from those who first commented on Aristotle (which is where and when the word "metaphysics" began to assume its traditional meaning). And that can't be a good reason either for present-day Dialectical Marxists to continue rejecting the (accepted) interpretation (which is also promoted at this site) that in no way depends on Locke. [Although Cornforth is right when he says that Empiricism and Positivism are both metaphysical; but then so is DM!]

Second, even if every (non-communist) Philosopher on the planet (in and around 1950) had been a card-carrying, died-in-the-wool Positivist, it is clear that they would still have rejected Metaphysics because, as Positivists, they accepted the traditional view of Metaphysics, which itself stretches way back beyond Locke. Cornforth just asserts the (assumed) fact that these Philosophers could trace their understanding of this word (i.e., "metaphysics") back to Locke, and no further; but he provides us with no evidence that that is so. Not even one citation! Anyone who studies work published by the Positivists, or even the Logical Positivists, will see that they weren't just hung up about the nature of "substance" (which term Cornforth focuses on simply because of what Locke had to say about it), but over all areas of Traditional Metaphysics. [On that, see below.]

[A good place to start here is Ayer (2001) -- this links to a PDF -- which is an excellent representative of The Simplistic, Entry-Level Wing of Logical Positivism. A more substantial alternative is Carnap (1950). See also Carnap (1931) -- 'The Elimination Of Metaphysics Through The Logical Analysis Of Language' (this also links to a PDF). More reliable accounts of this (now) obsolete current in Analytic Philosophy can be found, for example, in the following: Copleston (2003b), Friedman (1999), Hacker (2000c), Hanfling (1981), Misak (1995), and Passmore (1966). See also, Conant (2001). I would recommend Soames (2003a, 2003b), here, but Soames is a highly unreliable commentator on Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy. On that, see Hacker (2006) (this also links to a PDF).]

"Such an attempt, however, to define 'metaphysics' in terms of its subject-matter, is hardly satisfactory. For in a sense all science, as well as philosophy, is concerned with the substance of things and with the nature of the world. If, then, to speak of the substance of things and the nature of the world is 'metaphysical', then science itself has a 'metaphysical' tendency." [Cornforth (1950), p.94. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

Without doubt, metaphysical ideas have dominated much of the history of science, but, as Cornforth should know, that is because "the ideas of the ruling-class always rule". And yet, except in relation to popularisations, science has progressively distanced itself from the influence of metaphysics, especially in areas where an interface with the material world becomes paramount (for instance, in Chemistry, Geology, much of Biology, most of Physics -- and, of course, Technology). [Why that is so will be covered in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

Even so, Cornforth's argument still depends on the unsupported claim that Metaphysics is as he says Positivists say it is.

Anyway, Cornforth is being disingenuous here, for DM itself goes way beyond modern science in seeking to pontificate, for example, about motion, telling us that it is a "mode of the existence of matter", or that it is "contradictory" -- or, indeed, about "motion itself", the "essence of Being" ("Thing-in-Itself"), the "interpenetration of opposites", the "negation of the negation", and so on. These vague and dubious 'concepts' certainly fit the traditional, standard definition of Metaphysics.

Admittedly, the precise boundary between Metaphysics and Science might be hard to define, but that doesn't mean there is no difference between the two. There is a difference between night and day even though the boundary between them is impossible to delineate. [Again, I will say more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.] But that doesn't prevent us talking about daylight at 12 noon on a cloudless day in high summer!

These appear to be the only two substantive arguments Cornforth had to offer in support of his rejection of the traditional definition of Metaphysics (even though he had much else to say about Analytic Philosophy -- most of which is highly misleading -- in the above book and other publications, aspects of which will be examined elsewhere at this site), and thus in favour of his adoption of the reconfigured meaning he appropriated from Hegel and Engels [Cornforth (1950), pp.95-98]. Oddly enough, Cornforth doesn't reveal from whom Engels obtained this idea. But, it is quite clear that all three had to modify considerably the meaning of "metaphysics" to make their fanciful ideas 'work' --, plainly in their vain attempt to distinguish, and thereby distance, Metaphysics from DM [Cornforth (1950), pp.98-101]. This is, of course, just another classic example of the special pleading and use of persuasive definitions, by means of which DM-fans try to sell their idiosyncratic and confused doctrines.

Of course, all this is independent of Marx's own characterisation of Metaphysics. For example, in The Poverty of Philosophy, he had this to say:

"We shall now have to talk metaphysics while talking political economy. And in this again we shall but follow M. Proudhon's 'contradictions.' Just now he forced us to speak English, to become pretty well English ourselves. Now the scene is changing. M. Proudhon is transporting us to our dear fatherland and is forcing us, whether we like it or not, to become German again. If the Englishman transforms men into hats, the German transforms hats into ideas. The Englishman is Ricardo, rich banker and distinguished economist; the German is Hegel, simple professor at the University of Berlin. Louis XV, the last absolute monarch and representative of the decadence of French royalty, had attached to his person a physician who was himself France's first economist. This doctor, this economist, represented the imminent and certain triumph of the French bourgeoisie. Doctor Quesnay made a science out of political economy; he summarized it in his famous Tableau économique. Besides the thousand and one commentaries on this table which have appeared, we possess one by the doctor himself. It is the 'Analysis of the Economic Table,' followed by 'seven important observations.' M. Proudhon is another Dr. Quesnay. He is the Quesnay of the metaphysics of political economy. Now metaphysics -- indeed all philosophy -- can be summed up, according to Hegel, in method. We must, therefore, try to elucidate the method of M. Proudhon, which is at least as foggy as the Economic Table. It is for this reason that we are making seven more or less important observations. If Dr. Proudhon is not pleased with our observations, well, then, he will have to become an Abbé Baudeau and give the 'explanation of the economico-metaphysical method' himself.... Apply this method to the categories of political economy and you have the logic and metaphysics of political economy, or, in other words, you have the economic categories that everybody knows, translated into a little-known language which makes them look as if they had never blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason; so much do these categories seem to engender one another, to be linked up and intertwined with one another by the very working of the dialectic movement. The reader must not get alarmed at these metaphysics with all their scaffolding of categories, groups, series, and systems. M. Proudhon, in spite of all the trouble he has taken to scale the heights of the system of contradictions, has never been able to raise himself above the first two rungs of simple thesis and antithesis; and even these he has mounted only twice, and on one of these two occasions he fell over backwards." [Marx (1976a), pp.161-65. Bold emphasis and links alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged. I have used the on-line version here, but have also corrected what few typos I managed to spot.]

As seems clear from the above, Marx doesn't appear to agree with Engels over the nature of Metaphysics, clearly linking it with "dialectics" (albeit the 'dialectical method' Proudhon extracted from Hegel's work).

Be this as it may, I don't want to get hung up over a terminological point, so I recommend that anyone who objects to the usual definition of Metaphysics -- or even the phrase often used at this site, "Traditional Philosophy" --, preferring perhaps Engels's own characterisation, that they substitute for it the following:

"[T]he branch of philosophy concerned with explaining the ultimate nature of reality, being, and the world."

The above is a very brief definition of Metaphysics we find over at Wikipedia, which is, I think, reasonably accurate, if a little terse. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, on the other hand, is a little more expansive and specific:

"Metaphysics, most generally the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality. It is broader in scope than science..., since one of its traditional concerns is the existence of non-physical entities, e.g., God. It is also more fundamental, since it investigates questions science does not address but the answers to which it presupposes. Are there, for instance, physical objects at all, and does every event have a cause?" [Butchvarov (1999), p.563.]

"If metaphysics now considers a wider range of problems than those studied in Aristotle's Metaphysics, those problems continue to belong to its subject-matter. For instance, the topic of 'being as such' (and 'existence as such', if existence is something other than being) is one of the matters that belong to metaphysics on any conception of metaphysics. The following theses are all paradigmatically metaphysical: 'Being is; not-being is not' [Parmenides]; 'Essence precedes existence' [Avicenna, paraphrased]; 'Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone' [St Anselm, paraphrased]; 'Existence is a perfection' [Descartes, paraphrased]; 'Being is a logical, not a real predicate' [Kant, paraphrased]; 'Being is the most barren and abstract of all categories' [Hegel, paraphrased]; 'Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number zero' [Frege]; 'Universals do not exist but rather subsist or have being' [Russell, paraphrased]; 'To be is to be the value of a bound variable' [Quine]; 'An object's degree of being is proportionate to the naturalness of its mode of existence' [McDaniel]." [Inwagen, Sullivan and Bernstein (2023). Italic emphases in the original. Links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"Metaphysics is the exploration of the most general features of the world. We conceive of the world about us in various highly general ways. It is orderly, and structured in space and time; it contains matter and minds, things and properties of things, necessity, events, causation, creation, change, values, facts and states of affairs. Metaphysics seeks to understand these features of the world better. It aims at a large-scale investigation of the way things hang together. Within this broad description there are two conceptions of the subject. Metaphysicians may think of themselves as investigating the facts, or discovering the broad structures of reality. Or, they may see the enterprise as more self-reflective, gaining an understanding of how we represent the facts to ourselves: how our 'conceptual scheme' or perhaps any possible conceptual scheme, structures our own thought about reality. Once this description is completed, it may be that everything possible has been done, for we have no alternative but to continue to think from within the conceptual scheme whose features we have mapped." [Blackburn (1996), p.64; (2003), p.61.]

"1. What are the most general features of the World, and what sorts of things does it contain? What is the World like?

"3. What is our place in the World? How do we human beings fit into it?" [Van Inwagen (2015), p.4. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"Philosophers of all stripes have theories to offer, for better or worse.... Theories in philosophy, whether good or bad, aim to explain something, to answer certain explanation-seeking questions.... What is being? What is thinking? What is knowledge? What are we?.... Rare is the philosopher with no theory whatsoever to offer. Such would be a philosopher without a philosophy...." [Moser (1993), p.3. I owe this reference to Hutto (2003), pp.194-95.]

Here is another characterisation of Metaphysics taken from a comprehensive textbook entirely devoted to this topic, followed by Robin Le Poidevin's lengthier definition:

"Metaphysics is sometimes described as the study of reality, but the sciences also study (parts of) reality, so what is distinctive about metaphysics? One way of distinguishing metaphysics from science is by pointing to the level of generality in metaphysical discussion. Physics, for instance, concerns itself with particular processes, laws and entities: the conversion of one energy form into another, the laws of motion or thermodynamics, protons, neutrons and quarks. Metaphysics operates at a higher level of abstraction, and looks at those features the particular processes or entities might have in common: causal connection, taking place or existing in space and time, or being composed of matter. This distinction is not as sharp as one might suppose, however, since physics too has to deal in abstractions, and cosmology, for instance, is concerned with the nature of space and time themselves, and not just what takes place in them. Metaphysics is also interested, as physics is not, by what it is to be real. Is there anything informative we can say about the distinction between what is real, or existent, and what is not? Are there general principles that govern the whole of reality (for instance, that everything that exists must have a cause of its existence)? Having reached a view on what it is to be real -- perhaps that the character of reality is (unlike fiction) independent of our beliefs -- we may be in a better position to say what is real: that is, to catalogue, in the most abstract terms, those things that are real. Our list may include such familiar entities as persons and material objects, but it may also include items very different from these, such as numbers. The part of metaphysics that is concerned with what exists is known as ontology.... We might wonder whether there could be anything to metaphysics other than ontology, and indeed ontology does seem to be a large part of the metaphysical enterprise. But metaphysics is concerned not just with what is, but also with the way that it is. Objects do not merely exist: they have certain features. A building may be octagonal, a leaf brown, a bird in motion, and so on. Simply to list the things that are (even where 'things' is used in its widest sense) does not capture the way things are. Of course, recognising that things have features may itself lead us to expand our ontology to include properties as well as the things that have those properties. And we may have to allow not only the individual property instances but also what is common to those instances, the property types. Does this show that saying how things are just amounts, after all, to saying what there is? No, because listing all the objects and properties that exist is consistent with any number of different allocations of those properties to those objects. So something has to be said about what relates a property to an object, by virtue of which the object can truly be said to have that property." [Le Poidevin (2009), pp.xviii-xix. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

The above are all academic Philosophers, but, finally, here is fellow Marxist, Dario Cankovic's characterisation of 'Western Philosophy' (with whom I largely agree):

"Philosophy, at least in the Western tradition (and this includes Islamic philosophy which is a direct continuation of the tradition of Late Classical-era philosophy), goes through two-phases. The first metaphysical pre-Kantian phase of philosophy conceives of its activity as investigation of the mind-independent necessary metaphysical structure of the world. The second transcendental Kantian phase conceives of its activity as investigation of the mind-constitutive world-constituting necessary transcendental structure or structuring principles of thought itself. While Kant's Copernican revolution is certainly a revolution in philosophy, insofar as in trying to render philosophy scientific it radically changes the way philosophy is done, it doesn't represent a complete break with philosophy. Philosophy remains an effort to understand the world and ourselves a priori. Furthermore, both conceive of the objects of their investigation, whether metaphysical or transcendental, as necessary and immutable, as ahistorical or transhistorical, without or outside of history. Self-conceptions of philosophers aside, philosophy is not a transhistorical category, it is a human activity and a body of theories with a history. It is conceptual investigation and invention born out of a fascination with and misunderstanding of necessity. It is decidedly pre-scientific in that it is an attempt to understand nature, ourselves and our place in it through the lens of language, though not self-consciously so. This fascination and misunderstanding is a consequence of our alienation from our collective agency. While humanity shapes and is shaped by nature and our concepts, this collective capacity doesn't extend to individual human beings. We create concepts in an never-ending exchange with nature, but you and I as individual human beings are inducted into a community of language-users of an already formed language and brought forth into an already reformed world. We -- collectively and individually -- we are ignorant of our own history." [Quoted from here. (Unfortunately, this link is now dead!) Italics in the original. Minor typo corrected; links and bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged. The rest of this article is an excellent antidote to the widely-held belief that Marx was a philosopher. Update, June 2025: I have just found out that this article, which is really an interview, has been republished here.]

Even so, whatever this ancient intellectual pursuit is finally called, it is abundantly clear that DM-theorists attempt to do some of the above themselves --, i.e., they endeavour to "explain the ultimate nature of reality, being and the world" in their own idiosyncratic, dogmatic, sub-Hegelian fashion. They also ask and attempt to answer the same sort of questions along similar lines -- albeit with a view to changing the world. Indeed, they have adopted much the same approach to Philosophy as the traditional metaphysicians to whom Moser (above) alludes -- that is, they attempt to derive fundamental truths about reality from a handful of jargonised expressions, which 'truths' are then imposed on the world, many of which they claim are valid for all of space and time.

[That allegation was fully substantiated in Essay Two. Precisely how these verbal tricks work is, of course, the subject of Parts One to Seven of Essay Twelve. See also Essay Three Parts One and Two, where the logical and linguistic groundwork for much that will be argued here, in Essay Twelve, was set out.]

As far as the attempt to define Metaphysics as the study of things that don't change, this is what the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy had to say:

"Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its subject matter: metaphysics was the 'science' that studied 'being as such' or 'the first causes of things' or 'things that do not change.' It is no longer possible to define metaphysics that way, and for two reasons. First, a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics -- first causes or unchanging things -- would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion. Secondly, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no way related to first causes or unchanging things; the problem of free will, for example, or the problem of the mental and the physical." [Inwagen, Sullivan and Bernstein (2023). Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphasis added.]

[A useful (and thoroughly traditional) account of the nature of Metaphysics can be found in Aune (1986) and Van Inwagen (1998, 2015), with a much more comprehensive survey in Koons and Pickavance (2017). But there are countless books and articles that cover the same ground. For a useful survey of attempts to define Metaphysics, see Moore (2013), pp.1-22 -- although, it is revealing that philosophers can't even agree among themselves what this word means, as the passages quoted earlier amply confirm! As the above material suggests, the definition of Metaphysics is a metaphysical problem itself!]

This underlines what I posted on Quora recently, in answer to the question: "Where should I begin if I want to study Philosophy?" (slightly edited):

First, dial down your expectations. Not one single 'philosophical problem' posed by Ancient Greek thinkers (or any others since) has been solved, or even remotely solved. Nor are they likely to be. After 2500 years of this, we don't even know the right questions to ask, for goodness sake! As Oxford University Philosopher, Peter Hacker, noted:

"For two and a half millennia some of the best minds in European culture have wrestled with the problems of philosophy. If one were to ask what knowledge has been achieved throughout these twenty-five centuries, what theories have been established (on the model of well-confirmed theories in the natural sciences), what laws have been discovered (on the model of the laws of physics and chemistry), or where one can find the corpus of philosophical propositions known to be true, silence must surely ensue. For there is no body of philosophical knowledge. There are no well-established philosophical theories or laws. And there are no philosophical handbooks on the model of handbooks of dynamics or of biochemistry. To be sure, it is tempting for contemporary philosophers, convinced they are hot on the trail of the truths and theories which so long evaded the grasp of their forefathers, to claim that philosophy has only just struggled out of its early stage into maturity.... We can at long last expect a flood of new, startling and satisfying results -- tomorrow. One can blow the Last Trumpet once, not once a century. In the seventeenth century Descartes thought he had discovered the definitive method for attaining philosophical truths; in the eighteenth century Kant believed that he had set metaphysics upon the true path of a science; in the nineteenth century Hegel convinced himself that he had brought the history of thought to its culmination; and Russell, early in the twentieth century, claimed that he had at last found the correct scientific method in philosophy, which would assure the subject the kind of steady progress that is attained by the natural sciences. One may well harbour doubts about further millenarian promises." [Hacker (2001c), pp.322-23. Paragraphs merged.]

Second, begin with Bertrand Russell's Problems of Philosophy, which as about as good an introduction to Traditional Philosophy as you could wish to find -- which is also well written. Then, perhaps read some of the more accessible 'classics', such Descartes's Meditations, or his Discourse, Hume's Enquiries, Berkeley's Three Dialogues, Plato's Republic, or his Meno (Aristotle is, alas, far too difficult!), Kant's Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics -- steer clear of Hegel (who is impossibly difficult). All of these (except Hacker) -- and much more besides -- are available here: http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/philclassics.html

Traditionally Philosophy has been regarded as a sort of 'super-science', a discipline capable of revealing fundamental truths about 'reality', valid for all of space and time, ascertainable from thought, or from language, alone -- or, indeed, as some sort of uniquely authoritative moral or political guide, or perhaps even a clue to the 'meaning of life'. But it isn't like any science you have ever heard of. Traditional Philosophers typically spend a few hours in the comfort of their own heads -- by-passing all those boring observations and experiments, with their expensive equipment and a requirement that the individual concerned becomes technically competent --, and, hey presto, they emerge with a set of super-cosmic verities. This isn't to deny that some philosophers engaged in empirical work -- for example, Aristotle -- but that wasn't a core aspect of their work. Moreover, the sciences have gradually freed themselves from Traditional Philosophy by subjecting their work to empirical test (howsoever one interprets this). Nor is it to deny that scientists don't indulge in amateur metaphysics (especially in their popularisations), speculating about the nature of space or time, for example: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/

But, Traditional Philosophy is quintessentially a 'conceptual enquiry', which, directly or indirectly, revolves around what certain words mean (such as, 'time', 'space', 'matter', 'knowledge', 'belief', 'existence', 'identity', 'meaning', 'language', 'causation', 'justice', 'freedom', 'fate', 'good', 'evil', 'god', 'soul', etc., etc.), but this is in fact provides us with a clue to its fatal defects, and why it hasn't advanced one nanometre closer to a 'solution' to its 'problems' than Plato or Aristotle themselves managed.

[The deflationary approach to Metaphysics adopted at this site is discussed in more detail in Baker (2004b) and Rorty (1980) -- however, concerning Rorty's work, readers should register the caveats highlighted here.]

Incidentally, the ideas presented in this Essay shouldn't be confused with those developed by the Logical Positivists (henceforth, LP-ers) -- although there are several superficial similarities -- but 'only at the margins', as it were -- for example, several of those expressed in Ayer (2001), pp.1-29. [This links to a PDF.]

Even so, the difference between my ideas and those expressed by LP-ers is nevertheless profound. For instance, I am not offering a criterion of meaning (in fact, in this Essay, I hardly mention this term (i.e., "meaning") as LP-ers conceived of it. Moreover, and by way of contrast, I begin with how we ordinarily understand empirical or factual propositions, and to that end I use a term Wittgenstein introduced, "sense", to capture it. So, the approach adopted here reveals that the LP-ers framed this question the wrong way round; it is our grasp of the sense of a proposition that enables us to determine whether or not it is capable of being verified or falsified, not the reverse. As I frequently point out, if we didn't already understand a given proposition, we wouldn't be able to verify/falsify it, or, for that matter, know whether or not it is capable of being verified/falsified -- or even know how to go about doing either! How could anyone even try to verify a proposition they failed to understand? Finally, "meaning" is a highly complex term that was grossly oversimplified by the LP-ers. [I will say more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Three; see also here, and Interlude Seven.]

In that case, verification (at least as the LP-ers understood it) can't be a fundamental, or even a significant, factor in connection with our ordinary use of factual language. So, even though The Verification Principle has now been totally abandoned, its defects (real or imagined) have absolutely nothing to do with the ideas expressed in this Essay, or at this site.

More-or-less the same can be said about 'falsification', especially in relation to science -- indeed, will be said in Essay Thirteen Part Two.

[MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, i.e., Lenin (1972); DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; FL = Formal Logic.]

Returning to the main feature (i.e., concerning the DM-theory of matter and motion): What is peculiar about sentences like M1/M1a is that they purport to inform us of fundamental truths about 'reality', valid for all of space and time, albeit in this case expressed in terms of Engels and Lenin's seeming incredulity.

M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972), p.318. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Despite this we aren't meant to conclude from M1a that Engels and Lenin were merely recording their own personal preferences, beliefs, or opinions. On the contrary, they certainly thought that matter and motion were 'fundamental features of reality', that they were inseparable (even in thought -- whatever that means!) and that M1a was a scientific, or maybe even a 'philosophically objective' truth/law. Plainly, that itself was because they both accepted the background theory that motion was "the mode of the existence of matter" (what I have later labelled as P4) -– that is, they believed that matter couldn't exist without motion, nor vice versa. Motion was therefore one of the principal ways, if not the principle way, that matter expressed itself "objectively" exterior to the mind.¹

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]

"Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking." [Engels (1954), p.69. Bold emphasis added.]²

In that case, the 'content' of M1a may perhaps be paraphrased in one or more of the following ways:

[The word "content" is in 'scare' quotes for reasons that will become clear later on in this Essay.]

P1, P2 and P3 can also be read as follows (where the words "matter" and "motion" have swapped places):

[Such a swap is possible because of the intimate connection between matter and motion, indicating that, for Lenin and Engels, these two concepts/words can't be prised apart, no more than "three" and "number" can.]

In what follows, I will treat P1, P2 and P3 as the equivalent of P1a, P2a and P3a, respectively; so what I have to say about the former set of sentences also applies to the latter (unless otherwise indicated). Having said that, there is a logical and rhetorical difference between these two sets of sentences which I propose to ignore. Not much hangs on such differences, as I trust the reader will agree. Anyway, Lenin appears to treat his version(s) of them as equivalent in the chapter of MEC where he covers this topic in detail: Chapter 5.3 -- for example:

[There will be further discussion of these and other possible alternatives later in this Essay.]

The metaphysical nature of Lenin's pronouncement (in M1a) can be seen by the way it bypasses the need for any supporting evidence.

[That assertion might itself seem the be somewhat dogmatic, if not entirely perverse. It, too, will be tackled below; for example in Note 4, Note 5 and Note 5a.]

In addition, even if we were to accept Engels's re-definition of metaphysics, what both he and Lenin had to say about matter and motion presents the reader with (shock! horror!) a "rigid dichotomy" since it represents a clear demarcation between what is and what isn't matter. There is no third option here for something 'to be and not to be matter' (i.e., if, for instance, it doesn't move, or it 'moves and does not move!'). Given their words, there would be a clear answer to the question "Is this matter or is it not?" If it moves external to the mind it is matter, if it doesn't, it isn't -- since, for them, all things ('extra-mental') either move or they do not. And it won't do to reply that according to DM everything moves (so there is no other option to choose here!), since, even if that were the case (and there are good reasons to suppose it isn't -- on that see Essay Five), all that such a response will have done is provide a reply to the question "Does everything move or does it not?" DM-theorists' simply reply, "Everything does move". They readily choose that option over the other. Not one of them will follow Engels and reply that everything does and doesn't move -- which they should do if they reject the 'either-or' of FL and 'metaphysical commonsense'! In connection with this inconvenient 'either-or', for them there is plainly only one option.

"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.] For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

DM is based on this rigid theory -- i.e., that there is only matter in motion (with a few 'dialectical' flourishes thrown in for good measure) -- and on the fact that its theorists (in this respect, at least) reject any and all alternatives. Plainly, this means that for them "positive and negative absolutely [do] exclude one another" -- which they automatically apply by excluding stationary matter as "unthinkable"!

Hence, even for Lenin and Engels, sentences like these are metaphysical -- but I am sure they'd rather have their all teeth pulled than have to admit it!

So, for both of the above, P4 stands out as an obvious, incontestable truth concerning the connection between matter and motion that its denial is described as "unthinkable".

Nevertheless, if humanity had access to evidence and information about motion and matter many orders of magnitude greater than is available even today (never mind in Lenin's day!), that still wouldn't be enough to show that the separation of matter from motion is impossible, let alone unthinkable. No amount of data could warrant such an extreme view. While it might in the end prove to be false that the two can be separated (but who can say?), its "unthinkability" can't be derived from any body of evidence, no matter how large it happens to be. As, indeed, Engels himself admitted:

So, according to Engels, evidence alone can't supply the necessity, the inconceivability, or even the unthinkability that M1a seems to take for granted.

[Should any of my readers disagree, then they might like to contact me with the sort of evidence that would show 'motionless matter' is indeed "unthinkable".]

If evidence can't supply the necessity here, the following question forces itself on us: From where and from what does this proscription (i.e., M1a) arise?

"This aspect of dialectics…usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum total of examples…and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin (1961), p.357. Bold emphasis alone added.]

Be this as it may, the above claims (i.e., about the metaphysical nature of DM-'propositions' like this, and the lack of conclusive evidential support -- or, in some cases, any evidential support) might strike some readers as rather controversial, if not completely misguided. In that case, much of the rest of this Essay will be aimed at explaining, defending and substantiating them.

[Why the word "propositions" has been put in 'scare' quotes will also become clear as this Essay unfolds.]

The seemingly profound nature of sentences like M1a is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed; that is, it is connected with the fact that their main verb is often in the indicative mood. [Sometimes subjunctive or modal qualifying terms -- such as "must", "can't" or "necessary" -- are thrown in for good measure, which only succeeds in creating an even more misleading impression.]

As we are about to discover, this superficial (indicative) veneer hides a much deeper logical form that only becomes apparent when such sentences are examined a little more closely.

As noted above, expressions like these look as if they reveal, or express, profound truths about 'reality'. Plainly that is because they resemble empirical propositions -- i.e., they look like sentences that genuinely express matters of fact (e.g., M6 or M6f, below), concerning the truth or falsehood of which evidential support is relevant. As we are about to find out, sentences like P4 and M1a are nothing like them.

M2-M9 appear to share the same form: "ξ is F" -- or, sometimes "ξ is a φ-er" (or perhaps more accurately "ξ φ-ies").

[The use of Greek letters (e.g., "ξ") as gap markers was explained in Essay Three Part One (here and here). "F(...)" is a general predicate variable (which can go proxy for clauses like "...is a colour", or "...is short", etc.), while "φ(...)" is a more specific variable (standing for a verb phrase or clause like "...owns a copy of TAR", "...fibs more often than not", "...runs tens miles at least four times a week", or possibly even "...thinks something is unthinkable", etc., etc.). In what follows, when I refer to logical differences, I generally have in mind features of indicative sentences that affect their capacity to be true or their capacity to be false --, or, indeed, those that are relevant to the inferences we can validly draw from, with, or by means of, them.]

The logical difference that is of interest here (between, for instance, M6 and M2) lies in the fact that claiming to understand M2 seems to go hand-in-hand with knowing it is true. Truth and comprehension appear to be inextricably linked in such cases.

[Some might even call M2 a definition; but, either way, that sentence purports to establish, or express, the meaning of the word "two". It is important to keep that in mind as this Essay unfolds. It is also worth adding that the above remarks do not represent my views; I am simply rehearsing what might appear to be the case with M2 before it is subjected to the sort of analysis steadily being applied throughout in this Essay. Readers are directed to the caveat I have added to Note 3a.]^3a

Hence, any claim to be able to comprehend M2 seems to be at one with knowing it is true; anyone who failed to see things the way they are expressed in M2 would be judged not to have understood the use or the meaning of number words (or, at least this particular number word!).

Compare that with M6: in order to claim to understand M6 it isn't necessary to know whether it is true or know whether it is false. Indeed, it is a pretty safe bet that everyone reading this Essay will understand M6 even though they haven't a clue whether or not it is true. Hence, unlike M2, the comprehension of M6 isn't the same as knowing it is true. Nothing in M6 defines the meaning of the words it uses, unlike M2.

[It is also worth keeping that in mind as this Essay unfolds. In future, I will omit the prefixing clauses "claim to", "claiming to", "seems to", "appears to" (etc.. etc.) in contexts like these, but in what follows they should be understood to be applicable where relevant, unless otherwise stated.]

Nevertheless, knowing what would make M6 true or would make it false is integral to understanding that sentence even if neither option has been ascertained, or, indeed, will ever be ascertained. Again, it is a pretty safe bet that everyone reading this Essay will be able to say what would make M6 true and what would make it false, even if they have no idea which of those options is actually the case. Furthermore, they will still understand M6 even if they never find out whether it is true or whether it is false, nor care a fig about ascertaining either alternative.

[The significance of those comments will also become apparent as this Essay unfolds -- for instance, here.]

So, it isn't necessary to know whether Blair in fact owns a copy of TAR to be able to understand any sentence that could be used to say that he does. In contrast, comprehending that two is a number is to know it is true (except with respect to a handful of trivial cases, about which more later).

M9 (which is, perhaps, a more 'objective' version of M1a -- since it removes any reference to what a human could or couldn't comprehend) is somewhat similar to M2. For Lenin (and anyone who agrees with him), understanding M9 involves automatically acknowledging its veracity. The truth-status of sentences like M9 seems to follow from the 'concepts' they express (or the definitions upon which they depend, in this case P4). That is why their (supposed) veracity can be acknowledged without examining any evidence. Their truth-status appears to be based solely on language or thought -- or, perhaps even (exclusively) on a "law of cognition".⁴

Or, as pointed out above, the truth of M1a follows from a specific definition, such as:

In that case, the truth of M9 seems to be based solely on the meaning of certain words (or on their definitions) -- those in P4.

Hence, with respect to M2 and M9, meaning and 'truth' appear to go hand-in-hand, to such an extent that as soon as their constituent words have been comprehended (or 'cognised'), their 'truth' becomes obvious, if not "self-evident". The source of their veracity is 'internally generated', as it were. Indeed, that is why the negation, or the repudiation, of M9 (or the rejection of its (presumed) content -- which is expressed, for example, in P1, P2 or P3) was so "unthinkable" for Lenin and Engels. Plainly, their overt certainty followed from the definition (expressed in P4), that "Motion is the mode of the existence of matter". Hence, P4 seems to be the core idea, the bedrock principle that Lenin and Engels considered integral to the nature of, and the connection between, matter and motion. That helps explain why they asserted it so dogmatically, why Engels declared its opposite "nonsensical" and Lenin pronounced that opposite, "unthinkable".⁵

In stark contrast, once more, it is possible to understand M6 without knowing whether it is true or whether it is false.^5a0

In fact, it is quite easy to suppose M6 is actually false (which it probably is). Even if M6 were true, and known to be true, it would still be possible to imagine it to be false (and vice versa) without affecting the meaning of any of its words. But, it isn't possible to imagine that M2 is false without altering (or challenging) the meaning of its key words. Anyone who rejected the 'truth' of M2 would, ipso facto, be questioning the (accepted) meaning of "two" or "number" -- or perhaps even both. In like manner: for those who agree with Lenin and Engels, the same is the case with M9 and P4. Anyone who questioned their truth would reveal they either failed to comprehend "matter" and/or "motion" (as Lenin and Engels understood those terms), or they meant something different by their use of them. Hence, questioning their 'truth' has a direct affect on meaning. [Why that is so will be explained below. Why the word "truth" has been put in 'scare' quotes (in connection with such sentences) will also be explained later in this Essay.]

The actual, or even possible, falsehood of M6, on the other hand, would in no way threaten, undermine, alter or challenge the meaning of any of its constituent words. So, if M6 turns out to be false, that wouldn't affect the meaning of any of its words. Here, truth isn't directly connected with meaning.

[Later on that sweeping statement will be qualified somewhat in connection with what are often called "patent truths", etc.]

Despite this, in order to establish the actual truth or the actual falsehood of M6, evidence isn't an optional extra. Examination of the concepts or words used in that sentence (and nothing else) wouldn't be enough. No matter how much 'pure thought' was devoted to M6, it would still be impossible to ascertain its truth or determine its falsehood. So, the veracity (or otherwise) of M6 can't be established by thought alone; its truth-status isn't 'internally generated' -- i.e., solely from meaning -- but 'externally' confirmed or disconfirmed (as the case may be). Hence, an appeal to evidence is essential with such sentences.

That condition is itself connected with the earlier statement that the truth or the falsehood of sentences like M6 in no way affects the meaning of their words. Since the direct link between meaning and truth is absent here, the truth or the falsehood of M6 can't be derived from pure thought, or solely from meaning.

However, the opposite is the case with sentences like M1a, M9 and P4. The direct connection between meaning and 'truth', in relation to such sentences, means that it isn't possible for anyone who agrees with Lenin and Engels to regard, suppose, surmise, imagine or even entertain the idea that one or both of M9 and P4 are false. That would be to challenge the already accepted meanings of key terms (at least as far as Engels and Lenin saw things).

This shows that there is a fundamental difference between these two types of indicative sentence, one that their apparently identical grammatical form conceals.

As it turns out, the pseudo-scientific status and much of the 'plausibility' of metaphysical (or, so-called "essential"/"necessary truths") like M9 and P4 derive directly from this linguistic masquerade (for want of a better term).

In that case, it looks like the obviousness of M9, for example, is what motivated Lenin's incredulity (reported in M1a), since it certainly seemed to him that as soon as the words in M9 were read, heard or thought the truth of that sentence would become clear -- and to such an extent that its opposite would indeed be "unthinkable". For Lenin, meaning and truth (at least in relation to these sentences) were directly connected.

[The objection that M1a and M9 in fact express a summary of the scientific evidence contemporaneously available -- or even the evidence that is now extant -- has been dealt with in Note 4, Note 5 and Note 5a.]

So, for Lenin, the first half of M1a is "unthinkable" (i.e., the "Motion without matter..." part, when put in a sentential context). As we will see, that is because its denial would in effect undermine (or, at least, challenge) the meaning of words like "motion" and "matter", and hence would countermand the (accepted) interpretation of the concepts that those words supposedly express (again, when put in sentential form). Inferences like this are based on a core definition of "motion" -- that it is "The mode of the existence of matter" (P4). In addition, this would imply that anyone who questioned the veracity of P4 had simply failed to understand the words/concepts "matter" and "motion". This would be a far more serious mistake than an evidential error would be (i.e., getting the facts wrong or misreading an instrument, for example). It would represent or reveal an error of comprehension, or even a failure of linguistic competency.

[Why a sentential context is essential in such cases will also be explained below.]

This is also why, for Lenin and Engels, any attempt to reject M9, P1 and P4 could be ruled out without the need to examine evidence -- why it could be repudiated immediately and out-of-hand. What these sentences say supposedly gains our assent on linguistic or conceptual grounds alone. In that case, it now seems impossible to reject their truth without having to admit an intellectual, not a factual, error. Such a denial would be inconceivable -- or, as Lenin himself said, it would be "unthinkable". That is also why claims like M1a (i.e., P1 and M9) require no evidence at all in their support, and why none is ever given (again, on that, check out the above three links), and why it is difficult to imagine any evidence that could even begin to substantiate them.^5a

This means that in connection with the truth of sentences like M1a, P1, P4 and M9 the actual state of the world drops out of the picture as irrelevant. That is why no experiments need be performed, no data collected, no observations planned or carried out, and zero surveys conducted -- which is why none have ever been suggested by DM-supporters aimed at establishing the veracity of sentences like M1a or P4.^5b

That alone should have given someone like Lenin -- who wasn't ignorant of the scientific method -- pause for thought. Unfortunately, like so many others before him -- indeed, just like the vast majority of theorists since Ancient Greek times -- he failed to notice the significance of these seemingly trivial, but all-too-easily ignored, facts.⁶

The absolute certainty that M1a, M9, P4 and P1 appear to motivate in all those who accept their veracity is clearly based on what their constituent words are taken to mean. The subsequent projection of P4, for example, onto the world is simply a reflection of that certainty. If sentences like these express indubitable truths, who could possibly deny they apply across the entire universe, for all of time? That is, of course, why DM-theorists like Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin were -- and others still are -- happy to continue imposing such ideas on 'reality' (follow the next link for proof), and hence regard them as valid across all regions of space and time. What else could the scores of passages (quoted in Essay Two) drawn from the DM-classics and the rest of the 'dialectical' literature imply?

But, the alleged truth of M1a, P1, M9 -- and particularly P4 --, bears no relation to the possibilities that the material world itself presents. This can be seen from the fact that if the truth of those sentences were related to what might or might not obtain in 'reality', what might or might not be the case, evidential support would not only be appropriate (and imaginable), it would be absolutely essential. However, with respect to the aforementioned sentences, no such evidence is even conceivable. What fact or facts could possibly show that motion is inseparable from matter? Or that motion without matter is "unthinkable"? Or that motion is "The mode of existence of matter"?^6a

[Once again I ask: please let me know if you can think of any such evidence/experiments/observations. You'll be the first person in human history to do so if you rise to that challenge!]

This shows that M1a, M9, P1, and P4 aren't about the physical world around us; they are (indirectly) about (or rather they arise from) a specific use of certain words -- or, in many cases, they reflect the (assumed) relation between the 'concepts' they supposedly express.

[In fact, they indirectly 'reflect' an 'Ideal World' anterior to experience, originally invented by ruling-class theorists, who fabricated such talk back in Ancient Greece (as the rest of Essay Twelve will seek to show).

In Essay Twelve Part Four I have labelled this approach to 'philosophical knowledge' the Reverse Reflection Theory -- RRT. (Follow that link for a brief explanation.)]

It might now prove instructive to compare and contrast M1a, P1, P4, and M9 with sentences like M7 and M8:

'Propositions' like these, and countless others, litter the history of Metaphysics, but the above considerations help explain why Traditional Philosophers were only too ready to project them onto the world, dogmatically. The content of such 'Super-Truths' seemed to them to be based on something much deeper than anything empirical evidence could provide. Indeed, sentences like these (alongside many others) appeared to express indubitable, 'necessary truths' about 'God', 'The Mind', 'Essence', 'Being', 'Motion', 'Space', 'Time', 'Existence', and the like. The truth of Cosmic Verities like these was prior to, but in no way dependent on, the deliverances of the senses. In fact, theories like these were what determined the 'Logic of Reality Itself'. That is, they expressed concepts and categories that surpass (mere) human judgement, cognition and opinion. They represent or reflect the 'Logical Form of the World', and hence, for many, they gave expression to the 'Mind' or even the 'Voice of God'.

[In early modern and contemporary versions of these grandiose ideas, 'Super-Truths' supposedly delineate the nature of any and all possible worlds. Hence, they picture not just the 'Logical Form' of any conceivable world, they supplied the logical basis that underpinned any and all 'philosophically true theories about Reality Itself'.]

In previous centuries, it was believed that such Cosmic Verities expressed 'God's Thoughts', and, as such, they revealed 'divinely-ordained laws' that govern 'Being Itself', which meant that Metaphysics was widely seen as an attempt to re-present, or 're-flect', 'Divine Truth' in human 'consciousness'. This often meant that Traditional Philosophy was seen as a legitimate extension to Theology -- a point Marx himself made:⁷

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. Bold emphases added.]

In class divided society, this linked Metaphysics with the rationalisation of the status quo and the 'justification' of class rule -- and hence, the inequality, oppression and exploitation it created and helped maintain.

[There will be much more on this in Parts Two and Three of this Essay (summary here).]

This meant that if these 'Super-Truths' reflect 'The Divine Mind' -- or, indeed, the 'Cosmic Order' --, they could be dogmatically and legitimately projected onto the universe. No world was conceivable without them, so they most definitely apply to this world. Indeed, no configuration of matter or energy could fail to conform to Universal Truths like these, which meant, once again, that supporting evidence became irrelevant. If these 'Universal Truths' determined every possible world, why would evidence even be relevant? The material world itself could now effectively drop out of the picture -- at least in so far as confirmation was concerned.

[Admittedly, an after-the-event appeal to evidence might be made in order to illustrate such 'Super-Truths' -- so that they might be sold more readily to novices and the easily duped -- which is, of course, what we find DM-apologists doing, for example, in their promotion of Engels's Three 'Laws'. But that would be the only use to which any such 'evidence' would or could be put.]

As far as those who promulgated these 'Super-Truths' were concerned, they appeared to be so obvious, so certain, so indubitable that few if any were at all concerned when they were airily imposed on 'reality' over the next two millennia. On the contrary, the role that each philosophical theory was supposed to occupy (i.e., as a sort of "master key" capable of unlocking the 'Underlying Secrets of Being') readily 'justified' the whole sordid affair.

Of course, 'Super-Verities' like these had to be distinguished from ordinary, contingent, everyday, hum-drum, boring empirical truths and. of course, the 'banal' deliverances of 'commonsense'. So, because they shone a light on a 'secret world of essences' underpinning 'appearances', these 'Cosmic-Truths' were subsequently given a grandiose title; they were now re-christened, "Necessary Truths".⁸

Unfortunately, as we are about to discover -- and as Marx also pointed out -- traditional philosophical theories were (and still are) based on the misuse of language, and therefore on an aberrant distortion of that medium. The regular, double-millennium-wide projection of the 'Super Truths' that resulted from this distortion onto any and all possible worlds is ample enough confirmation of these moves. But, how else would it be feasible for theorists to specify what must be true in every possible world except by a use of language that is rooted in this corner of the universe and deliberately re-shaped to fit every single one of them? Since the semantic status of these 'Super-Truths' is 'known' prior to the examination of actual evidence, their 'necessary status' can't have been derived from anything other than the (presumed) meaning of the words they contained, and hence on the (presumed) linguistic rules that determine their employment in such highly specialised and severely restricted contexts.⁹

[Semantic status: this pertains to the truth or falsehood of indicative sentences (whether or not either option has actually been established -- always assuming it can be). Any other (possible) option -- for instance, indicative sentences that remain (permanently) truth-valueless (depending on the reason for that) -- would suggest that the sentences involved weren't empirical (or weren't even propositions), to begin with, whatever else they were. In Essay Two, several hundred examples were given of the dogmatic assertions dialecticians come out with (that are (supposedly) true for all of time and space, even though they are supported by little or no evidence, most of which had been appropriated from Hegel and other assorted Mystics).]

However, if language was to occupy such an elevated role (and be capable of expressing 'universal truths'), it had to be the sort of language that was set way above what passed as ordinary talk used by the 'unwashed masses'. It had to be a superior medium, one that had been devised by 'God Himself', one that was way beyond the capacity of ordinary folk to understand and which only a select few could 'comprehend' (or, at least, pretend to grasp). As we will see (beginning here), that is precisely how things panned out.

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

With that in mind we are now in a position to understand why, for its adherents, DM appears to possess 'universal validity', why they routinely impose it on nature and society (even while they deny they are doing just that!), and how this has helped cripple Dialectical Marxism.

As we have seen (in other Essays published at this site), DM-theories appear to possess 'universal validity' because:

(ii) Depend on a systematic mis-interpretation of linguistic rules as if they were empirical truths concerning the deep (but changing) structure of 'Reality' hidden behind 'appearances'.

In short, DM-theorists confuse the means by which we represent the world for the world itself. [This is just one aspect of the RRT -- the 'Reverse Reflection Theory' (follow that link for an explanation). The rest of this Essay (and the other Parts of Essay Twelve) are aimed at fully substantiating these seemingly controversial claims.]

Of course, Traditional Philosophers and Dialectical Marxists reject this way of describing their theories, but their opinion of how they think they use certain words is at odds with how they actually use them. Why that is so will also become clearer as this Essay and the rest of Essay Twelve unfold.

Once more, as we saw in Essay Two, while DM-theorists never tire of telling anyone who will listen that they don't impose their ideas on nature and society, they are simply 'read from the facts', their actual practice belies that disclaimer. Dialecticians, en masse, regard their doctrines as universally true, many of which are valid for all of space and time. Hence, in practice dialecticians do the exact opposite of what they say they do; they quite happily impose their ideas on the world, declaring them true prior to, and independent of, sufficient (or, in some cases, any) supporting evidence and argument. [For example, has a single one of them ever even tried to produce actual evidence, as opposed to a few verbal tricks, that motion is 'contradictory'?] This dogmatic, universalist approach to knowledge places DM way beyond confirmation by any conceivable body of evidence.^9a

M1a, P1, and P4 are just the latest examples of just such dogmatism. In common with other metaphysical systems, the projection of DM onto any and all possible worlds -- i.e., onto 'Reality Itself' -- reveals it solely based on linguistic and conceptual grounds. How else are we to interpret the following passages?

"Nature works dialectically." [Engels (1892), p.407, repeated in Engels (1976), p.28. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211. Bold emphases added.]

"Dialectics as the science of universal interconnection…. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion…. Hence, it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion…. In this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious. Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe…. The whole theory of gravity rests on saying that attraction is the essence of matter. This is necessarily false. Where there is attraction, it must be complemented by repulsion. Hence already Hegel was quite right in saying that the essence of matter is attraction and repulsion…. The visible system of stars, the solar system, terrestrial masses, molecules and atoms, and finally ether particles, form each of them [a definite group]. It does not alter the case that intermediate links can be found between the separate groups…. These intermediate links prove only that there are no leaps in nature, precisely because nature is composed entirely of leaps." [Ibid., pp.17, 63, 69, 211, 244, 271. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…". [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"But precisely therein lay the true significance and the revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy (to which, as the close of the whole movement since Kant, we must here confine ourselves), that it once and for all dealt the death blow to the finality of all products of human thought and action. Truth, the cognition of which is the business of philosophy, was in the hands of Hegel no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic statements, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart. Truth lay now in the process of cognition itself, in the long historical development of science, which mounts from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge without ever reaching, by discovering so-called absolute truth, a point at which it can proceed no further, where it would have nothing more to do than to fold its hands and gaze with wonder at the absolute truth to which it had attained. And what holds good for the realm of philosophical knowledge holds good also for that of every other kind of knowledge and also for practical action. Just as knowledge is unable to reach a complete conclusion in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect 'state', are things which can only exist in imagination. On the contrary, all successive historical systems are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human society from the lower to the higher. Each stage is necessary, and therefore justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the face of new, higher conditions which gradually develop in its own womb, it loses vitality and justification. It must give way to a higher stage which will also in its turn decay and perish. Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition, and the world market dissolves in practice all stable time-honoured institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy], nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute -- the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits." [Engels (1888), pp.587-88. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected. Parentheses in the original.]

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…. To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other…. Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58, 359-60. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

"Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world." [Ibid., p.110. Bold emphasis added.]

"Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature.... Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality,' he can only eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world...." [Ibid., p.182. Bold emphases alone added.]

"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of motion -- such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases alone added.]

"According to Hegel, dialectics is the principle of all life…. [M]an has two qualities: first being alive, and secondly of also being mortal. But on closer examination it turns out that life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that in general any phenomenon is contradictory, in the sense that it develops out of itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to its existence and will transform it into its opposite. Everything flows, everything changes; and there is no force capable of holding back this constant flux, or arresting its eternal movement. There is no force capable of resisting the dialectics of phenomena…. At a particular moment a moving body is at a particular spot, but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if it were only in that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become motionless. Every motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and as there is not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do not have in the long run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel, who said that dialectics is the soul of any scientific cognition. And this applies not only to cognition of nature…. And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…. When you apply the dialectical method to the study of phenomena, you need to remember that forms change eternally in consequence of the 'higher development of their content….' In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin and destruction…. [M]odern science confirms at every step the idea expressed with such genius by Hegel, that quantity passes into quality…. [I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That's how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged. (Unfortunately, the Index page for the copy of this book over at The Marxist Internet Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed directly here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: they have now corrected it!)]

"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves…. [T]he axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist…. For concepts there also exists 'tolerance' which is established...by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing…. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradiction, conflict and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc…." [Trotsky (1971), pp.64-66. Bold emphases added.]

"Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense the universe is permeated with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Ibid., pp.106-07. Bold emphases added.]

"It must be recognized that the fundamental law of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into quality, for it gives [us] the general formula of all evolutionary processes -– of nature as well as of society.… The principle of the transformation of quantity into quality has universal significance, insofar as we view the entire universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and transformation…. In these abstract formulas we have the most general laws (forms) of motion, change, the transformation of the stars of the heaven, of the earth, nature and human society.… Dialectics is the logic of development. It examines the world -- completely without exception -- not as a result of creation, of a sudden beginning, the realisation of a plan, but as a result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became the way it is as a result of lawlike development." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88, 90, 96. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics.... As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.... The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... There is nothing that does not contain contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist.... Thus it is already clear that contradiction exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological phenomena.... Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of the development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end...." [Mao (1937), pp.311-18. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"First, it is necessary to apply the Marxist-Leninist law of the unity of opposites to the study of socialist society. The law of contradiction in all things, i.e., the law of the unity of opposites, is a fundamental law of materialist dialectics. It operates everywhere, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in the human thought." [Mao (1964b), quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

"Marxist philosophy holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man's thinking. Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this that impels things to move and change. Contradictions exist everywhere, but their nature differs in accordance with the different nature of different things. In any given thing, the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is absolute. Lenin gave a very clear exposition of this law." [Mao (1977a), pp.392-93. Bold emphases added.]

"The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of movement (or theory of development). This means the recognition that movement is the form of the existence of matter, an inherent attribute of matter, a manifestation of the multiplicity of matter. This is the principle of the development of the world. The combination of the principle of the development of the world with the principle of the unity of the world, set forth above, constitutes the whole of the world view of dialectical materialism. The world is nothing else but the material world in a process of unlimited development…." ['Dialectical Materialism' (1938). Bold emphases added.]

"The universe is in every place and at any time itself new or present for the first time. It arises and passes away, passes and arises under our very hands. Nothing remains the same, only the infinite change is constant, and even the change varies. Every particle of time and space brings new changes. It is true that the materialist believes in the permanency, eternity and indestructibility of matter. He teaches us that not the smallest particle of matter has even been lost in the world, that matter simply changes its forms eternally, but that its nature last indestructibly through all eternity." [Dietzgen (1984), p.37. Bold emphases added.]

"In the universe which constitutes the object of science and the faculty of reason, both force and matter are unseparated. In the world of sense perceptions force is matter and matter is force. 'Force cannot be seen.' Oh yes! Seeing itself is pure force. Seeing is as much an effect of its object as an effect of the eye, and this double effect and other effects are forces. We do not see the things themselves, but their effects on our eyes. We see their forces. And force cannot alone be seen, it can also be heard, smelled, tasted, felt.... It is just as true to say that we feel matter and not its force as it is to say that we feel force and not matter. Indeed, both are inseparable from the object, as we have already remarked. But by means of the faculty of thought we separate from the simultaneously and successively occurring phenomena the general and the concrete. For instance, we abstract the general concept of sight from the various phenomena of our sight and distinguish it by the name of power of vision from the concrete objects, or substances, of our eyes.... The world of sense perceptions is made known to us only by our consciousness, but consciousness is conditioned on the world of sense perceptions. Nature is infinitely united or infinitely separated, according to whether we regard it from the standpoint of consciousness as an unconditional unit or from the standpoint of sense perceptions and as unconditional multiplicity.... The abstract matter is force, the concrete force is matter.... True there is no force without matter, no matter without force. Forceless matter and matter without force are nonentities." [Ibid., pp.82-85. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

"Everything is large, everything is small, everything extended through space and time, everything cause and everything effect, everything a whole and everything a part, because everything is the essence of everything, because everything is contained in the all, everything related, everything connected, everything interdependent. The conception of all as the absolute, the content of which consists of innumerable relativities, the concept of the all as the universal truth which reflects many phenomena, that is the basis of the science of the understanding." [Dietzgen (1906), p.417. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party.... The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself....; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena. Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not in a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development.... The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement and change.... Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides...; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born..., constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.... If there are no isolated phenomena in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent, then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the standpoint of 'eternal justice'.... Contrary to idealism..., Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice." [Stalin (1976b), pp.835-46. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

The above represent just a few of the dogmatic claims advanced by the DM-classicists. I have quoted hundreds more like them (and that number is no exaggeration, either!) from the same individuals and from dozens of 'lesser' DM-clones, in Essay Two.

Furthermore, the actual origin of every single DM-thesis lends support to the above allegations. As noted earlier, they latter weren't derived from a scientific study of nature, they were imported from the confused musings of a long line of mystics -- ranging from Heraclitus to Hegel, via Plato, Plotinus, Boehme, Spinoza and more than handful of other religious fantasists (listed here). In which case, their 'veracity' can't have been based on anything other than the presumed meaning of the words they contained, and thus on the linguistic rules that supposedly governed their use.^9b Indeed, the origin of the doctrines Dialectical Marxists are happy to project onto 'Reality' dates back to a time when there was precious little scientific evidence to speak of, and, as Marx himself pointed out, the original theories were based on distorted language and represented an extension to Theology.

Hence, the class-compromised origin of DM means that dogmatic, ruling-class ideas and thought-forms have been grated onto revolutionary theory -- and, what is more, that was done "from the outside", too.¹⁰

[Any who think DM-'Laws' are (or ever were) based on scientific evidence should check out Essay Seven Part One and then perhaps think again. See also: Note 4, Note 5 and Note 5a.]

Unfortunately for Lenin and other DM-apologists, a priori theories like this are incapable of 'reflecting reality'. As we will see, the world can't be as metaphysical-, or even as DM-theories attempt to picture it.¹¹ There are logical features of language that prevent theorists like Lenin and Engels from (validly) asserting the sorts of things they wanted to say about the world, and which won't allow them to 'depict' nature in the way they think they can. Or, rather, they can't do so without those ideas collapsing into incoherent non-sense, as we are about to find out.

This means that DM itself ends up saying nothing at all. It turns out to be little more than an empty string of words.

The above considerations aren't unconnected with the origin and nature of metaphysical theories in general. As will be demonstrated in later Parts of Essay Twelve, at a linguistic level, Traditional Philosophy was motivated by a determination to utilise a narrow range of expressions idiosyncratically -- that is, Ancient Greek thinkers were determined to employ words in ways they wouldn't normally be used in everyday life. This non-standard use of language involved a failure on the part of these 'linguistic innovators' to notice that it is only by misusing and distorting language that they are capable of concocting the 'universal and necessary truths' we now find throughout Traditional Philosophy --, and DM.

[Much of the mechanics (if that is the right term) underlying these moves was exposed in detail in Essay Three Parts One and Two. I have no intention of repeating that material here, so readers are referred there for further details.]

The detailed analysis set out below will show that this distortion and misuse of language resulted in the production, not of 'necessary' or 'universal' truths, but incoherent non-sense.^11ao

[The rest of this Essay (alongside and the other Parts of Essay Twelve) is aimed at fully substantiating these claims and allegations.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, i.e., Lenin (1972).]

In the next few sub-sections an argument will be developed that appears to show that Lenin contradicted himself when he made claims like the one expressed in M1a (repeated below). However, by the end of this Essay we will see that the problem goes much deeper than this. The bottom line is that Lenin didn't in fact contradict himself, and that is because he didn't say anything comprehensible to begin with! So, these two sentences: "Twas brillig and the slithy toves didn't gyre and gimble in the wabe" [S₁] and "Twasn't brillig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe" [S₂] don't contradict one another even though one of them appears to be the negation of the other. [Taken from the Jabberwocky, by Lewis Carroll.]

(i) The simple insertion of a negative particle into a given indicative sentence -- in this case producing S₂ -- doesn't always result in one that contradicts the original sentence -- in this case, S₁; and,

(ii) In order to count as a contradictory pair of sentences -- in this case, S₁ and S₂ -- they both have to say something that is, or is capable of being, true.

But, clearly, S₁ and S₂are incapable of being true, so they can't contradict one another. Hence, S₂ isn't the negation of S₁.

Similarly, as we will also see, what Lenin had to say (in M1a), and what Engels also asserted (by means of P4), are incapable of being true. That means this part of DM falls at the first hurdle, but it will also mean that in the end Lenin can't have contradicted himself.

Nevertheless, that is no reason for Dialectical Marxists to celebrate. Anyone who comes out with sentences that are incapable of being true, and which turn out to be incoherent non-sense, does little to enhance their reputation as a philosopher whose ideas are worth paying attention to.

In what follows it will first of all be shown that a superficial examination of Lenin's words does appear to show, or at least suggest, he contradicted himself. But as we delve deeper the real problem with his words and with metaphysical sentences like M1a and P4 will become much easier to see. This will help show why Lenin's words turn out to be incomprehensible no matter what is done to try to rectify the situation. As the History of Metaphysics has itself revealed (and as Marx also pointed out), philosophers repeatedly tied themselves in linguistic knots trying to uncover 'profound truths about Reality', valid for all of space and time. Hence, the next few sub-sections of this Essay will expose the conceptual knots into which Lenin and Engels twisted themselves as they developed, not just their theory of matter and motion, but the entire edifice of DM itself. While the real reason they couldn't 'think the unthinkable' about matter and motion won't emerge in those sub-sections, a foundation will nevertheless be laid that will allow it to be revealed by the end of this Essay. At that point, the real reason why what those two revolutionaries tried to rule out -- i.e., motionless matter -- will then be plain for all to see, but not in the way they seemed to imagine. This will then create space for exposing the real reason why every philosophical theory inevitably suffers the same ignominious fate: the systematic production of incoherent non-sense.

[Essay Nine Part Two will explain why DM-classicists like Engels, Plekhanov, Dietzgen, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, and the rest of the DM-Menagerie were so easily conned, and why disastrous consequences have (predictably) resulted from allowing such incoherent ideas to take over our entire movement. In tandem with this, Essay Ten Part One will set out in detail the (avoidable) political debacle that arose out of this serious ideological compromise, a debacle that will unfortunately continue into this new century unless we re-think our ideas and organisation from the ground floor up, like the radicals we at least claim to be.]

Concerning Lenin's assertion reported in M1a and P1 (both of which were based on P4), it is worth asking the following question: What is it about these words (or what they appear to express/'reflect') that made them seem quite so "unthinkable"?

In Lenin's case, at least, he must have thought the above words (or what they 'expressed', 'represented' or 'reflected') in order to declare that they were unthinkable! For those words to form the content of a thought which he could then declare "unthinkable", they would have to have featured in, or have been be translatable into, an indicative sentence of some sort -- that is, they would have to have been expressed in sentences capable of being true. In which case, "NN thought that..." would require completion by an indicative sentence or clause. So, in an ordinary context we would have something like "NN thought that London is the capital of the UK", where "London is the capital of the UK" is capable of being true. Contrast that with "NN thought that London is the cube root of ten", where "London is the cube root of ten" isn't capable of being true.

So, the phrase "motion without matter", and what it supposedly conveyed when expressed in a sentence or clause, must have been in Lenin's thoughts at some point. [The objection that this confuses use with mention will be dealt with presently.] Lenin at least had to understand the words "motion without matter" (as they appear in sentences like M1a) if he intended to use them meaningfully. It isn't as if he chose these specific words randomly, thoughtlessly or haphazardly. In that case, he must have known full well what their use implied -- i.e., what they could be used to assert, what combinations of matter and motion they ruled in, or ruled out, by saying/writing what he did by means of M1a. Otherwise, he would have asserted something he either didn't understand, or something concerning which he had given little or no thought at all. If we assume Lenin at least thought he knew what he was talking about -- and hence that he did understand M1a along with the phrase "motion without matter" as it is used in that sentence --, he must have devoted some thought to it. This he must have done either while actually writing those words -- or possibly before he actually did so -- maybe when he first studied what Engels had to say about the topic (quoted earlier) and included them in MEC. Otherwise, we would have to admit Lenin couldn't have understood the implications of what he was trying to say. Hence, in order to comprehend the phrase "motion without matter" and understand what it might be used to rule in -- just so he could immediately rule it out as "unthinkable" -- he would have to have thought about what motionless matter could possibly imply, when used in such a sentence.

Once again: failing that he wouldn't know what it was he was actually trying to rule out or reject.

In which case, it looks like Lenin had to do what he said couldn't be done; it looks like he had to comprehend and thereby think about, or think through, the 'content' of the phrase "motion without matter", and what it expressed when used in sentences like M1a. Even if he then went on to think the additional words tacked on at the end (i.e., "…is unthinkable"), he must have cognised the three 'offending' words first (i.e., "motion without matter"), along with what they conveyed when used in or by that sentence. Clearly, his thoughts didn't first 'switch on' the moment his eyes reached the relative safety of the last two words at the end of M1a!

Hence, it looks like Lenin must have done what he declared couldn't be done; he must have thought the "unthinkable" in the act of declaring that no one could do what he himself had just done!

Naturally, this means that, at first sight, Lenin appears to have contradicted himself (at least in practice), since he 'managed to do' what he said couldn't be done, by anyone. That is why (in practice again) it seems that Lenin's theory isn't just impossible to comprehend, it is impossible even to state (in these terms). That is, it is impossible to say what on earth Lenin could have meant by what he tried to say. If he managed to do what he declared no one could do in the very act of telling us they couldn't do it, why can no one else do what he had just done? What is so special about Lenin? How was he able to think the "unthinkable" in the very act of telling us it can't be done?

Worse still, if the rest of us can think the offending words (i.e., what the phrase "motion without matter" seems to convey in such a sentence -- or maybe even contemplate sentences like the following, "Motion can exist without matter", even if what it seems to say is then immediately ruled out), and we seem capable of understanding their 'content' whenever we read the words Lenin used in order to tell us that we can't do the very thing we must have done in order to grasp the point he was trying to make, we, too, must contradict Lenin in practice whenever we consult this part of his writings. Indeed, the very act of telling us we can't think these words (or what they express/convey) prompts us in doing what he tells us we can't do!

Even those who agree with Lenin -- that "Motion without matter is unthinkable" -- must think the three 'illicit' words along with what they convey in, and by means of, such a sentence. Hence, even the most slavishly obedient and sycophantic Lenin-groupie can't avoid disobeying the master every time they read this contentious sentence.

Have such characters failed to notice that the very act of reading these words -- and trying to grasp their 'content' -- is automatically to contradict Lenin?

It might seem possible to defend Lenin by arguing that his claims about matter and motion were meant to be understood hyperbolically. Hence, it could be argued that Lenin certainly didn't think that the words "motion without matter" (and what they implied in a sentential context) were literally unthinkable, merely that it made no sense to suppose there could be any actual examples of motion without matter anywhere in the universe. It could even be maintained out that the wording of Lenin's 'controversial' sentence meant he was simply rejecting out-of-hand the immobility of matter as a ridiculous or patently absurd supposition, on a par with denying (liquid) water is wet or fire is hot, for example.

But, that would mean an entire section of MEC -- entitled "Is Motion Without Matter Conceivable?" -- was misnamed. That is the section in which M1 makes its appearance. Lenin even italicised the word "unthinkable":

M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972), p.318. Italic emphasis in the original.]

"The fact that philosophical idealism is attempting to make use of the new physics, or that idealist conclusions are being drawn from the latter, is due not to the discovery of new kinds of substance and force, of matter and motion, but to the fact that an attempt is being made to conceive motion without matter. And it is the essence of this attempt which our Machians fail to examine. They were unwilling to take account of Engels' statement that 'motion without matter is unthinkable.' J. Dietzgen in 1869, in his The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind, expressed the same idea as Engels, although, it is true, not without his usual muddled attempts to 'reconcile' materialism and idealism. Let us leave aside these attempts, which are to a large extent to be explained by the fact that Dietzgen is arguing against Büchner's non-dialectical materialism, and let us examine Dietzgen's own statements on the question under consideration. He says: 'They [the idealists] want to have the general without the particular, mind without matter, force without substance, science without experience or material, the absolute without the relative' (Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit, 1903, S.108). Thus the endeavour to divorce motion from matter, force from substance, Dietzgen associates with idealism, compares with the endeavour to divorce thought from the brain. 'Liebig,' Dietzgen continues, 'who is especially fond of straying from his inductive science into the field of speculation, says in the spirit of idealism: "force cannot be seen"' (p.109). 'The spiritualist or the idealist believes in the spiritual, i.e., ghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force' (p. 110). 'The antithesis between force and matter is as old as the antithesis between idealism and materialism' (p.111). 'Of course, there is no force without matter, no matter without force; forceless matter and matterless force are absurdities. If there are idealist natural scientists who believe in the immaterial existence of forces, on this point they are not natural scientists...but seers of ghosts' (p.114).

"We thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is the connection between philosophical idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter? The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given us in sensation. Therefore, to divorce motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from objective reality, or to divorcing my sensations from the external world -- in a word, it is to go over to idealism. The trick which is usually performed in denying matter, and in assuming motion without matter, consists in ignoring the relation of matter to thought. The question is presented as though this relation did not exist, but in reality it is introduced surreptitiously; at the beginning of the argument it remains unexpressed, but subsequently crops up more or less imperceptibly.

"Matter has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to draw epistemological conclusions. But has thought remained? -- we ask. If not, if with the disappearance of matter thought has also disappeared, if with the disappearance of the brain and nervous system ideas and sensations, too, have disappeared -- then it follows that everything has disappeared. And your argument has disappeared as a sample of 'thought' (or lack of thought)! But if it has remained -- if it is assumed that with the disappearance of matter, thought (idea, sensation, etc.) does not disappear, then you have surreptitiously gone over to the standpoint of philosophical idealism. And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to conceive of motion without matter, for tacitly, by the very fact that they continue to argue, they are acknowledging the existence of thought after the disappearance of matter. This means that a very simple, or a very complex philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a very simple one, if it is a case of frank solipsism (I exist, and the world is only my sensation); a very complex one, if instead of the thought, ideas and sensations of a living person, a dead abstraction is posited, that is, nobody's thought, nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, but thought in general (the Absolute Idea, the Universal Will, etc.), sensation as an indeterminate 'element,' the 'psychical,' which is substituted for the whole of physical nature, etc., etc. Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism are possible and it is always possible to create a thousand and first shade; and to the author of this thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for example) what distinguishes it from the rest may appear to be momentous. From the standpoint of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism." [Lenin (1972), pp.318-21. Bold emphases and links alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

[I have reproduced the entire passage to short-circuit accusations that I have quoted Lenin 'out of context'!]

It clear from the above that Lenin was denying what certain scientists claimed -- i.e., that motion without matter was even conceivable. Or, as he puts it, once more:

M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972), p.318. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Later he added the additional detail that matter and motion were inseparable (again quoting Engels):

"In full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it, Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring (read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....' 'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be...'." [Lenin (1914), p.8. Italics in the original.]

"[M]otion [is] an inseparable property of matter." [Lenin (1972), p.323. Bold emphasis added.]

Hence, the unthinkability of separating matter and motion was integral to his philosophical case against Idealism. Indeed, if motion is "The mode of the existence of matter" -- its "mode of expression" -- then these two 'concepts', or what they 'reflect', can't be separated, even in thought. As soon as any attempt were made to try to disconnect them anyone attempting to do so would no longer be talking about matter, or even about motion (as far as Engels and Lenin were concerned), no more than someone who tried to divorce the concept/phrase, "even number", from the concept/name, "two", would still be talking about the number two -- or about even numbers (which are, of course, defined in terms of their divisibility by two, the result being an integer) -- trivial cases to one side, of course.

[Incidentally, Lenin is wrong about Marx and Anti-Dühring [AD], he didn't read that book "in the manuscript". In fact, it was only after Marx's death that Engels claimed he read AD to Marx. Just think how long that would have taken. [In fact, as I have shown in Essay Nine Part One -- here -- it would have taken at least two days to read AD to Marx!] Can you imagine how many times the ageing Marx would have nodded off, not realising the error-strewn, confused and sub-logical material it contained, but with which some would later claim he completely concurred? Does anyone think that Marx approved of, or agreed with, the ridiculous things Engels had to say about mathematics in that book? Marx was a competent mathematician (even though his mathematical knowledge appeared to be at least half a century out-of-date), whereas Engels wasn't. Those who now try to tell us that Marx and Engels agreed about everything have plainly failed to think through the implications of that unwise assertion since it would mean Marx was as incompetent a mathematician as Engels! (I have covered this entire topic in much more detail here and here.)]

As noted above, Lenin was clearly echoing Engels's non-hyperbolic (i.e., literal) use of language. Does anyone who disagrees with that conclusion think Engels was simply exaggerating for effect when he said the following?

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred.... A motionless state of matter is therefore one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

Engels clearly meant every word to be taken as read, literally, which is precisely how subsequent DM-theorists have always understood him.

In fact, if anything is, this is a core DM-precept. Both Lenin and Engels meant what they said.

At this point, someone could object that contradictions like this -- i.e., where Lenin argues that what he had just thought couldn't actually be thought -- are only to be expected. After all, this is dialectics! In that case, in any attempt to think these supposedly controversial words, thought is driven to the opposite pole and is forced to conclude that they (or what they express) can't be thought. It is meant to be contradictory!

[That response is in fact a variant of the 'Nixon Defence' we met in Essay Eight Part One. (Follow the link for an explanation!) It also represents a repudiation of the 'hyperbole rejoinder' outlined above.]

Except, Lenin did say (elsewhere) that the 'offending words' (or their content) could be thought, after all!

However, and what is far more likely, those who (now) read Lenin's words will doubtless conclude that in view of the fact that they, too, have just thought those very words (or their sentential content) in the act of being told they can't do it, motion without matter (or its sentential equivalent, P1) is plainly not unthinkable!

But, it is worth recalling that a belief in motionless matter was integral to Aristotelian Physics, which theory dominated scientific thought for well over fifteen hundred years. That being the case, the aforementioned readers would be perfectly justified in concluding that the claim that there can be motionless matter is thinkable. Plainly, that thought is far more thinkable than its opposite -- given the additional fact that it was held true far longer than DM and Dialectical Marxists have both been in existence!

Hence, far from thought being driven to an "opposite pole", the above considerations suggest thought remained riveted to just one of those poles, at least for many centuries.

[The above shouldn't be taken to mean the present author thinks there is, or could be, motionless matter. Any such theoretical statement would be just as metaphysical as Engels and Lenin's claims about matter and motion. As this Essay will show, such a counter-claim would itself be yet another example of incoherent non-sense.]

It could be objected that this Essay promotes what is in effect a specious anti-Lenin line. Indeed, one critic has so argued over at the now defunct RevLeft forum a dozen or so years ago):

"An also quite clear illogicality -- or perhaps even a sophism -- is the discussion of Lenin's assertion that 'motion without matter is unthinkable'. It is held that, since Lenin obviously thought the words 'motion without matter', he has contradicted himself, showing that it is perfectly possible to think 'motion without matter'. But this is clearly an invalid reasoning. The use of the words 'motion without matter' doesn't actually imply thinking motion without matter. The example of sentence 3. above may explain what I am saying. A similar idea can be expressed by

"6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

"If we follow the text, we will exclaim, 'but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!' What happens, though, is that when I think the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile' I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I -- or anybody else -- can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile', I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for 'triangular circle', 'the opposite side of a Moebius strip' (sic), or 'a man who is his own father'. And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different." [From here. (That links is now dead!) Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original. Minor typos corrected; link added.]

"Rosa actually considered that objection in the long Essay she wrote (she had to since I posed that very point to her back in 1998 or 1999!), and posted a short version of it in the passage Chris quoted. The point is that Lenin would have to know what any sentence containing the phrase 'motion without matter' implied.

'In order to rule motion without matter out of court, he would have to know what he was trying to exclude. He would have to know what motion without matter was so that he could exclude it as unthinkable, otherwise he might be ruling out the wrong thing. Hence, it would have to be thinkable for Lenin to tell us it wasn't!'

"So, he would have to think these words just to rule out the possibility that there was any motionless matter in the world. Otherwise, he would have no idea what he was ruling out. But, if he had no idea what he was ruling out, he'd have no idea what he was ruling in, either. So, the real problem is not that Lenin was contradicting himself, it's that not even Lenin knew what he was talking about.

"Moreover, as Rosa goes on to point out (I think you must have missed this), it's not possible to contradict non-sense. Since a non-sensical sentence cannot take a truth-value, no sentence can count as its contradictory. So Lenin wasn't contradicting himself (Rosa toys with that possibility until she shows that he isn't even doing that!); he is far too confused to be doing it. [It's the same point she makes about dialectics; it's far too confused for anyone to be able to say if it's true or if it's false, let alone contradict it!]

'6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.'

'If we follow the text, we will exclaim, 'but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!' What happens, though, is that when I think the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile' I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I -- or anybody else -- can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile', I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for 'triangular circle', 'the opposite side of a Moebius strip', or 'a man who is his own father'. And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.'

"And yet, how would you know what you were ruling out? Unless you know what a functioning perpetual motion machine is, or could be, your claim that it is unthinkable is just an empty phrase. [Suppose I say I can think it? Suppose inventors of these machines, who still turn up regularly, also say they can think it? And, isn't the universe in perpetual motion? According to some scientists, it is. So they can think of perpetual motion; even if they are wrong, they can certainly think it.]

"Same with the other examples you mention. If time travel is possible, a man can be his own father. Now, time travel might not be possible, but we can still think a man could be his own father. A triangular circle is also a possible object of thought; given homeomorphisms, it is possible to map a triangle onto a circle. So, topologically, a circle is the same as a triangle, hence, we can think it in mathematics! And we can easily define the opposite side of a Möbius Strip as follows: hold the strip between thumb and forefinger; the opposite side to that which touches your thumb is the side that touches your index finger. That might be a cheat, sure, but it allows us to think of the opposite side of a Möbius Strip.

"So, instead of asserting that, say, 'A triangular circle is unthinkable', you'd be better off following Wittgenstein's advice here (albeit given in another context) and say that certain combinations of words aren't part of the language; we have no use for them.

"However, this can't even be the case with Lenin's declaration, since immobile matter is not unthinkable; indeed, motionless matter had been a cornerstone of Aristotelian physics, which went largely unquestioned for over a thousand years....

"Now, the real problem with Lenin's declaration isn't that he ends up in an awful muddle, but that it follows from an a priori thesis invented by Engels: 'Motion is the mode of the existence of matter'. So, his declaration that 'motion without matter is unthinkable' wasn't based on evidence (since the latter is ambiguous), or on argument, but on this a priori thesis, which Rosa has shown is non-sensical." [Italic emphases in the original; links added.]

And, as we have just seen, Lenin admitted it was possible to think what he also said was "unthinkable" -- according to him, Idealists do just that!

If the water is periodically replenished (to prevent its total evaporation), this flow will continue indefinitely.

[Later on in this Essay I will return to the core of the above anti-RL remarks where it will become clear that my critic is in some sort-of-sense correct, but not in the way he imagined (which was also hinted at in the reply he received from the above supporter). This will allow me to reveal the real reason Lenin couldn't think the unthinkable even while he had to try to do so in order to tell the rest of it couldn't be done!]

It could now be objected that this whole line-of-thought is completely misguided. Consider, for example, the following sentence:

C1 doesn't imply that the Obama administration had actually thought of abandoning Taiwan, which they would have to have done if the criticisms aired in this Essay were correct. All it means is that the said individual is expressing the Obama administration's rejection of any possibility that Taiwan might be abandoned; that is, this was a total repudiation of the very idea.

[VP = Verb Phrase, which in this case is "Abandoning Taiwan...". It could also be classified as a Noun Phrase (NP) if "abandoning" were instead viewed as a Gerund.]

So, the clause "VP is unthinkable" can mean many things; for instance (in this instance):

Many of these alternative readings allude to the incredulity, or even intellectual stubbornness, of the individual or individuals involved even contemplating abandoning Taiwan; that is, they record or express the psychological impossibility of accepting -- or even a refusal to believe -- that the USA would ever abandon Taiwan. Now, if Lenin meant what he said about motion and matter in this sense, it would weaken considerably his opposition to the immobility of matter. That is because it would sever the connection his theory had with Engels's claim that "Motion is the mode of the existence of matter", which was for both of them a defining characteristic of matter, not a throw-away property the existence of which might depend on the limitations of human credulity. [Anyway, I have discussed this particular option further, below.]

More-or-less the same can be said of those other readings; they, too, sever this conceptual connection.

I will return to this topic when we consider the deeper, logical problems associated with M1a (mentioned earlier).

Even so, anyone who came out with one or other of C1-C6 would have to know, and would have to have thought about, what it meant for anyone to abandon Taiwan so they knew what it was they were categorically ruling-out.

Continuing now with the above objection, it could be argued that it is perfectly clear what Lenin meant: it is impossible to think about matter without conceiving of it as also moving (in some way or in some respect). In other words, B1 doesn't imply B2.

B2: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.

In that case, and once more, maybe Lenin was merely making a psychological point about the limits of his own imagination, or what he knew or thought he knew about what others were also capable of imagining. If so, all he was saying was that given what we know about the world (and, indeed, about ourselves, our relation to the world and our intellectual capacities), we are all psychologically, conceptually or physically incapable of forming the thought, or giving credence to the claim, that motion is possible without matter (and/or vice versa) -- or even of conceiving that any such thought could be true.

[That line of defence was partly neutralised earlier, as well as in the last sub-section.]

So, it could be argued that Lenin considered it psychologically (or even sociologically) impossible to agree with P1b:

But, if Lenin was saying we are [all?] psychologically, sociologically, conceptually or physically incapable of forming the thought that motion is possible without matter, he offered no evidence to substantiate what would now be a scientific claim about what human beings are capable of cognising, nor has anyone come to his aid since. And, if that was his reasoning, it is pretty clear why he wouldn't have been able to produce such data (even had he tried to do so). That is because, plainly, even to pose that question is not only to think the forbidden words (or their content), it prompts any target audience into doing so, too!

Moreover, and alas for Lenin, there is abundant evidence to the contrary. As noted above, previous generations found it quite easy to think this very thought, and they did so for many centuries. Once again: the 'natural' passivity of matter was a basic tenet of Aristotelian Physics.^11a

Having said that, Aristotle's own ideas about earthy matter, force and motion are far more complex than these brief comments might suggest. Nevertheless, it is still true that he believed that when located at the centre of the universe, earthy matter was motionless. [On this, see Bostock (2001), Jammer (1999), Lewis (2009), Morison (2002), Pfeiffer (2021), Sattler (2020), Skemp (1967), Sorabji (1988), and Copleston (2003a), chapter 30.]

"Now all things rest and move naturally and by constraint. A thing moves naturally to a place in which it rests without constraint, and rests naturally in a place to which it moves without constraint. On the other hand, a thing moves by constraint to a place in which it rests by constraint, and rests by constraint in a place to which it moves by constraint. Further, if a given movement is due to constraint, its contrary is natural." [Aristotle (1984b), p.458, 276: 22-26.]

[By "constraint", Aristotle meant "enforced motion"; that is, something "forcibly moved by some other mover" to wherever it ended up. (So, when you kick a ball, that is enforced motion.) On this see Bodnar (2023), Dijksterhuis (1986), pp.24-32, Gill (2003), Guthrie (1990), pp.243-76, Jammer (1999), pp.31-41, and Sorabji (1988), pp.219-26.]

So, Aristotle and his many followers and commentators could, and actually did, think about motionless matter.

Moreover, as my former colleague, "Babeuf", pointed out, it has been possible to think about motion without matter since at least Biblical times:

"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. And the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." [Genesis, Chapter One, verses 1 and 2. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]

Now, it won't do to argue that the above is false, mythical or even ideological, since the only reason it has been quoted is to show that, whether or not it is one or other of those, some human beings (hundreds of millions, possibly even billions, in fact) can think about motion without matter, and have been able to do so for at least 3000 years.

"The feature that distinguishes Leibnitz (sic) from Spinoza: In Leibnitz (sic) there is, in addition to the concept of substance, the concept of force 'and indeed of active force...' the principle of 'self-activity'.... Ergo. Leibnitz (sic) through theology arrived at the principle of the inseparable (and universal, absolute) connection of matter and motion." [Lenin (1961), p.377. Italic emphasis in the original; paragraphs merged.]

This confirms, of course, the a priori nature and origin of this idea since Leibniz manifestly did not obtain it via observation and would have had a stroke at any suggestion he had. Also worth mentioning is the fact that Leibniz was heavily influenced by Hermetic mysticism, as was Hegel. [This will be one of the many such topics to be covered in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here); until then, see Ross (1983, 1998).]

As Lenin notes, the doctrine of the inseparability of matter and motion is connected with "self-activity", which is itself intimately linked in with the 'contradictory nature of matter', as we saw in Essay Eight Part One. So, the 'inseparability thesis' is a 'logical' notion which 'follows' from Engels's Second 'Law'. Small wonder then that Lenin found its rejection "unthinkable".

However, if the above objection along with the alternative interpretation of Lenin's theory (i.e., that his claims about motion and matter concern the psychological/sociological limitations of human thought) are to remain viable options, then, at best, we would have to interpret what was actually said as (perhaps) Lenin's confession of his own limited powers of imagination --, even though he too seemed able to rise to the occasion and think the forbidden words (or their content) while casting them into outer psychological darkness in the very act of bringing us the good news that what he had just done couldn't be done!

Furthermore, Lenin offered no evidence in support of the supposed limits of anyone else's credulity (or powers of imagination), and he mentioned only two other individuals who thought as he did: Engels and Dietzgen. That being so, his confession merely records the limitations of his, Engels and Dietzgen's own powers of thought (which, as we have seen, appeared to be undermined in and by the very act of stating it!). Clearly, any such asseverations (no matter how sincere) are out of place in what purports to be a scientific or philosophical analysis of the supposed (conceptual) links between matter and motion.

In any case, what could Lenin have said to someone who claimed that they could imagine motion without matter, or vice versa? [Well, we have already seen what he would have said, and it was (typically) dismissive.] So, what if Lenin had encountered a latter-day Aristotle? What could he say to him? Several examples have been given (in this Essay) where it seems quite natural to speak about motion without matter. They may only be ruled out if it could be shown they are either metaphorical or are ruled out as irrelevant. But, who is to say that Lenin's use of these particular words was itself literal? Or that this is their only correct use? Or even that it is the most natural way of using them? In fact, any rejection of the aforementioned counter-examples could itself only be based on Lenin's own lack of imagination, on that of his modern day epigones, or, perhaps, on other criteria which Lenin unwisely kept to himself.

However, as the above indicates, it is possible to form the thought that motion can take place without matter. Nothing is easier. Not only does the last sentence itself prompt such a cognitive infringement, so do the sentences Lenin himself committed to paper. If they are unacceptable, it can't be for psychological reasons -- since, manifestly, they are ridiculously easy to think. If both B3 and B4, for instance, are to be ruled out as genuine examples of a thought, that should be done on logical or linguistic, not psychological/sociological, grounds, especially if reading Lenin's words seems to disprove what he says in the very act of doing so. If what those words try to say is to be ruled out, it would have to be because they somehow go beyond what is capable of being formed into a thought -- i.e., beyond the limits of thought or the limits of language. That is indeed the line that will be pursued below, where it will be shown that Lenin was (in a rather peculiar and surprising way) right -- but not for any reason he would have accepted!

At this point, it is worth recalling (once again) that Lenin himself acknowledged that this 'forbidden thought' can be thought, after all (perhaps not fully realising what it was he was admitting):

"From the standpoint of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism." [Lenin (1972), p.321. Bold emphasis alone added.]

Here, Lenin entertains the thought that motion could be "divorced from matter" (even if only so he could brand it "Idealist"). But that plainly means he was wrong to conclude it was "unthinkable". He had just thought it! So, it can't be psychologically impossible to think these forbidden words, after all.

But that just takes us right back to the beginning. We are still no clearer what Lenin could possibly have meant, or tried to say, by what he wrote.

[UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

At this point it is worth asking the following (rather obvious) question: "Why did Lenin conclude that motion without matter was 'unthinkable' instead of claiming it was simply contradictory?" Apart from saving him the trouble of having to do what he said couldn't be done -- think the very thoughts (or their sentential 'content') he wanted to convince the rest of us were "unthinkable" --, it would at least have allowed him to make his point much more succinctly, and, dare I say it, more 'dialectically'. Indeed, it would seem to be the obvious thing to say about matter and motion; that is, that any proposition asserting there is or can be motionless matter contains, or implies, a contradiction. Indicative sentences used to assert that matter is, or can be, motionless would certainly appear to contradict sentences used to claim motion is the mode of the existence of matter, or that motion is the way matter (always and under all circumstances) expresses itself.

[Of course, there is no contradiction here, but given the loose and profligate way that Dialectical Marxists use the word "contradiction", at first sight there seems to be no obvious reason why Lenin didn't use that word to describe motionless matter.]

Nevertheless, on reflection it seems pretty clear why he didn't do this: if Lenin had done so, it would have given the 'dialectical' game away. That is because, if he had ruled certain things out on the basis that they were contradictory, much of DM would have disappeared down the U-bend with it.

Clearly, the next question he would have been asked is this: "And why is just this contradictory state of affairs considered so objectionable in comparison to all the other contradictions that DM-theorists believe litter the entire universe that haven't similarly been proscribed? For instance, why is it that dialecticians fail to say that motion itself is impossible (or "unthinkable") because it 'implies a contradiction'? Or, to take another example, that wave-particle duality is impossible (or "unthinkable"), for the same reason?"

In fact, the existence of matter without motion ought to make perfectly good 'dialectical sense', if only because it appears to be 'contradictory' -- given the background theory that motion is a mode of existence of matter. After all, the Hegelian roots of DM seem to imply that matter moves because of its 'inherently contradictory nature' (even though the precise details are somewhat hazy).

"[B]ut contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Hegel (1999), p.439, §956. Bold emphasis added.]

Indeed, it would seem from this foundational doctrine that bodies must move because mobility and passivity are a product of an internal struggle going on in all objects (or is it between them(?) -- again DM-fans are a little hazy on that, too), since they are all UOs. So, why is there no 'unity of these opposites' -- i.e., in this case, 'motion and the absence of motion'? Anyone inclined to believe the cracked 'logic' Hegel peddled shouldn't find it too much of a challenge to 'derive motion itself' from the 'contradictory nature of matter'. The mobility of matter could then be predicated on its lack of motion! If concepts can develop into their opposites (as Hegel maintained), lack of motion should automatically 'develop', or 'pass over', into 'motion itself', one would have thought. Hence, far from immobile matter being "unthinkable", the foundational theory seems to require it, even if only to get everything moving, or keep it going!

It could be objected that the above argument is ridiculous. Dialecticians don't believe that motion is a UO of itself and its opposite, lack of motion. Indeed, it might even be pointed out that this caricature isn't the sort of contradiction to which Hegel was referring when he spoke about motion --, as Engels himself indicated:

"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]

However, that (proffered, hypothetical) DM-reply merely highlights the profound confusion lying at the heart of the 'theory-of-change' promoted by Dialectical Marxists, highlighted here, here and here. The problem is that according to what DM-theorists themselves have to say it is unclear whether objects and processes change:

(a) Because of a struggle between 'dialectical opposites' -- i.e., as a result of their 'internal contradictions';

[Essay Seven Part Three has exposed the physical and conceptual muddles the above alternatives create for DM-fans.]

So, if all things are UOs, and can only change because of that alleged fact, it seems that a moving body must be a dialectical union of 'opposites'. But what could possibly counts as the 'dialectical opposite' of motion? Until someone comes up with a better candidate, might I suggest, rest? In that case, all bodies must be a combination of motion and rest, otherwise there would be no 'dialectical opposites' at work here, no 'internal contradiction', and hence no motion or change. In that case, DM itself seems to imply all bodies are a combination of motion and rest, the struggle between which results in motion and change!

In that case, if the above anti-DM conclusions are "ridiculous", that is only because they make plain the incoherence at the heart of the DM-'theory-of-change'.

Moreover, as we saw in Essay Five, the alleged contradiction to which Engels refers (i.e., that a moving body is "Both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it" -- Engels (1976), p.152) can't be what makes an object move. If Engels is right, it is motion that creates the contradiction not the other way round. In that case, it seems that if there were any such 'contradictions', they would become apparent as each object moves, but not before. That would clearly imply motion causes these 'contradictions'; the 'contradictions' don't cause the motion.

[But, who can say with any certainty what -- if anything -- this part of DM implies. Any who do think it says something clear and determinate should get back to me after they have read Essay Five.]

Nevertheless, if Hegel is right, and objects do move because of their inherently contradictory nature, they must be UOs of some sort -- i.e., if one or more of the above three conditions apply. But, as argued above, what else could a DM-UO be but a union of motion and its opposite, rest. Nothing else appears remotely relevant.

[Again, any remaining doubters should contact me with their answer to this question: "What then is the 'dialectical opposite' of motion"?]

Others might be tempted to respond that that is precisely the point: because matter is inherently contradictory it is incessantly mobile.

But once more, if matter is truly contradictory -- and if we accept no half measures, or, indeed, we express no "excessive tenderness" toward moving things --, matter must be mobile and at rest all at once (if the above three considerations still apply). In that case, resolute Hegelians must at least be able to think, and clearly do think, the words (or what they 'represent') that Lenin proscribed -- i.e., that matter is motionless (at least, in part). It would have to be if every object and process is a DM-UO.

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]…. The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

So, we either abandon the above UO-thesis or we accept that matter is a 'dialectical union' of motion and lack of motion!

In fact, the good news is that there is no need to waste any more time speculating about this self-inflicted DM-conundrum since this is precisely what we observe everywhere. The seemingly 'contradictory' nature of matter (i.e., that it both moves and does not move) is not only an everyday occurrence, it is a scientific fact. Hard to believe? Well, with respect to one inertial frame an object can be at rest, but with respect to another it can be moving. And what is more, those two conditions can both be true at the same time concerning the same body.

Unfortunately for beleaguered DM-supporters this familiar (physical/mathematical) fact doesn't imply that motion is 'fundamentally contradictory in itself' (whatever that means!) -- so the above considerations offer DM no life-line -- only that given different reference frames we can picture it in no other way: as mobile with respect one frame, at rest with respect to another (at the same time). There is nothing deeply metaphysical about this; it is a spin-off of the conventions we use to depict the world. This socially-sanctioned fact, though, does lend sense to propositions about the mobility (or otherwise) of matter, and that is because we would (currently) have no other way of conceiving of movement scientifically except this way --, even if it doesn't actually make anything move (or, indeed, sustain movement) -- which is what DM/Hegelian 'contradictions' are supposedly meant to do.

Of course, the implications of 'dialectically unhelpful conclusions' like these can only be resisted on linguistic/conceptual grounds. That is, they may only be challenged by clarifying what words like "motion", "immobile", "inertial frame", "same time", and "contradiction" should be taken to mean. Naturally, anyone tempted to go down that route would only have succeeded in reminding us that Lenin's ideas in this area are, at best, the creatures of convention -- or they might even be a consequence of the way he idiosyncratically chose to talk about this and other related topics. That would mean, of course, they aren't even remotely "objective", as Lenin himself defined that word.

Moreover, given the additional fact that Lenin's philosophical ideas fall apart alarmingly easily (as, indeed, do Engels's -- on that, see here and here), any such DM-'convention' isn't likely to catch on in the scientific community. In fact, neutral observers should feign no surprise if these ideas fail to make the bottom of the reserve list of viable candidates that that community would even begin to take seriously.

As pointed out earlier, it seems that Lenin must have thought the words "motion without matter" (or their sentential 'content') in order to deny they were thinkable. If so, it is difficult to see what he was driving at if the very act of saying what he did appears to undermine the point he wished to make by saying it!

However, B1 won't do, either. Just as soon as the quoted sentence in B1 (i.e., B5) is entertained, it seems that that cognitive act itself would make B1 false!

Plainly that is because the embedded sentence in B1 (i.e., B5) appears to be false whenever anyone thinks it (i.e., its 'content').

[Again, what is meant by "content" is explained below, where it will become clear why that word has often been put in 'scare' quotes.]

B2: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.

Moreover, it seems that B1 itself becomes false whenever B5 (or its 'content') is itself thought; and yet by thinking B1, B5 must be entertained. The only way anyone could agree with B1 is by thinking B5 (or its 'content') -- i.e., knowing what that 'content' means or implies. Unfortunately, that itself means we may only agree with B1 by doing what B5 says can't be done; it looks like we have to think the unthinkable, thereby making B1 false. In that case, B1 would be 'true' just in case it were 'false'; we may only assent to it if we never allow its 'content' to cross our minds. But how could we do that if what it says isn't first understood? [That comment provides the first clue we need in order to uncover the real reason Lenin's theory of matter and motion (along with every other metaphysical theory) in the end turns out to be incoherent non-sense.]

It could be argued that this shows that B1 is true since it is indeed the case that matter without motion is unthinkable. And yet, that is precisely the point: even to assert this alleged fact requires the 'forbidden' words "matter without motion" (or their 'content') to 'pass through the mind'; so it looks like it isn't the case that these words (or their 'content') can't be thought.^11b

But, what about the counter-claim that the above remarks confuse B1 with B2? That objection will be considered in the next sub-section, and again later in this Essay.

B2: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.

It could be objected that the above argument simply conflates the following two sentences (in other words it confuses use with mention).^11c

R4: Sentences that assert that matter without motion is possible are unthinkable.

Clearly, R3a/R3b are susceptible to the points that have already been made. But, it could be countered that Lenin obviously didn't mean either of those. He clearly meant R2. It is certainly possible to think the 'offending words' without imagining them to be true (a point made earlier by the quoted critic). Hence, the above argument is confused and as such is entirely misguided.

The question therefore becomes: Is R2 vulnerable in the same way? Is it feasible to argue that Lenin was forced to contradict himself in order to make his point about matter and motion? Did he have to think the 'offending words' -- in the sense that (i) he had to imagine what would or could make them true, or that (ii) he had to imagine what the world must be like if what R5 below says were the case (even if only to rule it out immediately), or even that (iii) he had to contemplate the meaning of the 'offending words' in order to decide they were in the end "unthinkable" -- in the very act of denying anyone could do what he had just done?

Indeed, it might seem so. As we will see, in order to rule motion without matter out of court Lenin would have to know what he was trying to exclude. But, to do that he would have to know what motion without matter (or motionless matter) amounted to (i.e., what those words implied in a sentential context) so that he could exclude that possibility from all consideration on the basis that it was unthinkable. Otherwise, for all he knew, he could be ruling out the wrong condition, or, indeed, he might be ruling out nothing at all (in the sense that he wasn't engaged in an act of ruling out). Hence, the content of R5 (i.e., what it was supposedly being used to say, or could be used to say) would have to be thinkable so that Lenin could inform his readers it wasn't a viable possibility.

[That last remark in fact draws us closer still to the real reason Lenin's words collapse into incoherence. More on that later.]

It could further be objected that R3a, R3b, R4, P1, and P2 aren't what Lenin was trying to say when he argued that motion without matter is unthinkable. But, as we will see, it isn't possible to make sense of what he was trying to say whether or not he intended one or more of R3a, R3b, R4, P1, P2 or even R2.

[The above is a brief summary of a much longer argument I have developed below. See also here.]

R4: Sentences that assert that matter without motion is possible are unthinkable.

However, if we assume for the moment that Lenin was right, and that we were 100% clear what he was actually trying to say, even then what could he possibly have meant by what he said if it seems that everyone (including he himself) could so easily disprove, in practice, this supposedly self-evident conclusion? That is, if it is so easy to think about matter devoid of motion?

Precisely what is so unthinkable here that is also so easily thought? What is it about M1a/R2 that is supposed to command our assent -- but, apparently, only in the act of undermining what it seems to say?

As we try to answer these questions it becomes clear that there might be a grain of truth in the objection that the argument developed in this Essay appears to confuse use with mention, but not in the way that some might imagine.

The 'grain of truth' lies the form in which these ideas were expressed and the way that it affects how we interpret Lenin's words. Had Lenin come out with R1 (or either of R3a and R3b,), it is easy to see why his remarks might be correct.

R4: Sentences that assert that matter without motion is possible are unthinkable.

In R1, R3a and R3b, Lenin is merely mentioning the quoted words, he isn't using them. Those three words ("matter", "without", and "motion") are combined in a phrasal, not clausal, form, so on their own they can be neither true nor false. If Lenin meant that the act of thinking involved whatever was the object of his thought had to be in propositional form (i.e., it had to be expressed in a sentence, or clause, capable of being true -- somewhat like R4, or P1, above, for example), then it seems he was right to so conclude. But in R1, those three words appear in a phrase, and so they, or that phrase, can't be true or false.

[The minimum requirement for a set of words to be capable of being true, or false, is that they appear in a clause, not a non-verb phrase (a point that was clear to philosophers at least as far back as Plato). Anyone not too sure what a grammatical clause is might like to check out this explanation.]

So, if Lenin did mean by "thought" what was inferred a few sentences ago (repeated in slightly clearer form, in B6 below), then the phase "matter without motion" can't be thought (in the above sense) since it isn't expressed by a clause.

B6: In order to be able to think something, then, whatever is thought has to be in propositional form; it must appear in a sentence (or clause) that is capable of being true.

[It is also worth recalling that a clause is also capable of expressing a proposition. On that, see Chapter Two of Geach (1980).]

However, as anyone can check, Lenin uses the word "thought" (and its cognates, such as "think") in a variety of ways in MEC, many of which are consistent with B6.

In which case, Lenin wasn't (consciously or unconsciously) arguing that the phrasal nature of the 'three offending words' used in R2 (recall he was using them in R2, not mentioning them!) is what made them unthinkable. [So, this is the 'grain of truth' in the critic's objection, but he certainly didn't see it that way.] But, if Lenin were (successfully) to deny the thinkability of the offending words, he would have to do so in a sentential, or a clausal, context, which was at least capable of being true (or false). If so, he would have to have some idea what it meant for someone to think these words in a linguistic context that allowed it. Hence, those three words, at some point, would have to be expressed in an indicative sentence, a proposition or a clause. If not, how would he be able to deny truthfully they could be thought at the same time as accepting B6? And that is part of the reason why it has been maintained throughout this Essay that Lenin thought he meant something like P1 or P2, where emphasis is placed on the propositional or clausal content of a sentence using the three 'offending' words (more about that later):

B6: In order to be able to think something, then, whatever is thought has to be in propositional form; it must appear in a sentence (or clause) that is capable of being true.

Hence, in order to assert truthfully that the three controversial words ("matter", "without", and "motion") were "unthinkable":

(ii) Lenin would have to know what he was ruling out; he would have to know under what conditions a sentence like "Motion can exist without matter" [i.e., R5] might be true just so he could declare it was never true.

In that case, it could be that Lenin merely meant the truth of an indicative sentence (like M1a that contained, and used, the words "motion without matter") was unthinkable. Or even that such a sentence could never be true, or never thought of as true. If so, he might have in the end meant one or more of R3a, R3b, R4, P1, and P2:

R4: Sentences that assert that matter without motion is possible are unthinkable.

The question is: are any of the above options genuinely faithful to Lenin's intentions? Even more to the point: are they viable in themselves?

As we will see, the answer to the second question turns out to be negative, a result that turns out to have devastating consequences for any conceivable answers to the first.

The bottom line here is that Lenin can't have actually meant any of them!

Later in this Essay it will be shown that every attempt to make sense of what Lenin and other metaphysicians dogmatically assert (about matter and notion -- or, indeed, about 'Being', space, time, motion, 'consciousness', and much else besides!) fails. And that is because what they all come out with turns out to be incoherent non-sense.

The rest of this Essay will attempt to explain why that is so, and then justify this seemingly dogmatic conclusion.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

When Lenin's words are examined even more closely it becomes impossible to understand what it was he was trying to say -- or, indeed, precisely what 'truth' he was attempting to communicate to his readers. Or even whether what he appears to be saying could in any way be true, or even thought of as true, no matter how it was expressed, paraphrased, spun or re-configured.

R4: Sentences that assert that matter without motion is possible are unthinkable.

M10 looks rather awkward and it isn't obviously correct. P2 looks a little less awkward. But, is it correct? Well, it is possible to think of many examples of motion that don't involve the movement of matter or the locomotion of any bodies as such. [In addition to those considered below, a dozen or so extra examples were listed in Essay Five. Readers are directed there for more details.]

"Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking." [Engels (1954), p.69. Bold emphasis added.]

So, M11 could be true even if no matter was relocated in the process, or as a result of it. [Any who object to this example should consult Note 12 where I have dealt with their qualms.]¹²

M12: The occurrence of literal motion without matter can never be thought of as true.

This seems to be closer to what Lenin might have meant, even if it still looks a rather odd and a little stilted. Be this as it may, M13 presents problems of its own. Consider this apparent counter-example:

Now, M14 seems to depict literal movement, and yet it isn't easy to see whether any matter has to be re-located as a result. Perhaps we might appeal to the movement of atoms in NM's brain, or the re-arrangement of ink molecules in a diary or on wall planner -- when the new date is recorded somewhere (etc.), as possible examples of matter in motion, in this instance. But, at best, that would simply mean motion was indirectly associated with matter, since in this case the supposed strike itself wouldn't actually exist to be moved anywhere, even though it has still been moved.

It might be objected here that this sense of "move" wasn't at all what Lenin had in mind. But, Lenin himself appealed to a wider sense of "move" in his argument against the Idealists he was criticising:

"Let us imagine a consistent idealist who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take 'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas, sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject and regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his ideas come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' -- and that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of thinking. And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view. The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given us in sensation." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

Here, Lenin refers to the "movement of ideas and perceptions" as examples of motion (indeed, as did Engels before him), so it can hardly be objected when a wider meaning of the relevant words is used against his assertion recorded in M1a.

Again, it could be argued that in this particular example what has actually changed is the date of the said strike. It is this that has been moved not the strike itself. But again, if it were only a date that had been moved, it would still be unclear whether any matter has to be relocated as a consequence. Once more, the date is in the future and doesn't yet exist even though it has still been moved.

Now, it would be little use referring to the altered marks in a diary or on a wall-planner (or any such located elsewhere, for that matter -- no pun intended!) in order to claim that material changes were directly or indirectly implied in this case. Certainly, such things may change, but if anyone were to imagine that the dates of strikes, or even strikes themselves, are simply marks on paper, then bosses could easily put a stop to trade union militancy by rubbing-, or tippexing-out the relevant marks (or by destroying the wall-planners/diaries involved), and be done with it. The class struggle surely can't be so easily neutralised, can it?

At best, therefore, the movement reported in M14 is indirectly associated with matter. Nevertheless, M14 appears to indicate that we can at least understand sentences where the connection between motion and matter isn't as obvious or clear-cut as Lenin seems to think. So, maybe we can think the unthinkable, despite what Lenin said. We certainly have to entertain or mull over the idea (that in some circumstances matter and motion might fail to be linked in the way Engels and Lenin supposed) while the validity of this particular objection is assessed.

But, that still leaves the status of M12 and M13 unresolved. If we now just ignore (or hand wave aside) awkward cases like M14 and concentrate on examples of movement located only in the present, we might perhaps be able to discern Lenin's intentions.

[Unfortunately, this restriction would make the temporal quantifier (i.e., "never") in M12 and M13 seem superfluous, if not redundant. I will (mercifully!) also ignore that awkward complication.]

M12: The occurrence of literal motion without matter can never be thought of as true.

If we are careful to stipulate that "literal motion" involves change of place, then maybe the following re-write of M12 and M13 might be acceptable?

One obvious example of literal movement that takes place without matter -- which is not only thinkable, it is actual -- is the motion of the Centre of Mass [CoM] of the Galaxy [CMG], otherwise known as its Barycentre. [I have said more about CoMs and CMGs in Essay Eleven Part One, here.]

The CMG is located in 'empty space' (as are many Barycentres), but it exerts a decisive causal influence on everything in the Galaxy while not being material itself (it isn't made of anything, it is merely a theoretical point, a 'mathematical abstraction', if you will). In its turn, it moves under the influence of something else that isn't material, either -- the centre of mass of the cluster of galaxies of which ours is a part, and so on.¹⁴

This example, of course, omits any reference to the geodesics of Spacetime as causal factors, here. However, introducing that complication at this stage wouldn't affect the point being made since geodesics are, of course, non-material themselves. Arguably, they aren't even 'extra-mental'. What exactly makes matter, or, indeed, anything, move along a geodesic is itself a moot point, which I will leave no less moot for now.

"Lagrange points are positions in space where objects sent there tend to stay put. At Lagrange points, the gravitational pull of two large masses precisely equals the centripetal force required for a small object to move with them. These points in space can be used by spacecraft to reduce fuel consumption needed to remain in position. Lagrange Points are positions in space where the gravitational forces of a two body system like the Sun and the Earth produce enhanced regions of attraction and repulsion. These can be used by spacecraft to reduce fuel consumption needed to remain in position. Lagrange points are named in honour of Italian-French mathematician Josephy-Louis Lagrange. There are five special points where a small mass can orbit in a constant pattern with two larger masses.... This mathematical problem, known as the 'General Three-Body Problem' was considered by Lagrange in his prize winning paper (Essai sur le Problème des Trois Corps, 1772 [Essay On The Three Body Problem -- RL.]). Of the five Lagrange points, three are unstable and two are stable. The unstable Lagrange points -- labelled L1, L2 and L3 -- lie along the line connecting the two large masses. The stable Lagrange points -- labelled L4 and L5 -- form the apex of two equilateral triangles that have the large masses at their vertices. L4 leads the orbit of earth and L5 follows. The L1 point of the Earth-Sun system affords an uninterrupted view of the sun and is currently home to the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory Satellite SOHO. The L2 point of the Earth-Sun system was the home to the WMAP spacecraft, current home of Plank, and future home of the James Webb Space Telescope. [This was clearly published before that particular telescope was positioned in January 2022 -- RL.] L2 is ideal for astronomy because a spacecraft is close enough to readily communicate with Earth, can keep Sun, Earth and Moon behind the spacecraft for solar power and (with appropriate shielding) provides a clear view of deep space for our telescopes. The L1 and L2 points are unstable on a time scale of approximately 23 days, which requires satellites orbiting these positions to undergo regular course and altitude corrections.

"NASA is unlikely to find any use for the L3 point since it remains hidden behind the Sun at all times. The idea of a hidden planet has been a popular topic in science fiction writing. The L4 and L5 points are home to stable orbits so long as the mass ratio between the two large masses exceeds 24.96. This condition is satisfied for both the Earth-Sun and Earth-Moon systems, and for many other pairs of bodies in the solar system. Objects found orbiting at the L4 and L5 points are often called Trojans after the three large asteroids Agamemnon, Achilles and Hector that orbit in the L4 and L5 points of the Jupiter-Sun system. (According to Homer, Hector was the Trojan champion slain by Achilles during King Agamemnon's siege of Troy). There are hundreds of Trojan Asteroids in the solar system. Most orbit with Jupiter, but others orbit with Mars. In addition, several of Saturn's moons have Trojan companions. In 1956 the Polish astronomer Kordylewski discovered large concentrations of dust at the Trojan points of the Earth-Moon system. The DIRBE instrument on the COBE satellite confirmed earlier IRAS observations of a dust ring following the Earth's orbit around the Sun. The existence of this ring is closely related to the Trojan points, but the story is complicated by the effects of radiation pressure on the dust grains. In 2010 NASA's WISE telescope finally confirmed the first Trojan asteroid (2010 TK7) [NASA's original link here no longer works so it has been replaced with one that does -- RL] around Earth's leading Lagrange point." [Quoted from here; accessed 29/05/2025. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; several paragraphs merged. Numerous links and italic emphasis added.]

Somewhat similar points can be made about these LPs (again, no pun intended): These five Earth-Sun LPs are located in 'empty space', and while they clearly exert a causal influence on any bodies located there, they, too, aren't material bodies (again, they aren't made of anything but are the result of the confluence of the aforementioned geodesics, which aren't material, either). Despite this, they are all constrained to move as if they were physically tied to the bodies whose gravitational fields create them (in this case, the Earth and the Sun).

Despite this, it could be argued that because matter 'creates', or it is the efficient cause of, geodesics, all movement in the end is related in some respect to matter. If so, Lenin's original claim has to be watered-down to something like the following:

[Of course, that response assumes geodesics are extra-mental entities when they are in fact mathematical objects, and, just like lines of force, their physical status isn't just puzzling, it is entirely obscure. (On that, see here and below.) If so, it isn't easy to see how matter itself can 'create' a single geodesic.]

But, N1 might not even be true (and that possibility is quite apart from the fact that it, too, is "thinkable"; you, dear reader, have just thought it, or what it supposedly 'represents'/'reflects'!), and that could even be the case with or without the need to appeal to a single DM-precept. Anyway, as we saw in Note 1, according to DM-fans, motion is "The mode of the existence of matter"; its demotion to a factor that merely plays a causal role in the whole affair would seriously weaken yet another key component of DM.

The reason why N1 might not be true is discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part One. Briefly, that is because we don't as yet have a theory that connects QM with General Relativity, and currently the leading candidates depend on the reification of some highly abstruse mathematics, which approach itself has serious Idealist implications for Physics (as Lenin himself recognised). Such acts of reification either imply -- or are based on the unacknowledged premise -- that mathematical entities (differential equations, tensor, vector and scalar fields -- or 'the field' in general -- and assorted probability distributions, etc., etc.) are capable of acting as causal agents themselves. Unless we subscribe to some form of Mystical, Cosmic, Pythagorean-Platonism, that idea isn't even plausible.

It could be argued that the CMG and all those LPs are external to the mind, so the above claims are subject to the following rebuttal (advanced by Lenin):

"If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas, symbols, conventional signs, and so forth?" [Lenin (1972), p.324.]

Hence, in view of the fact that scientists' ideas about the nature of matter and energy are constantly developing, facts concerning Relativity (or even QM) in no way embarrass DM. Whatever is objective and external to the mind is matter, and that includes the CMG and those LPs. Again, as Lenin argued:

"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind.... Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., pp.311-12. Italic emphasis in the original. Paragraphs merged.]

Even more significant, the CMG doesn't actually exist -- at least, it no more exists than any other averaged quantity does. So, concerning averages in general: Is there in existence anywhere on Earth an individual answering to the following description: "The average woman in the UK"? If not how then can either an 'average person' or the CMG be 'objective'? And if 'objectivity' is supposed to be "existence independent of the mind" -- and since averages and the CMG are creations of the human mind -- they clearly can't be 'objective' in Lenin's sense of that word:

"To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972), p.148. Bold emphasis added.]

"Knowledge can be useful biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid., p.157. Bold emphasis added.]

[Naturally, the above comment about averages depends on whether we are talking about the mean, the median or the mode. In the above, the mean was clearly intended.]

As should seem reasonably clear, Lenin's catch-all definition -- that whatever "objective exists outside the mind" is material -- would plainly include the CMG and the LPs by definitional fiat. But, why should we accept such a definition? Lenin's continual assertion that this is what matter is, isn't, I'm sorry to have to say, a sufficient reason for the rest of us to accept it -- unless, of course, we conclude that Lenin was a Minor Deity of some sort.

Partisan bias to one side, would we be prepared to accept a 'definition' of "fairness" promulgated by a supporter of the capitalist system which meant that that word applied to everything and anything that happened inside Capitalism and had been initiated by the ruling-class or their ideologues for their benefit? Or that wages paid to workers were "fair"? I suspect not.

Indeed, would we be happy to accept a definition of 'God' as "The Supreme and Eternal Being who exists of necessity, but whose existence can't be proved"?

Well, since 'His'/'Her'/'Its' existence can't be proved, the sentence "God is The Supreme and Eternal Being who exists, but whose existence can't be proved" must be true, by definition.

But then, if 'His'/'Her'/'Its' existence can be proved, 'He'/'She'/'It' exists anyway. So, either way, 'He'/'She'/'It' must exist.

Now, it is little use pointing to the weaknesses, or even the 'contradictions' in the above 'argument', since a smart theologian will simply play the Nixon card (beloved of DM-fans) to silence all opposition. And, if you persist, you will simply be accused of not "understanding" 'Theological Dialectics'.

Now, I don't expect the DM-fraternity to accept any of this (and that might be because of Lenin's stature as a great revolutionary, or even because Dialectical Marxists have yet to abandon the partisan bias just mentioned), but when they see what odd 'entities' are permitted/admitted by Lenin's overly generous definitions of words like "objective", "material" and "matter", I suspect they might be among the first to demur. [On that, see Essay Thirteen Part One, Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6.]

Independently of that, it is worth asking "Is there any difference between creating a 'truth' by definition and imposing DM on the facts?" But, the latter is something Dialectical Marxists claim they never do.

Perhaps we should modify M15 to accommodate or even neutralise such 'inconvenient' counterexamples -- maybe along the following lines:

Alas, M16 now concedes the point that motion can take place while spatially-, or, perhaps even temporally-, divorced from matter, since it isn't specific about contiguous or concurrent causation (which, of course, may not be what Lenin meant by M1a anyway -- who can say?). And, as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part One (link above), Lenin's theory of matter (if such it might be called) is so vague and confused that little sense can be made of it.¹⁵

Nevertheless, despite these annoying 'problems', M15 and M16 face far more serious challenges than the inconvenient astronomical (or even mundane) facts mentioned above.

As we are about to discover, detailed consideration of these 'problems' will take us to the heart of the reason what Lenin's theory and all of metaphysics are in the end incoherent non-sense.

[Several of the points advanced in this sub-section might strike some readers as not only dogmatic (which might seem incongruous given the criticisms levelled against dogmatism throughout this site), but in want of substantiation. However, what follows largely serves as an introduction to ideas that will be more fully developed and substantiated as Essay Twelve, in all its Seven Parts (including the rest this Part), unfolds. By the end of this specific Essay, but even more so by the end of Part Seven, accusations of dogmatism should be much harder, if not impossible, to sustain. Hence, the reader's continued patience and indulgence is requested.]

