Essay Nine -- The Politics Of Metaphysics
Part One: Substitutionism -- Or, Why Workers Will Always Reject Dialectical Materialism
Visitors are encouraged to read this Essay in conjunction with Essays Nine Part Two and Ten Part One.
Anyone who hasn't read the above Essays is likely to conclude that most of the things I assert below are either baseless or purely dogmatic, but, without repeating all that material below, the only suggestion I can make is that (sceptical) readers should shelve any qualms they might have until they consult those Essays. I have supplied the relevant links where necessary.
If you are using Internet Explorer 10 (or later), you might find some of the links I have used won't work properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu); for IE11 select 'Compatibility View Settings' and add this site (anti-dialectics.co.uk). Microsoft's browser, Edge, automatically renders these links compatible, as do Windows 10 and 11.
However, if you are using Windows 10 or 11, IE11 and Edge unfortunately appear to colour these links somewhat erratically. They are meant to be mid-blue, but they render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and red!
Firefox and Chrome reproduce them correctly, as far as I can tell.
Several browsers also appear to underline these links erratically. Many are underscored boldly in black, others more lightly in blue! They are all meant to be the latter.
Finally, if you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used; Mozilla often replaces them with an "º'.
There are no problems with Chrome, Edge, or Internet Explorer, as far as I can determine.
Here are two Quick Links to my discussion of Marx's (alleged) connection to Hegel and DM: Part One and Part Two. The first deals with Marx's supposed agreement with Engels over practically everything (including the theory that there is a 'dialectic' operating in nature); the second deals with the claim that Marx was still working under Hegel's influence (albeit 'put the right way up') when he published Das Kapital. It contains some of the most controversial ideas aired at this site.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, again depending on the context.]
As is the case with all my Essays, nothing at this site should be read as an attack either on HM -- a scientific theory I fully accept -- or on revolutionary socialism itself. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary thirty-eight years ago. The difference between DM and HM, as I see it, is explained here.
Some readers might wonder why I have quoted extensively from a wide variety of DM-sources in the Essays published at this site. In fact a good 10-20% of the material in many of them is comprised of just such quotations. Apologies are therefore owed the reader in advance for the length and extremely repetitive nature of most of these passages. The reason for their inclusion is as follows: Long experience has taught me that Dialectical Marxists simply refuse to accept that their own classicists -- e.g., Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao --, alongside countless 'lesser' DM-theorists actually said the things I have attributed to them. That is especially the case after they are confronted with the absurd consequences that follow from their words. That remains the case unless they are shown chapter and verse and in extensive detail. Partial quotes, paraphrases and summaries in my own words they reject as "distortions", "mis-interpretations", "mis-representations", and even "manipulations". Furthermore, in debate when I quote only one or two passages in support of what I allege they are simply brushed off as "outliers" or "atypical". Indeed, in the absence of dozens of proof texts drawn from a wide range of sources (drawn from all areas of Dialectical Marxism), and reproduced in full, they tend to regard anything that a particular theorist has to say -- regardless of who they are, even if they turn out to be one of the aforementioned classicists -- as either "far too crude", "unrepresentative" or even(!) unreliable. Failing that they often complain that any such quotes have been "taken out of context". Many in fact object since -- surprising and sad though this is to say --, they are largely ignorant of the fine detail of their own theory, or, perhaps even worse, they simply haven't read the DM-classics! The only way to counter such attempts to deflect, reject and deny is to quote DM-material frequently and at length.
But even that doesn't always work!
Furthermore, because of the highly sectarian and partisan nature of Dialectical Marxism, I also have to quote a wide range of sources from across the entire 'dialectical spectrum'. Trotskyists object if I quote Stalin or Mao; Maoists and Stalinists complain if I reference Trotsky -- or even if I cite "Brezhnev era revisionists". Non-Leninist Marxists bemoan the fact that I haven't confined my remarks solely to what Marx or Hegel had to say, advising me to ignore the confused, even "simplistic", ideas expressed by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Trotsky! This often means I have to quote the lot!
That itself has had the (indirect) benefit of revealing how much and to what extent they (the classicists and subsequent epigones across all areas of Dialectical Marxism) largely agree with each other (despite sectarian rhetoric to the contrary), at least with respect to DM!
In relation to that, several readers have also complained about the sheer number of links I have added to these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply even to Essays that attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those who find such links do make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore those links(!) -- unless you want to access further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have linked to familiar subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of recent Presidents of the USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of popular films, or certain words that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies', or any at all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links connect to web-pages that regularly change their URLs, or which vanish from the Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers informed me of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to Haloscan no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
It is also worth pointing out that about 40% of my case against DM has been relegated to the End Notes. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more smoothly. This means that if readers want fully to appreciate my case against DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have added considerably more detail to the main argument, along with numerous qualifications. I have even raised objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments, which I have then answered. [I have explained why I adopted this tactic in Essay One.]
If readers skip the Endnotes, then this additional material and my response to any objections they might have will be missed.
Since I have been debating this theory with comrades for over 30 years, I have heard all the objections there are! (Many of the more recent on-line debates are listed here.)
The last six points:
[1] Phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius). They are intended to highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. Up until recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run the system for the elite.**
However, that will become the main topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, readers are directed here, here and here for further details.
[**Exactly how the above applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays published at this site (especially here, here and here). In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the argument -- but this time with absolute beginners in mind --, here.]
[2] Some readers might be tempted to think my main argument against DM is the following:
DM is false because -- on Lenin's admission -- it grew out of various strands of ruling-class thought.
That isn't my argument. I am in fact arguing that DM is far too vague and confused for it to be declared either true or false. It doesn't make it that far. Its origin in ruling-class ideology has simply made a bad situation worse, and that is part of the reason why Dialectical Marxism has been such an a protracted, abject failure. [On that, see also here.]
[Notice, I said "part of the reason" not "the reason". Why I have claimed this is explained in Part Two of Essay Nine and in Essay Ten Part One.]
[3] Although I refer to DM throughout this Essay, readers also should take this to include 'Materialist Dialectics' [MD].
[4] Unless otherwise stated, I have used the word "dialectics" in this Essay and throughout this site in the same way that DM-theorists employ it -- i.e., to refer to the theory/method they inherited from Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up'). It is in that sense that the title of this site is "anti-dialectics". However, "dialectics" had a different meaning before Hegel appropriated it and turned it into a cosmic super-theory, or method. I have no specific problem with the use of the word "dialectics" before Hegel had completely altered its meaning, except to point out that it is a particularly inefficient way to argue; hence, I have no problem with its classical meaning.
Nevertheless, when I turn to a discussion of Marx's use of this word (for example, and more specifically, in his Afterword to the Second Edition of Das Kapital), my argument takes a dramatic turn, which has confused some readers. There, and only there, I try to use the word as Marx understood it in that Afterword, not as it has been employed by subsequent DM-apologists -- or even by Hegel himself. It is quite clear that in the Afterword Marx adopted an older understanding of "dialectics" -- one based on the work of Aristotle, Kant and The Scottish Historical School (of Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Smith, Hume and Steuart). This means that his use of this word situates Das Kapital much closer to HM, not DM. [On that, see here.]
The difference between DM and HM, as I see it, is explained here.
[5] Some have complained that my linking to Wikipedia completely undermines the credibility of these Essays. When I launched this project on the Internet in 2005, there was very little material easily available on-line related to the vast majority of topics I could link to other than Wikipedia. In the intervening years alternative sites have become available (for example, the excellent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy), so I have been progressively replacing most of the old Wikipedia links with links to these other sources. Having said that, I haven't done so for some of the Wikipedia links -- for instance, those that are connected with geographical, historical, scientific, biographical (etc.) topics where the latter aren't deemed controversial, at least among fellow Marxists. In every case, I have endeavoured to avoid linking to Wikipedia in relation to key areas of my arguments against DM so that at no point does my criticisms depend exclusively on such links. [It will, however, take several years to complete this change-over!]
In addition to the above (as readers will soon see if they consult the Bibliography) I have provided copious references to other published academic and non-academic books and articles (posted on-line or printed in hard copy) in the End Notes to this Essay, which further develop or substantiate anything I argue, claim, allege or propose.
[6] Throughout this site I have employed the term "Dialectical Marxism" in order to distinguish Marxism itself from the 'dialectical aberration' that has completely dominated revolutionary socialism for over 150 years. So, the terms 'Dialectical Marxism' and 'Dialectical Marxist' are used to refer to the mainstream 'Marxist' tradition that, in one form or another, has accepted the validity of DM, and either applies it to all of 'reality' -- the LCD-Faction --, or restricts it to social development (i.e., it is confined solely to HM) -- the HCD-Tendency. However, I distance Marx himself from this toxic mutation; why that is so has been explained here and here. Furthermore, why this Hegelianised Hybrid (but not Marxism itself) has been an abject failure for well over a century is explained here and below.
[7] Finally, anyone puzzled by the unremittingly hostile tone I have adopted toward DM and Dialectical Marxism might find it helpful to read this first.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of December 2025, this Essay is just over 101,000 words long; a summary of some of its main ideas can be found here.
The material below does not represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
[Latest Update: 21/12/25.]
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the "Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
I have adjusted the font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
(1) Introduction
(a) The Aims Of Essay Nine Parts One And Two
(2) The Main Thesis Of This Site Seems Impossible To Believe
(a) The Origin Of DM
(c) Unwitting Dupes
(3) Substitutionism
(a) Philosophy -- Imported Into Marxism 'From The Outside'
(b) DM: Introduced To Workers Also 'From The Outside'
(5) DM: A Deep Mystery Even To Dialectical Marxists
(b) Well, Have You Read And Fully Understood The Whole Of Hegel's Logic?
(6) Interlude One: Marx And Dialectical Materialism - 1
(7) Interlude Two: Marx And Dialectical Materialism - 2
(8) A Mystery To Workers, Too?
(a) Unconscious Dialecticians?
(i) Interlude Three: Are There Any Proletarian Philosophers?
(ii) Possible Examples Of 'Class War Dialectics'
(9) Historical Materialism Different
(a) Dialectical Marxism -- A Long-Term Failure
(b) Historical Materialism -- Introduced From The 'Inside'
(c) Ordinary Language -- An Obstacle Or An Indispensible Resource?
(d) Hegel And 'Double Meanings'
(e) The Revenge Of The 'Either-Or Of Commonsense'
(f) Interlude Four -- Dialectical Materialism Isn't The Same As Historical Materialism
(g) Conclusion: Failure Substituted For Success
(10) Appendix A -- Aristotle's Remarks About His 'Dialectical Method'
(11) Appendix B -- The 'Controversial Passage' From Lenin's What Is To Be Done?
(12) Notes
(13) References
Summary Of My Main Objections To Dialectical Materialism
Abbreviations Used At This Site
Before we start: Since this Essay (and Part Two) deal with issues related to the working class, it is important to add that I am a worker and, until recently, I was a trade union rep, which (unpaid) post I held for nearly twenty years. I only mention this to forestall criticism that I am somehow an 'intellectual' who doesn't know or understand workers.
Readers can find more details in Essay One.
The Aims Of Essay Nine Parts One And Two
Essay Nine Parts One and Two will examine some of the political implications of the analysis of Metaphysics and DM advanced at this site, particularly the ideas developed in Essay Three Parts One and Two, but more particularly in Essay Twelve Part One.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, again, depending on the context.]
Part One of this Essay will show that, unlike HM, DM can't form a theoretical foundation for the "world-view of the proletariat", and, because of that, it has had to be imposed on what few workers Dialectical Marxism has managed to attract to its ranks over the last 150 years. It will also be argued that since DM depends on easily identifiable ruling-class forms of thought it has had to brought to workers and "from the outside". [What that means will also be explained, but anyone familiar with Lenin's work will already know.] This imposition also runs 'against the grain' (so to speak) of workers' materialist good sense. [That too will, be explained.] As a result it will be argued that DM is the ideology of substitutionist elements within our movement. Furthermore, since the Essays published at this site have shown that DM is a total mystery -- even to its leading theorists --, it can't even provide revolutionary socialists with a scientific or philosophical foundation either for their politics or for their practice. In which case, DM not only doesn't, it can't 'reflect the experience of the party or the class'.
The distinction between HM and DM drawn at this site will also be explained and justified.
Part Two will expose the role that dialectics (either in its DM-, or its 'Materialist Dialectics' [MD-] form) occupies, or has occupied, a key role in addressing and satisfying the contingent psychological needs of prominent Dialectical Marxists (factors that were highlighted by Marx himself). In addition, it will also be shown how and why Hegel's influence has assisted in the corruption of our movement from top to bottom (aggravating, but not causing, sectarian in-fighting -- fostering splits and expulsions that often emerge as a result), revealing, too, why DM has had such a deleterious and narcoleptic effect on militant minds. These untoward consequences will then be linked to the class origin and current class position of leading revolutionaries -- those who have helped shape our movement and its core ideas.
It will also be revealed how and why the above comrades are particularly susceptible to ideas that have been peddled by ruling-class theorists for thousands of years -- specifically, the doctrine that there is a 'hidden world', a world of 'abstractions' and 'essences', anterior to 'appearances' that is 'more real' than the material universe we see around us (in the sense that 'abstractions' are somehow capable of rendering objects and processes in nature concrete, an ancient idea that implies nature is insufficient to itself, and needs 'Ideas', 'Abstractions', or 'Concepts', to make it 'Real'), which 'secret world' can be accessed by thought alone.
That is certainly what lies behind these words of Lenin's:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961),171. Italics in the original.]
"Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature." [Ibid., p.182. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italics in the original.]
"Logical concepts are subjective so long as they remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the same time they express the Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, both phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source." [Lenin (1961), p.208. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Matter is not the Ground of Form, but the unity of Ground and Grounded. Matter is the passive, Form is the active." [Lenin (1961), p.145. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin is here paraphrasing Hegel.]
Notice how Lenin says that "Logical concepts are subjective so long as they remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the same time they express the Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, both phenomenon and essence...." [Ibid.]
The implication is clear: while nature is both concrete and abstract, what renders anything concrete are these 'abstractions'. [I have explained why that is so for Lenin, and hence for other DM-theorists, in Essay Three Part One.]
This also helps explain why Lenin and Engels (along with several others) agree with card-carrying Idealists that matter is an abstraction! [Proof here.]
Partly in this way, it will be shown that DM has played a key role in making Dialectical Marxism synonymous with political and theoretical impotency --, which, naturally, helps explain its long-term lack of success.
[Notice the use of the word "partly" alongside a use of the indefinite article here -- i.e., in "a key role". So, I am not blaming all our woes on this theory! Anyone who still doubts should re-read this caveat on the opening page of the site, in the right-hand column.]
These lethal characteristics and defects, among others, will be further explored in Essay Ten Part One, where this sordidly depressing tale will be concluded.
In Essay Twelve it was argued that Metaphysics was kick-started in Ancient Greece by ruling-class ideologies who expressed the interests and priorities of contemporaneous ruling elites. In subsequent Modes of Production, metaphysicians directly or indirectly benefited from, or helped serve, both the State and the ruling-class, rationalising hierarchy, class division, exploitation, and gross inequality as 'natural' or 'god'-ordained.
While, for example, Theology was always an overt theoretical expression of alienated religious sentiment (among other things), Metaphysics in its different forms has helped systematise, rationalise, and legitimate ruling-class hegemony, linking the authority of the State to the aforementioned 'natural', or 'divinely-instituted order'. From Ancient Greece onwards, metaphysicians busied themselves concocting Super-Scientific theories that supposedly revealed the fundamental principles governing the entire universe, exposing its 'underlying rational structure', which, un-coincidentally, also reflected the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity (but only when 'properly interpreted', of course). Beneath the 'velvet glove' of Metaphysics lay the mailed fist of class domination, its 'necessary truths' dimly reflecting -- perhaps more often 'justifying' --, the iron rule of the State.01a
[The above argument is outlined in more detail, here. It will be fully substantiated in Essay Twelve Parts One to Four.]
As Marx and Engels argued:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65. Bold emphases added.]
"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or -- this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms -- with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production." [Marx (1859), pp.181-82. Bold emphasis added.]
It is worth underling the last part of the first of these two passages -- since far too many comrades fail to appreciate its significance (especially those who deny that Traditional Philosophy, including the concepts that re-surfaced in DM, form a key component of the "ruling ideas" that Marx and Engels were speaking about):
"[T]hey do this in the whole range...[they] rule as thinkers, producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Ibid. Bold emphases added.]
Notice how the ruling-class "rule" in the "whole range", how they "regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age....", how they "rule as thinkers". But, since Ancient Greek times Traditional Philosophy has been one of "the ideas of [the] age", which can only mean that it is indeed one of the key elements of these "ruling ideas". Furthermore, in the second of the above passages Marx confirms that Philosophy is one of the "ideological forms in which men become conscious" of the class war and then "fight it out."01
[Exactly how the ruling-class and their ideologues manage to do that is one of the main themes of Essay Twelve (i.e., all seven Parts of it, when they are published; a summary of what they will argue can be accessed here), alongside Essay Three Parts One and Two. Both Parts of Essay Nine will simply examine the effect all this has had on Dialectical Marxism.]
It has also been argued (in the above Essays as well as Essay Two) that it was largely through the influence Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao and Plekhanov, among others (courtesy of Hegel), that such ruling-class concepts were imported into revolutionary politics (upside down, or 'the right way up'). [I have omitted Marx's name for reasons explained here and here.]
Indeed, Lenin was quite open about this (as are many other DM-theorists):
"The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." [Lenin (1947), pp.31-32. Bold emphases added.]
"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form o
f superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
In that case, the conclusion is reasonably clear (in fact, Lenin seems quite proud to be able to acknowledge it): DM-theorists have imported ruling-class forms-of-thought into Marxism! Hence they did so "from the outside".
Of course, it could be objected that Marx in fact argued as follows:
"In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out." [Marx (1859), p.182. Bold emphasis added.]
That being so, it implies workers can use philosophy to fight back. But, for 2500 years Philosophy has only ever been used in a limited number of ways in the class war: (i) To rationalise and defend the power and wealth of the elite, or (ii) To rationalise, promote and defend the pretentions of a new, rising class challenging for power and supremacy, rich enough to patronise philosophers. Neither has ever been true of workers. One can count on the fingers of a severely mutilated hand the number of workers who have ever bothered with Philosophy (in the sense that they have written and thought systematically about it). In fact, I can think only of Epictetus who might fit the bill -- with the Christian Mystic, Jakob Böhme, perhaps, on the subs bench. [As we will see, this isn't even true of Dietzgen, despite what we have sometimes been told. (The latest example of this is Pateman (2021) (this links to a PDF). I will respond to Pateman in Interlude Three.)]
Of late, I can think of only two examples of professional philosophers with a working class background (I am not denying there are others!):
(1) The late G A Cohen, but in his case it is worth adding that he was a notorious anti-Hegelian Marxist, co-founder of what came to be known as Analytical Marxism -- an approach to Marxist Theory not a million miles distant from the line adopted at this site. [Having said that, there are important qualifications that need to be brought to the attention of the reader.]
(2) Donald Davidson, who was a leading Analytic Philosopher, both working class in origin and a socialist. Having said that, Davidson's working class credentials aren't quite as clear cut as Cohen's. Nevertheless, as far as I know, Davidson didn't use philosophy to fight on behalf of either side in the class war.
[Details underlying Cohen's working class background can be found in Cohen (2000), pp.xx-xxi; the key role he played in founding Analytical Marxism is detailed on pp.xvii-ff. Davidson's background and political orientation are set out in Davidson (2004) pp.231-65. If anyone knows of other examples of working class philosophers (either from the past or the present), please e-mail me with the details. There have been several other modern Analytic Philosophers who were socialists; I will be dealing with them and their significance in Part Seven of Essay Twelve. (Until then, I have said a few words about that 'sub-set' in this other Essay.] But, none of them, as far as can be ascertained were of working class origin.]
Nevertheless, it can't be denied that Marxist intellectuals -- the vast majority of whom aren't working class (I will cover that specific topic in much greater detail in Part Two) -- certainly try to use Philosophy in order to fight for our side in the class war; but in spite of that their ideas have been completely compromised, as we have seen. Hence, bottom line here is that workers don't use Philosophy to fight the class war, and this Part of Essay Nine (as well as Part Two) will explain not just why that is so, but also why it couldn't be otherwise.
With that in mind, it is now clear that when Marx spoke about the use to which Philosophy is put in prosecuting the class war, he can only have had in mind the two uses of it mentioned above. In that struggle no working class philosophers have had any "skin in the game", to use an Americanism. There is a reason why the ideas of the elite always rule: their ideologues exclusively dominate the field --, just as they rule the thoughts of Dialectical Marxists.
Admittedly, the allegations advanced at this site face several seemingly insurmountable obstacles, not the least of which is its apparent incapacity to explain how it is even remotely conceivable that the above revolutionaries could possibly have appropriated and then disseminated ideas that represent the theoretical, political and practical interests of the class enemy. On the face of it, it seems totally unbelievable that class fighters of the highest calibre -- comrades who (mostly) have, or had, impeccable revolutionary credentials -- could possibly have accepted a theory that is here alleged to represent the worst form of ideological compromise imaginable.
However, anyone tempted to argue along those lines should re-read what Lenin had to say; he openly admitted, even celebrated, the fact that Dialectical Marxists have imported such ideas from the class enemy:
"The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." [Lenin (1947), pp.31-32. Bold emphases added.]
"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
And he isn't the only one to have done this; on that see here.
It could be countered that revolutionary theory has actually been refined countless times in struggle, and for over one hundred and fifty years, by the very best theorists and activists in the Marxist tradition. Had there been the slightest hint of 'contamination' from any form of ruling-class ideology, that would have shown up long ago, becoming apparent perhaps in a series of disastrous theoretical, strategic and tactical blunders, or in major compromises and accommodations with the class enemy. It is therefore inconceivable that revolutionaries (not to mention countless thousands of militants and socialist workers -- many of whom were, and still are, prepared to give their lives in furtherance of the revolutionary cause) would have, or could have, adopted ideas derived from the ideologies of the class enemy, thereby totally vitiating their long-term political aims, efforts and work.
Furthermore, it might well be wondered how revolutionary classics (such as Marx's Das Kapital, Marx and Engels's The Communist Manifesto, Engels's Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Lenin's What Is To Be Done? and State and Revolution, Trotsky's The Permanent Revolution and The History of the Russian Revolution, Luxembourg's The Mass Strike -- along with countless others) could have been written by comrades who have been portrayed in the Essays posted at this site as little more than undercover propagandists for the ruling-class.
Nevertheless, the contention advanced at this site -- in all seriousness -- is that the above comrades, in so far as they openly entertained a theory that is based on concepts drawn from Hegel and other ruling-class ideologues, succeeded in introducing into the revolutionary movement a world-view that constitutes a major theoretical compromise with the class enemy.
Indeed, and in answer to one of the objections rehearsed above, this ideological compromise is part of the reason why Dialectical Marxism has witnessed little other than defeat, disaster, retreat, and fragmentation over the last century or so. If practice tells us anything, it tells us that practice has not served us well, and that Dialectical Marxism is now almost synonymous with catastrophic, long-term failure.
[Again: notice, please, the emphasised word ("part") used in the first sentence of the last paragraph! Once more, I am not blaming our failures solely on DM! There are other factors, the most important of which are exposed in Part Two and in Essay Ten Part One -- where I will also be examining (among other things) the excuses generally advanced by DM-apologists as they try to explain (or even explain away) this truly abysmal record.]
Furthermore, both parts of Essay Nine aim to show why Dialectical Marxism has been about as 'successful' as religious belief has always proved to be causing and then compounding internecine warfare, fragmentation and sectarianism. Far from presenting a glowing beacon to mankind, foreshadowing a classless society, Dialectical Marxism has become an object lesson in failure and (in the eyes of most people) a byword for corruption and bureaucratic callousness -- the poster-boy for political catastrophe.
[I hasten to add -- since some have misinterpreted that comment -- I am not blaming DM for the rampant sectarianism in Dialectical Marxism, just that it has helped make a bad situation worse. Again, why that is so will be explained in Part Two (link above).]
Admittedly, much of the above we can attribute to the malign influence of Stalinism, but STDs and MISTs are ardent DM-fans, too. [In Part Two, I will examine allegation advanced by fellow Trotskyists that STDs and MISTs employ a "wooden and lifeless" version of the dialectic, transforming it into an ossified state dogma. Of course, if you are a Marxist-Leninist, you can blame much of this on us Trotskyists. But, OTs and NOTs are also fervent DM-fans.]
[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Dialectician; OT = Orthodox Trotskyist; NOT = Non-Orthodox Trotskyist.]
We can no longer attribute the negative opinion most have of Marxism to the influence of bourgeois propaganda, either. Time after time we have scored more than our fair share of own goals, presenting the capitalist media with plenty of ammunition to use against us. [This is just one of the latest examples. There are countless others.]
Furthermore, as we will also see in Part Two, this shameful record is one reason why Dialectical Marxists cling to dialectics like terminally insecure limpets -- despite the fact that it has been comprehensively refuted by history. DM 'allows' them to re-interpret long-term failure as its opposite, as success in disguise. Indeed, those who accept a theory that tells them that 'appearances contradict underlying essence' -- or 'underlying reality' -- are going to find it relatively easy to re-interpret each and every failure as its opposite, too, as a disguised success. That is because, whatever happens, the NON is guaranteed to turn things around eventually. This then 'permits' them to conclude that only those who 'don't understand dialectics' will think otherwise. [There is more on this in Part Two, here.]
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
Given such a rosy and upbeat view of history, not only does every failure now have a silver lining, there are in fact only silver linings!
Dialectics thus prevents the serious problems our movement faces from ever being addressed, which helps guarantee they will keep recurring. This it does by motivating those whose brains it has colonised into concluding that DM has been tested in practice and, as a result, has been a resounding success --, which is the exact opposite of the truth.
And, that is why, to the DM-faithful, the allegations advanced in this and other Essays at this site will seem so patently false, so preposterous, that they will be rejected out-of-hand, or, they will simply be ignored. Failing even that, they will be misrepresented and their author vilified.
Of course, those lost in the Dialectical Mist will resist all attempts to slap some materialist good sense into them.
Nevertheless, comrades, may I suggest you return to "the desert of the real"?
Having said that, it needs emphasising up-front what isn't being maintained here: that leading revolutionaries adopted ruling-class forms-of-thought duplicitously or willingly. What is being alleged is that they did so unwittingly. Exactly how and why this happened will be revealed in Part Two.
However, in order to provide an adequate answer to the seemingly insurmountable objections outlined above, we must take a slight detour. Strange as it might seem, we need to consider Substitutionism.
It is quite remarkable that the ideological roots of substitutionist thinking have received scant attention from revolutionaries. For example, in his otherwise excellent essay on Trotsky's views on this phenomenon, Tony Cliff doesn't even mention the ideological roots of substitutionist thinking. The closest he gets to doing so is here, in the following passage:
"The fact that the working class needs a party or parties is in itself a proof of the cleavages in the working class. The more backward culturally, the weaker the organisation and self-administration of the workers generally, the greater will be the intellectual cleavage between the class and its Marxist party. From this unevenness in the working class flows the great danger of an autonomous development of the party and its machine till it becomes, instead of the servant of the class, its master. This unevenness is a main source of the danger of 'substitutionism'....Men make history, and if these men organised in a party have a greater impact on history than their relative number warrants, nevertheless they alone do not make history and, for better or worse, they alone are not the cause of their greater specific weight, neither of the general history of the class nor even of themselves in this class. In the final analysis, the only weapons to fight the 'substitutionism' of the revolutionary party for the class, and hence the transformation of the former into a conservative force, is the activity of the class itself, and its pressure not only against its social enemy, but also against its own agent, its party.... Because the working class is far from being monolithic, and because the path to socialism is uncharted, wide differences of strategy and tactics can and should exist in the revolutionary party. The alternative is the bureaucratised party or the sect with its 'leader'. Here one cannot but regret Trotsky's sweeping statement that 'any serious factional fight in a party is always in the final analysis a reflection of the class struggle'. [Trotsky (1971), p.77.] This verges on a vulgar materialist interpretation of human thought as growing directly out of material conditions! What class pressures separated Lenin from Luxemburg, or Trotsky from Lenin (1903-17), or what change in class pressures can one see in Plekhanov's zigzags: with Lenin in 1903, against him in 1903, against him in 1905, with him again (and at last breaking, it is true, with Lenin and with the revolutionary movement and joining the class enemy)? Can the differences in the theory of imperialism between Lenin and Luxemburg be derived from an analysis of their position in class society? Scientific socialism must live and thrive on controversy. And scientists who start off with the same basic assumptions, and then use the same method of analysis, do differ in all fields of research." [Cliff (1960), pp.126-30. Here, I have used the version reprinted in Cliff (2001). Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
It is almost as if the party were run by automata, or by individuals who had no class-origin themselves, and hence had no philosophical baggage which they brought with them into the movement.
But, to suggest that the above stalwarts were human beings, who might have had ruling-class ideas already installed by their upbringing, socialisation, education and class background (ideas that had originally been concocted by countless generations of ruling-class hacks, just as Marx pointed out). Like the rest of humanity, these individuals react to defeat and demoralisation by looking for some sort of explanation, some form of consolation, in order to rationalise, reconfigure or even neutralise the intense cognitive dissonance such repeated set-backs must generate. To suggest this in no way amounts to a concession to "vulgar reductionism" (as is often claimed -- more on that here). On the contrary, it is to take Marx seriously when he said the following:
"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." [Marx (1859), p.181. Quoted from here.]
Naturally, we must analyse and/or critique the beliefs held by (most non-fascist) fellow human beings with some sensitivity, but revolutionaries like Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky weren't beamed down to the earth from a passing spaceship, nor were they born fully-formed with every single one of their mature ideas pre-installed.
But, when we find virtually every avowed Marxist -- despite their otherwise massive political differences -- ranging from Leninists to Trotskyists, Maoists to Stalinists, Libertarian Communists to non-Orthodox Trotskyists, accepting and attempting to apply almost exactly the same dialectical doctrines (derived from that ruling-class hack, Hegel -- upside down or the 'right way up'), that constitutes reasonably powerful, prima facie evidence that "social being" might very well have been at work here doing a little "determining", shaping the collective 'dialectical consciousness' of generations of Dialectical Marxists. [Again, there is much more on this in Part Two.]
Of course, this isn't to suggest that substitutionism hasn't been discussed at length by Marxists. Far from it. But, the debate so far has often been rather defensive, uncharacteristically piecemeal and vaguely apologetic, lacking any attempt to examine its roots in the class position of its leading proponents, or even the ruling-class ideology they brought with them into the movement. [Cliff's article perhaps constitutes Exhibit A in this respect.]
In Cliff's case, and with respect to the revolutionary party itself, substitutionism is portrayed as a latent disposition of little consequence or danger when the wider movement is vibrant, healthy and advancing, but which poses considerable threat when the movement is weak, in retreat or in what might look like its death throws.
Hence, substitutionism is depicted in terms that make it seem almost inevitable, given the 'right sort of circumstances'.
Indeed, Cliff all but suggests that the party will naturally gravitate in that direction unless it is prevented from doing so by an assertive working class!
But, in view of the fact that Marxist parties these days tend to be small (or, if large -- as they are in some 'third world' countries -- dependent on a predominantly passive working class base, which only serves as election-fodder or financial support, etc.), this can only mean, if Cliff is correct, that every Marxist Party is actively substitutionist or at least tends in that direction!
There is even a hint of this in Victor Serge's famous comment:
"It is often said that 'the germ of all Stalinism was in Bolshevism at its beginning'. Well, I have no objection. Only, Bolshevism also contained many other germs, a mass of other germs, and those who lived through the enthusiasm of the first years of the first victorious socialist revolution ought not to forget it. To judge the living man by the death germs which the autopsy reveals in the corpse -- and which he may have carried in him since his birth -- is that very sensible?" [Quoted from here.]
However, Serge neglected to identify this "germ of Stalinism". Might it have something to do with the class origin, class position, ideology, and psychology of leading Dialectical Marxists?
Naturally, this doesn't mean revolutionary theorists have failed to consider other aspects or causes of substitutionism, or that different explanations of it don't exist. [Nor is this meant to minimise the objective and truly dire conditions on the ground in the former Soviet Union [fSU] during the period 1918-1925.] What is undeniable, though, is that little systematic thought appears to have been devoted to the internal features and motivating factors of this phenomenon -- and especially to its ideological roots. Hence, little attention has been devoted to:
(i) The theoretical background that provides Dialectical Marxism with what appears to be its revolutionary rationale; and,
(ii) The class origin of those who were so easily compromised by Traditional Philosophy, and especially Mystical Christianity, in the shape of Hegel.
Indeed, even less thought has been devoted to:
(iii) The material, social and philosophical roots of substitutionist ideology.
It is undeniable that substitutionism must have an ideological basis if it is to have any effect on human beings, as opposed to, say, 'motivating' automata. But, exactly how it achieves this has never really been examined.
Without doubt, our understanding of the relationship between the Revolutionary Class and the Revolutionary Party has changed considerably over the last 150 years, yet the specific details of the theoretical (let alone the practical) relationship between the two have remained somewhat imprecise, vague and sketchy. That seems to be because few seem ready to admit that a serious problem actually exists in this area, even though the aforementioned relationship has presented the movement with intractable difficulties at important historical junctures -- for example in the fSU after October 1917, during the subsequent Civil War following on the almost total destruction of the Russian proletariat as an effective political, economic and social force in the early 1920s, and, of course, the death of Lenin.
Nevertheless, since the above relationship is central to the success or failure of Marxism -- and in view of the fact that Dialectical Marxism has witnessed little other than long-term failure -- it can only mean there is something profoundly wrong both with our movement and its ideas.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]
Indeed, it also suggests that our relationship with the working-class isn't all it should be, either.
However, it isn't my intention to address that particular problem in this Essay. [It has been partially dealt with in Essay Ten.] My aim here will be limited to the connection that is alleged (by me) to exist between DM and important ideological features of substitutionist thought.
Clearly, a solution to the former (i.e., the relation between the working-class and the Party) can only benefit from a resolution of the latter (i.e., the connection between DM and substitutionism).
Philosophy -- Imported Into Marxism
In his book Marxism And The Party, John Molyneux attempted to reconcile Marx's claim that the "emancipation of the working class" is the "act of the working class" with Lenin's belief that:
"Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of the relations between workers and employers." [Lenin (1947), p.78. Quoted in Molyneux (1978), p.45. Italic emphases in the original.]1
My aim here isn't to take issue with Molyneux's resolution of this apparent, but much discussed, problem. What is of present concern is that whatever 'dialectical relationship' there in fact exists, or is imagined to exist, between the working-class and the Party, it is clear that Molyneux concedes that workers of themselves can't develop a "revolutionary consciousness" -- or, at least, one that is politically even or fully-formed -- a fact which is undisputed by most Leninists, anyway.
Of course, as Hal Draper argued many years ago, this is a caricature of Lenin's position, but the point is that the 'received view' has, rightly or wrongly, motivated the approach adopted by many, if not most, self-described Leninists ever since. [Draper (1999).]
[More recently, Lars Lih has pushed his own 'revisionary' ideas to their limit (cf., Lih (2006)). See also Harman (2010) and Lih (2010).]
Nevertheless, how this particular theoretical dispute will finally be resolved (whether Lenin was right in what he appears to have said, or whether his views have been seriously misrepresented, etc.) doesn't affect the point being made here, as we are about to discover.
The 'received view' tells us that there is a pressing need for intervention by the Party to bring revolutionary ideas to workers. To be sure, not only must the Party learn from workers and their struggles, it must have in its ranks revolutionary proletarians themselves -- i.e., the "advanced" sections of the working class, as Marx and Engels termed them:
"The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement." [Marx & Engels (1968b), p.46.]
However, whether or not these "advanced sections" have always been, or have always remained, won't be entered into in this Essay (they will be in Part Two). Nevertheless, to state the obvious, the structure of the Party should be as democratic as the exigencies of the class struggle permit, and even though the Party will be "of the working class", it is still separate from it. Furthermore, it not only represents the "memory" of the class, it also remains a "tribune" for all sections of the oppressed (etc., etc.).2
However, it is worth emphasising that in What Is To Be Done? [henceforth, WITBD], Lenin doesn't say that workers can't develop "political consciousness", or that they can only do so outside the "economic struggle". Lenin pointedly leaves it open whether or not they might be able to develop this form of 'consciousness' in other ways. Clearly, if that is correct it must mean they don't need to have it introduced to them by 'the intelligentsia'. Lenin is merely talking issue with those he calls the "economists", theorists who argue that workers should only concern themselves with 'bread and butter' issues -- for example, rate of pay, safety at work, the length of the working day, hours worked, pensions, health care, etc., etc. Lenin clearly argued that when workers are drawn into fighting all forms of oppression, they will develop 'Social Democratic consciousness'. So, his use of the controversial word "outside" refers not to the working class as such, but to the economic struggle. He is talking about "outside" that struggle! Outside that struggle workers can develop 'Social Democratic consciousness', which is why communists agitate them in this direction and to fight all forms of oppression. It is amazing, to say the least, that critics of Lenin (and, indeed, most 'Leninists') have missed this simple, but glaringly obvious, point for over a century. [I have added the relevant passage from WITBD to Appendix B, along with Lars Lih's new translation.]
Indeed, Lenin agreed with Marx and Engels:
"Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarian, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years." [Marx and Engels (1968b), p.43. Bold emphasis added.]