The 'problems' Lenin and other metaphysicians face are a direct consequence of their use of distorted language (once again, this is a point Marx also made). But, there are other features of the language Traditional Philosophers employed that are less well appreciated (or, to be more honest, aren't appreciated at all!), which mean that the slide into metaphysical incoherence doesn't just involve DM. With respect to Metaphysics in general this collapse is as unavoidable as it is irreversible.

While it is true that Dialectical Marxists at least give lip service to the claim that language is both a social product and a means of communication, few of them seem to have thought through the full implications of that claim.¹⁷ On the contrary, one of the least well appreciated consequences is that language is conventional. Indeed, if language is social, how could it be other than conventional? Human beings invented language; it wasn't bestowed on humanity from 'on high', nor was it a gift from an 'advanced civilisation of aliens'. This means that at some point in their history human beings must have adopted, acquired or integrated a series of linguistic conventions into their inter-personal behaviour and social cohesion.^17a

In fact, an even less well appreciated corollary of the above considerations is that if language is primarily a means of communication, it can't primarily be representational.¹⁸

While it is undeniable that some Dialectical Marxists acknowledge what might seem to them to be the (strictly limited) validity of this corollary -- that language is conventional -- hardly any (perhaps none at all) have considered the added implication that language can't primarily be representational. Certainly Marx and Engels failed to do so, as have subsequent DM-theorists. Indeed, much of what they have to say on this topic -- especially in relation to 'abstraction', 'cognition', 'consciousness', and knowledge -- strongly suggests the opposite is the case.^18a

As we are about to find out, representational theories undermine the social nature of language and the role it plays in intercommunication. This means Dialectical Marxists, who up to now have accepted one or other version 'Representationalism', should 'do a 180' and completely reject this approach to language and knowledge. The 'representational family of theories' grew out of an ancient, mystical belief concerning the nature and origin of language, which pictured it as a 'supernatural gift', a 'window into the Mind of God'. This implied that language was, deep down, a secret code somehow capable of 'reflecting the Underlying Essence of Being' -- or a special key uniquely designed to unlock nature's 'hidden secrets' -- because of its 'Divine Origin'. That 'code' was buried in language and 're-presented God's Thoughts' to those capable of de-coding it. As a result, language was thought capable of 'reflecting fundamental truths' that had been stitched into the 'Fabric of Reality' during creation -- these days the is has been replaced by the 'Fabric of Spacetime'. [Different age, same symbolism.] More recently these 'Super-Truths' were simply there because of 'natural necessity'/'natural law', both of which turn out to be no less mysterious.

Hence, 'Reality' could now be 'reflected' in 'human consciousness' on a like-recognises-like sort of basis -- a doctrine that found clear echo in the old Hermetic mantra, "As above so below", which was later transformed into its more profane alter-ego, "As below so above". Hence, even for non-Theists, 'Reality' now became a projection of the obscure jargon concocted by philosophers and mystics for that very purpose; the 'linguistic below' now determined the 'metaphysical above'. In this way, the New Testament line, "In the beginning was the Word", was secularised and became, "The Word is the World".

[Passages in support of these rather sweeping claims can be found below, as well as here; several more will be referenced in Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve.]

If the world is the 'special creation of a 'Deity' (who supposedly conjured everything into existence by means of language), then 'reality' must be essentially mind-like, constituted by 'Divine Ideas', 'Thoughts', 'Concepts' or even Words. On that basis it seemed perfectly obvious to influential ruling-class theorists in the Ancient World that their thought must be capable of re-presenting 'God's Thoughts', since there must exists some sort of isomorphism between them -- because 'we' were supposedly made in 'His Image'.

In this way Representationalism became the flip side of Theism and Idealism -- as Hegel himself understood:

"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel (1999), pp.154-55; §316. Bold emphasis added.]

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases added.]

According to this ancient dogma, language contains a 'hidden message' a 'secret code'. This idea is upfront in Kabbalism (alongside the countless 'True Bible Codes' that have fed off this dogma. But it underlies much of Traditional Thought, as the next two Parts of Essay Twelve will demonstrate. Given this approach, language is in effect an Esoteric Cipher, the meaning of which may only be accessed and 'understood' by the elite, their lackeys, or, indeed, specially-trained Professional Philosophers. Successful comprehension of the Nuggets of Truth they found buried behind what look like ordinary words, and which revealed 'essential truths' hidden beneath 'appearances' -- which also shaped 'the real meanings' of ordinary-looking expressions -- was way beyond the intellectual capacity of ordinary folk. [Of course, none of this should astonish us since no one understands these 'deeper truths', as this Essay will demonstrate.]

But, the 'great unwashed' are (supposedly) 'intellectually handicapped', because their thoughts remain at the level of 'appearances', constrained and limited as they are by 'banal commonsense', 'formal thinking' and the 'static vocabulary' of the vernacular. Small wonder then that ordinary language has remained a target for countless centuries of ruling-class criticism and denigration -- echoed of late by Dialectical Marxists.

In that case, should any of us be at all surprised that the "ideas of the ruling class always rule" if our side is forever punching down, waving the ideological equivalent of a white flag?

The 'Christian Tradition' in all this would have us further believe this 'Hidden Code' was stitched into the 'Primary Language' given to Adam by 'God', but similar myths abound in other cultures. Indeed, as noted above, much of Hermetic, Neo-Platonic, Alchemical and Kabbalistic Mysticism is based on this view of the relation between 'God', language and 'Reality'/'Being'.

[On this, see Bono (1995), Eco (1997), and Vickers (1984b). This topic will be explored more fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here), and several other Parts of Essay Twelve.]

Various signs, portents and 'hidden messages' were also believed to be 'written in the stars', in sacred books, tea leaves, the flight of birds, the organs and entrails of slaughtered animals -- or, indeed, in more recent, secular re-incarnations of this doctrine, they have somehow been encrypted in our central nervous system as an innate "Transformational Grammar", or "Unbounded Merge" -- or even as a "Language of Thought". [On this, see Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

The Representational Dogma later surfaced in Dialectical Marxism as a direct result of the theory that 'thought is dialectical because reality is dialectical':

"Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically." [Engels (1892), p.407, repeated in Engels (1976), p.28. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211. Bold emphases added.]

"A dialectical method is only possible because reality itself is dialectically structured." [Rees (1998)., p.271. Bold emphasis added.]

[I have covered this aspect of DL in Essay Four, some of which has been reproduced below.]

This 'profound secret' is, alas, hidden from those who refuse to see, or, of course, who don't 'understand dialectics'. Fortunately for believers, the good news is that DM can now be viewed as an "Algebra of Revolution", which works, so we are told, because it alone is fine-tuned to harmonise with the "pulse" of 'Freedom'/'Reality' -- or, perhaps even because 'Reality' 'dances' to its highly syncopated rhythm. But, thanks should rather go to a Christian Mystic, since the thoughts of those who look to him for guidance are now 'in harmony' with these 'profound mysteries' -- which remain hidden from the 'unworthy' (i.e., those who can't quite fathom the obscure gobbledygook Hegel inflicted on humanity). Fortunately, loyal adherence to such gobbledygook enables the DM-Faithful to re-present 'the Logic of Being' in each privileged head, which enjoins them to spread the 'glad tidings' to rest of benighted humanity.

[Who, up to now, have turned their faithless backs on this semi-secular Gospel! No wonder the Party has to substitute itself for such ideological miscreants.]

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975c), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis added.]

"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly,' not 'abstractly,' not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution." [Lenin (1961), p.195. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Ibid., pp.196-97. Italics in the original.]

"1. the objectivity of consideration (not examples, not divergencies (sic), but the Thing-in-itself). 2. the entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing to others. 3. the development of this thing, (phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life. 4. the internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing. 5. the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and unity of opposites. 6. the struggle, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc. 7. the union of analysis and synthesis -- the break-down of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts. 8. the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with every other. 9. not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]. 10. the endless process of the discovery of new sides, relations, etc. 11. the endless process of the deepening of man's knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence. 12. from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form. 13. the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and 14. the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation). 15. the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the content. 16. the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa.... In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics...." [Ibid., pp.221-22. Bold emphases alone added. Formatting modified to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…." [Ibid., pp.357-58. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." [Lenin (1947), p.32. Bold emphases added.]

"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"Friends and Fellow-Citizens: The teachings of Communism contain the material for a new religion which, unlike any other religion, appeals not merely to the heart and emotions, but at the same time to the brain, the organ of knowledge. From all other earthly knowledge communism is distinguished by its religious form, by its fervid appeal to the heart and soul of man. Generally speaking the object of religion is to save the suffering soul from the gloom and misery of earthly life. This object it has thus far realized only in an unreal and fantastic manner, by referring us to an invisible God and to a Kingdom inhabited by ghosts. The gospel of today promises to save us from misery in a real and palpable way. God -- that is the Good, the Beautiful and the Holy -- is to be made man, and is to descend from heaven unto the earth, not as in the days of old in the flame of religion and in the spell of wonder, but in reason and reality. We want our saviour, our Word, to become flesh, and to be materialized not in one individual only. All of us desire, the people want to become sons of God.

"Religion was until now a matter for the dispossessed. Now, however, the matter of the dispossessed is becoming religion -- that is, something which takes hold of the whole heart and soul of those who believe. The new faith, the faith of the proletariat, revolutionizes everything, and transforms after the manner of science, the old faiths. In opposition to the olden times we say: Sun, stand thou still, and Earth, move and transform! In the old religion man served the gospel, in the new religion the gospel is to serve man. In order to emancipate humanity from religion not only vaguely but distinctly and really, it is necessary to overcome religion by analyzing and fully comprehending it. The new gospel asks for a thorough revision of the whole system of our thought. According to the old revelation the law was the primary, the supreme and the eternal, and man the secondary element. According to the new revelation, man is the primary, the supreme and the eternal, and the law the secondary, temporary and transitory element. We do not live for the sake of the law, but, on the contrary, the law exists for our sake, to serve us, and to be modified according to our needs. The old gospel required of us patience and submissiveness; the new gospel requires of us energy and activity. In the place of grace it puts conscious work. The old bible was named authority and faith; the new has for its title revolutionary science." [Dietzgen (1917a), pp.90-91. Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…. When you apply the dialectical method to the study of phenomena, you need to remember that forms change eternally in consequence of the 'higher development of their content….' In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin and destruction…. [M]odern science confirms at every step the idea expressed with such genius by Hegel, that quantity passes into quality…. [I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That's how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged.]

[I have entered into this topic in much greater detail in Essay Nine Part Two, Sections (2)-(5), where I connect the above approach (to philosophy) with the religious upbringing the DM-classicists received as children (and that includes Mao, too), which, of course, they later repudiated -- but not the idea that there is an 'invisible world' lying 'beneath appearances' that is more real than the world we see around us. No wonder then that Hegel's ideas appealed to them! Concerning the importance of the 'Appearance'/'Reality' dichotomy for DM-Epistemology and Ontology, see Section (9) of Essay Three Part Two (Any who doubt this link are invited to shelve those doubts until they have read that material.)]

As I argued in Essay Four Part One (in relation to the mystical dogma that there is a 'dialectical logic' -- of some sort yet to be clarified -- that supposedly runs the entire show 'behind, and in contradiction to, appearances' -- slightly edited):

Attentive readers will no doubt be able to spot the non-existent presuppositions (alongside Hegel's acceptance of the aforementioned 'traditional thought-forms'), in the following:

"This objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind. Anaxagoras is praised as the man who first declared that Nous, thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic. What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.50-51, §§53-54. Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. I have reproduced the published version, since the on-line version differs from it; I have informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. They have now corrected the on-line version! Paragraphs merged.]

Of course, contemporary logicians are now much clearer about the distinction between rules of inference and logical truths than their counterparts were in the Ancient World -- or, indeed, in the 19^th century! That fact alone means the criticisms DM-theorists level against FL are even more anachronistic and impossible to justify.

[The distinction between assumptions and rules of inference (i.e., between propositions, which can be true or false, and rules, which can be neither) was neatly illustrated by Lewis Carroll over a century ago in his dialogue, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. A PDF of that classic 'paradox' can be accessed here.]

Anyway, if materialists are to reject the mystical view of nature prevalent in Ancient Greece (which is both implicit and explicit in Hegelian Ontology) --, as surely they must --, then the idea that FL is just another branch psychology, or is best described as some sort of 'Super-Physics' -- or even that it is the 'Science of Thought' -- becomes even more difficult to sustain.

But, how is it possible for language to 'reflect' the 'logic of the world' if the world has no logic? How could the universe have a logic -- that is, how could nature have our (supposed) 'ways of thinking' stitched into it? That clearly isn't possible unless Nature is 'Mind' or the 'Product of Mind', and our 'thought' (somehow) reflects its 'Maker's Thought'.

If the development of Nature isn't in fact an expression of the 'development of Mind' (as Hegel supposed), how can concepts drawn from any such 'development' apply to Nature? Again, that couldn't be the case unless Nature itself were 'Mind', or the 'Product of Mind'.

Dialectical Marxists seem not to have noticed this rather obvious implication: If the Universe is 'dialectical' then 'Mind' must precede 'Matter'. But, what else would anyone seriously expect of a theory that was derived from the confused ramblings of a Christian Mystic (upside down or 'the right way up')?

Dialectical Marxists seem not to have noticed this rather obvious implication: If the Universe is 'dialectical' then 'Mind' must precede 'Matter'., and 'Matter;' is just an aspect of 'Mind'. Which helps explain why several DM-classicists (which includes Engels and Lenin), as well as several other DM-theorists, have claimed matter is just an abstraction.

What else could anyone seriously have expected of a theory that was based on the obscure ramblings of a Christian Mystic (upside down or 'the right way up')?

In response to challenges of this sort, Dialectical Marxists have invariably advanced an (implicit or explicit) appeal to the RTK -- but in their case, this amounts to an appeal to the sophisticated version of the 'Reflection Theory of Knowledge', which ('dialectically') combines the traditional, passive theory of reflection with references to practice and the active involvement of each 'Knower', each society even, in the formation of knowledge (on this, see Appendix Three of Essay Three Part Two). But, as we will discover in Essay Three Part Five and Twelve Part Four, that response was no less unwise. That is because the RTK, in the hands of DM-theorists, turns out to be RRT (briefly explained below).

[RTK = Reflection Theory of Knowledge. RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory (which is perhaps better described as the 'Projection Theory of Knowledge'). Basically, the idea is that, given DM, language and 'mind' don't in fact 'reflect reality' (as its proponents maintain). The reverse is the case. 'Reality' is deliberately structured so that it conforms with how DM-theorists think we cognise it; it is thereby made to reflect the contingent features of how they think we think, or how they think we talk (or, indeed, how they think we should talk!). So, discourse doesn't reflect the world, the world is made to conform with how 'dialectical jargon' tries to picture it. Language and meaning are thereby projected onto the world -- the 'Word becomes the World'. Hence, the ersatz 'reality' that results from this 'reverse-reflection' (this projection) is little more than a shadow cast on the world by a systematic distortion of language, to paraphrase Wittgenstein (and Marx), again. The RRT is therefore intimately connected (via Hegel and other Mystics) with ancient theories about the origin of the world via speech, a universe created by the Logos (as illustrated in The Book of Genesis) -- a topic covered here and here. The world is depicted as ultimately discursive; it is both a product of language and constituted by language. For those who prefer this way of 'doing philosophy' (i.e., dogmatically, treating it as a sort of Super-Science), it seems 'perfectly natural and legitimate' to impose such artificial linguistic categories on the world, in a 'like-reflects-like' sort of way. These are just two sides of the same coin: if the world is ultimately linguistic, philosophical theories may be imposed on it uncontroversially and dogmatically. Unsurprisingly, dialecticians bought into this approach when they began to take philosophical and logical advice from a Christian Mystic (upside down or 'the right way up', once more). (See also here. Until Essay Twelve Part Four has been published, where this will be dealt with in greater detail, readers are also directed here and here for more information an argument.)]

Whatever the details finally turn out to be in each case, this "ruling idea" -- i.e., that the 'really real world', the 'world of essences', lies 'hidden behind or beneath appearances' -- has only succeeded in populating 'Reality' with countless invisible "Forms", "Abstractions", "Universals", "Concepts", "Ideas", "Representations", and 'Rational Principles'. Fortunately, these are capable of being reflected in and by the language/'thought' of a self-selected coterie of 'thinkers' -- even though they have mysteriously escaped detection by physical means for over two thousand years. Nevertheless, such 'clandestine entities' have somehow been encoded in language in a form revealed only to those capable of performing complex feats of mental gymnastics -- and, of course, those who have sufficient leisure time to engage in this bogus enterprise. In addition, and as if to compound the problem, the 'abstractive skills' of this exclusive band of 'intellectual pioneers' have been augmented by an impressive ability to concoct increasingly baroque, but entirely vacuous, jargon the meaning of which even those who indulge in this complex conjuring trick find impossible to explain.

This attack on the social nature of language was just one strand of the class-motivated assault on the vernacular and common understanding that took place in the ancient world, which soon devolved into LIE. [More details about this process will be given in the next two Parts of Essay Twelve (summary here).]

As pointed out above, this anti-materialist approach re-interprets language as primarily representational. According to post-Renaissance versions of this doctrine, novice language-users first of all learn to 'represent the world in consciousness' as an individual -- thereby attaching an idiosyncratic meaning to each of their words. Only then are they able to communicate their thoughts to others. Once again, the individual knower, or in effect each individual 'meaning-creator', comes first, their socialisation and inter-personal interactions are relegated to second in line. Unfortunately, Dialectical Marxists have bought into this theory -- as demonstrated in Essays Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4) to (8). As far as language, meaning and knowledge are concerned, this family of theories pictures human agents in effect as 'social atoms'. Proponents of this approach then unsuccessfully attempt to transform these 'social atoms' into 'social molecules', or even 'social polymers'! But the social nature of language and knowledge can't be built from the individual upwards, no more than economic value can be built upon individual ('rational') choice.

[At least one Dialectical Marxist (in fact the only one I have encountered in well over thirty years!) was honest enough to acknowledge the philosophical hole that 'abstractionism' and 'representationalism' have dug for Dialectical Marxism; readers can check the details for themselves, here. In addition, follow the above two links for the reasons why this order of events (individual first, social second) will always fail to explain language, meaning and the nature, status and provenance of knowledge.]

Be this as it may, as Essay Twelve itself will show, instead of the obscure jargon Philosophers invented in order to 'mirror reality', the ersatz language they have cobbled-together instead reflects constantly changing ruling-class interests and priorities -- or those of the ideologues themselves. As such, this approach gives expression to a convenient and self-serving picture of the 'natural-' and 'social-order' -- one that was either 'ordained of the gods' or is in 'harmony with the rational/natural order of reality'. In this way, Traditional Philosophy has always tended to rationalise and 'justify' class division in tandem with the wealth and power of whichever ruling elite finally picked up the tab.

[How that works was set out in greater detail in Essay Three Part Two -- but Dialectical Marxists are generally aware of this ideological background, while they (all) fail to see how it has fed into and corrupted their own use of similar ideas, even if they have been completely soaked in obscure 'dialectical jargon', or were given a 'leftish-looking veneer' That is one of the main topics of Essay Nine Parts One and Two, and will be covered again from a different angle in Essay Fourteen Part Two.]

Because of their class position, Traditional Theorists were (and many still are) socially-, and often physically-removed -- or, alienated -- from the everyday world of work and working class experience (aka 'commonsense'). Hence, they are 'naturally predisposed' to treat language the same way. That is they are all motivated to remove -- or 'abstract' -- ordinary words from their role in communal life and inter-communication, as Marx himself pointed out:

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement [or, the alienation -- RL] of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases added.]

This ancient, aristocratic approach to language then becomes an integral part of what can only be called an 'epistemological feed-back loop' that helps reinforce the (often unacknowledged) background theory that 'Reality' is itself linguistic and fundamentally abstract, the product of some 'Mind'. That 'loop' works roughly as follows:

(a) If language does indeed 'reflect Reality', that tells us something fundamentally true about the world: at some level it must be linguistic or 'conceptual' (otherwise how could anything possibly have been reflected?). Mirrors can't and don't reflect what isn't there; and,

(b) If that is true of the world, it must also be true of language (since it is part of the world). So, language does reflect Reality...

These two ideas feed into and reinforce one another. Again, the old Hermetic adage, "As above so below" now become "As below so above": 'Reality' becomes a projection of what Philosophers have to say about it, not the other way round. So, that projection, and this loop, renders plausible the overall theory that 'language is a reflection of the world'.

That...suggests [the 'laws' concocted by Philosophers] -- and, indeed, the objects and processes that 'obey' those 'laws' -- were both a reification of, and a projection onto, 'reality' of subjective psychological/'mental' capacities and dispositions. Philosophers who thought along such lines in effect found themselves peering down a deep well of metaphysical fantasy and, unsurprisingly, they saw their own reflection looking back up at them.

That might help explain the use Marx himself made of several of Feuerbach's main conclusions:

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975e), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis and link added.]

"The characteristic human mode of being, as distinct from that of the animal, is not only the basis, but also the object of religion. But religion is the consciousness of the infinite; hence it is, and cannot be anything other than, man’s consciousness of his own essential nature, understood not as a finite or limited, but as an infinite nature. A really finite being has not even the slightest inkling, let alone consciousness, of what an infinite being is, for the mode of consciousness is limited by the mode of being. The consciousness of the caterpillar, whose life is confined to a particular species of plant, does not extend beyond this limited sphere; it is, of course, able to distinguish this plant from other plants, but that is the entire extent of its knowledge. In a case where consciousness is so limited but where, precisely because of this limitation, it is also infallible and unerring, we speak of instinct rather than consciousness. Consciousness in the strict sense, or consciousness properly speaking, and consciousness of the infinite cannot be separated from each other; a limited consciousness is no consciousness; consciousness is essentially infinite and all-encompassing. The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness. To put it in other words, in its consciousness of infinity, the conscious being is conscious of the infinity of its own being." [Feuerbach (1957), pp.2-3. The online version I have quoted is different from the 1957 edition here referenced. Bold emphases alone added.]

In other words, when humans think they 'see God' they actually see themselves writ large looking back at them. In like manner philosophers fool themselves. Where, for instance, they think they see 'Being' they, too, see themselves (or even humanity in general), writ large -- which, as we have seen they anthropomorphise completely. 'Being' (and not just 'God') now has human characteristics. No surprise then that Hegel found he had to re-enchant the world -- by projecting human qualities onto it -- in order to make his ideas 'work' and give life to all those immaterial, 'self-developing concepts'. No surprise either that Empiricists also had to credit 'ideas' with surrogate human capacities, or that Rationalists transformed 'the human mind' into an homunculus, where 'consciousness' was in effect 'a little man' in each head. It is also why Dialectical Marxists claim to see human conversations taking place everywhere and always, right across the universe, in the shape of all those 'contradictions', 'mediations' and 'negations'.

In which case, it now turns out that Feuerbach was even more perceptive than he or Marx ever suspected.

This 'family of theories' also implied 'the human mind' was intelligent/rational simply because the universe was. That peculiar (reversed) theory can be seen in the equally odd idea that the universe became 'self-conscious' with the emergence of humanity -- a doctrine implicit in Hegel, but openly promoted by the likes of Teilhard de Chardin, Bergson, and, perhaps even more surprisingly, several Marxist dialecticians (Ted Grant, for one). This animistic inference was itself a consequence of the tortured 'logic' that supposedly mirrored the 'self-developing concepts' of the Superhuman (Hegelian) Alter-Ego that ran the entire show: 'The Absolute' (which we met in Part One), or "the Totality" (that we will meet in Essay Eleven Part One).

Given this overall approach, not only was the Real Rational and the Rational Real, there was only the Rational -- and hence, only 'the Mind'.

"Plato, who must be numbered among the Socratics, was the most renowned of the friends and disciples of Socrates, and he it was who grasped in all its truth Socrates' great principle that ultimate reality lies in consciousness, since, according to him, the absolute is in thought, and all reality is Thought. He does not understand by this a one-sided thought, nor what is understood by the false idealism which makes thought once more step aside and contemplate itself as conscious thought, and as in opposition to reality; it is the thought which embraces in an absolute unity reality as well as thinking, the Notion and its reality in the movement of science, as the Idea of a scientific whole. While Socrates had comprehended the thought which is existent in and for itself, only as an object for self-conscious will, Plato forsook this narrow point of view, and brought the merely abstract right of self-conscious thought, which Socrates had raised to a principle, into the sphere of science. By so doing he rendered it possible to interpret and apply the principle.... Plato is one of those world-famed individuals, his philosophy one of those world-renowned creations, whose influence, as regards the culture and development of the mind, has from its commencement down to the present time been all-important. For what is peculiar in the philosophy of Plato is its application to the intellectual and supersensuous world, and its elevation of consciousness into the realm of spirit. Thus the spiritual element which belongs to thought obtains in this form an importance for consciousness, and is brought into consciousness; just as, on the other hand, consciousness obtains a foothold on the soil of the other. The Christian religion has certainly adopted the lofty principle that man's inner and spiritual nature is his true nature, and takes it as its universal principle, though interpreting it in its own way as man's inclination for holiness; but Plato and his philosophy had the greatest share in obtaining for Christianity its rational organization, and in bringing it into the kingdom of the supernatural, for it was Plato who made the first advance in this direction." [Hegel (1995b), pp.1-2. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

No, excuses comrades; this is the origin of one of your core theories: the fevered imagination of that card-carrying, ruling-class mystic, Plato.

"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel (1999), pp.154-55; §316. Bold emphasis added.]

As he knew full well, the traditional approach (outlined above) readily collapses into one or other of the Idealisms he spoke about -- Subjective or Objective -- indeed, as we have just seen.

Once again, Umberto Eco pointed out the following in relation to Christian, Jewish and Muslim tradition (but, as we will see in Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve, similar beliefs concerning the (supposed) magical connection between language and 'Reality' regularly resurface across countless religions, cultures and philosophical traditions (until they are published, readers are directed to this site for more details):

"God spoke before all things, and said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names that he created them and gave them their ontological status.... In Genesis..., the Lord speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior illumination, in which God...expresses himself.... Clearly we are here in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of the nomothete, the name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

The traditional approach to the formation of knowledge meant that only those capable of dreaming-up greater or more general abstractions (based less and less on any real contact with the material world they supposedly 'reflect') were able to grasp the mysteries 'hidden behind appearances'. Or, since Hegel's day, that was true only of those capable of 'understanding dialectics', who could harmonise with the "the pulse of freedom" or 'dance' to its hypnotic rhythm, which esoteric skill sets enable each acolyte to decode the "Algebra of Revolution".

How odd then that all this 'dialectical dancing', all this harmonising with 'the 'pulse of freedom' -- boosted by 'revolutionary algebra' -- has failed us for so long.

Fortunately, as we will are about to find out, metaphysical 'profundities' such as these can't be based on the vernacular, or, at least, not without distorting it or misusing it. That is, Traditional Philosophy can't be derived from a social resource that serves primarily a means of communication, not representation. That communally-based resource actually prevents such flights-of-fancy from being cobbled-together. It is precisely for this reason that ordinary language -- along with its roots in the daily experience and life of working people -- had to be down-played, denigrated and even set-aside by Ancient Greek theorists motivated by a well-resourced ruling-class agenda. They were determined to show that the oppressive and exploitative social system from which they benefitted was either ordained of the 'gods' or was 'natural' and 'in harmony' with the 'Rational Structure of Universe'. That was because state and the universe were both (supposedly) predicated on, or were an expression of, that underlying 'rational structure', and hence on the 'Will of the Gods'. That 'divinely ordained system' was itself based on an 'abstract Reality' composed of mysterious 'essences' that were (supposedly, once again) 'reflected' in and by the very abstract terms they had dreamt-up for that very purpose -- but which they alone were capable of detecting or comprehending.

The late Professor Havelock pinpointed the origin of these linguistic con-tricks (my phrase, not his!) in the moves the Presocratics tried to pull, but similar comments could very well apply, mutatis mutandis, to Traditional Philosophers and DM-theorists in general:

"As long as preserved communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is gods. Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas, mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic statement. The history of early philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it.... Nevertheless, the Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference." [Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links added; paragraphs merged.]

The steady move away from the overt use of religious language meant that equally mysterious terms -- abstract nouns and adjectives -- had to take their place. Although Havelock doesn't mention this, it also led to the invention of an endless stream of metaphors and analogies, since no literal sense could be given to the new theories and ideas being concocted -- which process has continued down to this day, and for the same reason. That in turn is linked in with the failure of representational theories of language and knowledge to account for both of the latter. [I will cover these developments in greater detail, and from a more political and social direction, in Essay Twelve Parts Two and Three, as well as Essay Thirteen Part Two. Until they are published, readers might like to consult the references listed here.]

As a result, ordinary language was now caught in a what amounted to a 'philosophical vice'. On the one hand, the everyday meaning of words doesn't permit the invention of theories metaphysicians try to generate from them; on the other, ordinary terms were branded as inadequate because they were (allegedly) 'paradoxical', when, in reality, any such 'paradoxes' were the result of a cavalier misuse of this very medium (indeed, as we saw in Essay Five in connection with Zeno's Paradox). That is why language has had to be distorted in order to make philosophical theories 'work', as Marx knew full well (quoted earlier).

This complex web of ideas was augmented by the systematic fetishisation of language so that what had once been the product of the relation between human beings (the vernacular) was inverted and transformed into a representational device that (allegedly) expressed an 'Ideal Relation' between a series of mysterious 'essences' and the 'consciousness' of the select few that had dreamt them up. To that end, many of the newly coined terms (to which the above Professor referred) were progressively identified with these 'essences' themselves, as talk about talk was systematically conflated with talk about the world. With Hegel -- and then with in the theories concocted by Dialectical Marxists --, DL now became the 'logic' that ran the entire show 'behind the backs of the producers' (i.e., workers), as it were.

"This objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind. Anaxagoras is praised as the man who first declared that Nous, thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic. What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.50-51, §§53-54. Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. Paragraphs merged. I have reproduced the published version since the on-line edition differs from it in places. I have also informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. (They have now corrected it!)]

"[B]ut contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Ibid., p.439, §956. Bold emphasis added.]

"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are.... Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The proximate result of opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposited to elements in the completer notion." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

The predictable results of all this word-magic are now plain for all but the purblind to see, but they were nevertheless imposed on the workers' movement by the DM-classicists who by such moves granted ill-deserved 'legitimacy' to crack-pot ideas that Hegel himself had floated or which he had borrowed from earlier Mystics and 'God-seeking Idealists'. With these remarks, Lenin is in effect pleading 'guilty' on all counts:

"The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." [Lenin (1947), p.32. Bold emphases added.]

Dozens more quotes from other DM-theorists that reason along the same lines, but which are often more detailed, can be accessed here. It is also worth adding: this adulteration of Marxist theory remains in place whether or not Hegel's system is left 'upside-down' or flipped the 'right way up'. 'Right-way-Up-Idealism' is no less Idealist than its pre-rotated alter -ego ever was. But, don't take my word for it; here is the Arch Idealist Himself (quoted earlier):

An intellectual and ideological compromise of this order of magnitude was bad enough itself but it was further compounded by an unwise acceptance of this ancient, ruling-class approach to language, logic and 'cognition'. This meant that DM-supporters in effect now reject Marx and Engels's insistence that language is rooted in communal life and collective labour, not in the individual efforts of socially-isolated 'abstractors'. The above (deliberate) 'philosophical adulteration' means these other even more famous words now apply to the theories concocted by Dialectical Marxists themselves:

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.... The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

In this way, the ideas and thought-forms of the class enemy have totally dominated Dialectical Marxism for over a century-and-a-half.

[More details on this were given in Essay Nine Parts One and Two, greatly elaborated upon in Essay Thirteen Part Three. They will be further developed in later Parts of Essay Twelve (summary here). It is important to add that neither the social-, nor the representational-nature of language is being asserted or denied (as part of a philosophical theory) at this site. It is possible, however, to develop an understanding of the communal role that language occupies as a "form of representation" integral to HM, and hence easily expressible in ordinary language. As should seem obvious, this means that any such understanding will remain consonant with the lives and experience of working people. (The term "form of representation" is explained here. See also, Note 18b and Note 19.)]

However, the above topics won't be covered in any detail this Part of Essay Twelve. Nevertheless, in connection with this, it is important to emphasise that Marx's advice (concerning ordinary language) has both been taken seriously and put into practice at this site. Having said that, it will be agued -- indeed, it will actually be demonstrated -- that any attempt to undermine the vernacular inevitably results in the production of incoherent non-sense on the part of anyone foolish enough to wander off into that conceptual minefield.

The rest of Essay Twelve (all Seven Parts) will be devoted to substantiating many of the above rather bald, dogmatic-looking, statements.

The only other (seemingly viable) alternative in this respect would be to claim, alongside Chomsky, that language is somehow 'innate', that it isn't a social phenomenon and therefore isn't primarily a means of communication. Despite what some revolutionaries have argued, there is no way that Chomsky's theory can be made consistent with Marxism, nor, indeed, can any sense be made of it. [Again, I have dealt with that topic at greater length in Essay Thirteen Part Three. Readers are directed there for more details.]

The acceptance by Dialectical Marxists of representational theories of language, cognition and knowledge means they aren't unique. Until recently, little critical attention had been paid to the traditional assumption that language is primarily representational --, i.e., that it first of all enables human beings to re-present the world to each individual -- in "thought", the "head", the "mind", "consciousness", or in "cognition" -- before communication can even begin.^18b

Until quite recently the traditional assumption (that only after language users have learnt to 'picture reality' to themselves as individuals are they able to communicate their thoughts to one another) has seldom been questioned. That comment also applies to those who at least give lip service to the rival claim that the primarily role of language lies in communication -- i.e., Dialectical Marxists. This means that, despite what they might say, the social nature of language is viewed by the vast majority of DM-theorists as the direct result of the isolated (but somehow later pooled) cognitive resources garnered by individual language-users. To that end, the social nature of language is downplayed as a by-product of each individual's attempt to share the 'contents' of their 'mind' -- their privately processed 'abstractions' -- with their community, not the other way round.¹⁹

As Avner Baz pointed out (his words are quoted in Note 18b), theorists who promote the 'representational interpretation' of language tend to focus on its ability to 'reflect the objective world in thought'; or, rather, they emphasise each language-user's ability to 'reflect reality' in 'thought', mediated (perhaps) by language. But they do this as individuals, which clearly implies they give each of the words they use their own idiosyncratic meaning, clear only to themselves (a theory echoed by Dialectical Marxists, as we discovered in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4) to (6)). Although social factors might be mentioned in passing, the prevailing 'representational theory' only succeeds in undermining the role any such factors play in establishing or fixing meaning and hence in enabling communication. If we all (naturally) 'reflect' the world (or parts of it) 'in our heads', or in 'consciousness', what need is there for socialisation in the formation of language and thought? What role can it possibly play in this respect? What could it contribute? That is one reason why Representationalists tend to view ordinary language as an obstacle, something to be 'revised', overcome, by-passed or even undermined in their quest for 'philosophical', 'objective' or scientific truth. For such theorists, if language were indeed social (or conventional), then philosophical -- and (supposedly) scientific -- notions of 'objectivity' would be vacuous. That also helps explain why Representationalists of every stripe advance the same complaints against ordinary language and 'commonsense' -- i.e., that they stand in the way of constructing an 'objective picture of reality'. That is also why they have to invent obscure 'philosophical' jargon by means of which they hope to by-pass the vernacular -- and, in several notorious cases, in order to confuse those 'not in the know', so that they might be conned into thinking obscurity implies profundity.

"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing" Childishness. On this, also see Interlude Ten.]

I rarely quote Nietzsche, but the following words of his seem uncannily relevant:

"Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound." [Quoted from here.]

The above considerations also help explain the hostility shown toward Wittgenstein's work (and OLP) by virtually every Traditional Theorist. [I will say much more about that in Essay Twelve Part Seven.]

Nevertheless, issues related to the conventional nature of language have also put dialecticians in something of an intellectual bind. On the one hand they feel they can't risk acknowledging its conventional nature without ditching their commitment to the 'objectivity' of science -- but more specifically their own 'theory'/'method', DM. On the other, they can't reject the conventional nature of language without compromising their avowed commitment to its social nature. This dilemma, which fittingly (and ironically) highlights Dialectical Marxism's 'contradictory' approach to discourse (alongside the arcane and convoluted thinking it forces on theorists and activists alike as they try (unsuccessfully) to harmonise these two irreconcilable views of language) was examined in much greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three.

[Also see the next sub-section. In addition, it is worth adding that the philosophical (not the ordinary) use of the word "objective" has been subjected to sustained criticism in Essay Thirteen Part One. See also Note 20.]

It has seemed to many (even on the revolutionary left) that representational theories of knowledge and language are more accurate in the way they express the results of 'objective processes' that supposedly underpin cognition, where private (mental) production has somehow contributed to public gain. That is, how each cognising individual processes sensory inputs and how that somehow contributes to, or is even turned into, the collective nature of knowledge -- how each 'social atom' becomes a 'social molecule' with respect to linguistic meaning and 'objective knowledge', to repeat an earlier metaphor. According to traditional theory, it is the isolated activity of lone abstractors that enables cognition and the meaningful use of language, which, as a result, underlies the formation and advancement of knowledge. Clearly, this will only succeed after these individually-created 'abstractions' have been pooled or shared. Unfortunately, how the latter process is supposed to happen, and avoids creating what amounts to a private language, still defies explanation!

For Dialectical Marxists, the order of events, therefore, appears to be something like the following (give or take a few additional steps, expressed in suitably 'dialectical language' and, of course, 'tested in practice'):

[Of course, the above 'model' is different for those who accept Chomsky's theory -- just replace stage (iii) with 'Activate a Mental Module -- The Language Acquisition Device' --, and merge it with (ii), since we are all supposed to be born with every concept we will ever use of even need, pre-installed, they just required 'triggering'. Naturally, this means Chomsky's theory is itself a classic example of Bourgeois Individualism, which should surprise no one since he openly admits he derived these ideas from The Founding Father of Bourgeois Philosophy, René Descartes, even calling his theory, 'Cartesian Linguistics'. In fact, one of his more influential books, Chomsky (2009), is entitled: Cartesian Linguistics. A Chapter In The History Of Rationalist Thought. On this, see Behme (2011). (This links to a PDF.) See also, Behme (2014a, 2014b, 2014c). Readers are also referred to Essay Three Parts One and Two for supporting evidence and argument that the above steps do indeed form a central core of DM-Epistemology, often in the order specified. The only thing missing is that there is also a feed-back loop that flips each lone abstractor back to Stage (i), the inputs of which are then 'reinterpreted' in light of Steps (ii) through (iv) -- which are all modified, shaped and revised by practice, but only after they have been liberally coated with dialectical jargon, almost as if that is magically capable of 'oiling the wheels' of theory. For a lengthy criticism of Chomsky, see Essay Thirteen Part Three and Note 30.]

The fact that inter-communication is last on the list -- and is also viewed as the most problematic factor -- is something that at least one leading DM-theorist has acknowledged, as argued in Essay Three Part Two (slightly modified):

"What, then, is distinctive about Marx's abstractions? To begin with, it should be clear that Marx's abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely from the abstractions of other thinkers both then and now. There has to be a lot of overlap. Otherwise, he would have constructed what philosophers call a 'private language,' and any communication between him and the rest of us would be impossible. How close Marx came to fall into this abyss and what can be done to repair some of the damage already done are questions I hope to deal with in a later work...." [Ollman (2003), p.63. Bold emphases added.]

Well, it remains to be seen if Professor Ollman can solve a problem that has baffled everyone else for centuries -- that is, of those who have even so much as acknowledged it exists!

It is to Ollman's considerable credit, however, that he is at least aware of it.

[In fact, Ollman is the very first dialectician I have encountered (in well over thirty years) who even so much as acknowledges this 'difficulty'!

[Be this as it may, I have devoted Essays Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three to an analysis of this topic; the reader is referred there for further details. Update February 2026: After well over 20 years waiting there is still no sign of Ollman's 'solution' to this 'problem'. Certainly, no attempt was made in Ollman (2019) to address it, let alone solve it. Nor is there any indication that others have risen to the challenge on his behalf -- or, that a single DM-fan since Ollman raised this issue regards it as a 'difficulty' that even needs to be addressed! One Academic Marxist with whom I debated this very topic a few years ago completely ducked the issue and showed no sign he was aware of it, never mind how to deal with it. Nor was he cognisant of the serious challenge 'abstractionism' poses for anyone who at least says they accept the social nature of language and knowledge.]

As we have seen, this approach to language acquisition and development by each user, as an individual, relegates meaning to a private domain located in that user's 'consciousness' and memory, something each user gives to the language they employ, perhaps as an expression of that individual's biography or even the ideological and social influences that constrain, influence and shape us all. This theory is neatly expressed by the following commentator (who attempts to connect 'inner speech' with meaning):

"Inner speech is the fluid interphase where meaning can start to be formed and shaped, based on the emotional, practical and social experience of the individual." [Parrington (1997), pp.135-36.]

This idea is connected with Parrington's earlier comments on something else he found in Voloshinov's theory:

"A related feature of inner speech that Voloshinov pointed to was that it is more concerned with 'sense' rather than 'meaning'. In this definition, meaning is the dictionary definition of a word, for instance cat: 'a furry domestic quadruped'. Sense, on the other hand, refers to the whole set of psychological events aroused by a word, such as the personal memories of your own pet and its mannerisms, the feel of its fur and so on. It contains activities, impressions and personal meanings, not just accepted social definitions. A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears; in different contexts, it changes its sense." [Ibid., p.135.]

[For Parrington -- and for Voloshinov, if he has interpreted him correctly -- the word "sense" has taken on a completely different meaning to that of the typographically identical word used in this Essay (about which, see here).]

So, given this scenario, the individual -- along with their cognitive and abstractive skills -- takes precedence over the social. Hence, individual episodes of 'abstraction' takes place well before any acts of communication can even be attempted, let alone have any effect. Only then can the shared meaning and knowledge (somehow) be constructed from of the disparate contributions each lone abstractor supposedly makes to an overall 'pool of meaning and knowledge'. Hence, according to this theory, not only is meaning personal, private and idiosyncratic, so is knowledge.

Since this theory pictures each language user as a 'social atom', it is hardly surprising its proponents struggle to explain how they collectively become 'social molecules', or even 'social polymers'. Professor Ollman is unique in admitting this, even if he still has no idea how to extricate himself or his theory from the semantic quagmire into which it has unceremoniously dropped him.

[In Essay Thirteen Part Three (Sections (4) to (6)) we will see that this is certainly the case with the approach adopted by theorists like Voloshinov and Vygotsky, along with others who have been influenced by them. I have also destructively criticised 'inner speech' and attempts to link it with meaning, in the same Essay, here. It is also worth pointing out that Voloshinov and those who look to him for inspiration conflate the many distinct meanings of "meaning" -- for example, they confuse meaning interpreted as personal significance with linguistic meaning. Again, I have covered this confusion in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three, here. Some of that material has been reproduced in Interlude Seven, below.]

Alternatively, meaning might be viewed the result of certain (yet-to-be-discovered) 'objective rules' nature has supposedly hard-wired into each brain -- perhaps as a 'Language of Thought', or even as a 'Transformational Grammar' (now re-christened, "Unbounded Merge").

Dialectical Marxists even speak about ideas existing in 'tension' with one another, inside each head:

This back-to-front theory -- which openly transforms ideas into agents, humans into patients -- will examined in greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three (links above). Suffice it to say that Parrington's (otherwise laudable) commitment to the social nature of language and thought has been totally compromised by the Bourgeois Individualist theory of 'consciousness' and meaning he has unwisely bought into.

[I am here using the word "patient" with its older meaning, as that which is acted upon not that which acts.]

Whatever the aetiology, this is one idea that has "ruled", in one form or another, for over twenty centuries.

As we saw in Essay Three Part Two (link above), post-Renaissance thinkers (Rationalist and Empiricist alike) took the public domain (where meaning is created), inverted it and projected it back into each individual head, only now re-configured as the social relations among 'images', 'ideas', 'concepts', and 'representations'!

That projection was also based on a systematic fetishisation of language and thought -- attributing human characteristics and powers to both of the latter. Unsurprisingly, this inevitably resulted in the conflation of the 'objective' world with the 'subjective contents' of 'consciousness', the upshot of which was the anthropomorphisation of nature, a theoretical degeneration brought to its apotheosis by Leibniz and Hegel.

[Again, all this is covered in detail in Essay Three Part Two (link above). I have used the term "fetishised" here, since, as noted above, this approach in effect treats words as agents which possess human qualities, characteristics, relations and powers.]

The outer, social world was thus re-located inside each individual head, the latter seen as primary, the former as secondary (or even, in some cases, as non-existent!). In this way, the social was privatised, internalised and neutralised. Knowledge thus became a function of the social life among ideas, a battle fought out in each head, as Parrington (quote above), tried to argue.

As Essay Thirteen Part Three shows, that is still largely where Cognitive Theory remains to this day.

Small wonder then that modern philosophy soon lapsed into overt, full-blown Idealism; 'Subjectivist' at first, later 'T ranscendental' and later still, 'O bjective', which saw Immanuel Kant complaining that it was a scandal that philosophers had so far failed to prove the existence of the 'external' world!

"No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof." [Kant (1998), p.121, B xxxix. Bold emphasis added. (This links to a PDF.)]

Unsurprisingly, too, we witness Dialectical Marxists facing the same predicament. [On that, see Essay Thirteen Part One.] That in turn is because they foolishly looked to a Christian Mystic for guidance, even though they then had to invert his theory, supposedly putting it 'back on its feet', all the while failing to notice that their own individualistic theory of 'mind', language and 'cognition' actually prevents that from happening.

More recently still, this (post-Renaissance) ruling-class thought-form -- i.e., where stress is placed on individualism in the formation and development of language and knowledge -- has re-surfaced in several novel disguises. On the one hand, it is reduced to, or it is re-configured as, an inter-relationship between neurons (as they 'communicate' with, or send 'messages' to, each other), under the watchful eye of a 'little man in the head' (covered in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three -- links below), otherwise known as 'consciousness' (a spurious concept invented by Descartes). Alternatively, the gene is credited with this overarching power. Together or separately these two factors operate as a surrogate, inner Bourgeois Legislative and Executive Authority. In the background, neurological -- or, in some versions of this approach, psychological -- processes express themselves via a 'computational-device'/'module' humming away in the background, which enables 'the mind' to write/use the rhetorical equivalent of 'software' (which is yet another anthropomorphism, but now imposed on the brain). [On this, see Essay Thirteen Part Three, here, here and here.]

[Concerning Descartes's invention of 'consciousness' and the intractable problems that 'concept' has bequeathed to science (now widely regarded as one of 'The last great mysteries of life', perhaps even the 'hardest problem left for science and philosophy to solve') -- but which is in fact an entirely bogus problem resulting from yet another misuse of language -- see Essay Thirteen Part Three, here and here.]

Given the representationalist view, while human beings might be born free (of language), everywhere they are restrained by this inner, surrogate 'state' -- 'consciousness'.²⁰ The latter is itself comprised of 'modules' (or even 'neural nets'), dominated by each individual's genome. The social doesn't even get a look in -- except perhaps as a dispensable by-product, a mere afterthought.

The aforementioned inversion (the political and social roots of which will be analysed briefly below, but more fully in Parts Two and Three of this Essay) completely negates the social nature of language. And no wonder: it represents a thoroughly bourgeois view of language and 'cognition', the opposite of Marx's view of both.

In fact, this ideological inversion has remained 'upside down' (in different forms) for thousands of years; it is also a source of several other 'inverted ideas' invented by Traditional Philosophers (and Dialectical Marxists). Inverted, as in a camera obscura, these 'rotated concepts' cloud the thoughts of all those whose brains they have colonised -- which, of course, helps explain why the ideas of the ruling-class always rule.

In this instance, among Dialectical Marxists, traditional ideas have been adopted by a seemingly endless supply of willing adepts, accomplices and proselytisers. A better way to describe these 'dialectical acolytes' might very well be to call them "Dialectical Marks".

[This recent (2023) video, by a rather sophisticated Maoist, underlines this point (i.e., that these characters are all marks -- Dialectical Dupes), further exposing this collective slide into Subjective Idealism. In the comment section below that video I tried to point this out, but my remarks sailed way over the heads of those so easily led astray, including the author of the video himself!]

Nevertheless, there seems little point arguing that language is a social phenomenon -- its key role being communication -- if it is primarily regarded as representational (or, if it is classified as primarily representational but only secondarily communicational). If that were the case, the social nature of language would be anterior to, if not parasitic upon, its supposedly primary, private role. No surprise then that this view of discourse introduces its own Robinsonades, analogous to those that Marx railed against in politics and economics. Except in this case, these Robinsonades have been introduced to explain the supposed origin of language in each private, 'socially-atomised' individual -- at least as far as the acquisition of meaningful language is concerned -- and not just in connection with the 'social contract' or the economy.

If there is a point to be made here, it is perhaps as much ideological as it is anything else: If language is primarily representational then human beings must acquire language, meaning and knowledge first (as 'social atoms') before they are capable of entering into, joining with or participating in a linguistic community.

But, that presents this entire (neo-bourgeois) approach with intractable problems. For example, how is it possible for individual 'knowers':

(i) To 'reflect' the world to themselves as one of these 'epistemological atoms';

(ii) To turn their each 'experience' (howsoever that is defined) into an 'inner representation';

(iii) To give what is in effect an idiosyncratic meaning to the words they (supposedly) 'associate' with these 'representations';

(iv) To re-invent grammar (which is intimately connected with, or which even shapes, meaning); and only then,

[Of course, the above is a gross oversimplification of Representationalism; in which case, readers are referred to Essay Three Part Two where this topic has been discussed in much greater detail. That having been done, it should become clear that even though Items (i)-(v) represent an oversimplification, they don't misrepresent the core precepts of Representationalism. The only revision that might be needed in order to cater for all forms of Representationalism would be to replace (iii) and (iv) with the two alternatives mentioned below. That would take care of Chomskyan hybrids or those that depend on his overall approach.]

(iii)* To access a seemingly bottomless well of innate ideas/concepts and 'associate' each with 'the local vocabulary';

(iv)* To generate coherent sets of words (phrases, clauses, sentences) by means of an innate (universal) grammar.

[Of course, the above might themselves oversimplify Chomskyan versions of Representationalism; for more details readers are referred to Essay Thirteen Part Three, where Chomsky's ideas have been criticised in greater detail -- for example, here, here, and here. However, there are far too many places to list where I have taken Chomsky to task in that Essay. Readers are therefore encouraged to do a page search of his name to locate them all.]

But, if items (i)-(v) are the case, then, as far as language is concerned, each human being would be first and foremost a 'semantic individual', and only secondly a social actor capable of communicating with others.

[That was the point of referring to those Robinsonades; a similar concern also lay behind Ollman's comments.]

In fact, as is easy to show, given the above approach, communication would be impossible. Indeed, if it were the case that each 'knower' represented the world to themselves before they were capable of conversing with others, they would be incapable of communicating, and humanity would be, for all intents and purposes, universally incommunicado.

[Once again, this point has been elaborated upon and substantiated in Essay Thirteen Part Three (links above). A highly compressed explanation of this point is implicit in Ollman's remarks (link also above).]

Given the representational approach, the role that human social evolution and ongoing communal life play in the shaping of language must now drop out of the picture as superfluous, irrelevant, or even non-existent. More-or-less the same can be said about Chomsky's theory, but for different reasons -- indeed, as Lecercle points out:

"If there is a single structure of language which is inscribed in our genetic inheritance, and if all social or cultural differences are, from [the] standpoint of language, irrelevant, [this follows]: each member of the human species is identical as regards the faculty of language, because language is inscribed in her brain. Language must therefore be studied in the individual: we are no longer dealing with a system that is external to individual speakers and independent of them..., but with a set of individuals endowed with the same capacities; and language, at least as conceived by the science of language, has nothing to do with social existence. In other words, the logical consequence of Chomskyan naturalism is methodological individualism, which is characteristic of liberal thinking in economics and politics. And there is [another] consequence. It is clear that language, derived from a mutation that constituted the human species, has no history, or only the quasi-frozen history of the evolution of the species over the very long term and by leaps: human language has no history in the strict sense, since it cannot have changed since its appearance at the dawn of humanity. Any historical phenomenon, any linguistic change is superficial, and irrelevant for the scientific study of the language faculty. Or, rather, there is linguistic change, but only at the level of the individual whose competence passes from an innate 'initial state' to a 'steady state', once parameters have been triggered by the linguistic environment. The transition from infancy in the etymological sense to articulate language is therefore not effected by learning (or only at a superficial level); and the sole temporality of language is the retrospective time of recollection. The child who acquires (but does not learn) speech is like the slave in the Meno: he remembers what he had always known, but did not yet know that he knew. Chomsky's position at least possesses the merit of coherence in its idealism." [Lecercle (2006), pp.21-22. Italics in the original, bold emphases and links added; paragraphs merged. See also Lecercle and Riley (2004), pp.91-123, 140-53, as well as Behme (2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c), and the references listed here.]

[The rest of the same chapter of Lecercle (2006) continues its author's sharp critique of Chomsky's entire programme.]

The difference is that, if valid, (non-Chomskyan) traditional representational theories would imply we all possess a different private language, where none of our words would mean the same, making communication impossible. [There are other serious problems which I have covered in the Essays referenced above.] In addition, the following wouldn't be the case: "Each member of the human species is identical as regards the faculty of language, because language is inscribed in her brain." At least with Chomsky's system there is some possibility of agreement and communication (although, even that is open to serious doubt -- again, follow the above links and my comments on this, in Essay Thirteen Part Three, for more details).

Atomistic implications like these shouldn't be lost on anyone cognisant of the History of Philosophy and the relation between Traditional Thought and ruling-class interests/priorities (mentioned by Lecercle). That includes the history of the diverse ways that this approach has helped shape ideologies that rationalise, or even 'justify', exploitation, gross inequality -- 'legitimising' the wealth and power of the ruling elite. This approach has been the dominant thought-form ever since the Renaissance: the elaboration and ratification of Bourgeois Individualism. Representationalism was clearly invented to serve that end. Traditional Thought (in its post-, and even pre-Renaissance forms) also helped interconnect human law with 'natural law', both of which could then be related (directly or indirectly) to 'God's Will', 'the Rational Order of the Universe' or even 'Nature Itself'.

In connection with which it is instructive to recall that Descartes explicitly connected human law, 'natural law' and 'Divine Law':

"The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and depend on him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures. Indeed to say that these truths are independent of God is to talk of him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject him to the Styx and the Fates. Please do not hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere that it is God who has laid down these laws in nature just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom." [Descartes (1991), p.23. Letter to Mersenne, 15/04/1630. Bold emphasis and links added.]

"Nevertheless, Aristotle never used the law-metaphor, though, as we have noted, he occasionally comes within an inch of doing so. Plato uses it only once, in the Timaeus [i.e., Plato (1997c) -- RL], where he says that when a person is sick, the blood picks up the components of food 'contrary to the laws of nature'.... But the conception of the governance of the whole world by law seems to be peculiarly Stoic. Most of the thinkers of this school maintained that Zeus (immanent in the world) was nothing else but...Universal Law; for example Zeno (fl. 320 B.C.); Cleanthes (fl. 240 B.C.); Chrysippus (d. 207 B.C.); Diogenes (d.150 B.C.). It seems more than likely that this new and more definite conception was derived from Babylonian influences, since we know that about 300 B.C. astrologers and star-clerks from Mesopotamia began to spread through the Mediterranean world. Among these one of the most famous was Berossus, a Chaldean who settled in the Greek island of Cos in 280 B.C. Zilsel, alert for concomitant social phenomena, notes that just as the original Babylonian conceptions of Laws of Nature had arisen in a highly centralized oriental monarchy, so in the time of the Stoics, a period of rising monarchies, it would have been natural to view the universe as a great empire, ruled by a divine Logos. Since, as is known, the Stoic influence at Rome was great, it was inevitable that these very broad conceptions should have their effects in the development of the idea of a natural law common to all men whatever might be their cultures and local customs. Cicero (106 to 43 B.C.), of course, reflects this, saying... 'The universe obeys God, seas and land obey the universe, and human life is subject to the decrees of the Supreme Law.'" [Needham (1979), pp.299-303. Bold emphases and links added. Several paragraphs merged. Two minor typos corrected. The rest of the chapter from which this was taken is highly relevant, as are these longer articles, Needham (1951a) and (1951b). See also Zilsel (1942).]

[Again, I have covered this topic in greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three -- especially in connection with recently revamped and rebranded neo-Hegelian theories currently in vogue (even among Analytic Philosophers!), which have coalesced around what has ironically been called (but only by its adherents), Critical Realism -- a misnomer if ever there was one! See also my comments concerning Christian Theology in Essay Three Part Two, as well as my remarks in Essay Three Part One about such 'laws'. I have further developed several of these ideas here. They will be expanded on in the next three Parts of Essay Twelve.]

As pointed out above, revolutionaries have resisted the claim that language is purely conventional since it would imply science is conventional, too, which they imagine would threaten its 'objectivity'.²¹

In fact, revolutionaries have in general rejected the connection between the conventional nature of language and the 'objectivity' of science with arguments that have only succeeded in undermining them both. Either that, or they have simply assumed that conventionalism must always collapse either into relativism or some form of Idealism.²² However, and ironically, the truth here is the exact opposite: it is the rejection of the conventional nature of language and science that compromises both. How and why that is so will be explained briefly below, but in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two. In what follows I propose to restrict my attention to the connection between the above considerations and Metaphysics (and thereby with DM).

If language is a social phenomenon (as Dialectical Marxists tend to acknowledge in their more sober moments), then what human beings say or write must be based on, or be the result of, normative conventions that govern discourse and social interaction in general --, if they want to make sense. That is why it isn't possible to utter just about anything, make random noises -- or even use ordinary words in weird ways or bizarre contexts -- and hope to be understood. [Although, as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Three, in connection with speakers' meaning -- as opposed to word/linguistic meaning -- even the production of complete gibberish might actually 'mean something'.] Naturally, scientific language has its own specialist or technical terminology, alongside assorted professional protocols layered on top, or even in place of, the ordinary conventions underlying use of the vernacular. Moreover, this entire ensemble will change and develop in accord with wider social and historical forces. But one thing is reasonably clear: if language is to be a means of communication, whatever lends sense to its empirical propositions must be independent of (and prior to) any truths they supposedly express.²³

[What that rather gnomic statement actually means (and what it implies) will take up much of the rest of this Essay -- as will its defence. Speakers' meaning: this is what a language user intends to achieve with, by, or as a result of, their words. That will include what effect they hope to have on, or produce in, their audience, over and above, or even in defiance of, the actual (linguistic) meaning of the words they use. This intended effect can also involve prosody and the context surrounding a given sentence, its timing, spacing, intonation, accompanying gestures, facial expressions of the language user, etc., etc. (Follow the above link to Essay Thirteen Part Three for more details. As that Essay also shows, DM-theorists influenced by Voloshinov invariably confuse speakers' meaning (and occasional meaning) with linguistic meaning.)]

If that weren't the case, language users would have to know whether an empirical proposition was true before they could understand it!

As should seem reasonably clear, that 'possibility' is patently absurd; no one could assent to the truth -- or even reject the falsehood -- of a proposition they didn't already understand. Indeed, if an individual failed to comprehend what was said, they couldn't even begin trying to find out whether or not it was true.²⁴

Plainly, considerations like these connect the social nature of language with the earlier discussion of propositions like M1a-M9. We saw that in the case of ordinary empirical propositions (like M6), it is possible for them to be understood before their truth-status is known (or could even be ascertained):

The overwhelming majority of English speakers will understand M6 on hearing or reading it -- providing, of course, they know what "Tony Blair" and "The Algebra of Revolution" mean (or so it might seem!) -- even if they haven't a clue whether or not what M6 says is true, whether or not they ever find out, or even if they don't care to find out. Communication (at least with respect to the conveying of information, etc.) would cease if that weren't so.

Some of my readers might now wonder how the above comments might be harmonised with earlier claims that the sense of a proposition can't depend on a set of truths when it is also claimed that language users must be in possession of, or be aware of, a set of truths (like who Tony Blair is, that The Algebra of Revolution is a book and that it is something capable of being owned). Those remarks surely imply that the sense of M6 does depend on such truths. The answer to that objection involves, inter alia, an explanation of the enigmatic (highlighted) codicil, "Or so it might seem!", also added to those earlier comments.

[This specific topic will be dealt with in Interlude Eight, which is still under construction. See also here.]

After all, how could anyone succeed in conveying their (supposedly fact-based) thoughts to anyone else if they had to know, or had to ascertain, whether or not what was said to them was true before they understood it? How could that individual even initiate an investigation into its truth (or its falsehood) if they hadn't the faintest idea what they had just been told?

By way of contrast, it was also established that, with respect to metaphysical/DM-propositions, the situation is radically different: understanding a proposition like M9 goes hand-in-hand with 'knowing it is true', or 'accepting its truth'. With respect to P4, M9 and M1a, rejecting any one of them as false would amount to changing the meaning of "matter" and/or "motion". [Why that is so will be explained later, but it is intimately connected with the foundational status of P4 (which defines what "motion" means, at least for Engels and Lenin).]

These two alternatives stand or fall together: understanding any one of the above is ipso facto to 'accept it as true'; in like manner, to reject any one of them as false amounts to changing the meaning of its key terms.

[Much of the material in this sub-section depends on results already obtained (and substantiated) in Essay Three Parts One and Two, and Essay Thirteen Part Three (links below).]

If, per impossible, the opposite were the case and the sense of an empirical proposition were dependent on truth (which had already been established, or had yet to be established), or, indeed, on other truths, and the latter were expressed in or by further propositions (which they would have to be), they, too, would have to be understood first before their truth-status could be ascertained. Otherwise, it would be impossible to determine the truth-status of these (additional) propositions. [Once again, it isn't possible to ascertain the truth of a proposition before it has been comprehended.]

[Anyone not sure of this point, it has been explained in greater detail in Interlude Four.]

So, if, per impossible, once more, the sense of an empirical proposition were dependent on knowing these further truths -- on knowing "the facts of the matter" -- this process, or hierarchy of dependency (of facts upon further facts, upon further facts, upon...), couldn't continue indefinitely. There appear to be only two ways an infinite regress [henceforth, IR] like this can be prevented (in such circumstances).

[In what follows I have left the word 'truths' deliberately vague so that several options aren't closed off from the start.]

(1) Language users must have -- or have had programmed -- in their 'minds'/brains a 'set of truths' (possibly even a 'set of rules') that aren't themselves expressed in, or expressible by, empirical propositions (concerning matters of fact). If so, such speakers must have direct access to what can only be described as 'non-linguistic truths' -- or maybe even a set of 'linguistic rules' that have been 'hard-wired' into the CNS -- perhaps written in a 'code' of some sort (which, paradoxically, wouldn't be a code or the above IR would simply kick in again; why that is so is explained in Note 25).²⁵

(2) The 'truths' upon which the sense of empirical propositions depend must be 'necessary truths', whose own truth can't be questioned (hence the word "necessary"), and whose semantic status follows directly from the meaning of the words or concepts they contain, but not from still further truths. In other words, these 'necessary truths' act rather like the buffers at the end of a railway line. The buck stops with them -- at least in terms of semantic status (i.e., in terms of truth/falsehood).

Unfortunately, as we will soon see, 'necessary truths' themselves have no sense and are incapable of being either true or false -- which means they are incapable of acting as literal or metaphorical buffers. That will, of course, rule out Option (2).

Anyway, Option (2) concedes an earlier point -- i.e., that meaning has to precede truth. That is because the truth-status of these 'necessarily' true propositions follows from the meaning of their constituent terms. [Which is why their truth could be 'read off' from those terms without an appeal to evidence, other than those meanings themselves.] In that case, there would be no good reason to postulate the existence of such 'necessary' truths in order to lend support to the opposite idea -- that meaning in the end depends on truth, not truth on meaning -- since, as seems plain, Option (2) relies on the fact that meaning is sui generis, and hence that truth depends on meaning, after all.

With respect to Option (1), as will also be demonstrated, the idea that there could be sets of 'non-linguistic truths' -- or 'rules' in nature, or wherever (and whether or not we are aware of them), that govern the sense of a proposition -- is based on an ancient belief that 'Nature is Mind', the 'product of Mind', constituted 'by Mind', or that it is in fact Ideal (i.e., that 'Reality' is composed of Ideas "all the way down", as it were).

This overall theory (i.e., underlying Oprtion(1)) originally depended on the (quasi-religious) belief that language itself is governed by:

(i) Nature's own 'pre-linguistic ideas' (perhaps those that exist in the 'Mind of God', or which are expressed in abstract/physical form somewhere, somehow); or by,

(ii) 'Physical laws' of some sort (which we have just seen were themselves based on mystical belief-systems themselves);

and hence that it is the 'intelligent' or 'rational' universe (or, indeed, its ultimate originating, supernatural cause) which lends to the languages that humans speak the meaning they have. Meaning as such was thereby alienated from humanity itself, its origin and continuing source now located either in 'Nature Itself' or in the 'Deity Himself'. Hence, given this account, the source of meaning was ultimately either (a) Natural or (b) 'Supernatural'.

Both alternatives clearly imply that meaning isn't social. Given the above, human beings didn't invent language, nor do they give their words the meanings they have (by use, or sometimes by stipulation), 'God', or 'Nature', did all the inventing.

As should now seem clear, this family of ideas harmonises seamlessly with Representationalism, for, given either outcome -- (a) or (b) -- human beings end up 'representing' these 'alienated meanings' to themselves automatically and naturally, by means of innate principles 'programmed' into us 'lawfully' by 'God', or by 'Nature'). In that case, these 'alienated meanings' arise in each individual created or implanted in them by external, non-social causes -- (a) or (b), again. Hence, at least as far as speech is concerned, this approach also sees language users as social atoms.

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. As the translators of Marx and Engels (1975c), p.xvii point out, "estrangement" means the same as "alienation". Bold emphases added.]

[These ideas have been explored at greater length in Essays Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three. They will be substantiated throughout the rest of Essay Twelve (summary here).]

In fact, more-or-less the same comment could be made about the theory that language is governed by rules that are genetically programmed into the CNS (howsoever that happened). Of course, it would mean that any such 'rules' were part of, or were created by, the 'rational structure of the universe', only now more widely understood (i.e., it would now perhaps involve evolution itself). However, as we will see (mainly in Essay Thirteen Part Three), that approach will only work if theorists are prepared to anthropomorphise the brain, viewing it as intelligent rather than human beings themselves. 'Intelligence' would thereby have to be alienated, too.

As pointed out earlier, the traditional view is currently based on the (suppressed) premise that language users rely on 'intelligent neurons' 'communicating' with each other, sending and carrying 'messages' to various areas of the body, or to one another. They are the linguists, here; we merely bend to their 'will'. This further implies that 'intelligent neurons' (or 'modules') determine or decide for each language user what their words mean, and it is this that enables each brain to 'mirror' the outside world. [Why that theory stands zero chance of being correct is explained here.]

In addition, as a corollary, if the above explanation were correct, it would help explain how and why figurative language, if interpreted literally, suggests nature itself is 'intelligent'/'rational', which then supposedly turns out to be 'the real source of our intelligence/rationality' -- and, incidentally, why right-wingers continually bang on about genes and IQ. If nature is (simply) assumed to be 'rational', the language we use will naturally end up appearing to confirm that assumption.

In that case, this entire approach implies that language, or even something pre-linguistic -- alongside the neurons or modules underlying one or both --, are the agents here, we are merely their patients. In turn, it ends up fetishising the products of social interaction as if they:

(ii) Represented or 'reflected' the real relation between 'intelligent neurons'/'modules'; or,

Item (iii) above means that words end up being conflated with the objects and processes they 'reflect', as talk about talk is systematically confused with talk about things. Clearly, this ends up confusing the means by which we represent the world with the world itself.

That in turn helps explain why Traditional Theorists and Dialectical Marxists regularly confuse talk about talk with talk about the world, as we have repeatedly seen.

[The liberal use of obscure jargon, inappropriate analogies, opaque and misleading metaphors, countless neologisms and 'scare-quote'-encased words by those who give 'concrete expression' to this ideological inversion (i.e., the theory that swaps the agents involved, so that nature (or 'God') becomes the agent while human beings are demoted to the role of patient, at least with respect to the meaning of words), rather gives the game away, one feels.]²⁶

Naturally, philosophers of a more 'robust theoretical temperament' (for want of a better term) might be inclined to rejected responses like this (for all manner of reasons), arguing that there must be physical or causal laws of some sort governing the way human beings form empirical propositions or sentences, or which give meaning to the words they use --, concluding, perhaps, that our understanding of language should be 'naturalised' accordingly.^26a

First, we currently have no idea what such 'laws' would even look like, let alone what they are.

Second, any such account of the origin and nature of language will only ever succeed in reduplicating the 'problem' it was meant to solve. There is and could be no conceivable 'law' (or set of 'laws') capable of doing all that is claimed for 'it' (or 'them') which doesn't at the same time anthropomorphise nature or read into it the very linguistic categories it was originally introduced to explain.²⁷

Third, if language is a product of, or has been caused/created by, a set of laws (which allows users to acquire a language that enables them to 'picture the world to themselves' -- i.e., if discourse is primarily and fundamentally representational), reference to its social nature and provenance will, of course, be vacuous. As noted above, Marxists who have accepted one or other version of this 'robust view' -- as a result, perhaps, of their unwise adherence concepts promoted in and by DM (originating, for instance, with Lenin and what he had to say in MEC) concerning the nature of cognition, or perhaps even based on ideas expressed by Chomsky and/or Quine -- have universally failed to appreciate this anti-Marxist corollary.²⁸

Finally, but more importantly, another implication of the idea that understanding language is at some point parasitic on truth (e.g., as set out in Option (1) and Option (2), from earlier) is that if, per impossible, that were the case, paradoxically, it couldn't be the case. That is because this way of viewing discourse inverts the factors involved. As we have seen, the establishment of the truth-value of a proposition is consequent on its already having been understood. Humans do not first of all appropriate or ascertain 'truths' and then proceed to comprehend them. Communication and representation would be impossible if that were the case.²⁹

On the contrary, as was also pointed out earlier, if the sense of a proposition weren't independent of its actual truth-value, then, plainly, the mere fact that a proposition had been understood would directly imply it was true --, or, as the case may be, it would imply it was false! Naturally, if either of these alternatives were viable, linguistic or psychological factors -- not the way the world happens to be -- would determine the truth-value of empirical propositions, and science would become little more than a sub-branch of Hermeneutics.^29a

Hence, given the above 'inverted' approach, as soon as a proposition had been understood, its truth (or its falsehood) could be inferred automatically. Clearly, that would destroy the distinction between empirical and non-empirical propositions, for, on such a basis, as soon as anyone understood M6, for example, they would know it was true, or they would know it was false (as the case may be).

[An indicative sentence has to be understood first before its truth-status can be ascertained, but, with respect to empirical propositions (i.e., indicative sentences concerning matters of fact), that doesn't automatically imply they are true. As pointed out earlier, that only appears to be the case with (indicative) metaphysical sentences; comprehending one of them does (appear to) imply they are 'true' (or 'false', as the case may be) -- i.e., for those who think this is a legitimate way to 'philosophise'.]

As a result, it is now perhaps possible understand how and why Representationalism seems to imply all (relevant) indicative sentences have the same logical form, whether or not this is immediately obvious. At some point, given Representationalism, all (relevant) indicative sentences would be -- or at would some point depend on -- a 'necessary truth', or a set of such 'truths' -- or, as the case may be, they would be, or would depend on, a 'necessary falsehood' or set of such 'falsehoods' --, which would thereby 'reflect' in our 'minds' how things must be and can't be otherwise. Or for Lenin this would in the end imply their 'negations' were "unthinkable"; or the opposite again in the case of the supposed truth of sentences like P4.

And, that is why this theory of language, knowledge and 'mind' (i.e., Representationalism) so naturally aligns itself with dogmatic apriorism -- that is, with the idea that 'fundamental truths about nature' can be accessed by thought alone, and can then safely be imposed on 'Reality'.

Hence, according to this theory, if M6 (quoted above) does ultimately depend on a necessary truth of some sort -- or it is a disguised necessary truth itself (that is, if, despite 'appearances to the contrary', Blair had absolutely no choice, his ownership of TAR was determined by the operation of a 'necessary law' of some sort (maybe, a là DM), by the unfolding of his 'concept' (perhaps, a là Hegel), by his implicit predicates (possibly, a là Leibniz), or even by 'God' (a là Calvin)) -- its truth would ultimately be ascertainable without any need for supporting evidence. All one would need do is 'comprehend' the associated indicative sentence/'law', or the 'concepts' supposedly involved, for it/them to be deemed automatically true.

But, as should now seem rather obvious, this would make falsehood difficult, if not impossible, to explain.

[For those to whom it might not seem all that obvious, the answer is hinted at below. A much fuller explanation will be given in Essay Three Part Four, where it will be shown that this family of theories also implies there can't be any false propositions! Until that Essay is published, the argument supporting that controversial claim has been summarised here. See also Essay Eleven Part One, here.]

As should also now seem plain, this theory, or family of theories, implies that scientific knowledge is likewise based on some form of LIE; that is, it is founded on the belief that (fundamental and apparently contingent) truths about the world may legitimately follow solely from language or from 'thought'. The 'mind', when it 'reflects the world', would merely be reflecting itself -- or perhaps even the thoughts of a more grandiose version of itself, those of 'God' or a 'Cosmic Mind' in 'self-development' (this is certainly what most Theists conclude, and that includes Hegel, even if it is open to considerable doubt whether or not he was a Theist), because, given this approach, the world is either 'Mind', the creation of 'Mind', or the product of 'self-developing Mind'. Hence, our thoughts (scientific or non-scientific) when true automatically 'reflect' that 'Mind's thoughts'. How could it be otherwise if your core theory is that 'God' is 'Supremely Rational' and magicked everything into existence along lines that expressed, or which manifested, 'His Rationality'. Hence, any truths about the world can't fail to reflect 'His Mind', 'His Rationality'.

[This is, of course, the conclusion Hegel himself alighted upon (or he was led by the nose to that conclusion by a few rather assertive 'concepts' that 'developed' by their own accord, holding him in their grip). It is revealing, therefore, to discover that these conclusions follows from the (alleged) 'inversion' of Hegel supposedly on display in DM. Hence, if the world is fundamentally rational, but there is no 'god', then for anything to be true it will still have to reflect that 'underlying rationality'. But for anything to be rational, it must be the product of 'mind'. So, even if there is no 'god', DM itself implies 'Mind governs Reality', 'Mind precedes Matter'. In which case, we obtain more-or-less the same results as those above even when Hegel is flipped head over a*s. That is a brief summary of one of the core arguments set out in Essay Twelve Part Four (to be published in late 2026), and Thirteen Part One.]

Hence, philosophers who thought along such lines in effect found themselves peering down a deep well of metaphysical fantasy and, unsurprisingly, seeing their own reflection looking back up at them (here, I am loosely paraphrasing Feuerbach). [Once again, I will say much more about this and its connection with the RRT in Essay Twelve Part Four.]

Apriorism and LIE thus go hand-in-hand -- indeed, as George Novack pointed out sixty years ago:

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis and link added.]

Fortunately, this way of looking at language and knowledge is undermined, if not blocked, by the vernacular itself -- which is, perhaps, one of the reasons why Marx recommended an entirely different approach:³⁰

"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases alone added.]

In that case, whatever lends sense to empirical propositions (i.e., whatever constitutes the conditions under which they are true or under which they are false) can't itself be a set of antecedent truths. Neither could it be a set of ex post facto truths (that is, truths established, or recognised as such at a later stage).

By way of contrast, since the socially-motivated and socially-sanctioned rules governing our ordinary use of language are incapable of being true and incapable of being false, they aren't subject to the above constraints. [These points will be explained more fully below and then defended at length.]

These constraints also apply to scientific language -- that is, if it is also capable of functioning as a means of communication (and, derivatively, as a means of representation).

[On that, see Note 31 and Note 33. But this particular topic will be covered in much greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two. In advance of that I have added a few relevant comments to Interlude Four.]

[The following material used to form part of Note 31. This sub-section will develop several ideas that were aired earlier, but connected with scientific knowledge. What follows depends on what has already been said about the sense of an empirical proposition (repeated below) and also on the assumption that in order to understand such a proposition an individual has to grasp its sense. That assumption will also be defended as this Essay unfolds.]

Whatever lends sense to empirical, scientific propositions it can't be the truth of another empirical proposition, or even a set of such propositions. As we have seen, the sense of an empirical, fact-stating proposition is constituted by the conditions under which it is true and the conditions under which it is false. Hence, the sense of an empirical proposition is a logical property of that proposition and, as such, is independent of epistemological factors.

[Why that is so will be explained below. In order to save on needless repetition, in what follows I will shorten the full description "the sense of an empirical proposition" to "the sense of a proposition" -- or, in some cases, I will just use "proposition" or "sense" instead. So, unless otherwise stated, "the sense of a proposition" and "sense" should be taken to be the equivalent of "the sense of an empirical proposition".]

As far as a given language-user is concerned, and in light of the above remarks, sense is intimately connected with what that user understands to be the case for a proposition to be true and what they understand to be the case for it to be false. That remains the case even if:

It is in this way (as well as in connection with several other factors covered in Interlude Eight) that sense is independent of epistemology. While what an individual knows or does not know has no effect on sense, it does impact on:

(b) How they might then proceed to ascertain its truth-value, should they decide to do so.

Furthermore, as we have also seen, a speaker shows they understand a given proposition when they grasp its sense, in connection with which they might need to know certain truths -- or more likely, possess certain skills -- in order to comprehend, verify or falsify it. But that has no more bearing on a proposition's sense than the preferences or choices made by an economic actor have on the value of a commodity. [Again, I will say more about this in Interlude Eight (link above), where it will also be made clear why this latest remark isn't inconsistent with the point made earlier.]

This means that if the above weren't the case and the sense of a proposition, S₁, were dependent on the truth of another proposition, S₂, a given scientist would only be able to understand S₁ after she had ascertained the truth of S₂. In which case, of course, that couldn't happen (for reasons that should be reasonably clear but will be made explicit presently). In turn, that would mean scientists in general wouldn't be able to understand one another -- since they, too, would have to know the truth-value of these additional propositions before they could understand any given proposition. [Once more, why that is so will be explained in the next few paragraphs.] Clearly, there are no propositions by means of which this could be achieved that are exempt from the constraints outlined earlier, briefly repeated above.^{31

32} ³³

Once more, if, per impossible, the sense of a proposition, S₁, were dependent on the truth of a further proposition or set of propositions, comprehension (and hence communication) could only be achieved at the end of an individual's education. Indeed, the latter couldn't even begin until knowledge of these 'further truths' had been acquired.

[Notice, I have spoken here about the sense of a proposition (which is itself connected with its truth conditions) as opposed to its truth-value. That is an important distinction to keep in mind in order to understand the points made in the first half of Note 31, and below. There will be more on that, too, as this sub-section unfolds.]

For example, if the sense of S₁ were dependent on the truth of a least one other proposition, S₂, then, plainly, in order to understand S₁ (NB, not in order to ascertain the actual truth-value of S₁ -- in order to understand S₁, in order to grasp its sense), the truth of S₂ would first of all have to be known -- i.e., it would have to be known that S₂ is true. But, in order to ascertain the truth of S₂, it, too, would already have to be understood. And for that to happen, the individual involved would have to grasp the sense of S₂. That is because, as pointed out several times, it isn't possible to ascertain the truth of an indicative sentence that hasn't already been understood. Comprehension must precede any search for a proposition's truth-value.

But, to extend the same point, if the sense of S₂ were itself dependent on the truth of yet another proposition, S₃ (which it would have to be, given an earlier assumption), then the truth-value of S₃ would have to be known, too. And yet, in order to ascertain the truth of S₃, it, too, would first of all have to be understood, and so on, ad infinitem...

Hence, if the above argument is valid, in order to understand any sentence the truth-value of a potentially infinite set of sentences -- {S₂, S₃, S₄,..., S_n} -- would first of all have to be known. In that case, understanding and communication could only begin at the (infinite?) end of one's education (which would be when this 'infinite set of truth-values' would somehow be known), which is clearly ridiculous.

So, the assumption that the sense of a proposition depends on the truth of another proposition, or propositions, leads to an infinite regress, and as such completely undermines, ab initio, the comprehension of any empirical proposition.

[There appear to be only two (viable) ways this infinite regress can be halted or avoided; they were covered earlier and were both shown to fail.]

It could be objected that the above reasoning depends on human understanding. Surely, a scientific account of language should consider only objective truth, which is independent of human cognition. In that case, this entire argument is misguided, at best.

That objection is itself misconceived. Plainly, scientists engaged in 'objective research', who hope to establish 'objective truths' and/or successful theories, have to understand not just their own sentences, but also those of other researchers -- let alone those of their carers, peers, teachers and lecturers during their socialisation and education -- if they are to function effectively, or at all! To state the obvious: scientists are social beings. They are only able to develop their ideas, construct their theories/hypotheses, and test them, if the empirical propositions/predictions that follow from such theories/hypotheses are expressed, or are expressible, in a comprehensible form, in some language or other. Even supposing such theories/hypotheses (and propositions/predictions) were highly technical and 'refer to' a world that is independent of, and anterior to, human cognition, scientists can neither rise above, nor countermand, ignore or wave aside, the constraints placed on them by their socialisation, education and professional interaction with others (briefly outlined above).

[More details can be found in Stroud (2000), particularly pp.21-60. The word "objective" is in 'scare quotes' for reasons explained here.]

As we have seen several times already, the supposition that the above constraints are somehow optional, or can be disregarded, itself relies on a fetishisation of language: i.e., on the reading of human cognitive and social capacities into nature. That clearly defeats the whole point of the exercise; far from avoiding LIE, it collapses straight into it.

[The substantiation of remarks made about the fetishisation of language, like those above, will be set out in the next three Parts of Essay Twelve (summary here); some of that material has already been published in Essay Three Parts One and Two, here, here and here.]

Nevertheless, for some readers the above rejoinder might itself smack of dogmatism, or it might even look uncomfortably like a Transcendental Argument. Both suppositions are mistaken.

When spelled-out in detail my argument isn't in any way 'transcendental', it is more closely analogous to a reductio ad absurdum, as should be plain from all that has gone before. [There will be more on this again in Essay Thirteen Parts Two and Three.]

That 'reductive' technique has been employed many times throughout this site. On those occasions, metaphysical-, and DM-theories have consistently been reduced to absurdity -- for example, by demonstrating that they either imply an infinite regress, as we have just seen, or they are based on a radical misuse of language --, which means, of course, that they are incapable of being true and are incapable of being false. As such, they aren't just non-sense, they are incoherent non-sense.

Naturally, such an analysis is inherently reactive, if not openly therapeutic. [On that, see Fischer (2011a, 2011b).] The Essays published at this site aren't trying to establish a new set of truths about language (or even about the world!), nor are they an attempt to construct an alternative philosophical theory. Among other things, they respond to the claims made by metaphysicians/DM-theorists, and in so doing they seek to expose the latent non-sense expressed by both. Their main objective (other than an overt political orientation) is to remind us of what we already know by constantly turning the argument back toward our ordinary use of language -- indeed, as Marx himself enjoined -- and our common understanding (which shouldn't be confused with common sense!). Any technicalities or neologisms employed to that end are dispensable or can be paraphrased away; they merely serve as shorthand.

Even so, whatever its motivation happens to be, the argument outlined above might still appear to be, at least, factually wrong, for it is plain that when they are studying science, students, for example, have to learn countless facts before they can even begin to understand the subject. Hence, an understanding of science is manifestly based on the (earlier) acquisition of a body of truths, facts, data and information -- contrary to the claims advanced in the last few paragraphs.

[This touches on issues briefly mentioned earlier -- i.e., that the sense of a given proposition, S₁, is independent of the truth of another proposition, S₂, even though, in order to understand S₁, a speaker might have to know certain facts or have mastered certain skills and techniques. At first sight these two conditions might seem to be inconsistent. Earlier it was claimed that sense is independent of epistemological factors, but now the opposite has just been conceded! This seeming incongruity will be tackled more fully in Interlude Eight (link above), but for present purposes it is sufficient to note that the sense of S₁, for example, isn't affected by anyone's comprehension. As noted earlier: Understanding has no more bearing on a proposition's sense than the preferences or choices made by an economic actor have on the value of a commodity. Sense is directly connected with possible states of affairs in the world, and they are independent of anyone's understanding. What an individual knows, what linguistic skills they possess, will certainly help them understand a given proposition, but that has no bearing on its sense. The latter is delineated by the world, not by human comprehension. In what follows I further draw attention to other factors that augment these points.]

First of all, a broad understanding of science isn't the same as understanding an empirical proposition.

Second, science and mathematics are taught and learnt in a variety of ways, but novices must first of all have some grasp of ordinary language, everyday skills and techniques before their scientific or mathematical education can even commence. These include the ability to listen, concentrate, follow instructions, read, write, count, take notes, operate a computer, check dials, spread sheets and print-outs, handle equipment reliably without misusing, misreading, damaging or breaking it (etc., etc.). In addition, but this is often later on, they must be able to carry out independent reading and research. [In the current capitalist system, such basic skills are, alas, way beyond some students -- and that isn't their fault!] If students are to progress beyond Ground Level Science and Mathematics, skills and proficiencies like these must be broadened and amplified by careful attention to detail, accuracy and precision, augmented by an effective 'work ethic'. They must also display 'natural' curiosity, resourcefulness, self-motivation and a willingness to study (independently) way beyond the subject matter in hand. The vast majority of these skills are based on knowing how rather than on knowing that -- although the latter will often modify the former, and vice versa. Comprehension will, of course, be further enhanced and extended by means of increasingly advanced 'on-hands' experience, supplemented and enhanced by analogical and metaphorical reasoning, illustrative examples -- which will themselves be accompanied and further amplified by the asking and answering of leading questions, all of which will be further modulated by the setting and completion of a range of practical exercises, the construction and use of simple models and the setting of graded tasks, among many other procedures. All of these will be directed toward the acquisition of relevant certificates, credentials and qualifications. Furthermore, it is only after their vocabulary has been widened and their understanding and mastery of (relevant) practical skills and proficiencies has been successful are students capable of comprehending -- as opposed merely to regurgitating -- the new facts, explanations and theories they encounter, or which are presented to them by their teachers. Indeed, only then are they able to extrapolate beyond the initial basic and rudimentary levels into new, more complex areas of knowledge (even if many might choose not to go down that route). All of these are presented to students by their teachers as integral components of countless inter-linked forms of representation -- which, in this instance, are rules used to help interpret any new facts learnt, unifying them into a comprehensible explanation of the phenomena being studied, and which also harmonise with other areas of current knowledge -- or, "normal science" as Thomas Kuhn has called it. [On this in general, see Polanyi (1962, 1983).]

[I will say more about this below, where I review an important distinction Wittgenstein drew between "criteria" and "symptoms".]

[The routinisation and regimentation of much of the above in capitalist society has ked to accusation that this is just a 'knowledge production line' (the equivalent of an 'epistemological sausage machine'), which stifles originality and turns students into economic units. That is undeniable, but it doesn't materially affect the above argument. Hence, important though it is, it will be ignored in what follows. On this see Pateman (1972), and, more recently, Heller (2016).]

This means that novel truths or facts learnt by students depend on (and are concurrent with) an extension to their understanding, practical expertise and technical competence. As should seem obvious, unless students understand what their teachers have to say -- or they succeed in grasping what they have read or studied; only if they are capable of successfully carrying out the graded tasks and exercises set --, new facts could only ever be accepted as such on trust or on the basis of deference to authority. If students are to advance beyond the parrot-learning and regurgitating stage, they must undergo an extension to their comprehension. Indeed, if education were just about fact learning, no facts would actually be learnt, merely parroted. That is why, of course, the word "learning" is attached to the word "rote" only ironically.

[Admittedly, some rote-learning forms an integral part of the mastery of certain specific techniques -- for example, learning the "Times Tables" in mathematics -- or when preparing for an exam, attempting to follow directions in order to find an address in a strange town, etc., etc. If the aforementioned Times Tables haven't been leant by heart, a student's mathematical education will be seriously impaired, if not crippled. The use of electronic calculators doesn't obviate this necessary step, either (as any mathematics teacher will attest, a view that is also supported by education research). The above doesn't, of course, mean that facts are unimportant or that they don't assist in further comprehension. Indeed, as argued below, learning of any sort depends on one or more "webs of belief". However, further excursion into this area would take us too far afield into Wittgenstein's ideas about the nature of human understanding and learning. An excellent account of this aspect of his work can be found in Greenspan and Shanker (2004); cf., also Williams (1999a), pp.187-215, Williams (2010), and Erneling (1993). See also Robinson (2003b) and Hanna and Harrison (2004), especially pp.159-90.]

It could objected that the above material ignores the fact that students have to learn countless facts -- such as "Aluminium is a metal", "Fructose is a sugar", "Force equals mass times acceleration", "Cats are mammals", etc., etc. -- if they are to make any progress in science (and other areas of knowledge). I will deal with this objection (and with several others more general than this) in Interlude Eight.

Nevertheless, this latest objection presents zero problems for the approach adopted at this site, since what it says is, indeed, (partly) how scientific advance itself is motivated, initiated and carried out: i.e., partly, but significantly, by means of an extension to the meaning of the words used in other, possibly similar -- maybe even analogous --, contexts and applications (alongside the establishment of new inter-relationships between them), as I hope to show in Essay Thirteen Part Two. In this way, 'old' facts are cast in a new light and novel connections become possible --, which, in effect, modify or transform these 'facts' by analogical and figurative extension. [On this, see Sharrock and Read (2002) and the work of Thomas Kuhn in general. Cf., also Hadden (1994). Concerning Hadden's work, see below.]

Factors and considerations like these also take care of the following objection (if it is also assumed to be the case that only when a proposition is part of a body of propositions would it be possible to ascertain its truth-value): a speaker wouldn't be able to understand what was said to her until she had mastered an entire language, which is patently false.

However, as education and socialisation unfold so does a speaker's general comprehension of language (and that includes understanding specific areas of science). Neither takes precedence. So the above objection is itself misguided.

Add to this the fact that there is also a "division of labour" with respect to the practice of science, and, indeed, knowledge in general --, as the late Hilary Putnam, for example, argued:

"[T]here is division of linguistic labour. We could hardly use such words as 'elm' and 'aluminium' if no one possessed a way of recognizing elm trees and aluminium metal; but not everyone to whom the distinction is important has to be able to make the distinction. Let us shift the example; consider gold. Gold is important for many reasons: it is a precious metal; it is a monetary metal; it has symbolic value (it is important to most people that the 'gold' wedding ring they wear really consist of gold and not just look gold); etc. Consider our community as a 'factory': in this 'factory' some people have the 'job' of wearing gold wedding rings; other people have the 'job' of selling gold wedding rings; still other people have the job of telling whether or not something is really gold. It is not at all necessary or efficient that every one who wears a gold ring (or a gold cufflink, etc.), or discusses the 'gold standard,' etc., engage in buying and selling gold. Nor is it necessary or efficient that every one who buys and sells gold be able to tell whether or not something is really gold in a society where this form of dishonesty is uncommon (selling fake gold) and in which one can easily consult an expert in case of doubt. And it is certainly not necessary or efficient that every one who has occasion to buy or wear gold be able to tell with any reliability whether or not something is really gold. The foregoing facts are just examples of mundane division of labour (in a wide sense). But they engender a division of linguistic labour: every one to whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word 'gold'; but he does not have to acquire the method of recognizing whether something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. The features that are generally thought to be present in connection with a general name -- necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the extension, ways of recognizing whether something is in the extension, etc. -- are all present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body; but that collective body divides the 'labour' of knowing and employing these various parts of the 'meaning' of 'gold'. This division of linguistic labour rests upon and presupposes the division of nonlinguistic labour, of course. If only the people who know how to tell whether some metal is really gold or not have any reason to have the word 'gold' in their vocabulary, then the word 'gold' will be as the word 'water' was in 1750 with respect to that subclass of speakers, and the other speakers just won't acquire it at all. And some words do not exhibit any division of linguistic labour: 'chair', for example. But with the increase of division of labour in the society and the rise of science, more and more words begin to exhibit this kind of division of labour." [Putnam (1973), pp.704-05. (This links to a PDF.) Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; paragraphs merged.]

[Putnam was once a Marxist, which perhaps helps explain the economic metaphor/analogy he drew. I distance myself, however, from his theory of meaning/reference (presented, for example, in Putnam (1975b), which is an expanded version of Putnam (1973), partially quoted above). I will say more about that aspect of his work in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

To state the obvious, if a student wishes to become proficient in any of the specialist areas of science, for example, she will have to master the technical use of, and demonstrate competence with, terms such as "electron", "allele", "self-adjoint operator", "wave function", "base pair", "path integral", "subduction zone", "igneous rock", "tensor", "aldehyde", "orbital", (etc., etc.) -- depending, of course, on which subject area they are tackling -- alongside any of the skills, methods and techniques associated with those disciplines.

Incidentally, this helps explain why new theories often look plausible only to those prepared to move into the new conceptual landscape carved out by those promoting these radically new theories (i.e., 'forms of representation'), alongside any of the novel vocabularies, practices, or "world-views" associated with them. [This will still be the case even if researchers are motivated -- or possibly even hindered -- by contemporaneous, differentially-situated, class-inspired -- or, indeed, class-biased and regressive -- reactions to social change.] To others who aren't so prepared -- or who are more, shall we say, conservative-minded -- innovations like these will seem patently false, paradoxical, or even ridiculous. That helps explain why older members of the scientific community find it much more difficult to accept the validity, or even the relevance, of new conceptual landscapes scientific development regularly enables. Indeed, to such individuals these will often appear to be completely false, absurd and incomprehensible. [I will present evidence in support of these claims in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

That fact alone would be inexplicable if science advanced by the mere accumulation of facts or depended on the development of greater and greater 'abstractions'.

This also helps account for the way that new scientific theories not only (partially, or even completely) change 'our view of the world' -- by modifying the language we use to depict, understand or interact with it. Often that is done by feeding off discourse and vocabularies that have already been altered or reshaped by social and economic development elsewhere (an example of which will be given a few paragraphs below in connection with the work of Richard Hadden). Novel theories enable new discoveries that were unavailable to those whose ideas remain dominated, or are completely ossified, by older theories/world-views. [There is an excellent description of this process at work today in the opening few pages of Smolin (2006), although the author, I think, fails to recognise its significance.]

In addition, the above considerations link scientific advance to conceptual change -- i.e., to developments in, and alterations to, the use of both singular and general terms -- all of which are motivated by, and aligned with, advancements in the contemporaneous Mode of Production, and hence in connection with innovative areas of research this enables, or even necessitates. Worthy of note, however, is the fact that both of these factors situate such developments in the open, in the social arena, moving them away from the secret world of 'inner representations' and 'abstractions' beloved of traditional 'abstractionist' and representationalist theories of language and knowledge -- which unfortunately includes ideas promoted by DM-theorists. [On this, see Note 32 as well as Essay Thirteen Parts Two and Three.]

As far as Marxism is concerned, this theoretical re-orientation enables an HM-account to be applied to the entire process. For example, as Richard Hadden (in Hadden (1994)) shows, developments in medieval society (mainly concerning the growth of market relations) motivated the establishment of innovative conceptual connections between certain specific general nouns -- the (possible) relationship between which had either made no sense in earlier centuries that had different Relations of Production and Exchange -- and which were therefore of no use to anyone working back then because they were regarded as incommensurable concepts (often for the same reason). As a result weren't capable of being connected by analogy. [On this, see also Kaye (1998).]

Social Constructivists have also more generally explored the close connection between linguistic innovation and scientific change, but, as far as I am aware, there has been no serious attempt made by Marxists (other than, perhaps, Hadden (1994) and Robinson (2003) -- but see also Robinson's Essays, posted at this site, as well as the studies referenced earlier) to link these developments with changes in the Relations of Production, or even link them with innovative conceptual possibilities and connections that became available because of the emergence of a new Mode of Production.

[However, in general, Social Constructivists lack a scientific theory of history (they reject HM!) that will enable them provide their piecemeal theories with an overall structure, direction and rationale. Nevertheless, for a clear survey of work accomplished in this area (up until relatively recently), see Golinski (1998). These issues, and more, will be covered in greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two. See also Note 32 (link above), Note 33, Interlude Five and Interlude Eight.]

Last two points on this specific topic: if the sense of a scientific proposition, S₁, were dependent on certain (other) truths about the world -- again, for instance {S₂, S₃, S₄,... S_n} -- so that, for example, the comprehension of S₁ implied it was true, that would mean scientists could abandon the conducting of experiments and the recording of observations, and simply take up linguistic analysis. Science would then become indistinguishable from LIE. The simple expedient of understanding a proposition would automatically mean it was true!³⁴

Finally, the above factors help validate the claim that scientific language, like the vernacular, is conventional.

Admittedly, these ideas are controversial.³⁵ They seem to imply science isn't 'objective'. However, that conclusion is itself based on a misconception.

[As noted earlier, this entire topic will be addressed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two. Readers are also referred to important remarks made about 'objectivity' in Essay Thirteen Part One.]

The foregoing remarks are in fact a consequence of a consistent commitment to the social nature of language and knowledge. They can't be swept under the 'dialectical rug', or hand-waved aside without seriously undermining that fundamental Marxist insight.³⁶

In which case, much of the rest of this Essay (and Essay Twelve in its entirety) will be devoted to:

(iii) Demonstrating why all philosophical theories are incoherent non-sense.

Parts of the rest of this Essay might strike some readers as unnecessarily repetitious. However, as I pointed out in the Preface (slightly modified):

This Essay is much more repetitive than most of the others published at this site. Experience has also taught me that if the difficult ideas it contains aren't repeated many times over (often from different angles), they either tend not to sink in or their significance is all too easily lost. Unfortunately, that is especially so with respect to the characters mentioned above -- i.e., Dialectical Marxists who seem to be both ignorant of, and allergic to, developments in Analytic Philosophy.

We are now in a position to understand what went wrong with Lenin's claim (expressed in M1a) and, as a result, explain why certain indicative sentences (especially those that litter Metaphysics) collapse into incoherent non-sense.^36a

[Much of what follows in this sub-section depends heavily on conclusions reached earlier -- as well as those obtained in Essay Three Parts One and Two.]

As argued above, this problem (if such it might be called) is connected with the use of what appear to be (empirical) indicative sentences to state 'necessary truths' (or they even appear to exclude their logical opposites, those which are classified as 'necessarily false'). Unfortunately, such moves end up distorting fundamental (logical) features of language, rendering metaphysical sentences non-sensical and incoherent.

As we have seen, for those who have bought into this way of 'doing philosophy', the 'truth' of metaphysical sentences seems to follow directly from the meaning of the words they use (which is why no supporting evidence, other than that provided by yet more word-juggling, is required or even presented). As a result, Traditional Theorists claim to be able to access, in the comfort of their heads, Universally-Valid, Super-Facts, which supposedly reflect 'fundamental features of Reality'. Metaphysics thus goes hand-in-hand with representational theories of language and thought. But, the spanner-in-the-works is that, instead of their words and ideas representing or 'reflecting' the world, Traditional Philosophers instead impose their idiosyncratic (and, as we will see, unrepresentative and distorted) use of words on the world. But this is just the RRT, once more.

In addition, as pointed out earlier (and as we saw in Essay Three Part Two), this entire way of viewing meaning and language inverts, and then internalises, externally-ratified social practices (i.e., comprehension and communication), re-configuring them as private, individual acts of intellection -- which are 'internally processed', and thereby are 'immediate to consciousness', etc., etc.

So, given this view, meaning isn't a social aspect of discourse, it is a direct result of all this 'internal processing' -- which involves 'images', 'ideas', 'concepts', 'representations' and 'abstractions', all handled in and by 'consciousness'. All this is integrated with, or augmented by, the supposed activation of "inner speech". For other theorists it is a key component in the 'language of thought'. But, this is a thoroughly bourgeois way of viewing language, thought and meaning -- an accusation which was accompanied an earlier allegation that this area of contemporary Cognitive Theory hasn't advanced much beyond the theories and methods concocted by Hobbes, Descartes and Locke.

Alas, DM-theorists have bought into this way of 'doing philosophy', which means they have collectively failed to appreciate how it completely undermines their commitment to the social nature of language, meaning and knowledge, just as they failed to realise this approach to 'cognition' doesn't even deliver what had been all along claimed for it.³⁷

For example, in Lenin's endeavour to inform his readers about what he took to be the relation between matter and motion, he boldly asserted that "motion without matter" was "unthinkable". Unfortunately, the sentential content of that assertion appeared to involve him in doing the exact opposite of what he said couldn't be done. This meant it looked like he had to 'think' the very things he said were "unthinkable". But, in order to do that, he had to understand what it meant for motion to exist without matter so that he could rule it out as something that could even be entertained, otherwise he would have had no idea what it was he was excluding. Plainly, that would turn this mock exclusion into an empty gesture. Unfortunately, this appeared to involve him in a radically non-standard use of language, which in turn meant he was actually unable to say what he thought he wanted to say. In practice, his own words implied the opposite of what he imagined he intended.

In fact, this suggests that there might not have been anything there for Lenin to have intended to say, or to have thought. That is because it isn't possible to say (in one sense of "say") anything meaningful that is in principle incomprehensible -- even if that 'something' is incomprehensible to the one trying to say it. While a speaker might utter complete babble, it isn't possible for them to mean anything by it (unless, of course, it is part of an elaborate code or it is aimed at simply creating an effect of some sort, such as eliciting surprise, confusion, puzzlement or consternation). One might intend to utter babble, but not intend to mean anything comprehensible by it (if those trivial examples are excluded).³⁸

With respect to sentences like M1a, it now becomes impossible say what it was that Lenin intended to communicate to his readers. Every attempt to translate his words in less confusing terms only seems further to undermine his presumed intentions. In that case, it is pertinent to wonder what (if anything) Lenin could possibly have meant by what he said.³⁹

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; LOI = Law of Identity; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]

We have already had occasion to examine similarly incoherent DM-theories -- for example, those connected with 'Dialectical Logic', Trotsky's attempt to expose the limitations of the LOI (or even Hegel's egregious efforts along the same lines), Engels's (and Lenin's) 'analysis' of the 'contradictory' nature of motion, Hegel and Lenin's claim that everything is "self-moving" and "inter-connected", John Rees's explanation of DM-Wholism, among other topics. The consistent DM-slide into unintelligibility isn't just bad luck, it is a direct result of a reckless distortion of language (among other factors, such as interpreting claims -- like the one expressed in and by M1a (repeated below) -- as super-empirical propositions that purport to reveal 'fundamental truths about Reality', when they turn out to be nothing of the sort).^39a

An empirical proposition derives its sense from the truth possibilities it appears to hold open, which options can then be decided one way or the other by a comparison with the (relevant) evidence. That is why the actual truth-value of, say, M6 (or its contradictory, M6a) doesn't need to be known before it is understood (indeed, the opposite is the case, as we have seen), but it is also why evidence is relevant in order to establish its truth-value as "true" or its truth-value as "false".

All that is required is some grasp of the same possibility that both M6 and M6a express. They have the same content, and are made true or false by the same situation obtaining or failing to obtain.⁴⁰

As we are about to find out, a proposition and its negation picture the same state of affairs as either obtaining or not, which means they have the same content. It is this shared content that (logically) connects the two, making each the contradictory of the other. If that weren't so, they wouldn't be contradictories, since there would be nothing (relevant to both) that uniquely linked them. One of them has to be capable of being used to deny what the other one can be used to assert, and vice versa. If they failed to 'overlap' like this, they couldn't be used to contradict (or gainsay) each other. This means that if a given proposition is true, the state of affairs it expresses obtains; if it is false, the same state of affairs doesn't.

[Of course, what constitutes a specific or relevant state of affairs will be intimately connected with the propositions involved. I will leave that enigmatic remark in its currently obscure form, but I will say more about it in Interlude Eight, where the reason for saying this will become clear.]

These (logical) factors enable us to know what to look for or what to expect in order to ascertain whether the proposition in question is true, or, indeed, whether it is false. This is just another way of saying that negation doesn't alter the content of an empirical proposition. If negation could alter content -- or, as we will see, if negation seemed to be able to do this -- then the sentences involved can't have been empirical, or, alternatively, they can't have been contradictories, to begin with.

[The significance of those remarks will also become clearer as this Essay unfolds. Nevertheless, it should be obvious to many that that paragraph, if correct, strikes at the heart of Hegel's 'theory of negation', and, by implication, at the core of DM, too. On whether there can be such a thing as 'real negation' -- an ill-defined and ill-advised term introduced by Kant, which Hegel appropriated and then transformed into a key component of his theory, without which he wouldn't have been able to concoct his 'innovative understanding' of the word "contradiction" -- see Appendix A of Essay Eight Part Two.]

The same situation obtaining -- i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of the above pair true, the other false. If Blair does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false; if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate intertwining of the content, and hence the truth-values, of M6 and M6a are a direct consequence of the same state of affairs linking them.

If a given speaker didn't know that M6 was true (and hence that M6a was false) just in case Blair owned a copy of the said book, and that M6 was false (but M6a was true) just in case Blair didn't own a copy of the said book -- or they were unable to determine or recognise what to look for, or to expect, should they ever want to ascertain the truth-value of M6 or M6a -- that would be prima facie evidence they didn't understand either or both of M6 and M6a. These two sentences stand or fall together. If one of them stands (as true), the other automatically falls (as false), and vice versa.

This might seem a rather obvious point, but its ramifications are all too easily missed, and have been missed by the vast majority of Philosophers for over two thousand years, as noted in the Preface to this Essay. [There is more on this in these references as well as much of the rest of this Essay -- especially here, and in Interlude Five and Interlude Eight (link above).]

Both of these objections (which overlap somewhat) will be considered in more detail in Interlude Eight (link above).

These factors also help explain why it is easy to imagine M6 as true even if it turned out to be false, or false even if it were true. That is, it is easy to imagine what would have made M6 false if it is actually true, and what would have made M6 true if it actually is false. [Vice versa with M6a.] In general, the comprehension of a proposition involves an understanding of the conditions under which it would or could be true, or would or could be false. As is well known, these are otherwise called truth conditions. Naturally, this allows anyone so minded to confirm the actual truth status of any given proposition by an appeal to the available evidence, since they would know in advance what to look for or expect. And that would still be the case even if no one ever wanted to ascertain its actual truth-value. A totally disinterested individual who understood M6 (or M6a) would nevertheless still know what would make it true (and hence M6a false) even if they never cared to find out. [It is worth recalling what the word "disinterested" means here! It doesn't mean uninterested.]

Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that this is something Lenin couldn't do. He couldn't say precisely what would make P4 false without changing the meaning of its key words. [Why that is so will be explained below.]

These non-negotiable facts concerning (this aspect of) discourse also help validate the usual Marxist emphasis on the social nature of language and knowledge. The above facility (i.e., related to knowing the content of a proposition in advance of ascertaining whether it is true or whether it is false) allows interlocutors to exchange information which they will be able to grasp independently of knowing the actual truth-value of a given proposition; speakers just have to know their truth-conditions (even if they have never heard of the term "truth-condition"). If that weren't the case, if they actually had to know that a given empirical proposition was true before they could understand it, the entire process would stall and communication (at least in these terms) would be impossible.

[Of course, it is certainly possible -- in fact, it is quite common -- that in order to ascertain the actual truth-value of a proposition, the truth-value of other such propositions will also have to be known; but, as has already been indicated, truth-values aren't the same as truth conditions. It is by confusing these two (seemingly similar) concepts that many go astray in this area. But, as demonstrated earlier, that isn't the case with respect to a proposition's truth-conditions. Truth-conditions are expressed by rules, not propositions. How that works out and what significance it has will be explained below. Also worth pointing out that even if the truth of certain (other) propositions might have to be known in order to be able to ascertain the actual truth of a given empirical proposition, that doesn't affect the points made so far, such as the rule that a proposition has to be understood first before any attempt to ascertain its truth-value can be made. While the truth of other propositions might help ascertain the actual truth or falsehood of a given proposition, that doesn't affect that proposition's truth conditions, and hence it in no way undermines the observation made above that a proposition has to be understood first before its truth or its falsehood can be established. (This partly answers an objection raised earlier; a more comprehensive response will be given in Interlude Eight -- link above).]

These everyday truisms about language confront metaphysical theories which emphasise the opposite: that understanding a metaphysical proposition is ipso facto to know it is true (or ipso facto to know it is false, depending on circumstances, or the theory in question), which by-passes the evidential confirmation and disconfirmation stage -- thus (apparently) reducing the usual 'truth conditions' to one option only.

[How the above considerations relate to what we might call 'patent truths' (about matters of fact) -- such as "Fire is hot" and "Water is wet" -- which have been dealt with in Interlude Eight, link above.]

As we saw in Essay Three Part Two (for example, here), post-Renaissance Metaphysics was closely bound up with representational theories of language and knowledge, which is one of the main reasons why modern and early modern epistemologies find it hard to account for falsehood. If each 'Knower' represents the world to themselves in 'in the head', how could anything be false? It is no help replying that these representations can be checked against the facts/the world, since, even if that were so, all a given 'Knower' would be doing is checking one set of 'representations' against another. In addition, relying on testimony, evidence or argument provided by other individuals would be no help either. Again, if representationalism were true, all we would be relying on in such circumstances would be 'representations' of testimony, 'representations' of evidence and 'representations' of argument!

But, how is it possible for one 'representation' to validate another 'representation', which is itself based on a third 'representation', which is based on...?

Furthermore, it's worth remembering that as a species we haven't yet found a way of 'leaping out of our heads' in order to check our 'representations' against 'reality' in an attempt to by-pass the need for any further validating 'representations'.^40a

As far as theories of communication as concerned, if the above considerations are correct, the 'contents' of one 'mind' can't be communicated to another 'mind' if there is no means of communication enabling it. But, this pretty obvious pre-condition is completely undermined by representational theories, since, if they are true, there could no such means of communication, none that carried or conveyed shared meanings. And that in turn is because representationalism implies we all create our own idiosyncratic meanings in the privacy of our heads. Furthermore, in light of the foregoing, how would it be possible for anyone to communicate with anyone else if they could only figure out what their interlocutors meant, or might mean, after they had ascertained the truth of what was said to them? Even worse, if all that an individual has to rely on are 'representations', how might the truth of anything be ascertained? Once again, in order to do that, individual actors would be comparing one set of 'yet-to-be-validated-representations' with another set of 'yet-to-be-validated-representations'.

Independently of this, there are other serious problems that traditional approaches to discourse face over and above the fact it would make shared language and knowledge (indeed, any language and knowledge) impossible.

As we are about to discover, intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge in relation to what look like empirical, but which are nonetheless metaphysical, indicative sentences if any attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with such propositions -- namely: truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when one such proposition is declared to be "only true" or "only false" -- or, more pointedly (at least in in post-Renaissance Philosophy) it is said to be 'necessarily true' or 'necessarily false' -- or when either of them is viewed as a particularly profound, universally applicable, Super-Empirical Truth.

Unfortunately, this results in the automatic loss of both semantic options (truth and falsehood, again), and with that goes any sense the original sentence seemed to have, rendering it non-sensical.

That is because an empirical proposition leaves it open whether it is true or whether it is false, which is why its truth-value (true/false) can't simply be read-off from its content, why evidence is required in order to establish its semantic status (true/false, once more), and why this logical property allows it to be understand it before its truth or its falsehood is known (even if the latter is never ascertained). If that weren't the case, it would be impossible to establish its truth-status. That is because -- and to repeat -- it isn't possible to verify or falsify an 'indicative sentence' if no one understands what it says.

When that isn't the case -- i.e., when one or other option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, or when such a proposition is said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence (clearly) becomes irrelevant.

So, while the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition can't be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the supposed truth or the supposed falsehood of a putative proposition were capable of being established solely or exclusively on the basis of linguistic, logical, conceptual or structural factors, that means it can't be empirical. That will still remain the case despite a use of the indicative mood, and in spite of its proponents thoughts about it (especially if any such proposition appears to reveal Super-Facts about 'Reality').

If, however, such a proposition were still held to be true, and still thought capable of revealing Super-Facts about 'Being', about underlying or hidden "essence" -- that would automatically render it metaphysical.^40b

Otherwise, its actual truth or its actual falsehood would have been evidence-sensitive not solely concept-, or meaning-dependent. That is, its actual truth or its actual falsehood would depend on how the world happens to be, but not solely on what its words were imagined to mean.

This explains why the 'comprehension' of a metaphysical proposition goes hand-in-hand with 'knowing' it is 'true' (or 'knowing' it is 'false', as the case may be): its truth-status is based solely and exclusively on thought, language, concepts, definitions and meaning, not evidence.

Of course, it could be argued that "essential thoughts"/"truths"/'propositions' 'reflect' deeper truths about the world, those that are 'philosophically significant' and, as such, are far more profound (and significant) than everyday, common-or-garden, 'empirical truths'.

[As we saw in Essay Three Part Two, that frame-of-mind is typical of opinion among Traditional Theorists, and has been since at least Plato's day. Its connection with ruling-class ideology was exposed here and here.]

But, if thought does indeed 'reflect' the world, it should be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a thought in advance of knowing whether it is true, or knowing whether it is false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would be an empty gesture. [That is a principle to which Dialectical Marxists at least give lip service.] But if a 'metaphysical proposition' is deemed to be true, that conclusion will have automatically followed from the meaning of its words. In that case, its (supposed) semantic status isn't, and can't be, based on evidence. If it were, that would mean the proposition involved could be false** -- which implies its contradictory would then be true. The disastrous consequences that that possibility holds out will be explored below where it will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, 'metaphysical propositions' do not have contradictories. This means that the only way that a 'metaphysical proposition' could be 'true' is that its semantic status must appear to follow exclusively and directly from the (supposed) meaning of the words it contains (since there is no other basis for it!).

[**If the semantic status of a proposition actually depends on evidence, there is always a possibility that that proposition could be false. But if such a 'proposition' can't be false, evidence becomes irrelevant. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, if a 'proposition' can't be true.]

In response, it could be argued that "essential truths" are different. That objection will be dealt with presently.

So, if it seems that the 'truth' of such a sentence could be ascertained from that sentence alone (i.e., if it is "self-evidently true"), the world must drop out of the picture (at least as far as establishing its semantic status is concerned). In turn, that would mean it can't be a reflection of the world, whatever else it might be.⁴¹

[There are deeper reasons for claiming this, which will be explored below -- and in Note 41 (link above).]

Furthermore, but worse, if a proposition is still supposed to be empirical -- or if it is said to reveal 'facts' (or even 'Super Facts') about underlying "essence", or it supposedly 'reflects essence' --, but it can only be true, or it can only be false (which seems to be the case with, say, M20, below, at least according to Lenin), then, as we are about to see, an intractable paradox soon emerges.

Consider the following sentence, M20 -- which Lenin would presumably have declared necessarily false, if not "unthinkable":

Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare M20 necessarily and always false (or "unthinkable"), the possibility of its truth must first of all be entertained -- even if only to be ruled out immediately --, otherwise he would have no idea what he was ruling out. He would have to understand what the M20 was saying to able to pass informed comment on it; that involves knowing what would make it true or would make it false, otherwise he'd be passing an opinion on something he didn't or couldn't comprehend. In which case, if the possible truth of M20 can't even be entertained (howsoever briefly) by Lenin, that would mean (a) M20 was incomprehensible (because of what M1a itself says), or that (b) Even if it were (somehow) comprehensible, Lenin himself couldn't actually understand it, but others might be able to. Either way, Lenin would have absolutely no idea what it was he was rejecting. As we are about to see, this (insurmountable) 'difficulty' has a knock-on affect on the semantic status of M1a itself.

Of course, contrary to the above it could be argued that Lenin doesn't need to entertain the possible truth of M20, he just needs to rule out what it says as unthinkable. But, as it turns out, if Lenin (or anyone else) didn't, or couldn't, entertain its possible truth, they would be in no position to assert M1a, or comprehend its alleged content, either.

Thus, if the truth of M20 is to be permanently excluded by holding it necessarily false, then whatever would make it true would also have to be ruled out conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what M20 rules in so that they could comprehend what was being ruled out by its rejection as always and necessarily false. And yet, that is precisely what can't be done if what M20 itself says is permanently ruled out solely on semantic or conceptual grounds, expressed by M1a.⁴²

[I cover this ground again from a different, perhaps more logically profound, angle, below.]

Consequently, if a proposition like M20 is necessarily false, this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its (possible) truth) can't actually be undertaken. That is because it would be impossible to say (or even think) what might even count as making it true so that that possibility could be rejected out of hand. Indeed, Lenin himself had to declare it "unthinkable", which means he not only couldn't inform his readers what might make it false, he couldn't even think about the import of its words (in the sense that he couldn't conceive their supposed content -- i.e., the state of affairs this sentence supposedly pictured or represented -- being held true or declared false). In that case, because the possible truth of M20 can't even be conceived, no one, least of all Lenin, would be in any position to say what was being excluded by its rejection.⁴³

Unfortunately, this now prevents any account being given of what would make M20 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist -- and paradoxically -- M20 would now be 'necessarily false' if and only if it wasn't capable of being thought of as necessarily false! But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make M20 true can't even be conceived; that train-of-thought can't be joined at any point. And, if the truth of M20 -- or the conditions under which it would be true -- can't even be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we wouldn't then know what was being ruled out.^43a

Anyone who disagreed with the above remarks need only ask themselves: "What exactly is Lenin ruling out by means of M1a?" As soon as they answer that question (i.e., as soon as they reply, "Lenin is ruling out the truth of this sentence 'Motion occurs without matter', or perhaps this one 'Matter can be motionless'"), they will have got the point. That is because they will have just done -- i.e., thought -- what Lenin said couldn't be done, because he had declared it "unthinkable". On the other hand, if they had no idea what Lenin was trying to rule out (i.e., if they can't answer the above question), that would reveal they had no idea what M1a actually meant. For them, M1a would be incomprehensible.

The same applies to M20. Anyone who disagreed with the above argument also need only ask themselves: "What exactly would Lenin be ruling out by his rejection of M20?" As soon as they reply, "Lenin would be ruling out the truth of this sentence 'Motion can sometimes occur without matter', or 'Matter isn't always in motion'", they too will have got the point. But if Lenin or those who disagree with the above argument didn't know what could make either of those true, they would have no idea what they were ruling out. Their rejection would therefore be an empty gesture.

In that case, the supposed negation of M20 (i.e., M20a or M20b, below) can neither be accepted nor rejected, asserted nor denied by anyone (if Lenin is correct) since no one would know what M20's content committed them to so that that content could also either be accepted or rejected, asserted or denied. Hence, M20 would lose any sense it seemed to have, since it couldn't under any circumstances be considered true, and hence under any circumstances be considered false. [That is, for those who accept M1a.]

The bottom line therefore appears to be this: if, according to Lenin, we are incapable of 'thinking the content of M1a', we certainly can't declare M20 false.

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory. Follow these links for two brief explanations; a more comprehensive explanation of both terms will be published in Essay Twelve Part Four.]

[In what follows, by "content" I mean what an indicative, empirical sentence purports to tell us about the world (or any other legitimate subject matter), what state of affairs it supposedly expresses, what we are to look for in order to determine its semantic status -- constrained by what the words of that sentence actually mean. Why that isn't inconsistent with what was said earlier about 'necessary propositions' -- i.e., that their 'truth' depends solely on the meaning of the words they use -- will be explained shortly.]

Our inability to conclude that certain 'propositions' -- or a subset of indicative sentences -- are false is a direct consequence of several of the points raised earlier, the most important of which was perhaps this: an empirical proposition and its negation have the same content, they express the same possible state of affairs. But, if one of those options is permanently ruled out -- i.e., if a given proposition isn't allowed to have, or doesn't have, a negation, for instance -- one of its paired semantic options (truth or falsehood) automatically goes out of the window. That means it has no content (and, as we will see, it ceases to be a proposition --, or, perhaps better: it wasn't one to begin with). [Why that is so will also be explained.]

But, that is what we have just seen happen to Lenin's hyper-bold assertion about matter and motion. In order to appreciate why this is the more fundamental reason for the collapse into incoherent non-sense of his and other metaphysical sentences we need to back-track a little, and in order to do that we need go over earlier ground a little more carefully.

We can see exactly why such problems arise if we consider another typical metaphysical sentence, L1, and its supposed negation, L2:

L1: Time is a relation between events. [Paraphrasing Leibniz.]^43b

L2: Time isn't a relation between events.

[L2a is more logically explicit version of L2; as a result it is far less colloquial.]

As we have seen, the alleged truth of L1 derives directly from the meaning of the words it contains (or the concepts it supposedly expresses, at least as far as Leibniz (thought he) understood them). Alternatively, in some cases, the supposed truth of L1 follows directly from several related principles, precepts and/or definitions (the supposed truth of which also depends on the meaning of the words they contain). Leibniz was telling his readers what he understood the word "time" to mean. But, the supposed truth of L1 wasn't based on evidence (and that remains so even if some attempt were later made to "illustrate" its truth by an appeal (directly or indirectly) to some form of 'evidence', or it is used to help explain other phenomena (these days this is called 'abductive reasoning', or 'inference to the best explanation'). [There is more about this in Interlude Five.]

However, the conclusion here was that Leibniz was refining ideas he had encountered in the work of previous (and contemporaneous) thinkers, but he was also marking out his own 'conceptual territory' by means of them. So, the supposed truth of L1 depends on internal factors (meanings, concepts, definitions, etc.), not on a comparison with the world. [In fact, Leibniz's understanding of "time" followed from his Theology and The Principle of Sufficient Reason, the former of which was in turn based on what he took the word "God" to mean. On this, see the references listed below.] What could he (or anyone who agreed with him) point to in the 'external world' that showed time was actually a relation between events? In fact, Leibniz would have suffered a cardiac arrest at any suggestion he had (actually) derived this idea from experience or observation.

However, the unique semantic status of sentences like L1 has the consequence that if some attempt were made to deny its truth by means of, say, L2, that would amount to a change in the meaning of the word "time". Hence, if time isn't a relation between events, then that use of "time" is different from Leibniz's use of this typographically identical word.

Sentences like L1 define what a given philosopher means by, in this case, "time", how they intend to use that word, conceive of its related 'concepts' (if it has any), or integrate it into a theory or theories being developed. Elsewhere, L1-type sentences are sometimes called "essential propositions". They purport to reveal or even define 'the essence' of the concept(s) involved. So, the word/concept, "time", with a different 'essence' -- or where the 'essential properties' that had been attributed to it are now denied it -- would have a different meaning. Once again, if time isn't a relation between events then the word "time" (used to assert this supposed (alternative) 'super-fact' about 'time') can no longer mean the same as it did in L1. "Time" must either possess no meaning in L2 or it must have a new meaning, one yet to be given. So, for instance, "time", as Newton understood it, was absolute, which clearly tells us he meant something different by that word compared with Leibniz. [On that, see, Alexander (1956), Ariew (2000), DiSalle (2002), Earman (1989), Mcdonough (2024), Rynasiewicz (2011), Vailati (1997).]

Either way, the result is that "time" has a different meaning in L1 compared with L2 (that is, if we also understand by "no meaning" a "different meaning" -- but even then "time" wouldn't mean the same across these two sentences). And, if that is so, L1 and L2 can't represent or 'reflect' the same (alleged) state of affairs. They thus have a different (supposed) content. A significant change of meaning guaranteed this.

In that case, and despite appearances to the contrary, L2 isn't the negation of L1! That is because the subject of each sentence is different.

To see this point, compare the following two sentences:

Whether or not one or other of the above is true, L4 isn't the negation of L3, and that is clearly because they relate to two different individuals, George W Bush and his father, George H W Bush. L3 and L4 thus have two different subjects. They are true or they are false under entirely different circumstances; they don't therefore have the same sense, the same empirical content. Plainly, they express different possible states of affairs.

[That isn't to suggest L3 and L4 are like L1 and L2 in any other respect. The change of subject matter is less easy to see in relation to L1 and L2 since they both use a typographically identical word, "time". The difference between them is nevertheless made obvious by the fact that L1 defines a specific meaning for the word "time", while L2 denies it that very meaning. L3 and L4 are merely being used to make this particular point -- a change of subject -- abundantly clear.]

Mutatis mutandis, the same comment in general applies to all similar metaphysical propositions -- i.e., those like L1, many of which are also "essential" -- and what appear to be their negations (i.e., in the case of L1, that was L2).

L1: Time is a relation between events.

L2: Time isn't a relation between events.

Why is this important? Well, if L1 is deemed "necessarily true", under normal circumstances (to be explained presently) that would be tantamount to declaring its alleged negation (L2) "necessarily false". And yet, L2 isn't the negation of L1. So, that specific inference isn't possible. Again, that is because L1 and L2 are logically unrelated sentences since they have a different (supposed) content, they 'express a (supposed) different state of affairs'. The 'truth' or 'falsehood' of the one has no bearing on the 'truth' or 'falsehood' of the other -- unlike M6 and M6a. There are no logical links between them; a change of subject established this.^43c

So, if or when it has been determined that M6a is true, the falsehood of M6 can automatically be inferred -- and vice versa, if M6 turns out to be true. Hence, M6 may be rejected if M6a is true, just as M6a may be rejected if M6 is true. The same content tells us what we can rule in and what we can rule out. This shared content connects the two sentences and allows valid inferences like this to go through. That wouldn't be the case, and so couldn't be done, if M6 and M6a didn't have this shared content.

It is important to recall that what is or isn't the case in the world is what sets the standard here, not factors 'internal to each speaker'. [What that means will be explained later, too.]

"The basic concept guiding Wittgenstein's whole enquiry is the concept of truth, or rather, being true or false. This is so, whether he is concerned with the nature of propositions, the nature of logic, or the distinction between the significant use of language and nonsense. A proposition is essentially that which is true or false...an apparent proposition is nonsensical if you cannot give a coherent account of the conditions under which it would be true or false. In this way, the central question becomes: 'What is it for a proposition to be true, or false, the right or wrong thing to say?' But to be true or false, right or wrong, is to be answerable to something that sets the standard for lightness and wrongness. The world is introduced here simply as the sum total of that which sets the standard for rightness and wrongness for the propositions of our language, and so the task of the book [i.e., Wittgenstein (1972) -- RL] will then be to answer the question: 'What is the nature of the relation of the propositions of our language to the world conceived in the way set out here, so that they are true or false according to the way the world is?' We thereby implicitly draw 'the limits of language', in the sense that if someone puts forward an apparent proposition, where it can be shown that they can give no coherent account of the way in which their putative proposition stands in such a relation to the world as thus conceived, then they have transgressed the limits of language and they have failed to give any meaning [or as I would put this, 'give any sense' -- RL] to their apparent proposition." [White (2006), pp.22-23.]

[Readers are encouraged to keep this in mind as the rest of this Essay unfolds.]

However, as we have seen, between a metaphysical proposition and what might appear to be its negation there is no shared content because of a change of subject. Two metaphysical sentences like L1 and L2 fail to relate to the same supposed state of affairs, since there is no shared state of affairs, no shared content. [In fact, as we are about to find out, metaphysical sentences have no content.] So, there is nothing that connects L1 and L2 in the above manner.

Hence, the 'truth' of L1 can't be ruled out by means of the 'truth' of L2 (nor vice versa), because we now have no idea what we are ruling out, and therefore no idea what we are ruling in. [Why that is so will also be explained presently, but it is connected with the fact that L1 and L2 express no actual or possible state of affairs.]

L1: Time is a relation between events.

L2: Time isn't a relation between events.

Or, perhaps better: what we might imagine we are trying to rule out (i.e., the truth of L2) by means of L1 can't succeed since L2 has a different subject and hence a different supposed 'content'.

Connected with this is another important principle: to declare a proposition "true" is ipso facto to declare it "not false". Those two semantic conditions go hand-in-hand.

[Some might think this represents an unwise concession to the so-called 'Law of Excluded Middle' [LEM]. I can't enter into that topic here, so any who do so think are advised to check out Note 39a, follow the link at the end of that Note, and then maybe think again.]

But, if we can't declare L1 "not false" (and we plainly can't do that if we have no idea what it is we are supposed to be ruling out -- as we saw any attempt to do so by means of L2, for example, ends up changing the subject!), we can't then say the original sentence is true.

By declaring a sentence like L1 "necessarily true", we appear to be conclusively ruling something in, and thereby conclusively ruling something out (i.e., L1's contradictory, L2) as "necessarily false". Hence, if L1 is deemed 'necessarily true', that would seem to imply L2 is 'necessarily false'. In that case, we would appear to be talking about -- and hence ruling out -- the same (shared) state of affairs expressed by L1 and L2. But, in this case (with respect to L1 and L2, once more) there is no shared state of affairs to be ruled out by the 'truth' of L1, and that is because the two sentences have a different subject. A change of meaning decided this.

In fact, there is no state of affairs here at all, shared or otherwise. L1 picks out no state of affairs -- even in theory.

As we will see, L1 uses certain seemingly familiar words in a specific way, but it isn't about the world as such. L1 actually expresses Leibniz's idiosyncratic rule for the use of the word "time". But metaphysical rules like this are typically interpreted, or misconstrued, as 'fundamental truths about Reality', in this case Leibniz's use of the word "time" represents a rule he intends to use to interpret the whole of 'Reality'. We can see that that is the case (that L1 expresses an idiosyncratic rule for the use of "time") since L2 records a change in meaning to a typographically identical word, "time", which shows this is about the meaning of words, not 'facts about Reality'. It can't be a 'fact about Reality' since if it were, it could be false; but, in order for it to be false, L2 would have to be true (about the same subject -- i.e., Leibniz's use of "time", or, rather, what Leibniz thinks he is referring to by that use). However, L2 isn't about "time" as Leibniz understood that word; it represents a change of subject, and hence a change of meaning. So, each seemingly identical use of the word "time" (in these two sentences) turns out to be a different use because these two otherwise identical marks on your screen (i.e., the pixels constituting the two occurrences of the word "time" in L1 and L2) now have a different meaning.

Once again: if, per impossible, there were a state of affairs that L1 expressed, it would be possible to negate it legitimately (as we seem to see in L2), but that can't be done -- and for the above reasons. As a result the state of affairs L1 supposedly expresses doesn't actually obtain, even in theory. If, the above constraints are ignored, and it were assumed such a state of affairs (seemingly expressed by L1) could exist, L1 could be false, which means L2 would be true. In that eventuality, it would be possible use the supposed truth of L2 to show that what L1 says -- the said state of affairs -- doesn't actually obtain. But, as we have just seen, we can't even do that. In relation to L2, what we think we are ruling out is what L1 expresses. But, L2 has a different 'content' to L1 (that is because these two sentences have a different subject), which means we aren't in fact ruling out (by means of L2) what L1 appears to say!

L1 therefore has no content at all, and neither has L2. If they did, it would be possible to form their legitimate negations. As a result, neither sentence is telling us anything about the world; they are simply expressing two idiosyncratic, but different, uses of the word "time".

When sentences like L1 are entertained, a pretence (often genuine) has to be made that they actually mean (i.e., that they actually "say") something determinate, that they are capable of being understood and hence that they are capable of being true or are capable of being false. That is, in this case, that they at least depict an actual or possible state of affairs, even in theory. To that extent, a further pretence (again, often genuine) has to be maintained that we understand what might make such propositions true -- and hence what will make their 'negations' false, so that propositions like L2 could then be declared "necessarily false", their assumed content ruled out accordingly.

To that end. those fond of talking this way imagine L1- and L2-type sentences actually depict (at the very least) a theoretical state of affairs, but that is something they can't do, as we have just seen. That is because L1 and L2 actually concern the use of a specific word (in this case the word, "time"), not 'reality'. Neither expresses a fact about the world (unlike M6 and M6a) since they both attempt to encapsulate a (peculiar) rule for the use of the word "time" -- albeit in this case, as we have seen, two different rules covering two different meanings of the inscription "time".

Neither the negation -- nor the truth or the falsehood -- of these two sentences has any effect on the meaning of its words, unlike L1 and L2. Again, unlike L1 and L2, M6 and M6a are about the world, are about the same state of affairs, either holding or failing to obtain. M6a is the negation of M6, but that has no effect on the meaning of any of its words. The meaning of the Proper Name "Tony Blair", is the same in both; negation has zero effect on that meaning. Of course, in relation to the other two sentences, L2 looks like it is the negation of L1, but that isn't so because negation has an affect on the meaning of "time" (in L2 compared with L1). That is why the apparent semantic status of L1 and L2 depends solely on the meaning of its constituent words; but in their case, since neither is the negation of the other, it turns out that neither has an actual semantic status (as we are about to discover). The situation is completely different with respect to M6 and M6a. There, the semantic status of these two sentences depends on two factors:

That is why the word "solely" was highlighted earlier. By contrast, the apparent semantic status of metaphysical sentences like L1 depends on Condition (i) only; whereas the actual semantic status of empirical propositions, like M6, depends on Condition (i) and Condition (ii).

If there were a state of affairs that L1 pictured, we would be able to negate the sentence legitimately (as seems to be the case in L2), but, as we have just seen, that can't be done since there is a change of subject between L1 and L2.

This means that metaphysical/philosophical 'propositions' like L1 and L2 are completely vacuous. The entire exercise (i.e., the construction of philosophical/metaphysical theories using sentences like L1) is an empty charade, for no content can be given to its indicative sentences. They depict no state of affairs, even in theory!

[As admitted in the Preface: this is of course a gross oversimplification of Metaphysics, but the above considerations do manage to capture the logical problems faced by what appear to be true indicative sentences that are typically promulgated by metaphysicians. Howsoever complex the theory or the system underlying a given metaphysical theory, at some point a metaphysician will assert, propound or give credence to what he or she thinks is a true proposition. The above comments therefore apply to those 'propositions'.]

Again, in order to declare L1 true, we might pretend, or even fondly and sincerely imagine, that a 'theoretical state of affairs' (at least) is being ruled out by means of L2. But, we have just seen that that isn't so. Nothing is being ruled in or rule out, since L1 is incapable of depicting anything, even theoretically! It has no content.

Hence, anyone who thinks L1 is true will find themselves in no position to say what it depicts, even in theory. That isn't because it would be psychologically impossible for them to do so; it is because it is logically impossible. If L1 could truly depict something (even in theory), we could legitimately negate it; but doing so (as seems to be the case with L2) changes the subject. As a result it isn't possible to specify conditions that would make L2 false (this time by means of L1), even in theory, without changing the subject. Nor can we say under what conditions L1 is true, and for the same reason.

But, if we can't say under what conditions L1 is true (since it depicts nothing at all), we can't say it is or isn't false, either. In which case, we are in no position to declare L1 either true or false! Any attempt to do so falls apart, for that would imply that two logically unrelated sentences (L1 and L2) were related after all.

The bottom line here is that metaphysical propositions can't be true and they can't be false. They have no semantic status, no content. They express no state of affairs, even in theory.

In which case, given what was pointed out here (about sense and non-sense), metaphysical 'propositions' permanently lack a sense, and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the situation.

Our socially-sanctioned use of language (particularly in relation to negating indicative sentences) actually prevents them from expressing a sense, never mind actually being true.

They are therefore non-sensical, empty strings of words.

Metaphysical sentences actually represent non-standard, idiosyncratic, quirky, distorted rules for the use of certain key words misconstrued as 'fundamental truths about Reality'.

As I am sure my readers are aware, rules can't be true or false, just useful or useless, practical or impractical, followed or disobeyed. The first option (about usefulness) is exactly what we have just found is the case with sentences like L1 and L2 (they can neither be true nor false); but, whether they are useful or useless will be covered across the remaining parts of Essay Twelve.

Those remarks also cover the metaphysical 'propositions' DM-theorists have cobbled-together (or, rather, have borrowed from Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up')).

[Essay Nine Part Two has already shown that DM-'laws' are totally useless -- or, to be more precise, they have no positive, only negative, applications in the class war --, here, here and here.]

[Incidentally, the word "proposition" is in 'scare quotes' above, because it isn't clear what is being proposed or put forward for consideration by metaphysical sentences (since, in such cases, those like L1, L2 and P4 have no content). Hence, nothing (i.e., no content) has been proposed or put forward for consideration. (Concerning vagueness, see here.)]

Some might wonder why there can't be necessary states of affairs that are independent of language and hence independent of human cognition, which are, or can be, reflected by metaphysically-, or necessarily-true, propositions. The above argument just assumes (without proof) that there can't be any such.

However, let it be assumed for the purposes of argument that L1 is necessarily true and that there is a 'necessary', or even a 'metaphysical state of affairs' out there somewhere in the world (perhaps even 'lying behind appearances', etc.) that is reflected by L1 (and which is also 'independent of language', 'independent of humanity', etc., etc.). If so, that would mean time is actually, and 'objectively', a relation between events, 'reflected' precisely by L1. [Of course, in order to so conclude we would have to ignore the (complex) use of language that got us to this point and which allowed this claim to be made, just as we will have to engage in the fantasy that whatever we say about 'fundamental aspects of Reality' is (magically) independent of language even though we must have used language to claim language hadn't been used to register that very claim! (I will say much more about (futile) attempts to 'get behind or beyond language' in Essay Three Parts Four and Six, as well as Essay Twelve Part Four.)]

We have already seen that moves like these automatically throw the semantic status of L2 into doubt, since there would still be a change of subject between these sentences, which means L2 isn't talking about what L1 is talking about, despite appearances to the contrary and despite the use of a typographically identical word. Anyone who holds L2 true (for example, a Newtonian) can't now mean by "time" what anyone who holds L1 true means by their use of this typographically identical word, "time". On the other hand, if L2 is declared false (for instance, by a Leibnizian), it, too, can't be about "time", as that word is understood by anyone who holds L2 true. In such circumstances, it would be impossible to explain how, when L2 is true, it could fail to be about time (again, as understood by a Leibnizian), but, when it is false, it is about time (as understood by a Leibnizian)!

Impossible, of course, unless we acknowledge that these are two different uses of typographically identical words.

As we have also seen, if L1 is declared "necessarily true", its falsehood is (seemingly) automatically ruled out. But, in that eventuality it now becomes impossible to rule out the falsehood of L1, for to do that we would (normally) have to entertain the truth of L2, or at least know what would make it true so that that possibility could be excluded. But, by declaring L1 "necessarily true" we are decisively ruling out its falsehood, and thereby (seemingly) decisively ruling out the truth of L2. But, L2 is totally unrelated to L1. They both have different subjects. In that case, we can't rule out the falsehood of L1 (and hence claim it is true) on the basis of the actual falsehood of L2. And yet, if that is so, we can't declare L1 "necessarily true", either. That being the case, L1 can't reflect a 'necessary state of affairs in reality'. Otherwise, all of the above would be possible: L1 would be connected to L2 by the same 'necessary state of affairs', and the truth of one would rule out the truth of the other. But a change of meaning, a change of subject, between L1 and L2 rules that possibility out.

As pointed out earlier, our use of language actually prevents metaphysical sentences from being either true or false. Hence, they are incapable of 'reflecting' anything (real or imagined, necessary or otherwise).

But, it might now be objected that there could be states of affairs in the world that language might not be able to reflect, but which are nevertheless still metaphysically necessary (and are such independently of our knowing this and independent of our saying anything true or false about them). Surely, the incapacity of language to reflect the world doesn't imply there are no such necessary states of affairs. Any attempt to assert there are none -- based on the presumed fact that they can't be represented in language -- would be guilty of the very thing the approach adopted at this site claims to have rejected. That is, by denying there are such metaphysical states of affairs the above analysis attempts to derive certain truths about reality -- namely, that there are no metaphysical states of affairs -- from language (i.e., from its supposed inability to represent their actual existence)! That is inconsistent with the repeated claims advanced above and in other Essays that that approach to Philosophy delivers nothing but incoherent non-sense.

Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that nowhere was it asserted that metaphysical or necessary states of affairs do not or cannot exist, only that any attempt to state such supposed truths will always be non-sensical and incoherent.

However, as soon as it is asked what is implied by a sentential use of the phrase, "necessary states of affairs", the whole sorry mess falls apart.

A "necessary state of affairs" is (supposed to be) one that can't be otherwise. For instance, if time were necessarily a relation between events (and that were so independently of language, independent of human cognition), it couldn't fail to be a relation between events. It would necessarily be a relation between events and "couldn't be otherwise". But, for such an "otherwise" to do any work here, and what its use seeks to convey, and for it itself to obtain (if there actually was an 'otherwise', even if this still remains independent of our knowledge), it would have to be the case that time would fail to be a relation between events in such an assumed scenario! And yet, as we have just seen, there is no such thing as an "otherwise" when it comes to 'necessary'/'metaphysical' states of affairs. In that case, it is impossible even to describe an "otherwise" in connection with 'necessary'/'metaphysical' states of affairs, for to do so would be to change the subject again! This means that in relation to the above attempt to define a "necessary state of affairs" with a use of the word "otherwise", it turns out that "otherwise " here does no actual work. It can't apply precisely here, and for the above reasons. The definition itself is internally defective.

[If anyone can come up with a better definition of a "necessary state of affairs" that doesn't use "otherwise", or its equivalent, please contact me with your best shot. I have been studying this topic for over forty years, and have yet to encounter one.]

Or, if we remain at a non-linguistic level (always assuming it is possible to do this!), any such "otherwise" would have to involve a different objective, language-independent 'time' than the one assumed to exist as an integral component of a 'necessary'/'metaphysical' state of affairs. Time can't both be necessarily the one and necessarily its opposite, a factor implied by "otherwise". In such an eventuality, we would no longer be speaking about time₁ but about time₂, where time₁ was a relation between events and time₂ wasn't! But if we can't speak about an "otherwise" without changing the subject (or the component), no coherent (or even comprehensible) possibility will have been presented for our consideration. Or, at least, no more than there would have been had someone asked about offside in chess or the square root of your left foot. No one is capable of theorising about offside in chess, or even begin thinking about the square root of your left foot. The same is the case with 'necessary'/'metaphysical' states of affairs. There is no "otherwise" to offside in chess! There is no onside in chess. Your left foot isn't a number!

There is no "otherwise" with 'necessary'/'metaphysical' states of affairs for us to rule in or out.

'Necessary states of affairs that exist beyond the reach of language' are no more to be accepted than claims there are 'gods' beyond both human comprehension or depiction. Such 'necessary states of affairs' are defined in terms of what "cannot be otherwise", but no content can be given to the definition itself, since there is no "otherwise" here to be taken into consideration, and for the above reasons.

[As should seem reasonably clear, that use of "content" is different from the use it was given earlier. Here is more closely means "coherence". So, the above clause should be taken to mean: "no coherence can be attributed to the definition itself...".]

That isn't to assert there are no such 'fundamental'/'necessary'/'metaphysical' states of affairs, it is to point out that any attempt to say there might be will be as devoid of content as claims about offside in chess.

Moreover, because the negation of DM-propositions (like P4) also fail to picture anything that could be the case in any possible world (for logical, not psychological or scientific reasons), they, too, have no content. Naturally, that automatically vacates the content of the original non-negated DM-'proposition' (such as P4, again), rendering it non-sensical, too.

Once again, the above might appear to be yet another example of a priori dogmatics promoted at this site -- in that it denies that DM-propositions could "picture anything that could be the case in any possible world", but that isn't so. It is rather to say that it makes no sense to suppose they were capable of picturing anything. They present us with nothing that can be given a sense, even in theory. Indeed, for all the 'sense' they do make, DM-propositions might as well have been taken from The Jabberwocky, a poem that makes about as much sense as Hegel's 'Logic':

Except, of course, The Jabberwocky is more obviously incoherent non-sense, while Hegel's work contains enough 'philosophical bait' (i.e., enough obscure metaphysical verbiage), to attract the approving attention of gullible readers. Once hooked, the following syndrome unfortunately kicks in:

"Hegelism is like a mental disease; you can't know what it is until you get it, and then you can't know because you have got it." [Eastman (1926), p.22. Bold emphasis added.]

[Anyone who objects to my quoting Max Eastman should check this out and then perhaps think again.]

As one might expect, this helps explain the quasi-religious fervour with which DM is both protected and defended by all those whose brains it has colonised. [On that, see here and here.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HCD = High Church Dialectician; follow the link for an explanation.]

[I]ntractable logical problems soon begin to emerge in relation to what look like empirical, but which are nonetheless metaphysical, indicative sentences if any attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with such propositions -- namely: truth and falsehood.

As the foregoing has shown, it isn't possible to restrict or exclude one of these paired semantic options -- for instance, falsehood in favour of truth or truth in favour of falsehood --, as metaphysicians generally try to do, without the above 'problems' arising. As we also saw, any such attempt will always be prevented by the socially-sanctioned rules ordinary human beings have developed over thousands of years. [Evidence and argument in support of that rather bold claim will be given in Essay Twelve Part Seven (but some of it has already been aired here and here).

On the other hand, if a proposition and its negation have the same content (which will be the case if one is to count as the negation of the other), they stand or fall together. If one is true, its contradictory is false, and vice versa. But, that isn't so with DM-'propositions'; they stand alone, since they have no content and hence can't share any such imaginary content (i.e., the content they are imagined by their proponents to possess) with any other indicative sentence, least of all with their own supposed negations. But that just means they too collapse as incoherent non-sense, just as we have seen happen with M1a.

This means that we need another way of explaining why DM-'propositions' were invented in the first place.

[There will be more on that presently. Why they all (and not just M1a) collapse into incoherence in addition to being non-sense will also be explained below.]

As we can now see, the radical misuse of language that results in the production of what look like empirical propositions (e.g., M1a or P4) involves an implicit reference to the sort of conditions that underlie the normal employment of similar looking sentences.⁴⁴

Hence, and once again, when sentences like these are presented for consideration, or are entertained (even if only briefly), a pretence (often genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they are capable of being understood, and hence that they are capable of being true or are capable of being false.⁴⁵ [This will happen even if certain restrictions are later imposed on any further attempt to 'process them theoretically', as happened with Lenin in connection with M1a and P4.] In that case, an additional pretence has to be maintained that the target audience (i.e., the hapless consumers of Dialectical Marxist Philosophy) understand what it is in nature and society that might make such 'propositions' true, or their 'negations' false, so that sentences like M20 might be declared 'necessarily false', or even "unthinkable".

This pretence is somewhat analogous to the charade religious believers often enter into when they are regaled with, or they read about, the 'amazing wonders' of their particular 'deity' and 'his'/'her'/'its' 'miraculous' accomplishments, tall tales none of them would believe for a second if something similar were said about another 'deity' belonging to a rival religion. It is also analogous to the sort of pretence entered into when we read fiction or watch movies that aren't just documentaries. Are cameras really able to record everything without the characters in a given film seeing the camera/camera crew, for instance? Viewers happily suspend belief over this and other 'movie miracles' -- for example, every dream, flashback and visualised memory is always shot in the third person (which has been experienced by no one on this planet, ever!). We might even call this 'Dialectical Shadowboxing', where the usual moves a boxer makes are all pretence (albeit aimed at improving their technique and fitness -- but with DM-fans this is just aimed at improving their standing/reputation in the party).

Such 'ease of comprehension' (if that is even the right phrase) is also apparent whenever dialecticians are confronted with accusations that they don't really understand the weird things they come out with. How many, for instance, actually understand how a moving object can possibly be in two places at once, in one of them and not in at the same time? Of course, they all mask their lack of comprehension with no little hand-waving, calling it a 'contradiction', as if that explains a single thing! In fact, it is worryingly like the response elicited from Christians who, when asked to explain 'The Holy Trinity', simply call it a 'mystery'. Or when asked about 'God', they just call 'Him' a 'Spirit'.

Dialectical Marxists are genuinely shocked, if not puzzled and offended by such allegations (as anyone will soon learn who confronts a randomly-selected DM-fan along these lines -- accusing them of not understanding their own theory). I used to make this point in public 'debates' I had with these characters many years ago -- that is, in those far off days when they were prepared to discuss DM. [The word "debates" here is in 'scare' quotes because DM-supporters can't actually debate this theory; they are far too emotionally invested in it, as I demonstrate in Essay Nine Part Two. This irrational response was plain for all to see in Trotsky's extreme reaction to any US comrades who were brave enough to question DM back in the 1930s.] In public meetings, 'dialectical comrades' used to heckle me, shouting: "You don't understand dialectics!", to which I always replied "Well, in that case, I'm in good company, since no one understands dialectics!" That used to shut them up. But, those days are long gone. The 'DM-Counter-Reformation' has well and truly set in, and, en masse, DM-fans have circled the wagons and now refuse even to debate this misbegotten theory, content merely to post abuse, personal attacks, or, failing that, they deflect on to me and my alleged motives and foibles (even where they deign to respond!). Here is an example from a few years ago. (I have covered that non-debate in more detail here.) And here is another recent example where I accused an HCD of not understanding the obscure, quasi-Hegelian gobbledygook he kept spouting. Needless to say he was -- to put it mildly -- 'somewhat miffed' I had the temerity to accuse him of not understanding what he was saying, but, try as hard as I could, I couldn't get him to explain what he actually did mean by his use of the odd language he kept coming out with. The irony of his total incapacity to make himself understood -- without using yet more obscure jargon (which he also couldn't explain!) in order to try to 'explain' the last broadside -- was clearly lost on him. Of course, he isn't the only comrade who has bought into the 'pretence' that DM is comprehensible. In effect, they have all sold their 'radical souls' to the other side in the class war in this respect (i.e., philosophically). As is easy to show, in the vast majority of cases, they haven't a clue what their theory means, or implies; in fact, no more than Christians have concerning the 'Doctrine of The Trinity'. Nevertheless, Theologians and Dialectical Marxists are both avid and consistent peddlers of jargon they can't explain to anyone, least of all one another. I have said much more about this in Note 45 (link above).]

The entire exercise is a theoretical and practical charade, for no content can be given to sentences like P4 and M1a, nor in fact to any metaphysical 'proposition'.^45a

Someone might object that "not true" doesn't necessarily imply "false" (nor vice versa), and that is because a proposition:

(i) Could lack a truth-value -- i.e., it could be truth-valueless (where this is meant to be a permanent, irresolvable condition);

(ii) It could have a third truth-value, neither true nor false; or, and what is even worse,

[Options (i) and (ii) might appear to be the same, but they aren't. If a 'proposition' has the truth-value neither true nor false, it clearly has a truth-value, which is what (i) rules out. Yes, these are the fine distinctions that feed the imagination of logicians and philosophers of logic!]

But, Options (i)-(iii), if they were even viable alternatives, would merely prompt a reconsideration of what we should count as a proposition, or, indeed, what we should count as an empirical proposition. This might even mean that any indicative sentences implicated in this way, that were this semantically-challenged, should be re-classified as, perhaps, non-factual. If a proposition purports to be about the facts, the only two truth-values available are clearly true or false. If that weren't the case, it would be entirely unclear what was being proposed or put forward for consideration, to begin with. If the facts themselves can't be used to decide whether or not a given proposition is true, then in what way could that sentence be validly described as factual? What could anyone who asserted an indicative sentence that was truth-valueless, was neither true nor false, or was both true and false, be proposing? In what way could the facts help that individual decide either way if the facts turn out to be non-dispositive.

Admittedly, it might not currently be known whether any such indicative (supposedly factual) sentences are or aren't true, and we might never know. But that has no bearing at all on what would make them true or would make them false, which is all that is required.

It could now be argued that even on the basis of what has was argued above and in the rest of this Essay, a proposition like M6, for instance, is actually truth-valueless until it has been decided one way or another.

It is not too clear what this objection amounts to, but it looks like it might be based on a confusion of truth-conditions with unknown truth-values. Anyone who understand M6 can predict ahead of time what (evidence) will make it true and what will make it false, which is all that is required of the approach adopted here. On the other hand, if it is impossible to say what might make a proposition true or might make it false -- like say, Q1, below -- then its status as a proposition would automatically be thrown into doubt.

Someone might object that it is possible to state Q1's truth-conditions, what would make it true and what would make it false. Any such response would take us into areas to be covered later on concerning incoherent language, since several of the words used in Q1 are problematic in themselves. This means that, in this respect, Q1 is in effect little different from Q2:

Q1: Schmod created À_o shmangels 9.645 nanoseconds before schme created the universe.

Since no meaning has been given to words like "God" and "angel", Q1 is fundamentally truth-valueless, like Q2.

Of course, this introduces controversial issues that have been raised in the Theory of Meaning, the Philosophy of Language and the Philosophy of Logic (for example by the late Michael Dummett and the late Donald Davidson (among others)). It also introduces 'problems' highlighted by Graham Priest (among others). [Concerning the latter, see here.]

At which point it is worth recalling the two conditions mentioned earlier -- especially Option (i):

The actual semantic status of empirical propositions depends on both factors, not just one.

Someone might further object that despite the above, if an empirical proposition is declared "not false" that plainly doesn't mean it is true. For example, consider an empirical, scientific proposition, V2:

Well, that confuses a logical with an epistemological point -- which is something the late Michael Dummett also tended to do -- a muddle further compounded by his conflation of meaning with sense, when he linked the meaning of a proposition with its "assertibility conditions" (on that, see Ellenbogen (2003), pp.25-58).

While we might not (currently) know whether or not V2 is false, we also don't know it is true. In that case, we are in no position to assert either of these: that V2 is false or that V2 is true. But, that doesn't affect the logical point that we can specify ahead of time (plausible) conditions that would make V2 true or would make V2 false -- if they obtained or failed to obtain, as the case may be. We would have no idea how to go about even investigating the semantic status of V2 if that weren't so. Hence, the aforementioned logical constraints draw the epistemological boundaries that were of concern to Dummett, not the other way round. Without doubt, that doesn't imply nature can't surprise us from time to time, only that we can now specify, in advance, what would make V2 true and what would make V2 false -- i.e., consistent with what we currently know about life and nature in general.

However, at this site, an empirical proposition is taken to have a True-False Polarity (and that is because of the requirement that they are capable of being understood first before their truth or their falsehood has been, or even could be, ascertained). [Again, I have said more about this in Note 53 (reproduced below) and here.]

In which case, as we have seen, it turns out that metaphysical propositions can't be true and can't be false. They thus lack a sense and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the situation.

They are, therefore, non-sensical.

[As we will also see: they are, in addition, incoherently non-sensical. How something can be coherently non-sensical will be dealt with presently.]

Throughout this site I have taken the word "false" to mean "not true" and the word "true" to mean "not false" (at least in the sentential contexts under review in this Essay).

[A] I have taken "false" -- when used to characterise the semantic status of a proposition -- to imply the following in relation to that proposition: "Operate on this proposition with 'not' (or some other equivalently negative particle/phrase/inflection) to yield a truth". That is because the indicative sentence in question before it was operated on in this manner must have been false if it yields a truth when so operated on.

[B] I have also taken "true" -- when used to characterise the semantic status of a proposition -- to imply the following in relation to the said proposition: "Operate on this proposition with 'not' (or some other equivalently negative particle/phrase/inflection) to yield a falsehood". That is because the indicative sentence in question before it was operated on in this manner must have been true if it yields a falsehood when so operated on.

[I owe this formulation to Peter Geach (this links to a PDF). Of course, in some contexts this will involve a rather more complex use of the negative particle, or its equivalent. It also depends on our ability to ascertain the actual truth-value of the said proposition, but that is an epistemological, not a logical, point, which has already been dealt with.]

Unfortunately, the above characterisation is (obviously) circular; hence, it depends on already understanding the key words ("false" and "true") as they are used in the vernacular. In which case, it merely explains the logical relation between these two terms, not what they mean.

This supposition doesn't need defending, either, since it is based on a reasonable interpretation of the ordinary use of these expressions. In that case, I am ignoring the alleged 'third semantic possibility' -- i.e., that "not true" or "not false" imply "neither true nor false" when applied to such propositions. Elsewhere, I have said a little more about why that approach has been adopted at this site (i.e., ignoring the aforementioned 'third semantic possibility'), alongside a few comments about another (fourth) 'semantic possibility', "both true and false". [I.e., in relation to Options (ii) and (iii), from earlier.]

In addition, I am ignoring other, wider uses of these words, since they don't feature in the sort of contexts examined here -- for example, the employment of "true" and "false" in phrases like "true friend", "false lead", "true colour", "false beard", "false smile", "false laugh", "true aim", etc, etc. In Part Five of this Essay, I will return to this specific topic, since it is connected with yet another serious (logical, semantic and linguistic) blunder Hegel committed.

If connections like these are rejected, then for a proposition to be true it would have to satisfy extra conditions over and above merely not being false, and vice versa. In certain specialised formal systems that might prove to be an acceptable extension to -- or, indeed, alteration of -- the meaning of "true" and "false" (and perhaps also of the meaning of "proposition" and "negation") -- although the difficulties and problems such modifications introduce into logic and formal languages don't appear to be worth the candle.

However, such profligacy in ordinary language would make communication impossible. By implication, it would also have a knock-on effect for scientific discourse, and that in turn would make scientific advance impossible.

For example, in the latter eventuality (ambiguity and rhetorical force to one side, and if it were maintained that truth and falsehood aren't mutually exclusive -- or aren't always mutually exclusive -- in the above manner), then, if a theory, T, predicted that event, E, would take place at time, t₁, which prediction was subsequently confirmed -- event, E, at t₁ having been observed and recorded successfully --, investigation would then have to be continued beyond that point to show that, although the earlier observation had established the truth of the prediction, it hadn't shown it wasn't false! But, what could possibly do that that the original experiment/observation had failed to accomplish? Similarly, for the converse eventuality: if T predicts that E would take place at t₁, which prediction was itself subsequently falsified -- event, E, at t₁ having failed to occur --, investigation would then have to be continued beyond this point to show that, although the earlier failure to observe E had established the falsehood of the prediction, it hadn't shown that it wasn't true! Again, what could possibly do that that the original experiment/observation had failed to achieve?

It might be thought that repeated experiments could be undertaken to decide in both cases, but the very same problems will (predictably) recur no matter how many repeated trials were attempted -- that is, if "true" didn't automatically mean "not false", and vice versa (in such contexts). No matter how many times an experiment is conducted, if a prediction were shown to be true, but that didn't mean it wasn't false, what more could be done to rectify the situation? [Same in reverse if that prediction were continually shown to be false.]

[In this, I am not committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent, since I am not arguing that T is true because it is based on the truth of the prediction, merely that the prediction of E will have been verified/falsified observationally, or in some other relevant and legitimate way; and, on the basis of that, asking what further could possibly be done to resolve this artificial 'difficulty'. I have also kept the above example very basic and simple so that the point being made is much easier to appreciate.]

Of course, in some areas of Physics it could be argued that sentences are often used that have an 'indeterminate' truth-value (i.e., indicative sentences that are neither true nor false -- for example, in relation to so-called "Quantum Logic", where the applicability of the LEM is questioned). The problem here isn't whether such propositions do or do not have an indeterminate truth-value, but whether they are (empirical) propositions to begin with. If they don't propose anything (factually) determinate (i.e., if what is being offered up for consideration is unclear), they can't be (factual) propositions, whatever else they might be. Or, they can't be so described until it is made clear exactly what they are proposing.

[On the logical defects of "Quantum Logic", however, see Harrison (1983, 1985). As should now be clear, the above approach (which holds that certain sentences have 'indeterminate' truth-values) confuses logical with epistemological factors.]

Furthermore, in ordinary discourse (rhetoric to one side again), if someone speaks the truth, we assume that what is said isn't false, which we couldn't or wouldn't do if the truth of what was said didn't automatically imply that it was also not false.

In addition, and as indicated above, it isn't possible to separate the use of the words "true" and "false" from the role of negation in ordinary language -- which, of course, operates in complex ways itself. [Cf., Horn (1989/2001) for a detailed study.]

Another problem that has dogged much of previous thought in this area is the idea that negation is somehow linked with falsehood, or 'privation' (i.e., with a lack of something). But, negated propositions should neither be regarded as automatically false nor seen as expressing any sort of 'privation'. The sentence "The Thames isn't longer than the Mississippi" is true despite being the negation of "The Thames is longer than the Mississippi". Moreover, the sentence "Tony Blair isn't dead" is the equivalent of "Tony Blair is alive" (if we regard "is dead" as synonymous with "isn't alive"), but "Tony Blair isn't dead" isn't expressing the lack of anything -- a deficiency of 'deadness' or a dearth of mortality, perhaps? Do we all lack 'deadness' and mortality until we die, when we somehow 'gain' one or both? In fact, "Tony Blair isn't dead" is expressing the exact opposite -- the presence of life!

[We will be looking at "Nothing" and its supposed connection with 'lack of Being' in Part Five of Essay Twelve; in the meantime, see here.]

Nor should assertion be confused with truth. If someone asserts "The Thames is longer than the Mississippi!", that doesn't make it true. And denial isn't the same as negation, either; nor is assertion its opposite. I can assert that the Thames isn't longer than the Mississippi just as I can assert the opposite, that the Thames is longer than the Mississippi. If assertion were the opposite of negation, these two would (logically) be the same, which they aren't. [I can deny both, too.] Assertion and denial are what we do with sentences regardless of whether they are true or whether they are false, negated or not. This can be seen from the fact that all known (natural) languages have symbols that can clearly be identified as negative particles, but none has a symbol for assertion that is the opposite of "not" (or its equivalent), or even a symbol for denial. Admittedly we can use the negative particle to deny something but we can also use it to assert something, so denial and negation aren't the same, either. Hence, "The Potomac isn't longer than the Nile" is as much a denial that the Potomac is longer than the Nile as it is an assertion that it isn't.

Of course, assertion and denial are often signalled or indicated by prosody, or even by the use of gestures, facial expressions or the context of the utterance itself, which make them what they are -- i.e., such lexical and behavioural moves indicate that what was said (or implied) is an assertion or is a denial/rejection, among other things. Having said that, these extra lexical and behavioural factors are related to, or they affect what is called speakers' meaning, not word meaning (concerning which, see here). But that is clearly an entirely separate issue. I won't enter into it in any more detail here since that will take us too far into the murky depths of the Philosophy of Language, Philosophical Logic, Sociolinguistics, and Psycholinguistics. [However, on this in general, see Horn (1989/2001) and Wansing (2001). (This links to a PDF.)]

[These issues often confuse those who conflate epistemological and pragmatic issues with the logical properties of propositions. In the above, I have also relied on unpublished lectures given by the late Professor Geach in 1977-78. If I can obtain permission from his literary executors, I will post them here, at this site, at a later date.]

It could be argued that the claims advanced in this Essay -- such as, "Metaphysical propositions are non-sensical" -- are self-refuting. That is because they clearly aren't empirical and yet they are also supposed to be true.

According to earlier sections of this Essay, and despite appearances to the contrary, AD2 isn't the negation of AD1 (since there is a change of subject between them). If so, AD1 can't be false; if it were AD2 would be true, but there is no logical connection between AD1 and AD2, so the supposed falsehood of AD1 can't imply the truth of AD2. Nor can the supposed falsehood of AD2 imply the truth of AD1, and for the same reason. So, if the argument presented earlier in this Essay is to be believed, AD1 can't be true and it can't be false. which means it is non-sensical.

(b) I am advancing a supposedly true philosophical theory of my own about language and philosophical theories in general. If so, what I have to say is no less non-sensical, and if that is the case, I will only have succeeded in refuting myself!

Unfortunately, the above objection is based on a false belief (at least concerning the argument presented in this Essay): that there are only two uses of the indicative mood, fact-stating and philosophical thesis-mongering. But, as has repeatedly been pointed out, there are other uses of the indicative mood. One such is in connection with the formulation of scientific theories, which, according to the approach adopted here, do not in general state facts -- despite what many believe. They express rules that scientists use in order to make sense of the world. [At this site, these are also called forms of representation (more about that presently).] Rules aren't the sort of thing that can be true or false, they can only be useful or useless, effective or ineffective, practical or impractical, followed or broken, etc., etc. In addition, they must be coherent or they couldn't be followed or applied (or even misapplied**). Since rules are incapable of being true or false they too are non-sensical (given the meaning of that term used at this site), which means rules are coherent non-sense. [The term "non-sense" is explained below.]

[**Even if a rule is misapplied it must be coherent otherwise no one would be able to decide whether or not it had been misapplied! An incoherent rule couldn't be applied. I also explain below what is meant by "incoherent".]

It is worth pointing out that at this site "non-sense" is not the same as "nonsense". That term has various meanings ranging from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$ 6y3n3& 8FT34n", always assuming the latter isn't some sort of a code).

"Non-sense" characterises indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of expressing a sense no matter what we try to do with them. ["Sense" is explained below, too.] So, such sentences are incapable of being true and they are incapable of being false. In relation to metaphysical theories, as we have seen, the indicative or fact-stating mood is regularly mis-used, mis-applied or misconstrued. So, when such sentences are employed to state supposedly 'fundamental truths about Reality', they badly misfire since they can't possibly do that. [Later sections of this Essay will explain why that is so.]

Hence, non-sensical sentences as such are neither patently false nor plain gibberish. [However, there are different types of non-sense. More about that later, too.]

Finally, the word "sense" is being used here in the following way: the sense of a proposition expresses the conditions under which that proposition is true and the conditions under which it is false. This is a logical property.

As far as language-users are concerned, sense is indirectly connected with what a language user understands to be the case for a given proposition to be true and what that user understands to be the case for that proposition to be false. This remains so even if (a) Neither of those two options (i.e., a proposition's truth-values -- whether it is true or whether it is false) is ever actually known, (b) Neither might ever be known, or (c) No one even cares to find out. These are epistemological, pragmatic and psychological factors, which many (who should know better) regularly and casually lump together and confuse with the above logical properties. [Indeed, as we will see in Interlude Eight (link below).]

So, the sense of a proposition is one of its logical properties and as such is independent of the above epistemological, pragmatic and psychological factors.

For example, if we first of all consider the epistemological factors, every user of English (above an extremely basic level), who knows what "Tony Blair" and "Das Kapital" mean, will understand T1 upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what (certain parts of) the world would have to be like for it to be true and what (certain parts of) the world would have to be like for it to be false. [Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said about the users of other languages that have the required vocabulary and grammar.]

More importantly, the same situation that makes T1 true (if it obtains) will make T1 false (if it doesn't).

These conditions are integral to our capacity to understand empirical propositions before we know whether they are true or before we know whether they are false. Indeed, they explain how and why we know what to look for, or what to expect, in order to show, ascertain or recognise that such propositions are true, or in order to show, ascertain or recognise they are false -- again, even if we never succeed, or even wish to succeed, in doing either.

On the other hand, if an individual didn't know such things (implicitly or explicitly), that would be enough to suggest they didn't actually understand T1 (for instance).

Again, epistemological factors in no way affect the aforementioned logical properties. T1 will be true, or it will be false, independently of anyone knowing either of these is the case, or even caring to know.

[Some have raised several objections to this characterisation of sense; their counter-claims will be dealt with in Interlude Eight.]

It is important to add that the above use of "know" should be understood as "know how" not "know that". So, for instance, the phrase "and who knows what 'Tony Blair' and 'Das Kapital' mean" should be read this way: "and who knows how to use 'Tony Blair' and 'Das Kapital' correctly". The significance of that remark will be also explained in Interlude Eight, as will this: truth-conditions are independent of our knowledge and understanding. Truth-conditions are expressed by the proposition in question. We demonstrate an understanding of one such proposition when we grasp those conditions. If that weren't so, truth-conditions would vary between users and communication would be impossible.

Other considerations involved in response to the above objection (that the approach adopted at this site is self-refuting), are these:

The following will help explain why scientific theories have been characterised the way they were earlier (however, this topic will be covered in much greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two):

When Newton, for example, stated in connection with his Second Law that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the applied force, he wasn't stating a fact about "force" or "momentum", otherwise it could be false, In that eventuality NW2 would be true, but that would imply the meaning of "force" and "momentum" in NW2 has a different meaning compared with their meaning in NW1, as he understood those terms. In that Law he was proposing, or establishing, a rule that could be used to study and the predict acceleration of a body of constant mass. It told us what he meant by "force" and "momentum".

[Of course, Newton himself might not have seen things this way (just as the vast majority fail to see it this way, too!), but that doesn't affect the point being made. Recall the comments made at the top of this page: This Essay "tackles issues that have sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest minds in history...." Again, I will say more about why such 'Laws' are in effect rules in Essay Thirteen Part Two. (Incidentally, this approach to scientific 'Laws' helps account for the odd fact that they all appear to "tell lies about nature". On that, see Cartwright (1983). (This links to a PDF.) Why that is so will also be explained in the aforementioned Essay.)]

In connection with the above objection (that many of the claims advanced in this Essay are self-refuting) two further points need to be made:

First: at this site, I often employ some indicative sentences as rules, but in most of those instances -- as indeed is the case in this Essay --, they are used interpretative or elucidatory rules.

[Except in connection with the main topic of this Essay, I do so in order to show that philosophical theories themselves turn out to be misconstrued linguistic rules, which means they aren't just non-sensical, they are incoherent. Why that is so has yet to be explained.]

Second: someone might draw our attention to one of Wittgenstein's most notorious remarks (since he seems to have made the same fundamental error):

"6.54: My propositions [Sätze -- sentences, RL] serve as elucidations in the following way: Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when he has used them -- as steps -- to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." [Wittgenstein (1972), p.151. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]

They might then claim (as, indeed, many have) that he only succeeded in refuting himself.

Even philosophers sympathetic to Wittgenstein's overall approach have struggled with this passage, and tend to argue it either undermines the entire book, or the word "nonsense" can't be understood literally -- for example Schroeder (2006), pp.104-12. However, such authors fail to distinguish between "non-sense" and "nonsense" (in fact they don't even use the term "non-sense" -- which is part of the problem!). [The so-called 'New Wittgensteinians' have pushed this to the extreme and have argued that Wittgenstein's use of "nonsense" (in the above passage) does indeed mean that the entire book is nonsense and was meant to expose the bankruptcy of traditional philosophy in its entirely -- including the Tractatus! (On the 'New Wittgensteinians', see below.)]

But, as explained earlier, in place of "nonsense" I prefer "non-sense"; and that is arguably what Wittgenstein also intended. That is, he was referring to 'propositions' (indicative sentences) which are incapable of expressing a sense (Sinn). [In The Tractatus (i.e., Wittgenstein (1972)), he pointedly contrasts Unsinnig (non-sense) with Sinnloss (senseless) sentences.]

Hence, Wittgenstein's own Unsinnig sentences [Sätze] express rules ("elucidations") in what appears to be propositional form. That is, his propositions use the indicative mood, by-and-large. He employed these "elucidations" in order to make clear how some of our sentences are capable of expressing a sense (Sinn), how others fail to express a sense (Sinnloss), and how some can't express a sense (Unsinnig). When that objective has been achieved -- or when we grasp what Wittgenstein was trying to say by these means, by these rules -- we no longer need them and can "throw them away".

Once more, as we have also seen, rules can't express a sense (they are Unsinnig); they aren't capable of being true or false; once again, they can only be useful or useless, practical or impractical, obeyed or disobeyed. But that doesn't prevent us from understanding them and the role they occupy, which we plainly do as soon as we realise they aren't like empirical propositions, or even like metaphysical pseudo-propositions. They are in this case, and in this way, elucidatory. We manage to do this when we see, or come to appreciate, these rules aren't incoherent non-sense (unlike indicative metaphysical sentences, which are both). In that case, Wittgenstein was presenting for consideration a set of interpretative rules aimed at clarifying his analysis of language and how it is capable of representing the world, while at the same time cutting Metaphysics off at the knees.

[In connection with this interpretation of his early work, it isn't relevant that Wittgenstein changed his mind, abandoned Representationalism and adopted an 'anthropological' view of language -- which was later interpreted as a means of communication, nor representation --, under the influence of his Marxist friends. (In connection with that, see here.) That is because many of the core insights expressed in his early work were carried over into his later period -- albeit radically re-configured -- and have been employed in this Essay, and this site, in order to undermine metaphysical theories and DM. On this, see White (2006).]

Again, when Newton, for example, tells us (in the indicative mood!) that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the impressed force he is (indirectly) informing us how he intends to use certain words and how he proposes to make sense of nature by means of them. His 'laws' elucidate his physics, and, as such, operate as rules.

But, why "throw them away"? Well, consider someone who is trying to teach a novice how to play chess, how the pieces move, how they can capture other pieces, etc., etc. While so doing they will explain the rules of chess, often employing the indicative mood: "The Queen moves like this, and this..., the Rook like this...". Of course, rules can also be expressed in the imperative mood, too -- for instance: "Move your Rook like this...", or "The King has to move this way...!" --, but that isn't absolutely necessary. In addition, the rules of the game can be taught by practical demonstration -- by simply playing! Novices can even learn the game just by watching others play, asking a few questions from time to time.

The rules of chess are also Unsinnig; they can't be true or false. They aren't descriptive, either (they don't express facts); they are prescriptive (they express rules -- they delineate how the game has to be played). If they were descriptive, they could be false. In that eventuality, for example, some other rule -- such as, "The Bishop doesn't move diagonally, it moves in a zig-zag fashion" -- might then be used. But, "The Bishop doesn't move diagonally, it moves in a zig-zag fashion" isn't an alternative rule for the Bishop in chess, since the way that that piece has to move defines what the word "Bishop" means in Chess. The rules of chess elucidate how that word is to be (legitimately) employed and how that piece must be moved (also legitimately). If a 'Bishop' were to move in any other way, at best it would be part of a different game, not chess!

Some might object that a rule in chess -- such as, "The Bishop moves like this..." -- is in fact true; it expresses a fact about this game. If so, the above comments are themselves false.

And yet, if that were the case, "The Bishop moves like this..." would be descriptive, not prescriptive. That would make it an assertion that could be true or could be false. But, anyone who now claimed that such rules were descriptive (and, in this case, were also true) would have no answer to someone else who retorted "Well, I'll move this piece any way I like!". Other than appealing to tradition, to how the game has always been played (but given this scenario, if these rules are descriptive, not prescriptive, there would be countless rule breakers in the past, which means there would be no settled behaviour, no precedence, to which reference could be made in order to control such unruly chess players), they could make no response. If the antics of maverick chess players is to be proscribed, "The Bishop moves like this...", and sentences like it, would have to be viewed prescriptively, and therefore as rules -- as imperatives --, not descriptions. Rules are enforced and are enforceable because they are prescriptive. It would make no sense to enforce a description in such circumstances -- unless it were thereby turned into a rule, and hence into a prescription.

Of course, "The Bishop moves like this..." is a correct (or true) description of, or assertion about, a rule in chess (as it is currently played), in the sense that anyone who used that sentence would be speaking truthfully about the rules themselves. Nevertheless, the prescriptive nature of this or any other rule doesn't depend on such veridical reports, but on the application of the rule involved -- in tandem with the social and institutional force such rules carry. In this instance such rules not only define, they prescribe, how certain pieces must move. They determine what are and what aren't legitimate moves in the game, appeal to which could be used to settle a dispute or challenge a questionable move.

Once we have grasped these rules we can in effect "throw them away" (unless, of course, we have to explain them to someone else, or appeal to them to settle a difference of opinion, etc.). How many times do players have to say to themselves (once they have mastered the rules of chess): "The Rook moves like this, the Pawns like that..."?

At the time of writing, every single Wittgenstein commentator has missed these rather obvious points, which (predictably) means they then struggle to comprehend the Tractatus!

Now, I'm not suggesting Wittgenstein was crystal clear about this (by no stretch of the imagination was he a systematic philosopher, at any point in his life; he pointedly ignored criticism, both constructive and destructive), but it seems to me to be the only way to make the Tractatus comprehensible, so that it doesn't self-destruct or morph into something completely different (perhaps as a result of the rather extreme interpretations suggested by the 'New Wittgensteinians'). [On this, see Crary and Read (2000), and Read and Lavery (2011).]

But, even if it could be shown that Wittgenstein didn't hold this view of his propositions, it certainly represents my view and my attempt to 'repair' this aspect of the Tractatus.

[Nor is it to suggest that Wittgenstein's understanding of the nature of propositions didn't undergo considerable development over the next thirty years, but further comments on that topic are way beyond the scope of this Essay.]

Hence, the above objection is itself misguided in that it assumes there is only one way to use indicative sentences.

There is another, rather odd feature of metaphysical theories that is worth highlighting (which is connected with the sort of pretence highlighted in the last sub-section): since the supposed truth-values of defective sentences (like those below) can't be determined by examining actual evidence, they have to be given a 'truth-value' by fiat. That is, they have to be declared "necessarily true/false", "metaphysically true/false", "eternally true/false", or they are given some other grandiose, honorific by a sage-like figure, some theorist or other. That in turn is because their supposed truth-status hasn't been derived from any interaction with the relevant facts (or with any whatsoever!), but followed solely from the supposed meaning of the words they contain. As we will see, that divorces them from the world, with which they can't now be compared.

Or, perhaps with even more pomp and circumstance, their opposites are anathematised as "unthinkable" by another Philosophical Prophet -- maybe even by an 'edgy', 'Radical' Philosopher, a 'Dialectical Magus', perhaps even a "Great Teacher".

Metaphysical proclamations like the following are as common as dirt in Traditional Thought -- and, as we can now see, in DM, too:

L7: Self-relation in Essence is the form of Identity or of reflection-into-self. [Hegel.]

L8: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth...is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or'. [Hegel.]

L10: All bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves. [Trotsky.]

L11: And so every phenomenon...sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite. [Plekhanov.]

L12: Motion itself is a contradiction. [Paraphrasing Zeno, Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin.]

L13: Internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature. ['The Great Teacher' -- Stalin.]

L14: It is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion. [Engels.]

L15: All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute. [Engels.]

L16: Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. [Lenin.]

L18: Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. [Lenin.]

L19: Contradiction is universal and absolute...present in the...development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end. [Mao.]

L20: The unity of opposites...is relative and transient...the struggle of opposites is absolute, expressing the infinity...of development. [Kharin, paraphrasing Lenin.]

[Most of the above have been quoted or excerpted from Essay Two (where each exact source has been given). The incoherence of many of them has been exposed in Essays Two to Thirteen Part One.]

Of course, the aforementioned 'ceremony' (from the previous sub-section, whereby a sage-like figure -- even a Dialectical Magus -- proclaims The Universal Veracity of sentences like those listed above) must be performed in abeyance of any evidence (as we saw was the case with Engels's 'Three Laws', in Essay Seven Part One, for example). Indeed, no actual evidence need ever be sought. Quite the contrary in fact. Evidence would detract from, or even debase, the pre-eminent status occupied by such Inter-Galactic Certainties. They are all now in effect Metaphysical Gems, each a Solitaire Epistemological Diamond, often credited with apodictic certainty by their promulgators and proselytisers, which claims now by-pass, by simple decree, the usual 'grubby' social practices that help determine the veracity of ordinary, boring empirical propositions. Such banausic protocols are way too proletarian for the delicate, un-sullied hands of genuine philosophers. If you want to 'hang with the cool kids', increasingly baroque language is more than just an optional extra.

Howsoever hard Dialectical Marxist Philosophers try to be accepted, howsoever lapel-clutchingly desperate they are to attract acclaim for their 'revolutionary philosophy, howsoever they try to dress it up with the usual gobbledygook, academic philosophers will never accept the fourth-rate twaddle that passes for DM.

As will soon become apparent, for all their claims to be radical, when it comes to Philosophy DM-theorists are surprisingly conservative -- and universally incapable of seeing this even after it has been pointed out to them!...

At a rhetorical level, philosophical conservatism like this has been camouflaged behind what at first sight appears to be a series of disarmingly modest disclaimers, which are then promptly flouted.

The quotations given below (and in Note 1) show that DM-theorists are keen to deny that their system is wholly, or even partially, a priori, or that it has been dogmatically imposed on the world, not read from it. However, the way that dialecticians themselves phrase their theories contradicts these seemingly modest-looking denials, revealing the opposite to be the case.

This inadvertent dialectical inversion -- whereby what DM-theorists say about what they do is the reverse of what they do with what they say -- neatly mirrors the distortion to which Traditional Philosophy has subjected ordinary language over the last two millennia (outlined in Essay Three Parts One and Two, and in Essay Twelve Part One), a point underlined by Marx himself:

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

However, unlike dialecticians, Traditional Metaphysicians were quite open and honest about what they were doing; indeed, they brazenly imposed their a priori theories on reality and hung the consequences.

But, because dialecticians have a novel -- but nonetheless defective -- view of both Metaphysics and FL (on that, see here and here), they are oblivious of the fact that they are just as eager as Traditional Theorists have ever been to impose their theory on the world, and equally blind to the fact that in so-doing they are aping the alienated thought-forms of their class enemy, whose society they seek to abolish.

Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked before they were even loaded; with such weapons, is it any wonder that DM-theorists fire nothing but philosophical blanks?

DM is a conservative theory precisely because its adherents have imported, and then adopted, the distorted methods, a priori thought-forms, theories and meaningless jargon they found in Traditional Philosophy.

For many, the above accusations might seem far easier to make than they are to substantiate.

Nevertheless, as we will see...not only is the search for a priori 'knowledge' a pipe dream (in that it can't deliver what has just been advertised for it), it destroys the capacity we have for articulating anything at all!

The same is largely the case with the methods adopted by Dialectical Marxists. Perhaps even worse, they have from the beginning shown they are only too willing to appropriate this anti-materialist, ruling-class 'view of reality'. The 'ruling ideas' that Marx spoke about now proudly rule what were supposed to be radical minds. The sad truth is that this 'approach to knowledge' ironically has had the opposite effect: it delivers no knowledge at all.

This means that while DM-theorists have hocked the 'materialist cow' they haven't even received a handful of beans in return:

In relation to a search for supporting evidence, we have already seen Lenin declare that:

In which case, it seems that the need to provide any such evidence is a distraction -- a probative step that any deeply dedicated dialectician should rightly avoid or reject. According to the above passage (and those below), the claim that 'dialectical opposites' exist everywhere -- governing every single instance of change, right across the universe, for all of time -- expresses a "law of cognition", a "law of the objective world". So, it is these "laws" that justify, if not "demand", the imposition of the by-now-all-too-familiar dialectical dogmas on nature and society. "Don't ask for evidence! Our 'law of cognition' outranks your tawdry demand that we provide you with evidence!"

"Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…. [D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added.]

Hence, the search for 'evidence' begins and ends with each Dialectical Marxist leafing through Hegel's Logic, or the work of some other obscure Mystic -- like Heraclitus, Zeno, Plotinus, Spinoza and Jakob Boehme.

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Italic emphases in the original. First bold emphasis only, added.]

According to C L R James, even asking for proof of the 'dialectic' is seriously misguided:

'Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.' [Hegel (1999), p.439, §956.]

"The first thing to note is that Hegel makes little attempt to prove this. A few lines later he says:

'With regard to the assertion that contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement.'

"We here meet one of the most important principles of the dialectical logic, and one that has been consistently misunderstood, vilified or lied about. Dialectic for Hegel was a strictly scientific method. He might speak of inevitable laws, but he insists from the beginning that the proof of dialectic as scientific method is that the laws prove their correspondence with reality. Marx's dialectic is of the same character. Thus he excluded what later became The Critique of Political Economy from Capital because it took for granted what only the detailed argument and logical development of Capital could prove. Still more specifically, in his famous letter to Kugelmann on the theory of value, he ridiculed the idea of having to 'prove' the labour theory of value. If the labour theory of value proved to be the means whereby the real relations of bourgeois society could be demonstrated in their movement, where they came from, what they were, and where they were going, that was the proof of the theory. Neither Hegel nor Marx understood any other scientific proof. To ask for some proof of the laws, as Burnham implied, or to prove them 'wrong' as Sidney Hook tried to do, this is to misconceive dialectical logic entirely. Hegel complicated the question by his search for a completely closed system embracing all aspects of the universe; this no Marxist ever did (sic!). The frantic shrieks that Marx's dialectic is some sort of religion or teleological construction, proving inevitably the victory of socialism, spring usually from men who are frantically defending the inevitability of bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution." [James (1947), quoted from here. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added; several paragraphs merged.]

[We have already seen other Dialectical Marxists argue along similar lines, that an appeal to empirical evidence is somehow way beneath them, and smacks of 'positivism' or even 'empiricism'.]

Here is Herbert Marcuse endorsing this a priori, evidence-free, approach to knowledge:

"The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973), pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting Hegel (1975), p.163, §112. Minor typo corrected. Bold emphasis added.]

'Observable facts' just get in the way of any self-respecting, dedicated dialectical dogmatist.

Another DM-fan -- David DeGrood -- was partially quoted the above passage (and with approval), and who assures us that every Marxist Philosopher accepts this approach to knowledge (highlighted below):

"To take each and every quality displayed by an object or even at face value would necessarily mean that neither a scientific nor a philosophic account could be given of it.

"[Added in a footnote:] As Herbert Marcuse explains: 'The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of "observable facts"....' Such an anti-positivist, anti-phenomenalist, Hegelian conception of essence has been continuously relied upon by Marxist philosophers ever since. The doctrine of essence is a fundamental one. A [quotation] from Mao Tse-Tung [is a] striking confirmation of this: 'When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.' Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p.213." [DeGrood (1976), p.73. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis alone added.]

Neither DeGrood nor Marcuse (and, it must be said, this also includes Hegel) bothered to prove (or even provide so much as a weak argument in support of) the ancient idea that there are any 'essences' to begin with. Nor did they even bother to show that the claim that there are any of these 'essences' was anything other than an elaborate invention, a figment of a few overheated metaphysical brains. Or, for that matter, they even gesture in the direction of substantiating the idea that anything in the universe actually has an 'essence'. In stark contrast -- just like that card-carrying Mystic, Hegel -- they seem to think they are blessed with an ability to discern these hidden 'essences', presumably by some sort of 'intuition', the nature and provenance of which they have all unwisely kept to themselves. As noted in the opening section of Essay Two, the invention of words like "essence" was actually the result of a verbal trick that now 'allows' contemporary dialecticians to ignore the deliverances of their senses and then impose a set of a priori doctrines on nature and society.

[Again, I have posted several hundred examples of this doctrinaire dialectical approach to knowledge in Essay Two (and that number is no exaggeration, either!).]

George Orwell had a well-aimed point to make about dogmatic group-think like this:

[Readers are encouraged to check out Montell (2021), which covers this approach to cultish language admirably well. Exception might be taken to my use of the word "cultish". I am not claiming Dialectical Marxism is a cult (although there are parties and tendencies in the movement that definitely are cults or which resemble cults uncomfortably closely -- on that see my more detailed remarks in Essay Nine Part Two, Sections (2)-(7). Cf., also Tourish and Wohlforth (2000). What I am claiming is that Dialectical Marxists in general have a way of framing their ideas and expressing themselves that employs what can only be described as cultish language. Again on that, see the above book.]

James White also highlighted this dogmatic attitude to 'philosophical knowledge', in this case as exhibited by the German Idealists, the intellectual progenitors of Dialectical Marxist Philosophy:

"Already with Fichte the idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of finding a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be based. Thinkers from Kant onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error, incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied in the laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996), p.29. Bold emphasis added.]

In fact, the above approach to 'philosophical truth' has dominated this ruling-class discipline in its entirety since its earliest days (in Ancient Greece), but more recently, and more overtly, in and by the work of early modern Rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, and, latterly, by Noam Chomsky. [Why that is the case with Chomsky is explained across several places in Essay Three Part Two (for example, here and here), but in more detail throughout Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

In this way, they have followed closely in Plato's footsteps -- i.e., concerning the doctrine that 'true knowledge' is 'of the mind' and bypasses the senses:

"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only." [Plato (1997c), 51e-52a, pp.1254-55. I have used the on-line version here. Bold emphases added. The published edition translates the third set of highlighted words as follows: "It is indivisible -- it cannot be perceived by the senses at all -- and it is the role of the understanding to study it." Cornford renders it: "[It is] invisible and otherwise imperceptible; that, in fact, which thinking has for its object." (Cornford (1997), p.192.)]

As we saw in Essay Three Part Two (here and here), DM-theorists have bought into this approach (despite their protestations to the contrary). This they do when they speak about unreliable 'appearances', telling all who will listen that 'genuine knowledge' is based on countless invisible 'underlying essences' (which, incidentally, 'contradict appearances').

[Follow the previous two links for quotations from the DM-classics and subsequent DM-theorists in support of those allegations.]

Nevertheless, as noted above, Super-Scientific Gems like these had to have their semantic pre-eminence bestowed on them as a gift. They couldn't be expected -- nor must they be allowed -- to consort with vulgar, empirical truths, soiled and besmirched as they are by so much worldly, working-class 'grime' -- which is otherwise disparaged as the "banalities of commonsense". After all, 'Bad associations spoil good abstractions'.

Instead of being compared with the facts in order to ascertain their supposed truth-status, the veracity of these Super-Truths is derived solely from, or compared only with, other related claims of Intergalactic Validity, another set of Super-Truths, which all form part of a bogus 'terminological gesture' at 'verification'. As far as this approach is concerned, 'confirmation' only takes place in the head of whichever theorist has just cut and polished the latest Philosophical Gem.

The bona fides of these 'Intergalactic Verities' are thoroughly Ideal, and hence completely phony.

As we have also seen in earlier sections, it is impossible to specify the conditions under which M1b, for instance, may be declared true so that DM-theorists could specify what was being ruled out by the 'necessarily true' status of M1a. As is the case with other metaphysical claims, there is no legitimate negation of M1a which would (ordinarily) make M1b true. That is because the DM-concept of matter is based on the 'necessary truth' expressed by P4. That sentence tells us what DM-theorists mean by the word "matter" -- and, in a roundabout sort of way, what they mean by "motion". But, it isn't an empirical fact about matter that it moves -- which, if it were, it could be otherwise in a different possible world, or even in this world had the universe developed differently -- it is one of its defining characteristics. Deny that (by means of P4a) and the meaning of the word "matter", as DM-theorists understand it, must change.

So, Lenin's acceptance of P4 is what makes 'motion without matter' "unthinkable". In that case, anyone who tried to deny M1a by means of M1b -- or deny P4 by asserting P4a -- would be operating with a different understanding of the word "matter" (and possibly also of "motion"). Any such rejection of P4 (by the acceptance of P4a) would mean that there had been a change of subject, or change of meaning, between these four sentences (P4/P4a and M1a/M1b). Hence, P4a and M1b are no longer about "matter", as Lenin and other DM-fans conceive of that word, but about 'matter' (a typographically identical term which has different defining characteristics, but concerning which we have zero other information). Hence, despite appearances to the contrary, M1b isn't the negation of M1a, nor is P4a the negation of P4. Between each such pair there has been a change of subject and hence a change of meaning.

[Of course, this isn't the only set of DM-sentences that is affected in this way.]

Unfortunately, this means that there is no state of affairs that P4 or M1a could 'reflect'. If there were, they would have legitimate negations.

That explains why, in earlier sub-sections of this Essay, the suggestion that Lenin had to 'think the very words he said were unthinkable' was hedged around with numerous qualifications and accompanied by a liberal use of 'scare quotes' and subordinate clauses. As we are about to find out it, isn't possible either to 'think the truth' of M1a or 'think the falsehood' of M1b. As we have just seen, P4a and M1b can't assume any such role -- i.e., they can't serve as the negations of P4 or M1a, respectively -- since they are no longer about matter, but about 'matter', the former of which is a term unique to DM, so we might be justified in labelling it, "matter_D". The other form of 'matter', in P4a, could then be labelled, "matter_ND", which stands for "non-Dialectical Matter". [Something similar could be done with the word "motion", but that has been left for the reader to play around with.]

As we have also found out, this implies P4 and M1a (and all the rest) have no content; there are no circumstances under which they could be false, and hence none under which they could be true.

Similarly with M1a; it can't be false; if it were, M1b would be true. But, M1a and M1b are logically unrelated. There is no state of affairs they both share because of the change of subject/meaning between them, and hence no state of affairs 'reflected' by either.

Compare M1a and M1b (and P4 and P4a) with what was said about M6 and M6a, from earlier (slightly modified):

In that case, DM-'propositions' lack a sense and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the situation. Once again, our use of language actually prevents them from expressing a sense, let alone being true.

They are therefore non-sensical, empty strings of words.

Just like other metaphysical 'propositions', M1a relates to an 'Ideal World' divorced from the language of everyday life and the ordinary lives of workers. The Super-Truths concocted in the brains of individual thinkers (as if they 'reflected' the 'essential Form of Reality') relate to nothing at all in nature or society -- despite 'appearances to the contrary' and irrespective of the intentions of those who dreamt them up. The conventions of ordinary language -- the language of the proletariat -- actually stops them from doing this, rendering them contentless, as we have seen. [How and why this is the language of the proletariat will be explained in Essay Twelve Part Seven; as will why it is decisive (which has partly been dealt with here.]

Since it isn't possible to specify what would count as evidence that might establish the truth of propositions like M1a -- or even evidence that might establish its falsehood -- their semantic status can't be materially-grounded, it has to be linguistically engineered. This means that its semantic status isn't sensitive to any state of affairs in the world --, which is because they have no content, as we have seen.

As such they can't assist in any attempt to understand the world, nor can they be co-opted to help change it.

[But, as we will see in Essay Nine Part Two, DM-concepts often manage to get in the way of attempts to bring about radical change -- and, in some cases, they help reverse those attempts.]

That, of course, helps explain why it was concluded (in Essay Nine Part One) that DM can't be used to propagandise or agitate workers, nor can it be employed during an actual revolution -- as we saw was the case even in 1917, the most important and significant event in the workers' movement, ever.

Instead of reflecting the world, DM-theories do the exact opposite: Via the RRT, 'the world' becomes a back-reflection, or projection, of the 'laws and precepts' DM-theorists have invented. The latter determine, or delineate, the way the world has to be, not the way it happens to be. We have already seen Lenin being quite open and honest about this:

"Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…. [D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added.]

"The determination of the concept out of itself the thing itself must be considered in its relations and in its development.... Without that the simple positive assertion is incomplete, lifeless, dead. In relation to the 'second,' negative proposition, the 'dialectical moment' demands the demonstration of 'unity', i.e., of the connection of negative and positive, the presence of this positive in the negative. From assertion to negation -- from negation.... The crux lies in the fact that thought must apprehend the whole 'representation' in its movement, but for that thought must be dialectical.... Dialectics in general is 'the pure movement of thought in Notions' (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the 'art of operating with them' (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions)." [Lenin (1961), pp.220, 226, 227, 251. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]

"Party philosophy, then, has a right to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they are, in all their manifold changes and interconnections, without disguises and without fantasy." [Cornforth (1976), p.14. Bold emphasis added.]

"The dialectical method demands first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in their interconnections with other things…." [Ibid., p.72. Bold emphasis added.]

"Let us now consider some examples of the second principle of dialectics, which demands that we should consider things in their movement, their change, their coming into being and going out of being." [Cornforth (2022), p.100. Bold emphasis added.]

"We have already seen that dialectic materialism (sic) demands the study of phenomena in all their totality (concretely) just as they occur in reality." [Adoratsky (1934), p.44. Bold emphasis added.]

"[M]aterialist dialectics demands a comprehensive analysis of processes and phenomena. The need for comprehensiveness in cognition derives from the main principle of dialectics: universal connection. It presupposes a study of the whole totality of the thing's diverse connections and relations with other things. Only a comprehensive analysis of these connections and relations makes it possible to single out its basic and essential connections, properties and features." [Krapivin (1985), p.153. Bold emphasis added. (This links to a PDF.)

"So contrary to metaphysics, dialectical method demands that we should not only study contradictions generally, but what is especially important, we should study this particular contradiction in any object and phenomenon, be it natural or social.... Hence, contrary to metaphysics, dialectical method demands that we should not only study general, particular and principal contradictions, but we should also investigate the two aspects of a contradiction. We should always analyse overall changing situation and its subsequent impact on these two aspects of a contradiction whether quantitative or qualitative...." [Quoted from here. Accessed 19/01/2022. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectical materialism demands that we constantly check our theory in practice. That is what it means to study socialism like a science." [Quoted from here. Accessed 20/07/2017. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectical materialism demands that things be understood in their original form, and that they not be distorted or reshaped." [Quoted from here. Accessed 20/07/2017. Bold emphasis added.]

"1. A dialectical contradiction must have a pair of opposite properties, tendencies, forces or requirements. 2. The opposites must be united within a single thing, process, or system. This is the unity of the contradiction. 3. These opposite sides must each actively work against or interfere with one another. This is, the struggle of its opposite sides of the contradiction Together, these properties define a dialectical contradiction as a unity of opposites." [Quoted from here (this links to a PDF). Accessed 26/02/2021.Bold emphasis added. ]

"Since struggle of opposites is inherent in every object and phenomenon and since development and motion is struggle of opposites, dialectical method demands that every thing should be viewed as in constant motion, always changing, always coming into being and passing away. Metaphysics refuses to do so." [Quoted from here. Accessed 19/01/2022.]

"The second conception not remaining on the surface of phenomena, expresses the essence of movement as the unity of opposites. It demands a penetration into the depth of a process, a disclosure of the internal laws which are responsible for the development of that process. This conception seeks the causes of development not outside the process but in its very midst; it seeks mainly to disclose the source of the 'self-movement' of the process. To understand a process means to disclose its contradictory aspects, to establish their mutual relationship, to follow up the movement of its contradictions through all its stages. This view gives the key to the 'leaps' which characterize the evolutionary series; it explains the changing of a process into its opposite, the annihilation of the 'old' and emergence of the 'new.' Thus only by disclosing the basic contradictions of capitalism and by showing that the inevitable consequence of such contradictions is the destruction of capitalism by proletarian revolution do we explain the historic necessity of socialism. This second conception is the conception of dialectic materialism.... The study of mutual penetration, of the identity of opposites, demands a concrete enquiry into the contradictory aspects of a process in its movement and development, the conditioning and mobility of all its facets, their conversion into each other." [Quoted from here; accessed 19/01/2022. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]

"In order to disclose the quality of an object, to express its internal uniqueness, we must consider it in its all-round connection. But the different relations of a thing to others must be united in our knowledge and action, not arbitrarily, not externally, not haphazardly, but on the basis of that thing's own development, its own self-movement. In the self-movement of an object 'its connection with the surrounding world is changed.' When we disclose the line of this change, we reveal the actual quality of the object, we find the form of movement that belongs to it." [Quoted from here; accessed 19/01/2022. Bold emphasis added.]

"By studying the evolution of society and taking into account the events of the past, the first observation one makes is that the division of society into classes has not always existed. Dialectics demands that we search for the origin of things.... We must remember that dialectics, while it provides us with a new way of conceiving things, also demands that we know them well in order to discuss and analyze them. Consequently, now that we have seen what our method consists of, we must try, in our studies and in our personal and militant lives, to see things in their motion, in their changes, in their contradictions and in their historical significance and not in a static, immobile state. We must try to study them as well in all their aspects and not unilaterally. In short, we must always try to apply the dialectical spirit everywhere." [Georges Politzer, quoted from here; bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged. Accessed 31/01/2026. (This links to a PDF.)]

But, we have already seen that DM-'laws' have been systematically imposed on the world, which means that 'the world' on which they have been foisted isn't the actual world, it is an RRT-induced fantasy (which is no more real than the World of the Jabberwocky).

The Ideal World of Traditional Thought and Dialectical Marxism is a direct result of the distorted language on which both are based. So, just like Traditional Philosophers, DM-theorists dictate to the world how it must be and how it can't be otherwise.

Plainly, this is the exact opposite of genuine science, which allows the world to tell us how it happens to be.

That is why 'profound philosophical truths' can only be read from language that has already been distorted and twisted out of shape (again, as Marx himself pointed out), expressed in and by sentences like M1a and P4, not from nature. Metaphysical sentences like these represent an attempt to impose a set of ideas on the world, hence they are 'true' only in the sense that they 'reflect' the Ideal World concocted by their inventors, as opposed to the material world we see around us. [Originally, back in the pre-modern world, these inventors were open and honest Idealists/Mystics, proud to claim that both titles, not the closeted Idealists/Mystics that shape and dominate Dialectical Marxism.]

That is why the actual truth, or the actual falsehood, of sentences like M1a and P4 was never, and could never be determined by a confrontation with the facts, but has to be bestowed on them as a gift by those who dreamt them up.⁴⁶

The usual protocols that help determine when something is true or when something is false (i.e., a systematic search for evidence by genuine scientists) have to be set aside, a spurious 'evidential' ceremony/charade substituted for it.⁴⁷

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HCD = High Church Dialectician; LCD = Low Church Dialectician. Follow that link for an explanation of both terms; LOI = Law of Identity; FL = Formal Logic.]

With respect to DM, the aforementioned 'evidential gesture' is invariably carried out after the event -- that is, after the 'dialectical nostrums' they try to sell the rank-and-file had been imported from Hegel, who had himself offered virtually zero supporting evidence (if such it might be called) --, which Dialectical Marxists merely use to 'illustrate' the validity of the 'laws' and 'principles' their already-accepted theory pushes. [And the vast majority of the latter hail from the LCD-wing of Dialectical Marxism. HCD-dialecticians in general tend to deny these 'laws' apply to nature, or they echo the sort of elitist attitude concerning evidence displayed by Lenin, Marcuse and James, covered earlier.] They certainly don't attempt to carry out a rigorous, scientific analysis of the evidence; instead they appeal to a narrow range of specially-selected and interminably recycled examples (as we found, for instance, was the case with Trotsky's criticism of the LOI, Engels's analysis of motion, his Three 'Laws' and Lenin's theory of knowledge).

This 'evidential charade' generally exhibits four inter-related characteristics:

(1) It is invariably performed 'in the mind' and forms part of a hasty post hoc consideration of the 'concepts' supposedly involved. No actual experiments or scientifically-designed observations/surveys are carried out (or even suggested!), no mathematical modelling is undertaken, no computer simulations are contemplated. If this farrago were ever presented as an example of genuine science -- for publication in an accredited scientific journal, for instance, or even a PhD thesis --, it would be laughed out of court even before it was subjected to peer-review. Instead of DM-'propositions' being compared with the material world in order to ascertain their truth-value, they are compared with, or are linked to, other related 'propositions' -- such as P4 -- or more often, they are compared with yet more obscure doctrines lifted from Hegel -- as part of a jargon-riddled gesture at 'verification'. This means that DM-theories are quintessentially Ideal and consistently anti-materialist.⁴⁸

(2) It often consists of a series of superficial thought experiments accompanied by an ill-informed, hasty, half-digested analysis of a few key terms, 'supported' by the frequent use of modal (or quasi-modal) terms -- such as "must", "inconceivable", "demand", "insist", "unthinkable", and "impossible" (as we have just seen). A classic example of this approach can be found in Engels's 'analysis' of motion, which was based exclusively on the meaning of the words/concepts involved. Engels nowhere appeals to evidence in support of what he claimed was true of every moving body in existence, for all of time. In fact, it is impossible to imagine any evidence that could be offered in support. [I have dealt with this topic at much greater length in Essay Five; readers are referred there for more details.]

(3) Almost without exception, the application of DM-'laws' is illustrated by an appeal to a narrow range of specially-selected (and endlessly repeated) 'supportive' examples -- which are themselves often mis-described or left unfathomably vague. This approach is as good an example of Confirmation Bias as one could wish to find:

"Confirmation bias occurs when an individual looks for and uses the information to support their own ideas or beliefs. It also means that information not supporting their ideas or beliefs is disregarded. Confirmation bias often happens when we want certain ideas to be true. This leads individuals to stop gathering information when the retrieved evidence confirms their own viewpoints, which can lead to preconceived opinions (prejudices) that are not based on reason or factual knowledge. Individuals then pick out the bits of information that confirm their prejudices. Confirmation bias has a long history. In 1620, Francis Bacon described confirmation bias as: 'Once a man's understanding has settled on something (either because it is an accepted belief or because it pleases him), it draws everything else also to support and agree with it. And if it encounters a larger number of more powerful countervailing examples, it either fails to notice them, or disregards them, or makes fine distinctions to dismiss and reject them, and all this with much dangerous prejudice, to preserve the authority of its first Conceptions.' (Bacon 1620)" [Quoted from here; accessed 01/02/2026. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; link in the original. Paragraphs merged.]

In Essay Seven Part One, we saw DM-theorists offer their readers what can only be described as watery-thin, laughably superficial 'evidence in support' of Engels's Three 'Laws'. As a result, I labelled DM a classic example of "Mickey Mouse Science". We can now perhaps see why it merits just such a derogatory title: the supposedly "self-evident" or "obvious" nature of DM-'laws' and precepts means that little (or no) empirical support is actually required. Hence, what few trite, specially-selected examples offered up are merely there to 'illustrate' (they certainly don't prove) these 'laws', which are then recycled, ad nauseam, year-in, year-out -- for decades.

[Boiling/freezing water, for instance. Which, as we also saw in Essay Seven Part One, fails to support their theory, anyway!]

Incidentally, that is why DM-fans soon resort to the following fall-back, knee-jerk response (aimed at critics): "You just don't understand dialectics". Clearly, that is because their theory isn't based on evidence, but on a rather quirky 'understanding' of a limited range of ill-defined words and 'concepts'.

(4) On other occasions, the 'evidence' used to 'illustrate' DM-'propositions' turns out to be the result of a few superficial forays into 'linguistic' or 'conceptual' analysis, which are themselves based on a series of 'persuasive definitions', or on those even more mysterious 'abstractions' (themselves of dubious provenance).⁴⁹ More specifically, as we saw in Essay Three Part One, this 'conceptual method' (if such it may be called) was applied to predicative expressions that supposedly 'name' the above invisible and uncheckable 'abstractions', which as a result turn out to be the Proper Names of Abstract Particulars. In the end, this vitiates the entire exercise by destroying the generality of the concepts they supposedly 'represent'. [Follow the above links for an explanation of these rather compressed, gnomic remarks.]

Whatever conceptual and linguistic sleights-of-hand are involved, direct or indirect reference has at some point to be made to the ordinary meaning of the words employed -- so that they can be 'revised' and 'put in good dialectical order' (so to speak) -- but more accurately to be described as distorted:

Unfortunately, since these opening DM-moves now involve a radical misuse of the relevant terms, they no longer carry their usual meanings, which in turn means that the whole exercise is doubly pointless.

For example, DM-theorists, en masse, repeatedly, almost neurotically, over use the word "contradiction", but they don't mean by their invocation of this term what it ordinarily means, nor yet how it is defined in FL. [What Dialectical Marxists think they mean is the subject of Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three. [Spoiler: It should come as no big surprise to discover it is completely obscure what they mean by "contradiction", which is also the case with Hegel's earlier use of a typographically similar phrase (i.e., when translated from the German). Nevertheless, even if Dialectical Marxists and Hegelians can't quite explain with any clarity, or consistency, what they do mean by "contradiction", they most definitely don't mean what ordinary speakers or logicians mean by it. [As I also demonstrated in Essay Five.] However, DM-fans aren't at all phased by this and still claim to be able to see 'contradictions' everywhere they look. Despite this, not one of them (and that includes Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao) registers even a perfunctory attempt to derive these 'phantom contradictions' logically, as Hegel at least tried to do -- even if that was just the once, notoriously, but invalidly, in connection with the 'master-servant' relation. Other than in connection with the supposed 'dialectical relation' between the proletariat and the capitalist class (which also fails), none of them even so much as tries to show these 'contradiction' are in any way 'dialectical'. It is just asserted they are, as if it were blindingly obvious why. Furthermore, their (collective) use of "contradiction" can legitimately and justifiably be called a distortion since it is indiscriminately applied to such diverse things as opposites, inconsistencies, absurdities, contraries, paradoxes, puzzles, quandaries, oddities, irrationalities, oppositional processes, antagonisms, interacting (opposing) forces, peculiarities, events that go contrary to expectations along with a whole host of other quirks and idiosyncrasies, as I have shown in Essay Eight Part Two. Compare that with ordinary speech, where "contradiction" is restricted to what is said and then gainsaid. In Philosophy and Logic the word has several meanings depending on the theorist and the theory involved; I have taken issue with most of them in Essay Eight Part Three. [On this topic in general, see here.]

While DM-theorists are free to use words anyway they please, re-configuring or revising their meaning as they see fit (not that they need my permission, acquiescence or compliance), no such revision can begin or even hope to succeed if the words involved have been distorted right from the start. It isn't possible to revise a word if it isn't actually being employed -- i.e., when a distorted term has been substituted for the target word, or it has been replaced by a typographically identical inscription, which is then used vaguely, inconsistently and idiosyncratically. As a result, Dialectical Marxists have only succeeded in creating confusion (primarily among themselves -- no one else is being fooled by any of this flummery) because of their weird use of this term. [There are more details about this 'process' -- i.e., attempts to 'revise' ordinary words and the fatal consequences that follow for any theory involved --, here.]

Hence, in such circumstances, what at first sight might appear to be perfectly ordinary terms putting in a brief appearance -- e.g., "motion", "unthinkable", "opposite", "equal", "identical", "place", "moment", "quantity", "quality", "leap", "negation", "unity", "contradiction", "change", etc., etc. -- closer examination soon reveals that that isn't the case. By no stretch of the imagination do these 'revised terms' mean the same as the supposedly equivalent word drawn from the vernacular; and that is a direct consequence of the extraordinary use to which they are now being put. [I have demonstrated this process in extensive detail throughout Essay Five with respect to words used by Dialectical Marxists they associate with time, motion and location, for example.]

This incongruity can easily be seen when an appeal is made to the usual, often diverse, meaning(s) ordinary words already possess (which approach has been adopted on numerous occasions at this site -- for example, here and here). That having been done, the seemingly obvious validity of every single DM-'theory' soon falls apart.

Nevertheless, this process is precisely what creates the spurious 'obviousness' and 'self-evidence' that DM-'laws' appear to possess (but only in the opinion of Dialectical Marxists). This also helps explain the consternation the latter almost invariably display when the validity of DM is questioned (as it has been at this site). After the initial shock their reaction often involves a predictable use of the "pedantry"/"semantics" defence -- as if the meaning of the words they have just distorted/mis-used is now somehow unimportant! And as if Marx himself hadn't warned us about this very issue!

The rationale underlying the rejection, repudiation and dismantling of DM at this site is completely mystifying to those held in its thrall. How such apparently "self-evident", 'obviously true' DM-'laws' could fail to be true, or could even be questioned, becomes "unthinkable". Indeed, as noted above, dastardly critics (like the present author) just don't "understand" dialectics. This also helps explain why DM-fans soon become abusive -- which is often also one of their first post-shock reactions. This level of incredulity, this depth of emotional response, is a direct result of the fact that the 'truth' of these 'laws' was a direct result of the linguistic/conceptual chicanery exposed at this site -- or because its truth-status had been bestowed on these 'laws' by a DM-'Prophet', 'Glorious Leader' or 'Great Teacher' -- not based on scientific evidence, or even careful thought.

That is also why DM-fans find it difficult to understand anyone who has the audacity to deny, for instance, the 'obvious truth' that 'a moving object is in two places at once, in one place and not in it at the same time', even though our ordinary use of words associated with motion and place reveals our ideas in this area are far more complex than Zeno, Hegel, Engels or subsequent DM-theorists ever imagined. As Essay Five (link above) reveals, our use of the vernacular allows for examples of movement that show Engels's 'theory of motion' (if such it might be called -- after all, he expressed it in less than a hundred words and offered zero evidence in support!) is seriously flawed, that is, where any sense can be made of it.⁵⁰

It is hardly surprising that a novel and distorted use of what (superficially) look like ordinary words ends up generating the sort of paradox. the above theorists thought they saw all over the place. That is because the everyday meaning of certain words seems to 'carry over' into these new contexts, bringing in their train endless confusion, as those usual meanings clash with the distorted meanings bestowed on them by such thinkers (again, numerous examples of this were given in Essay Five (links above)). That in turn helps explain why 'contradictions' seem to crop up everywhere in the DM-'Ecosystem' -- rather like Japanese Knotweed, and just as difficult to eradicate!

[In addition to those aired in Essay Five, detailed examples of radical DM-confusion were referenced and illustrated in Essay Three Part One and Essay Four (here and here), as well as throughout Essay Six.]

Almost as if to compound the problem, these paradox-generating DM-moves are often based on what are claimed to be the 'obvious' or the 'real' meaning of the terms involved. The wide range of diverse connotations such ordinary words possess is brushed aside as 'unscientific', 'un-philosophical', "valid only within certain limits" --, or they are rejected as uninteresting, inessential, compromised by banal "commonsense" and "formal thinking", or even that they reflect the 'prejudices of the age'. For example, the 'real meaning' of 'motion' is supposed to imply that it is 'contradictory' and paradoxical; the 'real meaning' of 'identity' is actually its opposite (especially when it is confronted by 'change'); the 'real meaning' of 'matter' implies 'motion' and 'existence external to consciousness' (which will be news to the vast majority of scientists); the 'real meaning' of 'metaphysics' is what Hegel said it was; the 'real meaning' of 'negation', 'contradiction' and 'opposite' is this, or that, or..., and so on.^50a

The original pre-distorted terms are then disregarded as of limited utility, or as unsuitable for use either in philosophy or science, and anyone who says differently is an 'obscurantist', or even a 'workerist'! However, as we have seen, and will repeatedly see, ordinary language is castigated because it actually prevents the sort of 'philosophical' chicanery by means of which metaphysicians have always tried to con their audience; and, with respect to Dialectical Marxists, befuddle their recruits and 'party marks'. Hence, according to Traditional Theorists (and now DM-fans), if ordinary language stands in the way of unrestricted speculation and endless day-dreaming, it is ordinary language which is to blame, not these moves!⁵¹

The steady move away from the overt use of religious language meant that equally mysterious terms -- abstract nouns and adjectives -- had to take their place. Although Havelock doesn't mention this, it also led to the invention of an endless stream of metaphors and analogies, since no literal sense could be given to the new theories and ideas being concocted, a process that has continued down to this day, and for the same reason. That in turn is connected with the failure of representational theories of language and knowledge to account for both of the latter. [I will cover these developments in greater detail, and from a more political and social direction, in Essay Twelve Parts Two and Three, as well as Essay Thirteen Part Two. Until they are published, readers might like to consult the references listed here.]

As a result, ordinary language was now caught in what can only be called a 'philosophical vice'. On the one hand, the everyday meaning of words doesn't permit the invention of theories metaphysicians try to generate from them; on the other, ordinary terms were branded as inadequate because they were (allegedly) 'paradoxical', when, in reality, these 'paradoxes' were the direct result of a cavalier misuse of this very medium (indeed, as we saw in Essay Five in connection with Zeno's Paradox). That is why language has had to be distorted in order to make philosophical theories 'work', as Marx knew full well (quoted again below).⁵²

"Wittgenstein's ambitious claim is that it is constitutive of metaphysical theories and questions that their employment of terms is at odds with their explanations and that they use deviant rules along with the ordinary ones. As a result, traditional philosophers cannot coherently explain the meaning of their questions and theories. They are confronted with a trilemma: either their novel uses of terms remain unexplained (unintelligibility), or...[they use] incompatible rules (inconsistency), or their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary use -- including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts in terms of which the philosophical problems were phrased." [Glock (1996), pp.261-62. See also, here.]

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis added.]

Philosophy endeavoured to augment (or even replace) religion; to that end it had to emulate what theological language had always be invented to achieve: provide dogmatic answers to bogus, empty questions and then re-configure those 'answers' in order to 'legitimate' and rationalise class division. In that case, Marx was 100% right: Philosophy is "Nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought...equally to be condemned."

That also helps explain the extremely irrational reaction displayed by DM-fans, which Marxist critics (like the present author) almost invariably encounter when the former are challenged in debate (that is, if they even agree to engage!). On such occasions, when they are confronted with the sort of material presented at this site they react something like this (which is the sort of response that should be familiar to anyone who has tried to debate a Theist -- especially a Fundamentalist -- or even a Trump fan):

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; NON = Negation of the Negation; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]

The exclusion of one or other of the semantic options ordinarily open to indicative sentences completely undermines the logical role of the non-excluded twin: whether this is truth in favour of falsehood or falsehood in favour of truth. For, as we have seen, if a sentence can only be false, and never true, it can't actually be false -- nor vice versa. That is because, if an empirical proposition is false, it isn't true.⁵³ But, if we can't say under what circumstances the sentence (expressing it) is true then we certainly can't say in what way it falls short so that it might be declared untrue, and hence false. Conversely, if it can only be true, the conditions that would make it false are similarly excluded; if we can't say under what circumstances the sentence (expressing it) is false, we certainly can't say in what way it falls short of that condition so that it could be true, and hence not false. In which case, its truth similarly falls by the wayside.

[Again, in what follows I will simply refer to a proposition being true or false, not the sentence expressing it being such. But it should be understood unless stated otherwise.]

Again, this forms an key factor in understanding the sense of a proposition: In order to grasp its sense, a speaker must understand under what conditions a given proposition could be true or could be false. Those two alternatives stand or fall together; so, grasping what would make such a proposition true is ipso facto to comprehend what also would make it false, and vice versa.

Anyone who knows how to use English (or whatever language might be employed to make the same point), and knows how names like Barak Obama and Das Kapital are used, will understand this sentence. Even if they haven't a clue whether it is actually true, or they haven't a clue whether it is actually false, they would still understand what would have to obtain for it to be true, the absence of which would automatically make it false. The same state of affairs (Obama owing a copy of Das Kapital, Volume One) features in both instances, the obtaining of which would make C1 true or the non-obtaining of which would make C1 false. If that weren't the case, if a speaker didn't (explicitly or implicitly) know this, then that would provide prima facie evidence that they didn't understand C1 or C2.

Having said that, epistemological, psychological and pragmatic protocols like these have no bearing on the sense of C1 or C2, since the sense of a proposition is given by the conditions under which it is true or the conditions under which it is false, and they are independent of anyone's knowledge. Furthermore, this condition is also independent of whether or not we know which option actually obtains, whether or not anyone cares to know which one does, and whether or not anyone will (or could) ever even find out which one obtains. While what an individual knows or does not know will certainly affect their comprehension of a given proposition, that will have no more affect on sense than knowing the price of a commodity affects its actual value.

[Certainly knowing the price of a commodity might help determine a commodity's value (when other economic factors are taken into consideration), but that knowledge will still have no affect on value itself. Value isn't sensitive to psychological or epistemological factors, a principle that sharply distinguishes Marxist economic theory from mainstream bourgeois economics. I will say more about this in Interlude Eight.]

Of course, DM-theorists aren't really interested in banal propositions like C1 and C2; they are more interested in change (especially social, political and economic), which means their focus is on in propositions that express, or can be used to express, motion and change. In such circumstances, the negative particle seems to them to add content to a given sentence -- via the NON.

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development, argues Hegel, because a static definition cannot cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions. This approach leads Hegel to see only a limited role for the law of identity, that way of looking at things which rejects the possibility of internal contradictions and which is signified by the notation A=A. Taken as an absolute principle, this law is the 'undoing of all distinct, determinate entities (or rather the hurling of them into the abyss of vacuity without further development or any justification).' The final phrase, in brackets, tells us why Hegel is dissatisfied with the law of identity. It may tell us, in a limited way, what a thing is, but it cannot tell us why a thing is (its justification), or how it will develop. Consequently, 'to pit this single insight, that everything…is the same [A=A], against the full body of articulated cognition [a dialectic approach], which at least seeks and demands such fulfilment, to palm off its Absolute as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black -- this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity.'". [Rees (1998), p.59; although this passage appears on pp.54-55 of the 2005 edition. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; bold emphasis added. Rees is here quoting Hegel (1977), p.9, §16.]

This rather dubious move involves what is sometimes called, 'The Power of Negativity', which supposedly helps drive change -- among other things, 'adding content' as it does so. This idea will be examined in more detail in Parts Five and Six of Essay Twelve. Suffice it to say here that if that were the case, it would prevent the following two propositions from being contradictories:

[Where "x₁", "y₁", and "z₁" are Cartesian Ordinates, and "t₁" is a temporal variable. If the negative particle used in C4 (i.e., which occurs in "isn't") were 'dialectical', and hence 'added content', C3 and C4 sentences couldn't be contradictories. They would have a different content and would be true or false under different conditions.]

"If, now, the first determinations of reflection, namely, identity, difference and opposition, have been put in the form of a law, still more should the determination into which they pass as their truth, namely, contradiction, be grasped and enunciated as a law: everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in contrast to the others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things. The contradiction which makes its appearance in opposition, is only the developed nothing that is contained in identity and that appears in the expression that the law of identity says nothing. This negation further determines itself into difference and opposition, which now is the posited contradiction. But it is one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity; but in fact, if it were a question of grading the two determinations and they had to be kept separate, then contradiction would have to be taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence. For as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.

"In the first place, contradiction is usually kept aloof from things, from the sphere of being and of truth generally; it is asserted that there is nothing that is contradictory. Secondly, it is shifted into subjective reflection by which it is first posited in the process of relating and comparing. But even in this reflection, it does not really exist, for it is said that the contradictory cannot be imagined or thought. Whether it occurs in actual things or in reflective thinking, it ranks in general as a contingency, a kind of abnormality and a passing paroxysm or sickness.... Now as regards the assertion that there is no contradiction, that it does not exist, this statement need not cause us any concern; an absolute determination of essence must be present in every experience, in everything actual, as in every notion. We made the same remark above in connection with the infinite, which is the contradiction as displayed in the sphere of being. But common experience itself enunciates it when it says that at least there is a host of contradictory things, contradictory arrangements, whose contradiction exists not merely in an external reflection but in themselves. Further, it is not to be taken merely as an abnormality which occurs only here and there, but is rather the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all self-movement, which consists solely in an exhibition of it. External, sensuous movement itself is contradiction's immediate existence. Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself.

"Similarly, internal self-movement proper, instinctive urge in general, (the appetite or nisus of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple essence), is nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity has no vitality, but the positive, being in its own self a negativity, goes outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it. But if an existent in its positive determination is at the same time incapable of reaching beyond its negative determination and holding the one firmly in the other, is incapable of containing contradiction within it, then it is not the living unity itself, not ground, but in the contradiction falls to the ground. Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary thinking, where its determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other determinations or into nothing

"If the contradiction in motion, instinctive urge, and the like, is masked for ordinary thinking, in the simplicity of these determinations, contradiction is, on the other hand, immediately represented in the determinations of relationship. The most trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on ad infinitum, all contain opposition in each term. That is above, which is not below; 'above' is specifically just this, not to be 'below', and only is, in so far as there is a 'below'; and conversely, each determination implies its opposite. Father is the other of son, and the son the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other; and at the same time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other; their being is a single subsistence. The father also has an existence of his own apart from the son-relationship; but then he is not father but simply man; just as above and below, right and left, are each also a reflection-into-self and are something apart from their relationship, but then only places in general. Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each other and are indifferent to one another. Ordinary thinking when it passes over to the moment of the indifference of the determinations, forgets their negative unity and so retains them merely as 'differents' in general, in which determination right is no longer right, nor left left, etc. But since it has, in fact, right and left before it, these determinations are before it as self-negating, the one being in the other, and each in this unity being not self-negating but indifferently for itself. Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to one another. Ordinary thinking when it passes over to the moment of the indifference of the determinations, forgets their negative unity and so retains them merely as 'differents' in general, in which determination right is no longer right, nor left left, etc. But since it has in fact right and left before it, these determinations are before it as self-negating, the one being in the other, and each in this unity being not self-negating but indifferently for itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.439-41, §955-§960. Bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged.]

However, we have already seen that the negative particle can't do what Hegel and DM-fans require of it. With respect to metaphysical-, and DM-'propositions', negating them changes the subject, which means that such 'propositions' and their supposed negations are devoid of content. So, instead of adding content, 'dialectical negation' reveals they either had no content to begin with or it obliterates whatever content they might have had!

Of course, Dialectical Marxists might mean something different by "contradiction" and/or "negation" (which means they will reject the above); if so, what? We have yet to be told, and we have only been waiting for 150+ years; so no rush...

[As we discovered in Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three, it is in fact impossible to ascertain what DM-fans do mean by their vague and peculiar use of words "contradiction" and "negation". Furthermore, as will be revealed in Parts Five and Six of Essay Twelve, it is equally impossible to decide what, if anything, Hegel meant by his idiosyncratic use of those words, either. Nevertheless, I certainly don't expect those whose thinking has been hijacked by Hegel to agree with any of this, but until they come up with a clear account of what they do actually mean by "dialectical contradiction", it will have to do. The same remarks also apply to what they mean by "dialectical negation". But, as we saw in Essay Eight Part Two, their use (and hence their 'understanding') of that phrase was inspired by Kant's introduction of the spurious term "real negation". Readers are directed there for more details.]

(i) The relation between these logical 'Siamese Twins' (i.e., truth and falsehood);

The ignoring, or even the breaking, of socially-sanctioned rules (like these) means that 'necessarily true' and 'necessarily false' sentences (such as those considered earlier) aren't just senseless, they are non-sensical. That means they are incapable of expressing a sense -- i.e., they are incapable of being true and incapable of being false. In turn, this means they are incapable of reflecting anything in the world (even in theory!). Whatever we try to do with them collapses into incoherence.⁵⁴

For the last two-and-a-half millennia metaphysicians have consistently ignored, or have systematically abrogated, this core logical feature of such propositions. Hence, in this respect, DM-theorists are merely, parvenus -- Johnny-Come-Latelies. These ancient errors and false moves duped Traditional Thinkers into believing that the 'necessity' of metaphysical 'propositions' derives from 'the nature of Reality', not from the distorted language out of which they were constructed and upon which they depend.

'Innocent-looking' linguistic false-steps like these helped motivate (and are still motivating) the invention of theories that were supposed to 'reflect' the 'essential nature of 'Reality', accessible to thought alone. But, such theories/'truths' are based on nothing more than linguistic chicanery, on distortion and misuse, in which case no evidence could be offered in their support. Except, of course, 'evidence' based on yet more word magic.

Metaphysical 'necessity' is therefore little more than a shadow cast on the world by distorted language (to paraphrase both Wittgenstein and Marx).

Over the centuries metaphysical systems were developed, not by becoming empirically more refined or increasingly useful (in practical applications connected with, for instance, technology, engineering, or medicine), unlike the very real contribution made by the growth of science -- but by becoming increasingly labyrinthine, convoluted and baroque, as further incomprehensible layers of jargon were layered on earlier deposits of linguistically deformed bedrock.

Naturally, this confirms the (non-negotiable) fact that both of these semantic options -- truth and falsehood -- must remain open if a proposition is even to count as empirical, subject to evidential confirmation -- and thereby for it to be described as "thinkable", in this sense.

In which case, as the above shows, no sentence can express a 'necessary truth' about the world while remaining empirical.⁵⁵

So, despite appearances to the contrary, Lenin's appeal to the 'unthinkability' of 'motion without matter' doesn't in fact say anything at all --, that is, it doesn't say anything empirically determinate. No wonder then that it was actually unthinkable.

[This section represents something of a detour and may be skipped by anyone wanting to focus on the main theme of this Essay. The only drawback is that subsequent sections might not be fully understood if this material is bypassed. Readers who still want to skip this section can begin again here.]

Considerations like those above show that indicative sentences conceal several widely differing logical forms, which is why it is unwise to take at face value what are superficially similar grammatical features of language. This serves to remind us that while sentences like M2-M9 might well be indicative, only two of them (M6 and M6a) are empirical/fact-stating. The rest masquerade as empirical propositions, and, as such, fail to express a sense, as we have just seen. That is itself a consequence of the conventions ordinary language-users have established over countless centuries -- by their practice, not in general by their deliberations --, which factors alone determine the nature of empirical propositions.

Even so, not every indicative sentence that lacks evidential support (or for which there could be no such support, even in theory) is, or need be, metaphysical.

This appears to be unconditionally, or even necessarily, true. However, its 'negation':

isn't false; it is either incomprehensible or, despite appearances to the contrary, it isn't about the number two. [Why that is so should become clear by the end of this sub-section.]

[In what follows, I have confined my comments to seemingly banal sentences (like M2 and M21) in order to: (a) Explain in what way they are 'true', and (b) Help distinguish them from metaphysical-, and DM-'propositions'. Having said that, what follows isn't meant to be an Essay about 'the nature of mathematics', in which case complex mathematical 'propositions' will be ignored. However, references will be provided so that anyone interested can study this approach to mathematics in more detail.]

M21 isn't just contingently false, it appears to be 'necessarily false' -- but only if it is taken to be a mathematical, not simply a terminological, statement. [That is, if it isn't simply viewed as a proposed revision applied to the names we use in our number system -- i.e., what I later call the "trivial option".] If we put trivial examples to one side for now (on that, see also below), it is impossible to specify what could possibly make M21 true (and hence M2 false). In that case, we would be in no position to specify what M21 is trying to rule out, and hence we would be in no position to say in what way it falls short of that for it to be false.