Marx was even clearer in this 1871 letter:
"The political movement of the working class has as its object, of course, the conquest of political power for the working class, and for this it is naturally necessary that a previous organisation of the working class, itself arising from their economic struggles, should have been developed up to a certain point. On the other hand, however, every movement in which the working class comes out as a class against the ruling classes and attempts to force them by pressure from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory or even a particular industry to force a shorter working day out of the capitalists by strikes, etc., is a purely economic movement. On the other hand the movement to force an eight-hour day, etc., law is a political movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say a movement of the class, with the object of achieving its interests in a general form, in a form possessing a general social force of compulsion. If these movements presuppose a certain degree of previous organisation, they are themselves equally a means of the development of this organisation." [Marx to F. Bolte, 23/11/1871. Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
So, for Marx, as for Lenin, economic struggles are either already political or they often turn in that direction. So, as we all know, economic struggles can soon lead workers into a direct confrontation with the state, which then motivates them to raise political demands: representation, male and female suffrage, education, safety, housing, healthcare, pensions, the legalisation of Trade Unions, etc., etc. As we have seen in the intervening years, depending on contemporaneous (subjective and objective) circumstances, these struggles can even move in a revolutionary direction. [I have entered into this in more detail in an answer of mine published on Quora.]
Be this as it may, a paradox still remains: even though the Party's strategy and tactics have been derived from a series of long-term interventions in workers' struggles, its philosophical ideas clearly originated elsewhere. And that is why the resolution of the above controversy is irrelevant (in this context).
Nevertheless, any such 'resolution' can't alter the fact that Dialectical Marxism's core philosophical ideas were developed "outside", and independent of, the working class and its struggles (of whatever kind -- as we will see), and hence they have had to be introduced to workers "from the outside".
Lenin himself confirmed as much several times (as have other Dialectical Marxists, many of whom are openly proud of that fact):
"The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." [Lenin (1947), pp.31-32. Bold emphases added.]
"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]2a
DM: Introduced To Workers 'From The Outside'
Lenin's argument is much more involved than the above brief quotation might suggest, and John Molyneux's analysis of it (which won't be questioned here) is admirably clear. [Molyneux (1978).] That topic belongs to HM, a subject area largely avoided in these Essays.
[Readers should also consult Lih (2006), Blackledge (2006) and John Molyneux's review of Lih's book, here.]
Be this as it may, as pointed out earlier, Lenin's words show that he certainly believed that DM had to be brought to workers from "the outside" because of its roots in Traditional Philosophy -- whatever else he might have meant in WITBD.
"The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." [Lenin (1947), pp.31-32. Bold emphases added.]
"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
Now, it isn't a matter of opinion or debate where the ideas enshrined in DM actually originated; the historical record is perfectly clear and acknowledged on all sides, as, indeed, Lenin himself concedes. Nor is it plausible to believe that workers of themselves could re-discover the ideas Hegel inflicted on humanity.
[Once again, the claim that Dietzgen's work falsifies any such assertion has been neutralised in Interlude Three.]
On the other hand, it is open to debate what Lenin actually meant in WITBD. Consequently, whatever Lenin in fact intended in that book, it is quite clear that DM itself has had to be introduced to workers from "the outside".
Indeed, as we will also see, it has had to be substituted into workers' heads 'against the materialist grain', as it were.
As this Essay aims to show, the fact that workers can't attain a 'dialectical view of reality' as a result of their own efforts isn't meant to question their intellectual capacities. No one (not even Hegel) is capable of attaining such a view.
There is no such thing as 'a dialectical view' of anything.
What dialecticians have in fact concocted is a set of impenetrably obscure theories which they certainly can't explain to anyone (and that includes one another!), let alone workers, with any clarity. There is thus no 'dialectical view of reality' any more than there is a Trinitarian view of 'God'. To be sure, there is Trinitarian Jargon, and there are those who are skilled at verbalising it at one another as if the words they utter made some sort of sense, just as there is Dialectical Jargon and those who mouth it at one another as if it, too, makes an ounce of sense. But neither makes any sense, so neither is capable of expressing 'a view' of anything -- as the Essays posted at this site clearly show.
As we will see, philosophical ideas like these can't be derived by workers themselves (and that isn't because they lack necessary 'intelligence'), hence they have to be introduced to them "from the outside". In which case, whatever Lenin really meant in WITBD, and despite the 'revisionist' reading put about by Lars Lih, it is plain that DM itself has had to be introduced to the entire movement "from the outside".
In which case, the following comment must also apply to DM and its origin:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65. Bold emphasis added.]
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
[The real significance of these comments will become increasingly clear as this Essay and Part Two unfold.]
Of course, in TAR John Rees argued that dialectical concepts arose partly out of a theoretical analysis of the growth of Capitalism, partly out of an engagement with the long-term resistance mounted by workers -- among other things --, and partly out of the interplay between the two. However, when these concepts are examined (as they will be below), it is clear that Rees's picture of revolutionary theory is, to say the least, a stranger to the truth. In fact, it is about as inaccurate as anything could be.
Not only is it impossible to believe that DM-concepts could have been cobbled-together in this way, it is equally impossible to believe a single one of them could have been developed by workers themselves. Nor could these concepts have been derived from any sort of interaction between the Party and workers, nor from a scientific analysis of the natural world -- or even an analysis of social development.
And neither could they have been developed in response to the experience of the Party, nor yet from any conceivable body of experience that a single human being could ever conceivably have encountered.3
Bold claims, for sure. Much of the rest of this Essay (and the next two) will be devoted to showing why such boldness is fully justified.
[In what follows, I first of all present a series of apparently dogmatic statements. The rest of this Essay, Part Two and Essay Ten Part One are aimed at substantiating each and every claim.]
I aim to show that while workers are capable of developing ideas consonant with HM (which is what enables them to connect with revolutionary theory and practice, systematised by the revolutionary party when the encounter it), they can't form from their own experience -- as a matter of fact and logic -- any notion whatsoever of concepts drawn exclusively from DM (or Hegel's work -- upside down or 'the right way up').
Indeed, it will be shown that such concepts lie way beyond the experience that any human being could conceivably have.
And that includes Dialectical Marxists themselves.
It will be argued, therefore, that workers have had to have this ruling-class ideology imposed on them. DM has to be substituted into workers' heads by outside influence (i.e., from outside the working class), and this has had to be done against their materialist inclinations and their use of ordinary language. In fact, DM has to replace many of the ideas that workers might already have formed, which could have helped them understand, not just Marxism, but how to transform their own lives by acting for themselves and in their own interests. In short, it will be argued that DM not only cripples workers' comprehension of Marxism, it hinders their self-activity, fatally compromising their capacity to mould society in their favour and thereby create a socialist society.
Even worse: it will be maintained that not only does DM put workers off Marxism (because it is incomprehensible), it aggravates sectarianism and hence helps fragment what they might otherwise have assumed was 'their' (united) Party, encouraging a climate of unreasonableness, backbiting and systematic corruption (political, personal, economic and sexual). Worse still, this theory/method 'allows' Dialectical Marxists to rationalise substitutionism, which approach has systematically helped cripple revolutionary socialism, putting hundreds of millions of workers off Marxism, leading directly or indirectly to the death or serious injury of countless thousands of proletarians and their family members. [That particular topic will form a key part of Essay Nine Part Two.]
Plainly, this in no way makes a century or more of the antics of Dialectical Marxists appealing to workers.
Furthermore, it will also be shown that despite claims to the contrary, revolutionaries themselves couldn't possibly employ -- or have ever employed -- dialectical concepts, either (i) In their own day-to-day activity, or (ii) During revolutionary upheavals (such as 1917). [On that, see here.]
That is because it is impossible to implement incomprehensible concepts. Since no one (not Engels, not Lenin, not Trotsky, not Plekhanov, not Kautsky, not Stalin, not Mao, not Luxembourg, not Gramsci, nor anyone else for that matter) is capable of understanding DM, it can't feature, nor could it have featured, in the practical activity of the Party, despite what we are constantly told. Again, that isn't because DM is too difficult to grasp, it is because it is both non-sensical, incoherent and far too confused for anyone to be able to understand and thus act upon.
[Why that is so will be explained in detail in Essay Nine Part Two here, here, here, here and here, as well as Essay Twelve Part One, here.]
Hence, the bottom line is that the concepts found in DM can't have been developed out of -- or in response to -- the class struggle (by any stretch of the imagination), by anyone, ever. In that case, whatever else they it is, DM is neither historical nor materialist.
Furthermore, it will also be argued that one of the spin-off side-effects of this ruling-class 'theory' is that it locks workers into a passive ideology, which transforms them into the objects of theory, not the subjects of history. [As should seem obvious, that is a key component of Substitutionism.] In connection with this it will be maintained that DM fosters in workers a servile, subservient notion of themselves as the playthings of mysterious metaphysical forces that neither they nor anyone else understands -- or ever will, or ever could --, but which they find they have to accept because DM forms an integral part of a philosophical tradition they had no part in building. In this way it is analogous the mysteries Popes, Bishops, Priests, Pastors, and Imams use to consolidate their power, wealth and influence. It is no accident therefore that DM originated in the heart of Mystical Christianity and Hermetic Mysticism.4
Strange as this might seem, the political and organisational 'activity' in which Dialectical Marxists engage has:
(a) Inadvertently contributed to the theoretical passivity of what few workers they have managed to attract to their ranks;
(b) Helped, directly or indirectly, put them off Marxism altogether; by,
(i) Attempting to fill their heads with an incomprehensible theory they simply have to accept, which no one is allowed to question;
(ii) Saddling them with undemocratic, even anti-democratic, party and/or state structures; and by,
(iii) Murdering them or otherwise directly or indirectly causing countless thousands of their deaths, among other contemptible anti-Marxist 'activities'.
All this is quite remarkable -- not just because this represents yet another set of 'dialectical inversions' -- but because no one seems to have spotted it before. Or, at least, no one has recognised the important role that the class origin and current class position of Dialectical Marxism's 'leading figures, alongside their theory/method -- DM -- has played in all this.
These (as yet to be substantiated and clarified) accusations are completely unique to this site.
Nevertheless, if the above remarks turn out to be correct, it is in fact the self-activity of workers that DM-theorists have turned on its head, not Hegel.
To that end, workers have had to be ideologically knocked off their feet, their materialist ideas inverted and mystified.
This topsy-turvy approach to revolutionary theory is just one more reason why Dialectical Marxism is, and has always been, so revolutionarily impotent and politically regressive.
DM thus encapsulates, not the 'rational core' within the famed 'mystical shell', but the rotten core of a monumental fiasco.
In stark contrast, HM provides workers with a clear and coherent analysis of the course of human history, in tandem with the vital part they must play in overthrowing the system that their exploiters and oppressors use to dominate them, a scientific theory which also connects directly with, and gives expression to, their daily experience of oppression, exploitation and alienation in class-divided society.
Hence, unlike DM, HM doesn't need to be substituted into workers' heads, it just needs to be introduced to them; and, as we will see, not 'from the outside', either.
In comparison, once more, DM (anachronistically) stands out as an atavistic throw-back to ideas that have motivated the ruling elite and their ideologues for thousands of years. By bringing DM to workers, Dialectical Marxists have inadvertently substituted metaphysical obscurantism for crystal clear materialism, and have thereby imposed on workers (and themselves) a theory that not only they don't understand, no one understands, or could understand.
Serious doubts have been raised throughout this site about the philosophical provenance of the concepts promulgated by Dialectical Marxists, but its actual historical origins aren't in any doubt. Its long and sordid history is there for all to see (and will be exposed in detail in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here)).
That fact doesn't need inverting; it just needs airing. DM grew out of the most all-encompassing form of Absolute Idealism ever concocted, a theory cemented right at the heart of an archaic tradition of philosophical and mystical speculation that stretches back into Ancient Greece, and even further, into Ancient Egypt -- and arguably beyond that to the very origins of class society itself, as, indeed, Lenin himself admitted.5
This means that DM has had to be brought to workers 'from the outside', from ideological traditions and forms-of-thought that are inimical to their interests and alien to their materialist good sense, whose concepts lie way beyond anybody's grasp and are foreign both to their experience and their everyday use of language.
Contrary to what some might now think, these claims are nearly as easy to substantiate as they are to make.
The rest of this Essay (and this site) is aimed at showing that that isn't an empty boast.
DM: A Deep Mystery Even To Dialectical Marxists
It could be argued that while many scientific theories lie way beyond the grasp of the majority -- given the poor education they receive in class-divided society -- that doesn't automatically brand them as inimical to their interests or of no use to revolutionaries. Most of modern science transcends ordinary experience; since that presents no problems for scientists, it can't present any for Dialectical Marxism, either. If so, the fact that workers don't understand DM (that is, even if it were conceded for the purposes of argument that they don't), this doesn't imply it represents ruling-class interests.
Or, so it could be maintained...
However, with respect to understanding science, only an inadequate education and insufficient leisure time stands in the way of ordinary individuals mastering that subject, or at least gaining a rudimentary and working knowledge of it. But the situation with DM is completely different. In the Essays posted at this site, we have seen on numerous occasions that even the DM-classicists find it impossible to explain its core ideas to one another -- or to anyone else, for that matter (let alone to workers) -- in a comprehensible form. Not only have we witnessed DM-theses repeatedly collapse into incoherence at the slightest encouragement, we have also seen how impenetrably vague and equivocal they are. In fact, even now, well over one hundred and forty years since Engels, Dietzgen and Plekhanov first invented DM, not one of its core ideas has been 'explained' in anything other than a terminally obscure form.6
Indeed, DM has remained in the same confused state that its classicists left it. From the beginning, Dialectical Marxists have largely relied on simply repeating, generation after generation, the same vague notions and confused ideas they inherited from Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Mao, the dialectical needle well and truly stuck in the same Ideal groove.
Hence, what we find in the DM-literature are the same erroneous assertions made about FL (which is repeatedly and continually -- and one suspects, deliberately -- conflated with Aristotelian Syllogistic), the same confused references to the LOI, the LEM, the LOC (and their connection with change), the same soporific and mantra-like repetition of Engels's vague and garbled "Three Laws of Dialectics",7 the same appeal to an epistemology that is as implausible as it is unworkable, the same unimaginative examples repackaged as if they were still farm fresh, or even relevant (e.g., those involving boiling/freezing water, Mendeleyev's table, John's manhood, a character from Molière's Monsieur Jourdain discovering he has been speaking prose all his life, plants negating seeds, Mamelukes out-fighting French soldiers (or maybe not), "yea, yea", and "nay, nay", and so on, ad nauseam, decade after decade). In addition, we encounter the same bluster, hand waving, sweeping generalisations, cherry-picking, and confirmation bias -- not forgetting the snide remarks, abuse and diversionary tactics whenever DM encounters any serious criticism.8
DM, the much-touted 'Philosophy of Change', has remained stuck in a 19th century time-warp; little sign here of the Heraclitean Flux!
[FL = Formal Logic; LOI = Law of Identity; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]
It is pertinent to ask, therefore: How is it possible for DM to be "brought to workers" (as an integral component of revolutionary theory) if not even its best theorists seem capable of 'bringing it to themselves', as it were, after over 140 years of not trying all that hard?
Well: Have You Read And Fully Understood The Whole Of Hegel's Logic?
The alarming facts upon which the above allegations supervene are thrown into even starker relief by Lenin's surprising and oft-quoted remark -- that not one single Marxist up until his day, which must have included Engels, Dietzgen, Kautsky, Luxemburg, and Plekhanov actually understood Marx's Capital, since none of them, according to Lenin, had fully mastered Hegel's Logic!
"It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]9
Clearly, Lenin's aside raises serious questions of its own. If professional revolutionaries find Hegel's work impossibly difficult to comprehend (few in my experience even bother to consult much of what Hegel wrote, let alone attempt to study the entire Logic -- but, which Logic did Lenin actually mean (there are in fact two!)?9a --, is it credible that workers themselves are capable of comprehending the whole of 'the logic' in its entirety? In which case -- if Lenin is to be believed --, what chance is there that anyone (revolutionary or worker) will ever make head or tail of Das Kapital?10
Even worse, Lenin's comments suggest that only a tiny fraction (if that!) of revolutionaries have ever fully understood Marxism (or at least Das Kapital). Can anyone understand Marx if they haven't fully grasped that classic? Lenin is quite clear: only those Marxists who have "thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic" (emphases added) can claim to be able to comprehend Das Kapital; short of that they can't. Again, how many revolutionaries have thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic (let alone read it) since Lenin's day? Even professional philosophers find Hegel's Logic daunting, and of those who claim to understand it, the presumption must be that that is an empty boast until they succeed in explaining it clearly to the rest of us.11
Perhaps of more significance is the additional and decidedly unwelcome fact that Lenin didn't have access to the substantive revisions Hegel wanted to add to the second edition of his Science of Logic, which are now available to modern readers -- i.e., Hegel (2015). [The substantive changes have been outlined on pp.vii-xv.]
As the Introduction notes:
"The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline [i.e., Hegel (2015) -- RL] is the only form in which Hegel ever published his entire mature philosophical system. It is therefore an indispensable text for those who want to study Hegel's conception of philosophy as a whole." [Hegel (2015), p.x.]
Never mind Lenin, did Marx have access to these revisions? Do they matter? Do they change anything? [No pun intended.] Indeed, do they affect the interpretation of Das Kapital, even if you accept the standard view that Marx was influenced by Hegel when he wrote that classic work? [But on that, see below.] I have yet to see a single Marxist comment on this. [If anyone knows differently, please e-mail me with the details!]
Nevertheless, a far more serious and damaging question is the following: How would it be possible to decide if anyone has ever actually understood all of Hegel's Logic?
Plainly, we can't enquire of Hegel what 'the correct interpretation' of his work is. Even Lenin himself failed to provide us with a comprehensive (or comprehensible) account of all of Hegel's Logic. He merely transcribed large sections of it and added a few obscure remarks of his own! [And 'Good Luck!' to anyone trying to understand them, too!] And, as we know with regard to the interpretation of that other (but far less) obscure book -- The Bible --, it is always open for someone to claim that their interpretation is the correct one, while all the rest aren't, with no effective or consistent way of deciding between them.
Of course, as we will see, this is precisely what allows revolutionary sectarians to impose their own brand orthodoxy on their corner of the militant market. Indeed, buried in there somewhere is one of the reasons why sectarianism is endemic in Dialectical Marxism;12 Hegel's Logic is to DM what the Bible is to Christianity -- and hence to splits, divisions and accusations of heresy. In relation to both books, a 'correct' interpretation functions as a permanent and convenient test of orthodoxy; their 'authority' is a source of mystification as much as it is a 'guarantor of righteousness'.
Moreover, as is relatively easy to demonstrate, this in-built obscurantism actually helps Dialectical Marxists ground whatever post hoc rationalisations and opportunistic 'reinterpretations' they require in order to 'justify' inconsistent, undemocratic manoeuvrings, or counter-revolutionary strategies and tactics, as and when the need arises. Furthermore, as is the case with 'sacred texts' in general -- where priests, theologians and assorted 'holy men' claim exclusive interpretive rights --, only a handful of self-selected and self-appointed Dialectical Magi can 'rightly' claim to 'understand' Hegel's Logic (and hence DM -- and thereby Marxism), even if they find it impossible to prove it by explaining DM clearly to anyone this side of the Kuiper Belt.