Unlike empirical propositions, M2 and M21 don't have the same content, nor do they relate to the same state of affairs -- since neither relate to any state of affairs. If they did, a comparison with the world, a reference to the facts, would be relevant to ascertaining their truth or establishing their falsehood. [Well, what fact or body of facts could decide whether M2 is true? Or even false? The same question also confronts M21.]

That is because (as we saw earlier), between M2 and M21 there is a change of subject; if two isn't a number (according to M21) then that use of "two" is different from its use in M2.

M2 expresses a rule for the use of the word "two" as a number word in a system of number words, since it reflects the role it occupies in that system, and hence how it is, or has to be, used. M2 is therefore prescriptive not descriptive. [On why that is important, if not decisive, see Interlude Five.] In that case, M21 would, at best, represent a rejection or repudiation of that rule (again, if we ignore trivial examples).

To think otherwise -- i.e., that M21 could express a supposed truth or even a supposed falsehood (again assuming M21 doesn't represent a simple terminological revision, which is the trivial case mentioned earlier) -- would be to misconstrue the ordinary use of the word "two" in such contexts. A major change of meaning like this, alongside the role sentences like M2 occupy in our number system, would significantly alter the meaning of any mathematical 'propositions' (equations, etc.) in which the word "two" (or the numeral "2") occurred, and that in turn would have a knock-on effect throughout the entire system.

Some might argue that M21 is "logically false" (and hence that M2 is "logically true", maybe because M2 is supposedly a tautology), but that would merely attract the sort of questions posed earlier about "necessarily false" and "necessarily true". If it isn't possible to specify conditions under which M21 would be "logically true" (trivial examples excepted, once more), it would thereby be impossible to say under what conditions it could fail to be "logically true", and hence impossible to say under what conditions it would be "logically false" (or "necessarily false"). So, this alternative would simply create the sort of difficulties we met earlier with respect to the truth or the falsehood of empirical propositions, only this time with a more grandiose term, "logically true" -- as opposed to "true" -- thrown on for good measure.

Of course, it could be argued that M2 is "definitionally true", but that would merely amount to acknowledging that M2 expresses a rule, after all.

Consider now one of the aforementioned trivial cases: suppose that in the course of development of the English language a different word had been chosen in place of "two". In such an eventuality, plainly, not much would change. Suppose, therefore, that in English "Schmoo", or a different symbol for "2" (perhaps "ж"), was used in place of "two" (or "2"). M2 and M21 would then become:

But, as noted above, that would simply represent a minor terminological revision. If this word (or this new symbol) were to be used just as we now use "two" (or "2"), there would be no substantive difference. [On this, see also Note 60.] Clearly, the same comment applies to number words (and symbols) used in other languages.

Some might be tempted to argue that M21 is self-contradictory. That alleged 'self-contradiction' might be expressed as follows, in M21b or M21c:

But, as seems plain, the first use of the word "two" in M21c isn't the same as the second use of "two" in that sentence. In which case, M21c is no more self-contradictory than this would be:

M21d: George W Bush is President of the USA and George H W Bush isn't President of the USA.

Of course, M21d isn't meant to express the same logical form as M21c (plainly M21c contains definite descriptions, while M21d uses Proper Names); it is merely meant to make explicit a change of denotation between the first and the second use of the relevant words. Plainly, in M21d, the first name refers to a different individual than the second.

M21e clearly isn't a contradiction, and that is because of the different denotations of "the number two" and "the number two bus":

The same applies to M21c, but that might not seem quite as clear cut. The reason M21c isn't a contradiction is that while the first occurrence of "two" is the familiar number word, the second isn't. Indeed, the second actually says it isn't! Hence, the two occurrences of "two" in M21c have a different denotation, too, which means M21c isn't a contradiction.

So, M2 would itself only become 'false' if one or more of its constituent words changed their meanings (this is just another the trivial case -- for example, there would be a change of meaning if "two" were no longer used to designate the whole number between one and three, and instead came to be the name of, say, a newly discovered planet). But, even then, M2 wouldn't be about what we now call "two". Plainly, as soon as anyone denies the number two is a number they automatically cease to talk about the number two, as we now understand that word. Once more, what such a denier might be doing in these circumstances is rejecting a rule (if we rule out trolls, intellectually-challenged individuals and deliberate contrarians), but that wouldn't affect how the rest of us use these rules or how the rest of us understand the number vocabulary we currently have.

Hence, despite appearances to the contrary, M21/M21f and M2 don't contradict one another. That is because M21 and M21f are either incomprehensible, or they are about something else (which would be the trivial case, once more). Again, the use of negation in this way, here, would, at best, amount to the rejection of a rule, or it would be trivial.^{56,

56a}

Conclusions to the contrary may only be sustained by maintaining at least one of the following:

(i) The false belief that M2 actually stands alone as a mathematical unit and isn't is part of a number system; or,

(ii) The theory that M2 is a contingent (or even that it is perhaps an empirical) proposition).

But, what makes M2 mathematical is its use in a system of propositions, which are themselves integral to the historically-conditioned practices that are inter-connected by the following: rule-governed operations, direct and indirect proofs, inductions, definitions and practical applications, etc., etc. Moreover, M2 isn't a contingent proposition (except with respect to trivial cases, once more), it is the expression of a rule. M2 tells us how we use, and are meant to use, this word or symbol. It situates a given numeral in a wider system of symbols governed by historically-, and socially-conditioned prescriptions.

The 'truth' of M2 isn't based on the way it relates as an 'atomic unit' to an alleged mathematical fact hidden away in some sort of Platonic Heaven (or, indeed, by the way it might relate to an 'abstraction' lodged in someone's brain/'consciousness'), but from its role in the aforementioned system of propositions, connected by applications and proofs -- as well as by the way it has grown out of, and was developed by, wider social practices.

[On this, see Note 56. Even if, per impossible, there were an 'ethereal object' in 'Platonic Heaven' for our number two to 'reflect', so that it was a number, the question would now be: Precisely what could or would make the 'heavenly object' supposedly designated by the 'heavenly word' "two", a number? Yet more reflection? If not, if the 'heavenly two' isn't a 'reflection' of that 'heavenly object', but it is still a number, the same must apply to the this-worldly number two. And the same comment also applies to any other theory of numbers that requires the number two to 'reflect' an 'objective number two', or an 'abstract number two', in some sort of 'third realm', or other 'ontological fantasy world'. The number two is a number because of how human beings use that symbol, how we count and the way we calculate, not because of theological, metaphysical, or representational fairytales -- which, and for the above reason, don't work even if we happened to accept one or more of them!]

That is why none of us would be able to comprehend an investigation aimed at testing the truth of M2 empirically. In fact, the inappropriateness of any attempt to verify empirically propositions like M2 is connected with their total lack of truth conditions.⁵⁷

Our use of such propositions -- which, as we can see, differs markedly from the way we employ and comprehend empirical propositions -- indicates that they have a radically different logical form. The failure of a proposition like M2 to correspond with anything in the world (or, indeed, in 'Platonic Heaven') is revealed by the fact that (barring trivial cases, once more) we would ordinarily fail to understand its 'negation' -- i.e., M21. Anyone who asserted M21 wouldn't be making an ordinary sort of factual error -- as they would had they said the following on or after the 25^th of June, 2016: "It isn't the case that David Cameron has resigned as UK Prime Minister".

This can also be seen by the way that mathematics is learnt. Children learn this discipline by one or more of the following methods/avenues: repetition (counting, number drills and recitations), rote learning, repetitive calculations, practical applications, problem solving, as well as by the construction of simple and increasingly complex proofs. They don't do so by 'abstraction'. Children aren't taught to 'abstract' numbers, but to count. At some point the 'penny drops', as it were, at which juncture parents and carers often find it impossible to stop their young pupils counting on and on and on.... But this is often also true in general (i.e., with general nouns, not just number words).

Understanding mathematical propositions goes hand-in-hand with mastering a skill or a technique, and subsequently by learning proofs, solving practical problems in tandem with the completion of a variety of operations and guided tasks, etc., etc.^57a

In that case, it wouldn't be possible to declare M2 true because it 'corresponds with a fact' --, or, indeed, false because it failed to do so -- either 'in reality' or in 'Platonic Heaven'. And that is because it isn't possible to determine what M2 rules out, and hence what it rules in (trivial cases to one side, once more), without changing the subject/meaning.

This is, of course, independent of the fact that it wouldn't be possible to confirm M2 by comparing it with an abstract fact (even if we could make sense of any such 'fact', never mind how a sentence might even be compared with any sort of 'abstraction'). To understand M2 and its use is to master a technique and a rule; it isn't to have identified a confirming fact or 'abstraction' against which it is to be evaluated. No fact could tell a pupil how to proceed mathematically, or how to use M2 correctly. Only the mastery of a rule (and an associated skill) could do that. In addition, as we have seen, contingent facts can be false. If M21 were an empirical or a contingent proposition, the 'falsehood' of M2 would appear to make M21 true. But, as has been pointed out several times, there is a change of subject between M2 and M21, so the supposed truth of M21 would have no bearing on the semantic status of M2 (trivial cases to one side, again). As we have seen, M2 has no negation.

In that case, the mere insertion of a negative particle into a sentence doesn't automatically map it onto the negation of that sentence (where "the negation" in such circumstances means "A proposition with the opposite truth-value -- false in the case of true, true in the case of false"), as we have repeatedly shown.⁵⁸

In this way we can see once more that the superficial grammatical structure of indicative sentences often obscures major differences and deeper logical forms. While empirical sentences may be mapped onto their contradictories by means of the (relevant) addition of a negative particle, that isn't so with non-empirical indicative sentences. This isn't, of course, unconnected with the fact that empirical sentences can be understood before their truth-values are known, whereas propositions like M2 are comprehended independently of that pre-condition. Sentences like M2 are understood only by those who know how to count and calculate, etc. In that case, the meaning of M2 must be accounted for in a different way to that of, say, M6:

As has already been pointed out, M6 can be understood well in advance of its truth-value being known, and that can't be ascertained solely on linguistic or logical grounds. That is quite unlike, say, M2 (or even, M1a).

Clearly, this means that sentences like M2 aren't empirical; they express rules for the use of certain words or they are a result of applying of those rules. That is, they express a normative application of their key terms (we are told how to use those terms legitimately by such rules); because of that they are incapable of being empirically true, just as they are incapable of being empirically false (since rules can neither be true nor false, only useful or useless, practical or impractical, etc., etc.). Any attempt to view them as empirical soon collapses into incoherence, as we have seen.

[Of course, it isn't being suggested that children are taught mathematics by leaning to repeat, or internalise, sentences like M2. Children demonstrate they (implicitly) understand sentences like M2 by their ability to count and do simple arithmetic (etc.) -- as argued earlier.]

As it turns out, the confusion of rules with propositions underlies the failure on the part of Traditional Theorists to see language as a social phenomenon.⁵⁹ That is because that confusion was itself motivated by a determination to view the 'foundations of language' as solely truth-based. Given such an approach, language was thought to be founded on empirical or quasi-empirical factors -- such as a capacity to 'represent reality', an ability to 'reflect the world in the mind' or in 'consciousness' -- rather than on socially-sanctioned rules, shaped and conditioned by communal practices and norms. Given the (traditional) view, falsehood merely becomes an erroneous, 'partial' or limited application of the 'contents of consciousness' -- howsoever the latter is conceived --, or it results from an incorrect connection established between 'internal factors'/'concepts'. However, since 'representations' like these can only be compared with other 'representations' -- and that is clearly because, given this approach, a layer of 'representations' will always lie between each 'Knower' and the 'Known', with no way of by-passing or 'tunnelling through' it/them --, representationalism ends up leaving the world out of the picture (it having been reduced to layers of 'representations'/'ideas'), obviating the whole exercise!

[As we will see in Essay Three Part Four, the 'traditional view of falsehood', briefly outlined above, isn't just circular, it is incoherent into the bargain.]

Hence, that approach to knowledge misinterprets social norms (expressed as rules of language -- e.g., those encapsulated by sentences like M2) as Super-Empirical propositions, which, since they are misconstrued rules, need no evidence in their support. In that case, normative aspects of language (i.e., rules, again) -- that are the result of countless lengthy processes of social development and human interaction -- are re-configured as if they expressed the real relation between things, or even as those things themselves. That is, they are misconstrued as 'necessary truths' that 'underpin reality', 'reflecting its essence' or as mirroring abstract particulars' in 'Platonic Heaven', or wherever. In this way, such 'Cosmic Verities' become Self-Certifying, since they are based on a misuse of language that has been distorted into the bargain. It is this slide that lies behind the fetishisation of discourse upon which Metaphysics and DM are both based.

That is why the falsehood of M6, for example, isn't like the 'falsehood' of M2. To repeat: in order to understand M6, no one need know whether it is true or whether it is false. The actual falsehood of M6 (in this case expressed by the actual truth of its negation, M6a) doesn't affect the meaning of any of its terms. That isn't so with M2 and its apparent negation, M21. If, according to M21, two isn't a number, the word "two" must have a different meaning in M21 compared with M2. The use of a negative particle (in M21) has significantly altered the meaning of key terms.

Trivial cases to one side, M2 can't be false. Its 'falsehood' would amount to a change of meaning, not of fact. Hence, M2 may only be accepted or rejected as the expression of a rule of language -- in this instance, a mathematical rule.⁶⁰

In fact, modifications made to sentences like M2 -- by means of analogy or metaphorical extension -- underlies many of the major (and even the minor) conceptual revisions that mathematical and scientific concepts regularly undergo (saving, of course, trivial examples, once more).

In stark contrast, the rejection of a proposition like M6 wouldn't herald a profound change of meaning to any of its terms. Hence, Blair's failure to own a copy of TAR won't initiate a significant conceptual revolution in, or modification of, the English language.

The fundamental conceptual changes that are set in motion by alterations to the rules that underlie languages of every type -- mathematical, scientific or fact-stating -- are also connected with factors that make metaphysical-, and DM-theories seem so certain, their rejection so completely "unthinkable" (by those who dote on such talk). As we have seen, metaphysical sentences arise out of a distorted use of language; in fact, they generally rely on the misconstrual of rules that seek to establish, or which actually constitute, new meanings. It is this that motivates the belief that they represent profound 'truths' about 'Being', 'consciousness', 'essence', or even 'Truth Itself'. That in turn is because they all depend on, and are generated from, language alone, not from a practical interface with the world, or even a (communal) relationship between speakers. Since they are totally 'concept'-, or language-based, this is what motivates the (traditional) belief that their truth-status can be established solely by 'thought'.⁶¹

At first sight, the physical structure of the above two sentences means that, on the surface, M9 resembles M2. Because of that, their apparent truth-values (true) are given by, or can be ascertained from, the meaning of their constituent words. No comparison with the world is required.

However, there is an important difference between M2-, and M9-type sentences, which is all too easily missed. M2 isn't a rule because of the meaning of the terms it contains; it is a rule because the social and historical practices upon which it is based constitute the meaning/use of its terms. How human beings have historically (and practically) employed words (when counting, teaching, learning, measuring, calculating, solving, proving, conversing, buying and selling, etc., etc.) has established their meaning. Rules like M2 express what is already part of established practice. This can be seen from the additional fact that mathematics was invented by human beings who were already social animals. It wasn't given to humanity by aliens, nor was it 'a gift the gods'.⁶²

[M9-type sentences will be discussed in the next sub-section where the stark contrast with M2-type sentences, alluded to above, will be made even clearer.]

On the other hand, if instead M2 expressed a rule because of the prior meaning of its terms, which had been determined by each individual as they 'abstracted' them into existence, de novo, each time (which is what Traditional Theory would have us believe), then whatever meaning they had (that is, if they had any!), would be independent of their (practical) use. Plainly, in that case, meaning wouldn't be based on social factors but on metaphysical, psychological or even idiosyncratic biographical factors of dubious provenance and even more suspect logical status. [I have covered this topic in much greater detail in Essay Three Parts One and Two, as well as Essay Thirteen Part Three. Readers are encouraged to consult that material.]

Indeed, if that were the case, the meaning of M2's constituent terms (as perceived by each individual 'abstractor') would be established before they featured in a single social practice, such as counting, teaching, learning, measuring, calculating, solving, proving, conversing, buying and selling, etc., etc. Furthermore, the latter would only have been enabled by the 'pooled contributions of independent abstractors', relying (piecemeal) on just such metaphysical, psychological or biographical factors, but acting now as socially-isolated 'thinkers'.⁶³

In such circumstances, each significant word, in sentences like M2 -- in this case "two", "number", and, in some systems, even "is" -- would gain its meaning by 'naming' a 'particular' or a 'universal' (which would in fact turn out to be the Proper Name of an Abstract Particular, as we saw in Essay Three Part One -- link above). Either that, or it would do so by representing an 'abstract concept'/'essence' 'underlying reality', the entire 'semantic process' having taken place 'in the head' of each lone abstractor. It would then be the 'atomised meaning' and 'socially-isolated origin' of a given term -- which would be associated with a 'representation in the mind' of each individual abstractor -- that 'told' them individually what that term meant. [As we will see below and in Interlude Five, no word, 'concept, or 'representation' can tell a given user how to use it, since that would require a rule (and hence some sort of social input), not an 'image' or 'representation'! Traditional theories -- even assuming for the purposes of argument they were valid -- end up saddling each lone abstractor with terms they can't, or don't know how, to use!] But, each speaker would then be constrained (in this way) to try to use a given term according to the individual meanings this process had bestowed on the language they supposedly possess. Terms produced in this way would inform each speaker what they meant; hence, words would dictate to users what they meant, which would transform each word (or its 'inner representation') into an agent, each human being into a patient, once more.⁶⁴

But no such scenario is even remotely viable. That is because no fact, 'abstraction', 'mental image' or 'inner representation' is capable of supplying the normativity that social reinforcement, education and training provides. Hence, if the Traditional Picture is to work, these 'abstractions', 'images', 'representations' or 'concepts' would have to replicate inside each head everything that external social factors already provide. So, these 'internal, privatised factors' would have to become agents in their own right, thus fetishising them. The role that the social world occupies in creating meaning would then have to be back-projected into each head. This is the ridiculous conclusion that Bourgeois Individualism, post-Cartesian Philosophy and the RRT offer to those who adopt this approach to language, meaning and cognition.

[Again, I have covered this in much greater detail in Essays Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three (links above).]

"It is indeed true that a sign can be lifeless for one, as when one hears an alien tongue or sees an unknown script. But it is an illusion to suppose that what animates a sign is some immaterial thing, abstract object, mental image or hypothesised psychic entity that can be attached to it by a process of thinking. [Wittgenstein (1969), p.4: 'But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use.'] One can try to rid oneself of these nonsensical conceptions by simple manoeuvres. In the case of the idealist conception, imagine that we replace the mental accompaniment of a word, which allegedly gives the expression its 'life', by a physical correlate. For example, instead of accompanying the word 'red' with a mental image of red, one might carry around in one's pocket a small red card. So, on the idealist's model, whenever one uses or hears the word 'red', one can look at the card instead of conjuring up a visual image in thought. But will looking at a red slip of paper endow the word 'red' with life? The word plus sample is no more 'alive' than the word without the sample. For an object (a sample of red) does not have the use of the word laid up in it, and neither does the mental image. Neither the word and the sample nor the word and the mental pseudo-sample dictate the use of a word or guarantee understanding.... It seemed to Frege, Wittgenstein claimed, that no adding of inorganic signs, as it were, can make the proposition live, from which he concluded that [for Frege -- RL] 'What must be added is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs'. [Wittgenstein (1969), p.4.] He [Frege -- RL] did not see that such an object, a sense mysteriously grasped in thinking, as it were a picture in which all the rules are laid up, 'would itself be another sign, or a calculus to explain the written one to us'. [Wittgenstein (1974a), p.40.].... To understand a sign, i.e., for it to 'live' for one, is not to grasp something other than the sign; nor is it to accompany the sign with an inner parade of objects in thought. It is to grasp the use of the sign itself." [Hacker (1993a), pp.167-68. Italic emphases in the original. Link added; paragraphs merged.]

But the normative use of language can only be based on, or arise out of, social factors -- and hence for it to be based on rules.

As the above shows, the atomisation of meaning is ultimately based on a fragmentation and fetishisation of language (on this, see Note 64). It would make the 'social interaction' between words (or their 'inner representations') the determinant of how human beings use, or are supposed to use, language. That would invert what actually happens: it is human agents who determine the meaning of their words by their social development, their interaction and their relation to the world. It isn't words, 'abstractions', 'representations', 'ideas', 'images' or 'concepts' that do this for us.⁶⁵

In that case, it is the pattern underlying the linguistic and social contexts that sentences like M2 encapsulate that gives expression to our rule-governed use of symbols like these, and which therefore constitutes their meaning. That is because patterns like this are based on generality of use -- i.e., on the possibility, and the actuality, of norm-governed, open-ended social employment of these symbols.^65a

The difference between mathematical and ordinary (indicative) sentences can perhaps (also) be seen by the way the use of their terms can be justified. So, if someone were challenged and asked why they had used "2" in the following way, "2 + 7 = 9" (trivial cases to one side, again), all that the one questioned could appeal to would be sentences like M2 and the rules of arithmetic. Either that, or simply retort "That's what I was taught! Were you taught differently?" The above simple equation couldn't be confirmed or justified (nor would it) by comparing it with anything in the world -- or, indeed, with any 'abstractions', 'representations', 'concepts' or 'images' in anyone's head or brain, still less with any 'objects' tucked away in an Ideal form, in 'Platonic Heaven' (or wherever Mathematical Realists imagine these 'objects' hang out).

It might be thought that an attempt could be made to justify "2 + 7 = 9" by actually counting some objects (for instance by adding two marbles to seven marbles, obtaining nine as a result). Certainly an attempt could be made to do this, but that attempt itself will only work if the parties involved already understand how to use the relevant vocabulary, rules of arithmetic and know how to count. So, this 'justification' (by actually counting) would in effect be an application of rules already understood and agreed upon, hence they can't be used to justify those rules. The rules justify the above trial, not the other way round. This can be seen from the fact that if someone were to count two marbles, and then count another seven, but who then declared that there were in total ten marbles, they would be told they had made a mistake. Manifestly, we use the rules of arithmetic to decide if counting has been done correctly. We wouldn't even think to revise our rules, or our use of sentences like M2, if they could be so easily 'falsified'. That being the case, counting objects/marbles can hardly justify a rule that had just been used in order to try to justify itself!

Once more, that response is entirely different from how we would react if M6 were shown to be false. In that eventuality, no one would think to revise the application or the meaning of any of the words used in that sentence.

In which case, sentences like M2 are used to decide whether or not an interface with reality (such as counting) has been carried out correctly or successfully. The opposite is the case with M6. Facts are what determine if M6 is true. M6 isn't used to decide if the world is correct!^65b

This is how mathematical words gain their meaning: as 'cogs' in systems of concepts that have grown in relation to our social development over many centuries.⁶⁶ They didn't acquire the meaning they now have piecemeal; that is, they didn't gain their meaning atomistically, before being used socially, practically or contextually.^66a

Mathematical propositions don't gain their semantic status from the way they correspond with objects or structures tucked away in some Ideal, Platonic Realm, or from the way they match 'abstractions' and 'representations' tucked away in each individual head.⁶⁷ This means that they aren't 'true' because 'a process of abstraction' established their status (the latter of which is quintessentially an individualistic process). They are 'true' because of the conceptual-, and proof-systems to which they belong (which, in the case of mathematics, are themselves reliant on highly regimented social practices) --, or because they are in some cases constitutive of the practices out of which they have grown.⁶⁸

[It is worth highlighting the different use of "true" in such circumstances -- i.e., in relation to mathematics and other formal systems --, where that word is synonymous with "provable within the calculus", or even, "used in a specific way within a practice and determined by its rules". With this in mind, one could say (rather loosely) that everyday mathematical propositions -- like M2 -- are "true", since, when they are applied as rules, they enable counting and calculation. That is, they work. But, I prefer not to use "true" in this way since it only fosters misunderstanding and increases confusion. So, in connection with mathematics and other formal systems, I generally put the word "truth" in 'scare quotes' -- unless, of course, I am specifically referring to ideas held by others. My doing so doesn't mean I think mathematical 'propositions'/'laws' (etc) are in some way questionable. In connection with this readers are directed to earlier remarks about rules added to Interlude Five.]

Consequently, two isn't a number because of what the word "two" (or its original equivalent in ancient languages) 'meant' before it was used in mathematical propositions or in counting, and the like.⁶⁹ On its own, divorced from such practices, the sign "2" (or the word "two") would mean nothing.^69a It would just be a mark on a cave wall, piece of bark, slate, stone or parchment -- or perhaps even a sound pattern in the air. "2" and the word "two" gain their life and meaning from their use in rule-governed, socially-sanctioned contexts, which were (and still are) typically those that take place in the open, in everyday life.

More formally, a mathematical context is a system of propositions that has grown up alongside specific social practices that are extensions to, and elaborations of, the above social institutions. So, "two" doesn't gain the meaning it has in isolation, as might appear to be the case if examples like M2 were read as trivial, terminological expressions. M2 can't supply "two" with a meaning that wasn't already there in a surrounding system of practices. Unless the practical and logical space already existed for "two" to slot into as a number term, "two" could be the name of a cat, or the colour of the sky, or it might even be a meaningless inscription. Once again, "two" and "2" gain their meaning from the rule-governed, normative role both play in everyday life, and hence in practical mathematics --, linked by systems of application and proof -- not as a result of correspondence relations, or even by means of a 'process of abstraction'.

As noted above, this can be seen by the way mathematical propositions are confirmed. We don't subject them to empirical test or perform experiments on them. Nor do we run brain scans to see if all users have understood number words the same. We apply them successfully within the systems and practices in which members of a speech community have been inducted, and then socialised to apply them. In addition, this all takes place in the open, in public.⁷⁰

In which case, M2 is empirically neither true nor false; it expresses a normative rule.⁷¹

Some might object that if the above were correct, how would it possible be for individual mathematicians to introduce new terms (which they regularly do)?

As pointed out at beginning of this sub-section, this Essay isn't meant to be a substantive contribution to the Theory of Meaning, the Philosophy of Language, or even the Philosophy of Mathematics. However, the answer to that question was hinted at earlier in this Essay. A more detailed response will be added to Note 71a.^71a

An example taken from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations illustrates the radical difference between number words and other terms we use (which, incidentally, also exposes one of the core confusions motivated in and by Semiotics -- that 'all words are signs', or operate as "signifiers" of the "signified"; on that, see Essay Thirteen Part Three).

Wittgenstein encourages us to consider a situation where a customer enters a grocery store and asks the sales assistant for five red apples. In response the assistant doesn't first go off in search of red things, nor yet collections of five things. Clearly, they will first of all go and find apples, or even red apples, and then count them.

This illustrates an important observation Frege advanced that number words attach to concepts, not objects. Or, as Wittgenstein might have said, number words express operations carried out on objects of a certain sort, qualified by a count noun -- like "three apples" or "five pears" (although, as far as I am aware, Wittgenstein didn't use the phrase "count noun"; he did, however, use a roughly equivalent term, "substantive").

Hence, the assistant will count apples: one apple, two apples, three apples..., and so on, as the concept expression "ξ is an apple" is successively instantiated or applied -- sometimes expressed demonstratively (or, typically, when teaching children) as: "This is an apple, this is another, this is another...". Of course, none of this is meant to suggest that these are very words any such assistant will actually use, or indeed that she will use any words at all; but they, or words like them, will have been used in her childhood training, at some point. No one is just taught to count 'objects', but to count objects of a certain sort, or objects identified demonstratively, regulated by the use of concept expressions (like "ξ is an apple"), or count nouns -- i.e., "Here are five apples". Novices who can proceed along the lines they have been trained are thus said to have grasped the use of number words (and, indeed, of concept expressions and count nouns, even if they have never head of "concept expressions" or "count nouns"). At some point this linguistic skill will become automatic, which is part of what we mean by "knowing how to count", or even how to serve in a grocery store! [On this, see Robinson (2003b). The use of Greek symbols, like those employed above, is explained here.]

[Nor is this to suggest that (implicitly) knowing how to apply number words is sufficient for us to be able to credit an individual with a minimal grasp of the concept of number. As is well known (at least since Frege (1953), also implied by the above remarks), this 'requirement' needs supplementing with what is now called a "criterion of identity". Hence, the individual concerned must be able to specify whether or not, in such instances, there are the same number of apples (or, indeed, red apples) each time; they have to know what counts as another apple. In order to do that successfully they must be proficient with the practical, not just the verbal, application and use of the phrase "same apple". As noted above, they must know what counts as the same (sort/variety of) apple. Of course, they needn't be experts in the classification of apples (or even fruit in general), but even that will depend on circumstances. They just have to be skilled enough to recognise something as an apple (wax replicas excepted, of course!). Naturally, criteria of identity will vary between cases; being able to tell whether or not something is an apple might not enable the individual involved to classify something as a Granny Smith or as a Fuji, for example. In relation to this, may I refer readers to several earlier comments about 'the linguistic division of labour', along with the following references: Wittgenstein (2009), pp.5e-6e, §1, Geach (1968), pp.39-40 -- this links to a PDF of the 3^rd (1980) edition, so the page numbers are different: pp.63-64 --, Lowe (1989, 2015) and Noonan (2022)? For some of the complexities involved in this area, see Epstein (2012).]

(iii) Words can't be "signifiers" of the "signified" -- otherwise, the order in which the above grocer looked for the items required by this customer would be indifferent, and he/she could or would look for five things first, red things next, apples last.

In addition, it is also reminds us that we all know this to be so (i.e., in our day-to-day practice -- in, for example, our automatic reaction to requests like the one the shop assistant faced --, but not necessarily in our deliberations about such things, where we often go astray). And, that is why -- whatever philosophical theory we might hold, whatever ideology we might assent to -- none of us would dream of looking for something named by "five", or even "red", first, and then "apples", last. On the other hand, if all words were names, we would typically do this.

It also shows that Wittgenstein wasn't fixated on ordinary German (or even ordinary English). No human being who has ever walked the planet would dream of looking for something 'named' by "five", or even "red", first, and then "apples", last (always assuming they lived in a society with the requisite social organisation and vocabulary, etc., etc.), whatever their language, social circumstances or ideological commitments happened to be. Not even George W Bush, or the Pope, or Andrew Carnegie, or Rupert Murdoch, or Plotinus, or Hegel, or Engels, or Eduard Bernstein, or Stalin..., or even that dim-wit, Donald Trump, would look for five red things first!

This is an important aspect of what Wittgenstein called "logical grammar" -- i.e., key conceptual features expressed in language, reflected in or by our practices, that illustrate how we all react in social circumstances (and elsewhere), no matter what ideology or theory we subscribe to, and no matter in what century we happen to live. Indeed, this is so much part of our second nature, so much part of what we automatically do without thinking, that we often fail to recognise it or acknowledge its significance --, which is, of course, why it went unremarked upon for millennia (until Frege and Wittgenstein pointed this out).

It also shows that Wittgenstein was interested in "big logical differences", rather than the minutiae that exercised much that passed off as OLP, especially as it was practiced in Oxford in the 1950s and 1960s.

[I owe this point to Peter Geach. On this, see Baker (2004b, and Note 71b). This also shows that numbers can't be 'abstracted' into existence, either. I will leave that gnomic comment in its rather vague and enigmatic state for now, but will return to it in future re-writes of Essay Three Parts One and Two. On this in general, see Frege (1953). Cf., also Beaney (1996), Dummett (1991), Kenny (1995), Noonan (2001), Weiner (2004). See also, Cook (2023) and Zalta (2023).]^71b

This particular topic hasn't been covered at all well in the Wittgenstein literature (indeed, many commentators seem to miss the point of the above parable). However, see Baker and Hacker (2005b), pp.43-91, and Baker and Hacker (2005a), pp.1-28. But, and once more, the best article on this is still Robinson (2003b).

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context .]

It was claimed earlier that despite superficial similarities there are significant differences between M2-, and M9-type indicative sentences. Among other things this sub-section will substantiate and explain that assertion.

In a way that might seen analogous to mathematical propositions, it could be argued that M9 is true because of what its constituent words mean, but the status of sentences like M9 is much more problematic.⁷² As noted above, M2 expresses a rule whose use constitutes the meaning of the number words it uses; hence, it is incapable of being either true or false. Rules like M2 are either useful or useless, practical or impractical, followed or broken.

But, as far as DM-fans are concerned M9 seems to be 'necessarily true', as we have seen. According to Lenin, its supposed opposite (which would appear to be M9a, or perhaps more naturally, M9b or M9c) is "unthinkable". That might help explain why any attempt to question the veracity of sentences like P4 would be met with counter-claims to the effect that sentences like this are true because of what words/concepts like "motion" and "matter" really mean --, or maybe even because of 'the (metaphysical/essential) nature of reality', expressed by P4. This can be seen from the additional fact that if for whatever reason critics were to reject P4, it would be no use DM-supporters asking them to look harder at the evidence, concerning which there is none anyway. After all, what evidence could be used to show P4 is the case? On the contrary, as we know, many Ancient Greek theorists accepted the evidence of their senses -- indeed, everyone's senses, it seems -- that matter is 'naturally motionless' and has to be set in motion (and kept there) by a motive force. In that case, all that a Dialectical Marxist could do in such circumstances is appeal to the words or concepts involved, and then, with Lenin, declare that motion without matter is "unthinkable". That is, of course, why Lenin didn't simply say, "It is false/incorrect to claim that motion can occur without matter, and here's the evidence in support". It is also why DM-fans (almost to an individual) respond to critics with a "You just don't understand dialectics!" Concerning the veracity of P4 or M9, they never say, "You should examine the evidence more carefully".

Of course, DM-supporters might point to the wealth of knowledge we now have that confirms the ceaseless motion inside and between atoms as well as across the known universe. But, at best, this shows that the matter about which we are aware is in motion, not that motion is a 'mode' of its existence. How on earth might that be demonstrated? Lenin and Engels just assert it, they offer no proof. And, what is to stop a hardcore Aristotelian from arguing that all this motion that Dialectical Marxists speak about is the result of constantly acting forces (which also happens to be a core precept of contemporary Physics), and that without those forces matter would stop moving. If so, motion couldn't be a 'mode of the existence of matter', or at least not in the way DM-fans seem to think. In addition, we have already seen that in suitably-chosen frames of reference any body can be shown to be at rest with respect to that frame. [I have covered this specific point in much more detail in Essay Five, for example, here.] This means that, in response, all that a DM-supporter could now refer to is the idiosyncratic meaning they have attached to words like "motion", "matter" and "space" --, which, as we discovered in Essay Five, they have unwisely (and characteristically) left vague for well over a century!

The above hypothetical response -- that dialecticians could only refer itinerant doubters to what certain words or concepts 'really' mean or imply -- itself depends on an archaic view of language. That approach sees discourse as a system of labels attached to, or which 'represent' or 'reflect' (individually, as 'linguistic atoms'), objects and processes in 'reality'. Either that, or such terms stand for, or name 'Forms', 'Essences' or 'Substances' that exist in a permanently hidden, 'abstract world', 'Platonic Heaven', or Aristotelian 'concept-space'. Either that or they stand for or 'reflect' 'images', 'ideas', 'concepts' or 'representations' in 'consciousness'. But what these terms don't do, and can't do, is serve either as a means of communication or as key components of a materially-, and historically-grounded expression of our communal and inter-personal life. And that is because of the abstractionist and representationalist theories on which they are based and depend.

[I have covered this aspect of DM-Epistemology in more detail, particularly as it relates the obsession Dialectical Marxists have with each knowers' relation to "objects" and "things" -- for example, as in "this thing", "thing-in-itself" and "thing-for-us", etc., etc.) in Note 6a of Essay Three Part Two. For them, knowledge isn't propositional, it is relational, a theory also invented by Plato. On that, see Essay Three Part Two (Note 2a and Note 6a -- link above), and Essay Six.]⁷³

Once more, this helps explain why the (proffered) rejoinder noted earlier (i.e., "M9 is true because of what its constituent words mean") could only ever be the Final Court of Appeal for Dialectical Marxists. There is nothing more that could be said to a sceptic who doubted the 'truth' of DM-sentences like these. What little 'evidence' there is that supposedly substantiates even a narrow range of DM-'laws' soon proves to be of no help at all (as we have seen in other Essays posted at this site --, especially this one). In which case, it would be no use a prospective defender of Lenin pointing to more evidence if the meaning of the words he used is what caused the problem.

The aforementioned 'linguistic defence' (i.e., "M9 is true because of what its constituent words mean") also gives the game away. In the end, DM-sentences are amenable to no other defence. Evidence is in the end irrelevant. DM-'laws' are the product of an idiosyncratic/odd use of language, and, as such, can only be defended linguistically, or 'conceptually'.⁷⁴

And we don't have to appeal to the paucity of evidence. DM wasn't originally based on an extensive body of well-researched scientific evidence, it was lifted from the confused and fragmentary musings of an Ancient Greek Mystic, Heraclitus, who based his ideas about change on what he thought was true of every example of motion in the entire universe because of what he concluded about stepping into a river! Nor has Hegel gone down in history as a great experimental scientist. So, Dialectical Marxists can stop pretending their theory is science-based when it has such a watery-thin and suspect pedigree!

Readers should by now have noticed that every single DM-theory was originally dreamt-up by Ancient and Early Modern Mystics.

But, Dialectical Marxists are social beings, too. So, their theories and ideas are sensitive to, or are at least reflective of, their class origin, current class position and conceptual bias. The ideas that the DM-classicists alighted upon also grew out of doctrines they had forced down their throats as they were socialised early on in life, as I have argued elsewhere at this site:

The founders of [Dialectical Marxism] weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the Classics, the Bible and Philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there lies a 'hidden world', accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This world-view was concocted by ideologues of the ruling-class, initially over two thousand years ago. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from, or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. That will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to win over the majority -- or, at least, a significant proportion of 'opinion formers' (bureaucrats, judges, bishops, imams, 'intellectuals', philosophers, teachers, administrators, editors, etc., etc.) -- to the view that the present order either: (i) Works for their benefit, (ii) Defends 'civilised values', (iii) Is ordained of the 'gods', or (iv) Is 'natural' and so can't be fought against, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view that rationalises one or more of the above is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling "in the same old way". While the content of ruling-class thought may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth (about this 'hidden world') can be ascertained by thought alone, and therefore may be imposed on reality dogmatically and aprioristically. [Some might think this violates central tenets of HM, in that it asserts that some ideas remained to same for many centuries; I have addressed that concern, here.]

So, the non-worker founders of our movement -- who had been educated from childhood to believe there was just such a 'hidden world' lying behind 'appearances', and which governed everything -- when they became revolutionaries, looked for 'logical' principles relating to this abstract world that told them that change was inevitable and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of that ruling-class mystic, Hegel. The dialectical classicists were quite happy to impose their 'new' theory on the world (upside down or the "right way up") -- as, indeed, we saw in Essay Two -- since that is how they had been taught 'genuine' philosophers should behave.

That 'allowed' the founders of [Dialectical Marxism] to think of themselves as special, prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, couldn't quite comprehend because of their defective education, their reliance on ordinary language and the 'banalities of commonsense'.

Fortunately, history has predisposed these dialectical prophets to ascertain truths about this invisible world on their behalf, which 'implied' they were the 'naturally-ordained' leaders of the workers' movement -- 'Great Helmsmen', no less. That in turn meant that they were in addition teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could thereby legitimately substitute themselves for the majority -- in 'their own interests', of course -- since workers have in general been blinded by 'commodity fetishism', 'formal thinking', or they have been bought off by imperialist 'super profits'. This meant that 'the masses' were 'incapable' of seeing the truth for themselves....

In that case, and in view of what has gone before in this Essay (and at this site), DM-sentences like M9 and P4 are little more than misconstrued or mis-applied rules of language. They express what the DM-classicists meant by the words they used, not how the world happens to be, and that is why they need no evidence in support. Their supposed veracity is internally-generated by a determination to use language in certain ways. This means that DM-'laws' are in effect mis-interpreted rules for the use of Hegelian jargon, imported into Marxism from an ideological tradition that has unimpeachable ruling-class credentials.^74a

This also helps account for the frequent use of modal, dogmatic, and hyperbolic expressions right across DM-literature; for example: "Motion must involve a contradiction" (several of these were quoted earlier, but more fully in Essay Two), which follow from this comment by Engels:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphases alone added.]

Add to that Lenin's comment from earlier -- "Matter without motion is 'unthinkable'" -- and his statement that dialectical logic "requires" or "demands" this or that:

"Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…. [D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is always concrete, never abstract, as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party.... The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself....; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena. Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not in a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development.... The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement and change.... Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides...; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born..., constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.... If there are no isolated phenomena in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent, then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the standpoint of 'eternal justice'.... Contrary to idealism..., Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice." [Stalin (1976b), pp.835-46. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics.... As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.... The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... There is nothing that does not contain contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist.... Thus it is already clear that contradiction exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological phenomena.... Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of the development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end...." [Mao (1937), pp.311-18. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"The dialectical method demands first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in their interconnections with other things.... This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole…. Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions…. Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes…. The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.72, 90, 95, 117; Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

Finally, John Rees's comment, "Totality is an insistence...", also sprang straight out of this emphatic and dogmatic tradition. [Several more examples of such table-thumping 'dialectical-philosophy' were given here.]

This remains so independently of whether or not such hyper-bold claims are accompanied by an appeal to the alleged definitions of certain words/concepts (e.g., "Motion is the mode of the existence of matter"). Empirical propositions have no need of modal 'strengtheners' of this sort. Who ever says, "Copper must conduct electricity!", or "Science demands that light travels at such-and-such a velocity!"?

"This aspect of dialectics…usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum total of examples…and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin (1961), p.357. Bold emphasis added.]

Plainly, a "law of cognition" needs no help from the grubby, working class world of evidence and facts. And that is why DM-theorists are, en masse, happy to impose their ideas on nature and society. [On this, see Note 2.]

Or, not unless M6g were itself the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one", or if it were based on a direct observation statement -- for example, "I saw his wife give him a copy as a present, and I later spotted in his bookcase". But even then, the truth or falsehood of M6g would still depend on an interface with evidence at some point, not simply on 'pure thought'.

With M6-type propositions, it is reality that dictates to us whether or not they are true. Our use of such sentences means we aren't dictating to nature what it must contain or what must be true of it. The exact opposite is the case with metaphysical and dialectical sentences. [But this is just the RRT, again!]

Nevertheless, despite appearances to the contrary once more, M9 and P4 can't be true solely in virtue of what their words mean. Normally, the ordinary-looking words that sentences like M9 and P4 use gain whatever meaning they have from the part they already play in other areas, in wider human practices that involve applications in everyday contexts -- as we saw was the case with M2-type sentences. Divorced from that background, the isolated use of specialised, jargonised expressions in sentences like M9 and P4 means they are like fish out of water, as it were. Even though the words employed by DM-theorists look like ordinary words, their odd and distorted use divorces them from the vernacular -- rather like the way that the theological use of words like "father" and "son" (to describe 'God' and 'Christ') divorces them from their everyday meaning, too.

There are no real-world systems -- i.e., social structures pertaining to material practice and everyday life -- in which the idiosyncratic employment of M9 and P4's constituent terms has a life (and hence a meaning) other than these novel, specialised, isolated contexts. And, as we saw in Essay Nine Part One, DM-theories play no part in the day-to-day activity of revolutionaries, nor do they even feature in their agitation or propagandisation of the working class.

Indeed, metaphysical 'sound bites' like M9 and P4 supply the only semantic background for the use of such terms. Artificial and contrived DM-contexts provide a unique backdrop for such 'dialectical nuggets', and this they do in non-practical (hence, non-material) surroundings -- quite unlike mathematical propositions (M2, again), which they might seem to emulate. Isolated from material contexts in this way, the connections that 'ordinary-looking' words employed by Dialectical Marxists have with the typographically similar, everyday words (from which they were allegedly 'derived', or possibly even 'abstracted') have been irreversibly cut. Because DM-jargon isn't based on material practice (again, as demonstrated in Essay Nine Part One), and can't be used in connection with the working class, or even the day-to-day activity of revolutionaries, it either has no meaning, or the usual meanings of the words employed denies sentences like M1a, M9 and P4 any sense, as we have seen. This, naturally, renders them not just non-sensical, but incoherent, too.^74a1

It is no surprise, then, to find that the use of such terms in sentences like these results in confusion, incomprehension and repeated lack of success. Nor is it any wonder seeing Lenin's words fall apart and then collapse into incoherence so readily.^74b

In this respect, at least, Lenin is in 'good' company: metaphysical theories also fall apart as incoherent non-sense -- only not quite as readily as this runt of the metaphysical litter, DM.

What has gone wrong here can perhaps be illustrated by consulting one of Wittgenstein's examples:

"If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of signifying.... (The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing is that there is no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.).... Thus the reason why 'Socrates is identical' says nothing is that we have not given any adjectival meaning to the word 'identical'. For when it appears as a sign for identity, it symbolizes in an entirely different way -- the signifying relation is a different one -- therefore the symbols also are entirely different in the two cases: the two symbols have only the sign in common, and that is an accident." [Wittgenstein (1972), §§5.473-5.47333, pp.95-97. Italic emphasis in the original; paragraphs merged.]

(i) The word "identical" used in the following sentence (W1) has no meaning (since we haven't given it one in such a context); or,

It could be objected that W1 is malformed -- but that is, in fact, part of the problem!

Again, it could be argued that W2 isn't at all like M9. No one would think of uttering W2, certainly not as part of a philosophical theory.

Confronted with these examples, decisions would have to be made about whether we understand what look like ordinary words used in such (strange, non-standard) contexts, or whether we grasp the unusual use to which they are being put, which is what appears to have created the 'problem'. The same is the case with M9.

Once more, it could be objected that W3-W5 aren't at all like M9, which is a scientific proposition. The others aren't.

However, as we have seen, propositions like M9 (i.e., M1a and P4) fall apart upon examination, and they aren't scientific. [Anyone who still disagrees should check this out, and the perhaps think again.]

Even so, the incoherence of M1a, for example, is less easy to recognise than it is with respect to W1, but it is no less correct to declare them incoherent.

The point underlying the last remark -- i.e., "their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary use -- including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts in terms of which the philosophical problems were phrased" is explained more fully in a passage quoted earlier (albeit in connection with the Philosophy of Mind, but what it has to say is applicable more generally):

"As to the widespread disparagement of attempts to resolve philosophical problems by way of appeals to 'what we would ordinarily say', we would proffer the following comment. It often appears that those who engage in such disparaging nonetheless themselves often do what they programmatically disparage, for it seems to us at least arguable that many of the central philosophical questions are in fact, and despite protestations to the contrary, being argued about in terms of appeals (albeit often inept) to 'what we would ordinarily say...'. That the main issues of contemporary philosophy of mind are essentially about language (in the sense that they arise from and struggle with confusions over the meanings of ordinary words) is a position which, we insist, can still reasonably be proposed and defended. We shall claim here that most, if not all, of the conundrums, controversies and challenges of the philosophy of mind in the late twentieth century consist in a collectively assertive, although bewildered, attitude toward such ordinary linguistic terms as 'mind' itself, 'consciousness', 'thought', 'belief', 'intention' and so on, and that the problems which are posed are ones which characteristically are of the form which ask what we should say if confronted with certain facts, as described.... We have absolutely nothing against the coining of new, technical uses [of words], as we have said. Rather, the issue is that many of those who insist upon speaking of machines' 'thinking' and 'understanding' do not intend in the least to be coining new, restrictively technical, uses for these terms. It is not, for example, that they have decided to call a new kind of machine an 'understanding machine', where the word 'understanding' now means something different from what we ordinarily mean by that word. On the contrary, the philosophical cachet derives entirely from their insisting that they are using the words 'thinking' and 'understanding' in the same sense that we ordinarily use them. The aim is quite characteristically to provoke, challenge and confront the rest of us. Their objective is to contradict something that the rest of us believe. What the 'rest of us' believe is simply this: thinking and understanding is something distinctive to human beings..., and that these capacities set us apart from the merely mechanical.... The argument that a machine can think or understand, therefore, is of interest precisely because it features a use of the words 'think' and 'understand' which is intendedly the same as the ordinary use. Otherwise, the sense of challenge and, consequently, of interest would evaporate.... If engineers were to make 'understand' and 'think' into technical terms, ones with special, technical meanings different and distinct from those we ordinarily take them to have, then, of course, their claims to have built machines which think or understand would have no bearing whatsoever upon our inclination ordinarily to say that, in the ordinary sense, machines do not think or understand." [Button, et al (1995), pp.12, 20-21. Italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

In connection with the remark made by Glock -- that is, if it applies to Lenin --, it would mean he isn't in fact talking about motion, but about 'motion', and we are no further forward (no pun intended). Along similar lines (again, no pun intended), W1 isn't about identity, but about 'identity'. [The other two possibilities have already been dealt with. (There is more on this in Interlude Eight.)]

Furthermore, it is also worth recalling that, for Lenin, M9 isn't expressing what might be described as ordinary inseparability --, like, say, "He is inseparable from his Teddy Bear", or "She is inseparable from her partner". [More on that later, too.] The inseparability Lenin intends here seems closer to "'Odd number' is inseparable from 'three'", or "'Regicide' is inseparable from 'king-killer'".

Despite this, it could be argued -- in response to the claims advanced in this Essay, that Metaphysics is incoherent non-sense, since it arises out of, and is based on, a radical misuse of language that isn't connected with wider social practices --, that if meaning is given by use, then metaphysicians certainly use words to formulate their theories. In which case, if it is assumed that what this Essay has to say about meaning is itself correct, it should guarantee the language used by metaphysicians does have a meaning. Furthermore, Traditional Philosophy is part of a social practice, just like countless other intellectual pursuits. Traditional Theorists have been debating among themselves now for well over two thousand years. They share ideas, methods and terminology; in addition they set standards for one another's work (especially these days in connection with peer reviewed books and articles). If so, neither their theories nor their language could or should be declared meaningless. After all, "The game is played", to paraphrase Wittgenstein.

In reply, it is worth pointing out that nowhere in this Essay have philosophical theories been described as meaningless, just non-sensical and incoherent. Moreover, as argued in Essay Thirteen Part Three, here, here and here, use doesn't guarantee that every inscription will have a meaning (here slightly modified):

But, if anything can mean anything (if so intended and as the occasion demands)...it would be possible for plain gibberish to have the same effect on an audience that a perfectly ordinary sentence had on those who heard both, and hence for the two to mean the same, if there were an intention to that effect. In which case, we should have to admit that a nonsensical string of letters, such as:

[Or, indeed, if both were intended to annoy or perplex supporters of [this] 'theory' of meaning, and succeeded in doing one or both.]...

[This] is also why we can all see that an inscription like... "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT"... is totally meaningless, despite the fact that V7 could have had the same effect on someone as a meaningful sentence, and be employed to the same ends. Even though V7 has a use -- for example, to make the very point that it is meaningless -- it is, nevertheless, mere babble. Using it to make that very point doesn't show that its meaning is that it is meaningless. Plainly not, otherwise it would have no meaning by meaning that -- indeed, in that case, its meaning would be that it had no meaning!...

Just because I have used "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" to make the point that it is meaningless that doesn't imply that "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" means "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT is meaningless". If it did then clearly "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" would mean "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT is meaningless", which in turn would mean that "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" isn't meaningless after all! In which case, "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" would imply that BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT is meaningless and BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT isn't meaningless!

Nor does it mean that just because I intended to show that "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" is meaningless that it is meaningless just because that was so intended by me. It was meaningless before I used it, and after. If we exclude the possibility that this string of letters is some sort of code, or is intended to be a code..., intentions can't turn babble into sense, nor the other way round. But, that fact didn't prevent the present author from using "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" to point out that it was indeed meaningless. Neither does it prevent anyone else understanding the present author's (speaker's) meaning to that end, even though whatever was, or could be said by using "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" is linguistically meaningless, for all that.

[It is important to note that in the aforementioned Essay I was, at that point, temporarily ignoring the distinction between meaning and sense.]

So, the mere use (or even the repetitive use) of a string of letters (or sounds) doesn't imply it/they have a meaning.

It could be objected that the string of letters used above (i.e., "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT") is neither a word nor a sentence, and so it isn't relevant to the issues at hand. Philosophical language isn't constructed out of random combinations of letters or symbols.

Maybe not, but that still fails to show how or why philosophical words do have a meaning. Of course, it all depends on what is meant by "meaning".

I added the following list of that word's possible connotations to Essay Thirteen Part Three:

(2) Evaluative Import: as in "May Day means different things to different classes."

(4) Linguistic Meaning, or Synonymy: as in "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", "'Chien' means 'dog'", "Comment vous appelez-vous?" means "What's your name?", or "Recidivist" means someone who has resumed their criminal career.

(6) Implication: as in "Winning this dispute means that management won't try another wage cut again in a hurry."

(7) Indicate, Point to, or Presage: as in "Those clouds mean rain", "Those spots mean you have measles", or "That expression means she's angry".

(8) Reference: as in "I mean him over there", or "'The current president of the USA' means somebody different at most once every eight years."

(9) Artistic or Literary Import: as in "The meaning of this novel is to highlight the steep decline in political integrity."

(10) Conversational Focus: as in "I mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% offer in the first place?"

(11) Expression of Sincerity or Determination: as in "I mean it, I do want to go on the march!", or "The demonstrators really mean to stop this war."

(12) Content of a Message, or the Import of a Sign: as in "It means the strike starts on Monday", or "It means you have to queue here."

(13) Interpretation: as in "You will need to read the author's novels if you want to give new meaning to her latest play", or "That gesture means those pickets think you are a scab."

(14) Import or Significance: as in "Part of the meaning of this play is to change our view of drama", or "The real meaning of this agreement is that the bosses have at last learnt their lesson."

(15) Speakers' Meaning: as in "When you trod on her foot and she said 'Well done!' she in fact meant the exact opposite".

(16) Communicative Meaning: as in "You get my meaning", or "My last letter should tell you what I meant", or "We have just broken the code, hence the last message meant this...."

(17) Explanation: as in "When the comrade said the strike isn't over what she meant was that we can still win!", or "What is the meaning of this? Explain yourself!"

(18) Translation, or a Request for Translation -- as in "What does 'Il pleut' mean in German?"

This isn't to suggest that these are the only meanings of "meaning", or that several of the examples listed don't overlap. [For example, items (4) and (17) intersect, as do (5) and (11), and (9) and (14), as well as (4) and (18).]

[A very useful summary of these and other senses of "meaning" can be found in Audi (1999), pp.545-50 (which entry was written by Brian Loar).]

In which case, it isn't being denied that DM-jargon possesses some sort of meaning; indeed, for its acolytes it seems to possess meaning in terms perhaps of Options (1) and (2), but it plainly hasn't any in terms of Options (4) and (8). Moreover, when an attempt is made to explain the meaning of philosophical jargon (especially the gobbledygook Hegel inflicted on his readers), all we end up with is yet more obscure jargon. That is also the case with DM.

As a result, very little more can be done with this aspect of the above objection (i.e., that if a word or an inscription has a use, it has a meaning) until we are clear which of the above connotations of "meaning" is/are intended.

I also argued in Essay Thirteen Part Three as follows (in relation to my claim that contextualism implies that incidental noises have a meaning; what the phrase "speakers' meaning" itself means is explained here) in relation to a theory attributed to Voloshinov (this material has been slightly edited):

In fact, Voloshinov's theory (that the meaning of words depends on the intention of the user and the occasion of their use) implies that a cough, for example, would actually mean the same as a sneeze if it were intended to make someone jump -- and that a child's cry was synonymous with an alarm bell if both were aimed at waking up the child-minder.

It could be objected that the above point about coughs and other incidental noises aren't linguistic expressions, hence they are inapt counter-examples.

However, if meaning were indeed occasion-sensitive (as opposed to it being a feature of the public use of words drawn from a finite vocabulary, etc.), then any sound or sign could count as a linguistic move. If, say, someone coughed and they meant (speakers' meaning) on that occasion: "Look out, the boss is coming!", then it seems, according to this theory that that noise would mean (linguistically) the same as: "Look out, the boss is coming!". In which case, for those who argue along these lines, that context and intention determines meaning, it looks as if a cough would be just as much a linguistic act as uttering the words: "Look out, the boss is coming!". Indeed, if that were so, the sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!" would be dispensable, and we could all use a cough from now on whenever we wanted to warn of the boss's approach --, or, indeed, to report on that possibility in this Essay.

If, say, someone coughed and they meant (speakers' meaning) on that occasion: "Look out, the boss is coming!", then it seems, according to this theory that that noise would mean (linguistically) the same as: "Look out, the boss is coming!".

Which everyone committed to this theory would understand, since the sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!" will for them mean the same as a cough, or even "cough".

In that case, the ridiculous nature of the above should now speak, or cough, for itself.

Again, it could be objected that the above response only succeeds in undermining the argument advanced in this Essay (which was that the meaning of words and the sense of sentences aren't in general dependent on contexts of utterance or the intentions of those who utter them), for if the meaning of, say, a cough is now admitted to be occasion-, and intention-sensitive, then meaning in general must be occasion-, and intention-sensitive, contrary to what had been claimed.

That objection is misguided. Given the theory under consideration, and the example used above, we would now have nothing into which we could 'translate' the said cough, since the original sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!" is dispensable (it having been replaced, along with its meaning, by a cough). If so, either (i) coughs would become meaningless by default -- they would not now be translatable because the sentence they replaced, and which could be used to translate them, has dropped from the language --, or (ii) if coughs retained some sort of a meaning, it would then be equivalent to the now unusable (or, from-now-on-and-forever-to-be-unused) sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!" -- once again, it having passed from the language. Either way, coughs would thus have taken on the role of the now defunct type sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!". As should seem clear, coughs would thus become occasion-, and intention-insensitive, since they would now have this meaning: "Look out, the boss is coming!", and no other. The whole point of the exercise would be lost and occasion-, and intention-sensitivity will have been transformed into its alter-ego: occasion-, and intention-insensitivity!

[Henceforth, to save on needless repetition, I will simply refer to occasion-sensitivity (or its opposite, occasion-insensitivity), but it should be assumed I also mean to include intention-sensitive (and its opposite, intention-insensitivity), unless otherwise stated. On the distinction between types and tokens, see here.]

Of course, considerations like these might very well create problems for anyone who coughed because they simply had a tickle in the throat, or were suffering from a chest complaint. Otherwise, might they not risk becoming known as 'serial boss-approach-warners'? And what are we to say of patients in tuberculosis wards? Are they all continually warning one another of the imminent approach of the same or a different boss?

On the other hand, (iii) even assuming that the sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!" doesn't slip from the language in the manner suggested (or in some other way), the point at issue here would still be that whatever handle we have on occasion-sensitive acts of communication it must rely on linguistic expressions that aren't themselves constrained by occasion-sensitivity.

So, the point made in the main body of this Essay wasn't that nothing is occasion-sensitive, it was that not everything could possibly be occasion-sensitive.

If the translation into language of coughs and other assorted random noises -- so that they could be taken to mean things like "Look out, the boss is coming!" -- were itself dependent on nothing but occasion-sensitive materials (including the sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!"), we would be involved in trying to comprehend something (the cough) in terms of something else (its supposed sentential equivalent) that would itself be in need of an unravelling process all of its own. Down such a road, I fear, lies another infinite regress, in which impenetrable thicket all meaning would soon become lost.

Again, it could be objected that this still fails to address the main point at issue: coughs (etc.) are non-linguistic acts; hence, they aren't at all what the theory under review was adverting to.

The reason why examples involving such things as coughs and cries (etc.) have been referenced is that the aforementioned theory can't in the end distinguish between (a) the occasion-sensitivity of such sounds/events (etc.), and (b) genuine linguistic acts, which its proponents say are also affected in this way (i.e., in that they, too, are subject to the constraints of occasion-sensitivity). But, if the meaning of both is occasion-sensitive (whereas the view advanced in this Essay is that that is the case only in relation to (a) -- and even then, only when used in the manner suggested), then this theory's proponents still need other criteria to distinguish (a) from (b). If a cough could mean (speakers' meaning) the same as "Look out, the boss is coming!" (and who can doubt it could?), and any other randomly chosen sentence (such as "My gerbil is dead!") could also mean "Look out, the boss is coming!" (as it seems is possible, given the validity of the aforementioned theory; that is, if the person using "My gerbil is dead!" actually meant it, or intended it, as a coded warning: "Look out, the boss is coming!"), then the distinction between linguistic expressions and mere (or even adventitious) sounds would be lost, and the points raised in the main body of this Essay would still stand.

Despite this, it might be felt that since coughs and itinerant noises aren't part of a standardised vocabulary, they can't be interpreted along the lines outlined above. But, if a linguistic expression can be used to mean anything whatsoever (even something wildly divergent from the norm -- or to use one particular theorist's words: it could be "different in every aspect") then standardised vocabularies must surely drop out as irrelevant. For example, if the word "cough" (not the actual noise, or action, but the word itself) could mean, say, "My armadillo is sick", then any connection it once might have had with its own dictionary entry (or its established meaning) would be lost (as would those of the other four words used: "my", "armadillo", "is" and "sick"). In that case, the links that the word "cough" had with its standard meaning would be severed, too. And, if that is the case, an actual cough could then mean the same as "My armadillo is sick", or any other word or set of words in the dictionary or the language, which could in turn mean anything themselves, including coughs.

It might now be objected that an actual cough isn't a word, so it can't perform the roles assigned to it in the above paragraphs.

But, if anything can mean anything (if so intended and as the occasion demands), we must surely lose touch with the meaning of the word "word" itself. On this view, the word "word" could in fact mean: "This expression actually means itinerant noises like coughs" if it were so 'intended' by deviant linguists (or if I so intend it here). If Occasionalism were true, this possibility can't be ruled out. Occasionalism permits any word to mean anything if it is so intended, or if the circumstances suggest it. And that includes words and phrases like "meaning", "sentence", "word", "cough", "and so on"..., and so on....

Moreover, if, as Voloshinov argues, sentence and word meaning (not speakers' meaning) were dependent on context and occasion of use, then words divorced from every context would have no meaning at all.¹⁶ So, for instance, the sentence "Voloshinov is correct about meaning and theme" would mean nothing until someone actually uttered it in a particular context with a specific intention. But, if it had no meaning, why would anyone choose to utter it? Why would anyone select such a meaningless string of words? They might just as well say something genuinely meaningless like: "BuBuBu" --, which, on this theory, should gain a sense from being uttered with a special aim in mind. But, wouldn't they rather utter "I'm hungry" in order to mean "Voloshinov is correct about meaning and theme"?

Be this as it may, the examples of philosophical language surveyed in these Essays clearly show -- and as this confirms -- little or no sense can be made of the words philosophers use to build their theories. That being the case, metaphysical meaning is probably catered for by Options (1) and (2), above, too. If, however, any attempt is made to explain the meaning of the words philosophers and/or DM-fans actually employ in their theoretical deliberations (i.e., along the lines of Option (4), for instance), then, as has been pointed out many times, such attempts invariably rely on yet more impenetrable jargon to 'explain' the last batch of obscure verbiage --, or, indeed, the last barrage of distorted ordinary language.

Hence, the closed circle of meaningless jargon and misused/distorted words can't be broken into, or exited, at any point.

As far as the phrase "The game is played" is concerned, Wittgenstein certainly didn't mean that just anything could count as a language game. But, even if he did so intend, readers will be hard pressed to find any reference to "language games" in these Essays (of course, saving a few isolated mentions like this). Again, as I argued in Essay Thirteen Part Three:

Wittgenstein introduced this metaphor to assist him compare and contrast the many uses there are of language, as well as to help him draw an analogy between language and rule-governed social behaviour. It wasn't meant to suggest that the use of language is merely a game, or that it is simply there for amusement or recreation, and is thus of little import. Nor yet that we play games when we use language, or even that our 'view of reality' is 'relative' to such games. [The last few words have been put 'scare quotes' partly because Wittgenstein himself would have questioned their employment in such contexts.]

So, for example, when confronted by those who use the negative particle in odd ways, he didn't just say "Ok, well the game is played, after all!"; he said this:

"There can be no debate about whether these or other rules are the right ones for the word 'not'.... For without these rules, the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just as well change the word too." [Wittgenstein (2009), §549, footnote, p.155e.]

It could be objected that Ms Lichtenstein's rejection of the usefulness of the language game metaphor in this regard doesn't mean she is right. Independent reasons (and evidence) are still required to show that if the 'Game of Metaphysics' is played, the words its adepts use are nevertheless meaningless.

[That issue will be tackled in Part Seven of Essay Twelve, when it is published.]

In advance of that, the reader is re-directed to a point Glock made earlier. Of course, if metaphysicians want to play their pointless games -- which have no more material significance than theological language or the nonsense rhymes of Edward Lear -- that is entirely up to them (not that they need my permission!). But, as the History of Philosophy has shown, they would have been far better occupied watching someone else watch paint dry than they did concocting the baroque and convoluted systems they finally dreamt up. Indeed, as far as Traditional Philosophy is concerned (if we except Theology and other forms of Mysticism), a more useless and unproductive human practice would be difficult to find.

[The counter-claim that Metaphysics has played a useful role in the progress and development of Science will be tackled in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

How and why Metaphysics and DM are incoherent non-sense will now be explained (but from all that has gone before the reason why should by now be reasonably clear).

As we have seen, sentences that express (or attempt to express) rules governing our use of words are invariably mis-interpreted as empirical propositions of a special, uniquely profound sort by DM-theorists and metaphysicians in general. That is, they are understood as Super-Scientific Truths, capable of revealing 'the fundamental nature of Being', valid for all of space and time. Unfortunately, we have also seen this means such sentences turn out to be non-sensical. Even worse, because they misuse and thereby distort language they are incoherent non-sense.⁷⁵

Theoretical sentences like M9 and P4 frequently depend on, or give rise to, a range of associated 'propositions', from many of which they had been 'derived' or are used to 'explain' their supposed 'content'. But in effect, as 'metaphysical statements', they stand-alone. That is, they confront the reader as isolated philosophical 'gems', as fundamental 'truths'.

[Examples of the above include the following: "I think, therefore I am" (the Cogito of Descartes); "Appearances are a glimpse of the unseen" (Anaxagoras); "To be it be perceived" (Berkeley); "Time is a relation" (paraphrasing Kant and Leibniz); "The whole is more than the sum of the parts" (Metaphysical Holists of every stripe), "Every determination is also a negation" (Spinoza and Hegel); "Truth is always concrete, never abstract" (paraphrasing Plekhanov and Lenin); "All bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour...they are never equal to themselves" (Trotsky), "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" (Quine); "Existence precedes essence" (paraphrasing Existentialists like Sartre); "The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror" (Gadamer); "All that is rational is real" (Hegel and George Novack); "Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it" (Engels). Several more 'glittering philosophical gems' have been listed here.]^75a0

'Philosophical jewels' such as these have traditionally been mined, cleaned and polished into their glittering splendour by socially-isolated thinkers, who 'discovered' these 'priceless gems' buried below 'the surface of appearances', by the sole exercise of 'thought'.^75a

["Socially-isolated, doesn't mean such thinkers weren't part of, or weren't operating within, a philosophical tradition, or even that in some cases they didn't belong to a school or style of thinkers (i.e., this doesn't imply that they weren't 'empiricists', 'rationalists', 'materialists', 'dualists', 'monists', or 'idealists', etc., etc.), nor that they lived in seclusion, like hermits. What I am suggesting is that, as far as their philosophical 'discoveries' were concerned, they were (in general) divorced from ordinary life (i.e., they were isolated from the working class, from ordinary human beings or ordinary life). In addition, the vast majority enjoyed privileged lifestyles, free from daily toil, often supported, subsidised or patronised by members of the ruling-class. Either that or they were 'employed' by the Church, had 'independent means' or belonged to the 'privileged elite' themselves. In addition, they all almost invariably used elitist forms of language. (I will cover this topic in more detail in Part Two and Part Seven of Essay Twelve.)]

But, their convoluted and obscure ideas were never based on -- nor were they even derived from -- ordinary practice and everyday language, otherwise the rest of us wouldn't need to be informed of them.^75b

Indeed, if 'philosophical discoveries' like the above had ever been based on any sort of interface with the ordinary, the mundane, the quotidian, they wouldn't have struck their inventors (or anyone else, for that matter) as especially 'profound'. In that eventuality, nor would it seem their heroic efforts (aided or not by what is in effect the metaphysical equivalent of a JCB, Hegel's Logic) had mined these 'pristine gems' for, and on behalf of, benighted humanity. If just about anyone could come out with such ontological jewels, who would employ or patronise a single philosopher? How much social esteem would devolve to those who came up with these 'theoretical trinkets' if any old Tom, Dick or Harriett could assemble and polish them with ease between breakfast and lunch?

In fact, metaphysical 'propositions' like these stage their dramatic entrance onto the world stage as glittering linguistic 'jewels' ('solitaire diamonds', if you will). They gain their 'meaning' -- their metaphysical shine, their theoretical sparkle, their intellectual mystique -- solely from the artificial setting arranged for them by those who invent them. Their entrance is staged, made to seem like "news from nowhere", as shafts of metaphysical light, 'Cosmic Verities' written on 'Tablets of Stone', straight off the top of Mount Verbiage.

And, surprise, surprise: the vast majority of educated individuals fall for these Philosophical 'Q-Drops', time and again. Human gullibility, even at the 'top end', knows no bounds.^75c

Nevertheless, countless generations of 'Metaphysical Prophets' concocted these Scintillating Gems -- almost as if they were 'Divine Intermediaries'; each one a latter day Hermes, the Greek 'Messenger of the Gods' -- collectively behaving as if the 'real meanings' of the ordinary-looking terms they co-opted were known only to them, when in fact their idiosyncratic 'meanings' had been bestowed on them because of the peculiar role they occupied in non-sensical sentences like P4 and L1, each the result of a pioneering experiment in 'innovative' linguistic chicanery. To that end, these 'intrepid thinkers' regularly invented entire catalogues of Proper Names and Neologisms that were pressed into service as identifying labels for the 'abstract' objects, 'concepts' and 'representations' they conjured into existence merely by thinking about them. These included such hardy perennials as, "Being", "Essence", "Nothing", "Becoming", "Substance", "Form", "Universal", "Haecciety", "Quale", "Trope", "Thing-in-Itself", "Thing-for-Us", and the like.⁷⁶

As we have already seen, Lenin and Nietzsche had this to say about such philosophical obscurantism:

"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing" Childishness. On this, also see Interlude Ten.]

The above confidence trick -- whereby Traditional Theorists claimed they were operating with 'real meanings', not these specially-concocted 'distortions' -- was further refined by the theory that words gain their meaning individually, atomistically, as linguistic or semantic 'units'. That was in turn supposed to be because of:

(i) The direct, unmediated connection each 'name' supposedly enjoyed with 'Reality Itself'; or,

(ii) The intimate link that was said to exist between the 'concepts' involved and certain (non-descript) 'mental processes' taking place in each individual theorist's brain (facilitated by the mythical 'process of abstraction').

That helps explain why the odd/distorted use of language is and always has been a key component of Metaphysics -- and now DM -- again, as we saw in Essay Three Part One and elsewhere at this site.

Hence, for Traditional Thinkers, at first sight the assumption that these newly minted 'names' gain their meaning directly and solely from whatever they supposedly denote seems entirely plausible, just as it might also seem reasonable to think that language (i.e., real language, philosophical language -- not the 'woefully defective vernacular') is based on such an atomised, socially-isolated naming ritual, which is uniquely able to track the 'Essence of Being' by the mere expedient of saying it does. Clearly, that approach to discourse trades on the further (unsupported) theory that there are such things as 'Essences', to begin with -- which is yet another dogma that was simply assumed, never actually shown, to be the case.⁷⁷

Of course, that is one reason why Traditional Philosophers insisted that the meaning of words is determined by atomistic criteria like this. In the newly emerging bourgeois world of Post-Renaissance Thought, this was a key factor in what really amounted to the creation of a series of 'private languages', each of which was the exclusive 'conceptual vehicle' for the thinker who concocted it, in the privacy of his/her head, which they alone understood. [More recently, 'inner speech' -- or perhaps even a (mysterious) 'language of thought' -- has assumed pride of place in the theoretical pecking order.] All this was supposedly the result of 'inner acts' of naming the 'images' 'Ideas', 'Representations', 'Categories', or 'Concepts' processed in and by the 'mind'/'consciousness', which has been deposited there by a 'process of abstraction'. Each one of these is then re-configured, or even shaped, by self-serving stipulative definitions, or the "unfolding of a genetically determined program", by one or other of certain non-descript 'mental modules'.

[Notice how this House of Cards has been built on shaky and insecure lower layers of flimsy 'cardboard-like speculation', and precious little actual evidence. I have subjected speculative talk like this (aka 'science fiction'), along with its 'supporting evidence', to sustained criticism in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4) to (8), but especially here.]

This is the danger Bertell Ollman warned about (in relation to 'abstractionism' and a reliance on secret 'inner processes' like those mentioned above -- as argued in Essay Three Part Two, quoted earlier):

As is the case with Ollman -- and, indeed, the same applies to everyone else who has written about this obscure 'process' (many of whom have been quoted in both Parts of Essay Three) --, we aren't told by Sayer how anyone actually manages to do this, still less why it doesn't result in the construction of a 'private language'.

Well, it remains to be seen if Professor Ollman can solve a problem that has baffled everyone else for centuries -- that is, those who have even so much as acknowledged it exists! [Update February 2026: After well over 20 years waiting there is still no sign of Ollman's 'solution' to this 'problem'. Certainly, no attempt was made in Ollman (2019) to address it, let alone solve it. Nor is there any indication that others have risen to the challenge on his behalf -- or that a single DM-fan (since Ollman raised this issue) regards it as a 'difficulty' that needs addressing! One Academic Marxist with whom I debated this very topic a few years ago completely ducked the issue and showed no sign he was aware of it, never mind how to deal with it. Nor was he cognisant of the serious challenge 'abstractionism' poses for anyone who at least says they accept the social nature of language and knowledge.]

It is to Ollman's considerable credit, therefore, that he is at least aware of it.

[In fact, Ollman is the very first dialectician I have encountered (in nigh on thirty years) who even so much as acknowledges this 'difficulty'! Be this as it may, I have devoted Essay Thirteen Part Three to an analysis of this topic; the reader is referred there for more details.]

It is no accident, therefore, that the traditional approach not only torpedoes belief in the social nature of language, it is also based on a class-motivated rejection of the material roots of discourse in everyday life (explored in Parts Two and Seven of Essay Twelve -- summarised here). Nor is it merely coincidental that it was promoted by thinkers who were openly sympathetic to wider ruling-class interests and priorities, who almost invariably favoured this anti-Marxist view of language.⁷⁸

Conversely, it is no coincidence either that ordinary language assumed a central role in Analytic Philosophy among left-leaning "Linguistic Philosophers" (and thinkers influenced by Marx -- like Wittgenstein), just when the working class was entering the stage of history as a significant social and political force.⁷⁹

[P5 is what I have elsewhere called 'Spinoza's Greedy Principle' [or, SGP] -- which neither Hegel nor Spinoza even attempted to justify. [I have nevertheless debunked it here and here.]

The 'truth' of 'atomic' sentences like these is somehow supposed to depend on the meaning of the words they contain. But, a completely novel use of words can't determine the sense of any sentences formed from them.⁸⁰ If that were the case then "I steam cleaned the square root of my cat" and "BuBuBu is NuNuNu" would make sense. Words gain their meaning from their applicability in an indefinitely large set of socially-sanctioned, communally-motivated and syntactically-conformal contexts.⁸¹ They don't have a meaning bestowed upon them first, divorced from linguistic or social contexts, which 'meaning' then enables them to function in sentences, any more than a lump of gold first gains its value in nature, or even in society, on its own, as an isolated 'commodity', unconnected with certain forms of social organisation and collective labour, only to enter the economy afterwards with a value already attached to it. Meaning is no more a natural, individualistic property than value. If the contrary supposition were the case, communication would be impossible (as, indeed, Ollman himself argued).⁸²

[We have already seen that the supposition that nature or words themselves determine meaning is a non-starter, which will be further criticised in the next sub-section. I have also covered this aspect of language in Essay Thirteen Part Three, for example, here, here, here, and here.]

However, ex hypothesi, there are no other contexts in which such 'metaphysically atomic sentences' (like M1a, M9 and P4) can make a practical or useful appearance, other than those that might fuel endless academic, or even sectarian, debate. The fundamental 'propositions' of Metaphysics stand alone as isolated nuggets of truth, core precepts, foundational principles. This means that (in such airless surroundings) the constituent words of sentences like M9, for instance, are in effect meaningless, despite the typographical similarity they enjoy with ordinary words. That is because such terms possess no connection with ordinary contexts that are themselves embedded in, or related to, material practice. That is, of course, one reason why M1a, for example, so readily collapses into incoherence.

[Of course, the above remarks depend on how we interpret the word "meaning"; I will have said more about that in interlude Seven. The phrase "material practice" should already be understood by fellow Marxists.]

In a similar vein (no pun intended), Gold isn't just valueless in nature, it is incapable of gaining a value by itself, of its own efforts, or, indeed, by the efforts of lone prospectors and refiners. And Gold would remain valueless if it had no connection with historically-conditioned material practices in a sufficiently developed society and economy.

Of course, to suppose otherwise --, i.e., to imagine that words, or 'inner representations', determine their own meaning independently of the use to which human beings put them in everyday contexts -- would be to fetishise them, as argued above.

Indeed, this would be tantamount to believing that words (again, or their 'inner representations') enjoyed a social life of their own anterior to, and explanatory of, the linguistic inter-play between human beings. If words (etc.) did in fact acquire their own meanings, piecemeal in such a manner and those meanings followed them about the place like ever-present shadows, the idea that language is a social phenomenon would itself assume an entirely different meaning. In that case, discourse would still be social, but that would be because words were the social agents, humans wouldn't. That would in turn mean that words themselves had gifted meaning to our discourse, not the other way round!

If that were so, communication would be social because our words already were, independent of humanity!⁸³

We are now in a position to understand why that is so: the supposition that a word (or, at least, its physical embodiment, its 'inner representation', perhaps) can motivate a human agent (causally or in any other way)⁸⁴ to regard it as the repository of its own meaning -- so that inferences can be drawn from ink marks on the page (or from 'images', 'ideas', and 'representations' in the head) to 'Super-Empirical Truths' about 'Reality', 'Being', or whatever -- would be to misconstrue the products of the social relations among human beings (i.e., words and meanings) as if they were their own autonomous semantic custodians that could act as creators, carriers and enforcers of their own meaning. In effect, that would be to anthropomorphise words, treating them as if they had their own history, social structure and mode of development. In this way, the social nature of language would reappear in an inverted form as an expression of the social life of words (etc.). Humanity would be atomised, linguistic signs (etc.) socialised!⁸⁵

Again, if that were so, and given the additional fact that meaning in language is an important cultural force that helps drive, and is driven in return by, human social development, Marx and Engels should perhaps have written the following:

What goes on in the external world would then be a projection of what goes on in each head. This is, once again, the RRT -- only now it has had life breathed into it!

In that case, M9, P4 and P5 can't be true in virtue of the meanings of any of their words -- for no meaning has yet been given to such an idiosyncratic use of language by human beings engaged in any form of material practice. They have no meaning and so can't contribute to the truth of such sentences.

If, however, an attempt were made to specify the meaning of words in a piecemeal fashion, a rule would be required.⁸⁶ But, to suppose that there is some sort of connection between a rule and 'reality' (determined, perhaps, by a 'physical, psychological, or neurological law') would be no help, either. If a rule were to depend on such a connection, it would become an empirical proposition, and cease to be a rule.⁸⁷

Unfortunately, the vast majority of philosophers have so far overlooked, or have been selectively blind to, this seemingly insignificant point.⁸⁸

In an Essay like this it isn't possible to deal with every conceivable objection that has been raised, or is capable of being raised, against the ideas presented in this Essay (concerning the nature and sense of empirical propositions, the meaning of words, or the defective nature of Traditional Philosophy/Metaphysics). So, in what follows I have dealt with just a few of the most obvious objections, several of which have already been alluded to.

[Others are addressed in the many books and articles referenced throughout this Essay and Essay Thirteen Part Three. If any of my readers have an objection they feel hasn't been fully or satisfactorily addressed, or even considered, they should email me and if it is significant enough, or the answers given below are unsatisfactory, what they have to say will be given due consideration.]

Some readers might wonder about the status of what are often called patent empirical truths, such as "Water is wet", "Dogs have four legs" and "Fire burns". In such cases, truth and meaning seem to go hand-in-hand, so that, for example, knowing what the word "water" means is ipso facto to know it is wet (as a liquid), and anyone who didn't know that dogs have four legs would be deemed not to know what the word "dog" meant. These appear to connect meaning directly with some form of knowledge, contrary to much that has been argued in this Essay.

First: Nowhere has it been asserted that meaning isn't connected with "some form of knowledge". In fact, little (if anything) has been said in this Essay about the meaning of sentences, and not much more about the meaning of words. That topic has been relegated to Essay Thirteen Part Three (Sections (4) to (8)). What has been of central concern in this Essay is:

(a) The sense of empirical propositions, the conditions under which they are true and the conditions under which they are false;

(b) How this implies metaphysical 'propositions' turn out to be incoherent non-sense; and, as a result,

(c) The sense of empirical propositions has been divorced from all such epistemological considerations (for instance, here).

[As pointed out before: henceforth, in place of the phrase "empirical proposition(s)", I will just use "proposition(s)", since, as has been argued, other types of indicative sentence aren't proposing anything determinate (or at all), and as such are either metaphysical (and hence are incoherent non-sense) or they express rules. But readers should assume that when I use the word "proposition" (in the singular or the plural case) I mean "empirical proposition(s)" unless state otherwise.]

Second: The actual truth of the sort of propositions cited above (plainly) wasn't originally established by the simple expedient of inspecting the meaning of the words they contained, and nothing else. Their actual truth had to be determined at some point by some sort of confirmation or 'interface' with the facts -- or, in certain cases, it might have been the result of a stipulation of some sort (but, on that, see below). Of course, mundane truths like those cited above have now been, so to speak, "put in the archives" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein), which means no one in their right or left mind would think to question them. Nevertheless, their actual truth still depends on their being confirmable, or on their having been confirmed, at some point by reference to the way the world happens to be, not the sole result of linguistic or conceptual analysis, or even by the exclusive operation of thought. So, for example, a child won't learn that water is wet merely by inspecting the words or concepts involved; nor will they learn it by simply thinking about water. Again, at some point that child will have to experience the wetness of water and be taught to describe it using this word (or associated terms). That is, they will have to be told (verbally or in written form -- in a child's reading matter, for instance) that this is what "wet" (and any related terms) mean; that can, of course, take place directly or indirectly. Naturally, having learnt when to use this particular word a child might take on trust (or accept the word of those she trusts, or that of an expert or authority figure) that other liquids are wet, too. But, no one learns these patent truths solely as a result of contemplation, even if some might accept them on the basis of the testimony of parents, siblings, carers, friends, peers, teachers or experts. [Again, on that, see below.]

[On testimony, see Kusch (2002). For a different view, see Lackey (2008). See also Leonard (2021). Also compare this with Wittgenstein's remarks about The Standard Metre -- Wittgenstein (2009), p.29e, §40. Cf., also, Baker and Hacker (2005a), pp.189-99, Diamond (2001), Jacquette (2010), Malcolm (1995b), and Pollock (2004); a copy of the latter can be accessed here (this links to a PDF).]

As a result, other readers might now raise questions about the status of propositions that are unquestionably empirical, but which nonetheless express certainties of the sort that exercised, say, George Moore -- such as our 'knowledge' of our own names, the content of our memories, the fact that we (or the vast majority of us) have two hands, or that we all have/had biological parents (even if, in some cases, we might not know who they are), etc., etc. However, as is the case with the previous examples, the truth of none of these was ascertained by thought alone. [On this, see Wittgenstein (1974b). See also Michael Williams (1999), Moyal-Sharrock (2007), and Moyal-Sharrock (2013), pp.362-78.]

That isn't to suggest we can't infer from an already accepted truth, or set of truths, another empirical truth or truths. Indeed, scientists do this all the time. But, even here, if exceptional circumstances are ignored, no scientist would accept propositions like "Copper conducts electricity" as true, or even unquestionably true, until they had been confirmed in some way, at some point, by someone or some team of researchers, howsoever long ago that might have been.

[Nor is it to suggest that the acceptance of such unquestioned truths is as simple and straightforward as the above comments might appear to suggest. However, further consideration of this particular point will take us too far from the main concerns of this Essay and this sub-section. Anyone who wants to pursue this topic further should consult the references given above, and those listed throughout the rest of this Interlude, as well as those itemised my more detailed remarks in Essay Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three (link above). In addition, when considering such examples the reader should once again keep in mind the important distinction drawn earlier between truth conditions and truth-values. With that in mind, none of these examples (or others one could imagine) impact on what was said about the sense of an empirical proposition, which is connected with its truth-conditions. That sense can't depend on the truth of another proposition, or propositions, but its actual truth can, and often does. I will say much more about that in the 'Gradgrind' sub-section, below.]

Some might object that this can't be correct. For example, if a language-user didn't know that water was wet, we would be reluctant to credit them with understanding either of those words.

In response, it is worth directing the reader's attention to a distinction Wittgenstein drew between what he called criteria and symptoms. [This links to a PDF.] Because of that distinction, what might at first sight appear to be a proposition -- or, indeed, what had once been regarded as a proposition --, could assume a radically different role or logical status.

Symptoms are those facts which we regard as lending support to, or which tend to confirm the truth of an hypothesis or tentative statement (again, this has no bearing on the sense of a proposition), whereas a criterion supplies conclusive proof, or helps provide such proof, of its truth, Alternatively, it could also confirm the correct application or use of a given expression -- such as "water" and "wet" --, with or without the contribution of other relevant criteria. Criteria also help determine whether a given sentence or claim can even count as true, or whether an object has been, or can be, classified/described correctly.

Hence, ceteris paribus, a plane figure possessing three straight intersecting edges would be a criterion for something to count as a triangle (or for calling it one), whereas a pavement being wet would merely be a symptom that supported a claim, or which lent credence to the supposition, that it is now, or has recently been, raining in the vicinity.

[Naturally, that depends on how "wet" is itself understood. If it is taken to mean that a certain liquid contains water, then the above criterion would more closely resemble a colloquial tautology. It should go without saying, however, that the everyday meaning of "wet" must be distinguished from the scientific term, "wetting".]

On the other hand, wetness would now be one of the criteria that could/would be employed in order to decide if a certain liquid was water (but it wouldn't be the only criterion, of course). However, the absence of wetness on its own would provide conclusive proof that the liquid in question wasn't water (obviously assuming the substance in question hadn't frozen). So, for example, liquid Mercury doesn't feel wet to human skin, just cold, hence its liquidity wouldn't be enough to call it water. Having said that, other obvious properties of Mercury would clearly distinguish it from water well before it was allowed anywhere near unprotected skin to see if it was wet!

Furthermore, what had once been viewed as a symptom could later become a criterion. For example, the observation that acids turn certain substances red was once regarded by medieval dyers and painters as an interesting fact about acids. That quirk was originally interpreted as a symptom. Centuries later that peculiar fact about acids was employed by Robert Boyle as a way of detecting, or of deciding upon, the presence of an acid. It thus became a criterion, now universally used in connection with, for instance, Litmus Paper.

Of course, we employ other pH-Indicators these days, but that just means the criterion has now become more varied and complex. Nevertheless, the distinction itself still remains valid -- indeed, as Peter Hacker notes (but here using the terms "rule or norm of representation" in place of "criterion"):

"It is true that we can, in certain cases, transform an empirical proposition into a rule or norm of representation by resolving to hold it rigid.... It was an empirical discovery that acids are proton donors, but this proposition was transformed into a rule: a scientist no longer calls something 'an acid' unless it is a proton donor, and if it is a proton donor, then it is to be called 'an acid', even if it has no effect on litmus paper. The proposition that acids are proton donors...has been 'withdrawn from being checked by experience but now serves as a paradigm for judging experience'. [This is a quotation from Wittgenstein (1978), p.325 -- RL.] Though unassailable, so-called necessary truths are not immutable; we can, other things being equal, change them if we so please.... But if we change them, we also change the meanings of their constituent expressions...". [Hacker (1996), p.215. Link added. See also my comments about acids and bases in Essay Eight Part Three.]

None of this affects the ideas being aired in this Essay since criteria are also rules. That is, we appeal to various criteria (as rules) to decide if a substance is water or if another is an alkali, etc. Indeed, they collectively or severally (depending on circumstances) constitute a form/norm of representation. Each one is "So to speak an empirical proposition hardened into a rule." [Wittgenstein (1978), p.325.]

[I have said more about the distinction between rules and empirical propositions in Interlude Five. On this topic in general -- i.e., concerning criteria and symptoms -- see Glock (1996), pp.93-97. More details can be found in Albritton (1959), Canfield (1981), pp.31-148, Harrison (1979), pp.49-58, Harrison (1999), Hacker (1993a), pp.243-66, Hanfling (2002), pp.38-50, Loomis (2010), McDowell (1982), Wright (1993) and Hertzberg (2022) -- the latter of which corrects several errors committed by earlier interpreters of Wittgenstein.]

Hence, owning a book can be rather vague and surrounding details may be somewhat complicated, in which case M6 could be declared true under a wide range of conditions (i.e., the criteria used to decide in such cases might be both varied and complex, just as they could differ between cultures and across different eras in the history of a given culture -- or, indeed, between diverse social groups and communities). For example, at present in the UK (and all other 'advanced economies', it seems), Blair would be deemed to own the said book, if: (i) He bought it himself; (ii) It was bought for him as a present; (iii) It was a gift from the publisher, the author or someone else; (iv) He won it in a raffle, or some other competition; or (v) He inherited it; and so on. If at least one of (i)-(v) (etc.) were the case, Blair would be credited as the owner of the said book. How he came to own it -- providing it had been 'legally obtained' -- is clearly irrelevant in this respect.

[As should seem obvious owning a book isn't the same as having that book in one's possession, either permanently, intermittently, or temporarily. One can own a book while not have it in one's possession -- for example, if has been loaned, confiscated, lost, stolen or partially destroyed (etc.) --, and one can have a book in one's possession without owning it -- for instance, if it has been borrowed, stolen, found, planted, or if it is being held for safe-keeping (etc.). Of course, each of these options have now been complicated somewhat by the arrival of e-books.]

Let us now generalise this and suppose that there is, or might be, a set of situations/circumstances the obtaining of which allowed us to count (or which allowed some other group or culture to count) an individual as owning a given book (that is, if they and/or that culture actually possessed such a concept -- as noted above, these criteria can change over time and between cultures), say: S₁, S₂, S₃,..., S_n.

[Where S₁, S₂, S₃,..., S_n stand for situations or circumstances like those mentioned above and which relate to such sentences about Blair, in this instance. These alternatives could, of course, be expressed propositionally**, or left as verb or noun phrases -- but the latter will be held to be the case, or held not to be the case, if they are used in, or applied in relation to, indicative sentences like M6b or M6c, below.]

Hence, M6 would be true if at least one element of S were itself the case -- i.e., if some sentence, "W_i", expressing at least one element of S -- namely, S_i -- were true (it would be false otherwise, i.e., if there were no such S_i obtaining in this case), and where W_i in this instance is, say, M6b. So, if no element of S obtained, W_i would now be M6c. [But, see also here.]

Of course, this puts pressure on what might count as a "situation" (on that, see below), but any such complicating factors would only serve to lengthen the list, not eliminate it or make it irrelevant.

In that case, M6 and M6a would still be contradictories, since M6 would be true if at least one of S obtained, and M6a would be true if none did. [It is worth recalling that the quantifiers "At least one..." and "None..." are contradictory linguistic functors.]

It is also worth pointing out that sentences like M6b and M6c express rules, so none of the above remarks contradict what was said earlier -- i.e., that the sense of a proposition doesn't depend on the truth of any other. [Again, on this see White (1974).]

[**Incidentally, I have already considered cases where rules can be expressed propositionally, or, indeed, where that can be done with the use of indicative sentences in general. On vagueness, see also here.]

Despite this, the above considerations relate to establishing or ascertaining the truth-value of propositions like M6, not their truth conditions. They don't need to be established or ascertained; they are given directly by the proposition itself. [I will say more about that below.] Readers are once again advised to keep this distinction (i.e., between truth-values and truth-conditions) in mind as the Essay proceeds.]

It could be objected that M6 and M6a could both be false (in which case they couldn't be contradictories). That would happen if, for instance:

(a) The book in question had never been written and we were to assume no one else is, has, or ever will write a book with that title; or,

(b) Tony Blair had never existed, and it were assumed no one else is, has been, or ever will be called by that specific name.

But, if either (a) or (b) were the case, M6 and M6a would both lack a truth value, and on that basis they would cease to be propositions. Under such circumstances, it would be unclear what was being proposed or put forward for consideration, and, hence, this would cease to be a valid objection to the argument presented in this Essay.

On the other hand, if (a) were the case, then some theorists might consider M6 false and M6a true, on the basis that if there were no such book, Blair couldn't possibly own a copy if it -- but see my response to (vii), below. However, in such circumstances, we would say something like this: "This character 'Tony Blair' doesn't own a copy of 'The Algebra of Revolution' since no book with that title has ever been written or published." And if (b) were the case, we might respond as follows: "No one with that name has ever existed, as far as we know, so the said book can't be owned by a fictitious individual".

However, as will be argued in more detail below, M6 and M6a would still fail to be propositions.

Under such circumstances we would probably say something like this: "These two propositions can't be contradictories, or even propositions, until it had been shown that there has been someone called 'Tony Blair' and that there has also been a book written (and possibly published) with the said title."

[Why this also has no impact on what was said about the sense of a proposition will be explained below, too.]

Further consideration of this particular alternative would bring into focus the second objection -- which is that the claim that someone owns something is itself rather vague. For example, if it were unclear what (vi) The Algebra of Revolution is; or (vii) What owning something actually amounted to.

[Of course, there are other possibilities, but my answer will take care of them all.]

If (vii) were the case, then M6 and M6a would cease to be propositions, let alone empirical (since, as before, it would be unclear what was being proposed or put forward for consideration), which means those two sentences couldn't contradict each other -- except, perhaps, in a figurative or 'fictional sense'. However, just as soon as these ambiguities (and any others that have yet to be, or which could possibly be, suggested) had been cleared up (by whatever means), M6 and M6a would once again become contradictories. On the other hand, if they can't be cleared up (either in practice or in principle), then the concept of ownership might itself be thrown into question, which would mean that M6 and M6a would cease to be propositions, once more -- since, yet again, it would be unclear what was being proposed.

As should seem obvious, philosophy can't legislate on such matters or determine how a given society defines ownership, or even whether or not it should even possess such a concept.

In any such an eventuality (if there were no concept of ownership, or it was impossible to determined whether or not anything was actually owned -- for whatever reason), several new examples would need to be considered --, maybe these two:

If anyone wants to question whether these two are contradictories, I can only wish them "Good luck!". If there are any brave souls out there who want to pull on that thread, they should email me with their best shot.

Finally, if (vi) were the case, we would be back where we were a few paragraphs ago: M6 might be deemed false and M6a true (but my answer to Option (vii) could apply here, too).

It could now be argued that the above approach falls foul of the redundancy objection, which goes something like the following, in this instance:

M6 is true if at least one (i.e., some) of S obtain[s], but it is also true if one of S obtains along with any other unrelated truth, say, T₁.

S1: Blair's legal purchase of the book and its current appearance on one of his shelves.

As pointed out above, S1 could also be expressed in propositional form, as, say, P₁, which could be expressed this way:

P₁: Blair legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves.

That would make the approach adopted in this Essay far too generous, for M6 would now be true if:

S2: Blair legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves and Paris is the Capital of France.

This is (ridiculously and patently) mistaken. The above 'difficulty' might be a problem for logicians (something that can be left to them to sort out), but it certainly isn't a problem for ordinary language. It is difficult to imagine anyone in command on their senses accepting the truth of M6 on the basis that S2 is the case. So, no sensible attempt to verify M6 would involve an investigation into the status of Paris as the Capital of France (or, indeed, the content of any other irrelevant sentence).

[Of course, because T₁ has itself been expressed in propositional form we would be faced with an infinite regress here if some attempt were made to specify the situations that made it true -- that is, if any randomly-selected truth could also be tacked on to T₁, as well.]

It is important to note that, from the way the above approach has been expressed, it appears to be based on the nominalisation of indicative sentences. That can (supposedly) be seen from the fact that "Blair legally purchased the book and it is now sat on his shelves" has been turned into the compound noun/verb phrase "Blair's legal purchase of the said book and its current appearance on his shelves". This rather niggling detail will be tackled in Essay Ten Part Two. For present purposes all that needs to be said is that the following phrase: "Blair's legal purchase of the said book and its current appearance on his shelves" can also be expressed by an indicative sentence, namely "Blair legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves" -- i.e., P₁.

P₁: Blair legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves.

Such considerations might make this account look as if it were identical to the Redundancy and/or Deflationary Theory of Truth. It might, except I am not propounding any sort of theory, here, since my approach can't possibly cater for every conceivable eventuality. In that case, the approach adopted here is a defeasible Form of Representation. Moreover, the elucidatory rules I summarised above might prove to be unworkable in some cases. If that were so they would need to be revised. But that, in a nut shell, is part of 'the human condition'. Philosophy can't legislate here, either.

[What is meant by "defeasible" needs clarifying. The use of that term here isn't intended to be understood epistemologically, but pragmatically. A rule becomes defeasible if it no longer seems practical, useful or relevant. I will say much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two. It is also worth adding that this overall account has nothing to do with the CTT, either. That topic will also be tackled in Essay Ten Part Two.]

Others might complain that the terms "state of affairs" and "situation" have been left hopelessly vague. Unfortunately, that renders the explanation of "sense" itself vague, if not useless.

In answer it is sufficient to point out that states of affairs and 'situations' are given by the propositions themselves, and are not more, nor no less, vague that those propositions are themselves.

Of course, that leaves much that remains -- for instance, how can it be that "states of affairs and 'situations' are given by the propositions themselves"? First, not only does that look like a proposition itself (which clearly implies sense does depend on the truth of at least one other proposition, namely this one, contrary to the entire case presented above), but second, it seems to attribute certain 'powers' to an abstraction (i.e., the proposition itself)!

The second problem (if such it may be called) will be tackled in the next sub-section. The first is easy to dismiss: since the compound clause -- "states of affairs and 'situations' are given by the propositions themselves" -- is itself the expression of an elucidatory rule, it isn't a proposition to begin with. Readers are therefore referred back to what was said earlier about such rules. So, the core argument presented here (that the sense of a proposition doesn't depend on the truth of another proposition) still stands.

Thomas Gradgrind is a character from Charles Dickens's novel Hard Times. He was also a Head Teacher [School Principal], famous among other things for this speech about facts:

"'Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, sir!'

"The scene was a plain, bare, monotonous vault of a school-room, and the speaker's square forefinger emphasised his observations by underscoring every sentence with a line on the school-master's sleeve. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's square wall of a forehead, which had his eyebrows for its base. while his eyes found commodious cellarage in two dark caves, overshadowed by the wall. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's mouth, which was wide, thin, and hard set. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's voice, which was inflexible, dry, and dictatorial. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's hair, which bristled on the skirts of his bald head, a plantation of firs to keep the wind from its shining surface, all covered with knobs, like the crust of a plum-pie, as if the head had scarcely warehouse-room for the hard facts stored inside. The speaker's obstinate carriage, square coat, square legs, square shoulders, -- nay, his very neckcloth, trained to take him by the throat with an unaccommodating grasp, like a stubborn fact, as it was, -- all helped the emphasis. 'In this life, we want nothing but Facts, sir; nothing but Facts!' The speaker, and the school-master, and the third grown person present, all backed a little, and swept with their eyes the inclined plane of little vessels then and there arranged in order, ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them until them were full to the brim.

"Thomas Gradgrind, sir. A man of realities. A man of facts and calculations. A man who proceeds upon the principle that two and two are four, and nothing over, and who is not to be talked into allowing for anything over. Thomas Gradgrind, sir -- peremptorily Thomas -- Thomas Gradgrind. With a rule and a pair of scales, and the multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh and measure any parcel of human nature, and tell you exactly what it comes to. It is a mere question of figures, a case of simple arithmetic. You might hope to get some other nonsensical belief into the head of George Gradgrind, or Augustus Gradgrind, or John Gradgrind, or Joseph Gradgrind (all supposititious, nonexistent persons), but into the head of Thomas Gradgrind -- no, sir! In such terms, Mr. Gradgrind always mentally introduced himself, whether to his private circle of acquaintance, or to the public in general. In such terms, no doubt, substituting the words 'boys and girls' for 'sir,' Thomas Gradgrind now presented Thomas Gradgrind to the little pitchers before him, who were to be filled so full of facts. Indeed, as he eagerly sparkled at them from the cellarage before mentioned, he seemed a kind of cannon loaded to the muzzle with facts, and prepared to blow them clean out of the regions of childhood at one discharge. He seemed a galvanising apparatus, too, charged with a grim mechanical substitute for the tender young imaginations that were to be stormed away." [Hard Times, quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

That passage, alongside questions about the relationship between facts and sense, re-focuses attention on two objections that were (briefly) aired earlier:

Y1: It could objected that the above material simply ignores the fact that students have to learn countless facts -- such as "Aluminium is a metal", "Fructose is a sugar", "Force equals mass times acceleration", etc., etc. -- if they are to make any progress in science (and other areas of knowledge).

Y2: Some of my readers might now wonder how it is possible for the above comments to be harmonised with earlier claims that the sense of a proposition can't depend on a set of truths when they suggest language users must be in possession of, or be aware of, a set of truths (like who Tony Blair is, that The Algebra of Revolution is a book and that it is something capable of being owned). Those concessions certainly seem to imply that the sense of M6 does depend on such truths.

Y1-type objections were dealt with in a previous sub-section as well as Essay Three Part Two. [They will be tacked again from a different angle in Essay Twelve Part Seven, part of which material has already been published.]

Concerning Y2-type objections, and what facts might need to be known in order to understand a given proposition, or for it to have a sense (at least according to the import of Y2), a few preliminary remarks are in order:

(1) What must or must not be known is an epistemological question and has nothing to do with the sense of a proposition, which is a logical condition. Without doubt, understanding a given proposition is connected with what a speaker might or might not already know, but once again, that has nothing to with the actual sense of the proposition at issue. Hence, whether or not the sense of a proposition is grasped by a given speaker has no effect on that sense, which is the 'common currency' that enables intercommunication.

(2) The sense of a proposition is set by the conditions under which it is true and the conditions under which it is false, otherwise known as its truth-conditions. The latter are independent of whether or not anyone knows if a given proposition is true or whether or not they know it is false (the latter of which are otherwise known as truth-values). Sense is also independent of whether or not anyone ever finds out which of those truth-values obtains, or even cares to find out. What an individual knows is independent of what would make a proposition true or would make it false. If that weren't the case, the sense of a proposition would depend on the individual knowledge of each speaker, which would in turn mean that sense would vary between speakers. As should seem clear, that would make communication impossible.

[An analogy with money might make this point even clearer: If, per impossible, the value of the notes in an individual's wallet depended on that individual, not on factors independent of her/him, the money-based economy in which they attempted to buy or sell would collapse.]

(3) A proposition's truth conditions can be read-off from the proposition itself since they are logical, not physical or epistemological properties of propositions. Nor are they epistemological, neurological or psychological properties/states of a given speaker. [How and why these are the case will be explained below.]

The above considerations naturally lead to questions about the nature of propositions, since it would seem that if we are capable of clearly specifying what sense amounts to, we must first of all understand what a proposition is supposed to be. In fact, it looks like such clarity will provide a more comprehensive answer to Y2-type 'problems' (along with any residual puzzles generated by remarks (1)-(3) above). For instance, it might well be wondered how it is possible to divorce epistemological, psychological and physical factors -- in the above seemingly cavalier fashion -- while attempting to deal with a medium (language) invented by human beings? How can the sense of a proposition be divorced from physical, epistemological, neurological or psychological considerations, when those factors are hardly unconnected with their formation of language to begin with? Furthermore, if sense can be divorced in this way, how would it be possible for human beings to use (or understand) a single proposition -- let alone for humans to have invented such indicative sentences? How is it possible for truth conditions to be "read-off" from a given proposition?

The above are among the more problematic and challenging questions Analytic Philosophers have been grappling with for over a century. Once again: since this isn't meant to be a PhD thesis, nor a monograph on the nature of propositions, the answers I am about to give will have to be brief. Reference to academic works that expand on or develop these answers will also be listed for those who want to follow up on this topic.

[This caveat is also worth repeating: whether or not the following explanations are correct has no bearing on the case against DM developed at this site.]

It might be felt that the arguments advanced in this Essay (and at this site) concerning conceptual change and the nature of language itself depend on an analysis of only one language -- English -- but, more specifically, modern English. That represents a very narrow view of language in general, which means the conclusions reached are highly parochial, at best, completely misleading, at worst.

In response, conceptual change has already been dealt with in Essay Four Part One (here, here, and here); in addition, the allegedly parochial nature of the arguments presented at this site was (partially) dealt with in Interlude Six. Finally, issues connected with the historic development of language were dealt with in Essay Five, Essay Eight Part Three, and Essay Thirteen Part Three.

Others might wonder what exactly constitutes the correct use of certain terms and whether misuse can alter meaning in the way suggested.

[The connection between use and meaning has already been explored; readers are directed back to Interlude Seven for more details.]

If rules for the use of ordinary words help constitute their meaning, it would follow that a misuse of language (by breaking, distorting or ignoring those rules) must either: (a) Vacate them of meaning or, (b) Endow them with a different meaning (indeed, as Glock and others quoted earlier pointed out). Plainly, with respect to Option (a), that would render a sentence containing any such word incapable of having a sense (i.e., incapable of being empirically true or empirically false), as opposed to it not having a sense simply as a matter of fact.

Admittedly, it isn't possible to specify the precise boundaries between these distinctions (which fact should be no big surprise -- language is a human invention not the creation of an Intergalactic Super-Computer). That is partly because, when engaged in ordinary discourse, speakers don't usually utter what they and others take to be factual sentences that are also incapable of having a sense -- even though they might sometimes utter those that contingently lack a sense. [Slips of the tongue, Spoonerisms and Malapropisms come to mind, here -- as do statements that are overtly religious or mystical.]

As far as a given speaker is concerned, a supposedly empirical sentence that as a matter of fact failed to express a sense would, for instance, be one that used terms that contingently lacked a denotation which would thereby contingently be incapable of being understood. For example:

Now, the name "Woodruff Durfendorfer" might not cause too many problems for those who take it to be the name of, or a name for, a man (even if they don't know who this supposed character is), but D1 would seem to lack a truth-value in the opinion of a given speaker -- call her "NN" -- until the denotation of "The Happy Sailor" had been established. As soon as that had been settled (e.g., that "The Happy Sailor" is the name of a boat, a pub, or a book...) NN would now be able to understand D1. That knowledge would allow NN to grasp D1's sense. Having said that, it is important to distinguish between NN knowing a sentence has a sense (and hence that it is a proposition) and that sentence actually having a sense independent of NN knowing what its sense is. That is because, as has been pointed out several times, sense is independent of epistemological, neurological and psychological factors. So, a sentence like D1 can have a sense independent of NN, or anyone else, knowing what that sense is.

As should seem obvious, D1's sense is this: D1 would be true if someone known as Woodruff Durfendorfer bought something called The Happy Sailor.

[I will say much more about how this works out when an earlier sub-section has been completed.]

The distinction between a name for and a name of a man/woman also needs explaining.

[In what follows, to save me having to keep saying this, when I use the word "name" in this specific context, what I mean is "Proper Name", unless otherwise stated. In addition, when I use the terms "name of, or name for, a man/woman" I also include "name of, or name for, a female human".]

Clearly, there are certain names that we automatically take to be names for human beings (which will, naturally, vary between cultures and eras), and there are names we instantly recognize can't function in this way. Concentrating on given names first: "Fido" can't be a name for a man/woman (plainly, in English-speaking countries, it is typically a name for a dog), nor can "Tiddles" (which is typically a name for a cat), whereas, "Peter" or "Susan" are the sort of given names we use for human beings. But, a name could be a name for a man/woman while not in fact being used to name any particular individual. So, "Jesus Christ" is the name for a man, but it is a pretty safe bet no one is (now) actually called by that name (saving perhaps a few 'mentally-challenged' individuals, sociopaths and/or religious con artists and grifters); the same is the case with "Adolf Hitler", "Heinrich Himmler", "Pol Pot", or even "Joseph Stalin" (although it is possible that certain Nazis and/or Stalinophiles might change their names to "Adolf Hitler" or "Joseph Stalin", respectively, or name their children after either, for reasons we should pass over in silence). So, if I am right (and excepting the extreme cases mentioned), the last five names aren't currently the names of anyone. But, even if I am wrong, we can certainly think of situations in which no one would, at that time, actually be called by those names or, indeed, by other names one could imagine, which is all we need for this distinction to hold in present circumstances. For instance, it is a safe bet that no one at present is called "Vlad the Impaler" (even though that was perhaps also a title).

[I am, of course, ignoring here the use of pseudonyms found on the Internet or used in role-playing and acting, for example, just as I am ignoring nicknames and names that appear in novels.]

So, a name of a man/woman is a name that is actually used or has been used to name someone, whereas a name for a man/woman is a name that could be use to name an individual (in a certain culture at a certain times), even if it isn't currently being so used. Similarly, we have names for, and names of, rivers, mountains, horses, cars, ships, planets, stars, wars, theorems, and oceans, to mention just a few. Hence, except as a joke, no one would take "E-type Jaguar", the name of a classic sports car, for instance, to be the name of, or the name for, a man or woman, or the name of, or the name for, a mountain (for instance). Not even pop stars would use "E-type Jaguar" as the name of one of their offspring. It is clearly the name for a car, not a human being, a mountain or a river. Same, mutatis mutandis, with "Dogger Bank", "Sargasso Sea" and "Atacama Desert".

A similar distinction will apply to names of and names for, certain objects or processes. Hence, "E-type Jaguar" is a name of a car, but not a name for a river; "Haber Process" is the name of the industrial method for manufacturing Ammonia not the name for a Symphony or disease.

Finally, it should be clear that all names of are names for, while not all names for are names of.

Sentences that are incapable of possessing a sense and are thereby incapable of being understood --, or which are just flatly incoherent --, would, for instance:

(i) Contain terms whose employment violated certain syntactic rules (like those we saw in Essay Three Part One, here, here, and here); or,

(ii) Contravene other, more general, combinatory logico-grammatical conventions.

[Here the word "grammatical" is being used both with its Wittgensteinian and its usual meaning. I will leave that comment rather vague for now, but I will present one example that might make the point a little clearer: Instead of writing "Leaping Lena won the 2:30 at Belmont", someone wrote "Belmont won the 2:30 at Leaping Lena" (and by "Belmont" they meant the race track). Plainly, the first of these makes sense, the second doesn't. I have also given another, perhaps more apposite, example below, W1.]

(iii) Represent the linguistic expression of a rule that has been misconstrued as an empirical proposition -- P4 being a prime example.

Again, not much can be done with W1. The same is true of M1a (which falls foul of Option (iii)), but it takes a little more prodding before its bogus status becomes obvious.

Of course, as a matter of fact, words may be employed in any way we please (but at the (possible) cost of failing to make ourselves understood, or of being easily misunderstood). Nevertheless, we aren't free to make what we please of the words we already have without creating confusion (unless, of course, such words are carefully re-defined, or their new meaning is clearly explained) -- not without altering their meaning. For example, although this is highly unlikely, the word "identical" (in W1) might one day come to mean what we now mean by "dead". [That is, of course, just a variation of the trivial case we met earlier.] No one would count it a significant discovery about the 'real meaning' of "identical" if it came to mean what we now mean by "dead". In such an eventuality W1 would begin to make sense.

Even so, as is relatively easy to confirm: confusions occur when speakers try to use the vernacular in any way they like -- a fact about life that should be as obvious as it is familiar to most competent speakers, anyway. Trivial cases aside (e.g., coded messages, jokes, the making of grammatical/linguistic points (as here), trolling on the Internet, entertainment, or as part of imaginative or innovative literature and poetry, etc., etc.), any such 'experimental' individuals would soon fail to understand even their own words, to say nothing of the puzzlement, confusion or consternation they would induce in their listeners/audience. [Naturally, there are exceptions to such sweeping statements, plainly since 'experimental linguists' might compile dictionaries in order to keep track of their 'innovations'. I will say a little more about that below.]

Again, W1 is a good example. There, "identical" can't mean what we ordinarily take it to mean (since it is part of a compound, transitive verb phrase, which takes an object). On the other hand, if it is still 'meant' to be understood with its usual meaning, no sense could be made of it. [Any who think differently are invited to contact me with their best shot!]

(b) They might be incapable of having a sense (given the language we now have), and thus be deemed incoherent as a result.

In the latter eventuality (i.e., Option (b)), for example, if a novel application a word actually violated rules we already have for the formation and use of propositions (outlined at the beginning of this Essay), then, if it were still intended to be read empirically (i.e., stating some fact or other), any sentence in which that word occurred would become incoherently non-sensical. That is, it would be incapable of being given a sense, given the meaning that words like "empirical" and "fact" already have.

Metaphysical and DM-propositions fall into the latter category. That can be seen from the discussion of the bogus nature of M1a found throughout this Essay -- as well as in connection with other DM-theories analysed elsewhere at this site. For instance, we witnessed the hopeless mess Engels got himself into when he failed to consider the obvious questions he should have asked about Zeno and Hegel's 'analysis' of motion, and just as we saw a similar fate befall Trotsky and his comments about the LOI.

[Anyone who takes exception to the use of the word "empirical" can substitute for it "fact-stating" or "factual"; not much will change. (On that, see Essay Three Part Four, when it is published.) Anyway, Marx and Engels employed "empirical" many times, and in the way if has been used here.]

Naturally, there is nothing to prevent language users from discovering or inventing new ways of forming sentences (etc.), or even expressing themselves, but novel developments like these will typically be socially-, not individually-, motivated. [That assertion is, of course, controversial, and has been addressed more fully in Essay Thirteen Part Three -- for example, here and here.]

However, should the connection that now exists between an empirical proposition and its negation be modified, the meaning of the word "empirical" (or even that of "negation") can't fail to be affected. But that would be confined to this novel context. The wider use of such 'modified' words won't be affected. Compare that with how certain words have recently changed without affecting their wider currency. So, think of words like "sick" (which, for many, now means that "cool" meant up to fifty or sixty years ago), "woke", or "text". Their (more narrow, slang of colloquial) use has changed radically over the last thirty years, while their wider (more normal) use hasn't. Hence, if someone were sick and in hospital no one would automatically think that that meant they were cool in hospital. At worst any such 'affected' words will simply become ambiguous or even obscure, and will need to be distinguished from the current use of what might appear to be typographically the same term, even if only for clarity's sake. Think of how US Republicans are now regularly misconstruing word with the letters "trans" in them! and how words like "migrant" and "refugee" are regularly mixed-up, especially by the right-wing media, as I pointed out in Essay Eight Part Three:

Even the soft left, reformist UK paper, The Daily Mirror, knows the importance of using the right words (in this case in an article about the political difference between using the terms "migrant" and "refugee"):

"Using the right words for the right things is very important. It's how we manage to communicate across languages and borders, via keyboards and tweets and picture captions. Using the wrong words means you stop communicating -- it means that at best you begin to mislead, and at worst you lie. For example, Newton's law of gravity states that the force of attraction between two bodies is directly proportional to the products of their mass. In other words, apples fall downwards because the earth is bigger than an apple. Imagine if just one of those words meant the opposite of what we think it does. We couldn't send a lander to Mars because we wouldn't know where it was, jet engines would make no sense so there'd be no package holidays, and we'd all think dancing on the ceiling like Lionel Richie was an option. If you don't get the words right, you get everything else wrong." [The Daily Mirror, 02/09/2015. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphases and link added.]

In that eventuality -- i.e., where language users discover or invent new ways of forming sentences (etc.), or they even develop novel ways of expressing themselves --, we might have to invent new words to serve in place of the old way of speaking and writing, so that we would then be able to say what we used to be able to say using such terms with their older meanings/rhetorical-force still attached, before they had been 'affected'. A recent example of just such a change concerns the use of "refute", which now seems to mean the same as "reject" or "repudiate". Anyone now using "refute" (with its old meaning) will very likely be misunderstood. We either have to accept the fact that "refute" now has two different meanings or we have to paraphrase words to make ourselves understood (in this case with "refute", paraphrased as "prove by the use of counter-argument or disconfirming evidence that what someone has said or written is incorrect or false"). Another, less serious change, is the recent confusion one finds on the Internet whereby younger users tend confuse "then" with "than". [That might, of course, be a spin-off from texting, just as much as it might be the result of homophony.] In relation to this, even the 'prestigious', right-wing UK newspaper (ironically "conservative", with both a capital and a small "c") has succumbed to this trend. Writing about the 3-0 defeat inflicted on Manchester United by their arch rivals, Manchester City, back in March 2014, one of their chief sports writers had this to say:

"There was a barbed observation from one Manchester United supporter at half-time suggesting that the only reason referee Michael Oliver spared Marouane Fellaini a red card for elbowing Pablo Zabaleta was that keeping him on the pitch was actually more advantageous to Manchester City then [sic] sending him off." [Mark Ogden, quoted from here; accessed 27/03/2014.]

Another example is the almost ubiquitous use of "of" in place of "have" -- as in: "He should of..." instead of "He should have...". Yet another, is the very widespread misuse of "nothing" -- as in "I ain't done nothing", or "I don't know nothing about nobody" (a line I heard delivered on a US TV cop show a few years back).

[On this, and other similar quirks, see Fry and Kirton (2012). On linguistic innovation, see Deutscher (2006).]

But, linguistic change like this is trivial: it amounts to little more than terminological novelty, or it is just another case of plain, good old fashioned confusion.

This isn't to deny that it is possible for individuals to innovate linguistically, just that, as social beings, we may do so only because of the linguistic and social space that already exists for us even to attempt to do so. Social media and the Internet have only increased the rate at which this is taking place (with "clicktivism", "haterade" and "otherize" among many of the new words recently added to the latest edition of the Oxford English Dictionary). If and when users innovate -- but their innovations fail to 'catch on' -- any new words, or uses of words, they might have introduced will, at best, become part of their own Idiolect. For instance, back in 2005, when the UK-press was working itself up into a lather over the re-election of Oona King, I coined the term "Oonanism" on a discussion board to capture the state of self-induced ecstasy they and the 'respectable left' seemed to be experiencing in connection with this MP (especially in relation to her boot licking, pro-Imperialist speech about the invasion of Iraq -- a speech replete with what were soon to be exposed as 'lies and disinformation' -- but who was subsequently rewarded for her efforts in that regard by being made a Baroness, in January 2011). Needless to say, it didn't catch on. [Although, a Google search will show that this word has been used many times since; but one suspects it has simply been confused with "Onanism".]

Other terms that do appear to have caught on (again, largely because of the Internet and social media) are the following: "Affluenza", "Brocialist", "Bromance", "Chillax", "Mansplain", "Selfie", "Screenager", "Twitterati", "Intersectionality", "Blogosphere", "blog", "vlog", and "Bling", etc., etc. A recent one is "Scamnesia" coined in early 2026 by US comedian, Jimmy Kimmel, over Trump's -- er..., shall we say -- 'less than consistent memory'. [Although, Kimmel (or his writers) regularly invents new words for comic effect, some of which 'catch on'.] And, of course, many words have changed their meaning, or have become new words themselves in the above manner -- "sick" again comes to mind. [On this, see, for example, here.] Recent developments in connection with trans rights have only added to this trend, and, ever since Watergate, nearly every scandal (big, small or imagined) has had a "gate" suffix attached to it.

Nevertheless, back in the first century BC, no one would have been able to innovate using words like "cell phone", "television" or "DVD player". There was no space in the language for such words since the technology didn't exist. [Both of which factors are social in nature, to state the obvious!] That explains why, if we found an ancient inscription that mentioned Plato's DVD collection or Archimedes's cell phone bill, we would either dismiss them as forgeries, fail to make sense of them, or, if a large enough number of such awkward facts turned up, we might begin to reconsider some of our fundamental beliefs about the past -- or perhaps even our collective sanity!

A similar conceptual revolution was initiated in Palaeontology, Earth Science and Biology when enough fossils (and other assorted anomalies) turned up or were discovered a couple of centuries ago. Scientists and assorted opinion-formers had to revise more than a few fundamental ideas about the Earth, the Bible and science itself. [On this see, Bowler (2003), Gillispie (1996), Greene (1996), Laudan (1990), and Rudwick (1985, 2007, 2010).] Something even more significant happened when scientists slowly abandoned the old Ptolemaic System and adopted expanded or modified versions of Copernicanism. [On that, see Koyré (1957) and Kuhn (1957).]

Over time some words have been emptied of meaning (the technical term for this is that they have been "bleached"), others have taken on a new meaning, but they have done so in a way that makes it unclear what their users mean by them (the technical term here is that they have been "skunked"). Nevertheless, this can still only happen socially, not individualistically, or in an occasion-sensitive manner. If intention and occasion of use determined meaning, no word could lose its meaning, and any word could mean anything. So, you, dear reader, could mean whatever you liked or found useful by the word "matter" if you intended it to mean what we now mean by "mind". Anyone who accepted occasional theories of meaning would have no effective response.

"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.'

"'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'

"Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. 'They've a temper, some of them -- particularly verbs: they're the proudest -- adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs -- however, I can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That's what I say!'

"'Now you talk like a reasonable child,' said Humpty Dumpty, looking very much pleased. 'I meant by "impenetrability" that we've had enough of that subject, and it would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't mean to stop here all the rest of your life.'

"'When I make a word do a lot of work like that,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'I always pay it extra.'

"'Ah, you should see 'em come round me of a Saturday night,' Humpty Dumpty went on, wagging his head gravely from side to side, 'for to get their wages, you know.'

"(Alice didn't venture to ask what he paid them with; so you see I can't tell you.)

"'You seem very clever at explaining words, Sir' said Alice. 'Would you kindly tell me the meaning of the poem called "Jabberwocky"?'

"'Let's hear it,' said Humpty Dumpty. 'I can explain all the poems that ever were invented just yet.'

"'That's enough to begin with,' Humpty Dumpty interrupted: 'there are plenty of hard words there. "Brillig" means four o'clock in the afternoon -- the time when you begin broiling things for dinner.'

"'Well, "slithy" means "lithe and slimy." "Lithe" is the same as "active." You see it's like a portmanteau -- there are two meanings packed up into one word.'

"'Well, "toves" are something like badgers -- they're something like lizards -- and they're something like corkscrews.'

"'They are that,' said Humpty Dumpty: 'also they make their nests under sundials -- also they live on cheese.'

"'To "gyre" is to go round and round like a gyroscope. To "gimble" is to make holes like a gimlet.'

"'And "the wabe" is the grass-plot round a sundial, I suppose?' said Alice, surprised at her own ingenuity.

"'Of course it is. It's called "wabe," you know, because it goes a long way before it, and a long way behind it-----'

"'Exactly so. Well then, "mimsy" is "flimsy and miserable" (there's another portmanteau for you). And a "borogove" is a thin shabby-looking bird with its feathers sticking out all around -- something like a live mop.'

"'And then "mome raths"?' said Alice. 'I'm afraid I'm giving you a great deal of trouble.'

"'Well, a "rath" is a sort of green pig: but "mome" I'm not certain about. I think it's short for "from home" -- meaning that they'd lost their way, you know.'

"'Well, "outgrabing" is something between bellowing and whistling, with a kind of sneeze in the middle; however you'll hear it done, maybe -- down in the wood yonder -- and, when you've once heard it, you'll be quite content. Who's been repeating all that hard stuff to you?'

If only Dialectical Marxists were as 'clear' as Humpty Dumpty at explaining the obscure terms in their 'theory'!

On this in general, see the following video which, among other things, shows how semantic slides and developments like these arise socially not individualistically:

When this sub-section has finally been completed, among other things, it will present a rough-and-ready classification of the sort of misuses of words of interest and relevance to the aims of this Essay and this site. Logical Fallacies will be ignored, not because they aren't important, but because several have already be covered in this and other Essays and because this isn't meant to be a Logic tutorial. In addition, the misuse of sentences will also largely be ignored -- mainly because many of them are a direct result of the types of misuse listed below.

There are several (overlapping) types of misuse of words/language, among which are the following: (i) Logical and Grammatical; (ii) Factual; (iii) Pragmatic; (iv) Confused; and (v) Philosophical/Distorted.

I will illustrate each type with examples, but in view of the aims of this site, I will then focus mainly on Type (i) and Type (v).

[This list and this typography isn't, nor is it meant to be, exhaustive. Compiling this I have ignored unintentional errors and inadvertent slips, such as spelling mistakes, typos, omissions, misplacements, inversions, translation and transcription mishaps, etc., etc. ]

As pointed out at the beginning of this Interlude, I haven't dealt with every conceivable possibility or objection, but, once more, this isn't meant to be an academic exercise, or a PhD thesis in the Philosophy of Language. A definitive treatment of just this one topic (i.e., the content of this Interlude!) would require several books devoted to it -- or, indeed, as hinted, an entire PhD thesis.

However, if anyone reading this has an objection they would like me to consider, or think my explanations above are far from clear, email me.

[On occasion-sensitivity, see Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4)-(6).]

The "below the surface" metaphor is often used to motivate (or even justify and enable) the search for all those 'underlying essences' and 'secrets of nature'. This figure of speech even crops up in contemporary popularisations of science; here, for instance, is theoretical physicist, Brian Greene, in the Preface to his book, The Hidden Reality:

"If there was any doubt at the turn of the twentieth century, by the turn of the twenty-first, it was a foregone conclusion: when it comes to revealing the true nature of reality, common experience is deceptive. On reflection, that's not particularly surprising. As our forebears gathered in forests and hunted on the savannas, an ability to calculate the quantum behaviour of electrons or determine the cosmological implications of black holes would have provided little in the way of survival advantage. But an edge was surely offered by having a larger brain, and as our intellectual faculties grew, so, too, did our capacity to probe our surroundings more deeply. Some of our species built equipment to extend the reach of our senses; others became facile with a systematic method for detecting and expressing pattern -- mathematics. With these tools, we began to peer behind everyday appearances. In writing The Hidden Reality, I've presumed no expertise in physics or mathematics on the part of the reader. Instead, as in my previous books, I've used metaphor and analogy, interspersed with historical episodes, to give a broadly accessible account of some of the strangest and, should they prove correct, most revealing insights of modern physics. Many of the concepts covered require the reader to abandon comfortable modes of thought and to embrace unanticipated realms of reality. It's a journey that's all the more exciting, and understandable, for the scientific twists and turns that have blazed the trail. I've judiciously chosen from these to fill out a landscape of ideas that peak by valley stretches from the everyday to the wholly unfamiliar." [Greene (2011), Preface. (This links to a PDF.) Spelling modified to agree with UK English; bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]

It might have escaped the good Professor's notice, but if we can't trust appearances, we certainly can't trust the instruments, the measurements or the observations upon which physicists themselves rely, or the mathematics they use, which has been committed to paper, written on blackboards and screens --, and neither can they. As I pointed out in Essay Three Part Two:

Scientists have to rely on their activity in this world -- the world of 'appearances' -- to test, refine, confirm and share their hypotheses or improve/revise their theories. No matter how sophisticated, technical or "elegant" a given hypothesis/theory happens to be, at some point researchers will have to interface with the ordinary world in order to confirm, refute, refine, test or modify it. In which case, scientists have to do one or more (but in some instances, possibly even most) of the following: read dials, instruments and meters, carefully mix substances, perform measurements, record and check data, design, handle or calibrate apparatus, conduct surveys, look down microscopes, telescopes or other optical devices, collect samples, write code or programme a computer, consult a computer screen, construct (physical or 'virtual') models, research the relevant literature, communicate with colleagues, compose reports, formulate and use equations, attend conferences and seminars, publish papers, articles and books, etc., etc. These have to be carried out if a theory is to become anything other than speculative, tentative or remain merely hypothetical, let alone accepted as established fact or as valid by the profession as a whole. Clearly, every single one of these activities and performances takes place in the ordinary phenomenal world and has to be carried out by ordinary, albeit highly qualified and expertly trained, individuals/teams.

All such socially-conditioned, communally-sanctioned and professionally-mandated practices take place in this world, the world of phenomena, and it is what enables the intelligent and efficient prosecution of scientific research, and with that the advancement of knowledge (albeit seriously diverted, distorted, hampered and mis-used by competing capitalist priorities and interests). In addition, the vernacular not only enables the education and socialisation of aspiring scientists, it underpins the skills necessary for the comprehension and performance of all standardised laboratory-, field- and research-techniques, as well as the design of surveys, questionnaires, experiments, excavations and expeditions, etc., etc. This overall background even lies behind the writing of every summa vitae (résumé), job reference, employment application, research post, transfer- and grant-request. Even the most technical of papers has to conform to grammatical rules or fail; to be understood/risk being misunderstood. [With a few modifications, the same protocols will still apply in a socialist/communist society.] While on the one hand mundane aspects of our material and social existence (like these) also facilitate successful inter-communication between scientists, on the other they provide a readily available and fertile source of the metaphors, analogies, figures of speech and models that breathe life into the vast majority of scientific hypotheses, theories, reports and papers.

Every single one of the above procedures and routines is constrained and regulated by the same conventions and protocols that govern everyday behaviour, speech and reasoning, which are in turn mediated by familiar, mundane physical skills and practices, all of which are once again materially-, socially-, and historically-conditioned.

In which case, scientists can't afford to risk undermining the constraints imposed on them by the phenomenal, natural or social world, just as they can't afford to depreciate ordinary language and everyday practice for fear that by sawing away at the branch upon which they are all collectively sat, they risk their own catastrophic fall....

Hence, any (fundamental) attack on 'common sense' is also an attack of the foundations of science itself....

If phenomena are untrustworthy, then any phenomenal statement of that 'fact' must be unreliable, too.

Hence, it should come as no great surprise to discover this metaphor is as misleading as anything we have seen so far in Traditional Thought.

Hence, no one supposes (it is to be hoped!) that if we scratched away at the 'surface' of an object, we would eventually be able to locate its "essence", which should at least be capable of being 'observed' or detected, 'contemplated'/'imaged'/'cognised' by 'consciousness', in some shape or form. In fact, the 'Below the Surface' metaphor appears to suggest that if we had senses that were vastly superior to those we now possess, we would 'somehow' be able to see or even sense (with or without the aid of instruments or even a 'third eye') the 'abstractions'/'essences' Traditional Thinkers claim exist ('somewhere'...). But, as Leibniz pointed out, even if we were shrunk down to the size of atoms and were inserted into someone's head, we would still be unable to see, or sense, 'thoughts', or the 'formal properties' of bodies, nor yet the 'necessities' metaphysicians assure us are 'really there', but which are forever mocking our feeble attempts to perceive, detect, or even imagine them. After all, what would or could an 'abstract' cat, dog or galaxy look like, even in 'the mind's eye'? Would any of us recognise an 'essence' even if we tripped over one? Has a single supporter of 'abstractionism' even described in the vaguest terms what one of these 'abstractions' looks like? What shape it has? Or where it exists, except to point airily in the general direction of 'Platonic Heaven', 'God's Mind' or their own 'consciousness'?

[Once again, I have covered this in extensive detail in Essay Three Part Two, Sections (2)-(6).]

Maybe the above remarks are too crude and are no way to interpret this metaphor. But if so, in what way are we supposed to cognise an 'abstraction'/'essence'? No good asking DM-fans, they generally respond to such requests something like this.

So, what does the 'Below the Surface' metaphor actually mean? After 2400 years, it is still far from clear.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

However, in response, if and when they deign to reply, DM-theorists sometimes refer critics to the following passage (taken from Volume Three of Das Kapital), which seems to appeal indirectly to the 'Below the Surface' metaphor:

"Vulgar economy actually does no more than interpret, systematise and defend in doctrinaire fashion the conceptions of the agents of bourgeois production who are entrapped in bourgeois production relations. It should not astonish us, then, that vulgar economy feels particularly at home in the estranged outward appearances of economic relations in which these prima facie absurd and perfect contradictions appear and that these relations seem the more self-evident the more their internal relationships are concealed from it, although they are understandable to the popular mind. But all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided." [Marx (1981), p.956); Marx and Engels (1998), p.804. Bold emphases alone added.]

[1] First of all Marx was here arguing with (or about) "vulgar economists", those who fail to study the economy beyond its superficialities, neglecting the relations that exist between the factors of production and exchange, all the while ignoring their historical development along with the class structure of a given society, etc., etc. [Marx's criticism of other economists won't be challenged here, or anywhere else for that matter!]

But, in what way do such 'economic realities' lie 'under the surface', or even behind/below "outward appearances"?

Well, whatever the answer to that question turns out to be, Marx responded to his own question by re-focusing his analysis so that it included these broader social and historical factors, those that exist in the open and are in fact capable of being recognised and described in detail by theorists who don't suffer from such ideologically-compromised, tunnel vision and who aren't hamstrung by their adherence to privatised theories of language that are themselves predicated on the dogma that individual economic actors are the basic units here. That includes those whose ideas aren't biased by their involvement in, or their support for, the other side in the class war.

In other words, Marx was proposing the use of a different/novel grammar -- or, if readers prefer, he was advocating a different theoretical framework or "form of representation" -- in order to analyse the economy scientifically. That re-orientation was nothing new. Every major innovation in science results from similar changes (albeit expressed differently in diverse subject areas and Modes of Production, as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Two). In that respect, therefore, what matters here isn't going deeper, but going broader, going social, going historical, going public, that counts -- which is exactly the approach advocated at this site.

[On this, see Lee Smolin's admission in Smolin (2006). For those who don't have access to Smolin's book, I have added the relevant passage to Appendix B. As far as anyone who thinks the above remarks threaten 'objectivity', all I can say is: suspend judgement until later. (This topic will also be addressed in Essay Thirteen Part Two.)]

[2] Second, as a general description of science, Marx's remarks are far too sketchy and vague to be of much use. That isn't to criticise Marx, since he wasn't attempting to write a monograph or a PhD-level contribution to the Philosophy of Science. It is all too easy, therefore, to read too much into this passage.

[3] Finally, even if we take Marx's words at face value, they make little sense (more on that presently). Hence, his comments are of no real help in trying to understand this metaphor (i.e., that 'essence' somehow lies 'below the surface', or 'behind appearances'), unless we interpret them along the lines suggested in (1) above. Then, they do make sense. If essence is given by grammar (as Wittgenstein argued -- by which he meant that the way we actually use language tells us what we count as conceptually essential, and what we regard as essential is expressed by a specific use of language), it will provide a way of comprehending this figure of speech that doesn't slide theory back into the Idealist quagmire that has held it fast for centuries. [I have given an example of Wittgenstein's method in this regard, here.]

[4] If the above passage is interpreted along these lines, it now becomes clear that Marx meant that we should locate the "essences" that scientists speak about (that is, if they do!) by examining more carefully the language they use -- what Wittgenstein called "depth grammar":

"In the use of words, one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the sentence structure, the part of its use -- one might say -- that can be taken in by the ear. -- And now compare the depth grammar, say, of the verb 'to mean', with what its surface grammar would lead us to presume. No wonder one finds it difficult to know ones' way about." [Wittgenstein (2009), pp.176e-177e, §664. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

[It might be objected that the above metaphor (concerning "depth grammar") suffers from the same interpretative difficulties as "below the surface" figure of speech, but that would be another mistake. Wittgenstein proposed this figure of speech -- and in some cases he succeeded in explaining what he meant by it -- when he appealed to the countless diverse ways we use what seem to be similar words (such as the verb, "to mean", and its cognates, indeed, as was attempted in Interlude Seven) -- in order to direct our attention toward the open and public use of language, directing attention away from the shadowy world that has always fascinated Traditional Theorists, with their neurotic focus on what 'lies beneath appearances', on what is 'hidden' away in each individual 'consciousness', or has been hived off into an ethereal, 'abstract world' that, even to this day, defies description. So Wittgenstein's metaphor was capable of being explained in publicly accessible, everyday terms. Contrast that with the 'below the surface' and 'behind appearances' tropes, which can't.]

This metaphor reappeared in Wittgenstein's later work in a different form (explored in Essay Three Part Two):

"Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.... It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of proposition need not be its real one". [Wittgenstein (1972), 4.002-4.0031, pp.36-37. This links to a PDF. Paragraphs merged.]

[Wittgenstein is here referring to Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions. On that, see Ryle (1932) -- neatly summarised here -- and Baker (2001). I am not claiming that Marx himself meant that his words should be viewed this way (which would be, at the very least, anachronistic!), but that it is a way of re-configuring Marx's metaphor so that we don't saddle him with an obscure, half-baked, Idealist Theory of Science. It is also worth adding that Wittgenstein modified his views about language quite markedly in his later work. On that, see, for example, Baker (2001).]

[5] Nevertheless, this metaphor is clearly connected to the ancient idea that nature "hides herself", a doctrine invented -- as far as we know -- by that deeply confused, ruling-class mystic, Heraclitus:

Although the following, more widely accepted academic source renders that passage rather stiltedly, as follows:

"The real constitution is accustomed to hide itself." [Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1999), p.192.]

This overarching idea has dominated traditional thinking ever since, as one on-line source points out:

"Heraclitus, along with Parmenides, is probably the most significant philosopher of ancient Greece until Socrates and Plato; in fact, Heraclitus's philosophy is perhaps even more fundamental in the formation of the European mind than any other thinker in European history, including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Why? Heraclitus, like Parmenides, postulated a model of nature and the universe which created the foundation for all other speculation on physics and metaphysics. The ideas that the universe is in constant change and that there is an underlying order or reason to this change -- the Logos -- form the essential foundation of the European world view. Every time you walk into a science, economics, or political science course, to some extent everything you do in that class originates with Heraclitus's speculations on change and the Logos.... In reading these passages, you should be able to piece together the central components of Heraclitus's thought. What, precisely, is the Logos? Can it be comprehended or defined by human beings? What does it mean to claim that the Logos consists of all the paired opposites in the universe? What is the nature of the Logos as the composite of all paired opposites? How does the Logos explain change? Finally, how would you compare Heraclitus's Logos to its later incarnations: in the Divided Line in Plato, in foundational and early Christianity? How would you relate Heraclitus's cryptic statements to those of Lao Tzu?" [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis and links added; paragraphs merged.]

[On this in general, see Eamonn (1994) -- although, as Eamonn points out, materialistically-orientated scientists from the 17^th Century onward abandoned this ancient view of nature. By way of contrast, it is equally apparent that the tradition that derives from the Hegelian Natürphilosophie wing of ruling-class obfuscation both reacted to, and actively resisted, this modernising trend. (There will be more on this in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here), and in later Parts of Essay Twelve.) Cf., the detailed account in Daston and Galison (2007), which traces the changes that took place (only relatively recently) in the meaning of the word "objective" that replaced the earlier phrase, "true to nature".]

Hence, it is quite clear that the usual way of (mis)reading Marx's metaphor is based on the ancient doctrine that there is a hidden -- or, as we might now say, there is "rational", or even an a priori -- structure to 'Reality', accessible to thought alone. It is also connected with the 'appearance'/'reality' distinction, as William Blake opined:

"If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as it is, infinite." [Quoted from here.]

"The best approach to understanding what is meant by 'metaphysics' is by way of the concepts of appearance and reality. It is a commonplace that the way things seem to be is often not the way they are, that the way things apparently are is often not the way they really are. The sun apparently moves across the sky -- but not really. The moon seems larger when it is near the horizon -- but its size never really changes. We might say that one is engaged in 'metaphysics' if one is attempting to get behind all appearances and to describe things as they really are." [Van Inwagen (1998), p.11. Bold emphasis alone added.]

[6] We have already seen dialecticians have bought into this view, following on Hegel's lead:

"1. [T]he objectivity of consideration (not examples, not divergencies (sic), but the Thing-in-itself). 2. the entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing to others. 3. the development of this thing, (phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life. 4. the internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing. 5. the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and unity of opposites. 6. the struggle, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc. 7. the union of analysis and synthesis -- the break-down of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts. 8. the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with every other. 9. not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]. 10. the endless process of the discovery of new sides, relations, etc. 11. the endless process of the deepening of man's knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence. 12. from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form. 13. the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and 14. the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation). 15. the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the content. 16. the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa.... In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics...." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22. Bold emphases alone added. Formatting modified to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other…. Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.359-60. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973), pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting Hegel (1975), p.163, §112. Minor typo corrected. Bold emphasis added.]

'Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.' [Hegel (1999), p.439, §956.]

"The first thing to note is that Hegel makes little attempt to prove this. A few lines later he says:

'With regard to the assertion that contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement.'

"We here meet one of the most important principles of the dialectical logic, and one that has been consistently misunderstood, vilified or lied about. Dialectic for Hegel was a strictly scientific method. He might speak of inevitable laws, but he insists from the beginning that the proof of dialectic as scientific method is that the laws prove their correspondence with reality. Marx's dialectic is of the same character. Thus he excluded what later became The Critique of Political Economy from Capital because it took for granted what only the detailed argument and logical development of Capital could prove. Still more specifically, in his famous letter to Kugelmann on the theory of value, he ridiculed the idea of having to 'prove' the labour theory of value. If the labour theory of value proved to be the means whereby the real relations of bourgeois society could be demonstrated in their movement, where they came from, what they were, and where they were going, that was the proof of the theory. Neither Hegel nor Marx understood any other scientific proof. To ask for some proof of the laws, as Burnham implied, or to prove them 'wrong' as Sidney Hook tried to do, this is to misconceive dialectical logic entirely. Hegel complicated the question by his search for a completely closed system embracing all aspects of the universe; this no Marxist ever did (sic!). The frantic shrieks that Marx's dialectic is some sort of religion or teleological construction, proving inevitably the victory of socialism, spring usually from men who are frantically defending the inevitability of bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution." [James (1947), quoted from here. Bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added.]

"To take each and every quality displayed by an object or even at face value would necessarily mean that neither a scientific nor a philosophic account could be given of it.

"The important thing about a Marxist understanding of the distinction between the appearance of things and their essence is twofold: 1) by delving beneath the mass of surface phenomena, it is possible to see the essential relations governing historical change -– thus beneath the appearance of a free and fair market transaction it is possible to see the exploitative relations of class society, but, 2) this does not mean that surface appearances can simply be dismissed as ephemeral events of no consequence. In revealing the essential relations in society, it is also possible to explain more fully than before why they appear in a form different to their real nature. To explain, for instance, why it is that the exploitative class relations at the point of production appear as the exchange of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay' in the polished surface of the labour market.... There is a deeper reality, but it must be able to account for the contradiction between it and the way it appears." [Rees (1998), pp.187-88. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

[7] In case someone is tempted to search back through the archives to find the dozens of warehouses full to the rafters with (the still missing!) evidence that Lenin (or, indeed, the rest of the DM-fraternity) had "carefully" collected and stored, which fully support the above hyper-bold claims about 'Reality', a consideration of the next two passages will at least relieve them of that onerous and thankless task -- that is, if the above quotes fail to convince them that Dialectical Marxists aren't really interested in supporting their theory with an adequate amount of evidence! Here, at last, Lenin is disarmingly honest about where he obtained these dogmatic generalisations and why no self-respecting DM-fan needs to worry about the search for supporting evidence (perish the thought!):

Again, in these private notebooks, Lenin is quite open and honest about the source of these ideas: dialectics derives its 'evidential support' -- not from a "patient empirical examination of the facts" -- but from studying Hegel! As far as evidence goes, that's it! That's all there is! The search for proof begins and ends with deeply devoted dialecticians leafing through Hegel's Logic (just as Fundamentalist Christians rely only on The Bible, while Muslims focus exclusively on the Koran and the Hadiths). That is the extent of the 'evidence' Lenin offered in support of his assertions about "all notions" without exception, "all phenomena and processes in nature", nature's "eternal development", and its "essence", etc., etc. As we have just seen, Lenin isn't alone; DM-theorists across the board are no less defensive about the dearth of supporting evidence.

This means that the aspiring metaphysician (and now, any hyper-avid DM-fan) need only look to specially-selected and doctored language (mostly derived from the Waffle-Meister Himself, Hegel) , or to 'pure thought', in order to venture where their senses can't take them -- i.e., 'beneath appearances' to the 'Heart of 'Being', searching, not for Truffles, but all those 'hidden essences':

To that end DM-fans have to rely on some sort of 'mystical vision', the 'light of reason', a 'law of cognition' (helpfully 'discovered' for us by Lenin without the use of a single consulting couch, brain scan or psychometric test) -- or, they can appeal to good old-fashioned 'intuition' -- augmented by no little 'word magic' and conveniently opaque jargon. Naturally, this situates the entire discipline where it belongs: slap bang in the middle of Idealistville.

I have quoted the following passage several times already, but it is worth giving it another airing:

[8] Returning to the Van Inwagen quote, is it really metaphysical theory that tells us the Sun isn't the same size as the Moon? If that were so, what need would there be for science? Of course, as Van Inwagen also notes, the salient point here is that it is the attempt to get behind "all appearances" that is metaphysical, not just one specific 'optical illusion', or even an isolated attempt to understand a given instance (such as the apparent relative size of the Sun and Moon).

[But, does anyone think that the Sun and the Moon in 4-space have any size at all? If they were so to think, that would make the size of the Moon dependent on a measuring system (or, indeed, on an 'Ideal Observer'), and thus on -- Shock! Horror! -- 'appearances', once more. In fact, even the 'Ideal Observer' has to rely on 'appearances'! (The clue here is to be found in the word "observer".) On this, see Essay Thirteen Part One.]

Anyway, the question remains: From a handful of perceptual oddities like these, is it really a good idea to question all appearances?

[Again, why that is so was discussed at length in Essay Three Part Two; hence no more will be said about it here. Readers are directed there for more details. Clearly this also raises complex issues connected with the nature of scientific knowledge, which will be tackled in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

[9] So, the best spin that can be put on Marx's use of this metaphor (again, if we want to absolve him of mysticism or of indulging in some form of Idealist Metaphysics) is to read it naturalistically. That is, if bourgeois economists view the world superficially and ideologically then no wonder they miss essential features of the economy. And by "essential features" I mean no more than those that are necessary to understand it correctly, using concepts and "forms of representation" drawn from HM. Now, since the latter are based on, and are consonant with, ordinary language and common understanding (on that, see below), and arise out of a study of the evolution and social development of our species (alongside its class divisions and changing relations of production, etc., etc.), this connects all of the above with our materially-based, historically-conditioned "form of life". Finally, since "essence is expressed by grammar" (again, as Wittgenstein suggested), a long-overdue re-orientation like this will allow Marx to be distanced from misguided DM-interpretations and defended from accusations by looking that the language he actually used, not the language some wish he had used.

Once more, I am not suggesting that Marx would have put things this way, or even that he would have agreed with it (but that is certainly a possibility); however it is the way this metaphor is viewed at this site, and for the above reasons. It is a metaphor, after all, so it has no literal meaning of itself and has to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with Marx's other ideas, remarks and commitments.

The following represents a reasonably accurate summary of the term "common understanding" as it is used at this site:

Clearly "common understanding" is connected with inter-communication, but it also involves what Wittgenstein called an "agreement in judgements", which is itself an expression of our shared "form of life". I will say more about both of those terms in Essay Twelve Part Seven.

Interlude Ten -- Why Do We Need A Philosophy, Or Even A 'World-View', To Begin With?

Anyone inclined to question the claim advanced at this site that metaphysical theories and Idealist forms-of-thought are readily accepted -- or are willingly, even enthusiastically, given credence (we might even call this "sanewashing") -- by highly educated individuals can't have studied Traditional Philosophy at College or University. The inordinate respect, deference and esteem shown toward -- let alone the endless hours spent on lecturing, holding seminars or writing books and articles about -- the vast majority of metaphysical obscurantists and confused bumblers history has inflicted on humanity is as damning as it is universal. Many of the ideas that are taken seriously and endlessly debated would land an individual in a straight-jacket, or some form of psychiatric care, if they were to utter them in public to ordinary, sane fellow humans. [A slight exaggeration!] Questions that might fall in to this category include "Do I have hands and feet?" "Do I exist?" "Is the world real?" "Am I dreaming I'm awake?"

Those observations apply equally well to the almost obsequious respect Dialectical Marxists in general direct toward this ruling-class thought-form -- Metaphysics -- evidenced by their resolute and determined defence of this ridiculously easy way to 'gain knowledge' -- just by thinking! This remains the case despite their criticisms of it -- revealed by their fourth-rate attempt to emulate it.

Again, anyone who still harbours doubts should check out the following (mercifully brief) examples of HCD-gobbledygook:

"Indeed dialectical critical realism may be seen under the aspect of Foucauldian strategic reversal -- of the unholy trinity of Parmenidean/Platonic/Aristotelean (sic) provenance; of the Cartesian-Lockean-Humean-Kantian paradigm, of foundationalisms (in practice, fideistic foundationalisms) and irrationalisms (in practice, capricious exercises of the will-to-power or some other ideologically and/or psycho-somatically buried source) new and old alike; of the primordial failing of western philosophy, ontological monovalence, and its close ally, the epistemic fallacy with its ontic dual; of the analytic problematic laid down by Plato, which Hegel served only to replicate in his actualist monovalent analytic reinstatement in transfigurative reconciling dialectical connection, while in his hubristic claims for absolute idealism he inaugurated the Comtean, Kierkegaardian and Nietzschean eclipses of reason, replicating the fundaments of positivism through its transmutation route to the superidealism of a Baudrillard." [Roy Bhaskar, quoted from here. Links added. In fact, I could have quoted almost any paragraph from Bhaskar (1993), a book that must surely be awarded the Gold Medal in this event.]

"The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power." [(Zap! Pow! Take that ruling-class!) Judith Butler, quoted from here. Link added.]

And then we have the following from a book aimed at clarifying -- plainly with no hint of irony! -- Roy Bhaskar's tangled maze of dialectical spaghetti (aka, "Critical Realism"):

"We have now considered how Bhaskar launches his dialecticisation of critical realism and his 'critical realisation' of dialectics. In terms of the MELD schema, these are essentially 2E moves based on negativity. Dialecticising critical realism by integrating absence and being, and 'critically realising' dialectic to produce a materialist conception of diffraction, both concern real determinate non-being in the world. In the process, however, both moves point beyond negativity to a third level of analysis, that of totality. Thus to think of the spatio-temporal causality of human being (sic)...is to think of the presence of the past in the present and the future, and of the relationship between identity and its outside. Similarly, to think of materialist diffraction of dialectic is to think...of how fragmentation and fracturing are ultimately the relata of a structured, contradictory whole.... 2E negativity in its various forms entails 3L totality, so in terms of the MELD schema, we move from 1M perduring non-identity to 2E real negativity, and on to 3L open totality...before moving...to 4D agency." [Norrie (2010), p.86.]

Anyone at all interested (or who is in search of a serious headache) can find page-after-page of obscure, dogmatic apriorism, neatly expressed in 'academic gobbledygook', 'supported' and 'explained' by yet more of the same throughout the rest of Norrie's book.

[What the above odd abbreviations mean can is 'explained' in the opening pages of Hartwig (2007), an 'intellectual briar patch' that plumbs even greater depths of obscurity in its author's endeavour to confuse further those already reeling from having struggled through Norrie (2010). Hartwig's book is available here as a downloadable PDF. (Make sure you have plenty of Tylenol/Paracetamol on stand-by.) Apologies for that mixed metaphor!]

Incidentally, both of the above works were published by Routledge. So, it would seem that Bhaskarean 'dialectic', coupled with these pioneering and commendably successful attempts to render his thoughts even more opaque, isn't an "abomination" for at least this publishing wing of the bourgeoisie. Clearly, those in charge at Routledge have concluded that if the revolution really does depend on philosophical goulash of this stodginess and oily consistency, their class has little to fear. This Bhaskarean Spectre isn't haunting Europe, it is far too busy haunting Academic Marxism.

"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing" Childishness.]

I have added to Essay Two a series of impressively obscure passages that Žižek thought it timely to inflict on his unfortunate readers, taken from his recent, successful attempt to redefine the word "unintelligible" -- i.e., Less Than Nothing, Žižek (2012), pp.364-67. (This links to a PDF.) He has now added to the confusion with yet another towering monument to obfuscation, Žižek (2015).

If comrades who dote on such material ever entertain even the slightest reservations about the 'ideas' Academic Marxists regularly secrete, they are almost invariably centred on their own aprioristic, idiosyncratic and similarly jargon-bound criticisms, or they are aimed at promoting their own equally befuddling alternatives, or, indeed, those of some other preferred/trendy Philosophical Waffle-Meister -- such as Bhaskar of his 'Critical Realist' Groupies.

An excellent example of this Debilitating Malaise can be found here, the Homepage of my old friend Ben Watson. [Check out, too, the Dogmafest this is openly celebrated, here.] Wall-to-wall gobbledygook of the highest order. These guys could obfuscate for their country if this were an Olympic Event. Readers are free to generate their own impressive, left-sounding verbiage/garbage by visiting this site, repeatedly.

[Much of the above material was taken from Essay Nine Part Two, where several more examples of impressive-looking HCD gobbledygook and deference to ruling-class thought-forms were aired.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HCD = High Church Dialectician; that term is explained here.]

What is more, dear reader, you have to 'play the game', too. You have to be able to churn out copious amounts of material full to the brim of obscure phrases, opaque neologisms, and impenetrable jargon. In addition, whatever you write has to be peppered with scores of names of, allusions to, and quotes from other unreadable theorists if you want to be counted as a 'serious thinker', someone worth studying and citing (so that they will pepper their work with names, including yours). On the other hand, if you reject this approach to theory, and demand clarity, and wherever possible you support what you say with actual evidence, your efforts won't be received too well.

Here, for instance, is a 'debate' in which I was engaged a few years ago where I was taken to task for even suggesting that we should turn our backs on the sort of ruling-class rubbish outlined in the previous sub-section. [Unfortunately, that link no longer appears to work!] Several more examples of the same sort of response can be found if readers follow the links (that still work!) posted here.

Not even once do such Dialectical Marxists ask the following questions: Is there adequate (or even any!) empirical evidence supporting these ideas? Have they been derived from the collective experience of the class, or even the party? Are they based on ordinary language? Do they reflect anything other than the ivory tower experience, thoughts and 'practice' of assorted HCD-'intellectuals' and de-classé professional revolutionaries?

In fact, questions like those aired above will be enough, on their own, to elicit derision, open contempt, rejection and even juvenile ridicule by Dialectical Marxists -- especially those belonging to the aforementioned HCD-Tendency -- since it is now an automatic assumption (nay, it might even be called an unquestioned article of faith) that not only is 'genuine' Philosophy necessarily obscure, it is way superior to the sort of 'working class' ("workerist"!) 'banalities' that require, or even demand, 'proof' of the sort promoted at this site. (Are you serious?! Wash your mouth with soap and waffle!). And this will be an important part of the reason why the approach adopted in these Essays will continue to be dismissed, out-of-hand, as 'superficial', 'simplistic' and 'un-philosophical' -- again, mostly by HCD-ers, their hangers on, cheerleaders and enablers.

You see, Ms Lichtenstein 'doesn't play the game' and refuses to indulge in 'legitimate' 'philosophical speculation'/theory-mongering. Nor does Ms Lichtenstein engage with the 'philosophical ideas' of Academic Dialectical Marxists. What a charlatan!

Guilty as charged, and proud of it. I reject this entire tradition as self-important, ruling-class hot air.

How impertinent of me! Have I no shame? Is there no level to which I won't sink!?

As Marx reminded us: the ideas of the ruling-class always rule -- and what helps them do so is the fact that erstwhile radicals, like those mentioned above, have turned their backs on radical thought and think they can advance the revolutionary cause by importing ruling-class methods and thought-forms into the workers' movement. Even worse, they eagerly bend over to accommodate ruling-class apriorism, willingly, even enthusiastically, adopting the class enemy's approach to theory, augmented by the unquestioned dogma that 'behind appearances' lies the really real world, the world of 'abstractions' and 'essences' that are accessible to (their) thought alone. As I pointed out in Essay Three Part Two, this puts Dialectical Marxists on the same side of the barricade as card-carrying Idealists (slightly edited):

This...helps explain why Lenin could declare that he preferred intelligent Idealism to "crude materialism". Plainly, he hadn't fully shaken off the regressive influence of the sort of Christian Mysticism that had been forced down his throat as a child (his family was Russian Orthodox, into which faith Lenin had been baptised and inducted):

"Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; (sic) metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of stupid." [Lenin (1961), p.274. Bold emphasis added. (I explain why he said this, here.)]

From this, it is quite clear that Lenin meant "Dialectical idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than crude materialism...".

And we now know why Lenin meant what he said when he wrote the [above]. The importation into Marxism of these ancient, well-entrenched "ruling ideas" significantly compromised his (otherwise) materialist good sense:

How and why that happened with Lenin (indeed, as happens to all Dialectical Marxists) -- and what ideological imperatives they underpin, express, or promote -- are the subject of Essays Nine Parts One and Two, Twelve Parts Two and Three (summary here), and Fourteen Part Two.

Subsequent dialecticians often quote [the 'intelligent idealism'] passage, always doing so approvingly -- for example, here, here, here, here and here (the last of these links to a PDF).

That wasn't an isolated passage, either. In the same Notebooks he had this to say:

"Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated...development...of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge, into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosised." [Lenin (1961), p.361. Italic emphases in the original; link added.]

Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that the worst Lenin has to say about Idealism is that it is "one-sided" and "exaggerated"! Is it any wonder then that DM-classicists like Lenin were happy to take logical and philosophical advice from Christian Mystics and ruling-class Idealists!

By nailing their colours to this (class-compromised) mast, Dialectical Marxists in general have openly placed themselves 'on the side of the Gods'.

"When the Gigantes about Pallene chose to begin war against the immortals, Herakles fought on the side of the gods, and slaying many of the Sons of Ge [or Gaia, the 'Earth Goddess' -- RL] he received the highest approbation. For Zeus gave the name of Olympian only to those gods who had fought by his side, in order that the courageous, by being adorned by so honourable a title, might be distinguished by this designation from the coward; and of those who were born of mortal women he considered only Dionysos and Herakles worthy of this name." [Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 4.15.1.]

That metaphor alludes to an image painted in Hesiod's Theogony (links at the end), later put to use by Plato in his dialogue, Sophist (i.e., Plato 1997d), which is one of his more profound surviving works. Indeed, the Sophist and two of his other dialogues -- Theaetetus (Plato (1997f)) and Parmenides (Plato (1997e)) -- are the principle source of much of subsequent Idealism.

The following excerpt from the Sophist reports on a conversation between an Eleatic "Stranger" (who appears to be a follower of Parmenides) and a character called "Theaetetus":

"Stranger. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being....

"...There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of essence.

"Stranger. Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and trees; of these they lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body.

"Theaetetus. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

"Stranger. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict raging concerning these matters.

"Stranger. Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

"Stranger. With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?

"Stranger. Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but seekers after truth." [Plato (1997d), pp.267-68, 246a-246d. I have used the on-line version here. Bold emphases added.]

[As noted earlier, this battle is described in Hesiod's Theogony (lines 675-715), a copy of which is available here.]

Again: from this it is quite clear that Marxist Dialecticians are far closer to the 'Idealist Gods' than they are to the 'Materialist Giants'!

Clearly, that helps explain why DM-theorists insist matter is just an 'abstraction'.

As will soon become apparent, for all their claims to be radical, when it comes to Philosophy DM-theorists are surprisingly conservative -- and universally incapable of seeing this even after it has been pointed out to them!

[An excellent example of this, and one that has been highly influential on how DM-theorists receive and then respond to such criticism has been posted here.]

Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked before they were even loaded; with such weapons, is it any wonder that DM-theorists fire nothing but philosophical blanks?

For many, the above accusations might seem far easier to make than they are to substantiate.

"I've returned from travel-speaking, where I spend most of my life, and found a collection of messages extending the discussion about 'theory' and 'philosophy,' a debate that I find rather curious. A few reactions -- though I concede, from the start, that I may simply not understand what is going on. As far as I do think I understand it, the debate was initiated by the charge that I, Mike [one of the individuals in this discussion -- RL], and maybe others don't have 'theories' and therefore fail to give any explanation of why things are proceeding as they do. We must turn to 'theory' and 'philosophy' and 'theoretical constructs' and the like to remedy this deficiency in our efforts to understand and address what is happening in the world. I won't speak for Mike. My response so far has pretty much been to reiterate something I wrote 35 years ago, long before 'postmodernism' had erupted in the literary intellectual culture: 'if there is a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret,' despite much 'pseudo-scientific posturing.' To my knowledge, the statement was accurate 35 years ago, and remains so; furthermore, it extends to the study of human affairs generally, and applies in spades to what has been produced since that time. What has changed in the interim, to my knowledge, is a huge explosion of self- and mutual-admiration among those who propound what they call 'theory' and 'philosophy,' but little that I can detect beyond pseudo-scientific posturing. That little is, as I wrote, sometimes quite interesting, but lacks consequences for the real world problems that occupy my time and energies.... The proponents of 'theory' and 'philosophy' have a very easy task if they want to make their case. Simply make known to me what was and remains a 'secret' to me: I'll be happy to look. I've asked many times before, and still await an answer, which should be easy to provide: simply give some examples of 'a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to' the kinds of problems and issues that Mike, I, and many others (in fact, most of the world's population, I think, outside of narrow and remarkably self-contained intellectual circles) are or should be concerned with: the problems and issues we speak and write about, for example, and others like them. To put it differently, show that the principles of the 'theory' or 'philosophy' that we are told to study and apply lead by valid argument to conclusions that we and others had not already reached on other (and better) grounds; these 'others' include people lacking formal education, who typically seem to have no problem reaching these conclusions through mutual interactions that avoid the 'theoretical' obscurities entirely, or often on their own. Again, those are simple requests. I've made them before, and remain in my state of ignorance. I also draw certain conclusions from the fact.

"As for the 'deconstruction' that is carried out (also mentioned in the debate), I can't comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. But if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words that I can understand, and show why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before and have continued to do since without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. That will cure my deficiencies -- of course, if they are curable; maybe they aren't, a possibility to which I'll return. These are very easy requests to fulfil, if there is any basis to the claims put forth with such fervour and indignation. But instead of trying to provide an answer to this simple requests (sic), the response is cries of anger: to raise these questions shows 'elitism,' 'anti-intellectualism,' and other crimes -- though apparently it is not 'elitist' to stay within the self- and mutual-admiration societies of intellectuals who talk only to one another and (to my knowledge) don't enter into the kind of world in which I'd prefer to live. As for that world, I can reel off my speaking and writing schedule to illustrate what I mean, though I presume that most people in this discussion know, or can easily find out; and somehow I never find the 'theoreticians' there, nor do I go to their conferences and parties. In short, we seem to inhabit quite different worlds, and I find it hard to see why mine is 'elitist,' not theirs. The opposite seems to be transparently the case, though I won't amplify. To add another facet, I am absolutely deluged with requests to speak and can't possibly accept a fraction of the invitations I'd like to, so I suggest other people. But oddly, I never suggest those who propound 'theories' and 'philosophy,' nor do I come across them, or for that matter rarely even their names, in my own (fairly extensive) experience with popular and activist groups and organizations, general community, college, church, union, etc., audiences here and abroad, third world women, refugees, etc.; I can easily give examples. Why, I wonder. The whole debate, then, is an odd one. On one side, angry charges and denunciations, on the other, the request for some evidence and argument to support them, to which the response is more angry charges -- but, strikingly, no evidence or argument. Again, one is led to ask why. It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I just lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have been unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their followers. I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years, when similar charges have been made -- but without any answer to my questions. Again, they are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an answer: if I'm missing something, then show me what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if it's all beyond my comprehension, which is possible, then I'm just a lost cause, and will be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be interested in them and seem to understand them (which I'm perfectly happy to do, having no interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in these things, but apparently little else).

"Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left with the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm certainly willing to grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll have to remain suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don't understand -- say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand it. Now Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. -- even Foucault, whom I knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest -- write things that I also don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says they do understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a) some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden genetic mutation, which has created a form of 'theory' that is beyond quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b)...I won't spell it out. Again, I've lived for 50 years in these worlds, have done a fair amount of work of my own in fields called 'philosophy' and 'science,' as well as intellectual history, and have a fair amount of personal acquaintance with the intellectual culture in the sciences, humanities, social sciences, and the arts. That has left me with my own conclusions about intellectual life, which I won't spell out. But for others, I would simply suggest that you ask those who tell you about the wonders of 'theory' and 'philosophy' to justify their claims -- to do what people in physics, math, biology, linguistics, and other fields are happy to do when someone asks them, seriously, what are the principles of their theories, on what evidence are they based, what do they explain that wasn't already obvious, etc. These are fair requests for anyone to make. If they can't be met, then I'd suggest recourse to Hume's advice in similar circumstances: to the flames. Specific comment. Phetland [another of the participants -- RL] asked who I'm referring to when I speak of 'Paris school' and 'postmodernist cults': the above is a sample. He then asks, reasonably, why I am 'dismissive' of it. Take, say, Derrida...one of the grand old men. I thought I ought to at least be able to understand his Grammatology, so tried to read it. I could make out some of it, for example, the critical analysis of classical texts that I knew very well and had written about years before. I found the scholarship appalling, based on pathetic misreading; and the argument, such as it was, failed to come close to the kinds of standards I've been familiar with since virtually childhood. Well, maybe I missed something: could be, but suspicions remain, as noted. Again, sorry to make unsupported comments, but I was asked, and therefore am answering. Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me) I've met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in print, and spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on real issues, and using language that was perfectly comprehensible -- he speaking French, me English); Lacan (who I met several times and considered an amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan, though his earlier work, pre-cult, was sensible and I've discussed it in print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly during the period when she was a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of them I haven't met, because I am very remote from these circles, by choice, preferring quite different and far broader ones -- the kinds where I give talks, have interviews, take part in activities, write dozens of long letters every week, etc. I've dipped into what they write out of curiosity, but not very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate, based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes, that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain gibberish. When I proceed as I do in other areas where I do not understand, I run into the problems mentioned in connection with (1) and (2) above. So that's who I'm referring to, and why I don't proceed very far. I can list a lot more names if it's not obvious. For those interested in a literary depiction that reflects pretty much the same perceptions (but from the inside), I'd suggest David Lodge. Pretty much on target, as far as I can judge.

"Phetland also found it 'particularly puzzling' that I am so 'curtly dismissive' of these intellectual circles while I spend a lot of time 'exposing the posturing and obfuscation of the New York Times.' So 'why not give these guys the same treatment.' Fair question. There are also simple answers. What appears in the work I do address (NYT, journals of opinion, much of scholarship, etc.) is simply written in intelligible prose and has a great impact on the world, establishing the doctrinal framework within which thought and expression are supposed to be contained, and largely are, in successful doctrinal systems such as ours. That has a huge impact on what happens to suffering people throughout the world, the ones who concern me, as distinct from those who live in the world that Lodge depicts (accurately, I think). So this work should be dealt with seriously, at least if one cares about ordinary people and their problems. The work to which Phetland refers has none of these characteristics, as far as I'm aware. It certainly has none of the impact, since it is addressed only to other intellectuals in the same circles. Furthermore, there is no effort that I am aware of to make it intelligible to the great mass of the population (say, to the people I'm constantly speaking to, meeting with, and writing letters to, and have in mind when I write, and who seem to understand what I say without any particular difficulty, though they generally seem to have the same cognitive disability I do when facing the Postmodern cults). And I'm also aware of no effort to show how it applies to anything in the world in the sense I mentioned earlier: grounding conclusions that weren't already obvious. Since I don't happen to be much interested in the ways that intellectuals inflate their reputations, gain privilege and prestige, and disengage themselves from actual participation in popular struggle, I don't spend any time on it. Phetland suggests starting with Foucault -- who, as I've written repeatedly, is somewhat apart from the others, for two reasons: I find at least some of what he writes intelligible, though generally not very interesting; second, he was not personally disengaged and did not restrict himself to interactions with others within the same highly privileged elite circles. Phetland then does exactly what I requested: he gives some illustrations of why he thinks Foucault's work is important. That's exactly the right way to proceed, and I think it helps understand why I take such a 'dismissive' attitude towards all of this -- in fact, pay no attention to it.

"What Phetland describes, accurately I'm sure, seems to me unimportant, because everyone always knew it -- apart from details of social and intellectual history, and about these, I'd suggest caution: some of these are areas I happen to have worked on fairly extensively myself, and I know that Foucault's scholarship is just not trustworthy here, so I don't trust it, without independent investigation, in areas that I don't know -- this comes up a bit in the discussion from 1972 that is in print. I think there is much better scholarship on the 17th and 18th century, and I keep to that, and my own research. But let's put aside the other historical work, and turn to the 'theoretical constructs' and the explanations: that there has been 'a great change from harsh mechanisms of repression to more subtle mechanisms by which people come to do' what the powerful want, even enthusiastically. That's true enough, in fact, utter truism. If that's a 'theory,' then all the criticisms of me are wrong: I have a 'theory' too, since I've been saying exactly that for years, and also giving the reasons and historical background, but without describing it as a theory (because it merits no such term), and without obfuscatory rhetoric (because it's so simple-minded), and without claiming that it is new (because it's a truism). It's been fully recognized for a long time that as the power to control and coerce has declined, it's more necessary to resort to what practitioners in the PR industry early in this century -- who understood all of this well -- called 'controlling the public mind.' The reasons, as observed by Hume in the 18th century, are that 'the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers' relies ultimately on control of opinion and attitudes. Why these truisms should suddenly become 'a theory' or 'philosophy,' others will have to explain; Hume would have laughed. Some of Foucault's particular examples (say, about 18th century techniques of punishment) look interesting, and worth investigating as to their accuracy. But the 'theory' is merely an extremely complex and inflated restatement of what many others have put very simply, and without any pretence that anything deep is involved. There's nothing in what Phetland describes that I haven't been writing about myself for 35 years, also giving plenty of documentation to show that it was always obvious, and indeed hardly departs from truism. What's interesting about these trivialities is not the principle, which is transparent, but the demonstration of how it works itself out in specific detail to cases that are important to people: like intervention and aggression, exploitation and terror, 'free market' scams, and so on. That I don't find in Foucault, though I find plenty of it by people who seem to be able to write sentences I can understand and who aren't placed in the intellectual firmament as 'theoreticians.'

"To make myself clear, Phetland is doing exactly the right thing: presenting what he sees as 'important insights and theoretical constructs' that he finds in Foucault. My problem is that the 'insights' seem to me familiar and there are no 'theoretical constructs,' except in that simple and familiar ideas have been dressed up in complicated and pretentious rhetoric. Phetland asks whether I think this is 'wrong, useless, or posturing.' No. The historical parts look interesting sometimes, though they have to be treated with caution and independent verification is even more worth undertaking than it usually is. The parts that restate what has long been obvious and put in much simpler terms are not 'useless,' but indeed useful, which is why I and others have always made the very same points. As to 'posturing,' a lot of it is that, in my opinion, though I don't particularly blame Foucault for it: it's such a deeply rooted part of the corrupt intellectual culture of Paris that he fell into it pretty naturally, though to his credit, he distanced himself from it. As for the 'corruption' of this culture particularly since World War II, that's another topic, which I've discussed elsewhere and won't go into here. Frankly, I don't see why people in this forum should be much interested, just as I am not. There are more important things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow and (to me, at least) pretty uninteresting circles. That's a broad brush, and I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without proving them: but I've been asked, and have answered the only specific point that I find raised. When asked about my general opinion, I can only give it, or if something more specific is posed, address that. I'm not going to undertake an essay on topics that don't interest me. Unless someone can answer the simple questions that immediately arise in the mind of any reasonable person when claims about 'theory' and 'philosophy' are raised, I'll keep to work that seems to me sensible and enlightening, and to people who are interested in understanding and changing the world.

"JohnB [yet another participant -- RL] made the point that 'plain language is not enough when the frame of reference is not available to the listener'; correct and important. But the right reaction is not to resort to obscure and needlessly complex verbiage and posturing about non-existent 'theories.' Rather, it is to ask the listener to question the frame of reference that he/she is accepting, and to suggest alternatives that might be considered, all in plain language. I've never found that a problem when I speak to people lacking much or sometimes any formal education, though it's true that it tends to become harder as you move up the educational ladder, so that indoctrination is much deeper, and the self-selection for obedience that is a good part of elite education has taken its toll. JohnB says that outside of circles like this forum, 'to the rest of the country, he's incomprehensible' ('he' being me). That's absolutely counter to my rather ample experience, with all sorts of audiences. Rather, my experience is what I just described. The incomprehensibility roughly corresponds to the educational level. Take, say, talk radio. I'm on a fair amount, and it's usually pretty easy to guess from accents, etc., what kind of audience it is. I've repeatedly found that when the audience is mostly poor and less educated, I can skip lots of the background and 'frame of reference' issues because it's already obvious and taken for granted by everyone, and can proceed to matters that occupy all of us. With more educated audiences, that's much harder; it's necessary to disentangle lots of ideological constructions. It's certainly true that lots of people can't read the books I write. That's not because the ideas or language are complicated -- we have no problems in informal discussion on exactly the same points, and even in the same words. The reasons are different, maybe partly the fault of my writing style, partly the result of the need (which I feel, at least) to present pretty heavy documentation, which makes it tough reading. For these reasons, a number of people have taken pretty much the same material, often the very same words, and put them in pamphlet form and the like. No one seems to have much problem -- though again, reviewers in the Times Literary Supplement or professional academic journals don't have a clue as to what it's about, quite commonly; sometimes it's pretty comical.

"A final point, something I've written about elsewhere (e.g., in a discussion in Z papers, and the last chapter of Year 501). There has been a striking change in the behaviour of the intellectual class in recent years. The left intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been teaching in working class schools, writing books like 'mathematics for the millions' (which made mathematics intelligible to millions of people), participating in and speaking for popular organizations, etc., are now largely disengaged from such activities, and although quick to tell us that they are far more radical than thou, are not to be found, it seems, when there is such an obvious and growing need and even explicit request for the work they could do out there in the world of people with live problems and concerns. That's not a small problem. This country, right now, is in a very strange and ominous state. People are frightened, angry, disillusioned, sceptical, confused. That's an organizer's dream, as I once heard Mike say. It's also fertile ground for demagogues and fanatics, who can (and in fact already do) rally substantial popular support with messages that are not unfamiliar from their predecessors in somewhat similar circumstances. We know where it has led in the past; it could again. There's a huge gap that once was at least partially filled by left intellectuals willing to engage with the general public and their problems. It has ominous implications, in my opinion. End of Reply, and (to be frank) of my personal interest in the matter, unless the obvious questions are answered." [Quoted from here. Spelling modified to agree with UK English, formatting and quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; links added. Several paragraphs merged.]

[Update February 2026: The fact that Chomsky's reputation has suffered a body blow as a result of the revelations that have just emerged from the 'Epstein Files' in no way affects the relevance and appositeness of the above remarks. Chomsky suffered a massive stroke in 2023 that has affected his ability to speak, which means he is far too unwell to respond and so can't defend himself. Having said that, there seems to be no way he would be able to do so even if he were fully fit and healthy.]

However, here is Richard Seymour's recent attempt to defend Leftist Obscurantism:

"Writing is an artifice in its essence; it is an art of embodiment, giving physical form to being. 'Putting it into words' means giving form to existence, and there is no omnipotent father, Big Other, or whomever, to guarantee that superiority of one form over another. The metaphysic of writing that is implied by 'plain style' zealots, however, is that wherein writing is a ‘window on reality’, with the subject neatly extruded -- and that is, lamentably, how many people are taught to write. Nancy Welsh (sic) in her very fine book on writing, Getting Restless, is scathing about the advice given to students to suppress their own role in the writing of knowledge -- 'this isn't about you, don't talk about yourself'. On the left, this has to do with a half-digested puritanism, and a degree of 'workerist' (patronisingly anti-working class) anti-intellectualism. There's almost a sense of shame at the intrinsic excess of writing, at the fact that it is never reducible to communication, that it always produces effects other than knowledge-effects. Words are aesthetic objects, erotic objects, and that produces a certain phobia in parts of the left. And, I suspect, there's a degree of aggression toward the reader among leftists who write in this 'plain' style, a desire to bore and bully readers as much as possible -- I've suffered for my vulgar exhortation, now it's your turn. This approach is giving us the worst of both worlds. People, to the extent that they go along with the idea that they can take themselves out of their writing, become bad writers, and bullshitters. They become bad writers because writing becomes yet another means of repression, rather than sublimation; it also becomes a guilt function, since having turned it into a joyless process, people can't understand why they're so bad at writing. They become bullshitters to the extent that they present a version of reality as if from a god's-eye-view, as if told by a non-desiring, Buddha-like being. Radical politics must be, if nothing else, radically de-naturalising. It must stress the art in living, the extent to which we produce and design the world we live in, even if not under circumstances and not with materials of our choosing." [Richard Seymour, quoted from here. Accessed 13/07/2017. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link and italic emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]

Unfortunately, 'fine-sounding words' like these (as well as those written by theorists who have influenced Seymour's own inexorable drift into HCD-obscurantism, many of whom were listed earlier) will sail right over the heads of those whom Richard seeks to champion: workers.

"They [i.e., 'people' who are 'bullshitters'] become bad writers because writing becomes yet another means of repression, rather than sublimation." [Ibid.]

"Repression"? How? And who exactly is being "repressed" by "bad writing"? Leftist Snowflakes? Pearl-clutching 'intellectuals'?

Having said that, in his YouTube videos, Seymour is almost invariably a model of clarity -- except where he tries to sell his viewers some 'a priori psychology' (i.e., often another dollop of half-digested Lacanian Freudianism). For example, two of his videos, here and here, are admirably clear. Since Seymour himself uses plain and simple English in these videos, the question naturally becomes: who exactly is he "repressing"? Who is he "boring and bullying"? And precisely what has he to feel "guilty" about?

[Update August 2025: I haven't checked his videos for several years, so I can't confirm whether or not he has maintained this level of clarity!]

"And if the bugle gives an indistinct sound, who will get ready for battle?" [I Corinthians 14:8.]

If there ever is a major political shift and Richard has to communicate with workers, en masse, he will soon discover (if he doesn't already know!) that the convoluted and flowery style he has perfected in many of his more 'serious' pieces will go down like a lead balloon with workers (i.e., if he tries to use any of it on them), which will in turn mean he will have to adopt a 'plain style' or fail to communicate with that target audience, or even merit a hearing. But, will they listen to a parvenu, to someone who has progressively withdrawn from the struggle, someone they don't know and hence don't trust, who writes obscure sentences and paragraphs about even darker obscurities (an excellent recent example of which can be accessed here, or even here -- the latter of which is a rather dyspeptic review of Angela Nagle's recent book, Kill All Normies)?

At such times, an "indistinct sound" could easily spell disaster. Lenin's words, quoted earlier, seem all the more apposite, therefore, and are well worth repeating:

"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing" Childishness. Bold emphases added.]

Until then, of course, Richard is perfectly at liberty to indulge his own flowery style (not that he needs my permission or acquiescence!), adrift as he now seems to be in an increasingly stagnant backwater of the class war, secure in his own unfolding irrelevance. Which, as noted above, is a 'pity since his videos (or, at least, those I have watched) on YouTube are always scripted in 'plain style' and are invariably of a very high quality -- two facts that aren't unconnected, of course.

Admittedly, Richard has a career to pursue, where academic gobbledygook is de rigueur, but that is no reason to make a virtue out of such self-enforced obscurantism.

[What I mean by "self-enforced obscurantism" was explained a few paragraphs back.]

Here are the words of the late Louis Proyect on Richard's recent turn in this direction:

"At one time Richard Seymour was someone who had a penetrating class analysis. However, in recent years he writes less and less on his blog based on historical materialism and much more in the Lacanian psychoanalytic vein. I don't know how much interest there is in the Lacanian stuff given his Alexa rating of 850,507 worldwide. He has set himself up on Patreon where for $3 per month and up you can get the a-list Seymour. With articles like 'Make cry-bullying kill itself', I am not sure if $3 per month is worth it. Over on Lenin's Tomb, you can also find the same kind of article. For example, there is one titled 'On Fetish', which sounds like the kind of paper delivered at the yearly American Language Association conference:

'This estrangement of the visual order, this conversion of attention into alienated labour, is what Beller calls the 'cinematic mode of production'. True to the paranoid, psychotic structure of the theory, he can do no other than offer us a cinematic image by way of explanation. We are in The Matrix, the life-energy we put into the world converted into energy to run the image-world, "imprisoned in a malevolent bathosphere, intuiting our situation only through glitches in the programme."'

"Most of this stuff has little interest for me but recently Seymour posted a link on Facebook to a May 19th article titled 'Is Fascism on the Rise' that shows how much damage this kind of psychoanalytic Social Text malarkey can do when the matter at hand requires a sober class analysis rather than the sort of prose that Alan Sokal parodied. I hadn’t noticed the article when it first showed up but thought it was worth some commentary since Seymour has become one of antifa's PR men.

'It was the Martinican poet and anticolonial fighter, Aime Cesaire, who tried to point out to Europeans that what they called Nazism, they had been practicing with a free conscience in the colonial world for decades. And that this relationship was not incidental. In fact, the conscience of the European was never free. Octave Mannoni, the French psychoanalyst who famously psychoanalysed the colonial situation, once suggested that there was a surprising pervasiveness of the colonised, in the dreams of Europeans who had never left the continent and never seen such a person. Today, one wonders if provincial, sedentary English men and women dream of the Muslim.' [Paragraph merged by RL.]

"Okay, spend a minute studying [this] and try to figure out what is wrong. Is the minute up? I hope that you would have noticed that the word 'Europeans' is not rooted in a class analysis. Which class was practicing something like Nazism on the colonized peoples? When your unit of analysis is the nation or the continent, that goes out the window. It was the capitalist class, not the French workers, who were oppressing and exploiting Algerians. 'Today, one wonders if provincial, sedentary English men and women dream of the Muslim.' What sort of nonsense is this? Who could he possibly be writing about? Colonel Blimp? This is a reductionist attempt to characterize an entire people, something that would never appear in a serious Marxist analysis. It evokes an op-ed piece in the NY Times, where someone like Thomas Friedman would pontificate on the 'Europeans' versus the 'Asians'. What a sad decline from the sharp analysis he used to deploy....

"Explaining how conditions today can produce a new Adolph Hitler, Seymour is not exactly lucid. He writes:

'Yes, economic crisis is important, but it has to be metabolised by the state somehow. A crisis of capitalism, has to be a crisis of its political institutions and of its ideological claims. That crisis must manifest itself in a deadlock of political leadership of the ruling class. If, typically, one of its sectors leads (say, the City of London) and imposes its imperatives as being for the good of all, that leadership will come into question.'

"Does anybody understand what it means for an economic crisis to be metabolized by the state? I don’t have a clue. To metabolize means to convert food into energy in a living organism. I gave up trying to understand what this might have to do with the Trump White House except maybe that his addiction to red meat and Coca-Cola might be producing baleful psychological effects that will condemn us all to concentration camps. But is Seymour right that the fascism of today won't look anything like the Nazis?

'But the fascism of the future doesn't have to be traditional. Nor does it have to respect the sequences observed in the interwar years, or reanimate old cultures. It could even adopt a patina of edgy cool, as with the alt-right: we should never underestimate the erotic glamour of fascism and its appeal to the death-drive.'

"The erotic glamour of fascism? The appeal to the death-drive? Lacan is now in the driver's seat, not Marx. Not being versed in Freudian psychoanalysis, I have no idea what this means. I guess I am a Marxist mouldy fig. I believe that people join fascist movements because they support a total war on the left and the creation of an absolutist state that will govern in their interests, at least based on the demagogy of the fascist leader. And primarily this meant solving the economic crisis. To the middle-class, Hitler promised eliminating the Jews who were ruining it. To the workers, it was job security and social benefits. To the bourgeoisie, it was a promise to put an end to working-class power. While Seymour's article barely mentions the USA, it does join with the leftist consensus in early 2017 that Trump was capable of imposing a fascist dictatorship: 'The attempt by Bannon and Miller to force a rupture in the American state was premature and voluntaristic. A more competent germinal fascism would take its time, patiently exploiting the fascist potential within the liberal state, to incubate and nurture the fascist monster of the future.' I generally bristle at the word 'rupture' since it smacks so much of the academic leftist prose that refuses to use a simple Anglo-Saxon word like 'break' or 'split'. What kind of split was Bannon trying to force? You'd think that Seymour regarded him as a latter-day Kurt von Schleicher who was a close adviser to Paul von Hindenberg. In 1930 he helped to topple the Social Democratic government, the first step in a series that would lead to Hitler becoming the German Chancellor. It was Schleicher who whispered in von Hindenberg's ear about the need to make Hitler Der Fuhrer. Does anybody in their right mind think that this was what Bannon was about? To whisper in Trump's ear about the need to arrest the leaders of the Democratic Party and to pare down the Republican Party to the narrow base that continues to back Trump? What then? Arrest the editors of the NY Times, Washington Post, MSNBC and CNN and put them in prison where they would be tortured or killed? What about the universities? Round up George Ciccariello-Maher, Jodi Dean and even Paul Krugman? That is what fascism would look like, after all." [Quoted from here; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added; several paragraphs merged.]

While Proyect is a little unfair here (for example, Richard isn't advocating the use of "European", he is merely summarising Octave Mannoni's ideas -- albeit somewhat uncritically --, and Seymour's use of "metabolised" is a perfectly acceptable metaphor, even if Proyect failed to understand it), it is clear that Seymour isn't the first to have had his thought-processes seriously clouded by French 'Philosophy' and 'Psychoanalysis', nor will he be the last. But then, he isn't the first to have had his thought-processes seriously compromised by Hegel, either -- and that includes Louis Proyect himself (who booted me off Marxmail for having the temerity to question the validity DM!).

"'Putting it into words' means giving form to existence, and there is no omnipotent father, Big Other, or whomever, to guarantee that superiority of one form over another. The metaphysic of writing that is implied by 'plain style' zealots, however, is that wherein writing is a ‘window on reality’, with the subject neatly extruded -- and that is, lamentably, how many people are taught to write.... On the left, this has to do with a half-digested puritanism, and a degree of 'workerist' (patronisingly anti-working class) anti-intellectualism." [Seymour, op cit.]

Neutral readers might be forgiven for thinking it a bit rich of Seymour characterising those who use 'plain words' as "workerist", "patronisingly anti-working class" and "anti-intellectual", when few workers will either read his prolix missives, and of those who do, few will understand a word of what they contain. That isn't to demean workers, since even those with degrees in Philosophy and Mathematics (like yours truly) find much of Seymour's more 'theoretical output' impossible to comprehend. [I think Louis Proyect also struggled with parts of Seymour's output.] Indeed, they might even go so far as to point out that it is surely the murky gobbledygook that HCD-comrades (like Seymour) churn out that is anti-working class (patronising or not). In fact, during debates I had with him over ten years ago it soon became apparent that Seymour had zero knowledge of Formal Logic (for example, he had never even heard of Russell's Paradox!) and Analytic Philosophy. That certainly helps explain why he thinks there is anything at all useful to learn from Lacan and Freud (other than, of course, how not to do philosophy or psychology). It is also revealing that he thinks regurgitating "half-digested" Lacan somehow means he can count himself as an 'intellectual', while others might feel fully justified in concluding the exact opposite about someone who offers zero evidence in support of his many wild allegations. But, as we have repeatedly seen, that is just par for the course in this backwater of fourth rate 'dialectical philosophy'.

[As far as 'puritanism' is concerned, Seymour blocked me on Twitter a few years ago when I had the temerity to point out to him some of the above (along with one or two other pertinent observations).]

It could be objected that Ms Lichtenstein [RL] is being inconsistent; happy to accuse others of uncritically accepting the obscure thought-forms of Traditional Philosophy, but seems quite content to accept Wittgenstein's work without so much as a quibble.

However, there is a world of difference between (i) Accepting the a priori theories and speculations of Traditional Philosophers and (ii) Employing a method (not a set of Superscientific Doctrines) that exposes, and thus helps terminate, this bogus ruling-class thought-form.

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context; LOI = Law of Identity; NON = Negation of the Negation.]

Some have argued that those who criticise Philosophy are forced to adopt or employ (often implicitly) an alternative Philosophy of some sort. Apparently, that is because it is (physically/psychologically?) impossible to avoid philosophising, which means critics can't evade having to argue from a philosophical stance (of some sort or description) in this respect. The implication here is quite clear: if the approach adopted at this site were correct, any alternative philosophy will automatically be tainted with ruling-class ideology, which can and must also compromise that approach.

Second, that response sounds suspiciously like the allegations thrown out by Theists (especially Fundamentalists) that atheists lie when they say they don't believe in 'God'. Apparently, deep down, we all 'know' 'He' exists (since, so the fable goes, 'knowledge of God' is part of 'His' image, supposedly implanted in us all at conception -- if so, why the desperate need to keep trying to prove 'He' exists?). Our 'arrogant denial' and 'rejection of God' is clear evidence of our sin and rebellion. No good emphatically repudiating that accusation, either; that will only confirm the 'depths of your iniquity'. Somewhat analogously, try telling a died-in-the-wool DM-fan (like, for instance, the late John Molyneux, quoted below) that not only don't you have a philosophy, we (i.e., humanity) would collectively be better off without that ruling-class thought-form, and see how far you get.

Third, even if it could be shown that many lay-philosophers (i.e., non-professionals) sometimes daydream about the nature of time, the 'meaning of life', or even whether a sound is made whenever a tree falls in a forest if there is no one around to hear it, such amateur speculations aren't to be compared with the detailed theories concocted by the likes of Plato, Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger. At least, dear reader, no more than floating a toy boat makes you an Admiral, swallowing a headache pill means you are a physician, or running for a bus implies you're an Olympian athlete!

Finally, maintaining the medical theme: the claim that we need a philosophy in order to counter the ideas of the ruling-class is no more convincing than arguing that a doctor, for example, has to be ill in order to be able to tackle disease. Or, even that in order to fight racism one has to be a racist!

Moreover, we have yet to shown the proof that it is "impossible not to philosophise". [On this, also see Note 88.]

"It is very difficult to sustain much ongoing political work for any length of time without a coherent alternative worldview to the dominant ideology which we encounter every day in the media (at work, at school, at college, etc.). A significant role in an alternative worldview is played by questions of philosophy. [Added in a footnote: To attempt an exact definition of philosophy at this point would be a difficult and lengthy distraction. But what I mean by it in this book is, roughly, 'general' or 'abstract' thinking about human beings and their relations between society and nature.]" [Molyneux (2012), p.5. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis and link added.]

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy -- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -- 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -- 'Fruit'…. Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -- 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'.... It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.' In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975a), pp.72-75. Italic emphases in the original; several paragraphs merged.]

"With the theoretical equipment inherited from Hegel it is, of course, not possible even to understand the empirical, material attitude of these people. Owing to the fact that Feuerbach showed the religious world as an illusion of the earthly world -- a world which in his writing appears merely as a phrase -- German theory too was confronted with the question which he left unanswered: how did it come about that people 'got' these illusions 'into their heads'? Even for the German theoreticians this question paved the way to the materialistic view of the world, a view which is not without premises, but which empirically observes the actual material premises as such and for that reason is, for the first time, actually a critical view of the world. This path was already indicated in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher -- in the Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie and Zur Judenfrage. But since at that time this was done in philosophical phraseology, the traditionally occurring philosophical expressions such as 'human essence', 'species', etc., gave the German theoreticians the desired reason for misunderstanding the real trend of thought and believing that here again it was a question merely of giving a new turn to their worn-out theoretical garment -- just as Dr. Arnold Ruge, the Dottore Graziano of German philosophy, imagined that he could continue as before to wave his clumsy arms about and display his pedantic-farcical mask. One has to 'leave philosophy aside' (Wigand, p.187, cf., Hess, Die letzten Philosophen, p.8), one has to leap out of it and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, for which there exists also an enormous amount of literary material, unknown, of course, to the philosophers. When, after that, one again encounters people like Krummacher or 'Stirner', one finds that one has long ago left them 'behind' and below. Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as onanism and sexual love. Saint Sancho, who in spite of his absence of thought -- which was noted by us patiently and by him emphatically -- remains within the world of pure thoughts, can, of course, save himself from it only by means of a moral postulate, the postulate of 'thoughtlessness' (p.196 of 'the book'). He is a bourgeois who saves himself in the face of commerce by the banqueroute cochenne [swinish bankruptcy -- RL] whereby, of course, he becomes not a proletarian, but an impecunious, bankrupt bourgeois. He does not become a man of the world, but a bankrupt philosopher without thoughts." [Marx and Engels (1976), p.236. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added. I have posted the entire passage so that readers can see it hasn't been quoted of context.]

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." [Theses on Feuerbach.]

"It can be seen how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, lose their antithetical character, and hence their existence as such antitheses, only in the social condition; it can be seen how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses themselves is possible only in a practical way, only through the practical energy of man, and how their resolution is for that reason by no means only a problem of knowledge, but a real problem of life, a problem which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it treated it as a purely theoretical problem." [Marx (1975b), p.354. Bold emphases alone added.]

Hence, according to Marx, "philosophy is nothing but religion rendered into thought" -- in other words, it is a far more abstract source of consolation than religion. Philosophy must, therefore, be "left aside"; one has to "leap out of it and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality", and that is because it stands in the same relation to the "study of the actual world" as onanism does to sexual love. Furthermore, Philosophy is based on "distorted language of the actual world", empty abstractions and invented concepts. No wonder then that Marx contrasts a desire to change the world with the empty and pointless ruling-class discipline, Philosophy.

In fact, after the mid-1840s, there are no positive, and very few even neutral comments about Philosophy in Marx's work.

[It could be objected that Marx made positive comments about dialectics throughout his life, both in published and unpublished work. I have dealt with that counter-claim in Essay Nine Part One, here and here.]

Indeed, as is well known, in 1847 Marx published The Poverty of Philosophy, the title of which is hardly a ringing endorsement! Here are a few relevant passages:

"If we had M. Proudhon's intrepidity in the matter of Hegelianism we should say: it is distinguished in itself from itself. What does this mean? Impersonal reason, having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an object to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose itself, is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and composing itself -- position, opposition, composition. Or, to speak Greek -- we have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For those who do not know the Hegelian language: affirmation, negation and negation of the negation. That is what language means. It is certainly not Hebrew (with due apologies to M. Proudhon); but it is the language of this pure reason, separate from the individual. Instead of the ordinary individual with his ordinary manner of speaking and thinking we have nothing but this ordinary manner purely and simply -- without the individual.

"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction -- for we have here an abstraction, and not an analysis -- presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that, if you leave out of account the limits of this body; you soon have nothing but a space -- that if, finally, you leave out of the account the dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical category. Thus the metaphysicians who, in making these abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their core -- these metaphysicians in turn are right in saying that things here below are embroideries of which the logical categories constitute the canvas. This is what distinguishes the philosopher from the Christian. The Christian, in spite of logic, has only one incarnation of the Logos; with the philosopher there is no end to incarnations. If all that exists, all that lives on land, and under water can be reduced by abstraction to a logical category -- if the whole real world can be drowned thus in a world of abstractions, in the world of logical categories -- who need be astonished at it?

"All that exists, all that lives on land and under water, exists and lives only by some kind of movement. Thus, the movement of history produces social relations; industrial movement gives us industrial products, etc. Just as by dint of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition -- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement. If one finds in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has found in the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only explains all things, but also implies the movement of things.... Up to now we have expounded only the dialectics of Hegel. We shall see later how M. Proudhon has succeeded in reducing it to the meanest proportions. Thus, for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is happening in his own mind. Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the history of philosophy, of his own philosophy. There is no longer a 'history according to the order in time,' there is only 'the sequence of ideas in the understanding.' He thinks he is constructing the world by the movement of thought, whereas he is merely reconstructing systematically and classifying by the absolute method of thoughts which are in the minds of all." [Marx (1976a), pp.162-65. Italic emphases in the original. Minor typos and a few major errors corrected. (I have informed the editors at the Marxist Internet Archive about them!) Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged; link added.]

Like all too many others who claim to be Marxists, Molyneux blithely ignores these very clear statements from Marx. Recall these quotes aren't from me, or Eduard Bernstein, or Karl Korsch, or James Burnham, or, indeed, anyone else -- they are from Marx himself!

Moreover, nowhere does Marx tell his readers that revolutionaries need a 'world-view' (either to keep their spirits up, provide them with an alternative approach aimed at countering the dominant world-views they regularly face, or, indeed, for any other reason). Quite the opposite, in fact, he tells them to abandon Philosophy! As we have seen elsewhere in this Essay, since Ancient Greek times the dominant world-view in the 'West' was based on the belief that there is a hidden, 'abstract' world anterior to the senses, 'underlying appearances', that is more real than the material world we see around us. [There were also analogous developments in the 'East'.] Hence, according to this archaic dogma, it is the philosopher's job to concoct increasingly obscure theories about this invisible world -- every single one of which was based on 'thought', 'concepts' or words and nothing else -- which were then dogmatically imposed on 'Reality'.

Later on in Molyneux's book (but similar ideas can be found in his other writings on dialectics), without blinking, he blithely presents his readers yet more of the same. So, far from providing us with a genuinely alternative world-view (to counter the traditional world-view that promotes the doctrine that there exists a Super-Real World of 'essences' underlying 'appearances'), he serves up his own version of it -- which turns out to be a re-hash of ideas Heraclitus, Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Trotsky imposed on the world, in like manner.

Marx was admirably clear: he predicted ideas like this would always rule (at least while there exists a ruling-class), and we can now see why he was 100% right, even with respect to his erstwhile followers. What Molyneux and others (mentioned earlier) have to offer their readers is a pale reflection of this ancient world-view, only now given a left-looking veneer!

The next few pages of his book provide a slightly clearer perspective on what Molyneux means by "philosophy":

"In the course of discussion with a friend or workmate they retort 'But there's one thing you've forgotten: you can't change human nature,' or 'But there's always going to be rich and poor, always has been, always will be!' In a debate in the movement someone says 'The real problem is the Tories; we must all unite to get rid of them and get in Labour. Then things will be better.' On a university sociology course the professor says, 'Of course, Marx believed that communism was inevitable, but as social scientists we have to reject such dogmatic views,' or 'Marxism reduces everything to economics and class, but sociology nowadays is more complex and sophisticated than that.' All of these statements have an immediate plausibility -- they seem to appeal to 'common sense'. This is because they rest on a worldview, a philosophy, systematically developed, perfected one might say, by our rulers, the capitalist class and its philosophical ideologues, over centuries and disseminated through innumerable channels to every corner of society. To answer them requires an equally developed and coherent philosophy from our side. Fortunately, such a philosophy exists -- Marxism!" [Molyneux (2012), pp.5-6. Bold emphasis added.]

First of all, it is far from clear that the above 'beliefs' are, or ever were, based on the "systematically developed" philosophy "perfected by...the capitalist class and its ideologies" that Molyneux speaks about. This isn't to deny the ideas of the ruling class always rule, it is to question whether "You can't change human nature..." and "The real problem is the Tories..." (etc.) are based on anything that can be called a philosophy. But, even if Molyneux (or anyone else!) could show such beliefs are, were or have ever been based on a philosophy of some sort, why that would require a competitor philosophy to counter it has yet to be made clear. As this site has shown, all such philosophies can be countered far more effectively by showing they are all incoherent non-sense. Of course, no one realistically expects Molyneux and other Dialectical Marxists to accept such a (seemingly glib) response. Far from it! But that shouldn't distract us from the fact that DM-fans in general, and Molyneux in particular, have yet to show that an alternative philosophy is still required. Simply asserting that one such is necessary isn't enough.

Second, it isn't too clear, either, how beating the Tories and voting Labour, or how the (false) claim that Marx allegedly reduced everything to class and economics, or even how he supposedly believed communism was inevitable, are part of 'common sense'. It is even less easy to see how the ruling-class (or, indeed, their ideologues) have been perfecting such ideas for "centuries" (with remarkable prescience in relation to the Labour Party, it would seem!). But, once again, even if all of this were crystal clear, and Molyneux was completely correct that these ideas encapsulate, or form part of, "common sense", it is still far from obvious why we need a world-view to counter them individually or even collectively. Surely, they can all be challenged by an appeal to the facts: Did Marx think communism was inevitable or did he not? Answer: "'No' and here are the reasons and the quotes...". Did he reduce everything to economics and class, or did he not? Answer: "'No', and here are the reasons and the quotes...." Is the Labour Party capable of 'making things better' or is it not? Similar response, except we point to its horrendous history and current structure and priorities. The other issues Molyneux mentioned can surely be neutralised in much the same way: is it a historical or scientific fact whether or not human nature is fixed? Is it a historical or scientific fact whether or not poverty is inevitable?

This isn't, of course, to argue that right-wingers will accept replies like these and change their minds as a result. Again, far from it! Anyone who has tangled with any of those characters will know only too well they are highly allergic to facts and profoundly deaf to counter-arguments. Over the last eight years I have been arguing with well over three hundred such individuals on Quora (and that figure is no exaggeration, either!). As a result I can count on the fingers of a severely mutilated hand the number of right-wingers who have responded in a non-aggressive, non-negative manner, or have actually engaged in honest debate. In the comment section under this answer on Quora alone, I have 'debated' such issues with over fifty right-wingers, conservatives and Trump fans, and every single one exhibited the above traits, and many more besides (which includes abuse -- in fact, all too many were uncomfortably reminiscent of the reaction I often also receive from Dialectical Marxists -- but compounded, in this case, by several threats of violence from assorted anti-Marxists). But, arguing with right-wingers isn't the same as discussing revolutionary ideas with fellow comrades, interested 'contacts' or workers. Does anyone seriously think that those who refuse to listen to the facts or pay heed to careful scientific arguments will be persuaded by a swift dose of dialectics? You might as well try to sell them astrological nostrums or The Gaia Hypothesis -- equally bizarre and weak fantasies.

Why then do we need a world-view? Couldn't we make do with scientific theory and hard evidence? Why do we even need a philosophical theory? Exactly what has an 'abstract' system -- which is how Molyneux himself characterises Philosophy -- got to offer those who are pondering political or scientific questions like those he mentioned? Precisely which 'abstractions', which 'essences', will help persuade someone drawn into the periphery of our movement, or who joins for the first time, that the Labour Party will always fail workers, for instance? Or, that Marx didn't think communism was inevitable?

Third, in his articles and blog posts Molyneux himself counters beliefs like those above, not with an appeal to any sort of philosophy, but with facts and concepts drawn from HM. The same is generally the case with other Dialectical Marxists who also appeal to ideas drawn from HM, but not from DM -- indeed, as I have argued in Essay Nine Part One (slightly modified):

[It is worth pointing out that the material below depends heavily on the evidence and argument presented in other Essays at this site, which have demonstrated time and again that DM makes not one ounce of sense, that its core ideas soon fall apart when examined closely, and, indeed, that they are far too vague and confused to be assessed even for their truth or falsehood. On this, see Essays Three Part One to Eight Part Three. That isn't the case with HM.]

It could be objected that the distinction drawn between DM and HM at this site is completely spurious; hence, the controversial claims made in this Essay are completely misguided, if not downright mendacious.

However, as will be argued in Essay Fourteen Part Two, HM contains ideas that are non-sensical only when they are translated into, or are corrupted by, DM-jargon. The eminent good sense made by HM -- even as that theory is understood by workers when they encounter it (often in times of struggle) -- testifies to this.

The clear distinction that exists between these two theories isn't just a wild idea advanced at this site; it can be seen clearly in the day-to-day practice of revolutionaries themselves. No Marxist of any intelligence would use slogans drawn exclusively from DM to communicate with workers; indeed, few militants would even attempt to agitate strikers, for example, with the conundrums found in DM. On a picket line the alleged contradictory nature of motion or the limitations of the LOI don't often crop up. How frequently does the link between part and whole loom large in the fight against the Nazis? How many times do revolutionary socialists have to explain the distinction, or even the link, between 'quantity and quality' in the fight against, say, austerity?

Consider, for example, the following slogans: "The Law of Identity is true only within certain limits and the opposition to sanctions on Venezuela!" Or "Change in quantity leads to change in quality and the defence of pensions!" Or: "The whole is greater than the sum of the parts and the campaign to keep hospital HH open!" Or even, "Being is identical with, but at the same time different from, Nothing, the contradiction resolved by Becoming, and the fight against the deportation of Abrego Garcia!"

Slogans like these would be employed by militants of uncommon stupidity and legendary ineffectiveness.

[Excellent examples of the utter uselessness of the above 'laws' can be found here and here.]

In contrast, active revolutionaries employ ideas drawn exclusively from HM -- as that theory applies concretely to the current state of the class war -- if they want to communicate with workers. The vast majority of revolutionary papers, for example, use ordinary language coupled with concepts drawn from HM to agitate and propagandise; rarely do they employ DM-phraseology. [A handful examples of the latter have been considered here.]

"[Red] Saunders thinks that the IS [which was the forerunner of the UK-SWP -- RL] attracted the best of the 1968 generation through its politics -- 'Neither Washington nor Moscow' -- but also through the accessibility of its publications, it used ordinary language rather than the jargon of other far-left groups." [Birchall (2011), p.422.]

Only deeply sectarian rags of exemplary unpopularity and impressive lack of impact use ideas and terminology lifted from DM to try to educate or propagandise the working class. Newsline (the daily paper of the old WRP) was notorious in this regard; but like the Dinosaurs it resembled, it is no more. [The NON, it seems, took appropriate revenge. Of course, other groups have descended with modification from the old WRP, but the original party is now defunct.]

It could be objected that no one would actually use slogans drawn from certain areas of HM to communicate with or agitate workers. That doesn't mean HM is of no use, so the same must be true of DM. For example, who shouts slogans about "Base and Superstructure", or "Relative Surplus Value" on paper sales? Who tries to propagandise workers with facts about the role of the peasantry in the decline of feudalism? Once more, this shows the distinction drawn in this Essay is entirely bogus.

While it is true that no one shouts slogans about the relation between "Base and Superstructure" on paper sales, or prints strike leaflets reminding militants of the role of the peasantry in the decline of feudalism, they nevertheless still use slogans (often popularised versions) drawn exclusively from HM, or which connect with HM as it relates concretely to current events in the class war. Hence, virtually every article, leaflet or slogan is informed by ideas drawn from HM.

In stark contrast, again, none at all (of this nature) are drawn from DM.

Admittedly, revolutionary publications in general casually employ a handful of jargonised expressions drawn from DM (in the vast majority cases this is confined to the use of the word "contradiction") in some of their articles, but it forms only a very minor part of their output, even though few, if any, comrades will use such terms in slogans on street sales, on demonstrations or in discussions on a picket line.

Anyway, as will be shown in Part Two of this Essay, the use of DM-terminology like this is merely a nod in the direction of tradition and orthodoxy. Indeed, we are forced to conclude this since no sense can made of such jargon -- as we have seen, for instance, here, here, here and here. Hence, the employment of 'dialectical-terminology' simply amounts to a declaration, or an admission of 'orthodoxy', on the part of the individual or group using it -- which therefore amounts to an 'in-group'/'out-group' marker, as argued here. Such jargon does no real work (other than negative) in circumstances like these -- unlike concepts and terminology drawn from HM. [On this, see Montell (2021). In case of misunderstanding, readers are encouraged to check out my remarks about cults posted earlier.]

So, just like Marx in Das Kapital, revolutionary papers merely "coquette" with Hegelian jargon -- and even then, only "here and there".

Hence, at least at the level of practice, where the party interfaces with the working class and the material world, DM is totally useless.

[As we will also see here, there is no evidence that DM, or any of its jargon, was actively used even by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, or, indeed, for several years after.]

Consequently, tested in practice -- or, rather, tested by being left out of practice -- the status of DM is plain for all to see: At best, it is a hindrance; at worst, it would totally isolate revolutionaries and make them look ridiculous.

This shows that the distinction drawn at this site between DM and HM isn't spurious in the least.

When they communicate with workers, active revolutionaries draw this distinction all the time.

Nevertheless, it could be argued in response that this attempt to separate HM and DM would fragment and compartmentalise our knowledge of nature and society. Such an 'alternative approach' to knowledge would possess clear, Idealist implications, suggesting that human beings are unique by implying that mind is independent of matter. If mind is dependent on matter (howsoever that link is conceived) there must be laws that span across the divide (so to speak). And that is partly where DM comes in.

But, that isn't so. As noted above, DM is far too vague and confused for it to function in that way. It is incapable of accounting for anything, social or natural (as the Essays at this site have repeatedly demonstrated -- indeed, as we have seen, if DM were true, change would actually be impossible). Hence, even if there were natural laws that governed these two spheres (and I will register no opinion that possibility here -- but I will do so in Essay Thirteen Part Three), and an inventory were drawn up of all the viable alternative theories capable of accounting for the above hypothetical connection, DM wouldn't even make the bottom of the reserve list of likely candidates. It is far too vague and confused.

In response, it could be argued that the above counter-argument is totally unacceptable since it ignores the fact that some of the best class fighters in history have not only put dialectics into practice, they have stitched it into the fabric of each and every classic and post-classic Marxist text. Without dialectics there would be no Marxist theory. Indeed, without DM, HM would be like "a clock without a spring":

"While polemicising against opponents who consider themselves -- without sufficient reason -- above all as proponents of 'theory,' the article deliberately did not elevate the problem to a theoretical height. It was absolutely necessary to explain why the American 'radical' intellectuals accept Marxism without the dialectic (a clock without a spring)." [Trotsky (1971), p.56. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

I have dealt with that objection in Part Two, here, so readers are directed there for more details.

The other claim (concerning matter and 'mind') was tackled in extensive detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three.

So, if any theory is required (in order to counter the 'common sense' ideas to which Molyneux alluded), it is HM, not DM. And HM is a scientific, not a philosophical, theory.

Should the above advice be ignored and those who become interested in Marxism are plied with 'dialectics', they will very likely be put off revolutionary politics. That is because a barrage of 'abstractions' will be thrown at them in answer to the sort of questions Molyneux posed, which 'abstractions' turn out to be far more obscure than the original questions themselves ever were.

But, even if it turns out that we do need a few 'abstractions', why can't those drawn from HM serve just as well, or even better? This is all the more so since the 'abstractions' drawn from, or based on, 'dialectics' fall apart alarmingly quickly, and which, if 'true', would, once more, make change impossible.

The problem is that Molyneux's 'definition' of Philosophy is totally inadequate (I suspect he hasn't given it much thought -- or, if he has, he should have given it much more), since it blurs the distinction we should normally want to draw between (i) Ordinary matters of fact, (ii) Scientific questions, theories and truths, (iii) More general, abstract areas of study (such as Mathematics, Logic, and Theoretical Physics), and (iv) Empty philosophical speculation. While it is plain that we need the first three of the latter, Molyneux has yet to show we need the fourth.

Another pressing question also requires an answer: Why were Molyneux's examples/questions taken from social, political and historical subject areas? In order to illustrate the 'invaluable nature of dialectics' one would have thought he should have chosen several from areas that impinge on DM. In that case, it is pertinent to ask: In connection with the fight against capitalism, why on earth do we need to know (a) what happens when water boils, (b) why the Mamelukes can't quite match the fighting prowess of Napoleon's infantry, (c) why the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, (d) why A doesn't equal A, or even (e) why Being is the same as, but different from, Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming? The answer is quite plain, not only is DM useless even here, we don't need to know the answer to any of these additional questions (always assuming there is anyone on the planet who actually understands the last one, about 'Being' and 'Nothing') in any struggle (large or small) against the current system.

Molyneux then proceeds to argue that the more involved an individual becomes in the leadership of the movement, the more "questions of philosophy become important". [Molyneux (2012), p.6.] Unfortunately, the history of our movement shows that that is undeniable, but that fact has proved to be detrimental to Marxism, as we have seen in Essay Nine Parts One and Two. There, it was pointed out that:

Unlike HM, DM can't form a theoretical foundation for the "world-view of the proletariat", and because of that it has had to be imposed on what few workers Dialectical Marxism has managed to attract to its ranks over the last 150 years.... Since DM also depends on easily identifiable ruling-class forms of thought, it has had to brought to workers and "from the outside".... In addition, this imposition runs 'against the grain' (so to speak) of workers' materialist good sense. As a result, it will be argued that DM is the ideology of substitutionist elements within our movement. Furthermore, since it is also possible to show that 'dialectics' is a total mystery -- even to DM-theorists themselves(!) --, it can't provide revolutionary socialists with a scientific or philosophical foundation, either for their politics or their practice. In which case, DM not only doesn't, it can't, 'reflect the experience of the party or the class'. [Quoted from here, slightly edited.]

Dialectics (either in its DM-, or its 'Materialist Dialectics' [MD-], incarnation) occupies, or has occupied, a key role in addressing and satisfying the contingent psychological needs of prominent Dialectical Marxists (factors that have also been highlighted by Marx and other Marxists). In addition, it will also be shown how and why Hegel's influence has assisted in the corruption of our movement from top to bottom (aggravating, but not causing, sectarian in-fighting, fostering splits and expulsions that often arise as a result), revealing, too, why DM has had such a deleterious and narcoleptic effect on militant minds. These untoward consequences will then be linked to the class origin and current class position of leading revolutionaries -- those who have helped shape our movement and its core ideas.

It will also be revealed how and why the above comrades are particularly susceptible to ideas that have been peddled by ruling-class theorists for thousands of years -- specifically, the doctrine that there is a 'hidden world', a world of 'abstractions' and 'essences', anterior to 'appearances' that is more real than the material universe we see around us (in the sense that these 'abstractions' are somehow capable of rendering objects and processes in nature concrete, an ancient idea that implies nature is insufficient to itself, and needs 'Ideas', or 'Concepts', to make it 'Real'), which 'secret world' can be accessed by thought alone.

In short, it will be shown that this theory has played a key role in rendering Dialectical Marxism synonymous with political and theoretical impotency --, which, naturally, helps explain its long-term lack of success.

[Notice the use of the indefinite article here -- i.e., in "a key role". I am not blaming all our woes on this theory! Doubters should read this caveat on the opening page of the site, in the right-hand column.]

Hence, if, as Molyneux imagines, practice is to be our guide and serve as the legitimator of truth, then practice has returned an unambiguous verdict: we should ditch this ruling-class thought-form [DM] since it has served us rather badly, if not disastrously, for well over a century.

Molyneux then argues that since religion is the most widespread form of philosophy, revolutionaries need to be philosophically aware, or trained to some extent in that discipline in order to counter it. [Molyneux (2012), pp.6-7.] But, it is plain that Molyneux has here conflated Theology (and possibly even Philosophical Theology) with religious belief. The latter clearly isn't a philosophy, but an affectation and response to alienation, as Marx pointed out. Sure, it may give rise to certain philosophical ideas or questions (i.e., those expressed by, or formalised in, Theology itself), but that still doesn't make it a philosophy.

Even so, anyone who thinks they can counter the arguments of sophisticated theologians with the sort of fourth-rate philosophy found in textbooks on 'dialectics' will be sadly disappointed, especially given the additional fact that it is itself a bargain basement version of Mystical Christian Hermeticism (upside down or 'the right way up'). In which case, if we needed a philosophy to counter Theology and religious affectation, DM would the very last thing we should turn to!

Anyway, it is possible to counter Theology reasonably successfully without the use of a philosophical theory. [I have done just that, here. (Unfortunately, that link is now dead, but a more recent, much briefer version of my argument can be accessed here.)]

Molyneux also claims that activists need a solid theoretical grounding in the historical development of religion, as well as a secure understanding of the politics and social forces underlying religious movements. [Ibid., p.7.] But, once more, he has conflated History, Religious Studies, the Sociology of Religion and Political Theory with Philosophy, per se. All of these (except the last, Philosophy) are, or can easily become, part of HM. Why we need an extra input from Philosophy is still far from clear.

Finally, Molyneux also points out that Philosophy is essential for those who hope to understand the complex tactical alternative approaches required by any intervention in the class struggle. [Ibid., p.7.] But, once again, that is a core part of HM. DM is useless in this regard. To repeat: who shouts slogans about quantity turning into quality on a demonstration? Who points out that truth is the whole at an anti-war meeting or when composing a strike leaflet? Who even so much as mentions the alleged fact that the nature of the part is determined by its relation to the whole, and vice versa, when countering the arguments of trade union bureaucrats? Who in their left mind points out that being is identical with, but at the same time different from, nothing, the contradiction resolved in becoming, on a paper sale? Or even in an argument with reformists?

Only those the worse for drink or drugs -- or, maybe someone who has just escaped from a padded cell --, that's who!

So, the 'Marxist case' (or, indeed, any case!) for Philosophy has yet to be made.

But even if Marxists needed a philosophy of some sort, we can surely do better than this fourth rate joke of an alternative: DM! What an insult it is to the workers' movement having to promote this p*ss poor 'theory'/'method' as our 'philosophy'. Haven't workers suffered enough under capitalism? Why twist the knife?

[To anyone who thinks otherwise and who still believes we need a philosophy: please email me with your best argument.]

Update July 2017: I have just read Andrew Collier's book on Marxism (i.e., Collier (2004)); there he attempts to minimise or even explain away Marx's anti-philosophical remarks along with his unambiguous repudiation of that bogus ruling-class discipline. Collier then tries to argue that not only does Marxism itself need a philosophy, he claims Marx himself possessed one (pp.117-30).

"Marx was, by training, a philosopher. He studied philosophy at university, and obtained a doctorate for a thesis on ancient Greek philosophy. He writes like a philosopher; the attention to the analysis of concepts and their precise use, the logical structure of his arguments, all show the methods and skills of a philosopher to a high degree. His reputation today is probably higher among philosophers than in any other academic discipline, and deservedly so: in his manner of argument, he is a philosopher, and one of the greatest." [Collier (2004), p.117.]

While Collier gives no examples of the "logical structure" of Marx's writings, or his "attention to the analysis of concepts", it is reasonably clear that in his early writings Marx was indeed a (dogmatic) philosopher of some sort, albeit in the Hegelian and Feuerbachian traditions. As I have shown, the opposite is the case after the 1840s. [See also here and here.] Even so, it is far from clear that Marx's reputation among professional philosophers is as Collier alleges -- at least, if we confine our attention to Analytic Philosophy, which is still perhaps the dominant tradition. What Collier says may still be true among 'Continental Philosophers', however. As pointed out above, if we examine Marx's later work, it is clear that Marx was an anti-philosopher -- as Collier himself reluctantly has to admit:

"Yet from 1845 on, the subject matter of his writing is not, for the most part, philosophy, but social science and political commentary. Much of what he says in 1845 gives the impression of consciously turning his back on philosophy." [Ibid., p.117. Bold emphasis added.]

Collier then quotes Marx's comment that we should "leave philosophy aside", adding this thought:

"There have always been some Marxists -- and, at times, Engels comes close to being one of them -- who have proclaimed that with Marx, philosophy comes to an end, and is replaced by something else." [Ibid., p.117.]

Of course, the argument developed at this site isn't that Philosophy comes to an end with Marx; it is in fact that it never had a beginning, except as a vehicle for highly abstract forms of ruling-class ideology and the promotion of "the ideas of the ruling-class". As Marx himself points out:

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. Bold emphases added.]

A passage Collier doesn't quote, not even once! And it isn't hard to see why: it torpedoes his entire argument.

So, what does Collier offer in response? He argues first of all that Marx supported the aims of The Enlightenment, which included a belief that it was possible for human reason to understand the world in order to help change it:

"When in his early works he first talks about an end for philosophy, he is mainly thinking of the project of emancipation by reason, and he does not mean that philosophy should be superseded by science and laid aside; he means that what philosophy has projected theoretically -- human emancipation based on reason -- should be realised in practice." [Collier (2004), pp.118-19.]

So, rather like the 'followers' of the 'Prince of Peace' (Jesus Christ) --, who told his disciples to love their enemies and do good to those who hate them -- who now try to tell us that he really didn't mean this, he meant the opposite. So, we should torture, shoot, stab and bomb any such enemies. In a similar way, Collier now tries to tell us that when Marx says that Philosophy is really a different form of religion -- and hence an expression of human alienation "equally to be condemned" -- and that we should "leave Philosophy" and devote ourselves to the study of the actual world (i.e., that we should in fact replace Philosophy with science!), he 'really meant' we shouldn't do any of that!

"One has to 'leave philosophy aside'..., one has to leap out of it and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality...." [Marx and Engels (1976), p.236.]

"When he talks about philosophy in The German Ideology, however, he is thinking of philosophy as speculation, and saying that this is no way to find out how the world works." [Collier (2004), p.118. Italic emphasis in the original.]

That is, of course, Collier's interpretation in support which he offers no textual evidence, and which, incidentally, flies in the face of what Marx actually wrote about philosophy post 1844. But, let us suppose for the sake of argument that Collier is right; what exactly will be left of this discipline if it has had its 'speculative' heart removed? Collier doesn't say.

What Collier does claim is that Marx's later work has a distinct philosophical content (p.118). However, it turns out that this 'philosophical content' is confined to questions relating to methodology in the social sciences -- specifically, questions about 'abstraction'. In support, Collier (partially) quotes the following passage from the Grundrisse (which I have reproduced in full):

"It seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete…with e.g. the population…. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest…. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and I would then, by further determination, move toward ever more simple concepts, from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations…. The latter is obviously scientifically the correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse." [Marx (1973), pp.100-01. I have analysed this passage in greater detail, here.]

Why Collier counts this as a philosophical question he unwisely left his readers to guess. Certainly Marx never described it that way, nor does he even nod in that direction. In fact, Marx says that this is "scientifically the correct method". It seems Collier is an expert at ignoring what Marx actually says, substituting for it what he would like him to have said!

Collier then moves off in a more traditional direction and attempts to recruit Marx's comments about "the dialectic method" to the cause of confirming his [Marx's] continued interest in Philosophy, even though he [Collier] also appears to deny 'the dialectic' operates throughout nature (p.125). Unfortunately, however, in so doing Collier committed a serious error. He both interprets and applies this 'method' by appealing to Fichtean Triplicity (!) -- of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" -- which has zero to do with Hegel's method. [On that, see here.]

Collier also quotes a few passages from Das Kapital where Marx allegedly uses Hegelian terms like "contradiction" and "negation"; since I have dealt with that topic at length in Essay Nine Part One -- here and here -- readers are directed there for more details. Collier then veers off at a tangent and tries to saddle Marx with a 'materialist ontology' (pp.125-28), in support of which he once again offers no textual evidence.

That is it! That is the extent of Collier's 'proof' that Marx didn't leave Philosophy -- contrary to what he himself declared.

Finally, as pointed out earlier, there is a world of difference between the amateurish, disconnected and tentative musings (for instance, about time, existence, ethics, or the 'meaning of life', etc., etc.) that ordinary humans sometimes engage in (perhaps down at the pub after a few too many jars?) and the systematic theory-building of Traditional Philosophy.

[The word "amateurish" isn't being used here in a derogatory or prejudicial sense. It merely serves to contrast the thoughts of Professional Dogma-Meisters (of the sort Chomsky mentioned) -- who indulge in systematic philosophising and who are fully employed in the production of 'High Theory' -- with the impromptu, disorganised ruminations of avowed non-professionals.]

[This sub-section is a recap of earlier results, but from a slightly different angle. It can be skipped by anyone who has 'got the point'. Begin again here.]

M22: "[M]otion [is] an inseparable property of matter." [Lenin (1972), p.323. Italic emphasis added.]

In so far as M22 purports to inform us about the properties of matter, it certainly resembles a scientific statement. However, as we have seen, when examined it turns out to be nothing of the sort. Contrast M22 with the following:

Here, we can imagine conditions under which M23 would be false and M23a true (think of ice or steam). But, M22 is a very much stronger claim than M23, and is clearly connected with M1a (or, indeed, with M9 and P4, reproduced below). We can see this if we examine it more closely.^88a

If M22 is re-written slightly and tidied up to eliminate the unnecessary detail, it would become M24:

M24 is apparently always true; its 'truth' is clearly connected with the supposed meaning of words like "motion", "matter" and "inseparable", etc., -- at least as far as Lenin and Engels understood them -- all three of which are ultimately based on the presumed truth of P4.

By asserting M24 (or M1a), Lenin certainly didn't mean to suggest that even if we were to try really, really hard we would still fail to separate in our thought the two words or 'concepts', "motion" and "matter" (i.e., what they meant or what they allegedly reflected). Lenin plainly wasn't informing us that while that would prove to be an extremely difficult physical or mental challenge, we could still make some attempt to imagine a scenario where they were or could be separated. He was claiming that we would find we always failed, and could never succeed -- even more so than any suggestion could turn out to be true that a normal human being could eat an entire adult Blue Whale in less than ten seconds.

Lenin was clearly alluding to a connection between matter and motion that was much tighter than this. He was perhaps reminding us of the futility of trying -- that this wasn't even an option --, just as it wouldn't be an option for anyone attempting to disassociate oddness from the number three, or the concept, king-killer from regicide, for instance.⁸⁹

Hence, if we were to view M23 exactly as Lenin viewed M24, it would appear to mean that not only could water not be non-liquid, nothing other than water could be liquid. It would therefore imply that water wasn't just the only liquid, it was the only liquid that could exist in the entire universe -- and that liquidity was the only conceivable form of water. Of course, any such claim would be ridiculous, but Lenin is making a hyper-bold claim like this about matter and motion, which if transferred across to water and liquidity would have had those weird implications. For Lenin, matter is the only thing that moves and anything that moves is material.

Hence, for him, matter is the only conceivable form of motion in the entire universe.

That is because, for Lenin, motion wasn't just one of the defining characteristics of matter, nothing that moves (outside of the 'mind') would fail to be material. Motion is, as it were, super-glued to matter and only to matter -- and, indeed, vice versa -- again, according to Lenin. [He says this over and over again in MEC; on that see here.] And, what is more, this covers everything external to the mind in the entire universe!

Hence, the same would have to be true with respect to water, if we were to read the connection expressed in M23 as strictly as we are meant to interpret the link in M24.

The main verb in M24 is clearly in the indicative mood. But, if M24 were an empirical proposition, its negation, M24a, would make sense, and yet for Lenin it doesn't -- indeed, it is "unthinkable", unlike the negation of M23 (i.e., M23a). That is because, once again, M24 holds open no truth possibilities; it asserts only one envisaged necessity.

Lenin obviously believed that it was impossible even to think the falsehood of M24 -- any more than it might be possible to think there were or could be a triangle with four vertices. As we have seen, in this he openly agreed with Engels:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

Nevertheless, and once again, the indicative mood of the main verb in M24 hides its real nature. Only a consideration of the overall use of this claim (that is, its role within Lenin's 'system of ideas') in the end reveals it as a metaphysical sentence, which plainly wasn't derived from the evidence but from the supposed meaning of a handful of words.

None of the above remarks imply the present author has adopted or agrees with the CTT, or, indeed, any version of the 'picture theory of representation', but Lenin appears to have accepted the former, and possibly a simplified version of the latter. [Again on this see Essay Thirteen Part One. The CTT will be covered in more detail in Essay Ten Part Two.]

On the basis of most versions of the CTT, empirical propositions are said to "picture" or "represent" certain states of affairs in the world -- so that if what they say obtains they are true, otherwise they are false. But, that condition is in fact a grammatical point about how we use certain expressions (which aspect of our use of language is itself contingent on how we have developed as a species, how we communicate with one another). It isn't a 'necessary truth' about 'representation as such' -- which point was established earlier on in this Essay. In which case, what some versions of the CTT attempt to say turns out to be a garbled "form of representation". In contrast the approach adopted at this site isn't a 'philosophical theory about reality' -- or even about 'the nature of the proposition' -- it is a form of representation that attempts to capture how we actually use such words. Social practices ground such rules (expressed in and by a given form of representation), not a set of a priori 'truths', 'valid in all possible worlds'. As we have seen, that is why metaphysical sentences turn out to be a confused expression of an idiosyncratic use of language.

Of course, we could always say that it is thought that connects an empirical proposition with the world, since it is up to each language user to 'connect' their thoughts (expressed by just such a proposition) with 'reality'.

To that end, let us suppose there is some theory, X, which holds that if a 'thought', "T", or other 'act of cognition', 'AC', were required to connect an empirical proposition, "E", to the a specific, independently identifiable, feature of 'external reality', "F" -- in whatever way or manner it was imagined to take place or even be possible. In that case, an explanation would be required that made plain what connects T (or AC) to E, and then what uniquely links any of the latter to F, and with nothing else.** Clearly, an answer to such questions can't appeal to a linguistic characterisation of F (call that, if it exists, "P₁"), or it would become a circular theory. In that eventuality, a second proposition, P₁, would now connect the first proposition, E, with F. Clearly, the next question would be "What connects P₁ with 'reality'? Yet another proposition, P₂? Rinse and repeat, yielding P₂, P₃..., P_i..., P_n.