That being so, few among the rank-and-file will feel confident (or foolish) enough to question the theoretical deliverances made on their behalf by the likes of Stalin, Mao, Mandel, Healy, Pablo, Hoxha, Grant, North, Avakian --, or, whomever else.13
Another analogy (drawn once more against the Numinous) springs to mind here: there would be little point in anyone complaining that the promulgations and tactical zigzags mentioned above were "inconsistent" in themselves, or were incongruous with whatever had passed either for 'orthodoxy' and the party line just the day before. That would simply confirm that the one complaining had obviously failed to 'understand dialectics'. [Several examples of this are given in Essay Nine Part Two.] Consistency is no more to be expected of Dialectical Marxists than it is of Doctors of Divinity or even Zen Buddhists. After all, 'The Deity' and 'The Dialectic' move in mysterious and contradictory ways; 'The Divine Mind' is no less baffling than 'The Dialectical Mind'. This makes DM a highly useful and convenient ideological cover to which our 'leaders' can appeal when they aim to justify whatever they like or whatever they find expedient -- i.e., saying one thing one day, the exact opposite the next. Or, as we will also see, saying one thing and the exact opposites in the same speech, paragraph, or even sentence! Which is, of course, one reason why they are loathe to abandon this infinitely pliable 'theory'. [Once again, I have given several examples of this in Part Two (link a few sentences ago).].14
Here lies the source of much of the corruption we have witnessed in and around Dialectical Marxism. If your core theory allows you to justify anything you like and its opposite (since DM glories in contradiction -- its theorists claim to be able to see them everywhere, or they invent them to order as they see fit -- once more I have given examples of this in Part Two), then the party to which you belong can be as undemocratic as its leaders please while they argue that it is 'dialectically the opposite' and is the very epitome of democratic accountability. It will also 'allow' them to claim that their party is situated at the vanguard of the fight against all forms of oppression, all the while covering up, ignoring, justifying, rationalising, excusing or explaining away sexual abuse and rape in that very same party. After all, if we become used to 'thinking dialectically', an extra contradiction or two here and there is simply more grist to the dialectical mill!
And if you complain? Well, you just don't 'understand dialectics'...
However, few scientists would be foolish enough to make similar claims for any of the classics in the history of science -- not even of Darwin's Origin or Newton's Principia --, i.e., that only if the latter were studied from end to end and thoroughly understood could an aspiring researcher or student claim to comprehend modern science. It is reasonably safe to assert that only a minority of scientists have actually read (let alone studied) most (or all) of the classics in the history of their field, but that doesn't significantly affect their work.15
Now, even though revolutionary theory is different from other scientific disciplines, that doesn't mean incomprehensible philosophical texts must be treated theologically, with every word regarded as required reading and every syllable understood before initiation into deeper mysteries can begin. And yet, Lenin's aside indicates that that is exactly how Hegel's Logic should be viewed by the DM-faithful: only the correct understanding of this intractably obscure work -- in its entirety -- is sufficient to allow novice socialists to proceed to the next level: trying to comprehend Marx's classic before they too can be set loose to spread the Glad Tidings.
Of course, this is all rather puzzling since Marx himself never claimed this for his work!16
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Interlude One: Marx And Dialectical Materialism - 1
[This used to form part of Note 6.]
In this sub-section I don't propose to intervene in any great detail in the debate whether or not Marx agreed with Engels that there is a 'dialectic' at work in nature (although I have dealt with a recent attempt made by Thomas Weston to rehabilitate the traditional view of the philosophical relation between them, as well as his attempt to show that 'dialectical contradictions' can be represented by opposing forces in Essay Eight Part Two: here, here, here, here, here, here, here -- and now in this Essay, here). It seems rather obvious to me that Marx and Engels didn't agree over this theory, mainly since DM was invented by Engels and Plekhanov. But, it seems equally plain to others that they did.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on context.]
I will, however, endeavour to show in Interlude Two that by the time Marx came to publish the Second Edition of Das Kapital he had rejected Hegel, root-and-branch (upside down and 'the right way up'). If I can show that, then the broader idea that he agreed with Engels on everything will, naturally, fall by the wayside. Of course, this is a highly contentious issue and confronts a long-standing and well-entrenched tradition (begun by Engels, not Marx) that promotes the contrary view. In which case, what I have to say on this topic will doubtless meet with immediate rejection by the vast majority of fellow revolutionaries -- that is, in the extremely unlikely event that they read this Essay.
If they make it this far, all I can say to them is: examine the material I have presented below (but, especially in Interlude Two), and then, if you still disagree, email me with your best arguments aimed at showing me where you think I have gone wrong.
Truth be told, the few scattered remarks that are usually produced in order to suggest that Marx did agree with Engels about everything, including DM, are far from conclusive, especially since most of them appear in prefaces, footnotes, asides and afterthoughts (etc.) -- as Terrell Carver points out:
"It is interesting that the major texts by Marx that are cited in conjunction with Engels' claims are often footnotes and tangential remarks. The 1859 preface, for example, contains a 'guiding thread,' which Engels re-voiced as a lapidary doctrine, beginning with his book review of the same year. Marx himself consigned these few sentences of text to a footnote to Capital, volume 1, surely not the place for one of the scientific discoveries of the age. Originally it came from a hastily drafted preface and was intended merely to guide the reader; as a footnote to another text it seems exactly that, a footnote…. There may be a highly ironic authorial strategy in Marx that reverses footnotes to texts in terms of speaking to the reader, but as a way of reading Marx, in my view, this focus on footnotes and odd sentences tends toward the cabalistic. References to Hegel are similarly cast by Marx himself in a prefatory and comparative vein, typically in the second preface to Capital, volume 1, in which he comments at length on someone else's (a Russian reviewer's) comparison of his (Marx's) method to the one employed by 'that mighty thinker' (Hegel). There are few references indeed to 'dialectic' in Marx, and none to its centrality to explaining anything and everything (Carver 1981, ch.5). Marx merely comments that he 'coquetted' with Hegelian terminology in the opening chapters of Capital, volume 1, and makes a limited number of qualified comparisons elsewhere in the text. My point here with respect to commentators is that these remarks and passages are not so much 'taken out of context' as put into a context supplied by the Engelsian tradition…." [Carver (1999), pp.25-26. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
This whole issue has been debated at length many times. The case against the 'received' view can be found in Carver (1980, 1981, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1989, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). See also Jordan (1967), Levine (1975, 1984, 2006), and Thomas (2009).
The 'orthodox' view (i.e., that Marx and Engels were in total agreement on everything, possibly even their favourite colour!) can be found in Novack (1978), pp.85-115, Rees (1994), pp.48-56, Sheehan (1993), pp.48-64, and Weston (2012) (this links to a PDF). Cf., also Stanley and Zimmerman (1984) and Welty (1983). [Again, I have examined the (few!) passages taken from Marx's published work that Thomas Weston offers in support of the idea that he (Marx) accepted the doctrine that there is a 'dialectic' in nature, here.]
[AD = Anti-Dühring; i.e., Engels (1976).]
Several of those who defend the traditional view of their relationship point to Engels's claim that he had read AD to Marx, and that Marx even contributed a chapter, which supposedly proves that Marx endorsed every single word in the entire book.
"I must note in passing that inasmuch as the mode of outlook expounded in this book was founded and developed in far greater measure by Marx, and only to an insignificant degree by myself, it was self-understood between us that this exposition of mine should not be issued without his knowledge. I read the whole manuscript to him before it was printed, and the tenth chapter of the part on economics...was written by Marx but unfortunately had to be shortened somewhat by me for purely external reasons. As a matter of fact, we had always been accustomed to help each other out in special subjects." [Engels (1976), pp.8-9. Bold emphasis added. This is from Preface II, dated September 23, 1885, two-and-a-half years after Marx's death.]
But, if Engels did read this to Marx (and it is worth noting that he (Engels) never made that claim while Marx was alive), it would surely have taken at least two whole days to complete.
[In the Preface to Volume 25 of MECW (which also contains AD), the editors claim that Marx "read and approved of the whole manuscript" [Marx and Engels (1987a), pp.xiii-xiv], but in support they cite (i) Engels's claim that he read AD to Marx (Note 1, p.646 of Volume 25), and (ii) p.9 of the same volume -- where Engels tells us he read "entire manuscript" to Marx. So, the only proof we have that Marx was cognisant of the entire content of AD is Engels's claim he read it to Marx. There is no hint of this in their correspondence, and Engels gave no date for this alleged event. Had Marx read the entire manuscript himself, Engels would not only have said so he wouldn't have needed to read it to Marx -- or, indeed, claim he had done so. Both claims can't be right -- i.e., that Marx read AD himself and that he had it read to him by Engels. The editors of Volume 25 cite no other evidence (from Marx or Engels's letters, or anything else they wrote) in support of their assertion that Marx himself read the whole manuscript and approved it. In which case, their claim must be treated with suspicion until they produce the missing evidence. None of the other defenders of the 'Orthodox' line have produced any evidence in support of the claim that Marx had read AD himself, either, or that he allowed Engels to read it to him.]
So, on what do I base the claim that it would have taken two whole days to read AD to Marx? The latter is based on the following estimations and calculations:
I estimate the book is slightly under 130,000 words long. In the version I have, the Peking Edition, there are approximately 300 words per page. If we omit the Prefaces and the Notes, there are just over 430 pages; so 430 x 300 = 129,000. [Two of the Prefaces were added after Marx had died, anyway, so they can't count, even if we were to believe Engels's story.]
I timed myself reading several pages of the above Edition, and doing so fairly rapidly it took me on average 1 minute 50 seconds to complete each page. So, reading non-stop, the entire book would take approximately 13 hours 10 minutes to finish. When I slowed down slightly, that added 20 seconds per page on average, increasing the total by 2 hours 20 minutes. The slower pace meant it would have taken 15 hours 30 minutes to read the entire book, non-stop. If we now add a 10 minute break every hour to the faster of these two times (e.g., for toilet or smoke breaks -- also taking into consideration the fact that Engels was a smoker, so he would have been slowed down somewhat by puffing away on several cigars, coughing regularly, stopping to light up again from time-to-time -- but allowing no time for discussion, drinks, food or sleep), the entire manuscript would have taken and extra 2 hours 10 minutes, which means the grand total would now be 15 hours 20 minutes.
[As noted above, when I slowed down slightly that added twenty seconds per page on average -- increasing the total time by 2 hours 20 minutes -- bringing the overall time to 17 hours 40 minutes, when we take into account the above additional considerations.]
In relation to the faster read, if we now allow for an eight-hour day, with a couple of hours for meal and/or drink breaks every eight hours, etc., that would increase the total by at least 4 hours -- meaning the total time taken would now be just under 20 hours. This represents two-and-half days (i.e., for an eight-hour day), of Engels banging on, and on...
But, the above figures are unrealistic, anyway, even if we accept Engels's version of events. Does anyone realistically think that Marx wouldn't have interrupted from time to time to ask questions, make a few points, or request clarification? Or that there would have been no discussion at all between the two? This alone would have added an hour or two to the total.
[Incidentally, if we omit the Prefaces and the Notes, there are 293 pages in the MECW edition (Volume 25, again), with approximately 450 words per page -- 293 x 450 = 131,850 words. Each of these pages took me on average 2 minutes 30 seconds to read (fairly rapidly) and then on average 2 minute 45 seconds (reading slightly slower). The faster read time would mean that the book could be completed (non-stop) in just over 12 hours 10 minutes; the slower time would yield 13 hours 25 minutes. So the two approximations agree reasonably closely. Faster pace: 13 hours 10 minutes vs 12 hours 10 minutes (respectively for these two editions); Slower pace: 15 hours 30 minutes vs 13 hours 25 minutes. In both cases here omitting all the breaks and stops mentioned earlier.]
Can you imagine it! Again, even if we were prepared to accept Engels's (unsupported) story, one wonders how often the rapidly ageing Marx will have nodded off, perhaps not fully realising the nature of whatever it was that some would later claim he fully agreed with, condoned or accepted!
But, why on earth was it necessary to read it to Marx? Were his eyes and brain failing him? Was he no longer capable of reading the book for himself? As far as I can determine, there is no evidence Engels had ever done this before (i.e., read a book to Marx). So, why this time?
Moreover, since Marx contributed a Chapter to AD, why didn't Engels simply ask him to check the proofs?
Perhaps more damning: AD contains several sections devoted to Engels's decidedly odd ideas about mathematics (which few other than die-hard-DM-fans -- who apparently know little mathematics --, will now defend). Unlike Marx, Engels was neither knowledgeable nor competent in mathematics (as is relatively easy to demonstrate -- on that see here and here). But, if we insist that Marx agreed with every single line read to him from AD, then we are also forced to conclude that Marx, too, was an incompetent mathematician! Are Dialectical Marxists who are competent in this area -- the opinions of those who aren't are surely irrelevant in this respect -- are they prepared to admit this? If not, then the claim that Marx had this book read to him, and that he agreed with every word in it, can no longer be sustained.
In which case, if the above claim (that Marx agreed with the entire content of AD) is abandoned, a major plank in the 'orthodox belief' that Marx and Engels saw eye-to-eye about DM, or, indeed, about everything, has now turned into sawdust. If Marx didn't agree with these 'mathematical' passages, but said nothing about them in his letters to Engels, then Marx's almost total silence about the other whacky DM-ideas that Engels was cooking-up in AD (and in several letters and Notebooks) assumes an entirely new light.
Some have wondered why, if Marx didn't accept DM, he failed to express any open disagreement with Engels on this very topic. Others have suggested that Marx didn't do so because he looked to Engels for financial support, which meant he kept quiet in order to avoid jeopardising that support. I think that 'explanation' demeans Marx, so, I, for one, reject it.
However, it isn't true that Marx failed to express any rejection of DM. In the next section of this Essay devoted to this very topic I quote a long passage Marx added to the Afterword to the Second Edition of Das Kapital, which did just this. That passage contains absolutely no trace of DM (or Hegel) and yet Marx still calls it "my method" and "the dialectic method". It is also worth noting that this passage is the only summary of "the dialectic method" Marx published and endorsed in his entire life. The only one!
By this time in his life Marx had much bigger fish to fry than initiate an arcane and pointless argument with Engels, in relation to which I am sure he could see no practical or political upside. He didn't live to see the truly disastrous effect this ramshackle and incomprehensible theory would later have on those who claimed to be his successors (set out in extensive detail in Part Two of this Essay). Had he lived to witness the ruinous influence DM was to have on revolutionary theory and practice in, say, the forty to fifty years following on from WW1, I suspect he would have been far more forthright in his opposition to DM, whatever Engels might have thought about it.
So, at this specific point in his life the very most he thought he could do was to append a very clear (but indirect) marker to the aforementioned Postface (which indicated he had abandoned Hegel root-and-branch), adding that he was merely "coquetting" with what few Hegelian terms-of-art there remained in Volume One.
Does this mean Engels lied when he said he read AD to Marx?
Well, Engels was no saint, and, so, in a faction fight with Dühring and his supporters, he bent the truth. Other Dialectical Marxists often do likewise, again in faction fights. Evidence in support of this will be given in Part Two and Essay Ten Part One. Having said that, in Interlude Two, I have presented an example where Lenin certainly did 'bend the truth' as he tried to recruit Marx to the 'DM-cause':
It is also worth recalling that Lenin repeatedly attributes to Marx philosophical ideas that can't be found in his work -- for example, this:
"All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism." [Lenin (1972), p.6.]
Lenin surely can't have been ignorant of the fact that Marx referred to his ideas that way not even once.
Which unfortunately means that Lenin isn't a reliable guide when it comes to Marx's 'philosophy'. Fortunately, the exact opposite is the case when it comes to Marx's politics.
If Lenin can fib so easily, why is it so hard to believe Engels can't do so, too?
In the second section of this Essay devoted to this specific topic, I deal with (published and unpublished) statements made by Marx that appear to contradict the above claims, and which seem to indicate he still accepted DM (and that he thought highly of Hegel) up until the day he died. Readers are directed there for more details.
[Email me if you think I have missed any of Marx's remarks from the 1870s or early 1880s (i.e., after the Postface to the Second Edition was published).]
A thorough survey of the entire subject can be found in Rigby (1992, 1998), with a brief overview in Rigby (1999). In fact, Rigby argues (rather forcefully) in favour of the 'orthodox' interpretation -- but only so he can then use it as a stick with which to beat Marx and Engels in relation to the ideas they expressed in HM. Nevertheless, Rigby's actual arguments are far from conclusive since he, too, relies on the aforementioned scattered remarks, footnotes, asides and peripheral comments to make his case (many of which I have debunked here and in Essay Eight Part Two (links above)).
[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on context.]
However, as far as can be ascertained Rigby doesn't appeal to Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts [i.e., Marx (1983)] to provide additional support for his case. That is puzzling since they would have greatly strengthened his argument. As we saw in Essay Seven Part One, Marx employed some rather dubious reasoning (which he adapted from Hegel) to try to provide a 'dialectical' solution to the vexed question of the nature of the derivative in Differential Calculus (but with no attempt to do so for Integration). And yet, even this aspect of Marx's work isn't as clear-cut as might at first sight seem. That is because mathematics is a human invention, which means, of course, that Marx's analysis might well form part of HM (even if erroneously so). Hence, his analysis of mathematics might not be applicable to nature. Careful readers of Marx's comments will notice, too, that he speaks exclusively of the movement of variables, not objects, even if the former are supposed to depict the latter. Even so, these manuscripts weren't published; but, as noted above, Marx did publish a summary of "the dialectic method" which contains not one atom of Hegel. [That particular passage has been quoted and analysed below.]
The late Hal Draper was a Marxist scholar whose reputation, opinions and work I hold in the highest regard, but in Volume One of his ground-breaking study of Marx's political theory he argued that the attempt to "put a wall between [Marx and Engels]" is misconceived, at best:
"In a mild form, it involves the assertion that there were some differences of viewpoint which were basic, but which apparently neither was aware of; in a more virulent form, it involves the assertion -- sometimes merely the assumption -- that nothing written by Engels can be taken as reflecting Marx's opinion unless Marx's name is signed and notarized." [Draper (1977), p.23. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Unfortunately, like many others who try to push the 'orthodox' line, Draper ignored the wealth of evidence and argument that supports the view that the two held different opinions on certain topics. He recognises, however, that those who oppose the 'orthodox' view often concentrate their fire on AD:
"The main cases at issue go further, for one of the chief objectives of the Engels-versus-Marx myth is to detach Engels' Anti-Dühring from Marx's seal of approval. This is a great convenience for a number of tendentious views, since Anti-Dühring was the only more or less systematic presentation of Marxism made by either of the two men, and therefore covers much that Marx never got round to treating under his own name.... It is a nuisance for the fantasists that Anti-Dühring came before Marx's death, and that their collaboration on the work is well documented, Marx even writing one chapter of the book. [Chapter X of Part Two -- RL.] I am afraid that the mythologists are unaware that Marx wrote a blanket endorsement of the book for party publication." [Ibid., p.24. Italic emphases in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
The case for the prosecution presented in this Essay, at least, doesn't in fact depend on arguing that Marx and Engels disagreed over everything, only that, after the late 1840s, unlike Engels, Marx had waved 'goodbye' to Philosophy (on that, see here), so it is no surprise to see that the chapter he contributed to AD belonged to a section that had nothing whatsoever to do with Philosophy. And, what is more, there is no trace of dialectics in that chapter, either. But that, too, shouldn't really surprise us given what we have so far discovered in this Essay.