This is yet another dead end, since without P₁, P₂, P₃..., P_i..., P_n (call this set "P_ω") we wouldn't know precisely what T, or E, or AC were in fact related to 'in reality -- if X were true.

Hence, for theory X to be true, 'thought' (in the shape of a potentially infinite set of propositions, P_ω) would now take precedence over 'reality', the exact opposite to whatever result DM-theorists had anticipated. If cognition, or 'thought', are required to adjudicate here (as we saw was the case with Lenin's theory, which inserts a layer of 'images' between each individual and 'reality'), then 'reality' simply becomes a creation of thought. Or, perhaps better: if cognition, or 'thought', are required to adjudicate here, 'reality' must be 'thought'!

Such an outcome should surprise no one given what Marx said about the nature of Traditional Philosophy and what we have discovered about the origin of DM in Mystical Christianity. This means that in order to forestall such an anti-materialist result, whatever it is that 'connects' proposition, E, with the world, it can't be a 'thought' -- at least, not without any theory that proposed this lapsing into full blown Idealism.

[**The point of that remark will become clearer when Interlude Eight has been completed. As the above remarks suggest, 'nothing connects' a proposition with the world, for that would be to treat propositions as objects, or the Proper Names thereof. I have said more about that here, here, here and here.]

In addition, questions would now be asked about the supposed link between F and P, answers to which would soon spiral off into yet another infinite regress. [That unappealing task will be left for the reader to complete, but a useful hint was given earlier.]

[Expressed differently, this was in fact one of the main themes of Wittgenstein's Tractatus [i.e., Wittgenstein (1972)]. The CTT itself flounders on this rock, too, which means that, contrary to widely held views, the Tractatus doesn't contain, or express, a version of the CTT, nor one remotely like it. Wittgenstein's concern there was to examine, and then specify, the logical principles underlying the capacity language has to represent the world. (There will be more on this in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two. Until then, the reader is directed to White (2006) for more details.)]

Nevertheless, sentences are material objects (or 'processes') in their own right. They exist as marks on the page or as sound patterns in the air, etc. In that case, it is difficult to see what could correctly connect just this set of molecules (constituting a written expression of a particular thought, or, if spoken, just this disturbance in the air) with another set of molecules or neural processes from which its 'mental' analogue is supposed to have 'emerged'. Since the word "correctly" introduces normativity into the equation, it isn't easy to see what could possibly do this that wasn't itself the result of another damaging concession to anthropomorphism --, duplicating in the brain an analogue of the social practices that already underpin the normative use of language in everyday life. [This theme has been extensively explored in Essay Three Parts One and Two. As noted above, more will be said in Interlude Eight when it has been completed.]

If such a connection is to have the required normative force -- which would be necessary in order to decide whether or not a particular use of language is correct -- then that would appear to commit us to the odd idea that social practices must in fact take place inside the head, or 'in the mind'/'consciousness', of each individual language-user. Failing that, it might even seem to commit us to the theory that 'thoughts' enjoy a communal life of their own inside each skull. In other words, it would be tantamount to regarding words as social agents in their own right, each of which 'determines' or legislates their own 'correct' meaning and 'correct' application. This would see words dictating to us how we must employ them. As has been pointed out several times already, that would not only fetishise words, it would dehumanise humans.

No wonder Marx said that philosophy is part of the alienation of humanity from itself.

Some readers might be tempted to question the consistent emphasis placed on linguistic 'correctness' at this site. That in turn might be because it smacks of small "c" conservatism, and hence of elitism, which could possibly even be labelled reactionary. If true, that would appear to make the approach adopted at this site antithetical to revolutionary socialist politics. However, any who object along those lines should never be given a job in the proof-reading department of a revolutionary paper or a socialist publishing house, where ordinary (and correct) use is required in order to communicate accurately and efficiently with 99% of their target audience.

Independently of that, the above 'elitist' jibe isn't apt -- at least, not unless we are prepared to call Lenin and Trotsky "elitists". Here, for example, is Lenin arguing that it is important to be clear about the meaning of (ordinary) key terms:

"'Sense-perception is the reality existing outside us'!! This is just the fundamental absurdity, the fundamental muddle and falsity of Machism, from which flows all the rest of the balderdash of this philosophy and for which Mach and Avenarius have been embraced by those arrant reactionaries and preachers of priestlore, the immanentists. However much V. Bazarov wriggled, however cunning and diplomatic he was in evading ticklish points, in the end he gave himself away and betrayed his true Machian character! To say that 'sense-perception is the reality existing outside us' is to return to Humism, or even Berkeleianism, concealing itself in the fog of 'co-ordination.' This is either an idealist lie or the subterfuge of the agnostic, Comrade Bazarov, for sense-perception is not the reality existing outside us, it is only the image of that reality. Are you trying to make capital of the ambiguous Russian word sovpadat? Are you trying to lead the unsophisticated reader to believe that sovpadat here means 'to be identical,' and not 'to correspond'? That means basing one's falsification of Engels à la Mach on a perversion of the meaning of a quotation, and nothing more. Take the German original and you will find there the words stimmen mit, which means to correspond with, 'to voice with' -- the latter translation is literal, for Stimme means voice. The words 'stimmen mit' cannot mean 'to coincide' in the sense of 'to be identical.' And even for the reader who does not know German but who reads Engels with the least bit of attention, it is perfectly clear, it cannot be otherwise than clear, that Engels throughout his whole argument treats the expression 'sense-perception' as the image (Abbild) of the reality existing outside us, and that therefore the word 'coincide' can be used in Russian exclusively in the sense of 'correspondence,' 'concurrence,' etc. To attribute to Engels the thought that 'sense-perception is the reality existing outside us' is such a pearl of Machian distortion, such a flagrant attempt to palm off agnosticism and idealism as materialism, that one must admit that Bazarov has broken all records! One asks, how can sane people in sound mind and judgment assert that 'sense-perception [within what limits is not important] is the reality existing outside us'? The earth is a reality existing outside us. It cannot 'coincide' (in the sense of being identical) with our sense-perception, or be in indissoluble co-ordination with it, or be a 'complex of elements' in another connection identical with sensation; for the earth existed at a time when there were no men, no sense-organs, no matter organised in that superior form in which its property of sensation is in any way clearly perceptible. That is just the point, that the tortuous theories of 'co-ordination,' 'introjection,' and the newly-discovered world elements which we analysed in Chapter I serve to cover up this idealist absurdity. Bazarov's formulation, so inadvertently and incautiously thrown off by him, is excellent in that it patently reveals that crying absurdity, which otherwise it would have been necessary to excavate from the piles of erudite, pseudo-scientific, professorial rigmarole." [Lenin (1972), pp.124-26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphases and links added. Paragraphs merged.]

"Try for once to think over the words you use to compile your phrases, comrades!" [Lenin, 'Intellectualist Warriors Against Domination by the Intelligentsia', Nashe Ekho, No.5, March 30, 1907. Quoted from here. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"It is necessary to call things by their right names." [Trotsky (1971), p.56. Bold emphasis added.]

Apparently, even the bourgeois press gets the point. Here, once again, is the soft left, reformist UK paper, The Daily Mirror, which, unlike some of the contemporary left, knows the importance of using the correct words (in this case in an article about the difference between "migrant" and "refugee"):

"Using the right words for the right things is very important. It's how we manage to communicate across languages and borders, via keyboards and tweets and picture captions. Using the wrong words means you stop communicating -- it means that at best you begin to mislead, and at worst you lie. For example, Newton's law of gravity states that the force of attraction between two bodies is directly proportional to the products of their mass. In other words, apples fall downwards because the earth is bigger than an apple. Imagine if just one of those words meant the opposite of what we think it does. We couldn't send a lander to Mars because we wouldn't know where it was, jet engines would make no sense so there'd be no package holidays, and we'd all think dancing on the ceiling like Lionel Richie was an option. If you don't get the words right, you get everything else wrong." [The Daily Mirror, 02/09/2015. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphases and link added.]

It could be argued that the above emphasis gets things completely the wrong way round; material reality precedes thought. So whatever connects certain aspects of reality, such as F (from earlier) to T (and/or AC also from earlier) -- or even to P₁ (ditto) -- must already be objective. The failure to acknowledge this crucial fact means this Essay is completely misguided.

Well, to be consistent, that pro-DM remark must also apply to what Lenin and Trotsky had to say, who must also have 'got things the wrong way round' when they emphasised a correct use of language, just as Marx and Engels must also have erred when they enjoined us to return to using ordinary language.

Nevertheless, issues raised by that pro-DM rejoinder turn out to be connected with the RRT, which will be examined in detail in Part Four of this Essay. [Until then, follow the link posted below this sub-section's headline.]

In advance of that, it is important to point out that Essays published at this site have been at pains to distinguish an anthropological account of language from theories of language that descend into, are based on, or which imply some form of LIE. Indeed, it has been argued that theories of language that run contrary to the approach adopted at this site readily collapse into LIE, since, at some point, they depend on a fetishisation of language (as argued earlier). By so doing they invert the products of social interaction, turning them into the real relations between things, or into those things themselves -- since they conflate talk about talk with talk about the world.

Furthermore, attempts to construct relevant or inter-linked theories of knowledge also face a similar fate. The 'truth' of any of the claims that emerge from such theories follows solely from the supposed meaning of the words they contain, not from the way the world happens to be. That is because the expressions they use haven't been derived from a material interaction with the world in collective labour and social communication (etc.), but from a series of arcane abstractions divorced from both, concocted by ruling-class ideologues, subsequently re-purposed by those who should know better (Dialectical Marxists!). As the next two Parts of Essay Twelve will show, this theoretical slide took place as a result of the ideological priorities of thinkers who were determined promote, preserve and legitimate class-divided society.

This Essay and others seek to undermine the traditional approach to language and knowledge by showing that an (alternative) anthropological account reveals how empirical propositions gain the sense they have. Their truth-values do not solely depend on the meanings of words, but on the way the world happens to be, and whose truth conditions are constituted by rules of grammar that are themselves based on social practices predicated on a historically conditioned interaction both with the world and other human beings.

Elsewhere, at this site, it has also been argued that it would be a serious error to claim that something called "the Mind"/"consciousness" (somehow) manages to appropriate, or even create, such 'truths' -- a rationale, of course, that underpins rationale all forms of Idealism, and which, it seems, is also the approach adopted by those who indulge in "subjective dialectics". [There is much more on this in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211. Bold emphasis alone added.]

Nevertheless, to state the obvious: while it is human beings who give voice to empirical propositions, it is the world that distributes truth-values among them. Hence, it is what we humans say that is capable of being true or false, and even though the meanings of the words we use haven't themselves been established under conditions of our own choosing (to paraphrase Marx), it is human beings who have nevertheless established those meanings in and by their practices, their interaction with each other and their interface with the world -- but not in general as a result of their individual or collective deliberation. None of this has been done to us, or for us, 'by the universe' (or its assumed 'laws' -- on that see the next sub-section), and that is because, of course, nature not only isn't an agent, unlike humanity it lacks a social history.

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

In response, it could be argued that human beings are (undeniably) part of nature; hence the above anti-DM (and unscientific) remarks are patently false.

The first half of the above pro-DM objection is undeniably correct (we are part of nature!). Nevertheless, the crucial point here is that nature itself isn't an agent, while human beings are.

Indeed, if we were to suppose that the natural world, or parts of it, determined the conditions under which empirical propositions were held true, or which determined the meaning of the words we use -- perhaps as a result of an (as yet) unknown 'causal-', or even 'dialectical-law'; i.e., if we naturalised epistemology and semantics -- then, as we will see, inferences could be made from the meaning of words to the truth-values of the propositions in which they occurred. That is because under those circumstances the sense of any such proposition wouldn't be independent of its truth-value.

[Those who actually reason along the above lines (in favour of just such a 'naturalisation') tend to focus on sentences -- i.e., on the vocalisation, or the inscription, of strings of words --, and won't have anything to do with propositions. (Why they adopt that approach is beyond the scope of this Essay! But, on this, see Glock (2003), pp.102-36 (especially, pp.118-36). Cf., also, White (1971).]

In order to see this, let us suppose there is a (naive) theory that postulates the existence of a (dialectical?) Law, L₁, which specifies that given a specific state-of-affairs, set of relations or processes in the world, S₁, observer, O₁, would be constrained to form a true proposition, P₁, even if at present we don't know what that 'Law' is, or, indeed, even if we never actually find out what it is.

[And by "specific state-of-affairs, set of relations or processes in the world" we can include all the relevant neural, psychological, 'emergent', 'mediated'/'dialectical' factors deemed applicable or as required.]

Clearly, falsehoods can't be produced in this way since, if a sentence is false, what it says doesn't obtain. But, a 'non-obtaining fact' can't exercise a causal (or even a 'dialectical') influence on anything at all. In that case, only propositions that were true (like P₁) would be causally induced in this way by such a process or set of relations. If so, any proposition that has been causally induced in the above way must be true. In that case, the mere fact that a proposition had been uttered/written would be enough to conclude it was true. No evidence (other than the fact it had been uttered, written or typed somewhere) would be needed.

In order to block that unacceptable, even ridiculous, conclusion, we a much more sophisticated account of the 'dialectical'/causal factors involved in the production of indicative sentences would be required. [On that, see below.]

[The above argument doesn't rule out 'negative causation', but it isn't easy to see how that could work in such circumstances. Examples of 'negative causation' were given here.]

In order to block or avoid the above ridiculous conclusion, we need to re-examine the above considerations more carefully to see where, if at all, that argument went wrong.

Consider the following indicative sentence uttered by someone (at a given time and place): "There is a cat on the mat". [Here we are assuming there is a mat and a cat for that mammal to be sat on it.] Plainly, it would be false to say "There is a cat on the mat" if there were no cat on the mat. But, if there is some causal/dialectical law at work here, the absence of a cat on the mat can't have caused what was actually said to be false, even though what was said would be false because there was no cat on the mat. ["Because", here clearly relates to the reasons why what was said was false, not the alleged cause of that false statement. (On the (relevant) differences between "because" and "cause", see Essay Thirteen Part Three.)]

In that case, if there is no cat on the mat there is nothing cat-like on the mat to cause this or any equivalent (false) sentence to be uttered. Absent cats aren't causes! A total lack of feline members of the animal kingdom, where that cat should have been, can't motivate or evince an utterance of the falsehood "There is a cat on the mat" -- unless, of course, this were some sort of secret code, uttered perhaps between spies (but, what might have caused that to be uttered will have to be passed over in silence; is there really a law that determines what spies do or do not utter?) On the other hand, an absent cat might motivate or evince the utterance of its (true) contradictory "The cat isn't on the mat" -- or, more likely, "There is no cat on that mat" (in contradiction to "There is a cat on that mat", where the mat in question is once again identified by a pointing gesture, or it is made perfectly clear in some other way which mat and which cat are being spoken about). Nevertheless, the lack of a specific cat on a specific mat can't have caused the utterance of the falsehood "The cat is on the mat" (codes, jokes and playfulness to one side), since there was no cat-on-mat state of affairs to cause anything!

[In more complicated circumstances, the causal antecedents and circumstances of the utterance "There is a cat on the mat", when there isn't one on the mat, will be far more involved than the mere fact that the said animal (or the said mat) was absent. (Several examples of this are given below.) But, this will merely complicate the picture without materially altering it. An absent cat, on its own, can't be part of some unknown causal law that prompts, or could prompt, an episodic utterance of the falsehood "There is a cat on the mat", any more than it would evince "Paris is in China".]

It might be argued in response that the absence of the said cat could cause, motivate, or prompt the utterance of the truth "There isn't a cat on the mat" (or, "There is no cat on the mat!"). However, not even that is plausible (except, perhaps, in special circumstances -- such as it being uttered during a search for the said cat, maybe as a way of eliminating one or more of its possible locations, or even to reassure someone who is perhaps hallucinating cats everywhere), since a cat-free-mat could evince any number of utterances, such as "This place needs hoovering!", "The dog has run off again!", "I see your father has been over today and left that awful mat in the hall again!", "Is this a non-slip mat?", "Yes, the mat is still covering that ink stain", "Oh dear, the mat salesman clearly saw you coming!", "Where are my shoes? They were on the mat a minute ago!", and so on, ad nauseam. Any one of those (and a myriad others) could be evinced by a cat-free mat! How many of us will say "There isn't a cat on the mat", or "There is no cat on the mat", whenever we see a mat?

[It isn't to the point, either, to argue that not all of the above examples are in the indicative mood, since the whole point is to show that a cat-free-mat can motivate a whole range of responses, some (possibly) predictable from the surrounding circumstances, some not, making an appeal to a causal or 'dialectical' law here seem woefully misguided.]

Additionally, the naive version outlined earlier might find it hard to account for propositions that change from true to false, and back again, regularly, or rapidly -- such as "Today is Monday", "It's raining", or "The lights are green" -- or even, "There is a cat on the mat" (if the said animal couldn't make its mind up where to sit, and soon wandered off). The naive version might also struggle with truths about the past, such as "Julius Caesar was assassinated on the Ides of March". What sort of causal/dialectical law could account for utterances like that? Or even, "Julius Caesar lived to a ripe old age."?

Hence, in such circumstances, and given the naive version of this theory, only true sentences would be causally motivated in this way -- i.e, by existent states of affairs. If so, knowing what a proposition meant would be all that one would require in order to know it was true -- that it had been produced 'in the mind' by one of these actual states of affairs by some causal/dialectical law. The truth of an indicative sentence would now be one with its meaning, and we could dispense with any need for supporting evidence.

In this way, it should perhaps now be clear why even an (allegedly) scientific law-governed account of meaning in language (which adopted the naive version outlined above) would collapse into LIE.

[It is worth recalling that one of the implications of LIE is that truth directly follows from meaning. Follow the link below this sub-section's headline for more details.]

Someone could object that not all sentences are uttered in response to states of affairs encountered directly (or even indirectly) in experience. Life, never mind conversations, would be extremely tedious if we all went about reporting on everything in our visual field. We can surely talk about topics that are not only far removed from us (spatially or temporally), but even those we have never experienced or could experience. If someone were to say that the temperature on Venus is 464ºC, or that The Vistula is shorter than The Columbia, they would either be reporting a belief or a fact based on evidence, not on personal experience. While I will be dealing with this entire topic in greater detail in Essay Three Part Four, it is sufficient to remind readers that I am only concerned here to show that traditional theories of knowledge can't account for falsehood, not truth. What motivates true beliefs (of the sort just mentioned -- assuming they are true!) will therefore have to be put to one side. What is of concern at present is a naive version of the above traditional theory and whether it can account for the motivation of falsehoods.

Returning to the naive version: it could be argued that a false belief (as opposed to an absent state of affairs) might cause the utterance or the production of P₁, short-circuiting the above argument. However, as we will see in Essay Three Part Four, this cobbled-together theory can't even account for false beliefs, so this isn't a viable objection. Anyway, that objection will be defused below.

If we now try to complicate matters and move away from the naive version, not much changes.

To that end, consider a set of circumstances, "C", that is indefinitely large, which might prompt, or occasion, the utterance of a given indicative sentence, IS. As we have seen, both "There is a cat on the mat" and "There isn't a cat on the mat" could be occasioned by a seemingly irrelevant set of circumstances or alternative motivations (call any such set, "C_C"). For instance, the latter 'circumstances' could be that such an utterance turned out to be:

(ix) An inference: "If you're right, and the cat is outside chasing birds, then the cat isn't on the mat...".

The possibilities are literally endless. Any one of the above, and a host of others, could motivate the utterance of "There is a cat on the mat" and/or "There isn't a cat on the mat".

If so, the prospects of finding a law that would cover all of these possibilities (when we don't even know which circumstances are or aren't elements of C_C, or what sentences would or could be evinced by a cat-free, or even a cat-occupied mat, and are never likely to find out, either!) do not look at all promising. Indeed, the likelihood that there is any such law (whether or not we know what it is) is vanishingly small. What law could possibly cause, or allow anyone to predict that you would utter these sentences (upon seeing either an empty mat or a cat-occupied mat) "Where's the dog?", "The mat is in the way again!", "I thought you said you'd sold that threadbare mat!", "That reminds me, we need some cat food", "Didn't you promise to keep that stray cat out of the kitchen!", "Did you take the cat to the vet's?","The cat has pinched the dog's mat again!", "Where's that darned cat? I saw it on the mat a few minutes ago", "Quick take a picture. The cat has fallen asleep and it looks so cute!", "Looks like the pepper spray worked!", "Did you remember to pick up the Cats Versus Dogs DVD?", "That reminds me, is Mat still at school? Or has he come home yet?", or even, "So, what's your next line in the play? I thought it was 'The cat isn't on the mat', but you now tell me it's been cut!"

More-or-less the same applies to the sort of sentences mentioned earlier: "The temperature on Venus is 464ºC" (S₁) and "The Vistula is shorter than The Columbia" (S₂). If we focus on S₂, the (physical, psychological or social) circumstances that might motivate its utterance or that of other such sentences are no less varied. (These have been covered in Essay Thirteen Part Three; readers are directed there for more details. Additional comments have been added below.)]

Of course, it is possible for the above conclusions to be disputed on more substantive grounds. One of those might involve the idea that there could be physical factors at work here, which we do not yet understand, or about which we are now completely ignorant, and which we might forever remain ignorant, that constitute a 'causal-', or 'dialectical-law' that governs what we say and when we say it. Perhaps a combination of 'dialectically'-, or 'historically-conditioned-' causes could create in our brains (or could allow our minds to respond to) the neurological conditions that prompt the uttering of IS. It could even be part of our evolutionary heritage, something that enables our brains to be flexible and hence capable of reacting in an open-ended manner to anything (within reason) we might encounter or speak about. Clearly, that set of possibilities wouldn't be affected by our subjective understanding or knowledge -- or even our lack of subjective understanding or knowledge -- of any such casual/'dialectical' laws. Speakers of a language needn't, therefore, be aware of all (or any) of the causes underlying the utterance of specific sentences, which means that the above inference from meaning to truth is invalid.

Unfortunately, that reply substitutes speculation -- or even Science Fiction --, for hard science.

[I have covered the problems introduced into philosophy by Science Fiction in Essay Thirteen Part Three, here.]

First, in response, it is worth pointing out that the above objection actually ignores the points made earlier. That is, how such a law -- even if we don't currently know what it is, and might never know --, how such a law can explain, or be used to predict, the countless responses that a cat either on, or not on, a mat might evince. [This point also applies to a set of such laws that might be postulated here, too. It also encompasses the background to the utterance of S₁ and S₂ from earlier.]

In addition, the formulation of any such 'dialectical-law' would itself be the result of another fetishisation of the products of the social relations among human beings. [On that, see the next two Parts of this Essay.] Hence, their re-employment here to try to argue that the products of social relations in fact depend on them (that is, the claim that the linguistic products of inter-personal interaction and social convention depend on such 'laws', even if we are currently ignorant of these 'laws'), not the other way round, wouldn't just be circular, it would undermine the capacity language has for allowing us to say anything at all (true or false). [Why that is so will be explained below.]

Second, as noted above, that objection ignores falsehood. If there were some 'dialectical-' (or even 'non-dialectical-') law, or laws, that conditioned language in this way -- again, even if we were forever ignorant of it/them -- it/they could only produce truths, hence all the earlier points still stand.

It could be argued in reply that DM postulates an array of social, economic, political and historical factors that are dialectically responsible for the production of a range of ideological concepts, so it isn't the case that dialectical-laws would only ever produce truths. However, that specific topic will be dealt with at length in Essay Three Part Four; the reader is referred to that discussion for a more detailed rebuttal (when it is finally published).

In advance of that Essay appearing, the above pro-DM response, if it ever were to be advanced, would represent an unwise move, anyway. That is because it is based on the mistaken view that (by means of empirical propositions) we can specify what the conditions are that lend to language the sense it has. But that approach would impose a certain structure on reality -- i.e., it would be a transcendental condition on the possibility of language --, something DM-theorists, at least, pretend to disavow.

It could now be argued that the above comments have deliberately been restricted to true or false reports of the immediate surroundings or circumstances of an given utterance -- sometimes these are called "occasion" or "observation" sentences. As such it ignores true and false utterances in general. In which case, it has failed to consider true or false propositions/sentences like these: "New Orleans is larger than Los Angeles", "US GDP rose by 1.6% in 2016", "Cats are herbivores", "Steve Bannon was fired on the 18^th of August 2017", "Flu is caused by Orthomyxoviruses", or "Concentrated Sodium Hydroxide is good for the complexion". [Please note, the latter sentence is false! Concentrated Sodium Hydroxide will remove your face!]

That is a valid point, and will be considered in detail in Essay Three Part Four -- and partly below.

To those who might feel that the above responses undermine materialist explanations of 'the mind' and/or its properties -- or even question the material source of an individual's linguistic output --, it is worth reminding them that an anthropological account of the origin of language (advanced at this site) is thoroughly materialist. It grounds discourse in social interaction, just as it views language as a product of the interplay between human beings in cooperative labour and communal life, in line with how they interact with the material world of everyday experience and each other. The postulation of the existence of yet undiscovered (and what amount to anthropomorphic) 'laws' to account for language would be completely circular (for reasons outlined above and explored in more detail in Part Seven of this Essay).

In addition, supporters of Lenin's account of matter, who might object to any such 'anthropological account' will need to be far clearer about what they themselves mean by "matter", "law" and "cause" before their objections merit serious consideration. As we will see in Essay Thirteen Parts One and Three, on that score, at least, their ideas aren't in the game. Nor are they even on the team roster!

More importantly, however, the claim (advanced at this site) that a proposition's sense is independent of its actual truth-value is just one way of making the point that language is a social, not a 'natural', product. That observation isn't dependent on speakers of a given language being aware of the truths that help determine the semantic status of any given proposition, as the counter-argument volunteered above seems to suggest. The approach adopted at this site maintains the line that the sense of a proposition can't depend on any truths -- or even falsehoods -- let alone upon those about which we might be unaware. A proposition's actual semantic status (whether it is actually true or it is actually false) might so depend, but that issue has been covered enough times already in this Essay (especially in Interlude Eight). Another bite at that cherry is therefore unnecessary.

[Once again it is important to distinguish the sense of a proposition from its truth-value. The truth or the falsehood of a proposition often does depend on the truth of other propositions, but as this Essay has shown, that isn't the case with its sense. The argument in support of that contention is summarised below.]

But, in order to consider every (plausible) possibility, let us suppose there is a Law, L₂, about which we currently know nothing, which specifies that given a certain state of affairs in the world, SA₂, observer, O₂, would be constrained to form/utter the true proposition, P₂. Once again, falsehoods can't be motivated in this way since, if a sentence is false then what it says doesn't obtain, and what doesn't obtain can't exercise a causal influence on anything (saving, of course, complex examples of negative causation, which were ruled out earlier). Hence, only true propositions, like P₂, will be evinced by such a process.

Now, the fact that we can and do make false claims about nature and society is sufficient to refute this view of language and such 'Laws'.

So, either way, whether or not we know any such 'Law' actually exists -- or even what it might imply -- since only true observation sentences would be so causally-motivated (by this 'Law'/'Laws'), it would then be sufficient to understand the said proposition to conclude it must be true -- that is, that it had been produced 'in the mind' by an existent state of affairs. Truth would now follow from meaning, and we could dispense with the need for supporting evidence, once more. Moreover, if the truth of a proposition followed from meaning, all the problems outlined in this Essay would kick-in, and that would undermine the capacity language had of allowing us to say anything at all (true or false), as noted earlier.

It could be objected that the above response attributes a far too simplistic set of ideas to those who might disagree with the approach adopted at this site. True and false beliefs are formed in far more complex ways and to such an extent that it is difficult to think of anyone who would argue that true beliefs are caused by actually existing states of affairs, at least not as supposed in this Essay.

In that case, let us now assume there exists a complex set of laws and physical or psychological processes, C, that prompt an individual, NN, to think, formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon, say, sentence/proposition, P₃. Even then, NN will need to understand P₃ before he/she knows whether it is true or whether it is false. Hence, whatever prompts NN to think, formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon P₃ will still have to be independent of its sense. That is because the mere formulation of P₃ won't determine the conditions under which it is true. P₃'s sense sets the stage for NN understanding what would make P₃ true or would make P₃ false. It is unrelated to what actually makes P₃ true or actually makes P₃ false. Whatever it was that prompted NN to think, formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon P₃ wouldn't be what makes it true, nor would it be what makes it false. In both cases, it is the world that tells NN whether P₃ is true or whether it is false. If that weren't so, events and processes internal to NN would determine the truth or the falsehood of P₃, not the external world. Hence, even if there were a complex set of laws and/or physical or psychological processes that prompted NN to think, formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon P₃, that wouldn't affect the relevant points made in this Essay.

In addition, we have seen that there are good reasons to question naturalistic accounts of meaning like this -- i.e., those that are dependent on dispositional facts concerning human brains. The reader is therefore referred back to that discussion.

Once again, this topic will be addressed more fully in Essay Three Part Four (but see the next sub-section, below) and Essay Thirteen Part Three -- where we find there are more cogent reasons to question whether there could be a complex set of laws and/or physical or psychological processes that prompt NN to think, formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon sentences like P₃.

Finally, it could be argued that a scientific theory that explains how human understanding works will (surely) show (one day) how misguided the above comments are.

Quite apart from the fact that this is yet another appeal to Science Fiction, I have responded to that specific point in Essay Thirteen Part Three -- particularly Section Five.

[See also Note 93. On this topic in general, however, see Shanker (1998), Kripke (1982), and Kusch (2002, 2006). It is also worth pointing out that the above remarks a address naturalistic and 'dialectical' attempts to account for truth and falsehood. While there are other philosophical theories that cover the same ground -- but not from a naturalistic, or even a 'dialectical', direction -- consideration of them is way beyond the scope of this Essay and this site. For further details I can only refer interested readers to the scores of references cited throughout Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

However, here is how I will tackle the problem of falsehood in Essay Three Part Four (yet to be published -- slightly edited):

Traditional attempts to account for falsehood faltered partly because of their links with earlier versions of the CTT (aired in Plato and Aristotle's work). Crudely put, the CTT held that a true proposition must correspond to a fact/process/state of affairs in reality; otherwise it would be false. [The CTT will be examined in more detail in Essay Ten Part Two, when it is published.] For present purposes it is sufficient to point out that traditional versions of this theory made it impossible to explain what exactly it was about false propositions that made them false. If a true proposition corresponds with a fact, then presumably a false one should fail to correspond with it. But, there might not always be such a fact for a false proposition to fail to correspond with. Indeed, if there wasn't, a false proposition could hardly fail to do so since it isn't possible to fail to correspond with something that doesn't exist. In that case, paradoxically, in such circumstances it wouldn't be false. However, obvious flaws like this consistently failed to stop determined souls from inventing convoluted and baroque philosophical theories to explain away such glaring, indeed, fatal flaws. Often this amounted to explaining falsehood as some sort of defect of the imagination, blaming it on "imaginary conceptions", but that only succeeded in undermining the CTT even further, as we are about to discover.

is false, there is no fact in the world that E1 fails to match in the required manner. Of course, what makes E1 false is the truth of E1a (quoted below), but, as pointed out, there is no 'fact anywhere in reality' -- such as 'Tony Blair is three feet tall' -- to which E1 fails to correspond. Nor is there a non-existent fact (a 'false fact', as some have called them -- almost as if there could be 'false truths'!), namely, {Tony Blair is three feet tall}, to which E1 does correspond. Of course, it is a fact that Blair isn't three feet tall (just as it is a fact that he isn't three feet one inch tall, or three feet two inches tall..., along with countless other facts that could be specified about Blair's possible height), but there is no identifiable part of reality answering to this supposed 'fact' (or, indeed, the countless other 'facts') to which E1 also fails to correspond.^EN1

[In what follows, facts to which certain propositions are said to correspond will appear on the page in single quotes, while propositions themselves will either appear without quotes or in double quotes, depending on the context. So-called 'false facts' will be reproduced between curly brackets. I am, of course, also assuming we are speaking about the adult version of Blair, not Blair as a child or as a teenager.]

Some attempt might be made to postulate 'possible facts' to which falsehoods actually correspond, but, paradoxically, that would make any such falsehood true since it would now correspond with a possible fact! We might try to rule this out by arguing that correspondence with a possible fact doesn't mean a given proposition is true. The problem with that is any attempt to state such a 'possible fact' -- such as, in this instance, "'Blair is three feet tall' is a possible fact" -- will simply raise questions about its truth. Down such a path I fear lies yet another an infinite regress as further questions are asked about the supposed fact to which "'Blair is three feet tall' is a possible fact" itself corresponds. If anyone wants to pull on that thread, I can only wish them "Good luck!" and hope they have to hand a plentiful supply of painkillers.

Alternatively, it could be argued that E1 fails to correspond with the true proposition that records Blair's correct height (which might, for example, be expressed by this sentence, "Tony Blair is six feet tall" (i.e., E4, below) -- assuming for the purposes of this Essay that this is his correct height at a set time on a specific day) -- and in this lies its falsehood. But, E1 also fails to correspond with all of the potentially infinite number of false propositions that also record his incorrect height. Hence, E1 in general fails to correspond with the following:

And, plainly, E2 isn't a fact, either! There is no part of reality that it represents. There is no configuration of matter anywhere in the universe that E2 'reflects' (and we can say that with supreme confidence since E2 is so vague). Hence, if the falsehood of E1 results from its failure to correspond with the true proposition that records Blair's correct height (i.e., "Tony Blair is six feet tall at 14:00, on the 30th October 2007"), it must also result from its failure to match each 'concrete' instance of E2, for any value of n other than 3! So, the falsehood of E1 isn't uniquely specified by its failure to match the true proposition that records Blair's correct height, which means, of course, we are no further forward.

Not only that, but E1 also fails to correspond with one or more of the following:

E1 also fails to correspond with a potentially infinite number of other (possibly true) sentences about everything and everyone. So, the falsehood of E1 isn't to be established by its failure to match the true proposition that records George W's correct military record (E3 or E3a, whichever of the two turns out to be the case), nor with countless other truths. Hence, we are even more in the dark.

Again, it could be argued that the falsehood of E1 results from its failure to correspond with whatever height Blair actually has (measured at a set time on a specific day), recorded by the following sentence:

That is because E4 does record an identifiable state of affairs in the material world and E1 fails to match it, so it is false.

Admittedly, E1 fails to correspond with E4, but E4 is a proposition, not an extra-linguistic feature of reality. Hence, we still don't have a 'part of reality' that E1 fails to match.

It could be argued that the above response is specious since it is plain that what is meant is that E1 fails to match what E4 expresses or reflects.

The problem with that response is that it is impossible to identify specific items in the world that propositions like E1 match or fail to match. That is because E1 also fails to match (even if it is consistent with) the following 'aspect of reality' expressed by yet another proposition:

E5 is also true, but the failure of E1 to correspond with it can't be what makes E1 false. And if that is so, it isn't easy to say what relevance the truth of E4 plays here that the truth of E5 fails to match.

As we have seen, the link between true and false propositions is partly connected with:

(i) What it means for a linguistic expression to be a proposition in the first place; and,

As it turns out, E1 is false because it is consistent with the negation of E4 (i.e., E4a, quoted below), which we are assuming is true, and because both belong to a system of propositions that are connected with the practice of measuring (among many other practices), which have logical (or 'grammatical'/rule-governed, or even pragmatic) connections with each other. Unfortunately, such an account of falsehood isn't available to DM-theorists because of their unwise acceptance of Hegel's excessive 'tenderness toward contradictions'.

Details of previous attempts to solve this insoluble 'problem' needn't detain us any longer.

"[A]ll science generalizes and abstracts from 'empirically verifiable facts.' Indeed, the very concept of 'fact' is itself an abstraction, because no one has ever eaten, tasted, smelt, seen or heard a 'fact,' which is a mental generalization that distinguishes actually existing phenomena from imaginary conceptions." [Rees (1998), p.131.]

It is now pertinent to ask: With what do "imaginary conceptions" correspond or fail to correspond? Strangely enough, if these odd 'entities' really are imaginary they should 'correspond' with nothing at all (but that depends on how far we are prepared to stretch the meaning of "imaginary" and "correspond"!). If so, why are abstractions (such as facts) needed if speakers are fully capable (if they are!) of distinguishing fantasy from "actually existing phenomena"? Do we really need an abstraction to tell us whether or not the Tooth Fairy is imaginary?

Of course, Rees was clearly aiming his remarks at ideological constructions. But, an appeal to ideology -- or even 'false consciousness' -- would be of little help in any such attempt to distinguish truth from error. That is because ideological claims are partially false themselves; hence a explanation of falsehood along these lines would plainly be circular. It is of little help to be informed that "imaginary conceptions" are created by a false view of reality, when an explanation of falsehood was required to begin with!

Furthermore, an appeal to the 'one-sided' or 'partial' aspects of a proposition or a theory -- as a way of explaining why they are false -- won't work, either. And that isn't just because some 'one-sided' beliefs are true -- the following, for example:

E11: "No two ways about it: the emancipation of the working class is an act of the working class."

[Naturally, the truth of E6, E7 and E8 depend on the present author interpreting the term "one-sided" literally, for once!]

It is also because the alleged limitations of a claim are never sufficient to make it false. Plainly, that is because a proposition is judged true or false in accord with extra-linguistic factors, not linguistic or psychological infelicities and impairments. Admittedly, unless a proposition were well-formed it would be incapable of being true or false to begin with -- but then, if it weren't well-formed, it wouldn't be a proposition.^EN2

Perhaps we should try to locate falsehood in the erroneous way the imagination (or the "understanding" -- a 'faculty' helpfully identified for us by Hegel without a single scientific fact offered in support) combines certain ideas or concepts? Of course, that (traditional) answer to the 'problem' of falsehood doesn't merit our respect simply because of its longevity; indeed, it is to be rejected because it, too, locates error in the supposed shortcomings of the individual concerned, not in a failure to accord with extra-linguistic factors. If a thought is well-formed (i.e., if it is expressed as a proposition), then a decision about its veracity must surely be reality-induced, not imagination-dependent. That is, indeed, why many falsehoods can and do become true (as we see in connection with E12, below): plainly, because the world, or parts of it, change.^EN3 That wouldn't happen with a falsehood if it were dependent on obscure 'internal' factors of some sort (even if we knew what they were!).

Incidentally, that is also why the 'deficiency theory' of falsehood -- as it might be called -- is often aired by Idealists. If truth is the 'whole', then any claim falling short of that must surely be 'partial' or 'one-sided'. Error would then be located in any mind that judged rashly or prematurely along such lines. That, of course, confuses the reason why someone might say something, or some unspecified limiting factors in their cognition, with why it might be false.

Unfortunately, the obverse of this is the idea that no matter how ludicrous, no proposition could be absolutely false (and for similar reasons). Small wonder then that that approach also finds it difficult to cope with falsehood. Given that view, no proposition is ever really false, it is just, "relative", "one-sided", "partial" or 'underdeveloped' (or whatever).

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; CTT = Correspondence Theory of Truth; COT = Coherence Theory of Truth; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]

Anyway, whatever they might say, in practice few dialecticians accept the idea that there are no completely false theories or propositions, even if they might sometimes tell their audience the opposite. Here, for instance, is Cornforth:

"Just as truths are for the most part only approximate and contain the possibility of being converted into untruths, so are many errors found not to be absolute falsehoods but to contain a germ of truth.... We should recognise, then, that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression...." [Cornforth (1963), pp.138-39. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]

Despite what Cornforth says, it would be impossible to find a "germ of truth" in any of the following:

(1) Ten litres of concentrated Nitric Acid applied directly to an unprotected human face dramatically improves the complexion if left there for several hours. [Do not try this! It is just an example, as are all the rest!! Nitric Acid will burn any face to the bone.]

(2) "Jews, Slavs, Romanies, Arabs, Asians and Africans all belong to 'inferior, sub-human races'."

(3) "Capitalism is a genuine expression of eternally unchanging human nature, which is both acquisitive and selfish."

(4) "All women are completely happy with their oppression and are keen to be reminded of it on a daily basis."

(5) "Imperialism is 100% progressive everywhere, at all times, and always will be."

(6) "The Ku Klux Klan and the alt-right are exemplary leaders in the fight for Black Liberation and full equality for Muslims."

(7) In 2002, Iraq manufactured and stored more WMD than any other country in the entire history of the planet.

(8) The earth is supported by a colossal tortoise, on top of a huge locust, on top of a giant crab, on top of a...

(11) Karl Marx was a flagrant plagiarist from Mars who copied all his best ideas from George W Bush.

(12) "Anyone who wanders about aimlessly for several hours crossing and re-crossing a busy main road during the day while blindfolded will live a long and happy life."

(14) The world was created about 6000 years ago from a bowl of custard by the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

I suspect that anyone who questioned the truth of, say, (1) would be hard pressed to find a single revolutionary who agreed with (2). Naturally, that means the negation of (2) is absolutely true (for all revolutionaries).

On the other hand, if they were to reject as completely false one or both of these sentences -- i.e., (1) and/or (2) -- which they should(!), they would thereby have confirmed the point at issue, which is: if either one of those sentences is completely false, then there is at least one sentence (namely (1) or (2)) that is completely false. QED.

And, just in case these remarks attract the attention of a brass-necked, died-in-the-wool, hardcore Hegel Honcho, who might claim that one or more of the above are 'partially true', 'partially false', they should perhaps be encouraged to consider the following sentence:

Again, one of the consequences of traditional theories being criticised at this site (especially the DM-variant) is that the truth-value of a concept, judgement or proposition has been de-coupled from any consideration of the facts (which thereby reduces this 'process' to the status of a "mental generalisation"). As we have seen their validity in turn depends on some sort of 'coherence' with other 'images', 'judgements', 'abstractions', 'representations', "mental generalisations", 'super-truths', or even 'the Whole' (whatever that is!) -- despite the fact that 'coherence' also depends on an 'Ideal Observer' (or its equivalent) in the 'Ideal Limit' -- to put this in terms Engels and Lenin would have recognised:

"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), pp.457-58, and Marx and Engels (2004), pp.463-64. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171. Emphases in the original.]

"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object." [Lenin (1961), p.195. Bold emphasis added.]

"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93.]

"Dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another." [Lenin (1972), p.312.]

"'Here once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much un limited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition..., its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual expression and in its realisation at each particular moment....' Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth'.... Here follows the example of Boyle's law (the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The 'grain of truth' contained in this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The law, it appears, is a truth 'only approximately'. Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge." [Ibid., pp.150-51, quoting Engels (1976), pp.108-09, 114. The on-line and published translations are slightly different. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and link added; paragraphs merged.]

Other DM-fans concur (and that is largely because they all agree with the theory that 'appearances' are 'contradicted' by underlying 'essence' -- often that in turn is because of the involvement of all those invisible, intangible 'abstractions', with which nothing could be compared!):

"A 'concrete' truth is a logical system of abstractions multilaterally reflecting the real concrete. One truth is more concrete than another to the extent to which it reflects more essential traits of the investigated object. Concrete truth like absolute truth, can only be reached asymptotically ad infinitum." [Wald (1975), p.35. Quotation marks altered to conform with conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original.]

"The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973), pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting Hegel (1975), p.163, §112. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected.]

"Prior to this formalisation, the experience of the divided world finds its logic in the Platonic dialectic. Here, the terms 'Being,' 'Non-being,' 'Movement,' 'the One and the Many,' 'Identity,' and 'Contradiction' are methodically kept open, ambiguous, not fully defined. They have an open horizon, an entire universe of meaning which is gradually structured in the process of communication itself, but which is never closed. The propositions are submitted, developed, and tested in a dialogue, in which the partner is led to question the normally unquestioned universe of experience and speech, and to enter a new dimension of discourse -- otherwise he is free and the discourse is addressed to his freedom. He is supposed to go beyond that which is given to him -- as the speaker, in his proposition, goes beyond the initial setting of the terms. These terms have many meanings because the conditions to which they refer have many sides, implications, and effects which cannot be insulated and stabilised. Their logical development responds to the process of reality, or Sache selbst ['thing itself' -- RL]. The laws of thought are laws of reality, or rather become the laws of reality if thought understands the truth of immediate experience as the appearance of another truth, which is that of the true Forms of reality -- of the Ideas. Thus there is contradiction rather than correspondence between dialectical thought and the given reality; the true judgment judges this reality not in its own terms, but in terms which envisage its subversion. And in this subversion, reality comes into its own truth.

"In the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are; consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence -- potentiality.... This contradictory, two-dimensional style of thought is the inner form not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grips with reality. The propositions which define reality affirm as true something that is not (immediately) the case; thus they contradict that which is the case, and they deny its truth. The affirmative judgment contains a negation which disappears in the propositional form (S is p). For example, 'virtue is knowledge'; 'justice is that state in which everyone performs the function for which his nature is best suited'; 'the perfectly real is the perfectly knowable'; 'verum est id, quod est' ['the true is that which is' -- RL]; 'man is free'; 'the State is the reality of Reason.'

"If these propositions are to be true, then the copula 'is' states an 'ought,' a desideratum. It judges conditions in which virtue is not knowledge, in which men do not perform the function for which their nature best suits them, in which they are not free, etc. Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the proposition involves a process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is. The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the eyes of God, by nature, etc.... Under the rule of formal logic, the notion of the conflict between essence and appearance is expendable if not meaningless; the material content is neutralised....

"Existing as the living contradiction between essence and appearance, the objects of thought are of that 'inner negativity' which is the specific quality of their concept. The dialectical definition defines the movement of things from that which they are not to that which they are. The development of contradictory elements, which determines the structure of its object, also determines the structure of dialectical thought. The object of dialectical logic is neither the abstract, general form of objectivity, nor the abstract, general form of thought -- nor the data of immediate experience. Dialectical logic undoes the abstractions of formal logic and of transcendental philosophy, but it also denies the concreteness of immediate experience. To the extent to which this experience comes to rest with the things as they appear and happen to be, it is a limited and even false experience. It attains its truth if it has freed itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind the facts -- that is, if it understands its world as a historical universe, in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice of man. This practice (intellectual and material) is the reality in the data of experience; it is also the reality which dialectical logic comprehends." [Marcuse (1968), pp.110-17. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphases added. Spelling adjusted to conform with UK English. I have used the on-line text here, and have corrected any typographical errors I managed to spot. Several paragraphs merged.]

"To take each and every quality displayed by an object or even at face value would necessarily mean that neither a scientific nor a philosophic account could be given of it.

Anyway, as we will also see, this view of falsehood undermines the validity of the CTT. Naturally, this makes DM-theorists' acceptance of both theories (i.e., the CTT and the COT) problematic, to say the least.

Even if the truth of this aspect of DM were accepted for the sake of argument, it would still be impossible to say which combination of concepts or ideas are or aren't illegitimate without reference to the syntactic preconditions that a linguistic expression (for instance, a phrase, clause or sentence) must fulfil in order for it to count as a proposition (or even a judgement), to begin with. And that would clearly make any such attempt to explain falsehood susceptible to the problems highlighted earlier (minor typos, slips of the tongue and colloquialisms, etc., to one side) -- which was: if a sentence isn't well-formed it can't be a proposition and hence it isn't capable of being true or false.

[Or, for those who accept a different philosophy of logic, it can't be an indicative sentence, to begin with.]

As now seems reasonably clear, traditional approaches to this 'problem' actually got things completely the wrong way round. An emphasis on concepts, ideas or abstractions as vehicles of truth ('partial', 'relative', or otherwise) itself depends on an atomistic theory of language, since it is based on a belief that concepts, ideas or 'abstractions' can somehow be true on their own. For Idealists, at least, atomistic theories (of this sort) do not sit well with the Holism they promote elsewhere. But, as any competent user of the language already knows, we neither connect together first, nor 'compare with the world' second, isolated ideas, concepts, and/or sentence fragments. As Socrates pointed out, our assent to a potentially true sentence depends on something that was obvious all along. In the present case, this 'something' faced us all the time: when making empirical claims we typically use sentences whose main verb is in the indicative mood. If anything is an unshakable fact, that is.

In connection with their theories of falsehood, Traditional Philosophers completely ignored the above platitude. It 'allowed' them to forget that, while the mere possibility of truth or falsehood (each of the latter acting as the 'property' of a 'judgement') is consequent on the formation of certain kinds of indicative sentences, their truth-values were dependent on the facts (etc.) -- that is, on the way the world happens to be. Falsehood doesn't result from the comparison of concepts, ideas or mental generalisations with anything -- plainly, it isn't possible to compare a concept or an idea with anything in 'reality'. That is of course because there are no concepts or ideas in the world 'outside' of the mind for them to be so compared, nor are there concept-like or idea-like 'things' in nature, either. It is puzzling, to say the least, that materialists like Engels and Lenin ignored this (highly significant) fact. [Claims to the contrary were laid to rest in Essay Three Parts One and Two.]

Unfortunately, the problems facing traditional approaches to language and knowledge don't stop there; what follows also applies to the sketchy DM-version of the same. If the truth or the falsehood of a given indicative sentence is to be explained by a theory aimed at 'relating each sentence to the facts', so that the truth predicate ("ξ is true") ends up being viewed as a relational expression (i.e., one that supposedly expresses a 'correspondence relation' between a proposition and what turn out to be obscure 'items in reality'), then it is hardly surprising that it became impossible to determine what falsehoods could possibly relate to. On this account, there would be nothing for them to so correspond; one half of the alleged relation is missing (for each false proposition). Small wonder then that this 'problem' arose out of yet another distortion of language, one that misconstrued the use of "ξ is true" as relational not predicative.

As pointed out earlier, philosophers enamoured of this way of theorising found they had to toy with the idea that falsehoods perhaps referred or related to "false facts" -- or even to "non-existent facts"/"possible facts" -- but they had no clear idea what any of these 'fantastic, non-existent beings' were, or where they might be located. Indeed, a false fact would make about as much sense as a counterfeit authentic coin, an imitation genuine Ming Vase, or even a reliable dodgy dossier. And, it would be little use anyone supposing that falsehoods correspond with the absence of whatever it was that would have made their contradictories true had they existed, since they would still correspond with nothing at all, except yet more 'absent facts'. And, it hardly needs pointing out, but 'absent facts' are just as much a liability as "imaginary conceptions" ever were.^EN4

At this point, we are no nearer understanding what it is that makes truths true or falsehoods false according to the traditional approach -- or the sub-optimal variant adopted by Dialectical Marxists --, and that is independent of whether or not all the earlier worries about the abstract and the concrete have themselves been laid to rest.

This might seem to contradict what has been argued [earlier in this Essay] where it was claimed that a sentence like M6 was true just in case Tony Blair owned the said book, false otherwise.

However, that would be a serious misinterpretation of the argument presented earlier. No correspondence relations were specified, or even hinted at. No fact was mentioned correspondence with which made M6 true, failure to so correspond made it false. In fact, it was argued at length in Essay Three Parts One and Two, as well as Essay Six, that the traditional interpretation of knowledge -- as a relation between the Knower and the Known (in this case, between a sentence/thought and a fact that made either true) -- was a serious error which led Epistemology astray for over two thousand years. This is what was argued (earlier):

I have tackled this objection, and several others (relevant to the aims of this Essay), in Interlude Eight.

EN1. Of course, this just shows how complex our use of the word "fact" turns out to be. Even though it is a fact that Tony Blair isn't three feet tall, nothing in reality answers to it, whereas something does answer to the fact that he has two hands --, namely, that he has two hands.

Admittedly, there are propositions about Blair that are inconsistent with E1 -- such as TB1:

But, the CTT (as it has traditionally been presented) says nothing about them. And even if it did, it would be of little use: logical relationships between propositions might help us decide which ones are inconsistent with which, but they can't tell us which are true and which are false (although they might help us decide which must be true if others are true/false themselves). Indeed, two or more inconsistent propositions could both/all be false. For example, "Blair is five feet tall" is inconsistent with "Blair is two feet tall"; both are inconsistent with E1, and all three are false.

EN2. This doesn't represent a concession to the CTT since no theoretical claims are being advanced here. It simply amounts to an observation concerning how we (typically) use the words "true" and "false".

EN3. For example, although it is false (at the time of writing) that Theresa May is an ex-Prime Minister of the UK, mercifully one day it won't be. Now, that couldn't happen if falsehood were a mere 'failing' that was sensitive to the 'internal operations of the mind' (the 'process of cognition', etc.), the 'development of concepts', or, even if it were a consequence of 'partial'/'one-sided knowledge' etc., etc.

EN4. However, if the CTT were true, it would suggest that if facts are indeed identifiable items in the world that made true sentences true (in contemporary jargon, they are "truth-makers"), it would seem that 'the presence of absent facts' should make falsehoods false. This we may (ironically) call the 'Correspondence Theory of Falsehood'. However -- and this is no accident --, the linguistic expression of such 'absent facts' turns out to be the negation of a true proposition that contradicts those very same falsehoods. So it looks like the notions of truth, falsehood and contradiction can't be prised apart, after all. In which case, we needn't appeal to correspondence relations to explain truth or falsehood: a proposition isn't false because it 'corresponds', or fails to 'correspond', with 'something in reality'; at a minimum, it is false because it is the contradictory of a true proposition. Of course, this account bypasses metaphysical correspondence relations, and as such isn't available to those who cast doubt on the LOC (as a rule of language, not a 'Super-Scientific Truth' that isn't always true!).

Naturally, the above is hardly an adequate account of truth or falsehood, but it does conform more closely to how we ordinarily understand and use these terms. Anyway, given the philosophical stance adopted at this site, not only do we have no need of a theory of truth and falsehood, none could be given -- so no attempt will be made to construct one. I will endeavour to explain more fully why that is so in Essays Ten Part Two (not yet published) and Twelve Part One.

Some might now wonder how this differs from (i) the account of sense and (ii) the establishment of the semantic status of a given proposition (as true or as false), promoted at this site. Those two topics will be tackled in Interlude Eight.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; CTT = Correspondence Theory of Truth.]

To this end, it is worth asking what could possibly make M24 'true', and, a fortiori, what would make it false.

Indicative sentences are normally true or false according to the way the world happens to be, but this sentence can't be false no matter what happens in the world. So, its falsehood can't be based on any conceivable state of affairs. As noted earlier, its truth seems to arise from linguistic (or conceptual) considerations alone, not from 'reality'. That can be seen not just because of its imputed necessity but by the way Lenin actually imagined he had established its veracity. He relied on its supposed self-evidence and nothing more. That in turn was based on his determination to follow Engels, who fixed the meaning of "matter" and "motion" by means of a new rule of language, P4. Neither of them even thought to support these novel ideas with actual evidence, nor with much of a supporting argument, either! Their 'truth' was internally-generated not externally validated.^89a

Nevertheless, what could possibly make this set of words 'necessarily true', according to Lenin? M24 is just a string of words. It would have to have some sort of projective or representational relation with the material world for it to be true, for it to be a true picture of our world and for it to 'correspond' with something extra-linguistic. [That comment doesn't mean I now accept the CTT; I am merely trying to re-think Lenin and Engels's position and what motivated it. In order to do that I have to use the sort of language CTT-supporters might themselves employ.] Moreover, whatever it was that confirmed M24 and/or P4's truth status would have be lodged in this world, not some alternative, 'parallel', or fictional 'universe'.⁹⁰

Well, whatever it is that succeeded in achieving that must also make the following sentences false:

But, ex hypothesi, M18 and M19 (or their content) are "unthinkable", according to Lenin. As soon as we think either of them (or their content) we face the intractable problems exposed earlier.

'Necessary' truths like P4 and P24 make the possibilities they rule out (i.e., M18 or M19) not just 'false', but Super-False and thereby also "unthinkable". Unfortunately for Lenin, they do this while at the same time requiring us to have to think about whatever it is they seek to exclude so that it and not some other situation can be rejected out-of-hand. But, in order to do that, we should have to be able to separate, in thought, motion from matter (along lines suggested by M18 and M19) in order to be able to declare that that is precisely what can't be done -- even in thought! Plainly, unless we could separate motion from matter in thought we would have no idea what we are supposed to rule out, and therefore no idea what we were meant to rule in by accepting M24. [But as we will see, even that ignores the core problem here. What that is, is hinted at below.]

Hence, if we are capable of grasping the truth of M24, we must already have some comprehension of what would make it false, i.e., what M24 is ruling out.

This (by-now-familiar) problem has arisen because Lenin entertained a 'necessary' truth (M24), the content of which is impossible to state in a comprehensible form. That is because such sentences run up against the expressive limits of language; they attempt to say what can't be said (and hence can't be thought) without uttering/writing incoherent non-sense. Indeed, as we have repeatedly seen.

This insurmountable obstacle doesn't just block Lenin's theoretical path, it stands in the way of every metaphysical theorist. Metaphysics similarly consigns countless 'propositions' (such as P4 and M8) to what can only be called linguistic limbo. By adopting such a traditional approach to 'knowledge', DM-theorists also permanently and irretrievably consign their ideas to outer philosophical darkness.

In that case, no one should be the least bit surprised that these empty 'dialectical' strings of words have presided over more than a century of long-term failure (predictably) experience by Dialectical Marxism.

[Once again: I am not saying Marxism has failed, just this poisonous, 'inverted' Hegelianised Hybrid.]

As we have seen several times throughout this site, both metaphysical and DM-sentences readily fall apart as incoherent non-sense. This they can't fail to do. While appearing to mimic empirical propositions they turn out to be radically different, masquerading as ordinary, seemingly far more profound, declarative sentences. Central to this (conferred) status as especially deep 'truths' is a distorted use of language. In many cases they also turn out to be mis-identified or even garbled linguistic rules.⁹¹

Such sentences often attempt to say what can only be shown by the ordinary use of language.⁹² And this they do surreptitiously and dishonestly. [In some cases, typically in connection with ideology, we can add in the word "mendaciously", too.]

Metaphysics misconstrues conventions and forms of representation expressed in and by our socially-conditioned and materially-grounded use of the vernacular, but they do so in a way that re-configures, re-interprets, or re-casts its misconstrued rules as Super-Empirical, 'necessary truths', quite unlike the ordinary, mundane truths associated with everyday life and ordinary practice -- or even those generated in and by science. Empirical propositions hold open two possibilities: truth or falsehood. Metaphysical sentences, while purporting to be empirical, close down one of these alternatives. By so doing they deny themselves any sense. They collapse and implode as incoherent and non-sensical strings of words.⁹³

Despite appearances to the contrary, the complete rejection of Metaphysics advocated at this site doesn't draw an a priori or dogmatic limit to the search for knowledge, it merely reminds us that truths about nature and society can't successfully be expressed by means of a radical misuse of language. Nor can they be formulated in a way that also renders supporting evidence irrelevant.

Since metaphysical theories fail to present genuine empirical possibilities, their repudiation and subsequent eradication can in no way adversely affect the scientific investigation of nature and society. Nor can their rejection interfere with revolutionary attempts to change it.

Metaphysical theories do not represent profound, ambitious or risky conjectures that merit our attention, or even our respect. They contain nothing but empty phrases. As such they are little more than a "house of cards" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein (2009), p.54, §118) --, which, at best, express self-important confusion, at worst a distorted, ruling-class 'view of reality'.

[There will be more on this topic in Parts Two, Three and Seven of Essay Twelve (summary here).]

Metaphysical pseudo-propositions violate the rules governing the formation of comprehensible empirical propositions by undermining the semantic possibilities they appear to present. In addition, they misuse ordinary words while pretending to extend, alter, 'sharpen' or revise their meaning. Supposedly providing insight into the 'essential nature of Reality', metaphysical and DM-sentences represent an attempt to derive substantive truths about the world solely from thought, solely from words. They thus possess an entirely undeserved mystique, a bogus cachet that arises from their chameleonic outer facade. That is, they resemble ordinary empirical propositions while pretending to inform us of 'necessary' or 'fundamental features of Reality'. But that superficial veneer hides what has really happened: they have reduced themselves to incoherent non-sensicality.

As should now seem clear, these deflationary conclusions rule out the possibility of any future Metaphysics (including the fourth-rate version promoted by Dialectical Marxists). That, of course, means the traditional approach to 'philosophical knowledge' is no longer a viable option (not that it ever was!). This doesn't mean that if philosophers and DM-theorists were cleverer than they now are, if they knew much more, they would be able to formulate and comprehend countless valid 'Super-Truths' about 'Reality' or 'Being'. There is nothing there that metaphysicians and/or DM-fans can hope to find so that (one day?) a search of some sort might even be attempted, never mind even succeed. The language that metaphysicians and Dialectical Marxists themselves use permanently and irreversibly rules any such search out as a viable option. This ancient ruling-class 'discipline' (Traditional Philosophy) presents us with no practical possibilities, no workable options -- or no more than there is, or might be, a 'free kick' in chess, LBW in basketball or 'offside' in poker. Hence, the search for 'metaphysical truth' is analogous to looking for a 'home run' in tennis or a 'touchdown' in snooker. In which case, it would be far wiser to treat this search for such 'Super-Truths' as we would an expedition to find and capture the Jabberwocky. To use another Americanism: Metaphysics turns out to be a Nothingburger.^93a

Contrary to expectations, the repudiation of Metaphysics in fact opens up the conceptual space for science to flourish. In this way, scientists are free to formulate theories that possess true or false empirical implications. A fortiori, the semantic status of latter won't depend solely on the meaning of the words they contain, but on the way the world happens to be. That wouldn't (and couldn't) be the case if science were based on Metaphysics. If it were, scientific truth, per impossible, would depend solely on the meaning of words, not on any actual state of the world.

Paraphrasing Kant: it is necessary to destroy Metaphysics -- and DM -- in order to create space for science to flourish.⁹⁴

[Smolin now adds a brief summary of the major advances made by Physicists since the 16^th century, culminating in the TOR and QM, which have been omitted -- RL.]

01. As noted in the Preface, much of this Essay is based on Wittgenstein's work -- for example Wittgenstein (1969, 1972, 1974a, 1975, 1976, 1979a, 1980b, 2009) --, relevant aspects of which are covered in Harrison (1979) and Hanna and Harrison (2004). See also, Baker and Hacker (1984, 1988, 2014), Hacker (1993a, 1996, 1997, 2000a, 2001a, 2013b, 2015), Kenny (1984c, 2006), Kuusela (2008), and White (1974, 2006).

Some of what I have to say here coincides with the anti-metaphysical views expressed in Rorty (1980) (this links to a PDF). I distance myself, however, from the latter's anti-Realism, his (inconsistent) attempt to construct a 'metaphysics of mind', and his rather odd equation of Philosophy with some form of literary criticism.

[Rorty defends his view of Wittgenstein in Rorty (2010). On that, see Horwich (2010), which is an effective reply (not that I agree with everything Horwich has to say, either!). It is also important to add that I don't agree with everything in Harrison (1979), especially what he has to say about linguistic autonomy (pp.1-21). [I will say more about that in Interlude Eight. However, much of the rest of Harrison's book is excellent and has influenced many of my own ideas in this area.]

1. Some readers might still take exception to my use of "metaphysical" to describe sentences like M1a -- and, more specifically, a specific thesis that will be examined in greater detail later on in this Essay, expressed by P4. If it helps, objectors can substitute the words "dogmatic", "essentialist" or "necessitarian" for "metaphysical" (in phrases like "metaphysical theory") used throughout this Essay. That done, not much will be changed by this 'terminological adjustment'. It is the logical status of these sentences that is important, not what we call them. [There is much more on this here.]

Here are a few relevant quotations about motion and matter from Engels and Lenin:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred. When motion is transferred from one body to another, it may be regarded, in so far as it transfers itself, is active, as the cause of motion, in so far as the latter is transferred, is passive. We call this active motion force, and the passive, the manifestation of force. Hence it is as clear as daylight that a force is as great as its manifestation, because in fact the same motion takes place in both. A motionless state of matter is therefore one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]

"Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking." [Engels (1954), p.69. Bold emphasis added.]

"In full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it, Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring (read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....' 'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin (1914), p.8. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), p.311. Italics in the original.]

"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., p.312. Italics in the original.]

"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of nature's existence outside the mind and perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid., p.314. Italics in the original.]

"The fundamental characteristic of materialism is that it starts from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality reflected by science." [Ibid., pp.354-55. Italics in the original.]

Nevertheless, as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part One, even though Engels and Lenin certainly believed motion and matter were inseparable, Lenin's other defining criteria for something to be counted as material actually fail to rule out the existence of motionless matter.

Anyway, as these passages reveal, Lenin characterised matter in a rather odd way -- i.e., as that which exists "objectively" outside, and independently of, the mind. As pointed out above, he also quoted Engels approvingly to the effect that motion is the "mode" of the existence of matter.

But, if all motion is relative to a given reference or inertial frame, it is entirely possible to depict certain bodies as motionless with respect to a suitably chosen frame. A contrary view can only be (successfully) maintained if space is held to be Absolute. That condition aside, this means motion is reference frame-sensitive. If motion can actually disappear (locally), or a body's velocity can become zero, with a suitable change of reference frame, motion can't be the mode of the existence of matter, as Lenin and Engels imagined. In which case, it is perhaps more appropriate to characterise Engels and Lenin's way of depicting motion as a form of representation (on that, see below), and, therefore, regard it as convention-sensitive. In other words, their ideas about motion and matter are language-, not evidence-based. That is, they were predicated on a determination to use words in a certain way.

[Much of the rest of this Essay will be aimed at substantiating these rather controversial allegations.]

"Form of representation" will be covered more fully Essay Thirteen Part Two; however, the term itself is connected with the following comments of Wittgenstein's:

"Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or conversely), and so on. The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions -- the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for building the edifice of science, and it says, 'Any building that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these bricks, and with these alone.' And now we can see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (The net might also consist of more than one kind of mesh: e.g. we could use both triangles and hexagons.) The possibility of describing a picture like the one mentioned above with a net of a given form tells us nothing about the picture. (For that is true of all such pictures.) But what does characterize the picture is that it can be described completely by a particular net with a particular size of mesh. Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these means. We are also told something about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of mechanics than with another." [Wittgenstein (1972), 6.341-6.342, pp.137-39. Paragraphs merged.]

Of course, a form of representation is much more complex than those remarks might suggest (for instance, it leaves out of account how theories are often inter-linked or coordinated with one another, and it seems to suggest that physics is an a-historical, non-social discipline). Thomas Kuhn's more considered thoughts about what he calls a "paradigm" are, in some respects, a little closer to what is meant by "form of representation" used at this site -- cf., Kuhn (1970, 1977, 1996, 2000). See also Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) -- especially Masterman (1970) --, as well as Sharrock and Reed (2002). This topic is also connected with Wittgenstein's ideas about "criteria" and "symptoms". [On that, see here. Cf., also, Glock (1996), pp.129-35. Some of the background to this way of viewing science can be accessed in Brockhaus (1991), pp.215-50. As noted above, I will say much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

Update October 2011: A recent example of the employment of just such a form of representation (or, to be more precise, several such forms) might assist the reader understand this phrase a little more clearly. In late September 2011 the news media were full of stories about an experiment which appeared to show that a beam of neutrinos had exceeded the speed of light. Here is how the New Scientist handled the story (the relevant aspects of several different but interlaced forms of representation (one or two that were themselves new) being employed by the author of the article -- albeit expressed rather sketchily -- have been highlighted in bold):

"Subatomic particles have broken the universe's fundamental speed limit, or so it was reported last week. The speed of light is the ultimate limit on travel in the universe, and the basis for Einstein's special theory of relativity [this links to a PDF -- RL], so if the finding stands up to scrutiny, does it spell the end for physics as we know it? The reality is less simplistic and far more interesting. 'People were saying this means Einstein is wrong,' says physicist Heinrich Päs of the Technical University of Dortmund in Germany. 'But that's not really correct.' Instead, the result could be the first evidence for a reality built out of extra dimensions. Future historians of science may regard it not as the moment we abandoned Einstein and broke physics, but rather as the point at which our view of space vastly expanded, from three dimensions to four, or more. 'This may be a physics revolution,' says Thomas Weiler at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, who has devised theories built on extra dimensions. 'The famous words 'paradigm shift' are used too often and tritely, but they might be relevant.' The subatomic particles -- neutrinos -- seem to have zipped faster than light from CERN, near Geneva, Switzerland, to the OPERA detector at the Gran Sasso lab near L'Aquila, Italy. It's a conceptually simple result: neutrinos making the 730-kilometre journey arrived 60 nanoseconds earlier than they would have if they were travelling at light speed. And it relies on three seemingly simple measurements, says Dario Autiero of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Lyon, France, a member of the OPERA collaboration: the distance between the labs, the time the neutrinos left CERN, and the time they arrived at Gran Sasso.

"But actually measuring those times and distances to the accuracy needed to detect nanosecond differences is no easy task. The OPERA collaboration spent three years chasing down every source of error they could imagine...before Autiero made the result public in a seminar at CERN on 23 September. Physicists grilled Autiero for an hour after his talk to ensure the team had considered details like the curvature of the Earth, the tidal effects of the moon and the general relativistic effects of having two clocks at different heights (gravity slows time so a clock closer to Earth's surface runs a tiny bit slower). They were impressed. 'I want to congratulate you on this extremely beautiful experiment,' said Nobel laureate Samuel Ting of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after Autiero's talk. 'The experiment is very carefully done, and the systematic error carefully checked.' Most physicists still expect some sort of experimental error to crop up and explain the anomaly, mainly because it contravenes the incredibly successful law of special relativity which holds that the speed of light is a constant that no object can exceed. The theory also leads to the famous equation E = mc². Hotly anticipated are results from other neutrino detectors, including T2K in Japan and MINOS at Fermilab in Illinois, which will run similar experiments and confirm the results or rule them out (see 'Fermilab stops hunting Higgs, starts neutrino quest'). In 2007, the MINOS experiment searched for faster-than-light neutrinos but didn't see anything statistically significant. The team plans to reanalyse its data and upgrade the detector's stopwatch. 'These are the kind of things that we have to follow through, and make sure that our prejudices don't get in the way of discovering something truly fantastic,' says Stephen Parke of Fermilab.

"In the meantime, suggests Sandip Pakvasa of the University of Hawaii, let's suppose the OPERA result is real. If the experiment is tested and replicated and the only explanation is faster-than-light neutrinos, is E = mc² done for? Not necessarily. In 2006, Pakvasa, Päs and Weiler came up with a model that allows certain particles to break the cosmic speed limit while leaving special relativity intact. 'One can, if not rescue Einstein, at least leave him valid,' Weiler says. The trick is to send neutrinos on a shortcut through a fourth, thus-far-unobserved dimension of space, reducing the distance they have to travel. Then the neutrinos wouldn't have to outstrip light to reach their destination in the observed time. In such a universe, the particles and forces we are familiar with are anchored to a four-dimensional membrane, or 'brane', with three dimensions of space and one of time. Crucially, the brane floats in a higher dimensional space-time called the bulk, which we are normally completely oblivious to. The fantastic success of special relativity up to now, plus other cosmological observations, have led physicists to think that the brane might be flat, like a sheet of paper. Quantum fluctuations could make it ripple and roll like the surface of the ocean, Weiler says. Then, if neutrinos can break free of the brane, they might get from one point on it to another by dashing through the bulk, like a flying fish taking a shortcut between the waves....

"This model is attractive because it offers a way out of one of the biggest theoretical problems posed by the OPERA result: busting the apparent speed limit set by neutrinos detected pouring from a supernova in 1987. As stars explode in a supernova, most of their energy streams out as neutrinos. These particles hardly ever interact with matter (see 'Neutrinos: Everything you need to know'). That means they should escape the star almost immediately, while photons of light will take about 3 hours. In 1987, trillions of neutrinos arrived at Earth 3 hours before the dying star's light caught up. If the neutrinos were travelling as fast as those going from CERN to OPERA, they should have arrived in 1982. OPERA's neutrinos were about 1000 times as energetic as the supernova's neutrinos, though. And Pakvasa and colleagues' model calls for neutrinos with a specific energy that makes them prefer tunnelling through the bulk to travelling along the brane. If that energy is around 20 gigaelectronvolts -- and the team don't yet know that it is -- 'then you expect large effects in the OPERA region, and small effects at the supernova energies,' Pakvasa says. He and Päs are meeting next week to work out the details. The flying fish shortcut isn't available to all particles. In the language of string theory, a mathematical model some physicists hope will lead to a comprehensive 'theory of everything', most particles are represented by tiny vibrating strings whose ends are permanently stuck to the brane. One of the only exceptions is the theoretical 'sterile neutrino', represented by a closed loop of string. These are also the only type of neutrino thought capable of escaping the brane.

"Neutrinos are known to switch back and forth between their three observed types (electron, muon and tau neutrinos), and OPERA was originally designed to detect these shifts. In Pakvasa's model, the muon neutrinos produced at CERN could have transformed to sterile neutrinos mid-flight, made a short hop through the bulk, and then switched back to muon before reappearing on the brane. So if OPERA's results hold up, they could provide support for the existence of sterile neutrinos, extra dimensions and perhaps string theory. Such theories could also explain why gravity is so weak compared with the other fundamental forces. The theoretical particles that mediate gravity, known as gravitons, may also be closed loops of string that leak off into the bulk. 'If, in the end, nobody sees anything wrong and other people reproduce OPERA's results, then I think it's evidence for string theory, in that string theory is what makes extra dimensions credible in the first place,' Weiler says. Meanwhile, alternative theories are likely to abound. Weiler expects papers to appear in a matter of days or weeks. Even if relativity is pushed aside, Einstein has worked so well for so long that he will never really go away. At worst, relativity will turn out to work for most of the universe but not all, just as Newton's mechanics work until things get extremely large or small. 'The fact that Einstein has worked for 106 years means he'll always be there, either as the right answer or a low-energy effective theory,' Weiler says." [Grossman (2011), pp.7-9. Bold emphases and several links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged. See also a report in Socialist Review. (This link is now dead!)]

The long-term success of Einstein's theory and the fundamental nature of the speed of light meant that physicists will search for other explanations of the above 'anomaly' while remaining committed to the TOR (even if that impacts, favourable or unfavourably, on other theories, such as M-theory, for example). So, the TOR (combined or not with other theories) is used as a form of representation; that is, it is employed -- analogous to the square or the triangular mesh to which Wittgenstein alluded earlier -- in order to make sense of, or re-interpret, experimental evidence, even if the latter might seem to refute other (perhaps significant) parts of currently accepted theory, so that it no longer does. This approach also sanctions certain inferences as 'legitimate' others as 'illegitimate' or 'suspect'. In this way, too, scientists police their own discipline (otherwise known as the "peer review system").

As readers will no doubt know, several errors were later discovered in the above readings, which meant this controversial experiment (in the end) failed to threaten fundamental tenets of modern physics. But, other forms of representation were used to reach even that conclusion! It is interesting to note, however, that before these errors were 'exposed', several scientists were prepared to weave them into new theories (as well as invent entirely novel mathematics, and introduce extra dimensions with 'holes' in them!), in order to try to make sense of this 'phenomenon' -- just so that the anomalous data (rather than current theory) remained 'valid'. [The significance of that observation will become clearer in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

[Incidentally, this highlights yet another growing problem in contemporary research (covered in more detail in Essay Eleven Part One): science by press release.]

Returning to the main theme -- i.e., whether or not motion is (a) Reference-frame sensitive or (b) A "mode of the existence of matter". Some might try to argue that QM has shown (a) to be incorrect (in that QM holds that all forms of matter are in ceaseless motion), but that is 'true' only because of a theoretical inference. There is no conceivable way that that supposedly universal truth can be confirmed to be the case throughout the entire universe, for all of time. Hence, it has to be read into nature, or imposed on it, metaphysically -- or, indeed, perhaps also as a "form of representation" in its own right. And, as such, it is a rule (of language) that physicists use to help them understand and manipulate nature (in a certain direction).

But, even if ceaseless motion could be confirmed and shown to be valid across the entire universe, the depiction of motion as a "mode of the existence of matter" (rather than as a highly confirmed property of matter) would still depend on space being viewed as Absolute. As should now seem obvious, there is no conceivable observation, or body of observations, that could confirm the supposed fact that motion is a "mode of the existence of matter". Indeed, as argued above, if a relevant reference frame is chosen, which is moving at the same relative velocity as any 'particle' it is 'tracking', that would render this 'particle' motionless relative to that frame (even if its location was thereby rendered indeterminate, according to certain interpretations of QM).

Of course, it is controversial whether or not there actually are any sub-atomic particles, as opposed to the existence of probability waves (or 'excitations of the field' -- I have covered this topic in more detail in Essay Seven Part One), but, even if each such 'particle' were viewed as a probability wave (or could be so modelled), the specification of its probable velocity (relative to some frame of reference) would similarly mean it was zero. [On this in general, see Castellani (1998).]

It could be argued that this just shows that all bodies are in constant motion relative to one another, which is all that DM-theorists need. But, as pointed out above, even if that were so, motion would still be reference-fame sensitive, and hence it couldn't be a "mode" of the existence of matter, otherwise it wouldn't be the case.

It would seem, therefore, that Lenin and Engels need space to be Absolute if their claim that motion is a "mode of the existence of matter" is to be lent even a minimum degree of credence.

1a. Here is Rob Sewell doing just as predicted: uncritically regurgitating Engels:

"The Greeks made a whole series of revolutionary discoveries and advances in natural science. Anaximander made a map of the world, and wrote a book on cosmology, from which only a few fragments survive. The Antikythera mechanism, as it is called, appears to be the remains of a clockwork planetarium dating back to the first century BC. Given the limited knowledge of the time, many were anticipations and inspired guesses. Under slave society, these brilliant inventions could not be put to productive use and were simply regarded as playthings for amusement. The real advances in natural science took place in the mid-fifteenth century. The new methods of investigation meant the division of nature into its individual parts, allowing objects and processes to be classified. While this provided massive amounts of data, objects were analysed in isolation and not in their living environment. This produced a narrow, rigid, metaphysical mode of thought that has become the hallmark of empiricism.... [Sewell neglected to point out that the 'metaphysical mode of thought' is also typical of Idealism, but there is no way he could point that out without undermining what he was going to say about Hegel and Lenin's praise of 'intelligent idealism', covered below -- RL.]

'To the metaphysician things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once and for all,' states Engels. 'He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. "His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in rigid antithesis one to another.

'At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence it forgets the beginning and the end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.' [Sewell is here quoting Engels (1976), pp.26-27 -- RL.]

"Engels goes on to explain that for everyday purposes we know whether an animal is alive or not. But upon closer examination, we are forced to recognise that is not a simple straightforward question. On the contrary, it is a complex question. There are raging debates even today as to when life begins in the mothers' womb. Likewise, it is just as difficult to say when the exact moment of death occurs, as physiology proves that death is not a single instantaneous act, but a protracted process. In the brilliant words of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus:

'It is the same thing in us that is living and dead, asleep and awake, young and old; each changes place and becomes the other. We step and we do not step into the same stream; we are and we are not.' [Sewell appears to be running together several fragments of Heraclitus's surviving work; on this see Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1999), pp.188-200.]

"Not everything is as appears on the surface of things. Every species, every aspect of organic life, is every moment the same and not the same. It develops by assimilating matter from without and simultaneously discards other unwanted matter; continually some cells die, while others are renewed. Over time, the body is completely transformed, renewed from top to bottom. Therefore, every organic entity is both itself and yet something other than itself. This phenomenon cannot be explained by metaphysical thought or formal logic. This approach is incapable of explaining contradiction. This contradictory reality does not enter the realm of common sense reasoning. Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things in their connection, development, and motion. As far as Engels was concerned, 'Nature is the proof of dialectics.'... The young Marx and Engels were followers of the great Hegel. They learned a colossal amount from this teacher. He opened their eyes to a new outlook on the world epitomised by the dialectic. By embracing the dialectic, Hegel freed history from metaphysics. For the dialectic, there is nothing final, absolute, or sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything. However, Hegel was limited by his knowledge, the knowledge of his age, and the fact he was an idealist. He regarded thoughts within the brain not as more or less abstract pictures of real things and processes, but as realisations of the 'Absolute Idea', existing from eternity. Hegel's idealism turned reality on its head." [Excerpted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added; several paragraphs merged.]

Our old friends, Woods and Grant (W&G, from the same party as Sewell), are also quite partial to tail-ending Engels, even down to quoting the same passage:

"Similarly with the law of the excluded middle, which asserts that it is necessary either to assert or deny, that a thing must be either black or white, either alive or dead, either 'A' or 'B'. It cannot be both at the same time. For normal everyday purposes, we can take this to be true. Indeed, without such assumptions, clear and consistent thought would be impossible. Moreover, what appear to be insignificant errors in theory sooner or later make themselves felt in practice, often with disastrous results. In the same way, a hairline crack in the wing of a jumbo jet may seem insignificant, and, indeed, at low speeds may pass unnoticed. At very high speeds, however, this tiny error can provoke a catastrophe. In Anti-Dühring, Engels explains the deficiencies of the so-called law of the excluded middle:

'To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, fixed, rigid objects of investigation given once for all. He thinks in absolutely unmediated antitheses. "His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.

'At first sight this way of thinking seems to us most plausible because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Yet sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. The metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the object, invariably bumps into a limit sooner or later, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions, because in the presence of individual things it forgets their connections; because in the presence of their existence it forgets their coming into being and passing away; because in their state of rest it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees… In like manner, every organic being is every moment the same and not the same; every moment it assimilates matter supplied from without and gets rid of other matter; every moment some cells of its body die and others build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time the matter of its body is completely renewed and is replaced by other molecules of matter, so that every organic being is always itself, and yet something other than itself.' [W&G are here also quoting Engels (1976), pp.26-27 -- RL.]

"The relationship between dialectics and formal logic can be compared to the relationship between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics. They do not contradict but complement each other. The laws of classical mechanics still hold good for an immense number of operations. However, they cannot be adequately applied to the world of subatomic particles, involving infinitesimally small quantities and tremendous velocities. Similarly, Einstein did not replace Newton, but merely exposed the limits beyond which Newton's system did not work. Formal logic (which has acquired the force of popular prejudice in the form of 'common sense') equally holds good for a whole series of everyday experiences. However, the laws of formal logic, which set out from an essentially static view of things, inevitably break down when dealing with more complex, changing and contradictory phenomena. To use the language of chaos theory, the 'linear' equations of formal logic cannot cope with the turbulent processes which can be observed throughout nature, society and history. Only the dialectical method will suffice for this purpose." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.93-94; Woods and Grant (2007), pp.97-99. (The online version appears to be the Second Edition.) Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

This isn't the place to enter into the topics raised in the above two passages; I have dealt with most of them elsewhere -- for example, the claim that life itself is somehow 'dialectical' was challenged here and here, the ill-informed things W&G have to say about FL were exposed for the fraud they are in several places throughout Essay Four Part One; the rest will be tackled in the main body of this Essay, beginning here.

Here is another on-line source (but this time authored by a Marxist-Leninist) that firmly inserts itself well-and-truly into the by-now-familiar tradition of uncritically appropriating Engels:

"At this point, let's look at the difference between the metaphysical and dialectical method. Then we can better understand how Karl Marx established the philosophical basis of revolutionary science, dialectical materialism. [This is the first fib; Marx didn't 'establish' DM -- RL.] Metaphysics is a subject of philosophy that really begins, at least in the West, with Aristotle in ancient Greece, and is intended to look at that which lies 'beyond the senses' or outside the realm of perceptual experience. Friedrich Engels, in his book Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, calls metaphysics 'the old method of investigation and thought…which preferred to investigate things as given, as fixed and stable, a method the relics of which still strongly haunt people's minds.'... [This is a reference to Engels (1888), pp.609-10 -- RL.] Engels goes into all of this at length in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. 'To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses.... For him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.' Engels goes on to say that 'dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things and their representations, ideas, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin and ending.' We see then that metaphysical materialism stops short of seeing how contradictory forces, both within and without, can change a given thing and even cause things to transform into their opposite. It ignores how matter and ideas affect one another, and indeed can transform into one another, for ideas can become a material force in history when taken up by the masses. We have already seen how this works in our previous articles on the Marxist theory of knowledge and the mass line. Marxist-Leninist epistemology is not only materialist, but is fundamentally dialectical. [These are both references to Engels (1880), pp.406-07 -- RL.]

"So much for metaphysics. Let's look more closely at dialectics. Like metaphysics, dialectics too has its roots in ancient philosophy. Socrates and Plato were both famous for their dialectical method. They believed that when two contradictory arguments were set against each other, reason could allow for a higher understanding to be reached. Later, the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel took this idea further in developing his philosophy of dialectical idealism. It was Hegel who first systematized the dialectic. To put it as simply as possible, Hegel argued that there was a dialectical process of historical progression toward Reason where one thing is contradicted by another, leading to their sublation, or overcoming. Often this is described in terms of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis, with the synthesis carrying forward some remainder as the thesis and antithesis are both overcome in something qualitatively new. [This is another fib; the method just described has zero to do with Hegel -- RL.] [Quoted from here; accessed 21-07-2025. Italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; several paragraphs merged.]

"Dialectics is a theory of the most general connections of the universe and its cognition and also the method of thinking based on this theory. Anyone who wants to find a rational orientation in the world and change the world must have a knowledge of the dialectics of life and thought. Dialectical thinking has its roots far back in the past. The most striking example was Heraclitus, who saw the world as being in constant flux, intrinsically contradictory, an eternally living fire blazing up and dying down according to certain laws. The ideas of dialectics run right through the history of the development of human thought. They were profoundly expressed in such great thinkers as Kant and Hegel. In Hegel, dialectics embraces the whole sphere of reality and the life of the mind. Dialectical thought reached its highest peak in the philosophy of Marxism, in which materialist dialectics is expressed in a system of philosophical principles, categories and laws. Dialectics arose and develops historically in a struggle against the metaphysical method, which is characteristically one-sided and abstract and inclined to absolutise certain elements within the whole. Metaphysical views have taken various historical forms. While Heraclitus stressed one aspect of existence -- the changeability of things, which the Sophists extended to complete relativism, the Eleatic philosophers in their criticism of the Heraclitean principle of flux, concentrated on another aspect, on the stability of existence and went to another extreme in supposing that everything was changeless. Thus, some philosophers dissolved the world in a fiery flux while others crystallised it into immovable rock.

"In modern times metaphysics has taken the form of an absolutising of the analysis and classification techniques in the cognition of nature. Because they are constantly repeated in scientific research, the techniques of analysis, experimental isolation and classification have gradually imparted to scientific thinking certain general ideas suggesting that in nature's 'workshop' objects exist in isolation, as it were, apart from one another. As philosophy and the specialised sciences have developed the focus of the struggle between dialectics and metaphysics has shifted from attempts to explain the connection of things to interpretation of the principle of development. Here metaphysical thought emerged at first in the form of simple evolutionism, and then in various concepts of 'creative evolution'. While the former hypertrophies quantitative and gradual changes, ignoring qualitative transitions and breaks in gradualness, the latter absolutise the qualitative, essential changes without perceiving the gradual quantitative 'preparatory' processes leading up to them. So metaphysical thought is inclined to 'jump' to extremes, to exaggerate some aspect of the object: its stability, recurrence, relative independence, and so on. In cognition this leads to idealism or dogmatism and, in practice, to the justification of stagnation and reaction. The only antidote to metaphysics and dogmatism, which is metaphysics in another form, is dialectics, which will not tolerate stagnation and sets no limits to cognition and its scope. Dissatisfaction with what has been achieved is the element of dialectics, and revolutionary activity is its essence." [Spirkin (1983), pp.61-62. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; links added, several paragraphs merged.]

2. Again, Essay Two highlighted the many occasions where modal terms were employed by DM-theorists -- in place of more tentative or reasonable summaries of the available evidence, and where it was clearly intended to 'beef up' the use of the indicative mood -- not by supplying more evidence, merely the verbal equivalent of thumping the table.

Nevertheless, here are a few such passages taken from the DM-classicists and 'lesser' DM-luminaries:

"But precisely therein lay the true significance and the revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy (to which, as the close of the whole movement since Kant, we must here confine ourselves), that it once and for all dealt the death blow to the finality of all products of human thought and action. Truth, the cognition of which is the business of philosophy, was in the hands of Hegel no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic statements, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart. Truth lay now in the process of cognition itself, in the long historical development of science, which mounts from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge without ever reaching, by discovering so-called absolute truth, a point at which it can proceed no further, where it would have nothing more to do than to fold its hands and gaze with wonder at the absolute truth to which it had attained. And what holds good for the realm of philosophical knowledge holds good also for that of every other kind of knowledge and also for practical action. Just as knowledge is unable to reach a complete conclusion in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect 'state', are things which can only exist in imagination. On the contrary, all successive historical systems are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human society from the lower to the higher. Each stage is necessary, and therefore justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the face of new, higher conditions which gradually develop in its own womb, it loses vitality and justification. It must give way to a higher stage which will also in its turn decay and perish. Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition, and the world market dissolves in practice all stable time-honoured institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy], nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute -- the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits." [Engels (1888), pp.587-88. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected. Parentheses in the original.]

"Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphasis added.]

"Consciousness, as the Latin root word indicates, is the knowledge of being in existence. It is a form, or a quality, of existence which differs from other forms of being in that it is aware of its existence. Quality cannot be explained, but must be experienced. We know by experience that consciousness includes along with the knowledge of being in existence the difference and contradiction between subject and object, thinking and being, between form and content, between phenomenon and essential thing, between attribute and substance, between the general and the concrete. This innate contradiction explains the various terms applied to consciousness, such as the organ of abstraction, the faculty of generalization or unification, or in contradistinction thereto the faculty of differentiation. For consciousness generalises differences and differentiates generalities. Contradiction is innate in consciousness, and its nature is so contradictory that it is at the same time a differentiating, a generalising, and an understanding nature. Consciousness generalises contradiction. It recognizes that all nature, all being, lives in contradictions, that everything is what it is only in cooperation with its opposite. Just as visible things are not visible without the faulty of sight, and vice versa the faculty of sight cannot see anything but what is visible, so contradiction must be recognized as something general which pervades all thought and being. The science of understanding, by generalizing contradiction, solves all concrete contradictions." [Dietzgen (1984), pp.32-33. Bold emphases added.]

"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly,' not 'abstractly,' not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution." [Lenin (1961), p.195. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Ibid., pp.359-60. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"As we already know that all things change, all things are 'in flux', it is certain that such an absolute state of rest cannot possibly exist. We must therefore reject a condition in which there is no 'contradiction between opposing and colliding forces' no disturbance of equilibrium, but only an absolute immutability…." [Bukharin (1925), p.73. Bold emphases added.]

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development...." [Mao (1961), pp.313. Bold emphasis added.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events. Both attraction and repulsion are necessary properties of matter. Each attraction in one place is necessarily compensated for by a corresponding repulsion in another place…." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"Nature cannot be unreasonable or reason contrary to nature. Everything that exists must have a necessary and sufficient reason for existence…. The material base of this law lies in the actual interdependence of all things in their reciprocal interactions…. If everything that exists has a necessary and sufficient reason for existence, that means it had to come into being. It was pushed into existence and forced its way into existence by natural necessity…. Reality, rationality and necessity are intimately associated at all times…. If everything actual is necessarily rational, this means that every item of the real world has a sufficient reason for existing and must find a rational explanation…." [Novack (1971), pp.78-80. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"Positive is meaningless without negative. They are necessarily inseparable.... This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), pp.65-68. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"…The 'whole' must be seen as an inner force which will strive to manifest itself in external reality as essence which must appear. Real 'wholes' must have elements bound together by the interaction of 'parts' and 'whole'. Since the 'parts' and 'whole' are constantly changing, the 'whole' as such can never be a sum total of its 'parts'. It is instead the sum total and unity of opposites in constant change, which are simultaneously not only single 'wholes' but many 'wholes'. Thus 'wholes' change into 'parts' and 'parts' into 'wholes'." [Healy (1982), p.58. Bold emphases in the original have been de-emphasised, new bold emphases added.]

"Contradiction, therefore, cannot be regarded as an 'empty word form' or a 'subjective' external impression, because it is contained within the very essence of all material objects and processes. It is the dialectical unity of external and internal contradiction. Thus the infinite self-movement of matter is contradictory." [Healy (1990), p.7. Bold emphasis added.]

"Hegel described this kind of account as 'bad infinity', because it postulated an endless series of causes and effects regressing to 'who knows where?' The defect of all such approaches is that they leave the ultimate cause of events outside the events they describe. The cause is external to the system. A dialectical approach seeks to find the cause of change within the system. And if the explanation of change lies within the system, it cannot be conceived on the model of linear cause and effect, because this will simply reproduce the problem we are trying to solve. If change is internally generated, it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998), p.7. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"If nature forms a totality, which it must unless we depart from materialism completely and become believers in the supernatural, and if this totality develops, as evolutionary theory indicates, then are we not obliged to picture this as self-development powered by internal contradiction?" [Ibid., p.78. Bold emphases added.]

"This appearance of opposing forces has given rise to the most debated and difficult, yet the most central, concept in dialectical thought, the principle of contradiction.... For us, contradiction is not only epistemic and political, but ontological in the broadest sense. Contradictions between forces are everywhere in nature, not only in human social institutions.... [O]pposing forces lie at the basis of the evolving physical and biological world. Things change because of the action of opposing forces on them, and things are the way they are because of the temporary balance of opposing forces.... The dialectical view insists that persistence and equilibrium are not the natural state of things but require explanation, which must be sought in the actions of the opposing forces...." [Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.279-80. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]

3. Plainly, this isn't meant to be an exhaustive list of such sentences; the itemised examples were chosen to make a particular point about the connection between metaphysical sentences and what look like ordinary empirical propositions. Several more examples taken from Traditional Metaphysics and DM-sources have also been quoted below.

3a. However, in Note 56 I will qualify these comments since it is clear that mathematical propositions can't be true in the same way that empirical propositions can.

4. It could be objected that in order to declare M9 true, for example, that would require some sort of reference to the material world -- at the very least this would necessitate an appeal to evidence.

Certainly, human beings have to live in this world in order to be able to assert things like M9 -- even if only to learn what the relevant words mean. But, as we will see later, while it looks like ordinary words are being used in such sentences, they (or, rather, the novel expressions invented by metaphysicians and the ordinary words they employ in radically new ways) can't be part of the vernacular -- indeed, as Glock pointed out in Note 3.

Notwithstanding this, the fact remains that, unlike M6, it isn't possible to establish the (supposed) universal truth of M9 by comparing it with the world.

However, in response it could be argued that M9 is a general proposition whereas M6 is particular.

That is undeniable, but it isn't relevant. Consider another general, but no less empirical proposition:

E1: All badgers living within a five mile radius of the centre of Luton on August 25th 2024 have eaten at least one hazel nut that day.

Now, you can 'reflect' on E1 until the cows next evolve, but that will still fail to tell you whether or not it is true. Even though E1 might never be fully confirmed (although, it wouldn't be impossible to do so if it were to be investigated promptly with enough resources devoted to the task -- while it might prove easier to falsify), a thorough collection of data coupled with detailed observation and analysis (etc.) would be the only acceptable or pertinent way so to do. Understanding E1 in fact tells us what to look for, what sort of evidence or investigation is or might be relevant, what sort of enquiry will confirm E1 and what sort will confute it, even if we never succeed in ascertaining either, or have any desire to do so.

[Anyone who disagrees is invited to contact me with details of the observations that could be made, or the experiments that might be carried out, in order to show M9 and P4 are universally and omnitemporally true.]

Finally, it could be objected that M9 and P4/M1a both represent a summary of the evidence we currently possess. That objection has already been dealt with in Note 2, but more fully in Essay Two. [See also here.]

Anyway, as we will see later, M9, P4 and M1a aren't even empirically true -- i.e., if we still insist on reading them that way.

5. As should seem reasonably obvious, M9 has been included in the list not just because of its connection with M1a (and other DM-precepts), but because Dialectical Marxists appear to regard it (or, at least, P4) as an a priori truth they feel confident they can assert dogmatically --, or, rather, the language they use to express themselves makes it impossible to defend them from that accusation.

However, even though M9 might look self-evident (at least to DM-theorists), not everyone would agree. Up until relatively recently (i.e., before, say, 1600CE), the idea that matter was naturally motionless (or, rather, the widely-held belief that effort had to be expended, or force applied, in order to set material bodies in motion and keep them moving) was uncontroversial. Indeed, that theory was a cornerstone of Aristotelian Physics, supported by countless observations over many centuries. It seemed about as well-confirmed as the claim that the sky is up and water is wet. It took a conceptual revolution to persuade post-Renaissance theorists to accept the contrary theory that motion is a 'natural' state of material bodies. Or, to be more honest, Aristotelians had to die out before any such conceptual realignment became possible. Of course, that radical intellectual change was itself motivated by NeoPlatonic and Hermetic ideas circulating across Europe at the time -- and they, too, weren't based on observation, either.

[References supporting the above assertions can be accessed here and here. The idea that matter is self-moving first surfaced (in the 'West') in Plato's dialogues, but it is arguable that it pre-dated even him; on that see here. Cf., also Sattler (2020).]

We have also seen -- here and here -- that Lenin's theory that matter is 'self-moving' would actually render completely obsolete much of post-Newtonian mechanics, and (whether Lenin was aware of it or not) that idea was itself based on another ancient, mystical dogma that nature is in effect a 'self-developing Cosmic Egg'.

The point is, of course, that even though DM-theorists themselves believe that matter is always -- and universally -- in motion, it is possible to think of it otherwise.

As argued above, if a suitable reference frame is chosen, a moving body can be regarded as stationary with respect to that frame. Hence, not only is matter without motion 'thinkable', most people who have thought about this topic have found little difficulty in so thinking. Indeed, the idea is now theoretically respectable. [Anyone who doubts that claim should check this and this out, and then perhaps think again.]

5a0. If that weren't the case, nothing determinate will have been proposed (i.e., put forward for consideration), which means that sentences like M6 would fail even to be propositions.

It is this that enables us to understand M6 without knowing whether or not it is true (i.e., for us to know it puts forward or proposes something determinate for consideration). Even if what M6a says turns out to be the case, what it says also allows us to imagine under what circumstances it wouldn't have been the case, and vice versa. In that eventuality, even when a proposition like M6 turns out to be false, what it says allows us to imagine, specify, or predict what would make, or would have made, it true.

On the other hand, if neither M6 nor M6a could be the case (i.e., if no circumstances could be imagined, or specified, that made either of them true or made either of them false), that would be sufficient grounds for:

(a) Concluding both sentences had failed to be understood (or maybe were even incapable of being understood); or, and what might amount to the same thing,

Under such circumstances it would be entirely unclear what was being proposed or put forward for consideration.

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

Of course, those of a 'dialectical frame-of-mind' might find the above (apparent) application of the LEM totally unacceptable and a sure sign of 'formal thinking' -- i.e., the requirement that for a sentence or clause to count as a proposition it has to be either true or false.

First of all, in response, that isn't what was being argued. The point being made is that for an indicative sentence to count as a proposition it has to propose something determinate. What it says has to be capable of being true or capable of being false (this is often called the bi-polarity of empirical propositions). Nowhere was it argued that such a sentence had to be either true or false, only that it be capable of being the one or the other (and that this is independent of whether we ever find out which one is the case, or even care to find out). Some might consider that to be a distinction with no difference, but it is a mistake many make equating bi-polarity (here briefly outlined) with the LEM. [I take this point up again, below.]

Second, It is also worth adding that this endlessly recycled DM-objection (about the limitations of the LEM) is self-refuting, since it itself relies on an application of the LEM to make its case. Even for die-hard Dialectical Marxists, that is because it must be the case that an application of the LEM is either an application of the LEM or it isn't; it can't be both. Indeed, we can go further: any DM-inspired claim that there has been an exercise of 'formal thought' also has to maintain that the latter is an example of 'formal thinking' or it isn't; it can't be both. Furthermore, any imagined defect in, or limitation to, the LEM must also itself be a defect/limitation or it isn't, it can't be both. Hence, as the foregoing demonstrates, any DM-supporter brave enough to attack the LEM will have to use it (explicitly or implicitly) in order to criticise that 'Law' or highlight its supposed limitations, rendering that criticism null and void. Any such DM-fan will have to (explicitly or implicitly) admit the validity of the LEM in the very act of trying to criticise it!

Even where it is unclear whether or not a supposed application of the LEM is or isn't an application of the LEM, that, too, will either be unclear or it won't, and we are back where were in the previous paragraph.

However, as will also be pointed out later, the above (supposed) application of the LEM in fact follows from the bi-polarity of empirical propositions.

Incidentally, throughout this Essay I have used rather stilted sentences like this: "It is possible to understand every word of M6 without knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false". That is because there is a significant (logical) difference between the following two sentences:

A1: It is possible to understand every word of M6 without knowing whether it is true or false; and,

A2: It is possible to understand every word of M6 without knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false.

[This topic is intimately connected with what I have to say about truth, falsehood, sense and non-sense in Interlude Five. The reader is directed there for more information and supporting argument.]

As will be explained later, it is implicit in the way we apply words like "empirical" and "factual" to indicative sentences that an empirical/factual proposition can only assume one of two truth-values (true or false), even if we don't at any point know which semantic option is the case. We would fail to understand someone who claimed a proposition was factual or empirical if they couldn't specify under what conditions it could be true or under what under what conditions it could be false. In those circumstances, all we could say to such an individual would be something like this: "Why call this sentence 'empirical' or 'factual' if you can't tell us what could or would make it true, or what could or would make it false? Do you mean something different to the rest of us by 'empirical'/'factual'?"

In other words, such propositions are "bivalent" and possess true-false polarity -- but it isn't part of what is meant by this that we must know whether any such proposition is true or know whether any such proposition is false (in order to understand it). All we need know is that such a proposition could be one or the other (i.e., what circumstances would make them the one or the other), not both. In fact, this lies behind the capacity we have to understand an empirical/factual proposition before we know whether it is true or know whether it is false, and that involves understanding what would make one such true or would make one such false. [Why that is so will also become clearer as this Essay unfolds.]

If that weren't so, it would be indeterminate what was actually being proposed or put forward for consideration -- which would in turn be enough to deny that the sentence in question was an empirical/factual proposition to begin with.

[I have explained this idea in greater detail below. On Hegel's 'apparent' rejection of the LEM, or even his (ill-advised) attempt to criticise it, see here. Nevertheless, the limitations of the LEM lie elsewhere. On that, see Peter Geach's article, 'The Law of Excluded Middle' [i.e., Geach (1956); reprinted in Geach (1972a), pp.74-87]. The metaphor of propositional true-false polarity comes from Wittgenstein, and was first aired in his early Notebooks -- i.e., Wittgenstein (1913), p.94, paragraph 2. As he points out, this is intimately connected with the use of the negative particle in such circumstances. He re-iterated this idea throughout the Tractatus -- i.e., Wittgenstein (1972); on this, see Maury (1977) and Mezzadri (2013). See also Note 40.]

5a. It could be objected that, contrary to what is claimed by the author of this 'blog post' [i.e., RL!], DM-theorists do in fact provide evidence in support of their theory. Often this involves an appeal to the 'whole of science', or perhaps even to 'human experience in general'.

But, vague gestures like this, which are typically accompanied by a few sentences, paragraphs --, or even (at its very best) several pages of specially-selected 'illustrative examples' (which don't work anyway, as we discovered in Essay Seven Part One (link at the end of this sentence, and below)) -- can be found right across DM-spectrum, with Molyneux (2012), quoted below, being one of the more recent exponents of what can only be called Mickey Mouse Science -- all of which really amount to classic examples of Confirmation Bias.

However, as we have seen, this DM-precept follows from the theory expressed by P4:

This means that for Dialectical Marxists the two 'concepts', matter and motion, can no more be 'separated'/'prised-apart' than the terms "even number" and "six" can.

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Italic emphasis in the original. Paragraphs merged.]

While evidence can and has been used to show that matter does move (not that that was ever in serious doubt -- why it does and whether it is an inherent property of matter certainly are questionable), no amount of evidence could possibly show that motion is "The mode of the existence of matter", or that motion without matter is "unthinkable" --, that is, the claim that matter can't exist unless it is moving, that we can't think about matter except in terms of its inherent motion, or even that anything that moves has to be material (i.e., it has to be matter or 'made of matter').

But, that is precisely what makes the 'evidential display' aired across Dialectical Marxism the charade it is. What little evidence DM-theorists have scraped-together is solely referenced illustratively; i.e., it isn't used to establish the truth of a given DM-theory, merely make it seem clearer, more plausible, or perhaps even 'more scientific'. And that display is obviously aimed at to impressing new recruits to the movement. Old hands have witnessed it a thousand times so they don't need to see or hear this 'proof' a thousand-and-one. That helps explain why the vast majority of DM-textbooks and articles remain stuck at the 'Introductory' level and fail to advance much beyond repeating (for the millionth time!) the basics, or merely regurgitating or paraphrasing the DM-classics, along with the usual hardy 'dialectical-perennials' -- boiling/freezing water, Mamelukes and their ambiguous fighting abilities when confronted with French soldiers, North and South poles of magnets, positive and negative particles, parts and wholes, 'contradictory' moving objects, cells that are both alive and dead, characters who have been speaking prose all their life, "Yea, Yea and Nay, Nay", etc., etc.

[Any who doubt the above allegations should check out Essay Two where several hundred of these highly repetitive, ground floor-level, sophomoric examples have been quoted (and that number is no exaggeration, either!).]

No independent expert in the relevant fields would accept any of this as proof. That is why this amateurish, highly selective and superficial approach to evidence was labelled "Mickey Mouse Science" in Essay Seven Part One (link above). The accuracy of that particular descriptor is confirmed by the additional fact that this part of DM -- concerning the universal nature of motion -- is based on Hegel's dogmatic ideas (as is much else in DM), who arrived at this 'Cosmic-Verity' before very much evidence was available. Of course, Hegel's ideas in this area were themselves ultimately derived from Heraclitus, who advanced these claims before there was any scientific data whatsoever! Indeed, he arrived at this 'Super-Scientific-Gem' (concerning change/motion), valid for all of space and time, merely by thinking about the possibility of stepping into the same river more than once!

[Alas, Heraclitus badly screwed even this observation up, about rivers! On that, see Essay Six.]

As we saw in Essay Seven Part One (and other Essays at this site, such as Five and Six) every single DM-'Law' possesses little other than watery-thin 'support', so it is no use dialecticians pretending their ideas were originally motivated by evidence, or even by a summary of the available evidence. They were all based on the overheated fantasies of a long line of Mystics and dogmatic obscurantists.

So at this point I'd be tempted to add "You just can't make this sh*t up!" -- but there is no need to: Mystics like Heraclitus and Hegel, aided by DM-fans, beat us to it!

[There is more on this specific topic here, as there will also be in several later Parts of Essay Twelve. In addition, see Note 5b and Note 6a.]

5b. In fact, it is hard to imagine single experiment that could confirm such hyper-bold claims. Because they were originally derived from thought/language alone, DM-theories reflect a determination to use a narrow range of words idiosyncratically. Each of these Super-Cosmic DM-Verities is then used as a (linguistic) rule to interpret experience (i.e., they function as forms of representation -- albeit incoherent forms of representation, as we will see), and as such they are employed in order to dictate to nature how it must be, what it must contain and how it must behave. But, this is just the RRT, again! That is, of course, why DM-theories seem 'self-evident' to those who concoct them (or who fall under their spell), why so many modal terms are used in their formulation, why no confirming experiments are called for and none are ever carried out. They are all based on a quirky use of language, not on a scientific review of the evidence. After all, has a single DM-supporter ever even so much as proposed a method for testing -- let alone having actually tested -- the veracity of the vast majority of DM-theories? But, why bother testing what appear to be self-evident truths? After all, who ever tests whether or not vixens are female foxes or whether or not three is an odd number?

No one does since they too are self-evident; hence, just like DM-theses, they need no evidence, and that is because they are all language-based.

It could be objected that Trotsky, for example, did in fact propose an experiment whereby two bags of sugar could be weighed to test the validity of the LOI. But, anyone who thinks that what Trotsky proposed could rightly be described as an "experiment" has a 'novel understanding' of the word "experiment". Since I have covered this topic at length in Essay Six, readers are directed there for more details. They are also directed to Essay Five, where questions were raised about the possibility of scientifically investigating Engels's claims about the contradictory nature of motion -- that is, whether or not a moving object is actually in two places at once, in one of them and not in it at the same time. Anyone who thinks such a claim (or, indeed, any of those mentioned above) can be scientifically tested, please contact me with the details.]

Unfortunately for Dialectical Marxists, this divorces their 'Super-Duper-DM-Truths' from a materialist account of nature and society.

In fact, if, as is maintained here, the 'truth' of DM-theories depends on thought alone, how could they be anything other than Ideal? As George Novack reminded us:

Worse still: if DM-theories are Idealist in form and content, how could they possibly be used to help change the world?

Well, as we saw in Essay Nine Part Two, a negative response to the above question would actually be mistaken. DM-theories can be used to help change the world -- but only negatively and in ways that benefit the class enemy.

Admittedly, some of these pronouncements were 'supported' by a series of short -- or even more protracted -- arguments. Nevertheless, the latter are used to help 'derive' such 'Super-Truths' from still other a priori statements, 'self-evident truths', assorted 'thought experiments', stipulations, persuasive definitions, thereby ultimately from yet more words! Their 'veracity' isn't based on actual evidence but on what their constituent words/concepts (and those of any supporting sentences) seem to mean. The linguistically-based nature of these 'derivations' means they can be recast or even marketed as 'universal truths', which, miraculously also need no evidential support. In relation to DM, we saw this was the case with the ideas Engels and Lenin peddled (the majority of which they borrowed or adapted from Hegel and other assorted Mystics); specifically, in this case, their remarks about matter and motion, like M1a, that supposedly followed from P4, but not from a thorough review of the evidence:

[The significance of these remarks will become clearer as this Essay and the rest of Essay Twelve unfold.]

6a. Again, it could be objected that Lenin actually devoted an entire section of MEC to providing support for this claim of his. Hence, the claims advanced in this Essay are entirely baseless.

Unfortunately, Lenin actually spent the bulk of the aforementioned section of MEC picking a fight with various Idealists, which makes much of what he had to say irrelevant to the topics addressed in this Essay -- and therefore irrelevant to supporting the above objection!

However, in order to consider every conceivable avenue open to Dialectical Marxists to defend Lenin (in this respect), it is necessary to check whether or not his arguments hold together even in their own terms.

Lenin's opening point in this part of MEC (I am ignoring the preamble on pp.318-19 since it seems to add nothing substantial), is this:

As we will see in Essay Thirteen Part One, Lenin's principal tactic when confronting ideas he doesn't like is to caricature them -- the above being an excellent example. "The entire world is his sensation"?! I can think of no Idealist of note who has ever argued this. [Email me if you disagree and can name a few such (with proof!).]

Even so, the force of Lenin's argument depends on his running-together two senses of "move". This allows him to insinuate that any Idealist who claims that "the world is motion" must somehow be contradicting herself, since her thoughts (and hence the 'contents of her world', presumably) "move". Now, even if we allow Lenin to get away with this verbal conflation, how it shows that "motion without matter is unthinkable" is far from clear.

It could be argued in defence of Lenin that for an Idealist, even thinking about matter involves motion, namely the motion of their own thoughts. In that case, motion without matter is indeed unthinkable. But, and once again, even if we accept Lenin's equivocation between these two different meanings of "move", we have seen he had already declared that:

In which case, if an Idealist thinks of something non-material (such as 'God' or the 'soul'), and his/her thought 'moves' in order to do so, then motion without matter is thinkable, nay actual, after all! [Whether 'God' and the 'soul' are in any way material will be discussed in Essay Thirteen Part One, but it is difficult to think of a single Dialectical Marxist who would want to argue that either of them could or should be so described!] Moreover, a consistent Idealist (of the sort Lenin is busy caricaturing) would probably conclude that while her ideas might move, that doesn't imply anything concerning the motion or lack of motion of matter, since she denies there is such a thing as 'matter' (i.e., as the latter term is understood by materialists like Lenin). The bottom line here is that this part of Lenin's argument torpedoes his claim that motion without matter is unthinkable! He has just admitted Idealists do it all the time!

Nevertheless, what devastating dialectical argument does Lenin now deploy in order to cast even this straw doctrine into oblivion? Wonder no more:

"The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given us in sensation. Therefore, to divorce motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from objective reality, or to divorcing my sensations from the external world -- in a word, it is to go over to idealism. The trick which is usually performed in denying matter, and in assuming motion without matter, consists in ignoring the relation of matter to thought. The question is presented as though this relation did not exist, but in reality it is introduced surreptitiously; at the beginning of the argument it remains unexpressed, but subsequently crops up more or less imperceptibly. Matter has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to draw epistemological conclusions. But has thought remained? -- we ask. If not, if with the disappearance of matter thought has also disappeared, if with the disappearance of the brain and nervous system ideas and sensations, too, have disappeared -- then it follows that everything has disappeared. And your argument has disappeared as a sample of 'thought' (or lack of thought)! But if it has remained -- if it is assumed that with the disappearance of matter, thought (idea, sensation, etc.) does not disappear, then you have surreptitiously gone over to the standpoint of philosophical idealism. And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to conceive of motion without matter, for tacitly, by the very fact that they continue to argue, they are acknowledging the existence of thought after the disappearance of matter. This means that a very simple, or a very complex philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a very simple one, if it is a case of frank solipsism (I exist, and the world is only my sensation); a very complex one, if instead of the thought, ideas and sensations of a living person, a dead abstraction is posited, that is, nobody's thought, nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, but thought in general (the Absolute Idea, the Universal Will, etc.), sensation as an indeterminate 'element,' the 'psychical,' which is substituted for the whole of physical nature, etc., etc. Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism are possible and it is always possible to create a thousand and first shade; and to the author of this thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for example) what distinguishes it from the rest may appear to be momentous. From the standpoint of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism." [Ibid., pp.320-21. Italic emphases in the original; link added. Paragraphs merged.]

This passage more than most exposes Lenin's philosophical naivety, if not incompetence. As pointed out earlier, this topic will be discussed in much greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part One, but for present purposes we need only note that all that the above 'argument' demonstrates is that Lenin based his own ideas on the fact that he had 'images' of something-or-other, and that what those 'images' 'reflect' must therefore exist. He supported this inference with a dubious claim that whatever is reflected in the mind must exist in the external world -- on that, see below.

But, even if we were recklessly charitable, the most this 'argument' could conceivably establish is that Lenin's 'images' correspond to his own 'image of reality', since all he has are 'images' with which to compare his other 'images'! He has no way of comparing his 'images' with anything which isn't also an 'image'. He couldn't jump 'out of his head' to inspect the world 'directly' in order to check his 'images' against the 'reality' he thinks they 'reflect'.

An appeal to practice, or even science, at this point would be to no avail either, since, if Lenin is right, all he would have are 'images of practice' and 'images of science'!

[I hasten to add that this doesn't imply I doubt the existence of the external world! But, anyone who agrees with Lenin faces serious problems like this, since they can only appeal to faith in support of their belief in 'objective reality'. In which case, they are philosophically no better off than Bogdanov and the others Lenin was criticising in MEC -- the "Fideists", as he called them. (As already pointed out, I have discussed this at greater length in Essay Thirteen Part One -- link above.)]

Hence, at most, all this long passage demonstrates is that materialists (but, only according to Lenin's definition of them) have a different 'view of reality' than Idealists, not that Idealists can't think about motion without conceding matter and motion are connected in the way Lenin and Engels supposed. Indeed, as we have seen, he even admits Idealists can do this:

"And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to conceive of motion without matter...." [Ibid.]

"We thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is the connection between philosophical idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter?" [Ibid., p.319. Bold emphases and link added.]

"What is essential is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism." [Ibid., p.321. Bold emphasis alone added.]

Critics might conclude, with some justification, that in the above Lenin has capitulated: it is possible to think about motion without matter!

"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., p.69. Bold emphasis added.]

"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added.]

[Nevertheless, how Lenin knew either of the above were true for other minds than his own -- but they can't actually be minds (since they exist outside his mind and he has as yet no proof there are any other minds out there, just an incessant supply of 'images'!), which, by his own criterion, must mean any such 'minds' must be material! -- he kept to himself.]

However, the inference that 'images' imply the existence of the thing 'imaged' is patently absurd. If that were the case, we would have to start believing in the real existence of Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy, for example. [On that, see here, and the extended discussion here.] Of course, since Lenin didn't believe in Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy, it is clear that he either didn't really believe "The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images....'", or he hadn't thought through the implications of his part of his theory. More-or-less the same can be said about his epigones, who have uncritically swallowed Lenin's theory of perception and knowledge.

But, even if Lenin were right, how does any of this show that motion without matter is inconceivable, or "unthinkable"? Indeed, not only is motion without matter conceivable, it is actual. Several examples of this everyday phenomenon will be given later on in this Essay.

Again, the most this argument is capable of establishing is that the idea of motion and the idea of matter are inseparable, or that the idea of motion divorced from the idea of matter is 'unthinkable', but then only if "materialist" and "matter" are defined in Lenin's rather odd way. Lenin had no way of breaking out of the Idealist circle he had constructed for himself.

However, Lenin has another argument up the 'image of his sleeve'. After a detour that took him into a consideration of Bogdanov's ideas, he argued as follows:

"Ostwald's answer, which so pleased Bogdanov in 1899, is plain sophistry. Must our judgments necessarily consist of electrons and ether? -- one might retort to Ostwald. As a matter of fact, the mental elimination from 'nature' of matter as the 'subject' only implies the tacit admission into philosophy of thought as the 'subject' (i.e., as the primary, the starting point, independent of matter). Not the subject, but the objective source of sensation is eliminated, and sensation becomes the 'subject,' i.e., philosophy becomes Berkeleian, no matter in what trappings the word 'sensation' is afterwards decked. Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism) by an indefinite use of the word 'energy,' but this very endeavour only once again goes to prove the futility of such artifices. If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas, symbols, conventional signs, and so forth? And this question proved fatal to the 'energeticist' philosophy, that attempt [sic] to disguise old epistemological errors by a 'new' terminology." [Ibid., p.324; italic emphases in the original, links added.]

This amounts to arguing (against the 'energeticists' -- i.e., those who claim that matter doesn't exist, or that it is simply energy) that they have merely:

"shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question, is energy material?" [Ibid.]

Well, if Lenin's words were sufficient on their own, it would settle the issue. Unfortunately, they aren't. So, what argument does he offer in support of his idiosyncratic 'translation' of "Does matter move?" into "Is energy material?" Apparently none at all -- or, none other than the following idiosyncratic re-definition of "matter" (which he repeats endlessly throughout MEC without once trying to justify it):

"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Ibid., p.311.]

"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., p.312.]

So, Lenin's only justification seems to be that to deny (or even reject) what he and Engels assert about matter is to brand oneself an Idealist. However, since Lenin failed to show that his own ideas (supposedly about 'reality', 'reflected in the mind', etc.) don't themselves collapse into Idealism, his endless bluster and serial caricatures are no help at all.

Exactly how Lenin's ideas collapse into Idealism is exposed at length in Essay Thirteen Part One, but the argument there also centres on his only apparent argument for the existence of the external world (which we examined briefly above): that an image implies the existence of the thing imaged!

"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added.]

But, as pointed out earlier, all that Lenin had to rely on here was his own 'image of a mirror' -- assuming that that is what lay behind his use of this ancient Hermetic metaphor. His knowledge of mirrors was his only guide when it came to using this figure of speech -- i.e., the trope concerning 'reflection'. And yet, all he had were 'images of mirrors' on which to base his argument! In which case, the most it establishes is that 'images' reflect other 'images'!

Now, it could be argued that mirrors actually reflect the images of objects, or even that they reflect objects themselves --, which, depending of what either really means, seems undeniable. But that response itself may only be promoted by those who reject Lenin's hopelessly confused epistemology, who don't think that all we have available to us are 'images'. That is because Lenin has yet to show that there are any 'real mirrors', as opposed to 'images of mirrors'. Or, indeed, show that these 'images of mirrors' reflect objects as opposed to reflecting the 'images of images of objects'. His version of the traditional representative theory of knowledge, whereby we represent the world to ourselves (as 'ideas', 'concepts', 'images', or even 'representations') in our heads, undercuts all talk of an 'objective' world independent of our knowledge of it, as was abundantly clear to 18^th century Idealists like Berkeley. Now Lenin, and/or his apologists/epigones might try to belittle, deny or repudiate the above anti-DM argument, in the process of which they might even kick up an 'image of a cloud of dust' (by the use of the sort of repetitive, 'scatter gun' bluster they learned from Lenin) in order to hide the fact that this 'image of Lenin's argument' doesn't work. But, to all but true believers, it is perfectly clear that Lenin's 'theory' would transform the world into a set of 'images' -- even 'images of images'!

[Again, I hasten to add that this isn't my theory (I reject all philosophical theories as incoherent non-sense, as this Essay shows). I am merely exposing the truly weird implications of Lenin's theory.]

And, as we will see below, it is no use Lenin or one of his epigones appealing to the 'commonsense' ideas of ordinary folk (to help bail him out):

"Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., p.69.]

That is because, if he is right, all he has are 'images' of such 'folk' and 'images of what they do or do not believe!

Nevertheless, if we now address Lenin's actual inference, 'images' do not in fact imply the existence of anything, since they are 'uninterpreted inner objects of cognition' (to use traditional jargon). And an act of interpretation (i.e., one that re-configures or that re-classifies these 'inner objects' as an 'image of' this, or an 'image of' that) would have nothing but still other 'images' (interpreted or not) to assist it to that end. In that case, any such this or any such that will itself be just another image (in the memory or generated in or by 'immediate perception'). Once again, Lenin would just be comparing one image with another, not with anything 'extra-mental'. Furthermore, as we will discover in Essay Ten, an appeal to practice can't turn an 'image' into something it isn't.

Still less is it any use arguing that the human race wouldn't have survived had their images of the world not corresponded, approximately or exactly, with the world (or at least local parts of it), since, and once again, all Lenin and his supporters have in their heads are images of humanity surviving. Lenin has yet to show that his images of 'humanity doing anything' (let alone surviving) actually correspond with anything outside the image they have (of 'it') 'inside their heads/brains'. Plainly, the same applies to whatever evidence might or might not be offered in support; it will simply amount to just another set of images, given Lenin's inherently defective epistemology and even more ridiculous starting point. Lenin has given us no way of producing anything other than an ever-expanding set of yet-to-be-authenticated-images. As will no doubt now seem clear: No image can authenticate itself, or, indeed, validate another image.

In addition, we have already seen that Lenin's approach to knowledge implies extreme scepticism. Hence, far from beginning with the "naive beliefs" of ordinary folk, his theory in fact obliterates both them and their beliefs! If we rely on what Lenin says on such matters, ordinary folk and their beliefs would simply be 'images in his head'.

The rest of Lenin's 'argument' (in this section of MEC) adds little to the above (as will become apparent in Essay Thirteen Part One); in that case, Lenin failed to demonstrate by argument or evidence that motion without matter is "unthinkable".

Some might object that Lenin's ideas underwent considerable development between the writing of MEC and PN. Attempts to defend Lenin along such lines has been neutralised in Appendix Three of Essay Three Part Two.

Others might argue that the above conclusions are patently absurd. Only the mentally ill, deliberate controversialists, or inveterate obscurantists would question the existence of the external word.

The first point that needs making in response is that nowhere at this site has any doubt been expressed concerning the existence of the external world. What has been argued is that anyone who accepts Lenin's theory, where a layer of 'images' has been inserted between a 'knower' and the 'known', rapidly collapses into solipsism. Anyone who thinks that conclusion is absurd has a choice to make: continue accepting a theory that has absurd consequences, or reject it precisely because of that.

As far as the mentally ill, deliberate controversialists and inveterate obscurantists are concerned, all that a supporter of Lenin (or a critic of this site who is a supporter of Lenin's theory) has available to them are images of the mentally ill, images of deliberate controversialists, and images of inveterate obscurantists. Whether any of the latter actually exist (i.e., in 'extra-mental reality') has yet to be demonstrated by any such objector. In order to confirm they do exist, at least as far as their own knowledge is concerned, they will have to leap out of their own heads and experience the world directly (whatever that means!), without a single image getting in the way. In effect they will have to refute Lenin in order to support him -- since they will thereby have denied or rejected the following clear statements:

"Acceptance or rejection of the concept matter is a question of the confidence man places in the evidence of his sense-organs, a question of the source of our knowledge, a question which has been asked and debated from the very inception of philosophy, which may be disguised in a thousand different garbs by professorial clowns, but which can no more become antiquated than the question whether the source of human knowledge is sight and touch, healing and smell. To regard our sensations as images of the external world, to recognise objective truth, to hold the materialist theory of knowledge -- these are all one and the same thing...." [Ibid., p.145. In all of the above, bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world...." [Ibid., p.69. Bold emphasis added.]

"For instance, the materialist Frederick Engels -- the not unknown collaborator of Marx and a founder of Marxism -- constantly and without exception speaks in his works of things and their mental pictures or images..., and it is obvious that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations. It would seem that this fundamental standpoint of the 'philosophy of Marxism' ought to be known to everyone who speaks of it, and especially to anyone who comes out in print in the name of this philosophy.... Engels, we repeat, applies this 'only materialistic conception' everywhere and without exception, relentlessly attacking Dühring for the least deviation from materialism to idealism. Anybody who reads Anti-Dühring and Ludwig Feuerbach with the slightest care will find scores of instances when Engels speaks of things and their reflections in the human brain, in our consciousness, thought, etc. Engels does not say that sensations or ideas are 'symbols' of things, for consistent materialism must here use 'image,' picture, or reflection instead of 'symbol,' as we shall show in detail in the proper place." [Ibid., pp.32-33. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"All knowledge comes from experience, from sensation, from perception." [Ibid., p.142. Bold emphasis added.]

"The sole and unavoidable deduction to be made from this -- a deduction which all of us make in everyday practice and which materialism deliberately places at the foundation of its epistemology -- is that outside us, and independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and that our perceptions are images of the external world." [Ibid., p.111. Bold emphasis added.]

"For the materialist the 'factually given' is the outer world, the image of which is our sensations." [Ibid., p.121. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality." [Ibid., p.320. Bold emphasis added.]

"What has annoyed this most worthy 'recent positivist'? Well, how could he help being annoyed when he immediately realised that from Haeckel's standpoint all the great doctrines of his teacher Avenarius -- for instance, that the brain is not the organ of thought, that sensations are not images of the external world, that matter ('substance') or 'the thing-in-itself' is not an objective reality, and so forth -- are nothing but sheer idealist gibberish!?" [Ibid., p.428. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link and bold emphasis added.]

In which case, those who agree with Lenin's Theory of Knowledge should pick a fight with him, not the author of this Essay, for dropping them in this bottomless pit of solipsistic confusion.

[Once again, to make myself clear, I do not for one second doubt the existence of the mentally ill, deliberate controversialists, and inveterate obscurantists. But, anyone who accepts Lenin's theory clearly must since that theory reduces them all to 'images'!]

7. Of course, metaphysical theories aren't set in stone. As Dialectical Marxists themselves acknowledge such theories change and develop in accord with the rise and fall of different Modes of Production, in line with the ideological imperatives of ruling elites, or those of any insurgent class intent on replacing them -- or, indeed, in furtherance of the (personal) aims and interests of such "prize fighters". [On this, see Shaw (1989).] Having said that, there is a common, uniting thread running through all forms of ruling-class Philosophy: the doctrine that 'Cosmic Super-Verities', valid for all of space and time, can be inferred from thought or from language alone -- as Marx and Engels themselves pointed out:

"[O]ne fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." [Marx and Engels (1968b), p.52. Bold emphasis added.]

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

Admittedly, early Ancient Greek Philosophers didn't use the word "Metaphysics"; that term was introduced much later, by Aristotle -- for whom it had a different meaning, too. Nevertheless, the world-views on which Super-Knowledge like this depends certainly date back (in the 'West' at least) to Anaximander and Anaximenes. In the 'East', of course, their version of 'metaphysics' stretches back even further. [There is more on this here and in Note I, as there will be in Parts Two and Three of this Essay.]

8. These days 'necessary truths' often tend to be defined extensionally, that is, they are defined as true in every possible world. [Divers (2002), Kirkham (1992), Menzel (2016).] That rather odd approach to 'necessary truth' will be critically examined elsewhere at this site.

However, this isn't to suggest that all metaphysicians attach modal qualifications to the word "truth" -- certainly not pre-Leibniz. Hence, the use of the phrase "necessary truth" (at this site, in order to highlight the confusion that is said to exist between necessary and contingent truths) is merely a convenient, shorthand way of underlining the thread running through the entire history of Metaphysics, briefly outlined in Note 7.

Clearly, some sensitivity needs to be evident when analysing the metaphysical ideas of theorists who wrote before the phrase "necessary truth" entered philosophical currency. Having said that, it is how a theorist employs their words and ideas that is important, not what the latter are called. If that use is no different from the use of genuinely necessary truths (as the latter have been conceived more recently), no serious distortion of the original ideas is intended or need be implied.

On this, see the extended comments entitled "Grammar and Necessity" published in Baker and Hacker (2014), pp.241-370. Much that those two authors have to say is consistent with the view adopted at this site, but their words should be read in light of other references given below, particularly the work of David Bloor and Martin Kusch. Nevertheless, what Baker and Hacker have to say greatly extends and amplifies the material related to this topic published in all Parts of Essay Twelve.

9. The ease with which all metaphysicians seem to be able to perform this trick (i.e., deriving necessary truths from a handful of words/'concepts') isn't the only clue we have concerning the nature and source of the dogmatic theories they regularly conjure out of less than thin air. A detailed consideration of different interpretations of the words used, coupled with a demonstration that there are other ways of viewing the 'same' words -- which are equally if not more plausible -- shows that metaphysical theories depend on little other than a determination to use language in odd ways. Or, as Marx said, on a determination to distort the vernacular.

Hence, it is possible to show that the 'Super-Truths' Traditional Theorists concoct decay into incoherence because they:

(b) Are based on a highly specialised, limited, distorted or implausible use of language.

In which case, these 'Super-Truths' can't be a 'reflection' of (supposedly) 'necessary'/'essential' features of this universe (or, indeed, any universe). Far from depicting the 'logical' or 'essential form of the world', they either express, or depend on, identifiable ruling-class assumptions (held and conveyed by their ideologues) about the sort of universe that is conducive to their interests, their retention of power and their need to reproduced the exploitative relations of production and control from which they benefit.

It could be objected that philosophical language is legitimate in itself, and as such shouldn't be beholden to, not should it be judged against, the vernacular.

In response, the reader is referred to Glock's comments, quoted earlier, as well as the following remarks (even though they were originally aimed at Cognitive Scientists and the analogy drawn against computers, they are still relevant to the point at issue here):

"We have absolutely nothing against the coining of new, technical uses [of words], as we have said. Rather, the issue is that many of those who insist upon speaking of machines' 'thinking' and 'understanding' do not intend in the least to be coining new, restrictively technical, uses for these terms. It is not, for example, that they have decided to call a new kind of machine an 'understanding machine', where the word 'understanding' now means something different from what we ordinarily mean by that word. On the contrary, the philosophical cachet derives entirely from their insisting that they are using the words 'thinking' and 'understanding' in the same sense that we ordinarily use them. The aim is quite characteristically to provoke, challenge and confront the rest of us. Their objective is to contradict something that the rest of us believe. What the 'rest of us' believe is simply this: thinking and understanding is something distinctive to human beings..., and that these capacities set us apart from the merely mechanical.... The argument that a machine can think or understand, therefore, is of interest precisely because it features a use of the words 'think' and 'understand' which is intendedly the same as the ordinary use. Otherwise, the sense of challenge and, consequently, of interest would evaporate.... If engineers were to make 'understand' and 'think' into technical terms, ones with special, technical meanings different and distinct from those we ordinarily take them to have, then, of course, their claims to have built machines which think or understand would have no bearing whatsoever upon our inclination ordinarily to say that, in the ordinary sense, machines do not think or understand." [Button, et al (1995), pp.12, 20-21. Italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

Hence, if philosophers use, for example, the word "knowledge" in an attempt to inform us what knowledge really is, but this (novel) use bears no relation to how that word is normally employed, what they have to say will relate to 'knowledge', not knowledge, leaving the 'philosophical problem of knowledge' unaffected. [On that, see also Baz (2012) and Coulter and Sharrock (2007).] On why the vernacular is the highest and final court of appeal will be covered in detail in Part Seven of Essay Twelve, but anyone who has a problem with this should pick a fight with Marx not the present author:

"[P]hilosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis added.]

The insurmountable problems that result from ignoring Marx's advice have been detailed here (which has been excerpted from Part Seven of Essay Twelve).

9a. Some might object at this point and claim that this emphasis on evidence, confirmation and proof only succeeds in confirming the suspicion that the present author is a Positivist, or is at least an Empiricist.

Neither is the case. The present author is merely holding DM-theorists to their own words -- like these, for instance:

"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), p.13. Bold emphasis added.]

"All three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels (1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment. Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line." [Ibid., p.47. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"The general results of the investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator from painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it." [Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]

"Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), p.233. Bold emphasis added.]

"Whenever any Marxist attempted to transmute the theory of Marx into a universal master key and ignore all other spheres of learning, Vladimir Ilyich would rebuke him with the expressive phrase 'Komchvanstvo' ('communist swagger')." [Ibid., p.221.]

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphases added.]

"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"[The laws of dialectics] are not, as Marx and Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult empirical task of tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key whose only advantage is to turn up when no real historical knowledge is available." [Rees (1998), p.9. Bold emphasis added.]

"'[The dialectic is not a] magic master key for all questions.' The dialectic is not a calculator into which it is possible to punch the problem and allow it to compute the solution. This would be an idealist method. A materialist dialectic must grow from a patient, empirical examination of the facts and not be imposed on them…." [Ibid., p.271. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

If asking for actual evidence means I'm an empiricist/positivist, then so was Marx:

"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.... The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.42, 46-47. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment." [Engels (1954), p.47. Bold emphases alone added.]

9b. On the ruling-class origin of the ideas promoted and disseminated by DM-theorists, see Essay Nine Part Two, here.

10. These allegations will also be substantiated in later Parts of Essay Twelve, as well as Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here).

However, it is important to register the following caveat (also added to Essay Nine Part One):

Having said that, it needs emphasising up-front that it isn't being maintained here that leading revolutionaries adopted ruling-class ideas duplicitously or willingly. What is being alleged is that they did so unwittingly. Exactly how and why they did this will be revealed in Part Two.

11. The word "can't" isn't meant to suggest there is a physical limit here. It expresses the fact that metaphysical theories soon decay into (obviously) incoherent non-sense and can't fail to do so. That is because, by means of such ideas their inventors attempt to transcend the expressive limitations of language. [More on that below; see also Note 9.]

11a0. The material that used to be here has bow been moved to Interlude Five.

11b. Conversely, it could be argued that this shows B1 is false. That possibility will be tackled presently.

11c. Here is an example where the word "Marx" is being used: "Marx wrote Das Kapital Volume One"; and here is one where the word "Marx" is only being mentioned, not used: "'Marx' contains four letters."

The use of quotation marks in order to highlight the occasions a word is merely being mentioned not used isn't strictly necessary. On that, see 'Objection Three', here.

[This apparently clear distinction has nevertheless been challenged several times. On that, see for example, Moore (1986).]

12. However, if 'thought itself' is to be linked to the motion of matter -- at however deep. convoluted or complex level that is deemed to take place -- then the second of these sentences (i.e., "This could be true even if no matter was in fact relocated in the process") would plainly be incorrect. Anyway, such a theory (about 'thought and matter') seems to depend on the truth of reductive materialism, a doctrine Lenin would certainly have rejected.

But, even if M11 were contestable on other grounds, it wouldn't be difficult to think of other examples that aren't so easily dismissed. Consider, therefore, the following:

E3: You say you'll mend the fence, but that job seems to move further into the future by the day.

E6: Multiplying –2 by –3 moves it from the set of Negative Integers to the set of Positive Integers (= 6), even while all three remain in the set of Real Numbers.

E7: The disqualification of Leaping Lena in the 3.30 at Belmont moved Mugwump into first place.

E8: The back of the Necker Cube moves to the front (and vice versa) depending on how you view it.

E9: The result of the strike ballot moved the question of tactics to the top of the agenda.

The above senses of "move" can't easily be reconciled with Lenin's claims about matter and motion.

[Several more such examples were given in Essay Five. See also Note 13, below.]

Admittedly, some might try to dismiss (or even neutralise as "not relevant") one or more of the above examples -- and, indeed, those advanced in Essay Five -- by refining Lenin's 'definitions' of matter and/or motion, in tandem perhaps with the use of several other (ad hoc) tricks and dodges. Alternatively, still others might try to argue that they employ several different meanings of the word "move" compared with Lenin's use of it. But even if that were so, it still wouldn't mean Lenin's was the correct way -- or, indeed, the only way -- to use that word. Clearly, what Lenin actually meant by "motion" (that is, if he actually meant anything by it!) must be ascertained before a decision is made either way. However, Lenin's intentions aren't at all clear. In fact, if we are honest, it is difficult to make head or tail of much that Lenin had to say in this area, and that is especially so throughout MEC -- as will be demonstrated in the main body of this Essay and Essay Thirteen Part One.

If exception is still taken to the counter-examples given above (each of which, incidentally, illustrates a perfectly ordinary use of the word "move" and its cognates), then that would amount to finding fault with ordinary language, not with the present author or even with those examples. But, we have already seen what serious problems confront anyone reckless enough to do down that rabbit hole.

Indeed, these examples represent a much wider and more representative sample of the use of "move" than is generally the case with the arcane musings of Idealists and metaphysicians (and that accusation includes Lenin). As seems clear, they show how ordinary human beings regularly employ this word (and others related to it) in their interface with the world and in communication with one another. Indeed, they do so in a manner, and in ways, undreamt of by Traditional Theorists.

Whatever else Lenin might have imagined he meant by "motion"/"move", it is clear that ordinary speakers don't use that noun/verb (and any associated adjectives/adverbs) that way, and neither do scientists. The use of "motion"/"move" by everyday materialists -- i.e., workers -- is not only a better, it is a much more reliable guide to this word's range of connotations than the use of similar-looking terms employed by inconsistent materialists/closet Idealists -- i.e., Dialectical Marxists. If Lenin's employment diverges from its materially-grounded use in everyday life, then so much the worse for him and anyone who agrees with him.

It could be countered that it is perfectly clear what Lenin meant. He was alluding to the physical or literal meaning of the word "move" -- i.e., its use connected with locomotion and "change of place" studied in and by the physical sciences and applied mathematics. Hence, the above anti-DM remarks are as misguided as they are irrelevant. Lenin agreed with Engels that motion is simple, "change of place":

"All motion is bound up with some change of place, whether it be change of place of heavenly bodies, terrestrial masses, molecules, atoms, or ether particles. The higher the form of motion, the smaller this change of place. It in no way exhausts the nature of the motion concerned, but it is inseparable from the motion. It, therefore, has to be investigated before anything else." [Engels (1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]

"Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking.... All motion is bound up with some change of place, whether it be change of place of heavenly bodies, terrestrial masses, molecules, atoms, or ether particles. The higher the form of motion, the smaller this change of place. It in no way exhausts the nature of the motion concerned, but it is inseparable from the motion." [Engels (1954), pp.69-70. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]

"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152. Bold emphasis added]

In reply, it is worth noting that the above physical sense of "move" (interpreted as "change of place") isn't without serious problems of its own. Since that was discussed in detail in Essay Five (link a few paragraphs back), the reader is referred there for further details.

"Let us imagine a consistent idealist who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take 'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas, sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject and regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his ideas come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' -- and that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of thinking. And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view. The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given us in sensation." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

Lenin here speaks about "the movement of ideas" and the "motion of...thoughts, ideas, sensations". He can't have meant "change of place" by that use of "move"/"motion"!

So, if Lenin is allowed to employ a slightly wider meaning of "motion" (and/or its cognates), Dialectical Marxists can hardly complain when the very same approach is adopted by those who criticise their method/understanding.

Independently of this, it is easy to show that Lenin is completely unclear what he did mean by "move" (and/or its cognates), just as he was no less unclear about "matter", too. [On that, see here and Note 1.]

Finally, since many of the above examples relate to events that take place, or might take place, outside the mind, they clearly relate to 'material movement' as defined by Lenin himself! If the aforementioned examples are unacceptable, the problem lies with Lenin's characterisation of matter and motion, not with the examples.

M12: The occurrence of literal motion without matter can never be thought of as true.

Use of "appears" was deliberate. That is because M12 could be true while M13 is false (which means that M13 can't follow from M12).

On the other hand, M13 could follow from M12 if an extra Idealist (or even suppressed) premise were added, namely:

Since it is central to my case against DM that its theorists (covertly) accept M12a (on that, see the RRT, as well as Essays Two, Twelve Part Four, and Thirteen Part One), then, at least, for them, M13 would follow from M12 (via M12a).

[The reverse implication is also problematic, since M13 could be true while M12 is false. However, that invalid inference isn't relevant to the aims of this Essay and will therefore be ignored.]

13. Another example of the indirect connection between motion and matter is the following:

Even though something material would have to move for that shadow itself to move, its motion is clearly non-material, and depends on the absence of matter (i.e., light).

Surfaces are rather puzzling; no one seems to be sure whether they are material or not. [Cf., Stroll (1988).] Few doubt they can move. The same goes for waves, shapes, holes, corners, boundaries and edges, all of which can move (indeed, some actually do move; e.g., Mexican Waves). The same applies to reflections and shadows. [On the latter, see Sorensen (2003, 2008). On shapes, see Bennett (2012); cf., also Casati and Varzi (1995, 1999, 2023), and Varzi (1997, 2023).]

Hence, not only is motion without matter conceivable, it is actual, as many of the above confirm.

[This forms part of Note 17. However, I have covered this topic in much greater detail here. Readers are directed there for more supporting evidence and argument.]

Marx's belief in the social nature of language, and the fundamental role it plays in communication (not representation), is confirmed by the following passages:

"The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. -- real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. [Marx and Engels (1970), p.47. Bold emphasis added.]

"Only now, after having considered four moments, four aspects of the primary historical relationships, do we find that man also possesses 'consciousness,' but, even so, not inherent, not 'pure' consciousness. From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into 'relations' with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.... On the other hand, man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all...." [Ibid., pp.50-51. Bold emphases added.]

"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life. We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]

"The object before us, to begin with, material production. Individuals producing in Society -- hence socially determined individual production -- is, of course, the point of departure. The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades, which in no way express merely a reaction against over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural historians imagine. As little as Rousseau's contrat social, which brings naturally independent, autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract, rests on such naturalism. This is the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the Robinsonades, great and small. It is, rather, the anticipation of 'civil society', in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century individual -- the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century -- appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new epoch to this day. Steuart avoided this simple-mindedness because as an aristocrat and in antithesis to the eighteenth century, he had in some respects a more historical footing. The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan [Stamm]; then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the clan. Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations. The human being is in the most literal sense a Zwon politikon not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society -- a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness -- is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other. There is no point in dwelling on this any longer. The point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle, which had sense and reason for the eighteenth-century characters, had not been earnestly pulled back into the centre of the most modern economics by Bastiat, Carey, Proudhon etc. Of course it is a convenience for Proudhon et al. to be able to give a historico-philosophic account of the source of an economic relation, of whose historic origins he is ignorant, by inventing the myth that Adam or Prometheus stumbled on the idea ready-made, and then it was adopted, etc. Nothing is more dry and boring than the fantasies of a locus communis ["a locus communis" = "a commonplace" -- RL]." [Marx (1973), pp.83-85. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]

"The main point here is this: In all these forms -- in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economic order, and where the economic aim is hence the production of use values, i.e., the reproduction of the individual within the specific relation to the commune in which he is its basis -- there is to be found: (1) Appropriation not through labour, but presupposed to labour; appropriation of the natural conditions of labour, of the earth as the original instrument of labour as well as its workshop and repository of raw materials. The individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being his; [relates] to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the latter realizes itself; the chief objective condition of labour does not itself appear as a product of labour, but is already there as nature; on one side the living individual, on the other the earth, as the objective condition of his reproduction; (2) but this relation to land and soil, to the earth, as the property of the labouring individual -- who thus appears from the outset not merely as labouring individual, in this abstraction, but who has an objective mode of existence in his ownership of the land, an existence presupposed to his activity, and not merely as a result of it, a presupposition of his activity just like his skin, his sense organs, which of course he also reproduces and develops etc. in the life process, but which are nevertheless presuppositions of this process of his reproduction -- is instantly mediated by the naturally arisen, spontaneous, more or less historically developed and modified presence of the individual as member of a commune -- his naturally arisen presence as member of a tribe etc. An isolated individual could no more have property in land and soil than he could speak. He could, of course, live off it as substance, as do the animals. The relation to the earth as property is always mediated through the occupation of the land and soil, peacefully or violently, by the tribe, the commune, in some more or less naturally arisen or already historically developed form. The individual can never appear here in the dot-like isolation...in which he appears as mere free worker." [Ibid., p.485. Bold emphasis added.]

[Much of the above anticipates Wittgenstein, except, he would have questioned the use of "consciousness" in the above manner. On that see Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

"Much more important is the direct, demonstrable influence of the development of the hand on the rest of the organism. It has already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labour, and widened man's horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other.... First labour, after it and then with it speech -- these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect...." [Engels (1876), pp.356-57. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

[I defend a particular interpretation of the above general idea in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

That isn't to suggest Marx and Wittgenstein would have seen eye-to-eye on this, or that Marx was a proto-Wittgenstein! Far from it. However, as I have argued here and here, anyone who concludes the opposite -- that Wittgenstein wasn't in any way influenced by Marx (or Engels and even Hegel!) --, faces serious difficulties over that interpretation, at the very least.

Having said that, there is convincing evidence that Wittgenstein adopted the 'anthropological' approach to language, which dominated his middle and later work, as a result of long conversations he had with Piero Sraffa, a noted Marxist, which fact isn't unrelated to his (i.e., Wittgenstein's) clear sympathies with the left.

So, far from Marx being a proto-Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein was, in a rather limited or attenuated sense, a latter-day 'attenuated Marxist'. In fact, in many ways, as far a Philosophy is concerned, Wittgenstein stands to Marx as Feuerbach does to Hegel. [I hope to defend that particular analogy in a later Essay. However, see here.]

17a. Language would have to be based on some form of convention for it to serve successfully and efficiently as a means of communication. [This idea will be developed extensively in Part Seven of Essay Twelve.]

The comments at this point in the main body of the Essay do not, of course, imply linguistic conventions are set in stone. In fact many have changed over the centuries, while some plainly haven't -- and can't. [Why that is so, among other issues raised by these seemingly dogmatic remarks, was covered in detail in Essay Five.]

18a. It could be objected that Voloshinov's work is a clear exception to these sweeping claims. That objection has been dealt with in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4)-(6).

"The prevailing conception of meaning, is, importantly, representational, or, as it has sometimes been put, 'descriptivist'. Those who adhere to it would not deny, of course, that we do any number of things with words other than describing, asserting, stating, or otherwise representing things as being one way or another. Nonetheless, they would insist (and presuppose in their theories and arguments) that the representational function of language is somehow primary and fundamental to it, and that there is in every (philosophically interesting) case a representational ('semantic') element to speech and thought -- an indicative core, as Davidson puts it (1979/2001, p.121) -- that may, and should, theoretically be separated from the rest of what is involved in speaking or thinking.... The prevailing assumption is that our words, and hence their meanings, ought first and foremost to enable us to form representations of things and the ways they stand -- to 'capture the world', as Horwich tellingly puts it (2005, p.v) -- and only as such may be usable for doing things other than, or beyond, representing. This is taken to be true not just of words such as 'Gödel', 'cat', 'water' and 'red', but also of philosophically troublesome words such as 'know', 'think', 'believe', 'see', 'seems', 'looks', 'good', 'reason', 'will', 'world', 'part', 'cause', 'free', 'voluntary', 'intention', 'soul, 'mind', 'pain', 'meaning', and so on.... What makes these words fit for this function, it is further presupposed, is their power to 'refer to' or 'denote' or 'pick out' some particular relation that sometimes holds between knowers and facts, or propositions...." [Baz (2012), pp.17-19. Bold emphases alone added; referencing conventions altered to conform with those adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

[While I agree with much that Baz says in the above study, in several areas I think he pushes some of his claims a little too far, and certainly beyond anything Wittgenstein himself would have envisaged. Not that that is decisive in itself; but, in so far as Baz was trying to defend Wittgenstein, that caveat is nevertheless apposite.]

[Added on Edit: The above link will take the reader to a site that is now almost totally defunct (if not completely dead), so I have re-posted an edited version of those remarks in Essay Three Part Two.]

"Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer." [Rousseau (1952), p.3.]

It is now clear that Dialectical Marxists have accepted and developed a Bourgeois Individualistic theory of knowledge, meaning and cognition, which they have loosely grafted onto an incompatible social theory of language and 'consciousness'. As Meredith Williams remarked about Vygotsky's theory (whose work is highly influential among DM-fans):

"Vygotsky attempts to combine a social theory of cognition development with an individualistic account of word-meaning.... [But] the social theory of development can only succeed if it is combined with a social theory of meaning." [Williams (1999b), p.275.]

Williams could in fact be talking about any randomly-selected Dialectical Marxist who has ever written on this subject.

[I have examined in detail the ideas of several of the above DM-theorists in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4)-(6) (link in Note 18a above).]

21. In fact, surprisingly few Marxists have written about language in any great detail or to any depth. Unfortunately, those who have at least made tentative moves in that direction also tend to undermine, denigrate or depreciate ordinary language. Either that or they make all the usual mistakes, implying that they, too, accept the traditional theory that language is primarily representational (even if they include a few weak gestures in the direction of its role in communication).

[The above claims will be substantiated in Essays Twelve Part Seven and Thirteen Part Three (link above). They were also covered in Essays Three Part Two and Four Part One.]

Independently of this, it is important to add that Conventionalism is highly complex and incorporates several widely differing intellectual currents and traditions. Having said that, what unites modern and classical versions of conventionalist theories of language is a determination on the part of its proponents to concoct a priori theories about the nature of discourse and science, which approach is itself also based on the supposed meaning of certain words. Such theories won't be defended in this Essay -- or anywhere else for that matter -- but from what has just been said, that disparate family of theories clearly constitutes a sub-branch of Metaphysics. [Those somewhat controversial remarks won't be defended here, either.]

Despite this, there are grammatical features of language -- which conventionalists mistakenly interpret as empirical facts both about language and the world --, that underpin the anthropological approach to discourse adopted at this site (except that approach a "form of representation", not a philosophical theory). Those features are also compatible with, and depend upon, the conventional nature of language (albeit in a suitably qualified sense). [There is more on this below, and in the rest of Essay Twelve, as well as Essay Thirteen Parts Two and Three.]

Unfortunately, there are disconcertingly few comprehensive -- let alone convincing -- Marxist analyses of Science, despite the fact that revolutionaries by-and-large have a high opinion of that discipline (when it hasn't been corrupted by right-wing ideology). Nevertheless, Robinson (2003) contains one of the best (currently) available Marxist accounts of science (see also his Unpublished Essays, which have been posted at this site). See also, Miller (1987), which is a notable, and rather unique, exception to the above remarks.

While Science itself has advanced dramatically since Engels's day, theories of science written by Dialectical Marxists have largely stood still, and that is especially true of material published over the last fifty or sixty years. DM-theorists in general have been more intent on rehashing tired old ideas lifted from the 'dialectical classics' than they have been keeping abreast of progress made in the History and Philosophy of Science (which has itself undergone something of a revolution since Kuhn (1962) was published). [This links to a PDF of the Second Edition.]

Two of the more recent attempts to squeeze scientific knowledge into a dialectical boot it clearly doesn't and definitely won't fit are, RIRE and Mason (2012) -- each of which is in effect just a padded-out, 'beefed-up' version of Baghavan (1987), and, mercifully, a shorter (but much less hagiographical) version of Gollobin (1986). In different ways all four of the latter read like notorious Creationist attempts to render The Book of Genesis consistent with Science. Another recent example of this genre is Malek (2011). [Malek is a retired scientist and, despite his rather odd devotion to DM, some of his remarks about the Idealist implications of modern science are well observed.]

[Readers should check out the desperate debating tactics adopted in defence of DM over at the Soviet Empire Forum and the Guardian Science blogs (a few years ago) where a comrade who writes and argues like Malek floats about with the pseudonyms "Future World" and "Futurehuman", respectively. It should be noted, however, that the second of these two individuals has denied he is identical with the first (even though their writing-style and the points they make are uncannily similar)! Incidentally, I am not 'outing' ("doxing") a fellow comrade here; Malek has openly acknowledged he is 'Futurehuman' in The Guardian comments section.]

To compound the problem, there have been even fewer attempts to understand the History of Science from a revolutionary perspective. Phil Gasper's review back in the 1990s only serves to underline that easily confirmed fact. [Gasper (1998).] However, much of what Gasper has to say is itself excellent and well worth reading for its own sake.

[There are countless (exceedingly brief!) attempts to squeeze DM into the aforementioned ill-fitting boot to be found in the scores of Dialectical Marxist sites that have sprouted on-line over the last twenty years or so. The vast majority say more-or-less the same as each other (i.e., they all represent a blatant, superficial rehash of Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao and/or Stalin). I have quoted well over sixty of them in two places in Essay Two (Appendix Three and here), as well as scores more elsewhere in the same Essay (for example, here and here). So, any who doubt the veracity of the above remarks can check for themselves whether or not I'm just 'blowing smoke'.]

Classical Marxist histories of science are by now badly dated. Even when new they tended to adopt an a priori and somewhat 'Whiggish' approach to the subject, dominated by the constant repetition of familiar, shopworn DM-clichés.

Regrettably, that observation also applies to Boris Hessen's classic study of the social dimension of Newton's work [Hessen (1971) -- this links to a PDF]. Despite its obvious strengths, and in spite of the fact that Hessen was working under intolerable pressure at the time, this work of his is far too insubstantial to count as a significant contribution either to history or theory. No doubt had the author lived he would have developed, justified and substantiated many of his more controversial claims. Unfortunately, however, in the intervening years little extra evidence or argument has emerged in support of his main thesis. And, as if to compound matters, Hessen's study is fatally compromised by his reliance on far too many of Engels's erroneous ideas in this area. [Cf., Graham (1985) and Clark (1970).]

Bernal's classic work is more closely tied to the actual development of science, but even here the author is ideologically biased toward Stalinism. [Bernal (1939, 1969); cf., also Ravetz (1981), and Swann and Aprahamian (1999). On Bernal's life and his Stalinist bias, see Brown (2005).]

Excellent (left wing) historical work in this area include the following: Farrington (1939, 1974a, 1947b, 2000), the minor classic, Caudwell (1949, 1977), Zilsel (2000) and Needham (1951a, 1951b, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1979), and, of course, Needham (1954-2004). Another more recent minor classic, however, is Conner (2005), which I cannot praise too highly.

Other works written from a Marxist perspective (but surprisingly ignored by Gasper) are rather more successful, though. Among these are Freudenthal (1986) and Swetz (1987). [Cf., also Høyrup (1994).] Also omitted: are: Albury and Schwartz (1982), Easlea (1973, 1980), J. Jacob (1988), M. Jacob (1976, 1988, 2000, 2006a, 2006b), Krige (1980), and Mason (1962). It is also important to add that several of the latter were published after Gasper's article was written and published!

However, by far and away the best work in this area is Hadden (1988, 1994), which developed ideas originally aired in Borkenau (1987), Grossmann (1987) and Sohn-Rethel (1978) -- alas, also omitted from Gasper's review. Hadden's book should, however, be read in conjunction with Kaye (1998).

Also, since writing much of the above, I have had the great pleasure of reading Lerner (1992). Lerner is clearly a Marxist or has been heavily influenced by Marxism. Whatever one thinks of his criticism of BBT, his analysis of science, as far as it goes, is excellent.

[BBT = Big Bang Theory; RIRE = Reason In Revolt; i.e., Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]

A 'Marxist' book that readers should study with caution, though, is Gillott and Kumar (1995). Those two authors are in fact surreptitious ideologues of the old UK-RCP -- the remnants of which, over at Spiked, now pass themselves off as supporters of unfettered free market capitalism while acting as shills for Big Capital! Evidence in support of those accusations can be found, for example, here, here, here and here. [The last link is now dead since the host site had been subjected to numerous hack attacks of a rather suspicious nature (that link is also now dead!) -- plainly because it is one of the best resources on the Internet exposing the GM industry.] Added August 2010: Their new site is now located here. Use the 'Search' function to look for: "LM Magazine", "Spiked", "RCP", "John Gillott", "Manjit Kumar", "Frank Furedi", "Fiona Fox", "Claire Fox", "Helene Goldenberg", "Science Media Centre", "Institute of Ideas", etc., etc.

As noted above, a recent addition to the genre is Mason (2012), which is almost entirely devoted to criticising the core DM-ideas aired in RIRE -- and, believe it or not, from a 'dialectical angle'! Parts of Mason's book are nevertheless excellent, but unfortunately much of it is highly repetitive and, where the author discusses DM, he is alarmingly naive. On that, see here.

Incidentally, Gasper's account is itself compromised as much by his uncritical acceptance of DM as it is by its extreme philosophical brevity, which is puzzling given his professional expertise (in this area). For example, while Gasper rejects "Social Constructivism", he does so on the basis of a few rather dismissive, all-too-brief remarks that he pointedly failed to substantiate. In marked contrast, Gasper seems quite happy to accept what Engels and Lenin (etc.) had to say about science with scarcely a blink, when what they claim is supported by evidence, analysis and argument that is considerably weaker and thinner than anything presented in the work of even the most feeble-minded and superficial of social constructivists!

Another book widely respected and referenced among revolutionaries is Helena Sheehan's highly respected but nevertheless badly mis-titled work: Marxism and the Philosophy of Science [Sheehan (1993)]. It is mis-titled for the simple reason that readers will search long and hard (and to no avail) for anything even remotely resembling the Philosophy of Science, or even a Marxist perspective on it! What they will find instead, however, is an excellent but no less depressing and detailed account of what various DM-apologists imagined was or wasn't the relation between Marxism and science, among many other seemingly irrelevant topics. Unfortunately, the vast majority of those mind-numbingly tedious, obsolete ideas, opinions, inter-party squabbles, faction fights, disputes and obscure wrangles now only possess curiosity value, of sole interest to antiquarians and die-hard DM-fans, but few others. Even in their heyday, those moribund arguments, dogmatic claims, no less dogmatic counter-claims and threadbare theories were seldom less than partisan, motivated more often than not by sectarian in-fighting and small-minded point-scoring than they were by a genuine search for the truth. Alas, that frame-or-mind still dominates much of Dialectical Marxism, and not just in relation to science.

And then there are some amongst us who scratch their heads, wondering why Dialectical Marxism hasn't 'seized the masses'...

In spite of this, it turns out that Sheehan's book is valuable in other respects since it (inadvertently) exposes the monumental waste of time and effort that Dialectical Marxists have devoted to a 'theory' that few have managed to advance much beyond Engels's amateurish and faltering first steps (which were exposed for the fraud they are in Essay Seven Part One) and Lenin's descent into Subjective Idealism (exposed in Essay Thirteen Part One). So, Sheehan's book (in effect) contains page-after-page of incriminating evidence that (inadvertently) reveals the extent to which DM has helped cripple, and even ruin, Marxist Philosophy for over a century, while some of our very best minds have unsuccessfully attempted to grapple with the gobbledygook Hegel inflicted on anyone foolish enough to take him seriously, which wasn't, I take it, part of Sheehan's original remit.

Depressing conclusions like those have been further compounded by the following studies (of the 'unfortunate' relationship between Stalinised Marxism and post-1920 science, typified by the work of Lysenko): Birstein (2001), Graham (1971, 1987, 1993), Joravsky (1961, 1970), Kojevnikov (2004), Krementsov (1997), Lecourt (1977) [this links to a PDF], Medvedev (1969), Soyfer (1994), and Vucinich (1980, 2001). For a different perspective, see Lewontin and Levins (1976). [I have said much more about this dark period in the degeneration of 'Soviet Science' in Essay Four Part One.]

In passing, it is worth noting that Levins and Lewontin's two books on science -- i.e., Levins and Lewontin (1985) and Lewontin and Levins (2007) -- are excellent, but only when they steer clear of 'dialectics'. Their quality drops off the edge of a cliff when they venture in that direction.

There are countless books and articles that focus on Marxism and science written by Stalinists; few are worthy of mention. Interested readers are referred to the sources listed above, as well as Helena Sheehan's work, for more details. However, the following three books are worthy of note: Omelyanovsky (1974, 1978, 1979).

Other sources I have found useful over the years are: Gregory (1977), Little (1986), Railton (1991), Thomas (1976), Wartofsky (1968, 1979) and Young (1990). Special mention, however, should once again be made of Caudwell (1949, 1977), whose brilliant insights were only slightly ruined by the author's vain and puzzling attempt to defend DM. I have in fact developed several of his ideas at this site.

Nevertheless, easily the best general book on the Philosophy of Science written from a Marxist perspective is Miller (1987) -- mention of which was also omitted from Gasper's article. [But not from Gasper (1990).] Another important Marxist author is Richard Boyd; cf., Boyd (1989, 1991, 1993, 1996).

John Dupré's work has (largely) also been written from a quasi-Marxist angle -- i.e., Dupré (1993, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2012), and Barnes and Dupré (2008). Unfortunately, Dupré's ideas seem to have slipped backward recently, as evidenced by Dupré (2021, 2025), and Dupré and Nicholson (2018) (this links to a PDF of the book in which that article was published), which turn out to be much more 'traditional' and 'dialectical'. I will say more about this latest, unfortunate turn-of-events in Essay Thirteen Part Two.

22. The author of TAR, John Rees, clearly rejects Conventionalism, but he unfortunately failed to explain why [cf., Rees (1998), p.297]. In MEC, Lenin made a characteristically weak gesture at refuting a handful of conventionalist interpretations of science current in his day, but, as noted in Essay Thirteen Part One, to call what he had to say in this respect a joke would be to praise it a little too highly; it is that bad.

Lenin almost invariably confronted each and every opinion he disliked with a neurotic repetition of the following mantra:

"[T]he concept of matter…epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Lenin (1972), p.312; italic emphasis in the original. A list of over forty passages like this strewn across MEC has been posted here.]

As things turned out, Lenin's timing was rather unfortunate, for a few lines later he posed this question:

"Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not…? [S]cientists…answer [this] in the affirmative." [Ibid., p.312; italic emphases in the original.]

But, what was so objective about the Ether that failed to prevent its subsequent fall from scientific grace a decade or so later?

Clearly, the problem with what can only be described as 'Revisionary Realism', a version of which Lenin promoted in MEC (although he didn't use that title), is that it is continually left with having to explain how such 'objective entities' suddenly vanish from the universe and thereby become 'non-objective'. Even more problematic is having to explain precisely what it was that scientists were talking about before these 'ontological deletions' took place. [I will say more about that in Essay Thirteen Parts One and Two.]

Nevertheless, in defence of Lenin it is worth pointing out that there are scientists who believe that the Ether actually does exist in some form or other. Readers might like to consult this website (and follow the links there) to access articles written by those who still believe this rather weird 'entity' exists. See also Essay Eleven Part One, where the opinions of several leading scientists on the nature and existence of the Ether (and that includes Einstein himself!) have been quoted and/or referenced.

Despite this, Dialectical Marxists can take little comfort from the inability of prominent Physicists to make up their minds over such basic issues. That is because it is quite clear that the ever-changing concept of the Ether can't be attributed to the development of greater and greater abstractions --, i.e., those that have been applied to, or derived from, nature. If that had ever been the case, the Ether would hardly keep disappearing from Physics and then re-appearing again later with completely different physical and mathematical properties. In fact, Einstein himself conceived of the Ether as little more than a mathematical construct. [Cf., Kostro (2000).] There is no way that that version of the Ether can be equated with Aristotle's, Newton's or even Maxwell's.

Nevertheless, some might think that the following comment of Lenin's could help clarify the issue:

"[D]ialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties…." [Ibid., p.312.]

The idea seems to be that 'objectivity' isn't undermined by the passing away of obsolescent theories that postulate the existence of soon-to-be-eliminated (but which are still supposed to be) 'objective' entities. That appears to be because these older theories were less near the truth than those that eventually superseded or replaced them, but which don't postulate the existence of these formerly 'objective' objects and processes.

Let us suppose that theory, T, for instance, postulates the existence of 'entity' or process, E, and that DM-theorists accept T as 'objectively (but 'partially', or even 'relatively'), true'. Suppose further that scientists later (validly) reject T along with E. It can't now be argued that the content of T was 'objective' or even 'partially true', since it was neither. If E doesn't exist (and never did), any claims made about 'it' are now devoid of content.

[In fact, such claims are neither (empirically) true or false -- for reasons examined in more detail in the main body of this Essay, but more fully in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

Now, in relation to the example under consideration, the Ether: if there is no Ether, Physicists won't have taken one step 'closer' to the 'truth' by postulating its existence. On the other hand, if the Ether does exist, Physics must have gone backwards when it was rejected (which it still is by the majority).

It could be objected that questions regarding the non-existence of the Ether (or Phlogiston, or even Caloric) are neither here nor there. What really matters is that researchers were able to advance scientific knowledge by developing certain techniques (conceptual, experimental, technical, mathematical and/or methodological) as a result of assuming such entities do exist. Hence, given this (modified) account, even wildly incorrect theories can help science progress.

No doubt they can, but what has this got to do with 'objectivity'? If the Ether, Caloric and Phlogiston don't exist, and never did, the supposition that they do takes science away from the 'truth', away from 'objectivity', not toward it. The sort of 'spin-off benefits' (howsoever impressive) have nothing to do with 'objectivity' -- which, according to Lenin, concerns the 'mind independence' of objects and processes:

"To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972), p.148. Bold emphasis added.]

'Objectivity', as Lenin conceived of it, has nothing to do with improved technique. Belief in God, for example, helped numerous great scientists construct classical Physics, but no one supposes that 'collateral progress' like this means belief in God was 'closer to the truth', or 'objective', just because of that. [On this, for example, see Dillenberger (1988), and Hooykaas (1973).]

If the 'objective' status' of the entities and processes that scientists study, or claim to have discovered, turn out to be irrelevant -- and only (adventitious) 'spin-off benefits' are what really matter -- then the status of those 'benefits' themselves can't fail to attract suspicion.

Dialectical Marxists often reach for the word "spiral" to describe the faltering progress of knowledge -- as science supposedly 'circles in' on the truth --, but, as the above shows, a better word here would surely be "screwy". [There is much more on this in Essays Ten Part One and Thirteen Part Two.]

However, it is worth pointing out that Conventionalism doesn't face such problems (even if it is confronted by other 'difficulties'), whereas all forms of Metaphysical Realism do.

[Several more obsolete 'objective' objects and processes have been itemised here.]

That isn't a very convincing-looking "spiral". It looks more like the path weaved by a drunk on his way home after 'one-too-many' at a local bar.

Admittedly, the evidence for the 'existence' of many of the above was at one time considered compelling, but as Philosopher of Science, P K Stanford, points out:

"[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18^th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19^th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Weismann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9. Links added; minor typo corrected.]

[See also: Stanford (2000, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2018, 2023), Chang (2003), Cordero (2011), Laudan (1981, 1984), Lyons (2002, 2003, 2006), and Vickers (2013). (Several of these link to PDFs.) My referencing these works doesn't imply I agree with everything they contain.]

Even Woods and Grant acknowledge this phenomenon, but mysteriously fail to apply it to DM:

"[T]here are few things in science that are not called into question sooner or later." [Introduction to the e-book edition of Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]

It is often argued that the above theories, processes and objects weren't part of "mature" science, and therefore stand in stark contrast to the "mature" theories we have today. Anyone who thinks that should read Baggott (2013), Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006), and then perhaps think again. [This topic will be discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two; see also here.]

23. Why only empirical propositions are being considered (in detail) in this Essay is explained in Note 29.

24. It could be argued that this isn't so. Someone could hold a sentence true even before they understood it. For example, they might implicitly accept the views of an authority on a given subject (in fact this is a typical response); others might accept the word of a holy man/woman. [Martin (1987), for instance, pushes that line.] Others might reject as false whatever a confirmed liar (like Donald Trump) had to say, even if they didn't understand it. [I have given an example of this, here.]

Consider, therefore, these examples (which were deliberately made incomprehensible to underline the point):

L1: Professor NN said, "The admurial current in this sample of Blongit has a value of 15.542 buhrs/spec when subjected to a Moggle Field of 1.896 galols/klm^7.6134."

L2: St. MM uttered these immortal words: "Orle Geerlty Jurthir Shcmood gleebers a minnert whal replificatoe."

Well, is either of L1 and L2 true? Is L3 false? Would anyone accept any of them as such before they understood the odd words they contain? If they were to do so, the next couple of questions would be: "What precisely are you holding true (or false) here? To what are you committing yourself if you haven't a clue what these sentences are saying?"

Putting to one side how anyone could possibly know whether or not this 'holy' woman had ever lied if everything she says were so readily believed by the faithful independently of any attempt to validate 'the gems' she comes out with -- never mind the profound gullibility it reveals --, this sort of credulity is manifestly centred on the person concerned not the 'content' of her words.

It could be objected that the above examples (L1, L2 and L3) are highly contentious and are therefore irrelevant. Maybe so, but until any such objector manages to produce a sentence that he/she doesn't understand that he/she would hold true (or false) if uttered by an authority figure (religious or otherwise) -- while explaining precisely what was being held true (or false), even though they had no idea what they were committing themselves to --, they will have to do.

"[W]e worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding the Persons; nor dividing the Essence. For there is one Person of the Father; another of the Son; and another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one; the Glory equal, the Majesty coeternal. Such as the Father is; such is the Son; and such is the Holy Ghost. The Father uncreated; the Son uncreated; and the Holy Ghost uncreated. The Father unlimited; the Son unlimited; and the Holy Ghost unlimited. The Father eternal; the Son eternal; and the Holy Ghost eternal. And yet they are not three eternals; but one eternal. As also there are not three uncreated; nor three infinites, but one uncreated; and one infinite. So likewise the Father is Almighty; the Son Almighty; and the Holy Ghost Almighty. And yet they are not three Almighties; but one Almighty. So the Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods; but one God. So likewise the Father is Lord; the Son Lord; and the Holy Ghost Lord. And yet not three Lords; but one Lord. For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity; to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord; So are we forbidden by the catholic religion; to say, There are three Gods, or three Lords. The Father is made of none; neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone; not made, nor created; but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten; but proceeding. So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts. And in this Trinity none is before, or after another; none is greater, or less than another. But the whole three Persons are coeternal, and coequal. So that in all things, as aforesaid; the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be worshipped. He therefore that will be saved, let him thus think of the Trinity." [The Athanasian Creed, quoted from here.]

In the above passage we have a set of indicative-looking sentences that absolutely no one understands, but which many millions hold true, contrary to what was asserted earlier.

The first point worth making in response would be to remind the objector that the original point had been this:

It could be argued that this isn't so. Someone could hold a sentence true even before they understood it.

In relation to The Athanasian Creed, that isn't so. Believers claim this dogma is true before they understand it, and they hold it true even though they never succeed in understanding it (supposedly in 'this life'). By way of contrast, metaphysicians claim to understand the 'propositions' they concoct.

Second, serious questions would arise concerning what exactly is being held true, here. Consider this puzzling sentence:

"So the Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods; but one God."

If there are three persons who are all 'God' how can there only be one 'God', not three 'Gods'? How can that be true?

Thirdly, it is quite clear that the above use of "true" bears no relation to its use in connection with empirical propositions, or even in connection with metaphysical 'propositions' -- in which case, this use of "true" has no impact or bearing on the claim made earlier that an indicative sentence has to be understood first before its semantic status can be determined. This specific use of "true" is a religious use of that word and hence bears as much connection to its ordinary use as the religious use of "father" bears to the ordinary word, "father". [Is 'God' really a father? Does 'He' have a body, does 'He' have a head, does 'He' eat food, breath, go to the toilet? Is 'He' married? Does 'He' even have sex organs? If not, in what way is 'He' a father? Or even male? On the other hand, if 'He' does have any of these 'things', in what way is 'He' 'God' and not a creature like the rest of us? Again, this is all "a mystery", apparently.]

Fourth, as also pointed out earlier, this expression of faith is centred on the institution of the Church and/or the religious tradition to which a given believer either belongs or lends credence, not the 'content' of the words that have been strung together, since their 'content' remains a permanent "mystery". So, holding The Athanasian Creed 'true' is tantamount to saying "I have faith in the Church and it's all a mystery...". Hence, this is an expression of faith (or even gullibility), not knowledge.

Fifth, this Essay is centred on scientific knowledge and whether or not DM is an incomprehensible, metaphysical theory. Any appeal to what the god-botherers among us accept or reject would only succeed in underlining the accuracy of the following remark:

Anyone who rejected L3 as false would be invited to explain what its truth might amount to so that it could then be deemed false for failing to meet that standard.

Should any of my readers demure, they too are invited to contact me with their best attempt to rise to that challenge.

Finally, it could be argued that the vast majority of humans accept the testimony of experts (and that includes believing what they say is true), based on trust (or, in some cases, based on peer pressure), even when they fail to comprehend everything said to them.

But, this is just a variant of the above example concerning the trust believers place in the words of 'saints', religious leaders, and/or the institutional integrity of their Church/Religion. That comment shouldn't be taken to mean I am equating expertise in science or in any other intellectual discipline with religious faith. It is merely to point out that when we accept the veracity of expert testimony, it is just another example of the trust most of us have for the institutional and social nature of knowledge (as opposed to the trust some place in religious institutions). While we might take on trust that the words of a given expert are true (in such circumstances -- even if we fail to understand those words), none of us would be able to say in what way those words are true, or what their truth amounted to. In fact, this would be the social or argumentative equivalent of someone, call her NN, saying: "For the purpose of argument, assume X is true..." (where "X" stands for some claim that has yet to be explained, like many of the metaphysical-, and DM-'propositions' reviewed at this site). That in no way implies NN really believes X is true, it is just assumed to be true. So, when we accept as true what an expert has to say -- for instance, during our education, in a debate, as part of a trial, or as a result of a medical consultation (etc., etc.) -- we are in fact saying something like this "For the purposes of this debate, or this trial, or this consult -- or whatever -- I will accept on trust the truth of what is said, even if I have no idea in what its truth lies, since I do not understand fully (or at all) what was said."

However, in circumstances like those mentioned above experts will often rephrase their words in ordinary (or more colloquial) terms so that a lay audience is able to comprehend (to some extent) what was said -- as Chomsky tried to point out in relation to technical areas of mathematics and science, compared with 'high theory' of the sort that Dialectical Marxists (or at least the HCD-wing) dote on or clearly seem to prefer (quoted earlier):

"The proponents of 'theory' and 'philosophy' have a very easy task if they want to make their case. Simply make known to me what was and remains a 'secret' to me: I'll be happy to look. I've asked many times before, and still await an answer, which should be easy to provide: simply give some examples of 'a body of theory, well tested and verified, that applies to' the kinds of problems and issues that Mike, I, and many others (in fact, most of the world's population, I think, outside of narrow and remarkably self-contained intellectual circles) are or should be concerned with: the problems and issues we speak and write about, for example, and others like them. To put it differently, show that the principles of the 'theory' or 'philosophy' that we are told to study and apply lead by valid argument to conclusions that we and others had not already reached on other (and better) grounds; these 'others' include people lacking formal education, who typically seem to have no problem reaching these conclusions through mutual interactions that avoid the 'theoretical' obscurities entirely, or often on their own. Again, those are simple requests. I've made them before, and remain in my state of ignorance. I also draw certain conclusions from the fact.... But if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words that I can understand, and show why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before and have continued to do since without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. That will cure my deficiencies -- of course, if they are curable; maybe they aren't, a possibility to which I'll return. These are very easy requests to fulfil, if there is any basis to the claims put forth with such fervour and indignation.... It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I just lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have been unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their followers. I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years, when similar charges have been made -- but without any answer to my questions. Again, they are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an answer: if I'm missing something, then show me what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if it's all beyond my comprehension, which is possible, then I'm just a lost cause, and will be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be interested in them and seem to understand them (which I'm perfectly happy to do, having no interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in these things, but apparently little else). Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left with the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm certainly willing to grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll have to remain suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don't understand -- say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand it. Now Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. -- even Foucault, whom I knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest -- write things that I also don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says they do understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a) some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden genetic mutation, which has created a form of 'theory' that is beyond quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b)...I won't spell it out." [Quoted from here. Spelling modified to agree with UK English, formatting and quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links and bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]

[Readers are also referred to my comments about the complex language/jargon Kant used, which can be rephrased and then explained in more ordinary terms.]

Of course, what Chomsky requested can't be done with theological language, but it is possible to do so in relation to the subject areas he mentions. [How much that might or might not distort the technical language originally employed we will have to put to one side, at least until Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

In which case, the claim made earlier (that indicative sentences have to be understood before they can be declared true or declared false) still stands.

25. It is here where we begin to see how 'representational-', and 'referential-theories' appear to gain some grip or even plausibility: if nature contains a 'secret code' of some sort (perhaps written in a mathematical (or 'Ideal') form --, or which is structurally/physically causal (maybe existing as an feature, or 'module', that is a core aspect of the 'architectonic of our cognitive faculties') -- and if it is also assumed nature is "rational" --, a human being would be declared 'rational' only if they were 'in harmony' with, or expressed, that 'external rationality'. That being the case, any sentence that states truths about this 'reality' would gain the sense it has by 'reflecting', 'expressing', 'representing' or 'incorporating' that 'code' -- i.e., 'reflecting', 'expressing', 'representing' or 'incorporating' this "external rationality" (howsoever that itself is apparent, and whether or not it is only 'partial'/'relative') -- in a 'like-represents-like' manner. Or, put another way: "As above so below", according to ancient Hermeticists, which is how they expressed this overall idea.

That is why 'correspondence' theories seem so plausible to those who accept them. If language didn't possess or embody a 'secret code' -- or, rather, if language had no 'deep structure' that was, incidentally, only capable of being accessed/grasped by a tiny minority -- correspondence theories would make no sense. The 'logical structure of the world' and the 'logical structure of language' (or even 'the logical structure of the Mind' and its 'architectonic' -- these days re-labelled as its 'modularity') somehow miraculously match/mirror one another. [I have covered this topic in more detail in Interlude Two.]

(a) The origin of this 'hidden code' (or even the origin of the 'deep structure of reality');

(b) What gives this 'code' the 'meaning' it has (it must have one or it wouldn't be a language, let alone a code); and,

And yet, if the above really were a code, it must have been transposed from some language or other -- using a 'translation manual' -- otherwise it wouldn't be a code, it would be a 'code', a term we don't yet understand. Plainly, this turn of events means that it is language that explains codes, not the other way round. Language first, codes second.

Some might point to certain codes that have already written into nature --, for example, the Genetic Code. But, that code isn't like the codes human beings have invented or developed. As we have just seen, codes depend on the prior existence of a language, into and out of which they can be translated using an agreed upon (normative) translation manual. Clearly, we can only attribute such a feature to nature and DNA if we are prepared to anthropomorphise both.

[In fact, the game is up whenever 'reality' is described as "rational" -- which would clearly imply its origin in, or its creation by, some 'Mind' or other. But even that won't 'solve this problem'. I will say more about that (over and above the remarks below) if I can summon up the will to do so, since it would otherwise take us too far away from the aims of this site, into areas covered by the Philosophy of Religion.]

Hence, whatever else it is that geneticists are referring to when they speak about such "codes", they can't be talking about any human beings have invented, nor anything like them. In which case, once more, they must be referring to 'codes', not codes. Either that, or they are using the word "code" as a technical term, which only succeeds in misleading the incautious (as indeed it does!). [There is more on this in Bennett and Hacker (2021), pp.177f, and Bennett, et al (2007), pp.146-56.]

As should seem obvious, we can't hope to solve 'puzzles about reality' like this by postulating intelligent causes, howsoever they are re-packaged or re-labelled. As David Hume pointed out, if human intelligence is to be accounted for by an 'exterior intelligence' or 'external rationality' -- of whatever sort or provenance --, an infinite regress must ensue. That sceptical argument, of course, isn't weakened in the slightest if the word "God" is replaced by "law" -- or even if "rationally-based-and-evidentially-supported-objective-theory" were substituted for one or both. On this, see Hume (1963).

Some, like the late Daniel Dennett, have tried to argue along neo-Darwinian lines that human intelligence can be modelled in this way -- that is, as a creation (or a combination) of the interplay between random mutation/variation and natural selection. I have said much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Three. [See also Bennett and Hacker (2021), pp.470-91, Bennett, et al (2007), pp.146-56, and Shanker (1998). There is also more on this in the main body of the Essay (here), as there will also be in Part Four (to be published in 2026). See also, Essay Three Part Two.]

26. This was discussed more fully in Essay Three Part Two (link above); it was also addressed in greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three.

26a. A representative example of this approach can be found in Devitt and Sterelny (1999), but there are countless others. [No pun intended. I will say more about this topic in Essay Thirteen Part Two and Part Three (link above).]

27. This topic will be tackled in Parts Two and Three of this Essay, and again in Essay Thirteen Part Three (link above).

29. Naturally, this puts considerable weight on the word "understanding", but anyone who has problems with that word is already way beyond my help.

My argument also appears to ignore the possibility that humans could first appropriate non-linguistic 'truths', rather like non-human animals do as and when they react to their surroundings. If true, humans must also learn this way, and, after having acquired language, proceed to comprehend the world in order to change it,-- the entire process, of course, developing across many thousands of years.

The wishful thinking -- or, indeed, the science fiction -- evident in the above remarks will be dealt with later.

[On this, see Baker and Hacker (2005a), pp.357-85, and Baker and Hacker (2005b), pp.305-56. See also here, as well as Note 31.]

The analysis presented in the main body of this Essay has largely restricted attention to indicative sentences and empirical propositions. That isn't meant to depreciate or indirectly denigrate other forms of discourse (e.g., questions, commands, fictional, poetic and ethical language, optatives, etc., etc.), nor is it to ignore the importance of figurative speech, gestures or prosody.

(1) Metaphysical theories purport to be based on, express or imply Industrial Strength, Super-Factual -- i.e., Super-Empirical -- propositions. But, as I have shown, their interpretation relies on a systematic failure to distinguish between different types of indicative sentence -- that is, between (a) 'pseudo-empirical' and (b) empirical propositions, or between (c) sentences that emulate the indicative mood but collapse into non-sense and incoherence upon examination, and (d) those that don't.

(2) Empirical propositions are, of course, intimately connected with the possibility of expressing and advancing scientific knowledge.

[In addition, and for the sake of simplicity, the distinction sometimes drawn between type and token empirical propositions has been ignored. Naturally, in a comprehensive account of the linguistic phenomena under review at this site, these issues, and many others besides, will have to be addressed -- for all that that would be inappropriate in an Essay of the present sort, or in connection with the rather narrow aims of this site.]

Since the other issues mentioned above aren't related to the topics under discussion here, and as important as they are in themselves, analysis of their mode of signification has been omitted.

Moreover, the idea that these Essays are fixated on single sentences -- which is a clichéd criticism of Analytic Philosophy often advanced by Dialectical Marxists (again, especially those belonging to the HCD-tendency) -- is no less misguided. Single sentences are analysed here merely to help focus attention on: (i) Problems associated with specific DM-claims, thereby highlighting difficulties that dialecticians universally fail to, or prefer not to, notice; and, (ii) Antiquated 'philosophical problems' that Dialectical Marxists have inherited from Traditional Thought. Where relevant, wider contextual issues have, of course, been taken into consideration (for example, in this Essay in connection with what Lenin had to say about matter and motion).

However, DM-fans need to face the fact that if they can't handle single sentences, they stand no chance with larger bodies of text.

Having said that, 'Contextualism' (i.e., the idea that words, or, indeed, sentences, gain their meaning -- always, solely or even partially -- from their context of use) has been criticised at length in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4)-(6). In addition, Metaphysical Holism (of the sort that DM-theorists themselves have unwisely bought into) has also been destructively analysed in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two, as well as here.

29a. It might be wondered how anyone who understands an empirical proposition -- like, say, M6 -- would know it was true, as opposed to not knowing it was false.

[I]f the sense of a proposition weren't independent of its actual truth-value, then, plainly, the mere fact that a proposition had been understood would directly imply it was true --, or, as the case may be, it would imply it was false! Naturally, if either of these alternatives were viable, linguistic or psychological factors -- not the way the world happens to be -- would determine the truth-value of empirical propositions, and science would become little more than a sub-branch of Hermeneutics.

Of course, it isn't easy to think our way into such an odd and plainly defective view of empirical propositions, which is why sentences like M1a were considered first. In relation to such sentences it is easier to see how and why the 'comprehension' of metaphysical claims goes hand-in-hand with automatically knowing which of their supposed truth-values obtains (at least, as Traditional Theorists see things).

So, for theorists like Engels and Lenin, who accept the theory that "Motion is the mode of the existence of matter" (P4), the 'comprehension' of M1a automatically implies it is true. However, if that were also the case with uncontroversial, plain and simple empirical propositions, then the comprehension of M6, for instance, would automatically imply it was true, too. In that case, the alleged truth, and thus the comprehension of M6 would follow from some other proposition, or propositions (just as the 'truth' of M1a seems to follow from the 'truth' of P4), which would, of course, mean that anyone who didn't know these other 'truths' wouldn't be able to comprehend M6, which is absurd.

It could be argued that it is easy to see what truths would have to be known first if M6 is to be understood -- namely that Tony Blair is a man and that he (at some point in time) exists, as well as the fact that The Algebra of Revolution is a book, which is something that can be owned.

This topic is partly what motivated Wittgenstein to argue as follows in the Tractatus:

"Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite. If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. In that case, we could not paint any picture of the world, true or false." [Wittgenstein (1972), p.11, 2.021-2.0212.]

Now, I don't want to enter into a discussion about what Wittgenstein did or didn't mean by "substance", except to point out that he later replaced the logical objects and formal concepts of The Tractatus with "logical grammar", "agreement in judgements" and a shared "form of life" in his later work. [Wittgenstein (2009), p.94e, §§241-42.] In other words, he regarded the rules we implicitly employ in our formation of propositions like M6 -- as a sort of non-propositional background -- meant that the sense of propositions like M6 don't depend on the truth of another proposition, or set of propositions. [How that works will be explained in Interlude Eight. In advance of that, it is important not to confuse truth-values with truth-conditions, or run-together epistemological and logical questions. [However, concerning the above passage (from the Tractatus), see White (1974, 2006).]

Another important point worth mentioning is that if someone didn't in general know these things, they wouldn't be able to engage in anything other than very basic social interactions. But, the capacity to engage in conversation isn't properly to be described as factual knowledge; it is more accurately to be described as the possession of a set of (behavioural) skills; hence, it is a form of knowing how rather than knowing that. I will say much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Three and Interlude Eight (link above). [See also Note 31.]

Finally, it is also important to distinguish what speakers have to know (in the above manner) in order to comprehend M6-type propositions and what lends such propositions the sense they have independent of our understanding them. That rather obscure (and seemingly contradictory) remark will also be clarified and disambiguated in Interlude Eight.

30. One of the leading alternative accounts of language being peddled these days -- the so-called "Nativist" theory of Chomsky, Fodor, Bickerton and Pinker, among others -- will be discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three. [Until then, the reader is referred to Baker and Hacker (1984), Behme (2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c), Cowie (1997, 2002, 2008), Everett (2008, 2012), Sampson (2005) and the review posted here.]

Also worth consulting are the following essays written by Sampson, here, and here. [The reader is, however, forewarned that Sampson is a right-wing Tory who holds objectionable, racist views (and much else besides). Despite this, Sampson is, in my view, right about Nativism (a doctrine that, oddly enough, also underpins other right-wing ideas). See also, here.] {The last two links are now dead!}

Furthermore, as we will discover later on, only if a proposition were part of a body of propositions would it be possible to ascertain its truth-value. Empirical propositions don't face the world as isolated units, nor do they function like arrows that pin truths to targets single-handedly (to vary the image). They function more like nets catching fish (to vary it once more). However, these nets are such because of the form of representation, or parts of several such forms (as the case may be), overtly or covertly employed by users to that end.

This might seem to make a mockery of the argument presented in the main body of this Essay: that to understand the sense of a proposition like M6 is ipso facto to know what would make it true or what would make it false. That argument seems to suggest such propositions face the world as atomic units, so to speak, not part of a body of propositions, as alleged above.

I will deal with that objection in the section dealing with Wittgenstein's comments on "criteria and symptoms". In the meantime, Quine's arresting metaphor will perhaps make the point a little clearer:

"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be re-distributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entail re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections.... But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole. If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement -- especially if it is a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field." [Quine (1951), pp.42–43. This links to a PDF. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; paragraphs merged.]

[I distance myself from the ideas presented in much of the rest of the above article -- on that see, for example, Grice and Strawson (1956) (this links to a PDF), and Glock (2003) -- as well as the claim that "it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement", since, as we have seen, it is easy so to do. However, the above remarks, suitably re-phrased, neatly overlap with Wittgenstein's approach (in this area). On that, see Glock (2003) again, and Hacker (1996), pp.189-227.]

Hence, the actual truth of propositions like M6 depends on a whole web of background practices and beliefs (this is what Quine later came to call "The Web of Belief" -- on that, see Quine and Ullian (1978) -- this links to a PDF). This means that while it might seem that empirical propositions face conformation or confutation on their own, their conformation and confutation also depend on this background.

[Readers are directed to Note 36, Interlude Eight, and the sub-section on Scientific Knowledge, for more details. Added on Edit: That material has now been moved to Interlude Four.]

In this regard, it is crucially important to distinguish between the sense of a proposition and its truth-value. While the truth-value of M6, for example, will depend on the truth of several other propositions (i.e., indicative sentences expressing the existence of whatever makes M6 true or M6 false, or which record the facts of the matter), its sense won't.

[I deal with this topic at greater length in the next sub-section of the main body of the Essay, but it will help if readers keep the above caveats in mind as they proceed. See also Interlude Eight (link above).]

32. That doesn't mean there exists (somewhere -- perhaps 'in each head') a set of precise rules governing human language and its use. What it does mean will be addressed Essay Thirteen Part Three.

Rules, of course, are no more capable of being true or false than are imperatives and interrogatives. They are dependent on wider social practices and hence, as such, are historically-, and socially-conditioned.

Given this (anthropological) approach, social change is reflected in language (among other things) by concomitant alterations to the conventionalised, rule-governed use of certain words. Naturally, this both situates and embeds language, and thus thought, in ambient material conditions (i.e., in real social interactions that arise from, or supervene upon, underlying Relations of Production, etc.), not buried away in a hidden, 'mental' realm supposedly located in each brain, nor in each socially-isolated, socially-atomised 'consciousness', subject only to an individual's mysterious and uncheckable powers of 'abstraction' and 'representation'.

[There is much more on this in Essays Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three (link above). On this in general, see Robinson (2003a), and Hanna and Harrison (2004). (Unfortunately, the overall quality and reliability of the latter work has been negatively affected by its authors' adoption of Kripke and Evans's 'Causal Theory of Names'. It should be read in conjunction with Baker and Hacker (2005a), pp.113-28, 227-49. Kripke and Evans's theories are presented in Kripke (1980) and Evans (1973, 1982). I will address some of their ideas in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

On the basis of the "anthropological approach", briefly outlined in this Essay, thought is more naturally grounded in discourse, human history, material practice, social interaction and communication -- but only derivatively linked to the capacity human beings have of representing the world by means of language (etc.) -- with the former set of activities and performances typically carried out in the open, in a public area (whether this involves writing on a cave wall, on parchment, on paper, or whether it is recorded in print, or communicated through the air by the spoken word, for example. So, given the approach adopted at this site, any such 'representations' are publicly accessible and hence are capable of being inter-subjectively checked and validated. They aren't to be found 'in the head'. [Why that is so is explored at length in Essays Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three (links above).]

In this way, therefore, there is no need to promote a vague, DM-style reference to the 'dialectical' unity between 'thought and practice', since, given the above approach, 'thought' is constituted both by social practice and by our use of language, both of which are inter-linked and in the open. 'Thought' thus requires no further 'philosophical' elaboration. It is, therefore, what our everyday use of words says it is, not what Idealist Philosophers or inconsistent materialists (i.e., Dialectical Marxists) claim it must be.

Extensive critical examination of the perennial confusions (such as those inspired by the above Paradigm) -- that festoon Psychology, Neuroscience, the Philosophy of Mind and DM -- can be accessed in the following: Anscombe (2000), Baker and Hacker (1984, 2005a, 2005b), Bennett and Hacker (2008, 2021), Bennett, et al (2007), Budd (1989), Button, et al (1995), Coulter (1983, 1989, 1993, 1997), Coulter and Sharrock (2007), Erneling (1993), Fischer (2011a, 2011b), Goldberg (1968, 1991), Goldstein (1999), Greenspan and Shanker (2004), Hacker (1987, 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2007a, 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d), Hark (1990, 1995), Hilmy (1987), Hutto (1995), Hyman (1989, 1991), Johnston (1993), Kenny (1973, 1975, 1984a, 1984b, 1992, 2003, 2006), Malcolm (1968, 1977a, 1977b, 1980, 1986b), Racine and Slaney (2013), Ryle (1949a, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 1971d, 1971e, 1982 -- the first links to a PDF of the 2009 edition), Schroeder (2001a), Schulte (1993), Shanker (1986b, 1987b, 1987c, 1987d, 1988, 1995, 1997, 1998), Stern (1995), Suter (1989), Williams (1999), and Wittgenstein (1967, 1969, 1980b, 1980c, 1981, 1982, 1989, 1992, 1993, 2009).

Furthermore, because we use words somewhat like we use tools, language has played a key role in human social evolution. That observation is important because language is partly constitutive of our psychological make-up.

This Essay, therefore, begins where Engels's theory (of the development of human 'consciousness' through cooperative labour and the use of tools (etc.)) leaves off.

[The word "consciousness" has been put in 'scare' quotes in many of the Essays published at this site because it is frequently used as a metaphysical term-of-art redolent of Cartesianism. On that, see Hacker (2007a, 2012, 2013a). Again, this topic will be covered in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three (link above).]

33. Unfortunately, the nature of science and scientific language remained largely unexplored in Wittgenstein's work. That failing (if such it may be called) has been compounded by the same level of neglect displayed by many of those who work in the Wittgensteinian tradition (in Analytic Philosophy), who haven't significantly developed or extended his method in this area since his death. Strange though this might seem (to some), that comment also applies to Thomas Kuhn's work and that of Norwood Russell Hanson.]

[Added on Edit, December 2023: Since the above words were first written, the picture now seems to be changing. This topic will be covered in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, which I aim to publish in 2027.]

The crucial point here is that Wittgenstein's method isn't solely confined to issues connected with ordinary language (as many erroneously suppose); it applies to anything we should want to call a language, or a linguistic practice (the former understood in a non-essentialist sense, of course -- since it is we who decide, not some underlying 'essence of language' or 'essence of thought' that does it on our behalf, or which motivates us in a certain direction). In fact, his method also encompasses scientific, technical and formal languages (and their associated practices). Admittedly, an extension of his method into such wider areas requires a detailed analysis of each of them in conjunction with the practices out of which they have arisen and are now situated. Since that is way beyond the scope of this Essay (and this site), such an analysis won't be attempted, but several important related issues will be addressed in Essay Thirteen Parts Two and Three (link above), as well as the rest of Essay Twelve, when they are finally published. [A summary of the latter can be accessed here.]

However, with respect to the analysis of figurative and analogical language, the picture isn't significantly better. For example, despite the subsequent, but nonetheless relatively minor, advances made -- mostly in the High Middle Ages --, our understanding of the logic of analogy has largely remained where Aristotle left it 2400 years ago. [Update August 2025: It looks like that picture is also beginning to change. On that, follow the above link, which is to Bartha (2019).]

Naturally, this means we don't as yet have a clear or comprehensive idea how such specialised areas of language actually relate to our wider understanding of the world, or, indeed, ourselves in general. [Although, as the above edit indicates, that picture is beginning to change.] In which case, much of what has been written about the scientific use of metaphor and analogy is of limited value. Recent work on metaphor -- which has unfortunately wandered off down a Cognitive Science cul-de-sac, following on the work of George Lakoff and others -- has only made a bad situation worse. That doesn't mean these specialist areas of discourse are in any way illegitimate, only that we don't yet understand how they work; and it rather looks like the only way they might be understood is by the use of yet more figurative language, which, as should seem obvious, is tantamount to arguing in a circle! Furthermore, this lack of understanding isn't unconnected with the way that theorists casually and uncritically employ figurative language to state what they think are literal truths about the world, or, indeed, about language itself. In other words, they use metaphor and analogy to hide their ignorance, often from themselves and not just their audience. Further use of metaphor and analogy (to that end) only works as a smokescreen, not a microscope.

[When I say this, I am not accusing such theorists of duplicity or of being disingenuous --, simply of fooling themselves unwittingly.]

Unfortunately, this means that the above theorists are still being held captive by a "misleading picture" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein, once more), which ends up further distorting the way they try to make sense even of their own theories. [On that, see Fischer (2011a, 2011b), and Egan (2011).] In turn, as noted earlier, their predicament isn't unconnected with the traditional idea that language is first-and-foremost a means of representation. That 'assumption' (which is itself based on a set of ancient metaphors, as we will see as the rest of Essay Twelve unfolds) seriously compromises their ideas right from the start.

This overall topic will receive further consideration in the next two Parts of this Essay, where an attempt will be made to connect moves made toward developing a representational view of language (which began in the 'West' in Ancient Greece) with the growth of early class society. That will connect it with contemporaneous ruling-class priorities, interests and ideologies, and thereby also with the invention of Theology and Metaphysics, both of which were aimed at rationalising such moves.

Alas, when scientists and amateur philosophers try to translate technical aspects of scientific theory into ordinary language, what they finally end up with invariably (and unavoidably) relies on inappropriate (often unacknowledged) metaphors, 'scare' quote encased words and misleading analogies. These are then often 'fortified' with half-baked, amateur metaphysical theories that are themselves expressed using specially-invented, obscure jargon and tailor-made neologisms. [Recent examples of this genre include Greene (1999, 2004), Smolin (2000), and Penrose (1989, 1995, 2004) -- but most 'popularisations' of science fall into this trap (and that remark applies to many of the 'scientific' videos posted to YouTube, as several of my comments over there have tried to expose).]

"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as Lee Smolin's The Trouble with Physics and Peter Woit's Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that string theory, the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use Stephen Hawking's words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'. So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.' At first sight that seems strange. What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result. Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of 1925, when the young Werner Heisenberg worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values. Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.

"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts. This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox. Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist Michael Green a few years after he and John Schwartz published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory mainstream. Green remarked that when Einstein was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply in philosophy. In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done. The American quantum theorist David Bohm embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably hindered. Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role.... Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat (2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases and several links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

Except, ordinary language isn't the least bit "Newtonian", and the 'problem' isn't with language as such but with the ancient belief that it functions most 'naturally' (or even primarily) representationally.

[Concerning metaphor in general -- and as it features in science --, cf., White (1996), Benjamin, et al (1987), and Guttenplan (2005). Cf., also Baake (2002) and Brown (2003). On analogical reasoning, see Bartha (2019) and White (2010) -- however, readers should make note of this caveat concerning the latter work.]

34. Of course, no one in their left mind would argue that the comprehension of an empirical proposition would automatically guarantee its truth. However, as we have seen, the metaphysical basis of traditional theories of meaning -- and that of many modern variants along the same lines -- relies on an appeal to 'necessary truths' (or their equivalent of some sort). Either that, or they are predicated on theories expressed in a metalanguage, or they relate to dispositional or even 'emergent brain states', all of which presuppose, or imply, stronger (in some cases weaker) versions of the same set of ideas. Since factors like these are what supposedly lend to language the sense it has (or which explain the meaning of words), this approach is implicit in the vast majority of traditional (and, indeed, contemporary) theories of language. That is, that, at some point, meaning is not only inseparable from truth, it depends on it. And, as if to compound the problem, truth now takes the front seat -- i.e., on this basis, truth precedes meaning, which is the opposite of what has been argued in this Essay. Hence, it is imagined that the supposed truth of factors involved in the above decides, or even determines, what our words and sentences mean. Indeed, for many theorists meaning can be dispensed with entirely. Much of Quine and Davidson's work (and that of those who agree with either of them) is based on this approach. So, some fact, theory or truth about the world accounts for meaning, not the other way round. In some cases, such 'facts'/'theories' imply meaning doesn't actually exist 'objectively', or it can be dispensed with in a scientific account of language and mind. "Sense", as it is used in this Essay, is just ignored.

Unfortunately for such theorists, these supposedly 'scientific truths' (but they are really science fiction) also seem to 'follow' from the alleged meaning of certain words. Sometimes the latter are called "analytic", sometimes "tautologious" or they are even described as "truisms". Alternatively, they are characterised as 'self-evident', or they are 'true' solely in virtue of a stipulation or definition of some sort. They are even said to depend on a rather vague (but convenient) set of 'intuitions'. Failing that, they are based on a strawman 'definition' of meaning. [On this, see Baz (2012).]

[I am not suggesting Quine and Davidson's theories are this crude! I will say more about their work (in this area) in a future re-write of Essay Thirteen Part Three. Until then readers are directed to the references listed here.]

Ironically, instead of meaning depending on truth -- as the above theories seemed to argue -- it now turns out that they themselves depend on distorted language, and hence, at some level, on 'revised' meaning, just as Marx indicated:

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Work in that tradition is based (tightly or loosely) on the assumption that understanding depends on a 'mental image' of some sort (I exclude Quine and Davidson from that comment!). [Hacking (1975).] That is certainly true of what passes for the theory of cognition and knowledge among Dialectical Marxists, especially Lenin. Hence, in order to understand a word or a sentence, some sort of 'mental image' or 'representation' is supposedly required. But that is just an internalised version of the approach criticised earlier. There is was argued that in order to determine whether or not a sentence is true it had to be understood first, but that must also apply to any 'mental images'/'representations' that accompany, result in, or cause, any such 'acts of understanding' or 'episodic patterns of cognition'. So, even if there were any of these 'mental images'/'representations', they would have to be understood before they could be declared 'true' (if that is even the right term). Images might or might no accompany understanding (I will put that possibility to one side for now), but even where they supposedly do, they can't explain understanding, understanding explains them.

Once again, that turn of events would re-locate understanding and situate it in the open, in the public domain, not in a hidden world of 'internal' and uncheckable 'mental images'/'representations'.

[It is important to add that I don't accept the theory that images can be either true or false (when only certain indicative sentences/clauses can), but those who promote the above approach certainly think they can, so these remarks are aimed at their beliefs, using their theories against them. Also worth acknowledging is the fact that many of the above remarks are somewhat vague, but that is because the DM-theories I am criticising are themselves vague! Any who doubt this might like to check out Essay Thirteen Part One.]

For further elaboration on this theme, see the later Parts of Essay Twelve (when they are published), Essay Three Part One and Interlude Eleven. On the weaknesses of dispositional theories of language (this links to a PDF) -- or, at least, concerning how they supposedly connect with our capacity to follow rules --, see Kripke (1982) and Kusch (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006); see also Bloor (1997). [However, several of these authors mistakenly portray Wittgenstein as some sort of 'meaning sceptic', which he certainly wasn't. He would simply have pointed out that the word "meaning" has a use (in fact many). On this, see Essay Thirteen Part Three and Malcolm (1986a). On Bloor's work, see Note 35. Cf., also Hanna and Harrison (2004), Chapter Eight.]

35. These comments should in fact be uncontroversial among Marxists since they follow from a consistent acceptance of the social nature of language. Unfortunately, however, because certain "ruling ideas" have sunk deep into Dialectical Marxism they will (in fact) seem controversial to most DM-fans.

In Essay Thirteen Part Three I will endeavour to show how conventions (constituted by social practice) -- i.e., rules -- are capable of underpinning the sense of empirical propositions without compromising the social nature of language.

A recent study by David Bloor [Bloor (1997)] has succeeded in extending this approach considerably. Unfortunately, Bloor's book is a mixture of illuminating insight and profound philosophical error, further compounded by no little confusion. Worse still, Bloor badly misinterprets the nature of Wittgenstein's method, mysteriously branding it a form of LIE. That is a serious error. Wittgenstein was at pains to distance himself from all philosophical theories, depicting his method rather as a way of dissolving philosophical 'problems', arguing that they were all pseudo-problems and that philosophical theories in general are elaborate "houses of cards", based on a misunderstanding and misuse of language. [I have summarised some of his remarks in this area, here.]

[On the question of Wittgenstein and Idealism, cf., Dilman (2002), Hutto (1996), and Malcolm (1995c). However, Dilman (2002) should be read with some care because of the incautious way the author 'explains' some of Wittgenstein's ideas. (On this topic in general, see Part Four of this Essay.)]

Bloor's approach is seriously flawed in other ways, too. That is partly because of the extreme voluntarism that appears to underlie his interpretation of rule-following, disguised as a 'social interpretation' of that very practice. It is also partly because of the philosophical method Bloor employs. According to him, rule-followers just make decisions on how to proceed each time they apply a rule, even if they are acting socially, as part of a group. Misleadingly, Bloor appeals to a rhetorical point Wittgenstein advanced in the Philosophical Investigations:

"'But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point? After all, whatever I do can, on some interpretation, be made compatible with a rule.'"

However, Bloor failed to note that in the same paragraph(!) Wittgenstein rejected this view of rules:

"No, that's not what one should say. But rather this: every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets and cannot give it any support." [Wittgenstein (2009), p.86e, §198.]

"So is whatever I do compatible with the rule?" -- Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule -- say a sign-post -- got to do with my actions? What sort of connection obtains here? -- Well, this one, for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it. But with this you have pointed out only a causal connexion; only explained how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this following-the-sign really consists in. Not so; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there is an established usage, a custom." [Ibid. Paragraphs merged.]

So, far from endorsing the view that whatever is decided upon can be made to accord with some rule or other (on some interpretation), Wittgenstein is here directing our attention to the social nature of rule-following, and how what we do is a result of our socialisation. This isn't to give a causal, but an anthropological and normative, explanation.

However, the only constraints on rule-following Bloor seems to allow are causal in character; but given the way he depicts this topic -- which is naturalistically --, conformity with a rule could in fact take any form whatsoever. In that case, the whole enterprise would collapse into the sort of extreme individualism and voluntarism his theory was intended to counteract. Indeed, the notion of social constraint, or social norms, falls apart when extreme voluntarism like this is introduced into the equation. [On that, see Malcolm (1986a).]

Bloor's otherwise excellent analysis is also undermined by his failure to take seriously the distinction Wittgenstein drew between a grammatical and an empirical investigation, as much as it is by his insistence on constructing a philosophical theory of rule-following. If Wittgenstein's work succeeded in achieving nothing else, it was that philosophical theories are based on, and hence result in, confusion because they are motivated by, and arise out of, a misuse or a distortion of language. And that is why Bloor himself had to alter the meaning of ordinary words like "decision", "rule" and "follow" to make his theory 'work'.

More illuminating recent accounts of rule-following can be found in Floyd (1991), Meredith Williams (1999), and especially Robinson (2003b). However, Williams's account is itself slightly spoilt by her neglect of what Wittgenstein regarded as the only legitimate method in Philosophy -- indeed, as pointed out above, this involves a grammatical investigation of our use of language. Unfortunately, there is as yet no definitive account of that method, but an excellent summary can be found in Savickey (1999). See also, Baker and Hacker (2014), and Suter (1989).

However, there are encouraging signs that Wittgensteinian commentators are at last beginning to tackle these issues with the sensitivity and attention to detail they merit. Recent examples of this welcome trend can be found in Crary and Read (2000) and in the work of Juliet Floyd, Meredith Williams, Rupert Read, Cora Diamond and James Conant, among others. Another recent publication well worth consulting is Forster (2004) -- see also Hutto (2003), Kenny (1998), Fischer (2011a, 2011b), Kuusela (2005, 2006, 2008), and O'Neill (2001). [Again, my citing these works doesn't imply I agree with everything they contain.]

As noted earlier, Bloor totally ignores Wittgenstein's explicitly stated intention that his work was primarily an investigation into the "logical grammar of language" (which means that it was based on an appraisal of how we actually use language, how we arrive at some form of agreement, typically without overt co-ordination, and often immediately -- which points are often ignored by critics --, how that itself is based on even more basic forms of agreement (in "judgements"), how discourse is a core feature of both our social and individual lives, all of which are set against the background of our shared "form of life".

[However, that doesn't mean Philosophy must now become a sub-branch of Linguistics. I will say more about that elsewhere; in the meantime, the reader should consult Kindi (1998).]

Finally, there is nothing in this Essay to suggest that we must accept something just because Wittgenstein said it; nor is it being denied that some of his ideas are difficult to understand (particularly from his 'early period'). However, to implicate his work with that of 'naturalistic' sociologists -- as Bloor himself attempts -- is a gross misrepresentation of his method and intentions, whatever else one makes of either.

36. Of course, this isn't the only consideration that recommends the adoption of an anthropological approach to language -- mainly since alternative approaches soon decay into a-historical incoherence, as we have seen. That, combined with other issues raised in this Essay (and Essay Thirteen Part Three), should be enough.

Incidentally, this latest point brings out the grain of truth in Lenin's comments about a certain tumbler, which we met in Essay Ten Part One. The meaning we give to a term (in our collective, practical application of it) delineates the scope of its generality, the totality of what we take to be its legitimate instances --, even if the latter have indistinct boundaries, or none at all, and even if much of it changes over time. That is perhaps the only way the DM-"Totality" can be given some sort of sense (in this respect) -- that is, if it is interpreted anthropologically. And that is all to the good, too, since, as we have seen, no clear meaning can be attached to that term in the way that DM-fans use it.

Again, it needs emphasising that the comments aired in this Essay don't mean that scientific truth must be relativised to a "conceptual scheme" (this links to a PDF). [On that, see Sharrock and Read (2002).]

In order for truths (or, indeed, falsehoods) to be stated, confirmed or even falsified, they should first make sense, They must be capable of being understood by those who use them, or who utter/write/read/hear them. With respect to empirical propositions this means that whatever constitutes their sense must also be anterior to whatever determines their truth-value. If the sense of an empirical proposition is constituted, not by its actual or presumed truth-value, but by its truth conditions, communication between language users (at this level, with respect to empirical propositions, indicative sentences, or sentence fragments/clauses, at least) becomes possible. With that in mind, the comprehension of an empirical proposition involves grasping the conditions under which it would be true or would be false, independently of knowing which of these actually obtains. Understanding such a proposition doesn't, therefore, require knowing whether it is true, or knowing whether it is false, just what would make it true, and, ipso facto, what would make it false.

[Those two semantic options are connected to the content of a given proposition. On that, see here and Interlude Eight.]

In that case, lack of knowledge of the actual truth or the actual falsehood of a given sentence doesn't, and wouldn't, prevent its comprehension, and hence prevent communication. That being so, interlocutors can engage in conversation before they know whether the indicative sentences they use are true or know whether they are false. Indeed, they might never find out which of these alternatives is the case, or even care to find out. For example, it is currently possible to discuss whether or not there is life on Mars (using sentences like, say, V1, but more concisely, V2) before anyone knows if there actually is life on that planet, just as it is possible to hypothesise about the whereabouts of Shergar even though we might never uncover the truth behind his disappearance, and so on. [That would be impossible given the referential and representational view of language; on that, see below. I will post a proof of this last point in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

V1: Structures similar to Stromatolites, which are formed by microbe colonies on Earth, show there is life on Mars. [Partially quoted from here.]

Scientists can discuss, and therefore understand, V2 even before they know whether it is true or know whether it is false. Admittedly, V1 and V2 are far more complex than M6, but that doesn't affect the point being made, which is that scientists have to understand such sentences before they can ascertain their semantic status -- or they wouldn't know what to discuss, what to expect, what to look for or what to investigate. Compare V1 and V2 with V3. [The use of an asterisk indicates V3 is non-standard sentence -- to put it mildly! To state the obvious, again, it isn't possible to investigate the semantic status a sentence like V3 that no one understands.]

If this weren't the case, communication would break down. Imagine trying to grasp what someone said if, in order to do so, you had to know in advance that what they said was true, and what its actual truth consisted in. [Here, of course, I am referring to grasping the sense of a sentence, not attempts made to ascertain speakers' meaning.]

Of course, failure to do the first of the above would make the second impossible.

It could be argued that if someone lacked knowledge of certain words (maybe they had never encountered them before, or they were specialist/technical terms), then communication would be threatened (as, for example, we see in relation to V3, or, more plausibly, in connection with V1), which means that the above analysis is defective.

But, that objection rests on yet another confusion. Trivially, lack of knowledge of (certain aspects of) language does indeed cripple communication, but facility with language isn't like learning ordinary empirical facts. Learning the meaning of new words is an extension to comprehension, not knowledge -- unless, of course, we mean by "knowledge", "knowing how" not "knowing that". [Concerning that distinction, see here.] It is this extension to understanding that enables the individual concerned to access new knowledge. While it might look like it is merely a fact that a word means this or that -- so, for instance, it might seem to be a fact that in English "vixen" means "female fox" --, the meaning of a word isn't based on that supposed linguistic fact but on the (rule-governed) use to which it has been, is still being, and should be put. The import of the rules we have for the use of words is, ipso facto, part of what enables learners to continue to employ them correctly -- which settled use has to harmonise with words speakers already comprehend, as well as with practices into which they have already been inducted, or with which they are becoming familiar -- if words are to mean anything to them. So, learning new words doesn't amount to learning new facts; it follows on the acquisition of, or the extension to, certain behavioural, practical and social skills.

it could be false. But, as we have seen, F1 can't be false without the subject of that sentence (i.e., "vixen") changing its meaning. In that eventuality, F1 would now be about the meaning of a typographically similar word -- that is, it would relate to the meaning of a different word -- "'vixen'" not "vixen". Either that, or it would represent a simple rejection/repudiation of the above rule. [On that, see Note 60.] Of course, none of this implies words can't change their meaning over time. [On conceptual change see Essay Four Part One, here, here and here.]

As we have also seen, this approach to meaning and sense re-locates linguistic skill (our facility with language) in the public domain-- as opposed to situating them in an individualised, private and uncheckable part of someone's brain/'consciousness' -- which is precisely what one would expect of a social account of language.

"Meaning does not reside in the word or in the soul of the speaker or in the soul of the listener. Meaning is the effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the material of a particular sound complex." [Voloshinov (1973), p.102. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Unfortunately, although Voloshinov emphasised the social nature of language and communication (as opposed to its alleged individualised and representational role -- at least as far as meaning is concerned), he turned out to be an unreliable ally (as we found out in Essay Thirteen Part Three). When he speaks about meaning being "the effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the material of a particular sound complex" he is in fact talking about something akin to speakers' meaning (link above) which he relativises to each interaction and its social setting, intertwined with the immediate aims and intentions of the interlocutors. Unfortunately, as we saw in Essay Thirteen Part Three (link above), that divorces his theory from a Marxist understanding of language as a social tool and means of communication. I don't propose to enter into that topic here; readers are directed to the aforementioned Essay for more details.

On the non-cognitive skills upon which language mastery is based, cf., Robinson (2003b). See also Glock (2004); but, once more, this should be read in the light of Bloor (1997), and Kusch (2002, 2006). See also Hanna and Harrison (2004).

Such rules thus enable greater facility in language and hence permit wider and more effective communication.

If we employ Wittgenstein's approach and terminology, then, among other things, the meaning of words and the sense of propositions in general depend on "logical grammar" -- the manner of their (i.e., the sentences or clauses') construction (or in the case of words, their rule governed use) -- and the role they play in our lives. [An example of this has been set out in Interlude Six. In the case of empirical propositions, this also includes the conditions noted in the main body of this Essay. However, readers should also take note the remarks posted here.]

[It is worth underlining the reason for adding the phrase "in general", used above. Without that, it would imply that language does indeed have an 'essence'.]

When coupled with the criteria we have for the application of certain words, these factors constitute what we (through inter-social agreement, in action) count as the truth conditions for the proposition in question, if those words are so used in that proposition. [On criteria, see Interlude Eight.]

This might seem to make truth itself dependent on human choice and behaviour, when it surely depends on the way the world happens to be. Unfortunately, if that were the case, it would once again confuse the truth-value of an empirical proposition with its truth conditions. The truth-values of empirical propositions are indeed sensitive to the way the world happens to be, but that isn't the case with their truth conditions. [On that, see here, here, and Interlude Eight.]

[Admittedly, the phrase "The way the world happens to be" is itself rather vague; it will be sharpened in Interlude Eight (link above). Its use here shouldn't, however, be confused with its employment in the CTT.]

Because these criteria are socially-conditioned and collectively-sanctioned, empirical sense is dependent on:

(ii) The material and social relations humans have with one another and past generations; and,

Since truth-values are set by the way the world happens to be, scientific knowledge (expressed in and by empirical propositions, not natural laws (which are themselves forms of representation or rules)) is also ultimately dependent on the world --, even while such knowledge isn't independent of, nor is it insensitive to, wider social forces and historical factors. It is, after all, human beings who have to decide under what conditions a proposition is or isn't to be counted as true, and because we are social beings, such decisions can't be divorced from these wider social and historical factors. But, of course, in relation to the semantic status of an empirical proposition the final arbiter will always be the facts of the matter.

[Further discussion of this topic would take us too far into Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language. For a brief account of some of the central issues concerned, see Glock (1996), pp.98-101, 124-29, 150-55, and 315-19, as well as Baker and Hacker (2014). A much more detailed list of relevant references can be found in Essay Thirteen Part Three. i will say much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

However, it is worth adding that most of Wittgenstein's commentators appear to have ignored the connection between the social nature of language and his method. Even those who at least gesture in that direction generally fail to develop them in anything like a satisfactory manner; they certainly fail (openly) to acknowledge the central role social and historical factors play in Wittgenstein's work (except, perhaps, merely to give lip-service in that respect). The problem with much of the writing in this genre is that even where these factors are taken into account, they are invariably given an a-historical twist. This unfortunately makes it entirely mysterious how language is connected with human beings and their historical and social development, as opposed to cardboard cut-outs-of-human-beings who have no history and don't eke out their lives in class-divided societies. Indeed, it is almost as if the entire human race had been beamed in from another planet/'dimension' -- almost as if human practice (and all that that entails) descended from the skies.

[A notable exception to that generalisation is Robinson (2003). See also his essays.]

For instance, Meredith Williams's otherwise excellent work is seriously undermined by her open and explicit rejection of HM. [Williams (1999b), pp.280-81.] Another recent example along similar lines is O'Neill (2001). However, that major gripe won't be explored any further here; it would, anyway, require the setting up of detailed interconnections with, and within, HM, a topic that is largely ignored at this site.

36a. The difference between non-sense as such and incoherent non-sense will also be explained.

we wouldn't know what to make of it (saving, of course, rather odd, unusual or special surrounding circumstances -- for example, if D1 were a code of some sort). However, if the following 'explanation' were now offered:

we would still be unable to make any sense of it. The prefixes "NN asserted that…" and "NN meant by…" (or even "What I meant by...") can't of itself turn babble into meaningful language any more than "MM paid...for..." can turn a bucket of cat droppings into money:

D4: MM paid for her copy of the Morning Star with a wheelbarrow of h@Yhrtuitjner.

Without the aforementioned special circumstances, D1-D4 aren't just nonsensical, they are incoherently so.

39. Issues connected with trying to make sense of the rather odd things people sometimes come out with were examined in more detail in several articles in Crary and Read (2000) -- for example, Cerbone (2000). Cf., also Conant (1991), Diamond (1991), Lippitt and Hutto (1998) and Robinson (2003).

39a. In what follows, an implicit use will be made of the LEM (as a rule of language, not as an a priori 'truth' or 'law'). Dialecticians, of course, take exception to the LEM's universal and unrestricted application, especially in relation to change. However, we have already seen that few, if any, of them manage to get this 'law' right, even though they themselves have to appeal to it, and even use it, repeatedly (albeit this is often done implicitly), in order to try to make their case. For example, I can think of no sane or sober DM-fan who would argue that the sentence, "Karl Marx is the author of Das Kapital Volume One" is neither true nor false -- nor yet that it is true and false -- it is one or the other. They all choose one of these options, that it is indeed true.

As far as DM-theorists are concerned, there are only two options available here: (i) P4 is true, or (ii) P4 is false.

Dialectical Marxists opt for (i) and reject (ii), of course; but these are still the only two options. Hence, in answer to the question: "Is motion the mode of the existence of mater or not?", not one of them will quote Hegel:

"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Engels (1954), pp.212-13. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

Nor would any of them answer the above question as follows: "P4 is neither true nor false, it is both! There are no rigid differences between truth and falsehood". Or: "You see, that sort of question shows you're in the grip of formal thinking. You think metaphysically, not dialectically!"

Indeed, it is perfectly clear why they wouldn't respond in either of those ways (or anything analogous): if they were to do so, they would also have openly to admit that an acceptance of P4 commits them to only one alternative -- just such a "fixed and rigid", "hard and fast" line -- motion is either a mode of the existence of matter or it isn't, not both. Indeed, for them, it is the former.

Just as it is perfectly clear why they have to adhere -- surreptitiously -- to this "fixed and rigid", "hard and fast" line: nothing determinate about the world could be proposed (i.e., "put forward for consideration") without accepting as valid a use of the LEM -- again, as a rule of language, not as a Super-Truth, or even a 'law' about 'the nature of language, logic and the world'.

If or when this 'law' is applied to change, DM-theorists variably claim it breaks down. But that claim itself is what actually breaks down, as P6 clearly demonstrates:

P6: The LEM either breaks down when applied to motion and change or it doesn't.

DM-theorists opt once more for the first half of P6: that the LEM breaks down when it is used in connection with motion and change, thus applying yet another hard-and-fast line in defiance of their own criticism of just such rigid distinctions!

So, DM-qualms -- should they be aired in relation to that earlier use of the LEM -- would be, at best irrelevant, at worst self-refuting.

[The reader is directed to these more detailed comments about the LEM, which also highlight the serious problems that arise from the usual, tired old, shop-worn, defective DM-criticisms of this 'law'. (The word "law" is in 'scare quotes' here since the LEM isn't a law but a rule of language -- however else it might be interpreted by some logicians.)]

40. This is the requirement of bi-polarity mentioned in the Preface, which protocol constitutes one of the fundamental insights of Wittgenstein's Tractatus [Wittgenstein (1972)]. On this see Maury (1977), Mezzadri (2013), Moyal-Sharrock (2007), pp.33-51, Palmer (1988, 1996, 2011) and White (1974, 2006). See also Note 5a0.

40a. There will be more on this in Essay Three Part Four. In fact, this is the same epistemological black hole into which Lenin dropped DM in MEC. [On that, see Essay Thirteen Part One.] Indeed, this is just one of the fatal weakness of Representationalism. [On that, see Hacker (1987), (1991, 2013a).]

40b. A 'Super-Truth' is what is expressed by an indicative sentence whose (supposed) content superficially resembles that of an ordinary-looking scientific proposition (such as "The temperature of this liquid is 37.5ºC", where it is also made clear which liquid is being measured, and when that was carried out), but which turns out to be nothing at all like one. Super-Truths transcend anything the sciences could possibly deliver, confirm or even falsify. M8 and P4, from earlier, are particularly good examples of this. Their supposed truth depends solely on meaning, not on the way the world happens to be. They tell us how the world, any world, must be, not how it happens to be. In this respect they form core components of the RRT.

No amount of evidence can confirm or confute the above two sentences; evidence is irrelevant in both cases. [On this, see Note 41.] Moreover, any attempt to declare them false will alter the meaning of key terms, which shows that their supposed truth is based solely on meaning (i.e., the meaning of those key terms), not the facts.

41. Quite the reverse, in fact; in this case, an 'Ideal sort of reality' in effect becomes the projection of such 'thoughts' or 'propositions'. Hence, far from the 'proposition' in question being a reflection of nature (which is what was supposed to happen), 'reality' becomes a construct created by 'thought', or by the stipulated/distorted meaning of certain words. Dogmatic claims like these attempt to tell us what the world must be like. The supposed logical properties of such sentences 'determine the rational form' of the 'Ideal World' that results from these moves, not the other way round. Hence, this amounts to yet another inversion: 'thought' determines the fundamental nature of this artificial 'world', which is, of course, why theories that depend on this approach collapse into, or imply, Idealism.

In Part Four of Essay Twelve, this logical inversion (which parallels one that was highlighted earlier) will be used to support the accusation that the 180º flip DM-fans say they inflicted on Hegel's system (in order to create 'Materialist Dialectics', when 'the dialectic' was 'put the right way up') hasn't in fact taken place, no matter what Dialectical Marxists might otherwise claim. Indeed, the projection of thought, or of language, onto the world lies behind something that will later be called the "Reverse Reflection Theory" [RRT], which implies the world is fundamentally thought-, or language-like -- since, given that approach, key linguistic features of that theory have been reified/alienated and dogmatically projected onto the world. In relation to DM, we have seen this happen in connection words like "contradiction", "negation", "being", "opposite", "consciousness", "change", "difference", and, indeed, the many and diverse results of 'the process of abstraction' (as demonstrated in detail in Essay Three Parts One and Two).

[Key words in such theories are alienated since they are now divorced from their roots in material practice and social discourse; as a result, they have been reified and fetishised, turning them into objects and/or the relations between objects.]

By these means, forms of discourse now delineate the form of the world. So, instead of the world being allowed to tell us what to think about it, in its place we are informed how certain (privileged) sections of society think we think and think we talk, which fantasy language supposedly determines how the world must be. Moreover, these 'privileged sections' have always acted this way in order to promote and secure their interests -- or, even more often, the interests of their patrons -- not those of the working population.

What is worse, because Dialectical Marxists have bought into the above approach, DM is just another shady, but third-rate product of this age-old costume drama.

The traditional approach to 'philosophical knowledge' populates the Universe (or, rather, it fills parts that supposedly underlie 'appearances') with countless "Abstractions" and "Essences", which are little more than shadows cast on the world by the distorted language invented for that very purpose. [That remark, of course, repeats, extends and amplifies a point made by Marx and Wittgenstein.] As we can now see, these distorted aspects of discourse have been read into nature on the back of centuries of ruling-class ideological hegemony (which Dialectical Marxists have leached into revolutionary theory by their adoption of theories that were given the equivalent of a cocaine boost by Hegel -- it is now the 'opiate of the militants'), not 'read from it'. Had these ideas been derived from the world, the indicative sentences involved would be capable of being negated; but, as we will see, they can't.

[The significance of that seemingly irrelevant observation will soon become clear. See also Note 43a.]

One important strand in this age-old 'logico-linguistic conjuring trick' was exposed in Essays Two and Three Part One, where a contingent feature of Indo-European Grammar (i.e., the subject-predicate form, allied with the special role occupied by the verb "to be") were read into the world as fundamental features of 'Being'. Those enamoured of this way of talking were now supposedly capable of giving birth to an endless brood of "Essences" via the mysterious 'process of abstraction'. [On that, see Kahn (2003), and Essay Three Part One (link above).]

[There is more on this below, and in Parts Five and Six of this Essay, where we will see how Hegel further tortured the innocent-looking verb "to be", and then inserted it into an all-embracing cosmic process -- "Becoming" --, powered by the 'contradictions' he was also able to magic into existence as a spin-off of his ham-fisted 'analysis' of the LOI. (A summary of these 'moves', and where they go wrong, can be accessed here.)]

43. It could be argued that Lenin was simply ruling out the very possibility of motion without matter. End of story! Move on...

There are in fact several possible, alternative interpretations here: Lenin could be have been rejecting:

(c) The separability of matter and motion (with "separability" itself now interpreted either physically or conceptually); or, indeed,

However, if Lenin was ruling out either or both of (a) and (b), he couldn't have done so without thinking the forbidden words, "motion without matter", what they or their supposed content implied (i.e., when embedded in a sentential context). In that case, he must have entertained the possible truth of at least one sentence that expressed this state of affairs -- i.e., motion without matter -- while claiming no one could do what he had just done, since it was "unthinkable"!

He must have had in mind the very state of affairs he said couldn't exist (i.e., immobile matter), even as he had to know what that state was, and hence what its existence amounted to or implied!

Otherwise, he would simply have been commenting about empty phrases or he would be using words he himself didn't understand.