Further, Draper tells us that Marx "wrote a blanket endorsement of the book for party publication", but when we check his references (given in a footnote on p.666), all we find there are rather bland references to AD. For example, in a letter to Wilhelm Blos (dated 10/11/1877) Marx merely notes that Engels is working on "several longer books, [and] is still sending contributions to the Vorwärts." [Marx (1991), p.289.] These "contributions" later became AD.
The other source to which Draper refers is Marx's Introduction to the French edition of Engels's Socialism: Utopian And Scientific (which was written by Marx in May 1880), where he had this to say:
"The series of final articles which he [Engels] contributed to the Vorwärts under the ironic title Herr Dühring's Revolution in Science (in response to the allegedly new theories of Mr. E. Dühring on science in general and socialism in particular) were assembled in one volume and were a great success among German socialists." [Marx (1989), p.339. Italic emphases in the original.]
This is hardly a ringing endorsement -- or even any sort of endorsement -- of DM! Marx notes that the book was "a great success among German socialists", which I am sure it was; but how that constitutes Marx's Imprimatur for all that AD contains is far from clear. Marx pointedly failed to recommend the book as representing "their view", he merely said that it was a "great success" in Germany.
This isn't an impressive display of evidence or argument from an otherwise very careful, reliable and scrupulous writer. But, he was, after all, working with very poor material in this instance, and merely seems to be defending the 'party line'.
Admittedly, it would greatly assist the case being presented in this Essay if it could be shown conclusively that Marx didn't accept DM; it would at least absolve him of any connection with what is a manifestly non-sensical and incoherent theory. It is far from easy to accept the idea that a first-rate revolutionary and theorist of such outstanding genius (such as Marx!) gave credence to doctrines that would even give the term "fourth-rate" a bad name.
Fortunately, the case against DM isn't affected by an unfavourable answer to the above question. DM is no less believable even if it should ever turn out that Marx accepted it; it is just that Marx's intellectual stature would suffer greatly if that were the case.
Correction 20/06/2014: Confession time! Up until a few years ago, I had only read a handful of chapters of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts, having unwisely taken the word of several commentators that it was a work of 'dialectics' (in the traditional Engels/Lenin sense of that word). I have now carefully checked these manuscripts in detail, line-by-line, and can find only one sentence in the entire book that is unambiguously 'dialectical' (in the above sense): Here it is:
"The whole difficulty in understanding the differential operation (as in the
negation of the negation generally) lies precisely in seeing how it
differs from such a simple procedure and therefore leads to real results." [Marx
(1983), p.3.] [Italic emphasis in
the original.]
That's
it! That is the extent of the
'dialectics' (again, in the above sense of the word) in these manuscripts, and
it occurs very early, making no further appearance. Even then this indirect
reference to 'dialectics' (once again, in the above sense of the word)
is equivocal, at best. Anyway, Marx certainly does nothing with it.
Hegel is mentioned only once in the entire book (that is, if we ignore
the many references to him made by the editors and the commentators at either
end of this volume), and then only in passing -- in fact, Hegel is referred to as
many times as Kant and
Fichte (p.119)!
As far as I could determine, "contradiction" also makes only one appearance;
here it is:
"This leap from
ordinary algebra, and besides by means of ordinary algebra, into
the algebra of variables is assumed as au fait accompli, it is not
proved and is prima facie in contradiction to all the laws of
conventional algebra, where y = f(x), y1
= f(x+h) could never have this meaning." [Ibid.,
p.117.
Italic
emphases in the original.]
I think it
is pretty clear that this isn't a 'dialectical' use of "contradiction" (with
"dialectical" understood in the above sense, once more).
Finally, there is this passage:
"And here it may be remarked that the process of the original algebraic
derivation is again turned into its opposite." [Ibid.,
p.56.]
If readers check, they will see that Marx isn't arguing 'dialectically' here
(again, with that word understood in the above manner); there is, for example,
no 'struggle' going on between 'dialectical opposites' in this instance,
as we were told by the DM-classics must be the case. Marx is simply making a
point about the algebraic manipulations he had just completed and is about to
complete. No other unambiguously 'dialectical' terms show their face in the
entire book. There is no "change in quantity passing over into quality", no
"Totality", no "universal interconnection", no "mediation", no "parts make the
whole and whole makes the parts", no "universal or ceaseless change", no criticism of
FL, or even of "formal
thinking", etc., etc. If a theorist in the former Soviet Union [fSU] had
written this book in say, 1950, he'd have been hauled off for 're-education'!
So, this work isn't in fact an example of Marx trying to shoehorn
the calculus into dialectical boot it won't fit, contrary to what I asserted in
Essay Seven Part One (and hinted at earlier), but it does further substantiate
my view that Marx had waved 'goodbye' to that confused mystic, Hegel (upside
down or the 'right way up'), by the late 1860s or early 1870s. Anyway, as we are
about to discover, Marx meant by
"dialectics" something completely different from the Engels/Plekhanov/Lenin
tradition.
In which case, it isn't at all surprising that Rigby ignored this particular book! There is precious little grist for him to mill!
[I have included several other detailed comments about this aspect of Marx's work in Essay Seven Part One.]
However, as noted above, Thomas Weston [in Weston (2012), this links to a PDF] has recently defended the traditional view that Marx believed 'the dialectic' operated in both human history and nature.
I have now added some remarks concerning Weston's attempt to recruit a throw-away line found in Das Kapital (about elliptical motion) to the theory that Marx accepted that there is indeed a 'dialectic in nature', here. I have also added several comments to Essay Eight Part Two that are connected with Weston's use of what I have also called 'Spinoza's Greedy Principle' (SGP) -- i.e, "Every determination is also a negation". [Readers are also directed to the links posted earlier for more details.]
Update January 2024: I have just added a few remarks to Appendix A of Essay Five concerning Weston's endeavour to explain how 'contradictions' can be 'resolved'.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Interlude Two: Marx And Dialectics - 2
[This used to form part of Note 16 and represents a continuation of the material posted in Interlude One (concerning the alleged connection between Marx, Engels, Hegel and DM). Since it is relevant to the material presented below, may I refer readers to my earlier comments about my use of the word "dialectics", as well as my remarks about Marx's view of Philosophy? It is also worth pointing out that no other part of my work riles, annoys or triggers Dialectical Marxists more than this one -- especially those who hale from the HCD-Tendency. Readers will soon be able to figure out why that is so as this sub-section unfolds.]
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HCD = High Church Dialectician. That term is explained here.]
William Roberts has recently drawn our attention to the peculiar nature of Volume One of Das Kapital (speaking about the findings published in his book, Roberts (2017a)):
"The research question that my book poses and tries to answer is the old question of Marx's 'method of presentation' in Capital. Why does Volume 1 take the form it does? Because Marx himself addresses this question -- however elliptically -- in the course of rebutting the claim that he is applying a Hegelian method to the study of political economy, the scholarship on this question is dominated by efforts to find a Hegelian or quasi-Hegelian method of presentation in Volume 1. This has had mixed results. Everyone acknowledges that parts of the text look rather Hegelian. On the other hand, major chunks of the book don't look Hegelian at all: much of Parts 3, 4, and 8, together adding up to about 40 percent of the book. These are the 'historical' parts. Hegelian Marxists tend to be embarrassed by these parts, since they don't add much to the development of the concepts. Social historians like Gareth Stedman Jones think they are the only valuable part of Capital. The two halves are never knit together, though." [Roberts (2017b), accessed 17/03/2021. Link in the original, quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis alone added. Paragraphs merged. Detailed support for the above claims can be found in Roberts (2017a), pp.9-16.]
As readers are about to discover, I go much further than Roberts and claim that the 'Hegelian' parts of Volume One aren't even Hegelian.
Upon learning of the aims of this site -- but more specifically the above rather controversial claim, never mind those below -- rarely does a Dialectical Marxist (and these are once again mainly drawn from the aforementioned HCD-Tendency), rarely do they fail to quote the following passage at me, so influential has it become:
"It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]
Nevertheless, Marx established no such precondition for those trying to understand his work. In fact, as we are about to discover, the truth is quite the opposite: he downplayed Hegel's influence. Here, for example, is what he did say:
"And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists, the economic economy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society." [Marx to Weydemeyer, 05/03/1852. Italics in the original.]
Unless I am mistaken, there is no hint of 'dialectics' -- or even of Hegel (let alone his 'logic') -- anywhere in that passage.
Despite this, the opposite idea has sunk so deeply into the collective 'dialectical mind' that claims like those above (and below) will elicit immediate disbelief, if not outright rejection. Or, as experience has unfortunately revealed, Marx's own words will simply be ignored, as will the evidence and argument presented here. But, this material is nevertheless true for all that.
Here is why:
By the late 1850s, Marx himself pointed out that the relevance of Hegel's method could be summarised in, or by, a few sheets of paper:
"What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken another look by mere accident, Freiligrath having found and made me a present of several volumes of Hegel, originally the property of Bakunin. If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified." [Marx to Engels, 16/01/1858; MECW, Volume 40, p.249; a copy of this letter can be accessed here. Bold emphases in the original.]
Needless to say, Marx failed to provide his readers with even this summary. From that fact alone we may perhaps conclude that in the end Marx didn't really think Hegel's method was all that significant, relevant or useful. Indeed, the evidence and argument presented below suggests that that itself might very well be an understatement. So, despite all the millions of words Marx committed to paper, he never considered it important enough to publish, let alone write, these relatively few pages.
Meanwhile, and in stark contrast, he wasted a whole year banging on about Karl Vogt -- rather than fulfil his "very much" liked aim to complete this 'vitally important' summary.
Even had Marx written such a summary it would have meant that only a tiny fraction of Hegel's work was relevant to understanding Das Kapital: a few pages! And that was back in the 1850s or early 1860s.
Contrast it, too, with what Lenin said:
"It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]
Attentive readers will no doubt also have noticed that Marx tells us he encountered Hegel's Logic by "accident":
"What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken another look BY MERE ACCIDENT, Freiligrath having found and made me a present of several volumes of Hegel, originally the property of Bakunin." [Loc cit. Capitals and italics in the original. Some versions have capitals, others just use bold type.]
That hardly suggests he was a constant, avid student of Hegel's 'Logic'. Indeed, he didn't even possess his own copy and had to be given one as a present by Freiligrath!
Much has been made of certain references to Hegel in Marx's later work. However, a close examination of the relevant passages reveals a picture markedly different from the standard line retailed by Dialectical Marxists. In the later decades of Marx's life, the scattered remarks concerning Hegelian Philosophy -- which mainly appear in unpublished writings before Das Kapital itself was published -- are, at best, inconclusive. [Cf., Carver's comments posted above, in Interlude One.] I will examine several of them in what follows, anyway.
[It is worth emphasising at this point that I am not denying Hegel was a major influence on Marx's earlier work, only that by the time he came to write Das Kapital he had waved 'goodbye' to that mystical and logical incompetent. We already know Marx himself had abandoned Philosophy, root-and-branch by the late 1840s.]
Some readers might point to the following passage (taken from the Afterword to the Second Edition of Das Kapital) in support of the claim that Marx was still operating under Hegel's influence (but only if the latter's theory is flipped and put 'the right way up'), at that stage of his life (i.e., in the 1860s and 1870s):
"I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added. I have used the punctuation that appears in MECW Volume 25 here.]
However, Marx's use of the word "coquetted" suggests that, at best, Hegel's Logic only exercised a superficial influence on his ideas, confined merely to certain "modes of expression", and limited to just a few sections of Das Kapital (i.e., "here and there"). A 'coquettish' employment of certain "modes of expression" is clearly not the same as a scientific or even philosophical use of Hegel's method or terminology.
Again, contrast that with what Lenin said, and with what we are about to discover concerning Marx's own view of "the dialectic method".
HCDs and dialecticians in general invariably take great exception to this interpretation of the Afterword, arguing that all this "coquetting" was, on Marx's own admission, confined to the chapter on value, not the rest of the book. However, that response is far from conclusive, and for three reasons:
First, the punctuation used in MECW (reproduced above) suggests Marx referenced the chapter on value as one example among many where he had "coquetted" with Hegel's "mode of expression", but it wasn't the only one. And, of course, Hegelian terminology crops up in other parts of the book.
Second, it would be decidedly odd if Marx had confined his "coquetting" with Hegelian "modes of expression" exclusively to what many take to be the most important chapter of the book, but had done so nowhere else. Why pick on the most important chapter to "coquette" -- i.e., play around -- with such supposedly important "modes of expression"?
Third, as far as Marx "openly" avowing himself a pupil of Hegel, he pointedly put that comment in the past tense, which is a detail those who try to argue in favour of the 'orthodox view' -- that Marx was still using Hegel's method (but now 'the right way up') as he wrote Das Kapital -- pass over in silence even as they quote this passage and try to recruit it to their cause:
"I criticised the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago, at a time when is was still the fashion. But just when I was working on the first volume of Capital, the ill-humoured, arrogant and mediocre epigones who now talk large in educated German circles began to take pleasure in treating Hegel in the same way as the good Moses Mendelssohn treated Spinoza in Lessing's time, namely as a 'dead dog'. I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Ibid., pp.102-03. Bold emphases and links alone added. Once more, I have reproduced the punctuation found in MECW Volume 25.]
Once again, this is hardly a ringing endorsement; indeed, it is equivocal, at best. Marx didn't say that he was still a pupil of Hegel, but that he once was. Of course, it still might have been the case that he counted himself a pupil of Hegel when the above was written (there is no conclusive evidence either way, just repeated indications and hints he wasn't, outlined above, and below), but there is nothing in that passage to suggest Marx viewed the link between his own and Hegel's work in the way Lenin later characterised it, or in the way that subsequent Dialectical Marxists have done. Indeed, given what we are about to find out, the opposite conclusion is far more likely.
[Several letters that seem suggest Marx still counted himself as a 'pupil of Hegel' were in fact written before the Afterword was published, so, in that respect, they aren't relevant.]
Of course, it is entirely possible to describe a theorist as a "mighty thinker" and claim to have learnt much from them even while disagreeing with everything they had to say. For example, I think Plato is a "mighty thinker", but I disagree with 99.99% of what he wrote. Many Marxists think the same of Aristotle, that he was a "mighty thinker", but how many agree with him 100%? Or even 10%?
John Rees, the author of TAR, made a valiant attempt to neutralise this devastating conclusion -- that the extent of the influence on Marx of Hegel's Logic was no more than a few jargonised expressions with which he merely "coquetted", and only "here and there" --, by arguing as follows:
"Remarkably, this last quotation is sometimes cited as evidence that Marx was not serious about his debt to Hegel and that he only or merely 'coquetted' with Hegel's phraseology, and that he really did not make any further use of the dialectic. That this interpretation is false should be obvious from this sentence alone. The meaning is clearly that Marx was so keen to identify with Hegel that he 'even' went so far as to use the same terms as 'that mighty thinker' not that he 'only' used those terms." [Rees (1998), p.100. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Well, if that were the case, why did Marx put his praise of Hegel in the past tense, and why did he immediately add the following?
"[E]ven, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, [that he (Marx) had -- RL] coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added. Once more, I have used the punctuation found in MECW Volume 25.]
That comment is perfectly clear: Marx -- not Rosa, not Peter Struve, not James Burnham, not Max Eastman, not... --, Marx himself says he "coquetted" with Hegelian "modes of expression" (which is hardly a serious use of the Logic!), and only in a limited number of places ("here and there"). So, far from merely "using" such terms, as Rees suggests, Marx in fact "coquetted" with them. Indeed, had his alleged "debt" to Hegel been plain for all to see, he wouldn't have expressed himself quite so equivocally, quite so dismissively, quite so flippantly.
These days we would perhaps use 'scare quotes'.
As will soon become clear, the core HM-ideas expressed in Das Kapital owe much more to the 'dialectical method' developed by Aristotle, Kant and The Scottish Historical School (of Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Smith, Hume and Steuart) than they do to Hegel. Indeed, as Marx himself acknowledged in his letter to Weydemeyer, quoted earlier.
[On this, see Meek (1954). On Kant, see Wood (1998, 1999). On Marx and Aristotle, see McCarthy (1992) and Meikle (1995). On Aristotle's conception of 'dialectic', see Reeve (2001). See also my comments at RevLeft, here and here; some of that material has been reproduced below. For Aristotle's comments concerning his own 'dialectical method', see Appendix A. (Unfortunately, RevLeft is now totally defunct, so links to that site no longer work!)]
[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]
This is something Engels himself had already (partially) admitted:
"The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic intellect of them, had already analysed the most essential forms of dialectic thought. The newer philosophy on the other hand, although in it also dialectics had brilliant exponents (e.g., Descartes and Spinoza), had, especially through English influence, become more and more rigidly fixed in the so-called metaphysical mode of reasoning, by which also the French of the eighteenth century were almost wholly dominated at all events in their special philosophical work. Outside philosophy in the restricted sense, the French nevertheless produced masterpieces of dialectic." [Engels (1976), pp.23-24. Bold emphases added.]
Just like Marx, Engels was in the habit of referring to The Scottish Historical School, mentioned above, as "the English".
It is now plain that the ideas developed by those earlier dialecticians (Aristotle, etc.), coupled with the above comments (but more importantly, the content of the long passage quoted below), represent the "rational kernel" of Hegel's mystical theory. Because of that, it is clear that there is in fact zero (non-'coquetted') input from Hegel himself in Das Kapital.
Hence, for Marx, rotating Hegel and putting him 'on his feet' only succeeded in revealing how empty his head really is; the "rational kernel" thus contains absolutely no trace of the input of that Christian Mystic! All Hegel succeeded in doing was appropriating the above ideas (i.e., those found in Aristotle and the rest mentioned earlier), mystify them, and then bury the lot under several tons of 'Hegelian gobbledygook'.
In response, some have pointed to Marx's own words -- where he actually refers to "the dialectic method" -- in order to counter the above remarks. The question is, of course: what did Marx himself -- not others -- what did Marx himself mean by that phrase?