43a. Once more, it could be objected that it is perfectly clear what Lenin was rejecting: the immobility of matter. However, as we have just seen in the previous Note, in order to do that, Lenin would have to think the "unthinkable" by thinking about the supposed content of the offending sentences that expressed this 'forbidden state of affairs'. So, if it is possible to think about the immobility of matter (even if only in order to reject it out-of-hand, something he could only do if he knew what it was he was ruling out), the immobility of matter can't be "unthinkable". Or, perhaps better, the content of any sentence used to assert the immobility of matter would still have to be entertained, even while that 'possibility' was immediately rejected as something that could be entertained!

Of course, the use of the word "thinkable" is itself rather vague and ambiguous (in such a context). Consider one particular example: It is possible to 'think about' four-edged triangles in the sense that one intones, or entertains, those words, but since there is no such thing as a four-edged triangle, it isn't possible to think about them! There is no "them", here!

Whoever asserts T1 will have to know what they were ruling out; for instance, T2:

T2: This plain one-dimensional manifold has four intersecting straight edges and is a triangle.

T3: A triangle is a polygon with three vertices formed from the intersection of three lines or line segments.

In this case, since nothing could count as a four-edged triangle, ruling out this combination of words amounts to the rejection of the use of the word "triangle" to describe what we would otherwise call a quadrilateral. Alternatively, it might be a reminder to novices that "triangle" is the wrong word to use in relation to quadrilaterals. In that case, ruling out T2 amounts to the endorsement of a linguistic rule that instructs us how to classify three-edged polygons, as triangles -- exemplified by T3.

Now, if someone like Lenin wanted to treat a sentence like T1 as a fundamental truth about reality, as opposed to an indirect expression of a rule (i.e., T3), he would have to know what state of affairs he was ruling out, which would in turn mean that he would have to be able to think the content of T2, for example, even if only to rule it out straightaway. But, if he can't even do that, he would have no idea what he was trying to rule in, either.

In response, the supposition that Lenin couldn't do this might itself be based on a counter-claim that in order to know what state of affairs he was ruling out, and hence be able to think the content of T2, he would have to be able to picture to himself or form a mental image of a four-edged triangle. But, since that is impossible, the above claims about what Lenin had to be able to do in order to claim something was "unthinkable" are patently false.

However that counter-argument is itself based on another all-too-common error: that in order to understand an indicative sentences, an individual must be able to form (or access in 'consciousness') a 'mental picture'/'image' of whatever it is they are trying to comprehend. I have dealt with this (traditional) theory in detail in Essay Three Part Two, but to cut a long story short, it is quite easy to see how this theory is completely misguided. Does anyone think they have to be able to form an image of all (or even any) of the following in order to understand, or assert, them?

(2) Karl Marx's eldest daughter, Jenny, visited friends in Rye, East Sussex, on Sunday, 25^th of June 1876.

(3) A factory in Sweden, owned by Swedish Match, manufactured 238,350,234 matches between 2016 and 2024.

(4) A US Air Force stealth bomber, the B2 Spirit, reached a top speed of 631mph at 15:42 (EST) on Tuesday, 15^th of August 2025.

(6) The No Kings protest, held on Saturday 14^thof June 2025, was attended by at least 5.75 million protesters in 2169 towns and cities across the USA.

If not, then Lenin doesn't need to be able to form a 'mental image' of 'motionless matter' in order to try to rule it out as "unthinkable".

But, just in case anyone tries to claim they can form a 'mental image' of one or more of the above, let me remind them that it is only after a sentence has been understood may some sort of 'image' be conjured up. And to anyone who questions even that counter-claim may I then point out that had all of the above been written in a language they had never encountered before, they could have formed no relevant 'mental image'. That should convince all but the inveterately purblind that sentences have to be understood first. Plainly, you can't form an image of something you fail to comprehend. Finally, anyone who still thinks they can form an image of every single one of the above is invited to contact me with convincing reasons.

[In connection with this, I refer readers to the aforementioned Essay, as well as Essay Thirteen Part One. Remember, a sentence doesn't have to be true to be asserted or believed (concerning assertion, see here). Readers are directed to Essays Three Part Two (link above) and Thirteen Part Three for more on this. I also discuss this further in Note 43c. Nor does a proposition have to be true for us to able think it. All that is required is that a sentence is capable of being true or capable of being false. It might now be wondered how anyone might know of a given proposition, like, say (5) above -- or even propositions drawn from the sciences that use technical or mathematically complex language --, that it is "capable of being true or capable of being false". I will deal with such 'difficulties' in Interlude Eight (but part of the answer has already been aired in Interlude Four).]

As we will find out later, this 'quandary' (about what Lenin can or can't do or think) takes us to the heart of the 'problem', for we will see that such sentences (be they metaphysical or even mathematical) have no negations, even though what might look like their negations actually use a negative particle. This is in fact what makes M1a (and T1) problematic.

So, the real problem isn't whether M1a or T1 are or aren't 'thinkable', but whether or not they violate rules we already have for the use of certain words. In short, as Wittgenstein noted, metaphysics is based on systematic confusions like this -- i.e., in this case, on the misconstrual of linguistic rules as 'Super-Empirical propositions' expressing 'fundamental truths about Reality'. [On this, see Note 44 and Note 43c.]

"As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions." [Alexander (1956), pp.25-26. A different and more recent edition to the one I have quoted in this Essay can be accessed here. (This links to a PDF.)]

[See also Vailati (1997), pp.109-37, and Earman (1989). (This also links to a PDF.)]

43c. The argument presented in the main body of this Essay (and Note 43a) might appear to mean that no one could deny, for example, that an ordinary triangle has four edges.

Hence, if Z1 were to define a triangle then (if the argument in the main body of this Essay is to be believed), Z2 must have changed the subject and so can't be about triangles, but must be about 'triangles'. That being the case, Z2 can't be the negation of Z1, and so can't be used to reject Z1. But, children are often told that triangles don't have four edges, they have three. The same goes for many other mathematical statements and denials --, for example, "Four isn't an odd number", "A hexagon doesn't have five edges", "π isn't a rational number". That means core parts of this Essay are totally misguided.

As will be argued later on in this Essay, mathematical propositions aren't to be compared with empirical propositions; many are in fact rules for the use of certain symbols (or in some cases, certain words). So, the 'negation' of a mathematical proposition in fact amounts to the rejection of a rule.

In that case, Z1 isn't about triangles. It is in fact proposing a new rule for the use of a typographically identical word, 'triangle'. This means that Z2 amounts to a rejection of that rule -- or rather, it amounts to this:

Z2a: Triangles have three edges, so you must be using "triangle" illegitimately, or you are talking about 'triangles' not triangles.

Mutatis mutandis, the same goes for sentences like "Four isn't an odd number", and "A hexagon doesn't have five edges".

"π isn't a rational number" is, however, different. It was a mathematical discovery that what were later called "Real Numbers" -- e.g., √2 and π -- weren't Rational. In that case, when it was determined that π wasn't a rational number, that amounted to a change in the rules governing the use of that symbol, or, indeed, the introduction of a new rule.

[Yes, I am aware that the Reals include the Integers, the Rationals and the Natural Numbers; the only point I am making above is that numbers like √2 and π (and, of course, literally countless others!) forced mathematicians to expand the concept of Number by introducing Real Numbers.]

However, as argued earlier, metaphysicians (and DM-theorists) regard sentences like M8 and P4 as 'Super Empirical Truths' about 'Reality', but as we have also seen what appear to be their negations (M8a and P4a) turn out not to be their negations (for reasons mentioned above). This means that sentences like M8 and P4 express rules for the use of certain words (on that, see here), which in turn means that M8a and P4a amount to the rejection of those rules.

This means that while it is certainly possible to deny triangles have four edges, deny time is a relation between events, and deny motion is the mode of the existence of matter, that isn't the same as denying Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of Revolution. Hence, such a denial doesn't alter the meaning of any of the words in empirical propositions. By way of contrast, the rejection (by means of a denial) of M8 and P4 does change meaning of their key terms (or it challenges those meanings). That alone shows that M8 and P4 are directly connected with the meaning of words and as such express rules for the use of those words. Any such denial represents a rejection of those rules.

44. In our unguarded, or perhaps even our unreflective, moments we tend to receive or 'hear' such propositions as if they were empirical -- or, rather, in relation to Metaphysics, as if they are Super-Empirical and are informing us of 'profound philosophical truths' about, or which express, fundamental principles that underpin, 'Reality'. This is indeed why many of us slip so easily into metaphysical or dogmatic mode, or allow it to shape our thought. Even now, far too many of us are still 'god-seekers', looking for some sort of 'deep meaning to existence'. [Again, on this, see Stove (1991), pp.83-177, which contains one of the best takedowns of this frame-of-mind I have so far read. Readers should also take note of the warnings about Stove's work posted here and here.]

Traditional philosophical theories are supposed to express 'fundamental truths' that 'reflect' a 'hidden world' that lies behind, or which is anterior to, both 'appearances' and the physical universe (with the word "hidden" meant to be understood metaphorically). These 'Cosmic Verities' are 'S uper-True' because they 'reflect' this 'secret world', a world that believers consider 'more real' than the world we see around us -- since this 'hidden world' both explains, and lends some sort of substantiality to, the physical universe. To those who think this way, that means these 'Super-Verities' can't be false. They are 'Principles'/'Laws' that govern the nature and existence of any possible world, so how could they be false? They define what counts as 'Philosophical Truth', and, as such, are 'Metaphysically Necessary'. The very possibility of falsehood has been surgically -- i.e., definitionally -- removed from them. No exhaustive examination of the evidence could conceivably challenge, let alone overturn, their Adamantine Alethic Status, so any appeal to evidence would be demeaning, to say the least! The unrevisable validity of these 'Super-Truths' was decided stipulatively -- or, in other words, their semantic status was linguistically authorised and legitimated. That is certainly how 'metaphysical truths' have always been regarded, received and conceived, at least by Traditional Thinkers and those who attend to, learn from, or have been influenced by such 'sages'. It is also in line with what have seen several DM-theorists argue.

Hence, if or when anyone internalises the 'Traditional View of Reality' -- which they do by accepting the 'fact' that it is hidden from them but can nevertheless be accessed by a 'pure act of thought' --, or they allow it to influence their ideas --, they thereby engage in a cognitive pretence: that 'special', if not 'unique', thinkers (like them!) are somehow capable of grasping the (presumed) sense of the indicative sentences expressing these 'Super-Truths', and hence that they (somehow) know the conditions under which the latter would be true. After all, that is how all of us have been socialised to receive/cognise ordinary empirical propositions, which these 'Super-Truths' superficially resemble, even though they go way beyond anything an ordinary proposition might say. Sentences that masquerade as empirical propositions are received in like manner; hence, those who think like this conclude that these 'Super-Truths' are also capable of having a truth-value (in this instance, 'True'). But, with these 'Super-Verities', their 'Truth' follows from the meaning of the words they contain, or from the concepts they express/reflect, not from any evidence. This happens whenever anyone accepts the 'truth' of Metaphysical sentences like those listed above before any evidence has been examined. In such circumstances, all that has to be done is read a few words, scan a body of text, or perhaps even study a book, and the 'truth' of a seemingly endless set of 'Super Verities' is automatically revealed to them, almost like a 'light from on high'. Thought alone, or language alone, is all the 'evidence' needed, required, or even expected.

That is how Traditional Thought has operated and duped the vast majority of thinkers since Ancient Greek times (in the 'West', at least).

How many of us who read what Leibniz had to say about time being a relation between events nodded along without once asking what evidence there is in its favour? Or, if we rejected his ideas, how many of us asked what evidence falsified his words? (And here "evidence" doesn't mean yet more 'linguistic' or 'definitional' support; it means the sort of physical evidence we would expect if a group of scientists were to claim that certain particles had travelled faster than light, for instance. And we could, and should, ask the same of DM-fans when they first encountered sentences like P4.

But, as soon as they are critically examined (in the manner illustrated in this Essay and at this site) it soon becomes obvious these 'Super-Truths' can't be viewed in the way they have been for countless centuries, since one or other of their semantic options (i.e., in this case, with P4, falsehood) has been closed-off --, which, as we have also seen, has the knock-on effect of shutting both alternatives down.

And it is this that lies behind the genuine puzzlement, if not overt consternation, Dialectical Marxists feel (and often express) when they are told -- as they have been at this site (and by yours truly in on-line 'debates' or in person) -- that no one "understands" DM; not Engels, not Plekhanov, not Lenin, not Mao, not Trotsky...

Since the supposed truth of DM-'propositions' depends solely on the alleged meaning of the words/concepts they utilise, no wonder Dialectical Marxists assent to their 'veracity' as soon as they imagine they have been 'understood'. Nothing extraneous to those 'special sentences' is required. That is also why they are genuinely nonplussed (or, in many cases, angered) when they are told that they themselves don't and can't possibly understand their own theory, since it is incoherent non-sense.

In such cases, however, it is little use Dialectical Marxists trying to provide more evidence in order to convince doubters -- because the presumed truth of each DM-'Law' is independent of any evidence. That fact alone helps explain why DM-fans almost invariably respond with the following clichéd mantra: "Well, you just don't understand dialectics!". That, of course, gives the game away since it reveals what was obvious all along, that even they (implicitly) realise their theory is based on a presumed comprehension of the language used to express the theory, not on the evidence.

[And, we have already seen that what little 'evidence' DM-supporters have scraped-together in support -- but the latter is invariably used to "illustrate" DM, not prove it -- is more accurately to be described as Mickey Mouse Evidence.]

DM-theorists are so used to receiving, accepting and viewing their theory in the above manner -- which is precisely as the traditional approach to such 'Epistemological Pearls of Wisdom' has socialised them to react (outlined a few paragraphs ago), which response integrates them into a belief-system as practitioners of 'legitimate philosophy' that reveals 'profound knowledge' --, that it seems perverse, if not downright offensive, to claim that they don't understand their own theory. But, since DM-'propositions' have no content -- merely a jargonised, ersatz sort of 'content' -- there is nothing there for them, or anyone, to understand. In that case, telling them that they don't understand their own theory isn't to malign them, it isn't to question their intelligence, it is to make a logical point about DM itself. Their theory is incapable of being understood by anyone. If there were a 'God', even 'He' would scratch 'His' head if 'He' were ever to leaf through DN, AD, PN or IDM.

[DN = Dialectics of Nature -- or Engels (1954); AD = Anti-Dühring -- or Engels (1976); PN = Philosophical Notebooks -- or Lenin (1961); IDM = In Defence of Marxism -- or Trotsky (1971).]

The above explains the almost religious sense of awe Dialectical Marxists often display upon having these 'profound DM-truths' revealed to them after a few hours of reading the DM-classics (or modern-day 'Introductions'). Any who doubt this should check out the examples of just such quasi-religious fervour displayed by new converts to the faith, listed in Essay Nine Part Two, here and here.

But, as is the case with genuine religious indoctrination, all that these new converts to the DM-faith are fed is incoherent non-sense.

45. As we will soon see, this pretence -- or, in many cases, this elaborate charade -- often involves those who 'claim to understand' DM spinning increasingly baroque 'elucidations', each beset with even more complex webs of jargon, stitched together in a vain attempt to 'explain' or elaborate on the last batch of obscure verbiage that was itself produced to 'explain' the previous barrage, and so on... An excellent recent example of this can be found here. This process results in the creation of increasingly recondite, super-webs of self-referential lingo with nothing to ground it in ordinary language, everyday life or even the practice of a revolutionary party. Hegel's Logic, of course, is the prime example of this, with Heidegger's work, alongside Bhaskar (1993) and much of Zizek's recent 'contributions', sat on the substitutes' bench.

[January 2026 Update: As a side-note: this was heard during a recent BBC Drama (I am paraphrasing): "Ah, Slavoj Zizek, where performance art meets verbosity!"]

Such attempts at 'clarification' are, alas, no more illuminating than the tales spun by Christian Theologians and other assorted Mystics, trying to 'explain', for instance, the Incarnation of Christ. The only difference is that the latter are, at least, open and honest about the fact that their entire belief-system is an unfathomable "mystery". Not so with our very own Dialectical Mystics and their 'theory'.

Francis Bacon summed-up this mind-set admirably well (although he confined his criticism to the tangled web of 'verbal spaghetti' weaved by Medieval Schoolmen -- i.e., the Scholastics -- but it is just as applicable to those who try to 'explain' Hegel, upside down or 'the 'right way up'):

"This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the Schoolmen: who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, works according to the stuff, and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider works his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit." [Bacon (2001), pp.25-26. Bold emphasis added; Stuart/Elizabethan English replaced by contemporary English.]

"44. Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men's minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the theatre. For we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received or imagined, as so many plays brought out and performed, creating fictitious and theatrical worlds...." [Novum Organum, quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

Some might wonder why this site keeps promoting ordinary language as the final arbiter in every circumstance. As is the case with any complex intellectual discipline -- such as science, medicine, engineering, mathematics (etc.) -- over many centuries Philosophy has developed its own technical vocabulary. If the author of these Essays can't understand the terms philosophers use, that is hardly philosophy's problem.

[Compare this objection with my anecdote (reported below) about me trying to explain Kant's Moral Theory when I was an undergraduate.]

First, why the emphasis on ordinary language? This will be dealt with more fully in Part Seven of Essay Twelve (several sections of which have already been published in Essay Four Part One), as well as elsewhere in this Essay; but for present purposes it is sufficient to quote Marx once more:

Marx wanted to communicate with workers not academics; which is why he also said:

Dialectical Marxists (especially those drawn from the HCD-wing) might fail to get the point -- especially individuals who confuse prolixity with profundity.

"Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing" Childishness. Bold emphasis added. On this, also see Interlude Ten.]

As argued more fully in Essay Nine Part Two, almost since its inception Marxist theory has been dominated by the convoluted prose of diverse intellectuals (and that includes those who shape 'accepted theory' in revolutionary parties themselves). That is why they focus on parts of Hegel (and other mystics/obscurantists) that can be 'sanitised' (i.e., those sections where the overt mysticism, or those that are just impossible to fathom, even by experts, can simply be ignored), rather like theologians who try to 'sanitise' the Bible, declaring 'troubling' verses metaphorical (etc.). In addition:

(a) It allows Dialectical Marxists to 'hang with the cool kids' (i.e., mainstream intellectuals);

(b) It helps provide Dialectical Marxists with some sort of career (in academia or even in a revolutionary party); and,

(c) It helps explain why capitalist publishing houses are happy to print their work (it is 'genuine philosophy', after all), when, for the capitalist press, it is simply a way they can further milk the militant market. Since few if any workers will read this output -- and of those who do, not one will underrated what they read -- the system is safe, and profits can role in.

Once again: this isn't to demean workers; as already pointed out, no one understands this material.

Second, as far as my incapacity to understand the complex jargon Traditional Philosophers (and Dialectical Marxists) have inflicted on humanity is concerned, I can play the game when I have to (for example, in order to obtain my degrees). To that end it is worth quoting an anecdote that originally appeared in another Essay (here slightly modified):

This reminds me of those who tell me their theological studies help them understand the world, but when asked for details all we get is a series of word-salads and a refusal to face the objections others have raised against such fanciful ideas.

Hegel-groupies also remind me of myself when I was studying Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals (which is, in my view, as great a work as his Critique of Pure Reason) in my second undergraduate year (1977-78). I was part of a seminar group of philosophy students and one week the tutor sent us off and we were given seven days to study that book, attend class the following week fully prepared to summarise its core ideas. Hence, geek that I was back then, I spent hours and hours making page after page of notes on this amazing book ready for that seminar. So, the big day arrived and the tutor asked for someone to summarise Kant's key ideas. I was always in the habit of talking too much in such seminars, so I held back hoping another student would take over. But no one volunteered, so after what seemed an eternity I raised my hand and volunteered to contribute. The tutor's face immediately fell (she later informed those present at a student body meeting, and in my presence, that when asking for contributions from students she always began at the other end of the room to where I was sat whenever I attended her seminars, and for this very reason -- my tendency to dominate discussion!), but she had no other option but to call on me. As a result, over the next five minutes I unloaded a week's worth of compressed Kant. I regurgitated all those jargonised Kantian terms-of-art like a latter day answering machine, convinced I understood this philosopher, the proof being that I could reel off all that Kantian jargon in some sort of plausible order. When I had finished my monologue I sat back rather pleased with myself, but the tutor said, "Unfortunately that is typical of those who study Kant and don't actually understand a word of what he is saying." I was aghast! She then asked me several searching questions, to each of which I reeled off another barrage of orthodox Kantianisms. She again indicated that I had just reeled off load after load of jargon. "What does any of it mean?" she queried, shooting me down in flames again. After another four or five such attempts, which received the same smack down, I gave up, rather dejected and nonplussed. No one else was going to try after that dressing down, so she proceeded to summarise Kant's main points in crystal clear, ordinary language, shorn of all the usual Kantianisms and jargonised philosophical expressions. [Unlike my other tutors and lecturers, she wasn't even a Wittgensteinian! (I think it is (largely) possible to do this with Kant, but not Hegel, a vastly inferior thinker.)]

I learnt a lesson that day that I have never forgotten. I even repeated it in the opening Essay of my site:

These Essays have been written from the perspective of a specific current in Analytic Philosophy -- and, it is worth adding, it represents a minority and highly unpopular viewpoint among Analytic Philosophers these days, too! However, since the vast majority of DM-fans, sadly, have virtually no background in this area, many of the points made at this site have had to be pitched at a very basic level. Professional Philosophers will doubtless find much here that they regard as superficial, and which might even irritate them. That, however, is their problem. As I have already pointed out, this site isn't aimed at them.

In addition, I have endeavoured to write much of this material with the following thought in mind: "If this or that passage isn't accessible to ordinary working people, re-write it!" Now, I don't think for one second that I have everywhere succeeded in achieving that level of clarity or directness, but most of the material at this site has been written and re-written well over fifty times (and that figure is no exaggeration!) with that goal in mind. This process will continue indefinitely. Naturally, it is for members of the target audience (i.e., working people, should they ever read these Essays!) to decide if I have succeeded or failed in achieving my stated aim.

Indeed, and in this respect, I am happy to be judged by them alone....

Hence, I am now irredeemably suspicious of those who can't express their ideas without the use of Hegelian or other jargon drawn from Traditional Thought; and if they can't explain themselves in ordinary language, I refuse to believe they understand what they themselves are banging on about. Sad to say that is also true of my reception of MS's comments. Sure, like other HCDs, MS is an expert at reeling off pages of jargon, and I am sure he thinks he understands it -- just as I thought I understood Kant when I was reproducing all those unfiltered Kantianisms --, but in so far as he can't explain himself in ordinary language (free of all that jargon), and flatly refuses even to face the serious problems that jargon creates, I just don't believe him. Of course, he can prove me wrong by producing an explanation of, say, "contradiction" (as Hegel thought he was using that word) employing only ordinary language, free of traditional forms-of-thought. He'll be the very first person in over 200 years to do that if he succeeds.

So, when required I can reel off philosophical gobbledygook with the best of them, but as the above anecdote shows, unless it can be explained in ordinary terms, those doing any such spouting don't understand a word of it. [On this, see Chomsky's comments on 'High Theory' -- and good luck to anyone trying to show he hasn't the brain power to understand philosophical jargon!]

Finally, the word "explain" is already an ordinary language term. Any other use of it must therefore be using 'explain' (a term itself in want of explanation!), not "explain".

45a. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Five.

46. But the supposed truth -- or the supposed falsehood (as the case may be) -- is bestowed on such Super-Truths (or Super-Falsehoods) as a 'gift' by those who appear to, or who at least claim to, comprehend the supposed meanings of the words they contain and the way those terms are combined. As we have seen, these 'truths' flow solely from what certain words seem to mean (and suggested by the indicative mood they employ). However, many of the words used by Traditional Theorists have been drawn from a rather narrow, highly specialised lexicon (or they are simply technical terms and/or neologisms), such as "Being", "substance", "essence", "entelechy", "form", "accident", "necessity", "contingency", "haecceity", "trope", "category", "apodictic", "a priori", "consciousness", etc., etc. In many cases, they remain interminably obscure and are 'definable' only in terms of yet more specialised, arcane jargon that never seems to 'touch ground', as it were. And -- as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Three, as well as below and in other Essays -- they can't be expressed in ordinary language.

For Lenin, of course, the truth of M1a is rather more like that of M2 or M3; he just says that motion without matter is "unthinkable". He didn't even attempt to supply evidence in support of that contention (nor provide much supporting argument, either!). On the contrary we have already seen that that idea (or its 'content') certainly is thinkable (i.e., using sentences like S1).

Of course, that is because, for previous generations of Philosophers and Scientists (who accepted the theory expressed in and by S1) the word "matter" (in English, or other languages that possess such a word) clearly had a different meaning. But that is part of the point being made here. Any attempt to change what Lenin (or any other theorist) meant by "matter" would itself mean that sentences using typographically identical inscriptions in a different way can't contradict those that failed to use them that way. That is because, while sentences like P4 and P4a below, for instance, look like they are contradictories, since they represent a change of subject, and hence of meaning, they don't contradict each other. In order to do that they would both have to be capable of being true or capable of being false, but, as we have seen in the main body of this Essay, neither of them can be true or can be false since they turn out to be contentless, empty strings of words, or they are both (idiosyncratic and novel) rules for the use of words like "motion" and "matter". And rules aren't the sort of thing that can be true or false, just practical or impractical, etc., etc.

47. This spurious evidential 'ceremony' is typically (and supposedly) 'performed in the head' or 'in the mind' of those concocting metaphysical fantasies like this. Often that rigmarole is accompanied by a 'thought experiment' of some sort (several 'classic' thought experiments are outlined here), which is partly why the 'underlying essences' beloved of Traditional Theorists are surprisingly easy to find -- but, oddly enough, only by those with more leisure time on their hands than is good for any human being to enjoy --, or, of course, only by those who are capable of mentally stripping a concept down to its 'abstract' core, inventing an entire phrasebook of impenetrable jargon as and when the need arises.

Dialectical Marxists also try to sell the idea that these 'easily accessed abstractions' "reflect" the world (or even in some cases, they represent 'underlying essence'), which task they perform more fully and accurately after they have been 'tested in practice'. However, as we have seen several times in this Essay (and in Essay Three Parts One and Two, as well as Essay Thirteen Part Three), not only does this rather secretive method (i.e., the 'process of abstraction') seriously compromise their (avowed) commitment the social nature of language and knowledge, 'abstractions' do not, nor can they, 'reflect' anything in nature and society, or, indeed, anything supposedly 'lying behind appearances'. On the contrary, they are deliberately chosen and then deployed in order to impose a certain structure on 'reality'. [This is the RRT, again.] In this way, the world isn't reflected in or by language, the opposite turns out to be the case: an artificial world is constructed by means of the philosophical jargon deliberately invented for this express purpose.

And that is, of course, why metaphysicians and dialecticians are quite happy to impose their ideas on the world, for their world is, and has always been, Ideal, constructed out of the terms they invented/distorted for that very purpose -- just as Hegel himself acknowledged:

"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel (1999), pp.154-55; §316.]

48. With respect to dialecticians, since their 'thought experiments' have largely been lifted from Hegel's work (or the ramblings of other mystics), they are all based on defective 'logic' and Idealist myth-making.

49. "Persuasive definition" is a term introduced into Philosophy by C L Stevenson in order to label, or even stigmatise, attempts made by certain theorists to re-define controversial words, but with the clear intention of manipulating, manoeuvring and thereby persuading others to accept a particular moral principle or doctrine disguised behind what looks like a series of neutral terms. So, this is in effect a sneaky, underhanded, 'Trojan Horse' type of definition that achieves its aim by re-defining key words in ways that mean they now possess 'acceptable' or 'useful' connotations favoured by the definer. This can also involve the use of loaded and emotive language intentionally aimed at swaying readers in a specific direction.

However, at this site, "persuasive definition" won't be employed in the way Stevenson himself intended; it will be used solely in relation to metaphysical theories aimed at predisposing a target audience toward accepting a particular 'view of reality' (in this case, one that is acceptable to Dialectical Marxists). So, in relation to several examples covered in these Essays, Dialectical Marxists present their audience with what are biased definitions intended to convince them to swallow the entire DM-enchilada. After all, who can argue with a definition?

(i) Where Engels and Lenin tell us (with no proof, and without even an attempt made to present the reader with the thinnest of supporting arguments!) that motion is the "mode of the existence of matter";

(ii) Where Lenin tried to re-define "matter" in epistemological terms (reviewed and criticised extensively in Essay Thirteen Part One); and,

(iii) Where Hegel and Engels endeavoured to re-define "metaphysics" in a way that (a) favoured their own theories and (b) paints every other philosophical theory in a negative light.

In other Essays we have seen DM-theorists redefine the following in like manner, terms such as: "contradiction", "opposite", "negation", "logic", "motion", "place", "identity", "change", "internal", "quality", "commonsense", "appearance", "truth", etc., etc. This isn't to pick on Dialectical Marxists. Metaphysicians in general do this; so DM-fans have once again found themselves in 'good company'.

[Several more examples of this 'tactic' were given in Essay Two; another can be found in Essay Eight Part Two.]

50. The same can be said about the decidedly odd ideas DM-theorists inherited from Hegel concerning identity and change. Contrary to what they (i.e., DM-theorists and Hegel) believe, some things can be identical while not being the same, some can be equal and identical, or even equal and fail to be identical, and so on. Some can even change while remaining the same! [These topics are covered in detail in Essays Five and Six, where numerous examples of the above possibilities were given.]

50a. In Essay Nine Part One we saw that the claim that certain words contained or implied their own opposites also originated in Hegel's twisted 'logic'. We also saw that his approach had to fetishise language -- transforming words into agents and their users into patients. -- in order to even seem to work.

["Patient" here doesn't refer to those who need to see a doctor! It refers to anything that is acted upon and which isn't therefore an actor or agent in its own right -- i.e., in the linguistic sense outlined here.]

I have said more about the provenance of this 'view of reality' in Note 61 and Note 64.

51. As we will see in Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve, this is precisely what motivated Ancient Greek Philosophers to engage in linguistic moves like these; it is also what has prompted Traditional Philosophers to do likewise ever since. [The background to these claims has been summarised here.]

52. In this particular argument, I have (temporarily) blurred the distinction that should normally be drawn between the meaning of a word and the sense of a proposition. A more pedantic use of that distinction wouldn't alter the conclusions reached in the main body of this Essay, it would merely stretch the patience of the reader even further.

[This topic has been examined at much greater length in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

Nevertheless, the principles governing the sense of indicative sentences depend on the use (and hence the meaning) of words like "true" and "false". The claim advanced in the main body of this Essay is that it is a radical misuse of such words that lends to certain metaphysical theories their seeming 'necessity'.

Of course, unless we're very careful, if we were to speak about "the meaning of" an indicative sentence (as opposed to its sense), we would already have begun to blur the distinction between words and sentences. That muddle has caused widespread, radical and long-lasting confusion in Traditional Philosophy for well over two thousand years. It still does -- even among Analytic Philosophers, who should know better. However, providing we are careful not to end up blurring the distinction between words and sentences (in this respect), there is no real harm in speaking of the meaning of a sentence (even if I have refrained from doing so to any great extent in this Essay). In many cases, however, when we do so speak, we are often referring to speakers' meaning -- that is, what an individual hopes to achieve by her words or by her use of a given sentence or phrase.

There is another danger associated with ignoring this distinction that is important to guard against: if and when we speak about the meaning of a sentence, we risk falling into the trap that vitiated much of Voloshinov's work (and that of his many DM-admirers). I have covered this topic extensively In Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4)-(6). Readers are referred there for more details.

"A proposition is essentially that which is true or false...; and an apparent proposition is nonsensical if you cannot give a coherent account of the conditions under which it would be true or false. In this way, the central question becomes: 'What is it for a proposition to be true or false...?' But to be true or false...is to be answerable to something that sets the standard for rightness and wrongness. The world is introduced here [by Wittgenstein] simply as the sum total of that which sets the standard for rightness and wrongness.... We thereby implicitly draw 'the limits of language', in the sense that if someone puts forward an apparent proposition, where it can be shown that they can give no coherent account of the way in which their putative proposition stands in such a relation to the world as thus conceived, then they have transgressed the limits of language and they have failed to give any meaning to their apparent proposition." [White (2006), p.23. Paragraphs merged.]

[Incidentally, the above book is easily the best (currently available) introduction to the Tractatus. However, I distance myself from White's confusion of "sense" and "meaning", as well as his use of "relation" in connection with the presumed link between a proposition and the world. I also think that White has failed to distinguish different sorts of nonsense (or, non-sense, as I have characterised that neologism at this site). Sentences, as physical objects certainly can be related to the world, but only in a philosophically uninteresting way; however, propositions can't since they aren't objects. Why that is so is covered in Note 2 of Essay Eight Part Three.]

Naturally, this puts much weight on a clear account being given of what counts as a proposition, just as it requires a defence of the use of that specific expression (as opposed to the use of "sentence", à la Quine or Davidson, etc. -- or even "statement", à la Oxford Logic -- in its place); those knotty issues will be tackled elsewhere.

In the meantime, anyone who objects to the use of "proposition" can substitute for it "indicative sentence" (bearing in mind the fact that not all indicative sentences are empirical), or perhaps even "statement" -- however, in relation to "statement": same caveat. Moreover, many indicative sentences aren't actually stated (i.e., asserted) -- "statement" thus falls foul of what Professor Geach has called "the Frege point". On that, see Geach (1972b, 1972c, 1972d, 1972e).

Quineans will object, too -- but they aren't likely to have much truck with DM; so, for the purposes of this Essay, they can object all they like.

On this, see Wittgenstein (1974a), p.124, and, for example, Hacker (1996), p.288, n.65 and p.318, n.13. Also see Baker and Hacker (1984), pp.168-205, and Glock (2003), pp.102-36 (especially pp.118-36). See also, White (1971).

[Again, readers shouldn't assume that I agree with everything the above authors have to say.]

55. There is an excellent account of Wittgenstein's reasons for saying this in Baker and Hacker (2014), pp.241-370.

This doesn't place a restriction on what we are capable of discovering about the natural or the social world, it merely sets limits to what we can sensibly say about what we think we have found -- or are capable of finding -- given the language we now have, our current level of social development and organisation, alongside the social and political forces that might distort/deflect/redact the results. Of course, what we can sensibly or even meaningfully say will also alter as language develops in line with the type of social change just mentioned. In addition, it reminds us of the limited extent to which we can distort language before it ceases to say anything at all comprehensible.

[It is worth pointing out that in this Essay I have ignored the important distinction philosophers have recently drawn between so-called de dicto and de re necessity since it raises issues that relate to other topics that will be discussed elsewhere, concerning LIE and the RRT (in Essay Twelve Part Four). Hence, I will postpone further comment until then.]

55a. Unless, of course, we were to regard a definition and the linguistic expression of a rule as 'logical truths'.

If we concentrate on a less stilted version of M21, we still obtain the same result:

We can see that M2 and M21f fail to contradict one another since the use of the word "two" has once again differed between sentences. In addition, these earlier comments concerning what I have called trivial cases might also apply to M21f, M21c and M21h.

Incidentally, these facts alone refute Abstractionism -- especially the claim that numbers and our number system were both 'discovered' by 'a process of abstraction'. I will leave that comment in its present enigmatic form for now (but a moment's thought should make it clear why it is correct).

However, if, as was pointed out above (i.e., in Interlude Five), the use of negation in ordinary language is analogous, or is closely similar, to that of a logical operator that maps truths onto falsehoods and falsehoods onto truths, then the negation of a true proposition will ipso facto produce a false one, and vice versa. If, however, it isn't possible for a sentence to be true, or it isn't possible for it to be false (if, for instance, it is 'necessarily' the one or the other, or the sentence itself is non-sensical), then, whatever else might be deemed legitimate or acceptable in certain non-standard or non-classical systems of logic, this particular use of the negative particle can't operate in such a straightforward way. Hence, if the putative negation of a 'necessarily true' or 'necessarily false' proposition causes it to disintegrate into incoherence (a result we have witnessed many times in these Essays with respect to numerous DM-'propositions'), it would appear to confirm the claim advanced either that (i) The original sentence hadn't actually been negated (despite a negative particle having been used), or (2) It wasn't an empirical proposition, to begin with. Or, of course, (iii) Both.

Admittedly, the word "incoherence" (used above) is rather vague itself. But, it is possible to form some idea of what it means in present circumstances by considering a response Lenin might have made to someone who attempted to negate the following sentence:

The only response Lenin could have made to N3a and/or N3b would surely have been to argue that the erstwhile negator of N2 had failed to understand the use of certain words. And that response itself would be based on a prior acceptance of P4:

Either that, or Lenin would have had to admit that he himself just couldn't understand this new set of words (i.e., N3a or N3b), and neither could anyone else --, since he had declared them, or their content, "unthinkable" -- not just for him, but "unthinkable", period.

Now, this is all we need in the present circumstances to understand the use of "incoherent" (and its cognates). Because of what Lenin took the words employed by N2 to mean -- together or severally (as in P4) -- he would have declared N3a, for instance, "incoherent".

Further discussion of this topic would take us too far into Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language and Mathematics. There is a useful summary of the latter in Glock (1996), pp.63-66, 150-55, 258-64, 315-19. [See also Interlude Five and Note 54.]

There is also an excellent outline of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics online -- Rodych (2018). However, Rodych interprets Wittgenstein as a Formalist of some sort, which isn't supported by the weight of evidence. A more balanced account can be found in Shanker (1987a). See also Marion (1993, 1998), Floyd (2021) and Schroeder (2023). Other references to Wittgenstein's distinctive view of mathematics were given in Essay Four. [See also here.] On the inapplicability of the words "true" and "false" to mathematical propositions (i.e., without a distinct change of meaning), see Baker and Hacker (2014), pp.41-67, 241-370.

56a. Employing perhaps a more familiar but simpler example: if someone were to say "The strike has been called off", and someone else denied it, "The strike hasn't been called off", the second sentence would only be taken to be the negation of the first if the same strike were being spoken about. Or, to take another, if someone said "I put my wages in the bank today", and her interlocutor responded, "No you didn't; you spent all day fishing", the first wouldn't be taken to contradict the second (in a more ordinary sense) if it were then ascertained that the original speaker had buried her wages in the river bank while fishing.

It is perhaps a mis-description to say that a sentence like M2 lacks truth conditions since that suggests it is still appropriate to say that M2 could have truth conditions but it just so happens not to have any, rather like a book might not have an index, a car might not have a catalytic converter, or a dog might be born without a tail.

But the lack of truth conditions in this instance records the fact that M2 is a rule and rules can no more have truth conditions than a triangle can have children.

57a. I am well aware that those who have been influenced, for example, by Imre Lakatos [specifically, Lakatos (1976)], might object to this rather bald statement, but the kind of experiments considered in Lakatos (1976) plainly aren't like those conducted by scientists in the lab or out in the field. So, not even the most rabid Lakatosian would dream of checking M2 by observation or measurement! And the same comment probably applies to Mad Dog Quineans, too.

Some might object that M2 is utterly banal and not at all the sort of thing Lakatos or Quine had in mind. Maybe not, but then that might be part of the problem.

58. Incidentally, this relatively simple observation provides another clue as to how the 'problems' connected with the supposedly 'contradictory nature of motion' might be resolved. Unfortunately, that particular topic won't be explored any further in this Essay. [On that topic, however, see here.]

59. That contentious claim will be substantiated in Parts Two and Three of this Essay.

60. Of course, such a rejection wouldn't come without a price. I will endeavour to say more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two.

The argument presented here is defective. That is because it is clearly a fact that the English word for Two is "Two". So, M2 would be false if the following new fact were the case:

So, E2/M2 would now be false because of the above new fact about English -- i.e., E1.

But, this suggested revision amounts to the adoption of a new rule. Hence, counting in English would proceed as follows: "One, Schmoo, Three, Four,..." and the supposedly 'new fact' (i.e., E1) would be based on this new rule. E1 would then amount to the following:

which would, of course, express, or reflect, the termination, demise, rejection or cancellation of the old rule.

In response, it could be objected that it would still be a fact that English had a new name for the integer between One and Three.

Indeed, but this fact would depend on the adoption of this new rule. However, this novel fact about English isn't what would make E2/M2 false -- it can't be false since it is the expression of a rule.

Despite this, it could be maintained that the following would no longer be true:

Maybe so, but it would be a fact about English that in such circumstances the word "Two" was no longer being used in the old way, but it still isn't the case that what we now call Two (i.e., the number which when added to Three yields Five, etc.) isn't a number. Recall M2/E2 isn't:

[E5 would admittedly be made false by a terminological revision of the sort rehearsed above.]

And that rule is currently still applicable no matter what we might later wish to call Two. Hence, the new fact about English would be E6:

Whatever the new word for Two happens to be, it will have to do what "Two" now does or, plainly, it won't be able to take its place in our number system. Otherwise, that would amount to changing the entire system, along with the meaning we currently attach to "number", and possibly also to "add", "subtract" "multiply" and "divide", etc. For something to count as a number (no pun intended!), it would have to slot into our number system in a rule-governed manner. It wasn't a discovery that "two" appeared in our system of numbers -- like, say, the discovery of new moons of Jupiter or a previously unknown species of beetle. Users of the English language (or whatever preceded it) didn't wake up one day to find to their surprise "two" (or whatever preceded that inscription in Latin or Arabic, etc.) following "one" where the day before there hadn't been anything. Howsoever it was that our number system originally arose and developed, "two" (or whatever preceded it) was either stipulated to follow "one", or it had already been established as part of a normative practice (the detail concerning which we might never find out).

That being the case, the above 'revision' would amount to a trivial, terminological modification, as, indeed, was argued in the main body of this Essay.

So, a trivial change like this can't affect the status of E2/M2. What we now call "Two" remains a number whatever we might later wish to call it -- and so long as it is subject to the same rules, etc.

Of course, this doesn't mean that our understanding of numbers hasn't changed or hasn't developed over the centuries. Mathematicians have a much clearer and broader concept of number than they had, say, three hundred years ago. [On this, see Grattan-Guinness (1997), Ifrah (2000), and Potter (2000).] That shouldn't be taken to mean the present author agrees with every such development (especially in relation to some of the 'numbers' aired in this video!), but this isn't the place to enter into such 'knotty problems'.

61. This is also the case with the so-called 'Laws' and 'Thoughts' of 'God' --, the verbal expression of which are themselves the result of an analogous fetishisation of alienated forms of human self-deception, self-expression and self-perception (if we follow Feuerbach on this). Misconstrued rules like these, which underpin theories developed in Traditional Philosophy, carry with them a similar social or psychological force, and no little 'charm' (for want of a better term). Metaphysical theories appear to let the reader in on a secret that few will ever (fully) appreciate or even know about. As with any secret they carry with then a certain cachet. Those made aware of them appear to develop a new level of self-esteem; they are 'in the know', the rest of benighted humanity isn't. Metaphysical theories also seem to give a 'God-like view of Reality' since they originate from a similar source: socially-alienated patterns of thought. They appear to command respect and gain general acceptance (but only among a selected group), in like manner. Social norms, which constitute and underpin our very capacity to think, communicate and reason spill over into these fetishised areas and credit them with an almost irresistible authority, in some cases even breath-taking awe -- i.e., an alienated form of social esteem akin, indeed, to the 'Voice of God'. And in this lies their 'charm'. They appeal to those who think the material world isn't sufficient to itself; hence another, hidden world of 'immaterial beings', 'concepts' 'abstract particulars', and 'ideal objects' is required in order to lend this world its substance, purpose or point -- a train of thought also connected with a search for 'the meaning of life'. It is also why certain theories and theorems (in mathematics and physics) are often described as "beautiful", and where those that are deemed more "beautiful" than their rivals are to be preferred in their place. [On this, see Hossenfelder (2018) and Note 75b. See also Note 44.]

This is also part of the reason for the rampant Platonism, for example, in mathematics, and much of Contemporary Physics. [On that, in addition to Hossenfelder (2018), see Essay Eight Part Two, Livio (2009), and Tegmark (2015) -- as well as here, here, here.]

Hence, when we peer down this bottomless pit of metaphysical pseudo-knowledge, all that stares back up at us are the reified, mystified and misidentified social norms concocted by alienated human beings -- just as Feuerbach suggested (even though he confined his remarks to religious belief).

The above, of course, merely represents the beginning of an attempt to push Feuerbach's insights much further, perhaps in a Durkheimian direction, extending the latter's ideas by making them fully social, instead of their being individualistically orientated, which is what we find in Feuerbach's work. This topic will be explored more fully in later Parts of Essay Twelve, but in more detail in Essay Fourteen Part Two. There, it will be linked to the fetishisation of language originally introduced into Philosophy by Ancient Greek theorists (later perfected by Hegel, among others), which moves turn out to be a reflection of the alienated thought-forms developed and promoted by countless centuries of ruling-class 'prize-fighters' and Traditional Philosophers. Also explored will be the manner in which this approach has seeped into the very core of Dialectical Marxist thought, which has helped cripple our movement theoretically ever since. [Cf., Durkheim (2001).]

[That topic will also be connected with ideas floated in and by Stove (1991), pp.83-177, which is one of the most coherent and powerful condemnations I have ever read of the above 'Idealist world-view'. Having said that, I hesitate to reference Stove's work in general because of his objectionable and reactionary political views. I distance myself, therefore, from many of the remarks he makes, especially those found on p.96 (of the above book). On that, see also here.]

This claim about the fetishisation of language (in and by Traditional Thought) is partially based on the work of David Bloor (even if he doesn't quite put it like this, as far as I am aware), where distorted social norms like these indeed function like the 'Voice of God' -- because of which words and concepts seem to dictate to us what we should make of them, not the other way round. That happens, for instance, when theorists alienate the linguistic products of social interaction and project them onto the world. The result is that Nature is reconfigured so that it looks as if were made in our image, pictured as 'Rational' and 'Law-governed'. [This frame-of-mind re-surfaces in DM with all those 'contradictions', 'mediations' and 'real negations', etc., etc.] The theories that emerge as a result "weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (to quote Marx), as they become reified and ossified into Super-Scientific Truths about nature and society.

[On this see Bloor (1978, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1991, 1992, 1997), and Guy Robinson's Essays, published at this site.]

In relation to the principal claims advanced in this Essay -- other than those made by Guy Robison (see above) -- few of Wittgenstein's many commentators seem to be aware of the full implications of this aspect of his work. [It is far from clear he was aware of it, too!] That is possibly because this aspect of his method is most forcefully represented in his early work [Wittgenstein (1972, 1979a), and Waismann, (1979)] and in the unpublished writings of his so-called "middle period" [Wittgenstein (1974a, 1975, 1979b, 1980a).] Not only are these still not widely (or fully) understood, many commentators erroneously believe he repudiated much of what they contain.

[Although, the signs are that this way of reading Wittgenstein is increasingly out of favour, certainly more so than when the above words were first written in 1998. There is an excellent recent collection of essays that suggests this general picture is at last beginning to change -- i.e., Crary and Read (2000). (That comment shouldn't be taken to mean that I fully concur with everything implied by this new direction in Wittgenstein Studies. For example, see my comments on this in Interlude Five.)]

Among the notable exceptions to the above generalisation are the following: Baker (1988, 2004a), Carruthers (1989, 1990), Maury (1977) and White (1974, 2006, and forthcoming); although, it needs adding that White has argued against the approach adopted by the 'New Wittgensteinians' (forcefully, for instance, in White (2006, 2011)). It shouldn't be assumed, either, that every author mentioned in this paragraph is sympathetic to the views expressed by the ''New Wittgensteinians', either!

There are also many short articles in Glock (1996), which present excellent, clear summaries of Wittgenstein's main ideas. On the continuity of Wittgenstein's work, see Hilmy (1987).

Once again, there is as yet no definitive study of these key areas of Wittgenstein's early work -- although Roger White's long awaited book [White (forthcoming), if it is ever published!] should rectify the situation somewhat. [See also, Robinson (2003), and Robinson's Essays (link given earlier).]

62. That is, of course, part of what is implied by connecting meaning and use. The socially-sanctioned employment of number words is our main (if not our only) guide to their meaning. Individual words don't gain their meaning as isolated units, like atoms, but holistically as part of such practices. If words gained meaning as isolated units, that would be to model all of them on the way that names supposedly gain their meaning -- as 'linguistic atoms'. But not even names gain their meaning in isolation. Typically we use words in sentences, so it is this that lends meaning to what we say. I have covered this topic in much greater detail throughout Essays Three Part Two and Thirteen Part Three, where the traditional approach to language and meaning is there connected with atomistic theories of human cognition, that is, with theories that claim we all attach meaning to the individual 'ideas'/'concepts'/'representations' that are 'formed in our brains' from the 'data' the senses send its way. This approach to meaning sees each one of us establishing the meaning of words de novo (re-inventing the wheel, as it were) as we somehow attach or associate words with these 'ideas'/'concepts'/'representations'. [That would, of course, make communication impossible since we would all mean something radically different by the words we use.] In post-Renaissance thought this approach to meaning fed into, and was further compounded by, increasingly dominant Bourgeois Individualism.

[On the background to this, see Hacking (1975). Concerning this aspect of Wittgenstein's work (who expanded on Frege's observation not to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation but only in the context of a sentence), and the many confused ideas that have been foisted on him, see Hallett (1967). See also Baz (2012), although I distance myself from Baz's 'contextualism' and his comments about Frege and Geach.]

However, this is one place where Wittgenstein's work differs from traditional Conventionalism. Philosophers working in the Logical Positivist wing of that 'tradition' tended to argue that it was the meaning of certain terms that enabled specific conventions to be established -- or which permitted the stating of certain truths -- an approach that is clearly atomistic and arose out of their own avowed Empiricism.

In contrast, Wittgenstein argued that meaning is constituted by convention -- that is, it arises in, and grows out of, social practice, so his approach is anti-individualist, anti-empiricist; hence, the many and varied uses of words express conventions that have already been established (in practice), and this in turn means propositions which are labelled "necessary truths" are in many cases confused/garbled expressions of conventions (or rules) ratified in and by such social practice.

The former approach would have words gain their meaning piecemeal in advance of the conventions/practices in which they were subsequently embedded, while the latter holds that meaning takes shape in, and as a result of, already established social practice. Sentences are themselves sensitive to earlier linguistic and social interactions within which these conventions and practices have historically been rooted and consequently shaped. [On this, see Note 64.]

The profound difference between Wittgenstein's method and the approach adopted by other Conventionalists -- alongside the important consequences this has for Philosophy in general -- is brought out in Baker (1988) and Shanker (1987a), pp.274-353. See also Glock (1996), pp.129-39, 226-28, 343-44, and Glock (2004). However, these works should be read in conjunction with Bloor (1997), Robinson (2003), pp.158-71, and Williams (1999a). Two other important studies are Kusch (2002, 2006).

A minor modern classic in this area is David Lewis's Convention [i.e., Lewis (1969) -- this links to a PDF. Readers should also take note of the remarks I have made about Lewis's book, here.]. Lewis demonstrates in detail how and why conventions don't need to be based on conscious, planned decisions (or stipulations), as many suppose. They are dependent on wider social phenomena, interpersonal interaction and group dynamics. Having said that, Lewis's work is seriously compromised by his reliance on Game Theory, and hence on bourgeois individualism (i.e., on the theory that human beings typically confront one another as, what can only be called, social atoms). If we restrict ourselves to the level of a physical description, that is patently true, but philosophically uninformative; indeed, it is about as useful an account of human interaction as claiming that chess, for example, is simply the inter-relationship between bits of wood, a board, a clock and a set of fingers. [On this, also see von Savigny (1988).]

Quite apart from this, the conventions already expressed in and by ordinary episodic behaviour -- and hence in and by ordinary language -- show that human beings don't regard themselves as social atoms. [That (seemingly) controversial and contentious claim will be defended in Part Seven of Essay Twelve.]

Incidentally, Blackburn (1984), pp.118-42, contains a sharp but misplaced critique of Lewis. Blackburn, unfortunately, allows himself to become a little distracted from the central issue, and ends up chasing to ground a Gricean hare in the mistaken belief that it is a Lewisean rabbit.

Blackburn's own brand of individualism is the subject of an effective critique in Bloor (1997). On this topic in general, see Williams (1999a), and Kusch (2006).

[Blackburn's real quarry can be found burrowing away in Grice (1989). However, on Grice, see Baz (2012).]

One of the most common criticisms of Wittgenstein's work is that even though he tells us he isn't advancing a philosophical theory, he is doing just that, is effectively refuted in and by Kuusela (2006, 2008). See also Iliescu (2000), and Baz (2012).

63. Otherwise an infinite regress would be initiated (for obvious reasons). Some claim that an infinite regress is no big deal (for example, Gaskin (2008)). Admittedly, if humans were semi-divine beings, it would be no big deal. Alas we aren't, and so it is.

64. That is because, instead of social factors -- i.e., the complex, historically-conditioned relationships between human agents, albeit distorted by class division and alienation -- governing the meaning of words, that would be regulated by factors internal to the each individual language-user, or their 'consciousness', the fine details concerning which would depend, of course, on which theorist was spinning this story. That approach has been the dominant paradigm in much of post-Cartesian Philosophy, which isn't, of course, un-connected with the hegemony of ideologies connected with, and promoting, Bourgeois Individualism.

(i) 'Inner representations' would individualistically dictate to each user what words or 'concepts' mean to that user; or,

(ii) Those 'representations' would individualistically associate words with idiosyncratic meanings based on 'factors that have yet to be ascertained'. [In other words, 'It's all a mystery...'.]

Clearly the above run contrary to the Marxist approach. Instead of meaning arising in, and because of, the interaction between human beings -- albeit conditioned by their social history, organisation, technological development, contemporaneous class structure and relation to the natural world --, it would be imposed on each language user by forces not under their (individual or collective) control. Hence, given Traditional Theory, meaning either results from:

(a) The interaction between 'representations' (which are often portrayed as inner psychological or neurological correlates of words); or from,

(b) A relation between each individual and their own 'representations' -- which amounts to an interaction between these 'representations' and each 'socially-atomised' 'consciousness'/'mental module'/'mind', with the 'representations' taking the lead. Given this view, no one would have control over their 'representations' or the meaning they were thereby constrained to adopt. They would be the master, we their slaves.

That would make 'representations' the source/agent of meaning, while human beings become (in effect) docile/passive puppets.

[As we saw in Essays Thirteen Part One and Three Part Two, it would be to no avail denying that DM commits its theorists to a passive theory of knowledge and meaning by appealing to the active intervention each individual makes in the formation of meaning and knowledge (and hence referring sceptics to the importance DM-theorists place on practice, in this regard). That is because, according to Lenin there will always be a veil of 'images' between that individual and the deliverances of practice. In that case, all that each knower will have access to are 'images of practice', not practice itself. So, even for Lenin (and that includes the more 'sophisticated Lenin' of PN), individuals are still passive factors in the formation of meaning and knowledge. (Readers are referred to those two Essays for proof.)]

Once again, the traditional approach to meaning isn't unconnected with the alienation each individual experiences under capitalism; so it is no big surprise to see it was originally concocted, promoted and propagated by bourgeois ideologues. The individual, or rather their 'representations'/'ideas', come first, 'society' second. Either that, or we are informed "There is no such thing as society", to begin with. (Margaret Thatcher)

If the above were the case, there could be no shared meanings of words. If each language-user determined the meaning of the words they used -- or, rather, if those meanings had been determined for them by the above psychological/neurological factors --, there would be no basis for inter-communication.

Or, indeed, if -- as some Marxists (such as Voloshinov) maintain -- meaning is 'occasion-sensitive', communication would also be impossible. [There is much more on this in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4)-(6). Of course, Voloshinov registered a few gestures in the direction of a social theory of meaning, but those gestures were weak, inconsistent and self-refuting, as Essay Thirteen Part Three shows.]

But, as far as Dialectical Marxists are concerned -- so that they can at least feel they have nodded in the direction of preserving or maintaining their (avowed) commitment to the social nature of language and knowledge --, the communal life of human beings has in fact been alienated, or inverted, and then projected back onto the words they use -- or onto the 'representations' of those words in each 'socially-isolated' head. In effect, this re-configures the entire process as the 'social life' among signs --, or, indeed, as the 'communal life' enjoyed by 'inner representations' and 'consciousness' (which is under their control, anyway), thus fetishising them. [On this specific point, see Note 69a.]

That is indeed what happened with all those "signs" we read about in Voloshinov's theory; they become the agents, each language user the patient. The bottom line of this post-Renaissance paradigm is that, as afar as their use of words is concerned (and what those words mean), each language user is a puppet, a marionette controlled by their 'inner-representations'.

[The owners of the above image -- Tourismus Salzburg GmbH -- have absolutely nothing to do with opinions and politics of the author of these Essays, nor their content.]

This exposes, of course, the original motivation underlying the fetishisation of language and 'consciousness' that runs throughout Metaphysics -- and, as we have seen, throughout Dialectical Marxism, too.

[That topic was covered in detail in Essay Three Part Two; I don't propose to repeat that material here.]

65. Once more, this topic will be addressed in greater detail Essays Thirteen Part Three and Fourteen Part Two.

65b. Incidentally, and once again, the best account of this topic is to be found in Robinson (2003).

66. This is connected with an idea expressed by Wittgenstein, that language forms a Satzsysteme (a system of sentences), whereas Mathematics forms a Beweissysteme (a system of concepts). These terms are explained in detail in Shanker (1987a). That distinction began to appear in Wittgenstein's "middle period"; see, for example, Waismann (1979), pp.63-67, 87-90. It then featured throughout the rest of his work in various different forms.

66a. Plainly, that doesn't mean new terms can't be introduced into mathematics (which would be absurd!). If and when that happens, novel words and concepts have to relate in some way to those already in use -- or, indeed, to practices and techniques that have already been established -- otherwise no one would understand them, or, indeed, accept them. [A relevant example of this is outlined here.]

67. This was covered in Essay Three Part Two (here and here), where it was shown that the mysterious 'process of abstraction' would prevent inter-communication, and that includes any that might take place between mathematicians themselves.

The opposite approach is, of course, what motivates, or tends to motivate, the Platonic or neo-Platonic view of 'mathematical objects' -- the latter of which is in effect a 'halfway house perspective' that views mathematical structures as 'abstract', or even 'objective', but doesn't in general accept Plato's Ontology of Forms. That 'opposite approach' now often merges almost imperceptibly with contemporary versions of Mathematical Realism. [On that, see for example Maddy (1992) and Hale (1986). For an opposing view, see Burgess and Rosen (1997). In general, see Brown (2008), Colyvan (2012), and Shapiro (2000); but, in particular, see Balaguer (1998).]

The reader should note that each of these works adopts a different approach to the one promoted at this site -- and, indeed, different from each other! They do, however, illustrate how sophisticated this area of Analytic Philosophy has now become, and, by implication, just how out-of-touch, obsolete and degenerate 'DM-analyses' of mathematics are.

[See also the works listed here, as well as Benacerraf and Putnam (1964, 1983), and Jacquette (2002). On Wittgenstein's distinctive approach to mathematics, which has largely been adopted at this site, see here.]

69. Again, this general point was covered in Note 64, but it has been discussed more fully in Essay Thirteen Part Three.

69a. The terms "socially-atomised" and "isolated" are being used here to mean "cut off or 'abstracted from' social practice". That is, they are meant to relate to what allegedly goes on 'in the head' when an individual is said to 'abstract' numbers magically into existence on their own, based on their own 'inner experience'. [On this, see here.] Only then, so the story goes, are they able to engage in calculating and counting. The general theory behind this has been destructively criticised in Essay Three Parts One and Two.

70. As noted above, while we might teach mathematics to young children by manipulating objects familiar to them -- or encouraging them to follow instructions related to the same --, we establish the 'truth' of 'mathematical propositions' by proof, not by comparing them with reality. [Is there a mathematician on the planet who will attempt to prove, say, The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra by comparing it with anything in her, or anyone else's, experience? Of course, we certainly check to see if something has been counted correctly, but a physical check isn't a mathematical proof. Any checks made about the results of counting gain their validity from the rules we already have and the proofs already actioned, not the other way round. If someone were to check whether three apples added to four apples equalled seven apples, they would base any check they instigates on a proof that 3 + 4 = 7, not on a re-count. That can be seen from the fact that, if someone counted those apples and concluded there were only six, even after the tenth re-count, the proof that 3 + 4 =7 wouldn't then be called into question, but their counting, their eyesight, their memory or their sanity. [On this see Coope (1974).]

Nor do we base any of this on a 'process of abstraction', or on 'objects' that supposedly exist in an invisible, 'Platonic Universe'. How would an appeal to a set of 'abstractions' help us account for the necessity we attribute to the relation between mathematical objects and structures themselves? If material objects and structures themselves can't account for necessity, how will a retreat into 'the abstract' manage it? [On this, and why material objects themselves -- never mind 'abstract objects' -- fail to account for necessity, see Essay Thirteen Part Three, here.]

Of course, by now the vast majority of mathematical proofs have been "put in the archives" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein), so it is no longer necessary to re-prove or reproduce them (except when teaching students, etc.). Hence, we no longer need to rehearse them each time we engage in arithmetic (etc.), but that doesn't make them in any way redundant. [The only apparent exception would be if an error or an unsupported inference were detected in an earlier proof, assumption or theorem. One thinks immediately of Euclid's Parallel Postulate leading to the development of non-Euclidean Geometry. However, further consideration of this will take us too far afield into Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. On that, see the references listed earlier.]

71. Having said that, it is possible to use mathematical (and other 'necessarily true') 'propositions' in alternative ways, some of which could be, and are, empirically-orientated, some not. For a brief summary, see Hacker (1996), pp.212-16. A more thorough account of this phenomenon can be found in Baker and Hacker (2014), pp.41-67, 241-370.

71b. I heard the following directly from Peter Geach (in a seminar), but Hallett refers to it in Geach's lecture notes:

"[N]otice that the order of the operations in the grocer's shop is determinate: it would be hopeless for the grocer to...look around for red things until he found some that were also apples, and it would be still more hopeless for him to recite the numerals up to five in his language first of all -- this would be a completely idle performance. Frege said that a number attaches to a concept.... What Frege of course meant was that a number is a number of a kind of things -- a kind of things expressed by a general term; and that until you have fixed upon the kind of thing that you are counting, you can't count, you can't attach a number." [Hallett (1977), pp.74-75.]

72. Recall that the words in M2 don't acquire their meaning in this way, hence the use of the word "seem".

73. This can be inferred from the things Dialectical Marxists say about the concepts and words they use, for example:

"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), pp.457-58. Bold emphasis added.]

"Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its image even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representation. We think in names." [Hegel (1971), p.220, §462. Bold emphasis added.]

Indeed, Marx made the following point quite explicitly: it is philosophers who invent abstract names for things:

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'…. It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.' In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975a), pp.74-75. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

So, Marx explicitly contrasted the 'process of abstraction' -- which for him was akin to the invention of names for 'abstract objects' -- with the way ordinary human beings think and talk.

[On this, see Note 74a and Note 6a of Essay Three Part Two, Note 23 and Note 85 of Essay Thirteen Part Three, and Note 74a below, as well as here. Cf., also, Hacking (1975).]

For such Traditional Theorists, all words are names (they were the general names, or even the Proper Names, of 'images', 'concepts', 'representations', 'things', or even a given 'object'), which meant they functioned as linguistic atoms. Admittedly, there are theorists who still try to argue that all such 'concepts' are inter-linked, but as we saw in Essay Three Part Two, this idea is in reality a shattered 'Humpty Dumpty of a theory' which can't be put back together again. Unfortunately for Traditional Theorists and DM-fans, such 'philosophical atoms' can't be re-connected.

[There is much more on this in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4)-(6), where we will see theorists like Voloshinov argue along this by-now-all-too-familiar, but seriously flawed, traditional line.]

It could be argued (once again!) that Dialectical Marxists do in fact appeal to evidence to support claims like M1a.

For example, speaking about change (which includes motion), John Molyneux argued as follows:

"At the heart of dialectics is the proposition that everything changes. 'Everything' here refers to everything in the universe itself to the tiniest particle. For a start everything is in motion, the most basic form of change, but also everything is also developing, altering, evolving, coming into being and passing out of being. As Bob Dylan once put it, 'Who isn't busy being born, is busy dying.' This fundamental principle of dialectics is entirely in accord with, and confirmed by all the findings of modern science from Copernicus, through Kepler, Newton, Darwin and Einstein to quantum mechanics and big bang theory. In other words it is a well established fact." [Molyneux (2012), pp.40-41. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links and bold emphases added; paragraphs merged. Of course, Molyneux isn't alone in advancing such hyper-bold claims; scores of passages taken from the writings of DM-classicists and more recent DM-theorists who say more-or-less the same were quoted in Essay Two.]

As we have seen, what Molyneux says isn't even remotely true. There are in fact trillions of unchanging objects in every gram of matter, and there are countless trillions that don't "come into being and pass out of being", let alone "evolve". Indeed, as far as we know, protons, electrons and photons are changeless. [On that, see here.]

Of course, that depends on what DM-supporters mean by "change"; but it should by now come as no surprise to find that they have yet to tell us what they do mean by this (hardly insignificant!) term. [I have said more about centuries of failed attempts to define change, here.]

But, even if what Molyneux asserted were 100% correct, its 'truth' was proclaimed long before any such evidence was available, having originally been dreamt up by Heraclitus, who based his ideas about motion and change everywhere in the entire universe of his day on what he thought was true about stepping into an imaginary river! In that case, as with practically every other DM-'law', this idea was originally invented by a notorious mystic (Heraclitus) and promptly imposed on the world, just as it has continued to be foisted on nature by Dialectical Marxists for the last 150+ years. Actual evidence has never been central to the supposed veracity of this and other DM-theories. As we have seen, DM-fans can't even tell us what they mean by change! The appeal to evidence (and not even all of it!) is little more than a recently clutched straw.

It could also be countered that no Dialectical Marxist would respond in the way suggested in the main body of this Essay -- which had them conceding their theory is all about the meaning of certain terms. On the contrary, they would argue that Lenin's words reflect objective reality. So, M1a, for example, is about the world, not language.

But, we have already seen that Lenin's words (and their supposed content) make no sense, so they can't be a reflection of anything other than his own confused thinking, which was itself based on yet more distorted language.

The only way to defuse that anti-DM response would involve Dialectical Marxists explaining what Lenin's words in fact mean (of course, without actually using or thinking the words "motion without matter", or their content, while doing just that!), so that what he said could even begin to reflect something other than contingent features of Lenin's (or Engels's own) confused use of language. Clearly, that would involve a clarification of the words he/they used.

In which case, the allegations advanced in the main body of this Essay aren't wide of the mark. On the contrary, they hit bullseye every time.

So, this is about the use of language. The words we use tell us what we mean about the things we talk about, and what we talk about is defined by the words we use. That doesn't confuse 'the outside world' with language itself, it simply reminds us that what we say about, for instance, movement and change, or about identity and difference, is constrained by what we mean by words like "change", movement", "same", "different", etc., etc. Just as we cant leap out of our heads to check the world independently of our sense, we can't do so either without language. While the world is still independent of what we say about it, what we say about it isn't independent of language.

But if, according to Marx, we rely on distorted language, we should feign no surprise when our theories decay into non-sense and incoherence.

74. In fact, as we have seen (especially in Essay Seven Part One), at best DM-apologists only ever use evidence illustratively. What little they have scraped-together in no way constitutes proof, and the way it is utilised shows they themselves don't regard it as proof (either that, or they don't know what the word "proof" means). In relation to DM (but not HM) Dialectical Marxists have consistently adopted a completely amateurish approach to supporting evidence, which amply justifies it being labelled Mickey Mouse Science, at this site. As I argued in Essay Seven Part One:

The reason why I have called DM Mickey Mouse Science should now be quite plain. The examples usually presented by DM-fans to illustrate their First 'Law' -- which lack clarity and are ill-defined -- are almost without exception either anecdotal or entirely amateurish. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal purporting to establish the veracity of a new law, or even support a novel hypothesis, with the same level of vagueness, imprecision, lack of detail and supporting mathematics -- failings that are compounded by profound theoretical wooliness --, it would be rejected out-of-hand at the first stage, its author's reputation forever damaged. As even Maurice Cornforth (an otherwise enthusiastic DM-supporter and -proselytiser) was forced to admit:

"But investigation of universal laws of dialectics remains an open field. It is something that has been projected but not yet systematically done. And the laws that have been written down, following Hegel, still lack both the precision of formulation and the systematic derivation to be expected of anything that can rank as science. The laws of dialectics should be, as Engels claimed, 'as simple and clear as noonday'. If they are not, and if their interconnection is not evident, that is because not enough work has been done on their formulation. (A case in point is the so‑called 'law of the negation of negation'.)" [Cornforth (1965), p.293; quoted from here. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

The above was written many years ago but the situation hasn't markedly changed in the intervening years. So, this is still the case: "[T]he laws [of dialectics] still lack both the precision of formulation and the systematic derivation to be expected of anything that can rank as science." Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere:

Anyone who has studied or practiced genuine science knows the great care and attention to detail that has to be devoted by researchers, often over many years or decades, if they want to add to or alter even relatively minor areas of current knowledge, let alone establish a new law. This was the case in Engels's day, just as it is the case today. Moreover, the concepts employed by scientists have to be analytically sound. The use of primary data is essential (or it has at least to be reviewed or referenced by the scientists involved); supporting evidence has to be precise, detailed, meticulously recorded, and subject not only to public scrutiny but also to peer review.

In contrast, the sort of Mickey Mouse Science one finds in Creationist literature is rightly the target of derision by scientists and Marxists alike. And yet, when it comes to DM we find in Engels's writings (and those of subsequent dialecticians) little other than Mickey Mouse Science. Engels supplied his readers with no original data, and what little evidence he offered in support of his 'Laws' would have been rejected as amateurish in the extreme if it had appeared in an undergraduate science paper, let alone in a research document --, even in his day! DM-theorists today almost invariably present their readers with a few paragraphs, or, at best, a few pages of highly selective secondary and tertiary 'evidence' of the sort that Engels paraded before his readers. It is salutary, therefore, to compare Engels's approach to scientific proof with that of Darwin, whose classic work is a model of clarity and original research. Darwin presented the scientific community with extensive evidence and fresh data, which has been expanded upon greatly over the last 150 years. All we find in DM-'science' is mind-numbing repetition and vaguely-worded anecdotes.

Contrast, DM-Mickey Mouse Science with the real thing; here, for example, is one report of the accuracy achieved by the instruments aboard the recently launched Gaia satellite:

"'Gaia was not designed to take Hubble-like pictures; this is not its operating mode at all. What it will eventually do is draw little boxes around each of the stars you see in this picture and send just that information to the ground.'

"The satellite has been given an initial mission duration of five years to make its 3D map of the sky.

"By repeatedly viewing its targets, it should get to know the brightest stars' coordinates down to an error of just seven micro-arcseconds -- an angle equivalent to a euro coin on the Moon being observed from Earth." [Quoted from here. Accessed 06/02/2014. Bold emphasis added.]

Even back in the 16^th century, astronomers were concerned with accuracy and precision; Tycho Brahe, for instance, was able to observe the heavens with the naked eye down to an accuracy of one arcminute (1/60^th of a degree!). Once again, this is typical of genuine science, which, unfortunately, starkly distinguishes it from the 'science' we find in DM....

[I then give several examples of genuine science, with its careful attention to detail, accuracy and precision, and contrast that with the sloppy approach evident in Mickey Mouse DM-'Science'.]

Do we see such care and attention to detail in Engels's work on DM -- or in that of subsequent dialecticians?

Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any endeavour to establish either the truth of classical economics with an argumentative and evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as we find in the musings of DM-fans; to say nothing of the contempt they would show toward theoretical wooliness of the sort they regularly serve up to their readers. In such circumstances, dialecticians who might otherwise be quick to cry "pedantry" at several issues raised in this Essay and elsewhere at this site, would become well-focused 'pedants' themselves, nit-picking with the best of them at any such attempt to defend classical economics or the capitalist system.

[In fact, the aforementioned 'dialectical pedants' already do this with my work. In one breath they complain about my alleged "pedantry", in the next they home in on what they think are minor errors in detail or wording in my Essays. Here is just the latest example; concentrate, for example, on the comments of one "Gilhyle"; here is another. At the same time, they show almost limitless patience coupled with endless understanding when it comes to Engels, Lenin or Trotsky's writings about DM. Critics like me are pilloried for the slightest of assumed mistakes; DM-fans are regularly issued with get-out-of-jail-free cards.]

When we compare this amateurish approach to evidence, proof and clarity with the opposite state of affairs apparent in, say, HM, the contrast is stark indeed. In economics, history, current affairs and politics Marxists display commendable attention to detail alongside admirable clarity, almost invariably adding page after page of (often novel) facts, figures, tables, graphs, references and detailed analyses to their books and articles -- much of which show signs of painstaking research and careful thought. One only has to look at a handful of the excellent blogs run by Marxist economists to see how meticulous they are in connection with HM -- for instance, this one. In addition, they devote adequate space to analysing concepts like "ideology", "the falling rate of profit", "mode of production" and "alienation" -- indeed, sometimes even publishing entire articles and books -- but hardly ever even so much as a single paragraph to "quality" or "node", to say nothing of the missing detail noted earlier (for example, here, and here)....

At this point we might wonder where Engels's predilection for Mickey Mouse Science came from. After all, he was familiar with the careful and detailed work of contemporaneous scientists (like Darwin and Helmholtz). Why then was he prepared to assert that his 'Laws' were indeed laws on the basis of very little primary data -- or, in some cases, none at all? For instance, how much data did Engels provide in support of his theory that motion was contradictory? In fact, he offered zero evidence, just a highly suspect 'thought experiment'. [I have covered this topic in much more detail in Essay Five. Readers are directed there for more details.] In general the sad fact is that in support of his 'Laws' Engels relied on sketchy, secondary or even tertiary (highly selective) evidence --, compounded by seriously compressed, vague and sloppy analyses. Compare that with the level of supporting detail Marx added to Das Kapital.

We need look no further than Hegel for an answer to the above question (i.e., where Engels's ideas came from). He not only derived them from Hegel, he also copied the latter's cavalier attitude toward the provision of supporting evidence. So, that Christian Mystic, Hegel, was the original Mickey Mouse Scientist, which makes Engels, perhaps, the Sorcerer's Apprentice.

"The system of natural numbers already shows a nodal line of qualitative moments which emerge in a merely external succession. It is on the one hand a merely quantitative progress and regress, a perpetual adding or subtracting, so that each number has the same arithmetical relation to the one before it and after it, as these have to their predecessors and successors, and so on. But the numbers so formed also have a specific relation to other numbers preceding and following them, being either an integral multiple of one of them or else a power or a root. In the musical scale which is built up on quantitative differences, a quantum gives rise to an harmonious relation without its own relation to those on either side of it in the scale differing from the relation between these again and their predecessors and successors. While successive notes seem to be at an ever-increasing distance from the keynote, or numbers in succeeding each other arithmetically seem only to become other numbers, the fact is that there suddenly emerges a return, a surprising accord, of which no hint was given by the quality of what immediately preceded it, but which appears as an actio in distans [action at distance -- RL], as a connection with something far removed. There is a sudden interruption of the succession of merely indifferent relations which do not alter the preceding specific reality or do not even form any such, and although the succession is continued quantitatively in the same manner, a specific relation breaks in per saltum [leaps -- RL].

"Such qualitative nodes and leaps occur in chemical combinations when the mixture proportions are progressively altered; at certain points in the scale of mixtures, two substances form products exhibiting particular qualities. These products are distinguished from one another not merely by a more or less, and they are not already present, or only perhaps in a weaker degree, in the proportions close to the nodal proportions, but are bound up with these nodes themselves. For example, different oxides of nitrogen and nitric acids having essentially different qualities are formed only when oxygen and nitrogen are combined in certain specific proportions, and no such specific compounds are formed by the intermediate proportions. Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary, each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration.

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state. In thinking about the gradualness of the coming-to-be of something, it is ordinarily assumed that what comes to be is already sensibly or actually in existence; it is not yet perceptible only because of its smallness. Similarly with the gradual disappearance of something, the non-being or other which takes its place is likewise assumed to be really there, only not observable, and there, too, not in the sense of being implicitly or ideally contained in the first something, but really there, only not observable. In this way, the form of the in-itself, the inner being of something before it actually exists, is transformed into a smallness of an outer existence, and the essential difference, that of the Notion, is converted into an external difference of mere magnitude. The attempt to explain coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be on the basis of gradualness of the alteration is tedious like any tautology; what comes to be or ceases to be is assumed as already complete and in existence beforehand and the alteration is turned into a mere change of an external difference, with the result that the explanation is in fact a mere tautology. The intellectual difficulty attendant on such an attempted explanation comes from the qualitative transition from something into its other in general, and then into its opposite; but the identity and the alteration are misrepresented as the indifferent, external determinations of the quantitative sphere.

"In the moral sphere, in so far as it is considered under the categories of being, there occurs the same transition from quantity into quality and different qualities appear to be based in a difference of magnitude. It is through a more or less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness is exceeded and something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus right becomes wrong and virtue vice. Thus states, too, acquire through their quantitative difference, other things being assumed equal, a distinct qualitative character. With the expansion of the state and an increased number of citizens, the laws and the constitution acquire a different significance. The state has its own measure of magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere change of size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its expansion." [Hegel (1999), pp.368-71, §§774-778. Italic emphases in the original. Several paragraphs merged.]

"The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase of diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or ice. A quantitative change takes place, apparently without any further significance: but there is something lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts as a kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The antinomy of Measure which this implies was exemplified under more than one garb among the Greeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair from the horse's tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of quantity as an indifferent and external character of being, we are disposed to answer these questions in the negative. And yet, as we must admit, this indifferent increase and diminution has its limit: a point is finally reached, where a single additional grain makes a heap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we continue plucking out single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story of the peasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce after ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable burden. It would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic futility; they really turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is of great importance in practical life, especially in ethics. Thus in the matter of expenditure, there is a certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but when the Measure, imposed by the individual circumstances of the special case, is exceeded on the one side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in the above examples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt, and a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into avarice or prodigality. The same principles may be applied in politics, when the constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of, no less than as dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number of its inhabitants, and other quantitative points of the same kind. If we look, e.g. at a state with a territory of ten thousand square miles and a population of four millions we should, without hesitation, admit that a few square miles of land or a few thousand inhabitants more or less could exercise no essential influence on the character of its constitution. But on the other hand, we must not forget that by the continual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point where, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration alone necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the constitution. The constitution of a little Swiss canton does not suit a great kingdom; and, similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic was unsuitable when transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany." [Hegel (1975), pp.158-59.]

If only all scientific papers were as clear, rigorous, detailed and technically competent as this!

Sarcasm to one side, non-partisan readers will no doubt be alarmed to learn that rank amateurism like this isn't confined to Engels -- or even Woods and Grant. Hegel could 'amateur' and dissemble with the best of them.

Defenders of Hegel have for too many years tried to convince sceptics of his sophisticated scientific knowledge (rather like they try to do the same with Engels). Perhaps the most detailed (and sordid) example of this sycophantic character defect is Burbidge (1996). Burbidge manages to show that Hegel was a well-informed amateur chemist (although he failed to mention Hegel's Alchemical and Hermetic mind-set, an important omission that seriously undermines Burbidge's credibility). However, even as he tries manfully to rehabilitate Hegel he struggles heroically to make, for example, Hegel (2004) pp.232-72, §§326-336 (which is a section called 'The Chemical Process') comprehensible. That particular section begins as follows:

"In individuality developed into totality, the moments themselves are determined as individual totalities, as whole particular bodies which, at the same time, are in relation only as different toward each other. This relation, as the identity of non-identical, independent bodies, is contradiction, and hence is essentially process, the function of which, in conformity with the Notion, is the positing of the differential as identical, the enlivening and dissociation of it." [Hegel (2004), pp.232-33, §326. Italic emphasis in the original.]

I am sure readers will agree that this is so much clearer than anything Dalton, for instance, came out with!

Nevertheless, one wonders what the point is of the entire exercise given the fact that Hegel succeeded in mystifying and rendering obscure processes that have since been made perfectly clear by contemporary chemists without an ounce of Hermetic Philosophy to slow them down. Other than mystics themselves, does anyone familiar with contemporary science try to defend the odd ideas ancient and early modern alchemists came out with? Why then try to defend this Christian and Hermetic Mystic?

[The answer to that question can be found in 'Idealism: A Victorian Horror-Story, Parts I and II', in Stove (1991), pp.83-177. (However, in relation to Stove's work, readers should take note of the caveats I have posted here.)]

Be this as it may, when it comes to scientific 'proof', Hegel's own commitment to Mickey Mouse Science isn't now in any doubt.

[On Hegel's Alchemical, Hermetic and Kabbalistic influences and leanings, see Magee (2008).]

We have already had occasion to note that even though Hegel asserts such changes in 'quality' represent a break in gradualness, they don't actually do so:

"But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it." [Hegel (1999), loc cit.]

But, in no way does the transition from one number (it is assumed that this is what Hegel meant by "magnitude") to the next represent an "interruption of gradualness'. The number two doesn't slowly or gradually morph into the number three, and then at a certain point suddenly change into it. There is no 'development' here either -- two doesn't develop into three. Hegel's other examples fare no better: the chemical compounds he mentioned don't gradually change into whatever he thought they changed into, they do so abruptly (as we have already seen). Hegel himself half recognised this, all the while still imagining that there is gradual change here when there isn't!

"But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state." [Hegel (1999), loc cit.]

After first of all asserting that such processes represent an "interruption of gradualness", he then admits that water doesn't gradually turn into ice!

It could be objected that is unfair to Hegel since it is plain that he spoke about an interruption of gradualness, here. But, a body of water doesn't suddenly and completely turn into ice (except in the unusual circumstances mentioned by Hegel). Ice crystals slowly form in what is called a "mixed-phase" until all the water has frozen. [Readers are directed back to an earlier discussion of this phenomenon.]

"Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary, each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration." [Hegel (1999), loc cit.]

He points out that temperature, for example, increases gradually, but that slow increase is then interrupted by a "nodal" change in the "quality" of the said water as it freezes abruptly. We have already seen that what makes water "what it is" and not something else (which is how Hegel himself defines "quality") is the fact that it is H₂O. Its solid state does not define water. Countless things are solid, so that can't be what makes water 'what it is and not something else'. If solidity were the "quality" here, we would have to say that a rock, a lump of metal and a car are frozen water, because all four are solid.

"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity and measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged. Links in the original.]

Plainly, the whole point of the above remark is that there must be a change in the "quality" of water, and that "quality" doesn't change gradually, but abruptly. The temperature might alter gradually, but not even that changes into something new (slowly or abruptly).

[But, once more, we have been here already; readers are directed back to the earlier discussion (link above) of the changes water experiences when it is heated or cooled.]

[Any who still question the above conclusions might like to email me with their reasons why DM shouldn't continue to be labelled Mickey Mouse Science. And, please, no more of the 'water turns into steam/ice' mantra; that was completely debunked in Essay Seven Part One (link above).]

74a. Following on from Note 73: I have just received a copy of Houlgate (2006), which tries to defend Hegel's use of language. Houlgate first cites these words:

"It is in names that we think." [Hegel (1971), quoted in Houlgate (2006), p.75; this author is using his own translation.]

"Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its image even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representation. We think in names." [Hegel (1971), p.220, §462.]

This isn't a good start since it clearly reflects the traditional view of language criticised at this site (i.e., the theory that all words are names and that thinking is an inner, private act of intellection, or 'cognition' engaged in by each socially-isolated individual). Hegel was a bourgeois theorist of the first water, held captive by the Platonic/Christian/Cartesian Paradigm; so it is no big surprise he reasoned along those lines.

Gilbert Ryle explains why that theory can't work (although he targets contemporaneous Philosophers), introducing what he called "The Fido-Fido Fallacy":

"Frege, like Russell, had inherited (directly, perhaps, from Mill) the traditional belief that to ask What does the expression 'E' mean? is to ask, To what does 'E' stand in the relation in which 'Fido' stands to Fido? The significance of any expression is the thing, process, person or entity of which the expression is the proper name. This, to us, grotesque theory derives partly, presumably, from the comfortable fact that proper names are visible or audible things and are ordinarily attached in an indirect but familiar way to visible, audible and tangible things like dogs, rivers, babies, battles and constellations. This is then adopted as the model after which to describe the significance of expressions which are not proper names, and the habit is formed of treating the verb 'to signify' and the phrase 'to have a meaning' as analogous relation-stating expressions. 'What that expression means' is then construed as the description of some extra-linguistic correlate to the expression, like the dog that answers to the name 'Fido.'...

"Now a very little reflection should satisfy us that the assimilation to proper names of expressions that are not proper names breaks down from the start. (Indeed the whole point of classing some expressions as proper names is to distinguish them from the others.) No one ever asks What is the meaning of 'Robinson Crusoe'? much less Who is the meaning of 'Robinson Crusoe'? No one ever confesses that he cannot understand or has misunderstood the name 'Charles Dickens' or asks for it to be translated, defined, paraphrased or elucidated. We do not expect dictionaries to tell us who is called by what names. We do not say that the river Mississippi is so and so ex vi termini [by definition, or by implication -- RL]. A man may be described as 'the person called "Robin Hood",' but not as 'the meaning of "Robin Hood".' It would be absurd to say 'the meaning of "Robin Hood" met the meaning of "Friar Tuck".' Indeed, to put it generally, it is always nonsense to say of any thing, process or entity 'that is a meaning.' Indeed, in certain contexts we are inclined not to call proper names 'words' at all. We do not complain that the dictionary omits a lot of English words just because it omits the names of people, rivers, mountains and novels, and if someone boasts of knowing two dozen words of Russian and gives the names of that number of Russian towns, newspapers, films and generals, we think that he is cheating. Does 'Nijni Novgorod is in Russia' contain three, four or five English words? There are indeed some important parallels between our ways of using proper names in sentences and our ways of using some, but not many sorts of other expressions. 'Who knocked?' can be answered as well by 'Mr. Smith' as by 'the landlord'; and in 'the noise was made by Fido,' 'the noise was made by the neighbour's retriever' and 'the noise was made by him' the proper name, the substantival phrase ['Mr Smith', or 'Fido' -- RL] and the pronoun play similar grammatical roles. But this no more shows that substantival phrases and pronouns are crypto-proper names than they show that proper names are crypto-pronouns or crypto-substantival phrases.

(1) Frege saw that the phrases 'the evening star' and 'the morning star' do not have the same sense (Sinn), even if they happen to apply to or denote (bedeuten) the same planet. An astronomical ignoramus might understand the two phrases while wondering whether they are mentions of two planets or of only one. The phrase 'the first American pope' does not apply to anyone, but a person who says so shows thereby that he understands the expression. [Update May 2025: After the election of the new Pope, Leo XIV, we might need to change this example to: 'The first Chinese Pope' -- RL.] This concession seems to have been thought to be only a tiresome though necessary amendment to the 'Fido'-Fido principle. In fact it demolishes it altogether. For it shows that even in the case of that relatively small class of isolable expressions, other than proper names, which are suited to function as the nominatives of certain seeded subject-predicate sentences, knowing what the expressions mean does not entail having met any appropriate Fidos or even knowing that any such Fidos exist. The things ('entities'), if any, to which such expressions apply are not and are not parts of what the expressions mean, any more than a nail is or is part of how a hammer is used.

"(2) The traditional doctrine of terms had required (confusedly enough) the analysis of proposition-expressing sentences into two, or with heart searchings, three or more 'terms'; and these terms were (erroneously) supposed all to be correlated with entities in the 'Fido'-Fido way. But sentences are not just lists like 'Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,' or even like 'Socrates, mortality.' For they tell truths or falsehoods, which lists do not do. A sentence must include some expressions which are not terms, i.e. 'syncategorematic words' like 'is,' 'if,' 'not,' 'and,' 'all,' 'some,' 'a,' and so on. Such words are not meaningless, though they are not names, as all categorematic words were (erroneously) supposed to be. They are required for the construction of sentences. (Sometimes special grammatical constructions enable us to dispense with syncategorematic words.) Syncategorematic words were accordingly seen to be in a certain way auxiliary, somewhat like rivets which have no jobs unless there are girders to be riveted. I have not finished saying anything if I merely utter the word 'if' or 'is.' They are syntactically incomplete unless properly collocated with suitable expressions of other sorts. In contrast with them it was erroneously assumed that categorematic words are non-auxiliary or are syntactically complete without collocations with other syncategorematic or categorematic expressions, as though I have finished saying something when I say 'Fido,' 'he,' 'the first American pope' or 'jocular.'..." [Ryle (1949b), pp.226-28. (This links to a PDF.) Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; links added and several paragraphs merged.]

[I have discussed this topic at length in Essay Three Part One. I distance myself, however, from Ryle's declaration that Proper Names have no meaning, or, indeed, that they might not even be words. Normally, Ryle was extremely careful when it came to the complexities built into our use of language, but here he seems to have treated "meaning" as a rather simple term, when it clearly isn't. [If meaning is largely to be defined as the use to which we put words, then Proper Names have a use and hence a meaning. We use them to name the things Ryle himself mentioned: "dogs, rivers, babies, battles and constellations." I have said more about this in Interlude Seven.] Moreover, dictionaries aren't the final (nor are they the only) arbiter of meaning, either! Having said that, Ryle's sharp criticism of this fallacy (that all words are names or operate like names) is fully in line with the approach adopted at this site.]

Unfortunately, DM-theorists have uncritically followed Hegel (and traditional thought) in this regard, so it should surprise no one that they have been accused (by me) of adopting an approach to language that is no better than theories concocted by Locke and Descartes, which means their ideas are thoroughly bourgeois, too. The traditional approach to language and thought is atomistic and patently misguided. When was the last time you 'thought' only in names?

"We next went to the School of Languages, where three Professors sat in Consultation upon improving that of their own country. The first Project was to shorten Discourse by cutting Polysyllables into one, and leaving out Verbs and Participles, because in reality all things imaginable are but Nouns. The other, was a Scheme for entirely abolishing all Words whatsoever; and this was urged as a great Advantage in Point of Health as well as Brevity. For it is plain, that every Word we speak is in some Degree a Diminution of our Lungs by Corrosion, and consequently contributes to the shortening of our Lives. An Expedient was therefore offered, that since Words are only Names for Things, it would be more convenient for all Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the particular Business they are to discourse on. And this Invention would certainly have taken Place, to the great Ease as well as Health of the Subject, if the Women in conjunction with the Vulgar and Illiterate had not threatened to raise a Rebellion, unless they might be allowed the Liberty to speak with their Tongues, after the manner of their Ancestors; such constant irreconcilable Enemies to Science are the common People. However, many of the most Learned and Wise adhere to the New Scheme of expressing themselves by Things, which hath only this Inconvenience attending it, that if a Man's Business be very great, and of various kinds, he must be obliged in Proportion to carry a greater bundle of Things upon his Back, unless he can afford one or two strong Servants to attend him. I have often beheld two of those Sages almost sinking under the Weight of their Packs, like Pedlars among us; who, when they met in the Streets, would lay down their Loads, open their Sacks, and hold Conversation for an Hour together; then put up their Implements, help each other to resume their Burthens (sic), and take their Leave. But for short Conversations a Man may carry Implements in his Pockets and under his Arms, enough to supply him, and in his House he cannot be at a loss: Therefore the Room where Company meet who practise this Art, is full of all Things ready at Hand, requisite to furnish Matter for this kind of artificial Converse." [Gulliver's Travels, The Voyage to Balnibari, Chapter 5. Paragraphs merged. Original capitalisation left in place.]

Holding up objects, instead of using words, would make conversation and communication impossible -- unless it were part of a code or puzzle of some sort -- both of which depend on language and the (easily confirmed) fact that not all words are names. But words are objects too, and they signify because of the role they occupy in sentences or clauses. If words functioned atomistically, then using a word would be as useless as holding up an object. Peter Hacker made a similar point in relation to signs (which are also objects):

We have already seen that Hegel's reference to the implicit 'speculative nature of the German language' was about as genuine as a video purporting to show Rembrandt using his cell phone to post a list of his favourite rock songs on Facebook.

Nevertheless, Houlgate then argues that Hegel was actually using ordinary German words in his Logic, not a specialised vocabulary. Apparently, Hegel did so in order to reveal its inherently 'speculative nature' (which in effect suggests language is really a secret code the meaning of whose words is clear only to a tiny minority -- in fact, a minority of one, Hegel!). So, while English readers might (mistakenly) think that Hegel's argument is obscure, tortuous and opaque because of his convoluted use of what appear (to some) to be ordinary German words, apparently that isn't the case for those who can read him in the original German, according to Houlgate:

"At this point, those who know Hegel's work only through English translation may be forgiven a distinctly sceptical smile. Hegel uses ordinary vocabulary? Can that be true? Do Germans really go around talking about 'determinateness' (Bestimmtheit) and 'being in and for itself' (Anundfürsichsein)? Well perhaps not precisely in the way Hegel does, but they do use related expressions in everyday speech. Ask a German if he or she thinks national reunification was good thing and you may hear in response 'bestimmt' ('definitely'), or 'an für sich, schon' ('in principle, sure')." [Houlgate (2006), pp.76-77. Italics in the original.]

This flies in the face of the fact that other highly competent German speakers --, like, say, Schopenhauer --, find it almost impossible to work out what Hegel was banging on about, even in his day:

"If I were to say that the so-called philosophy of this fellow Hegel is a colossal piece of mystification which will yet provide posterity with an inexhaustible theme for laughter at our times, that it is a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking, and, by the most outrageous misuse of language, putting in its place the hollowest, most senseless, thoughtless, and, as is confirmed by its success, most stupefying verbiage, I should be quite right. Further, if I were to say that this summus philosophus [...] scribbled nonsense quite unlike any mortal before him, so that whoever could read his most eulogized work, the so-called Phenomenology of the Mind, without feeling as if he were in a madhouse, would qualify as an inmate for Bedlam, I should be no less right.... At first Fichte and Schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point of talent -- I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel." [Schopenhauer, quoted from here. Bold emphasis alone and links added; paragraphs merged.]

"But the height of audacity in serving up pure nonsense, in stringing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously been known only in madhouses, was finally reached in Hegel, and became the instrument of the most barefaced general mystification that has ever taken place, with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity, and will remain as a monument to German stupidity." [Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2, p.22. Bold emphasis added.]

"Fichte is the father of the sham philosophy, of the disingenuous method which, through ambiguity in the use of words, incomprehensible language, and sophistry, seeks to deceive, and tries, moreover, to make a deep impression by assuming an air of importance in a word, the philosophy which seeks to bamboozle and humbug those who desire to learn. After this method had been applied by Schelling, it reached its height, as everyone knows, in Hegel, in whose hands it developed into pure charlatanism.... In Germany it was possible to proclaim as the greatest philosopher of all ages Hegel, a repulsive, mindless charlatan, an unparalleled scribbler of nonsense.... If indeed I now chose to call to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions have abused such wide and empty abstractions, I should have to fear that both the reader and I myself would be ill; for the most nauseous tediousness hangs over the empty word-juggling of this loathsome philophaster.... It may be said in passing that one can see how important the choice of expressions in philosophy is from the fact that that inept expression condemned above, and the misunderstanding which arose from it, became the foundation of the whole Hegelian pseudo-philosophy, which has occupied the German public for twenty-five years." [Ibid., quoted from here. Bold emphases and link added; paragraphs merged.]

So, if Schopenhauer, a sophisticated German speaker if ever there was one, found that the language of the verbose Waffle-Meister, Hegel, was full of "senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously been known only in madhouses" and "empty abstractions", that it was "incomprehensible", "inept", amounting to "empty word juggling", was full of "the most outrageous misuse of language" and "stupefying verbiage", what hope is there that ordinary Germans could comprehend this tidal wave of obscurantism coming from Hegel?

This adds support to much of what has been argued at this site: metaphysicians like Hegel take ordinary words and use them in radically non-standard ways, nominalising verbs -- for example, the verb "to be" is transmogrified into "Being"; "is identical with" reified into "Identity"; the use of the negative particle morphed into "Difference"/"Negativity" --, and transforming general words (i.e., common nouns) into the Proper Names of Abstract Particulars.

And, of course, Schopenhauer's negative opinion was shared by Marx, even if he wasn't quite as harsh (this was partially quoted earlier):

"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction…. If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy -- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -- 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -- 'Fruit'…. Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -- 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'. The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'…. It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.' In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975a), pp.72-75. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

Should any of my readers be tempted to respond that this can't be so (because Hegel was a "great philosopher"), consider Exhibit A For The Prosecution:

"Being is the indeterminate immediate; it is free from determinateness in relation to essence and also from any which it can possess within itself. This reflectionless being is being as it is immediately in its own self alone. Because it is indeterminate being, it lacks all quality; but in itself, the character of indeterminateness attaches to it only in contrast to what is determinate or qualitative. But determinate being stands in contrast to being in general, so that the very indeterminateness of the latter constitutes its quality. It will therefore be shown that the first being is in itself determinate, and therefore, secondly, that it passes over into determinate being -- is determinate being -- but that this latter as finite being sublates itself and passes over into the infinite relation of being to its own self, that is, thirdly, into being-for-self. Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing. Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content -- undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being. Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being -- does not pass over but has passed over -- into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.82-83. Italic emphases in the original; paragraphs merged.]

This is the sort of "Blaahdee Rraahbeesh" (paraphrasing Tony Cliff -- but, sadly, he didn't direct that expletive at Hegel!) intelligent people like Houlgate uncritically swallow. What is perhaps even more disturbing, Houlgate also tries to con the rest of us into thinking Hegel was using standard, ordinary German, and that it made some sort of sense!

Insults and invective to one side, has anyone ever heard a single ordinary German speaker (not the worse for drink, drugs, brain disease, or Hermetic Mysticism) misuse German in the above way (i.e., in the original language of the above quotation)?

[In Parts Five and Six of Essay Twelve this passage, and many more like it, will be tipped back into the Neoplatonic and Hermetic Swamp from which it slithered two centuries ago.]

74a1. Of course, as noted in Essay Thirteen Part Three, the word "meaning" is itself rather complex. On that, see Interlude Seven (link below).

75. The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Eight.

Of course, this greatly oversimplifies the nature and complexity of Traditional Metaphysics. It would be hard (if not impossible) to condense much of it into pithy one-liners like those quoted here. However, having said that the vast bulk of Traditional Thought does consist of theses (sub-theses, corollaries and sub-corollaries), which each theorist spends much time and energy trying to derive or substantiate (the latter of which prose sometimes stretches across hundreds of pages, or even several different works). But, as argued in the main body, this is just a protracted and convoluted, attention-grabbing charade. That is because all that this (largely wasted) effort amounts to is the production of yet more obscure jargon aimed at 'substantiating', or elaborating upon, the last batch of impenetrable jargon. Entire bodies of text, protracted arguments and corollaries form a self-referential set, an exercise in futility that amounts to a pointless attempt to derive Supertruths from language/thought alone.

75b. One or two readers might counter that this is true of science, too --, i.e., that research is both individualistic and gnomic. I seriously doubt there are many Marxists who will avail themselves of that escape route! Science is and always has been a collective enterprise. [Cf., Bernal (1939, 1969); Conner (2005).]

While this might appear to be a somewhat controversial claim (at least for those who accept the 'Great Man' theory of history), that theory is only given credence by non-Marxists, and they were told to sling their hooks ages ago.

It could now be argued that science has always relied on a steady stream of theories drawn from Metaphysics. That idea will be laid to rest in Essay Thirteen Part Two.

It might be objected that the vast majority of us have to be informed of scientific truths; if so, that fact can't also be used against Metaphysics or DM.

But, [these] convoluted and obscure ideas were never based on -- nor were they even derived from -- ordinary practice and everyday language, otherwise the rest of us wouldn't need to be informed of them.

So, to repeat: science has grown out of materially-, and socially-grounded practice -- augmented and shaped by collective labour and the development of technology --, unlike Metaphysics. That is why hundreds of millions of human beings can be given a basic (or even an advanced) scientific education; the same can't be said about Metaphysics. Furthermore, much of science (outside of theoretical physics, perhaps) can be expressed in ordinary language (at some level), even if somewhat less concisely. [On this, see these earlier comments.]

While it is undeniable that many scientific facts aren't in any way obvious -- and it is also the case that we have to be informed of them -- unlike metaphysical theories, their truth doesn't follow from thought alone.

Once more, it could be countered that much of Physics, for example, openly depends on countless 'thought experiments'.

That is also undeniable, but that aspect of Physics is either confirmable by observation/experiment, or it remains purely theoretical or hypothetical. No one (other than closet -- or even overt -- Platonists) would accept a 'thought experiment' as true (or, in many cases, even relevant) if there is no way to test it, or no way it could be confirmed empirically. Nor would the vast majority be inclined to accept a given theory if the only support it enjoyed was based on 'thought experiments'. A possible exception to that generalisation is the way that String Theory has taken over large swathes of contemporary Physics. But, as pointed out in Essay Eleven Part One, that picture is slowly changing because of the physical impossibility of confirming this theory with actual evidence. [Even trolls and sociopaths on the Internet find it necessary to fabricate evidence of some sort in support of their lies and smears!] By way of contrast, metaphysical theories remain forever unconfirmable (in the above way).

Of course, as Galileo was able to show, 'thought experiments' might end up motivating the re-examination of familiar facts or they might shine them in a new light. That is indeed what made Galileo's thought experiments so powerful and convincing, which isn't the case with Metaphysics. [On Galileo's 'thought experiments', see Palmieri (2017). (This link takes the reader to a page where the article itself can be downloaded as a PDF.)]

"It is more important to have beauty in one's equations than to have them fit experiment...." [Quoted from here.]

Others have voiced similar opinions, but then they often also say things like this:

[Further discussion of this topic will be resumed in Essay Thirteen Part Two. On the distinction between science and philosophy, see Hacker (2007b). On how physics has been led astray by the search for 'beauty', see Hossenfelder (2018).]

75c. Why that is the case with Dialectical Marxists is explored in Essay Nine Part Two; why it ensnares most educated individuals was explained over 150 years ago by Marx himself:

76. All this helps account for the close, almost incestuous, relationship that exists between Traditional Philosophy and Abstractionism. Without that bogus 'thought-form', Metaphysics (in Ancient Greece) would have been stillborn, as the late Professor Havelock argued (quoted earlier). [There is more on this in Essay Three Parts One and Two -- as there will be in Part Two of Essay Twelve, when it is published.]

These days, in certain quarters, this process has (disarmingly) been re-christened, "designating" -- new word, same implications. [On this, see Ryle (1949b), pp.229-35. (This links to a PDF.)] The idea seems to be that if, for example, predicates actually failed to "designate" something (be this a set, a class, a 'course of values', a property, an "essence", or a "Universal" in this or in some other 'possible world') they would be empty phrases -- 'mere words' (as Roscelin might have described them) -- which would mean they were devoid of content.

Clearly, this view of predication confuses its descriptive or attributive role with the referential role played by Proper Names and other singular terms. [There is more on this in Essay Three Part One and Ryle (1949b), link above.]

Someone might object that that response is misleading since Philosophers don't just assume there are Universals and Essences, they have constructed arguments substantiating claims they exist, or are somehow 'objective'. That topic, and those 'arguments', will be examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.

78. Once more, this contentious claim will be substantiated in the next two Parts of this Essay (summarised here).

In Chomsky's case, this latest allegation might seem obviously wrong. But, that isn't so. [On this, see Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

79. For centuries, theorists have ignored, depreciated or down-played the vernacular and the collective labour and communal life on which it is based. [Evidence in support of that contention will be given in Part Seven of this Essay. In the meantime, the reader is referred to Conner (2005), Eamon (1994), Eco (1997) and Meiksins Wood (1988).]

However, for practically the first time in human history -- i.e., from approximately 1903 (starting with the revolt against Idealism led by George Moore, soon followed by Bertrand Russell), up until the mid-1970s --, this age-old stream of ruling-class ideology was partially, but only temporarily, stemmed -- even reversed for a few short decades. [On this, see Hacker (1996).]

Of course, it is no mere coincidence that during this period the proletariat elbowed their way onto the stage of history for the very first time as an international force to be reckoned with, nor is it a coincidence that these moves against Idealism/Metaphysics (which redirected attention toward ordinary language and common understanding) were aggressively promoted and championed by openly socialist, Marxist and left-leaning Philosophers (in Wittgenstein's case, see here). These moves had been pre-figured, if not signalled, by Marx himself at a time when the working class was just starting to flex its muscles, and he was beginning to take notice of this and appreciate what this meant for Traditional Philosophy itself.

Nevertheless, the current move away from OLP began in the 1970s, with the international downturn in working class militancy, and, oddly enough, with the beginning of the Neo-liberal, Monetarist, and Conservative assault on living-standards, union organisation and working class culture -- the first wave of which was pioneered (again, not uncoincidentally!) by philosophers, linguists, ideologues and economic theorists working in the USA, the heart of the beast. [On the background to these political, social and economic developments, see Neale (2004).]

In the context of these Essays and the political points that will be made in Essay Twelve Part Seven, these developments are nevertheless highly significant. Dialectical Marxists, who otherwise claim that all things are inter-linked, have so far failed to notice these glaringly obvious connections.

[On this in general, see here, which is a much longer and more comprehensive version of Uschanov (2002), although the author fails to take noted of the political and social character of these developments.]

81. This is just one aspect of what it means to argue that language is a social phenomenon. [This topic will also be examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three (link above).]

82. That isn't to suggest I am advancing a philosophical theory here, merely a set of reminders (i.e., linguistic rules) that assist in the comprehension of language, knowledge and the nature of science. Moreover, these comments are also related to Wittgenstein's analysis of rules in his "middle" and "later period". On this, see the references given in Essay Thirteen Part Three (link above). See also Note 36.

[On the accusation that Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians do in fact advance philosophical theories, see here.]

Concerning the limitations of the analogy sometimes drawn between money and language, see Jones (1991).

[That publication was originally meant to be the first of three parts, but the author has informed me that the other two will not now be published. That is a pity since they were intended be an analysis of Marx's view of language, perhaps the only one currently available. Update: Since that comment was first written there have been a several developments in this direction. One of note is Lecercle (2006), which is, alas, almost totally useless in this respect. More-or-less the same can be said about Voloshinov (1973) and the contributions of Voloshinov's many commentators. Those contentious remarks have been substantiated in Essay Thirteen Part Three (link above).]

"The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan [Stamm]; then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the clan. Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations. The human being is in the most literal sense a Zwon politikon not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society -- a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness -- is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other. There is no point in dwelling on this any longer. The point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle, which had sense and reason for the eighteenth-century characters, had not been earnestly pulled back into the centre of the most modern economics by Bastiat, Carey, Proudhon etc. Of course it is a convenience for Proudhon et al. to be able to give a historico-philosophic account of the source of an economic relation, of whose historic origins he is ignorant, by inventing the myth that Adam or Prometheus stumbled on the idea ready-made, and then it was adopted, etc. Nothing is more dry and boring than the fantasies of a locus communis ["a locus communis" = "a commonplace" -- RL]." [Marx (1973), pp.83-85. Bold emphasis and links alone added.]

Unfortunately, when Dialectical Marxists read the above words they consistently fail to recognise their significance. Is this yet another case of 'selective dialectical blindness'?

[On other similarities between Marx and Wittgenstein, see Kitching and Pleasants (2002) -- see also here and here. I have covered this topic in greater detail, here.]

83. If correct, that would make words the linguistic equivalent of intelligent ideas, or even agents in their own right, a contentious topic that was examined earlier, but in much more detail in Essay Three Parts One and Two.

85. This reversal -- one result of which is that each human being is re-configured as a socially-isolated and individually-acting 'abstractor', someone who is capable of establishing for themselves what their words mean, which is a bourgeois individualist methodology, further compounded by the fetishisation of the products of social interaction (i.e., language -- on how that works follow the links in Note 83). This reversal (whereby words become agents that control language-users) was originally motivated by clearly identifiable ideological aims and objectives established (and promoted) by ruling-class ideologues, just as Marx indicated. Small wonder then that this view of language and knowledge (i.e., that it is based on the mythical process of 'abstraction') has underpinned Traditional Thought for well over two millennia. And now, DM.

[This topic will be explored in more detail in later Parts of this Essay and in Essay Thirteen Part Three. Abstractionism was critically analysed in Essay Three Parts One and Two.]

86. But even an attempt to specify the meaning of words in such a piecemeal manner wouldn't justify the inferences that have traditionally been made from the supposed meaning of words to the truth of favoured scientific or a metaphysical theories, valid for all of 'Reality', for all of time.

It is important to add the following: there is no suggestion that rules must be explicit; in fact, many can't be. [Why that is so will be explained in Essay Twelve Part Seven. Until then, see Note 88 below and Interlude Eleven (link above).] In general, the sort of rules of interest (here) originate in, and grow out of, social practice, which is plainly absent in this case. [On that, see Robinson (2003b) and Kusch (2002, 2006). See also the modern minor classic, Lewis (1969) -- this links to a PDF. Readers should also take note of the remarks I have made about Lewis's book, here.]

87. However, this is just another way of saying that language is a social phenomenon and rules of language (that developed over countless millennia) aren't answerable to nature. Indeed, how could nature determine what our words mean? And that remains the case whether or not the supposed influence of 'nature' is thought to be expressed genetically, or in some other way. [For example, whether or not it is the case that our grammatical, or 'ontological', prejudices "carve nature at the joints", as Plato surmised -- Phaedrus 265e; i.e., Plato (1997b), p.542. Again, on this, see Interlude Eleven (link above).]

88. This observation captures one aspect of the claim Wittgenstein made that -- except superficially/trivially -- meaning in language can't be expressed in language by means of empirical propositions. [On the significance of the terms, "superficially"/"trivially", see the section on mathematics, as well as Interlude Seven and Interlude Eleven (link above).]

That might seem a rather odd thing to say, especially when we can assert things like "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", but, as noted above, that isn't an empirical proposition, but the expression of a rule.

Once more, this view of language underpins the usual complaint made against Wittgenstein (and, indeed, directed at Essays like those published at this site) that, despite protestations to the contrary, claims like these do depend on, or they even express, some sort of 'theory'. The reason for assuming/asserting this is plain enough: those who accept the traditional view of language see representation as its only legitimate -- and even its primary -- function, which must mean Wittgenstein's use of language was in some way representational, too.

A case for that might be made in relation to Wittgenstein's early period, but not his middle and later work. In the mid-, to late-1930s, '40s and early '50s, Wittgenstein's method in fact exposed representationalism as a misleading picture of the way language actually works (although he wouldn't have expressed himself this way!), since it completely undermines the role language plays in communication. So, for this and other reasons (explored across all Parts of Essay Twelve), there can be no such thing as a legitimate or valid philosophical theory. [On this see Kuusela (2006, 2008) and Iliescu (2000). See also, Fischer (2011a, 2011b).]

Now, responses like the above often fly over the heads of those who have already sold their radical souls to ruling-class forms-of-thought (i.e., Dialectical Marxists). Indeed, they often argue that it is inconsistent to criticise Traditional Thought along such lines or even attempt to bring an end to this bogus discipline (i.e., Traditional Philosophy), and that is because any such attempt must itself be philosophical, and thereby involves a theory.

Well, that makes about as much sense as claiming that socialists who want to end Capitalism must also be Capitalists, or that in order to fight a virus one must first of all catch it! [On this, see Interlude Ten.]

88a. It could be objected that liquidity is an inseparable property of water (and so M23a -- re-quoted below -- is always false). That is undeniable in the sense that liquidity is an inseparable property of liquid water (which is plainly an 'analytic truth' (i.e., it is a linguistic rule), not an empirical fact, otherwise it could be false, and if that were the case, we wouldn't be referring to liquid water!), but, since ice and steam are also water (i.e., H₂O), M23 is itself either a contingent truth about water (as H₂O), or it is now a criterion we use to decide what counts as water, even if it isn't the only one. Hence, it is a rule, not a fact.

Of course, one could always modify M23 so that it became something like the following:

M23b: Liquidity is an inseparable property of (pure) water between 0ºC and 100ºC, at normal atmospheric pressure.

But, as noted above, that would turn M23b into a criterion for something to count as water, and hence into yet another rule!

However, if anyone still objects to this particular example, they can substitute the following for M23, M23a, and M24, etc.:

That having been done, not much will have changed -- i.e., with respect to the argument presented in this section of the Essay.

89. That was, of course, the point of calling motion "The mode of the existence of matter" (on that, see Note 89a, below).

From P4 alone it is clear that the connection between motion and matter is meant to be conceptual. Since "modes" can't be experienced, this 'property of matter' (at least as DM-theorists view the world) couldn't be otherwise. As Lenin might have said, P4 is a "law of cognition", or it is predicated on one.

89a. Had this claim been based on evidence Lenin would have said something like the following: "Motion without matter has never been observed, but it is impossible to say if it can't exist in any other way...", or something to that effect. But, Lenin and Engels went much, much further:

"In full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it, Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring (read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....' 'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin (1914), p.8. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred. When motion is transferred from one body to another, it may be regarded, in so far as it transfers itself, is active, as the cause of motion, in so far as the latter is transferred, is passive. We call this active motion force, and the passive, the manifestation of force. Hence it is as clear as daylight that a force is as great as its manifestation, because in fact the same motion takes place in both. A motionless state of matter is therefore one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

91. This idea is elaborated on in Suter (1989), passim, and in Glock (1996), pp.261-62, 293-96. See also Baker and Hacker (2014), pp.41-67, 241-370, and Peterman (1992). However, the best recent work on this is Fischer (2011a, 2011b).

"Empirical, contingent truths have always struck philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained…. Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere, e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in quantum mechanics today. One feature that explains philosophers' fascination with truths of Reason is that they seem, in a deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential relations of Simple Natures; mathematical truths are apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build upon them mythological structures.

"We think of necessary propositions as being true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as the truth-functions or (in Frege's case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics. So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a supra-empirical domain (a 'third realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however these authors record this erroneously as p.139 -- RL] or the 'mineralogy of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g., Pascal, admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal. Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again, these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41 -- RL]. Logic seems to investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….

"In our eagerness to ensure the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent 'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell (1937), p.xv (this links to a PDF); again these authors record this erroneously as p.v; although in the edition to which I have linked, it is p.xliii -- RL], then the mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of physical theorising, such as Planck's constant." [Baker and Hacker (1992), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original have been altered to conform with those adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; links added. This passage doesn't appear in the 2^nd edition of their book -- i.e., Baker and Hacker (2014), pp.241-370 -- even though similar thoughts are expressed there.]

[Part of this book can be accessed here (this links to a PDF); there is a .wav recording of the debate available here (which takes a few minutes to load!).]

Chomsky, N. (2009), Cartesian Linguistics. A Chapter In The History Of Rationalist Thought (Cambridge University Press, 3^rd ed.).