Well, we needn't speculate. Marx very helpfully told us what he meant by "the dialectic method" in the Afterword to the Second Edition of Das Kapital. There, he quotes a reviewer in the following terms:
"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:
'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'
"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02). Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
In the above passage: not one single Hegelian concept, or even "mode of expression", is to be found. There are no "dialectical contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality", no "universal and incessant change", nothing about "parts and wholes" --, and yet Marx still calls it "the dialectic method", adding that the author of the review takes it to be "my method", which Marx doesn't deny or repudiate.
So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two, "here and there", with which he merely "coquetted" -- i.e., used non-seriously!
Some have wondered why he even "coquetted" with Hegelian terminology if what is alleged in this Essay is correct. Why use any such terms at all?
First, had Marx still counted himself a "pupil" of that "mighty thinker", why on earth would he quote a passage that contained zero Hegel, refer to it as "the dialectic method" and identify it as "my method"?
Second, Marx was still trying to divorce himself from Hegel. He was in the early stages of his foray into this Hegel-free conceptual landscape. A complete and total break with Hegel-speak at this point would have detracted from his overall message, so he adopted a sort of half-way house approach. That helps explain why large sections of the book contain no Hegel whatsoever, no 'coquetted' terms at all -- indeed, as Roberts pointed out (quoted earlier):
"The research question that my book poses and tries to answer is the old question of Marx's 'method of presentation' in Capital. Why does Volume 1 take the form it does? Because Marx himself addresses this question -- however elliptically -- in the course of rebutting the claim that he is applying a Hegelian method to the study of political economy, the scholarship on this question is dominated by efforts to find a Hegelian or quasi-Hegelian method of presentation in Volume 1. This has had mixed results. Everyone acknowledges that parts of the text look rather Hegelian. On the other hand, major chunks of the book don't look Hegelian at all: much of Parts 3, 4, and 8, together adding up to about 40 percent of the book. These are the 'historical' parts. Hegelian Marxists tend to be embarrassed by these parts, since they don't add much to the development of the concepts. Social historians like Gareth Stedman Jones think they are the only valuable part of Capital. The two halves are never knit together, though." [Roberts (2017b), accessed 17/03/2021. Link in the original, quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis alone added. Paragraphs merged. Detailed support for the above claims can be found in Roberts (2017a), pp.9-16.]
If Marx still considered himself a serious pupil of Hegel, why omit his method from 40% of Das Kapital? Why use Hegelian jargon non-seriously in the rest of the book?
The answer is quite plain: Marx's "dialectic method" more closely resembled that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical School.
Notice, too, that Marx wasn't here referring to a "dialectic method", or merely one part or aspect of "the dialectic method", nor yet one man's take on "the dialectic method", but "the dialectic method".
Even more significant still is the following underappreciated fact: this is the only summary of "the dialectic method" Marx published and endorsed in his entire life!
And it contains not even a faint echo, not so much as a lingering whiff, of Hegel (upside down or 'the right way up').
As should seem obvious to all but the most purblind or partisan, Marx's published words carry far more weight than his unpublished musings. So, unlike the vast majority of Marx's epigones, I begin with the long passage above when I want to understand what Marx meant by "the dialectic method". Unapologetically: that is because it represents the only published summary of the "dialectical method" that Marx ever publicly endorsed, and it tells us what Marx himself, not anyone else, what Marx himself considered to be his "method", and I interpret everything else Marx said about 'dialectics' from that time onward in this light.
[Yes, I know someone else wrote that summary, but who called it "the dialectic method" and who described it as "my method"?]
Mysteriously, those who claim to be Marxists refuse to adopt that approach to this passage! In fact, they all almost totally ignore both it and what Marx had to say about it. Indeed, many of them severely criticise me for paying so much attention to it!
[A recent example of this can be found in a debate I had a few years ago with a card-carrying member of the HCD-fraternity. Since it blew his theory apart, he took great exception to my use of this passage and the fact that I had the effrontery to base my interpretation of what Marx meant about this own "method" on his own words! How absolutely underhanded of me to base my approach to what Marx meant on what Marx himself said!]
If we were to rely on what my critics have to say, neutral observers would be forgiven for thinking that after his death Marx must have left behind dozens of summaries of "the dialectic method" (as it supposedly features in Das Kapital) that unambiguously expressed the intimate links his work still enjoyed with Hegel's 'logic' (when flipped the 'right way up'), which would then mean this unique passage could be ignored or explained away.
But, unfortunately for them, Marx left us this one summary, an inconvenient fact with which such critics have yet to come to terms.
And then they have the unbridled cheek to claim they are being faithful to Marx!
But, why on earth would anyone who wanted to understand what Marx actually meant by "the dialectic method" pay any attention to the only summary of that method he published and endorsed in his entire life? Why indeed...?
Have I no shame!? Is there no level to which I won't sink? How dare I rely on what Marx had to say?!
How on earth do I manage to sleep at night...?
In reply, others often point to the following passage:
"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." [Ibid., p.102. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link and bold emphases added.]
Of course, one can't be any more of a "direct opposite" to, or "different" from, Hegel than excising his ideas completely from one's own -- and then rubbing that fact in by using Hegelian terminology non-seriously.
Again, we needn't speculate about this since the long passage quoted above -- in which not one atom of Hegel is to be found, and which Marx nevertheless calls "the dialectic method", identifying it as "my method" -- supports the above interpretation. That is indeed the case if we begin with this, the only summary of "the dialectic method" Marx published and endorsed in his entire life, and ignore the failed Engels/Plekhanov/Lenin tradition of interpreting Marx as some sort of 'inverted, bargain basement Hegelian'.
[I will pass no comment here on Marx's remarks concerning "reflection"; I shall, however, have something to say about that in Essay Twelve Part Four, when it is published.]
Still others point to the following passage:
"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary." [Ibid., p.102. Paragraphs merged.]
Naturally, that leaves it open to interpretation what the "rational form" of the dialectic really is. But, and once again, if we rely on what Marx actually published, as opposed to what the failed Engels/Plekhanov/Lenin tradition would like him to have said, the long passage quoted above tells us what that "rational form" actually is. As we have seen, it contains no Hegel at all, upside down or the 'right way up'. Indeed, as noted earlier, to turn Hegel 'the right side up' is to reveal the profound vacuum between his ears!
But, what about this?
"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner." [Ibid.]
Naturally, concerning "the dialectic", that doesn't prevent Hegel "from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner." What does prevent him is the fact that he wasn't the first -- Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical School beat him to it. Engels even admits as much (quoted earlier):
"The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic intellect of them, had already analysed the most essential forms of dialectic thought. The newer philosophy on the other hand, although in it also dialectics had brilliant exponents (e.g., Descartes and Spinoza), had, especially through English influence, become more and more rigidly fixed in the so-called metaphysical mode of reasoning, by which also the French of the eighteenth century were almost wholly dominated at all events in their special philosophical work. Outside philosophy in the restricted sense, the French nevertheless produced masterpieces of dialectic." [Engels (1976), pp.23-24. Bold emphases added.]
Indeed, those that Engels mentioned -- including Aristotle and the "English" (by which he meant the Scottish Historical School, as we have seen) -- exercised a major influence on Hegel himself. That Christian Mystic simply took their ideas and mystified them, dumping a load of Hermetic and Christian garbage all over them. Furthermore, Hegel signally failed to present his readers with a "comprehensive and conscious" form of "the dialectic", as the long quotation above once again shows. There, Marx calls that summary -- but not Hegel's ham-fisted 'dialectic' -- "the dialectic method", despite the fact that it was, and still remains, a Hegel-free zone.
After all, why would Marx quote and endorse a summary that contained zero Hegel -- which he also called "the dialectic method" -- if there were nothing that actually "[prevented] him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner"? He wouldn't, of course, because there was something that did prevent him. Not only wasn't he the first, the dialectical mess he dumped on humanity wasn't even comprehensible.
In that case, according to Marx's own endorsement -- not mine -- according to Marx, "the dialectic method" contains no trace of Hegel (upside down or 'the right way up')!
Of course, dialectical traditionalists are guaranteed to take exception to that conclusion. If so, they should pick a fight with Marx, not me.
In fact, they most certainly do not like it. Witness the reception an earlier version of the above argument received at RevLeft (and elsewhere) -- here, here, here and here. Nothing rattles their cages as much as this. It seems that reality is one thing dialectically-distracted comrades are completely averse to facing, still less can they handle being confronted by it. Witness, too, another recent attempt to impose Hegel on Das Kapital, here. In those 'debates', I have responded to several objections in addition to those mentioned above, one or two of which might indeed have occurred to the reader. I don't intend to reproduce that material in this Essay, so interested readers are referred to the above debates for more details. Another attempt to re-mystify Marx can be found here, in the comments section at the bottom. An even more recent example can be accessed here, and, as pointed out earlier, another, here. [However, as pointed out in the Preface, RevLeft links no longer work.]
Hence, when we begin with Marx's own summary of "the dialectic method", we arrive at an entirely different view of his position; that is, we end up with a reading at variance with the traditional view of his work (unfortunately adopted by a good 99% of his interpreters). If Marx called something that contains no trace of Hegel whatsoever "the dialectic method" (note again Marx's own words: he didn't call it "a dialectical method", or "part or one aspect of the dialectic method", nor yet "one man's interpretation of the dialectic method", but "the dialectic method"), and which, by implication, represents the "rational core" of Marx's own 'dialectics', then it can't be the case that Hegel was "the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner." Again, why call such a summary -- the only one Marx published and endorsed in his entire life -- "the dialectic method", and "my method", if it contained absolutely no input from Hegel, unless he had completely abandoned Hegel by the time he came to write his masterpiece?
Of course, if we don't start from Marx's own characterisation of his method (or, at least from a summary he published and endorsed), but from some other view of it concocted by others after he died, then we can hardly claim to have been faithful to his intentions, can we?
Woods and Grant [W&G], however, note that Lenin argued that Marx did leave behind his own version of Hegel's Logic, namely Das Kapital. [Woods and Grant (1995), p.76.]
"If Marx did not leave behind him a 'Logic' (with a capital letter), he did leave the logic of Capital, and this ought to be utilised to the full in this question. In Capital, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further." [Lenin (1961), p.317. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italics in the original.]
But, Marx's own words (i.e., where he tells us he merely "coquetted" with Hegelian terminology, and even then only in a few isolated places, coupled with his description of the summary written by that reviewer -- which he calls "his method" and "the dialectic method", and which contains not even the vaguest hint of Hegel, and which both W&G and Lenin pass over in total silence) shows that this is much more than a mere "exaggeration" on Lenin's part. It is a complete travesty.
It is also worth recalling that Lenin repeatedly attributes to Marx philosophical ideas that can't be found in his work -- for example, this:
"All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism." [Lenin (1972), p.6.]
Lenin surely can't have been ignorant of the fact that Marx referred to his ideas that way not even once.
Which unfortunately means that Lenin isn't a reliable guide when it comes to Marx's 'philosophy'. Fortunately, the exact opposite is the case when it comes to Marx's politics.
[I have put the word "philosophy" in 'scare' quotes since I aim to show in a later Essay that by the mid-, to late-1840s Marx abandoned this bogus, non-sensical, incoherent ruling-class discipline for good. (Added on Edit, June 2013: This material can now be found in a greatly expanded form, here.) However, as far as I can determine, Terrell Carver, a noted critic of the 'orthodox' view that Engels and Marx saw eye-to-eye on everything and that Hegel exerted a profound influence on Marx all his life, has back-tracked somewhat in Carver (2000). Even so, his reasoning there is uncharacteristically obscure. For more details, cf., Rosenthal (1998).]
It could be argued that an earlier work, the Grundrisse [i.e., Marx (1973), Marx (1986)], disproves many of the above claims. Well, that would be the case had Marx seen fit to publish it, but he didn't, so it isn't.
But, he did publish this:
"...I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added. Once more, I have used the punctuation found in MECW Volume 25.]
And, by way of contrast, he did publish a summary of "the dialectic method", which he included in the Second Edition of Das Kapital -- the only one he endorsed in his entire life, and which, as we have seen, isn't even Hegel-adjacent.
So, whatever it was that happened to Marx's thinking between the writing of the Grundrisse and his publishing the Second Edition of Das Kapital, it clearly affected his view of Hegel's Logic, and to such an extent that its jargon became something he no longer wanted to employ seriously, but with which he merely wished to "coquette" -- and even then only in a few places, "here and there". Or, to be more honest, it was jargon he now wanted to ignore almost totally. We can see this from the fact that he added a summary of his own method, which he called "the dialectic method" that contained no Hegelian terminology at all. Zero. None.
Some critics of the above remarks point to several letters Marx sent to Engels (and others) that appear to support the view that Marx still looked to Hegel as some sort of authority, or to whom he still looked for inspiration, when he wrote Das Kapital. However, those letters aren't conclusive; the vast majority were written before the Afterword was published. More importantly, no unpublished work can countermand an author's published opinions. Once again, in Marx's case, that includes the only summary of "the dialectic method" he published and endorsed in his entire life, in which not one atom of Hegel is to be found -- upside down or 'the right way up'.
Indeed, as Roberts also pointed out:
"...Despite the fact that volumes two and three were published well after volume one, they -- and especially three -- were by and large written before it, and have the appearance of volumes, instead of being rough manuscripts like the Grundrisse, only because of Engels's intensive editorial work.... One does not have to go so far as Cole, who claimed that 'Marx stopped thinking fundamentally about the development of capitalism when he had finished writing Volume I of Das Kapital'.... Nonetheless, it is undeniable that 'Marx did extraordinarily little work on [volumes two and three] in the period [after 1872]. The material used in volumes II and III comes overwhelmingly from the 1850s and 1860s. Sources from the 1870s are exceedingly sparse and of little consequence' (Collins and Abramsky, Karl Marx and the British Labour Movement, 296 -- this is a reference to Collins and Abramsky (1965) -- RL). The first volume is the only part of Capital that Marx finished, and it has to be taken as his last word on most issues. More importantly for my purposes, it has to be taken as Marx's premier act of political speech, his major public statement to the workers' movement on most matters." [Roberts (2017a), p.11, ftn.35. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, Volume One was Marx's "last word on most issues".
In several of these letters Marx does indeed speak about "the dialectic method" and "dialectics", but we now know what he meant by those terms. Again: as the long quotation above reveals: Marx's "dialectic method" owes absolutely nothing to Hegel, except for a few jargonised expressions with which he merely "coquetted", and even then only in a few places in his book -- certainly not "all the way through".
Of course, that doesn't mean that Marx's unpublished works are unimportant, only that when it comes to interpreting an author, what he/she saw fit to publish must take precedence, especially if they represent their "last word on most issues".
Hence, if we rely only on what Marx actually published about "the dialectic method" -- and ignore the failed Engels/Plekhanov/Lenin tradition of misinterpreting him -- it is clear that Marx had turned his back on this 'mighty thinker' before he wrote and published Das Kapital -- at least, the Second Edition.
[I find I have to keep repeating the above points since DM-fans develop selective blindness and tend not to see them otherwise. So, apologies are owed once more to readers who have to endure such tedious repetition.]
Others point to the following passage in Volume One of Das Kapital as proof that Marx accepted the traditional view of 'the dialectic':
"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e., as personified capital, to the appropriation and therefore control of the labour of others, and to the selling of the products of this labour. The guilds of the middle ages therefore tried to prevent by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist, by limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master within a very small maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his 'Logic'), that merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative changes." [Marx (1996), p.313. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Here is what I have written about that passage in Essay Seven Part One:
Values (it is assumed that these are "exchange values") don't become Capital by mere quantitative increment. It requires the presence of a Capitalist Mode of Production (and thus a change in the Relations of Production), or a different use of that money, for this to be so. The capitalists concerned have to do something with these exchange values. So, the mere increase of exchange values doesn't automatically "pass over" into a qualitative change and become Capital. These values have to be invested (or put to some other specific productive use), and that too isn't automatic (in certain circumstances, they could be consumed). So, what we have here is a change in quality passing over into another change in quality! Quantity has nothing to do with it. The same quantity of money could be used as Capital or fail to be so used. It requires a change in its quality (its use, or its social context) to effect such a development.
As Hillel Ticktin recently pointed out:
"[T]he International Monetary Fund has pointed out that there is something like $76 trillion being held by financial firms, such as private equity in different forms, waiting to be invested. There is...something like $28 trillion that is held in the bank of New York Mellon alone. The amount of money that cannot be profitably invested keeps going up.... It is a crazy situation when such enormous sums of money are being held and not being invested -- a situation that has lasted almost a decade. In other words, there is a very large proportion of surplus value that is not going into investment. And money that is not invested is not capital: it is not being used to generate more surplus value." [Quoted from here; accessed 22/01/2016. Paragraphs merged.]
Notice, "money that is not invested is not capital...."
Over the last twenty-five years or so, in my wander across the wastelands of the Dialectical Dustbowl, I have yet to encounter a single dialectician who has pointed out that this application of Hegel's 'Law' by Marx contains a serious error! So desperate have DM-fans become (in their endeavour to find support for their failed theory in what Marx wrote), every single one of them seems to have forgotten, or disregarded, basic principles of Historical Materialism [HM]!
Hence, £x/$y (or their equivalent) owned by a Medieval Lord in, say, Eleventh Century France, couldn't of its own become Capital no matter how large this pot of money became (but see below), whereas £w/$z in Nineteenth Century Manchester, even though that sum might be less than the £x/$y held by the aforementioned Lord (allowing for inflation, etc.), would be Capital if employed in certain ways. It isn't the quantity that is important here but the Mode of Production and the use to which the money is put, that are.
Also worth asking is the following question: How does this money actually "develop"? In what way can it "develop"? Sure, money can be saved or accumulated, but how does a £1/$1 coin "develop" if its owner saves or accumulates more of the same? Even if we redefine "save" and "accumulate" to mean "develop" (protecting this 'law' by yet another terminological dodge, thus imposing it on the facts), not all money will "develop" in this way. What if the money was stolen or had been expropriated from, or even by, another non-capitalist? What if it had been obtained (all at once) by selling land, slaves, works of art, political or other favours, etc? Where is the "development" in such cases? Notes and coins don't change, or become bigger, if they are accumulated. Money in the bank doesn't "develop" either. Or are we to imagine that in the vaults, or stored on disk somewhere, notes and coins grow and reproduce, or that all those digital 'ones' and 'zeros' on that disk become more 'one'-, and 'zero'-like?
But, this money could still operate or serve as Capital, howsoever it had been acquired, or where it had been stored, depending on its use and the Mode of Production in which this takes place.
Of course, this isn't to deny that there were Capitalists (or nascent Capitalists) in pre-Capitalist Europe; but whatever money they had, its nature as Capital wasn't determined by its quantity, no matter how large it became, but by the use to which it was put. This is also true of the period of transition between Feudalism and Capitalism (before the Capitalist Mode of Production was apparent or dominant); again, it is the use to which money is put that decides whether or not it is Capital, not its quantity.
In which case, this passage represents an egregious mis-application of Hegel's 'Law' -- by Marx himself! Now, either we believe Marx was a complete imbecile (in that he committed this crass error and failed even to understand his own theory, HM!), or we conclude he was still "coquetting" with Hegelian jargon. [Again, these days we would use 'scare quotes' in such circumstances, or we would refrain from employing such language. Or, we would rely on an editor to filter it out completely.]
Compare the above with Marx's more considered thoughts (where there is no hint of any such "coquetting"):
"Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labour, and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilised in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labour, and new means of subsistence. All these component parts of capital are creations of labour, products of labour, accumulated labour. Accumulated labour which serves as a means of new production is capital. So say the economists. What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton-spinning machine is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain relations. Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold in itself is money, or sugar the price of sugar.... Capital, also, is a social relation of production. It is a bourgeois production relation, a production relation of bourgeois society.... How, then, does any amount of commodities, of exchange values, become capital? By maintaining and multiplying itself as an independent social power, that is as the power of a portion of society, by means of its exchange for direct, living labour power. The existence of a class which possess nothing but the ability to labour is a necessary prerequisite of capital. It is only the dominion of accumulated, past, materialized labour over direct, living labour that turns accumulated labour into capital. Capital does not consist in accumulated labour serving living labour as a means for new production. It consists in living labour serving accumulated labour as a means of maintaining and multiplying the exchange value of the latter." [Marx (1968), pp.79-81. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged. (The on-line version differs slightly from the published version I have used.)]
We also have this remark from Volume Three of Das Kapital:
"Capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society...." [Marx (1998), p.801. Bold added.]
But more importantly, this from Volume One itself:
"The change of value that occurs in the case of money intended to be converted into capital, cannot take place in the money itself, since in its function of means of purchase and of payment, it does no more than realise the price of the commodity it buys or pays for; and, as hard cash, it is value petrified, never varying. Just as little can it originate in the second act of circulation, the re-sale of the commodity, which does no more than transform the article from its bodily form back again into its money-form. The change must, therefore, take place in the commodity bought by the first act, M-C, but not in its value, for equivalents are exchanged, and the commodity is paid for at its full value. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the change originates in the use-value, as such, of the commodity, i.e., in its consumption. In order to be able to extract value from the consumption of a commodity, our friend, Moneybags, must be so lucky as to find, within the sphere of circulation, in the market, a commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption, therefore, is itself an embodiment of labour, and, consequently, a creation of value. The possessor of money does find on the market such a special commodity in capacity for labour or labour-power. [M = Money; C = Commodity -- RL.]
"By labour-power or capacity for labour is to be understood the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description. But in order that our owner of money may be able to find labour-power offered for sale as a commodity, various conditions must first be fulfilled. The exchange of commodities of itself implies no other relations of dependence than those which result from its own nature. On this assumption, labour-power can appear upon the market as a commodity, only if, and so far as, its possessor, the individual whose labour-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a commodity. In order that he may be able to do this, he must have it at his disposal, must be the untrammelled owner of his capacity for labour, i.e., of his person. He and the owner of money meet in the market, and deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law. The continuance of this relation demands that the owner of the labour-power should sell it only for a definite period, for if he were to sell it rump and stump, once for all, he would be selling himself, converting himself from a free man into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity. He must constantly look upon his labour-power as his own property, his own commodity, and this he can only do by placing it at the disposal of the buyer temporarily, for a definite period of time. By this means alone can he avoid renouncing his rights of ownership over it.
"The second essential condition to the owner of money finding labour-power in the market as a commodity is this -- that the labourer instead of being in the position to sell commodities in which his labour is incorporated, must be obliged to offer for sale as a commodity that very labour-power, which exists only in his living self. In order that a man may be able to sell commodities other than labour-power, he must of course have the means of production, as raw material, implements, &c. No boots can be made without leather. He requires also the means of subsistence. Nobody -- not even 'a musician of the future' -- can live upon future products, or upon use-values in an unfinished state; and ever since the first moment of his appearance on the world's stage, man always has been, and must still be a consumer, both before and while he is producing. In a society where all products assume the form of commodities, these commodities must be sold after they have been produced, it is only after their sale that they can serve in satisfying the requirements of their producer. The time necessary for their sale is superadded to that necessary for their production. For the conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner of money must meet in the market with the free labourer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realisation of his labour-power." [Marx (1996), pp.177-79. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]
In which case, the mere accumulation of money, according to Marx himself, can't be or become capital if (i) "definite social production relations" are absent, (ii) labour isn't 'free' and (iii) labour-power isn't also a commodity. Once again, quantity has nothing to do with it.
Other objectors also point to the following passage from Volume One of Das Kapital:
"John St[uart] Mill, on the contrary, accepts on the one hand Ricardo's theory of profit, and annexes on the other hand Senior's 'remuneration of abstinence.' He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as 'abstinence' from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a while, over Spinoza's: 'Determinatio est Negatio.' ['Every determination is a negation' -- RL.]" [Marx (1996), p.592, footnote 2. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added.]
This also appears to contradict the conclusions reached earlier.
Here is what I posted at RevLeft concerning this passage (slightly edited):
The first thing to note is that this sentence is ambiguous:
"He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as
he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic."
You [i.e., the individual with whom I
was discussing this at RevLeft] seem to think its meaning is obvious, that Marx
is claiming that "Hegelian contradiction is the source of all dialectic", but
that isn't plausible, and for several reasons:
1) Marx goes on to appeal to Spinoza's principle to illustrate the source of the
dialectic:
"It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to
make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as
'abstinence' from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking,
abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling,
abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a
way, over Spinoza's: 'Determinatio est Negatio.'" [Determination is also
negation -- RL. I have subjected this throw-away line of Spinoza's (which
neither he, Hegel, Marx or Engels ever even attempted to substantiate) to
sustained criticism in Essay Three
Part One.]
Of course, Spinoza's 'principle' predated the invention of Hegel's 'dialectical contradictions'. If
so, these 'contradictions' can't be the source of all dialectic -- as
Marx is clearly indicating by quoting Spinoza! And, indeed, these
'contradictions' most certainly aren't the source, since the
dialectic originated in Ancient Greece (as Marx knew full well).
2. The sentence itself gives us a clue as to Marx's intentions:
"He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as
he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic."
Now, the final phrase -- "the source of all dialectic" -- could be referring back to this passage:
"as he feels at sea in the Hegelian
contradiction...."
Or, this:
"He is as much at home in absurd
contradictions...."
Or, and what is far more likely, this:
"He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as
he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction...."
In
other words Marx is here alluding to the sort of puzzlement that motivated the
early Greeks to engage in dialectic (the pursuit of truth through argument and
counter-argument), puzzlement that has now re-surfaced in Mill's mind.
And this interpretation is supported by point 1) above -- Marx appeals to the
puzzling features of Spinoza's Principle.
So, far from Marx being guilty of a simple historical error here (i.e., the claim that
Hegel's 'contradictions' are the source of all dialectic, which they plainly
aren't), he is pointing out something much less controversial: i.e., that puzzlement
is the source of the dialectic (in fact, this is a remarkably Wittgensteinian
claim to make).
[My attempt to absolve Marx of such crass idiocy has gone down rather badly with one comrade over at LibCom -- on that, see here and here.]
Again, if we attend to what Marx actually said -- as opposed to what we might think he said, or, indeed, what the failed DM-tradition tells us he 'must' have said or meant -- then the approach adopted in this Essay succeeds in absolving him of egregious ignorance in this instance.
The choice is therefore quite stark: either Marx was an incompetent ignoramus, or, the above interpretation is correct.
Take your pick...
Tom Weston refers his readers to this passage from Das Kapital (I have quoted it as it appears in Weston's article first, and then as it has been published in MECW):
"We saw that the process of exchange of commodities includes relations that contradict and exclude one another. The development of the commodity does not overcome [aufhebt] these contradictions, but creates a form within which they can move themselves. This is in general the method through which real [wirkliche] contradictions solve [losen] themselves. It is a contradiction, for example, for one body to continuously fall into another, and just as constantly fly away from it. The ellipse is one of the forms of movement in which this contradiction is actualised [verwirklicht] just as much as it is solved [lost]." [Quoted in Weston (2012), pp.5-6. This links to a PDF; italic emphases in the original.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Marx (1996), p.113.
This links to a PDF; italic emphases in the original.]
Weston takes exception to several of the translated phrases in the second of the above two passages, such as "it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another", on the grounds that:
"[T]he phrase 'it is a contradiction to depict' conveys an idea directly opposite to the assertions of the German text. The contradiction is not only in the depiction of elliptical motion; it is in the motion itself. This is the clear sense of the German text's assertions that the contradictions are 'real [wirklich]', are 'actualised [verwirklicht]', and that the sides of the contradiction are the two tendencies of motion that are mentioned, not their depictions." [Weston (2012), p.28. Italic emphases in the original.]
Weston must mean "not merely their depictions" in the last sentence above since it would seem reasonably clear that if a 'contradiction' is 'real' then its depiction can't fail to be contradictory, too.
Be that as it may, for this and other reasons, Weston clearly prefers the first translation (his own!) to the second.
As we saw in Essay Eight Part Two (links below), Weston doesn't tell us why this is a 'contradiction' (whether it is 'real' or even merely figurative), and Marx doesn't either. Both of them simply help themselves to this word without even once trying to justify it. Except, we already know that Marx was merely "coquetting" with Hegelianisms like this in Das Kapital. He explicitly told us he was, so we have no excuse.
But, even if we were to ignore Marx's use of "coquetting" and took his word seriously, is this even a 'dialectical contradiction' to begin with? Do these two forms of motion 'struggle' with, and then turn into, each other, as the DM-classics tell us they must? Do they imply one another so that one can't exist without the other (like, say, the capitalist class and the proletariat, neither of which can exist without the other, and where the existence of the first supposedly implies the existence of the second)? If so, Weston kept those details annoyingly to himself.
Anyway, in Essay Eight Part Two I responded to Weston's attempt to recruit Marx to the failed Engels/Plekhanov/Lenin tradition, as follows (slightly edited):
Thomas Weston has made a recent attempt to find a 'second force' (or cause) in such cases -- that he locates in..., 'inertia', which isn't, of course, a force. [A rate of change of momentum might be considered a force, or the result of a force, depending on how Newton's Second Law is interpreted, but not momentum itself.]
"In the classical mechanics pioneered by Newton, elliptical motion of a body will result if it is attracted to another 'central' body by a force inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them, provided that the body has an initial velocity that is not too large or too small, and not directly toward or directly away from the central body. This situation involves only a single force on the body, which, in the case of a planet orbiting the Sun, is the force of gravity. Gravity is not the only cause of this motion, however. An elliptical orbit is the result of two causes, which produce two tendencies of motion. One tendency results from the force directed toward the central body, which makes the body turn toward that central body. The second tendency is that of the body to continue in a straight line at a constant speed. This tendency is usually called 'inertia'. Inertia is not a force, since forces cause change in speed or direction, and inertia is the tendency not to change speed or direction. Inertia is a causal principle, as Newton recognised, calling it an 'innate force of matter'. He expressed this principle in his first law of motion, while forces are described in the second law. In elliptical motion, these two causes, gravity and inertia, are united by the physical fact that the mass responsible for inertia is proportional to the mass that gives rise to gravity. This fact is an important element in recognising the dialectical contradiction in elliptical motion." [Weston (2012), pp.6-7. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]
One moment Weston tells us that inertia isn't a force, the next he quotes Newton to the effect that it is (or, to be more precise, it is "a force of matter")! However, nowhere does Weston explain how gravity and inertia can "struggle" with each other (whether or not they are, or they cause, opposing "tendencies"), or how they could possibly turn into each other -- which the DM-classics tell us they must "inevitably" do. Nor yet how this set-up is even a 'contradiction' to begin with! As is the case with other DM-fans, Weston simply helps himself to this word with no attempt to justify it.
Indeed, as Weston admits, Hegel argued that the orbital motion of a planet is governed by the operation of only one force:
"We must not therefore speak of forces. If we want to speak of force, then there is but one force, and its moments do not, as two forces, pull in different directions." [Hegel (2004), p.65. Italic emphasis in the original. Bold added.]
As pointed out earlier, it is difficult to see how a 'dialectical contradiction' can be cobbled together from only one force.
Another serious difficulty arising from Weston's attempt to shoehorn Marx's comments into this ill-fitting dialectical boot is the inconsistent way he uses the word "tendency". One minute "tendencies" aren't causes, but are caused by something else (in the first of the above passages, where it seems that an elliptical orbit "produce[s] two tendencies of motion"), next they are causes:
"Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely." [Weston (2012), p.17. I examine variations on this theme later on in this Essay.]
However, we have already had occasion to argue forcefully that tendencies not only aren't, they can't be, causes. They are caused by other processes.
Finally, Weston only mentions the TOR once (p.7, ftn.17), but even then he fails to notice that one of the components of the 'contradiction' here has now been edited out of the picture -- 'the force of gravity' has been replaced by motion along a geodesic. According to the TOR, we no longer have even one force operating here, since gravity isn't a force!
[I have said more about the above here and here. I return to consider Weston's ill-advised article in more detail here, here, here, and here, where I have also shown that Weston's definition (concerning the interplay between 'Tendencies' A and B) also fails.]
[TOR = Theory Of Relativity.]
Finally, and once more, it is far from clear that the two "tendencies" Weston has recruited to his cause are 'dialectical opposites' of one another in the required manner, either. They don't imply each other in any sense of that word, which they would have to do to qualify as 'internally-connected' 'dialectical opposites'. Nor is it the case that one can't exist without the other. In what way does a "tendency" to fall into a planet imply a "tendency" to continue to move along the same line of action -- in the way that one class under capitalism (the bourgeoisie) is said to imply the existence of the other (the proletariat), such that neither of them can exist without the other? But, the "tendencies" Weston speaks about had to be discovered. If they implied one another, they wouldn't need to be discovered. Or, at least, when one of them had been discovered the other needn't also have been since it would be implied by the first of them. Who has ever had to 'discover' that a vixen is a female fox, or that a regicide is a king-killer? Clearly, the propositional use of one of these terms does imply the other.
Weston also fails to consider this core Hegelian principle -- but so do the vast majority of Dialectical Marxists, as they throw the word "contradiction" at almost everything in capitalism and beyond (on that, see here and here) without any attempt to derive any of the supposed examples they cite 'dialectically', unlike Hegel who at least attempted to do so. And, it isn't hard to see why: this omission succeeds in obscuring the fact that this isn't by any stretch of the imagination a 'dialectical relation', which means it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction', either -- howsoever else these two "tendencies" are actually related.
Hence, the above passage from Das Kapital offers no help at all to beleaguered DM-fans in their attempt to re-mystify Marx's masterpiece.
Weston presents his readers with only one other quotation from Das Kapital aimed at trying to show Marx accepted the theory that there is a 'dialectic in nature', which we have already examined:
"John St[uart] Mill, on the contrary, accepts on the one hand Ricardo's theory of profit, and annexes on the other hand Senior's 'remuneration of abstinence.' He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as 'abstinence' from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a while, over Spinoza's: 'Determinatio est Negatio.' ['Every determination is a negation' -- RL.]" [Marx (1996), p.592, footnote 2. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added.]
Except, Weston quotes only part of this passage, which allows him to draw the wrong conclusion from it:
"Marx himself saw contradiction as the central concept of dialectics. In Capital, Marx wrote that 'Hegelian "contradiction" is the source [Springquelle] of all dialectics.'" [Weston (2012), p.31. Italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Readers are referred to my earlier discussion of this passage (a link to which can be found several paragraphs back).
However, since the 'elliptical motion' passage is not only Weston's most important, it is his best piece of evidence, this doesn't augur well for the other passages to which he appeals. In fact, the other passages he quotes, or to which he refers, were either drawn from unpublished writings, or they constitute the sort of scattered remarks and asides we have already met. In those writings, Marx certainly talks about 'dialectics', but, as we already have seen, he meant something totally different by this word compared with Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin --, and now, Weston.
Once again, the above considerations don't constitute cast iron proof that Marx didn't see eye-to-eye with other DM-fans (like those mentioned above) -- that there is a 'dialectic in nature' -- but it does succeed in throwing the traditional interpretation of Das Kapital into considerable doubt.
In that case, unless supporters of the traditional view can produce a summary of "the dialectic method" written and published by Marx himself, contemporaneous with or subsequent to the Second Edition of Das Kapital, that supports the interpretation I have criticised in this sub-section, the view defended here must stand: Marx abandoned Hegel root-and-branch when he came to write his masterpiece. And, if that is the case -- if "the dialectic method" in Das Kapital is a Hegel-free zone (upside down or 'the right way up') --, it becomes all the more obvious that he didn't accept the doctrine that there is a 'dialectic in nature' in his later years, either.
Hence, Lenin should have said:
"It is possible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, merely by coquetting with the phraseology of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later anyone who is capable of coquetting will understand Marx!!" [Edited misquotation of Lenin (1961), p.180.]
[Support for this reading of the relation between Marx, Lenin and Hegel has come from Louis Althusser's notorious article, 'Lenin Before Hegel' (reprinted in Althusser (2001)). I hasten to add that I don't agree with everything Althusser has to say in that article (for example, I don't accept the "epistemological" break Althusser attributes to Marx -- Marx isn't interested in 'epistemology', an odd idea that Althusser and others have foisted on Marx -- at least, nowhere near the level that merits labelling anything in Marx's intellectual development as an 'epistemological break'). It is also worth adding that I have pushed this contrarian case much further than Althusser ever would, or could. After all, he still thinks the word "contradiction" has some sort of 'dialectical' role to play in Marxist theory! In addition, he totally ignored what Marx had to say about Philosophy -- i.e., concerning the "distorted" jargon and empty concepts philosophers like Althusser routinely throw at the page.]
Incidentally, here is what I have posted about the influence on Marx of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish School, in Part Two of this Essay (slightly edited):
Marx made plain the influence on his ideas of the 'Scottish School' in the German Ideology (erroneously calling them "English"):
"The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, particularly as long as they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry." [Marx and Engels (1976a), p.42. Bold emphases added.]
On this see Meek (1967), and Wood (1998, 1999) -- the latter of which underlines how influential Kant's work was in this area.
This is what I have posted at RevLeft on this topic (slightly edited):
It is not I who called them this (i.e., "The Scottish Historical Materialists"), but others, mainly Marx and Engels.
"Ronald Meek, 'The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology' [1954; collected
in his Economics and Ideology and Other Essays, 1967.] Such luminaries as
Adam Ferguson and
Adam Smith. This influence was actually acknowledged. In The
German Ideology, right after announcing their theme that 'men be in a position
to live in order to be able to "make history", they say "The French and the
English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called
history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, particularly as long as they
remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first
attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first
to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry.'" [Quoted from
here. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[I ought to point out that the author of the above is in fact hostile to Marx and Engels, but there is little available on the Internet at present on this topic that isn't hidden behind a pay wall.]
Meek actually calls them the "Scottish Historical School" (p.35), but he
attributes this phrase to
Roy Pascal (a Communist Party member, friend of
Wittgenstein
and translator of The German Ideology), who used it in his article
'Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth Century',
Modern Quarterly, March 1938.
The full passage reads as follows:
"Since we are dealing with the Germans, who are devoid of premises, we must
begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all
history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to
be able to 'make history.' But life involves before everything else eating and
drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act
is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of
material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental
condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and
hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Even when the
sensuous world is reduced to a minimum, to a stick as with Saint Bruno
[Bruno
Bauer -- RL],
it presupposes the action of producing the stick. Therefore in any
interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact
in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due
importance. It is well known that the Germans have never done this, and they
have never, therefore, had an earthly basis for history and consequently never
an historian. The French and the English, even if they have conceived the
relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided
fashion, particularly as long as they remained in the toils of political
ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of
history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil
society, of commerce and industry." [Quoted from
here.]
In the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx also wrote:
"Let us do him this justice:
Lemontey
wittily exposed the unpleasant
consequences of the division of labour as it is constituted today, and
M.
Proudhon
found nothing to add to it. But now that, through the fault of M.
Proudhon, we have been drawn into this question of priority, let us say again,
in passing, that long before M. Lemontey, and 17 years before Adam Smith, who
was a pupil of A. Ferguson, the last-named gave a clear exposition of the
subject in a chapter which deals specifically with the division of labour." [[Marx and Engels (1976b),
p.181. Spelling modified to conform with UK English.]
Marx refers to Ferguson repeatedly in his Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy (Marx
and Engels (1987b), pp.257-417), as he does others of
the same 'school' (e.g., Adam Smith and James Steuart) throughout this work.
He does so, too, in Volume One of Das Kapital --
Marx (1996),
pp.133, 359, 366, 367.
[This links to a PDF.]
Marx also refers to others of that 'school', e.g., Robertson, p.529, Steuart and Smith (however, the references to the latter two are far too numerous to list -- check out the index!).
Indeed, throughout Marx's entire works, the references to Smith and Steuart are
also too numerous to list.
Kant's influence is outlined in the following (I owe these references to
Philip
Gasper):
Wood, A, (1998), 'Kant's Historical Materialism' in Kneller and Axinn, Chapter
Five.
--------, (1999), Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press).
Kneller, J., and Axinn, S, (1998), Autonomy And Community: Readings In
Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy (State University of New York Press).
[See also 'Ferguson and Hegel on the Idea of Civil Society' by Martha King -- as well as Kettler (2005).]
Finally, one comrade has directed me to this comment, taken from Volume One of Das Kapital:
"The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on cooperation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production." [Marx (1996), p.751.]
Fortunately, the clue to the correct interpretation of this (and what few other scattered remarks there are in the same book that appear to be employing Hegelian jargon), was provided by Marx himself:
"...and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added. Again, I have used the punctuation found in MECW, Volume 25.]
Surprising as this might seem (to some), I didn't write the above words -- Marx did. And no wonder; he had already published a summary of "the dialectic method" in which not one scintilla of Hegel is to be found.
It is hardly my fault if comrades choose to ignore what Marx actually published about his own "method", alongside his decisive and irrevocable repudiation of Hegel.
As noted above, these days we would use 'scare' quotes -- or better still, we would stop using such obscure, confused gobbledygook altogether.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
DM: Beyond Workers' Ken?
It was asserted above that not only is DM not, it can't be associated, connected or linked with workers' experience, nor for it to be an expression or generalisation of it. But, that appears to contradict this observation of Trotsky's:
"[A] worker who has gone through the school of class struggle gains from his own experience an inclination toward dialectical thinking…. Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects…. Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense the universe is permeated with ‘unconscious’ dialectics." [Trotsky (1971), pp.58, 65, 106-07. Bold emphases added.]17
One of the more revealing aspects of the above words is Trotsky's assertion that human beings obey the laws of dialectics for the most part "unconsciously", and, furthermore, that the actual law they observe is the "Hegelian law", not (note!) its alleged 'materialist inversion' --, i.e., they obey the full-blooded 'law' based on Absolute Idealism, pre-inversion!18
Trotsky also claimed that workers "obey" DM-laws "unconsciously" ("in most cases"). Without doubt, if workers are largely unaware of these 'laws', then, ex hypothesi, they would need to be informed of them from the 'outside', since it wouldn't be possible to learn about them from their own experience, left to their own devices -- otherwise we wouldn't have needed a Hegel to bring us the 'good news', would we?
Nevertheless, this unsupported opinion of Trotsky's presents several serious problems of its own, since it also appears to suggest that workers can form rudimentary dialectical concepts if they are left to themselves. In which case, it would seem important for dialecticians to be able to show that (some? many? any?) workers can develop a rudimentary grasp of dialectics, just as Trotsky intimated.
Indeed, if the above were so, it would seem to imply that dialectics wouldn't need to be introduced to workers 'from the outside'.
In which case, it could be argued that workers might become aware of these 'laws' to some extent when they encounter them in their day-to-day activity. Indeed, it could even be maintained that while most workers don't always think dialectically, certain advanced sections of the proletariat might gain a rudimentary or limited dialectical view of the world as a result of their experience of the class struggle (etc.).
In that case, there appear to be several possible alternatives -- and there maybe even be others -- that Trotsky might have had in mind in connection with workers like this (or, indeed, with human beings in general). Consider, therefore, the following Options:
[1] Some might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of their experiences in the class struggle.
[2] Some might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of their practical activity in the labour process.
[3] Others might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of their reflection on their own unconscious compliance with certain dialectical laws.
[4] Still others might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of reading Hegel and/or the DM-classics.
While Trotsky might have assented to Options [1], [2] and [3], he certainly wouldn't have disagreed with Option [4]. I won't, however, be discussing the latter here since the possibility it expresses has already been covered. [Interested readers are re-directed here for further details.]
Nevertheless, Trotsky's general point seems to be that workers (and human beings in general) could attain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM, in some way, by some means, somehow. Hence, Trotsky might also have thought that ordinary workers -- or possibly even anyone -- could comprehend dialectics, or certain aspects of it -- for instance the universal nature of change, the concrete inapplicability of the LOI, the 'Three Laws of Dialectics', the "Totality" and universal inter-connection, the part-whole relationship -- in any rudimentary attempts they made to account for some of the structures and processes at work in nature and society (etc.) -- as a result of their general life experience.
I shall consider each of these options in turn, beginning, however, with Option [2].
But, before that we need to take a brief detour.
To recapitulate, Trotsky argued as follows:
"Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of a bearing-brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones which should not, however, go beyond certain limits…. By observing the norms of tolerance, the cones are considered as being equal. ('A' is equal to 'A')…. Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously." [Trotsky (1971), pp.65, 106.]
That passage was tackled in Essay Six in the following way:
From this it is clear that Trotsky misconstrued his own version of the LOI! If he had wanted to direct our attention to the lack of identity between two different objects (the two "cone bearings" in the quoted passage) he should have used the following schema:
W1: A is equal to B.
But not:
W2: A is equal to A.
In the quotation above, Trotsky referred to the manufacture of "cone bearings" in his argument against the unrestricted application of his own simplified version of the LOI. Here, he was clearly interpreting the two "A"s in W2 as standing for different (even if somewhat similar) "cone bearings", that is, he was in fact employing W1. Naturally, this throws into serious doubt Trotsky's ability to spot when something is or isn't even an instance of his own garbled version of the LOI!19
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
Some might regard those remarks as unfair. Surely, Trotsky's point was to argue that just as cone bearings look very similar (but are nevertheless distinct), the two "A"s in W2 are equally similar but distinguishable (in some way). So, he was right to use, or imply, W1.
That counter-objection has some force -- but, fortunately, not much. That is because Trotsky began with the following assertion:
W3: Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects....
[Trotsky's point about two letter "A"s in "A is equal to A" being non-identical themselves was tackled earlier in Essay Six (link above).]
The idea seems to be that workers often (invariably?) realise that the LOI is of limited applicability when they make things. However, even if that were so, Trotsky's main point would be irrelevant. His avowed target had been the LOI ("A is equal to A", not "A is equal to B"), since he hoped to show that workers in their practical activity (implicitly or explicitly) reject that 'law' -- or, at least, that they are aware of its limitations. In order to do this he advanced the claim that workers in general know it is impossible to make two objects exactly alike. But, one of his criticisms of the LOI was that all objects change continually and hence they are never equal to themselves. Now, even if we accept Trotsky's version of the LOI, it doesn't refer to two separate objects being the same; in its classical form (and sometimes even in Trotsky's version) it is manifestly about an object's alleged relation to itself.
If, on the other hand, Trotsky had written:
W4: Every worker knows that it is impossible to make an object completely equal to itself,
the absurdity of what he was saying would have been clear to all; no worker (or anyone else for that matter) would entertain such a crazy idea.
W1: A is equal to B.
However, in W1, Trotsky's point is completely different; there he was arguing that different objects aren't identical and workers know this. In this particular case, he wasn't saying that any one specific object isn't self-identical, but that concerning any two objects, not only can workers see they aren't the same, they also know they can't make two distinct objects that turn out to be identical. He didn't say, or even imply, that workers are aware that they can't make one object the same as itself. But, that is precisely what Trotsky needed to show: that no worker believes one object can be made the same as itself -- i.e., that it is impossible to make one that is self-identical. He manifestly failed to do that....
Put like this, it is reasonably clear that few workers (if any) would understand such a claim (does anyone understand it?), but, even if someone did, no worker would draw such an weird conclusion from their own activity.20
In any case, Trotsky's point (in W3) can't even be derived from his own criticism of the LOI. W3 isn't even a DM-thesis! And, that is quite independent of whether or not workers conclude everything he said they should or would. As seems clear, it isn't relevant to claim that workers are automatic dialecticians because they assent to a banal truth that isn't actually part of DM. It isn't a DM-thesis that two objects are different, only that no object is self-identical. What is wanted here is an example taken from DM that workers could assent to before they were persuaded that direction by a fast-talking Dialectical Missionary. What we actually have is a truism that any card-carrying member of the ruling-class could accept; even dim-wit Donald Trump knows that two apples aren't/isn't one apple!
[Trotsky's point that the two letter "A"s in "A is equal to A" aren't identical themselves was also tackled in Essay Six, link above.]
Nevertheless, and contrary to what Trotsky said, workers can make countless identical objects. Given the fact that certain sub-atomic particles are identical to every other particle of the same type, any worker can easily 'produce' two or more identical objects. Hence, every time a worker throws a light switch, he or she makes (or generates) countless trillion identical objects per second -- which must mean that such workers are "unconscious" anti-dialecticians, if we apply the same sort of fractured reasoning here as Trotsky.21
[Supporting argument and evidence for these seemingly controversial claims can be found in Note 21 (link above).]
This brings us back to Option [2], mentioned earlier:
[2] Some might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of their practical activity in the labour process.
Despite the comments made in the previous sub-section, it could be argued that Trotsky's point is that workers in general are aware of change, since they know that the machines they operate (or might operate) produce seemingly alike, but slightly different, objects. Hence, it could be argued in line with Option [2] above that the labour process will enable them at least to form rudimentary dialectical ideas, at least about identity (or lack of it).
If that is what Trotsky meant then it is certainly unexceptionable, but it isn't what he said. And even if he had said it, it wouldn't have distinguished a DM-description of processes at work in nature and society from one available to anyone using ordinary language, or, indeed, anyone cognizant of 'bourgeois' science -- or even anyone with an ounce of 'commonsense'. Indeed, we can go further: no sane Capitalist or ruling-class ideologue believes that all commodities are identical or even that things don't change.
In fact, workers themselves were aware of change long before they arrived at their first job. They learned to talk about and understand change as they became proficient with the vernacular and as they gained practical experience -- as, indeed, do members of the ruling-class, their enablers, their hangers-on and their ideologues. Hence, workers (at least) don't need to be informed "from the outside" about change -- and neither are they "unconscious" of it. Clearly, a failure to learn about change -- or, a lack of awareness of it -- would threaten the survival of any organism so afflicted, let alone that of workers. This means that the attempt made by DM-theorists to enlighten workers about change is about as useful as telling them that water is wet, grass is green or that "the" is a word.
Again, it could be objected that this admission simply confirms that DM is integral to workers' consciousness, after all, since it acknowledges that they are aware of change almost from birth.
Of course, this point was underlined in Essay Four: ordinary language contains countless words capable of describing and depicting every sort of change, and way beyond the limited capacity possessed of technical jargon, far in excess of anything expressible in the obscure terminology Hegel inflicted on his readers (and that comment applies in equal measure to his modern-day DM-Proselytisers). Furthermore, ordinary human beings are highly proficient at recognising change. In fact, our ancestors would have left little or no progeny behind to ponder this question were they not possessed of this capacity, or had failed to pass it on.
The only point at issue, therefore, is whether or not we should call this facility a sort of 'dialectical awareness of the nature of reality'. If this is what DM-theorists mean by such a skill, it is worth asking: What happened to the general DM-claim that ordinary language and 'commonsense' are super-glued to a static view of reality? Or that it is suffused with 'formal thinking'? Opinions along those lines was aired in TAR itself, alongside the patently false assertion that all that ordinary humans are capable of doing when they speak about the world is pathetically mutter words like "this" and "that":
"Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'…." [Rees (1998), p.45.]22
Here, too, is Engels:
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
Again, as argued in earlier Essay Four (link above), it is in fact ordinary language and common sense that lend even to DM-theorists what little ability they have to talk about change, not the other way round! Once more, if this is what Trotsky meant, there would be no problem because it concedes the point (defended at this site) that ordinary language is all right as it is (to paraphrase Wittgenstein). It doesn't need any assistance from Dialectical Marxists, or their obscure jargon. Quite the reverse, in fact. As we have seen, if DM were true, change would be impossible.
However, this is almost certainly not what Trotsky meant -- that is, of course, if it were even possible to determine what he did mean.
In addition, members of the ruling-class and their hangers-on are also aware of these issues when they use the vernacular (just as much as workers are). Even they are able to refer to change -- and, it must be said, in a way that is vastly superior to Dialectical Marxists, since the latter insist on using the impoverished and severely limited logico-linguistic resources they imported from Hegel and other ruling-class ideologues. Paradoxically, that would, of course, make members of the elite superior 'dialecticians', at least in this respect!
Anyway, this is completely different from showing that workers are capable of gaining a hazy, or even rudimentary, grasp of DM from their life experience. Workers understand change as a result of their interaction with nature and with one another -- and because of the sophistication ordinary language and common understanding make available to them -- partly by means of which we are all socialised. That doesn't mean the rest of DM can be lumped in as a job lot.
That is so for at least three reasons:
(1) Everyone (not just workers and their families) learns about change in this way -- including the most reactionary and conservative elements in society. Are we now to say that the latter are "unconscious" dialecticians, too? [And, as already noted, that would imply they were superior 'dialecticians', since their ideas don't imply change is impossible, unlike DM-fans.]
(2) Ordinary language is incomparably richer in its capacity to express change, identity, difference, negation, movement, stability, instability, opposition, struggle, development, resistance (etc., etc.), than the obscure terminology one finds in DM and Hegel. Indeed, that is why ordinary language is used by all revolutionary papers, leaflets and interventions with the working class. Few such papers quote Hegel at length, or at all! In which case, a switch by workers to the use of DM-jargon wouldn't just constitute a backward step, it would be detrimental to their ability to think clearly. If any of them subsequently wanted to comprehend more complex changes, they would then have to unlearn DM and become conscious anti-dialecticians!
(3) The type of change referred to in the DM-classics isn't just change simpliciter, it is change through 'internal contradiction'. Not only is this sort of change incomprehensible (to one and all, as was demonstrated in Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three -- but more specifically here), workers would never think of using such weird language to depict anything, never mind change -- as we are about to find out.23
It could be argued in response that the labour process in fact teaches workers more about deeper aspects of change than ordinary language and 'commonsense' -- which important factors that DM later hooks onto and greatly amplifies.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the validity of that particular claim until it is made clear what these "deeper aspects of change" actually are. And that is by no means easy. [For the difficulties even defining the word "change" (which has meant that after 2400+ years of trying. philosophers and logicians still lack any such definition), see Essay Three Part Two.]
Presumably, these "deeper aspects" are related to one or more of the following: the 'appearance'/'reality' distinction, the connection between 'the abstract and the concrete', the notion that change occurs through 'internal contradiction', the 'inter-connected, mediated nature of the Totality', and so on. But, even if sense could be made of any of the latter -- and, as we have so far seen in the Essays published at this site, none has --, it is equally clear that workers could make no sense of them, either.
And we can assert that with some confidence, since the best minds in the entire history of Dialectical Marxism have so far failed to attain to that blessed state themselves.
[Anyone who thinks differently, please contact me with the details.]
It is worth remembering that workers are supposed to be able to conclude such things -- 'dialectically' -- simply from watching items roll off the production line, from digging a ditch, from wheeling a hospital trolley, from engaging in some other form of collective labour/activity, or perhaps even from attending strike meetings or, indeed, from forming (or joining) a picket line, etc., etc. -- if this specific interpretation of Trotsky's intentions is correct:
[2] Some might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of their practical activity in the labour process.
But, are we really supposed to believe that as the 1000th Widget for the day is packed into the 100th crate, worker NN thinks to herself: "Well, that's another nail in the coffin of the LOI"? Or: "So, that's what the deeper aspects of change really are"? Or: "How amazing, the Totality has just mediated another 1000 Widgets!" Or, "Did anyone notice that Widget #997 had a few too many internal contradictions?" Or even: "Now I understand why Being is identical with but at the same time different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming!"?
Naturally, that doesn't mean workers don't reflect on their experience, or learn from it. Quite the opposite, in fact. [No 'dialectical pun' intended!] But, if 2400+ years of philosophical speculation, mountains of obscure Hegel-speak -- coupled with Dialectical Marxists' own best efforts over the last 150 years -- can't produce a single clear description or characterisation of "deeper change", never mind all the other Precepts that litter the Dialectical Midden, it is a pretty safe bet that workers can't either. Or even that the latter could make sense of questions like these, to begin with.
Or, more significantly: whether there is actually anything substantive there for anyone, let alone workers, to make sense of.
By way of contrast, this does mean we have once again discovered that Trotsky's claims are either completely misguided or they are far too vague and confused for us to assess, either way. Hence, in this respect, it isn't credible to suppose that workers can raise themselves up by their conceptual bootstraps to attain to a 'DM-understanding' of their own experience, howsoever vague, attenuated or rudimentary it is deemed to be.
That isn't because workers are incapable of understanding complicated questions, it is because there is as yet nothing here that they (or anyone else, for that matter) can even aim toward comprehending. DM-theorists have yet to provide us with a clear goal for anyone -- again, let alone workers -- to aim for. They have yet to say with any clarity what the options before us actually are!
Indeed, we might as well be asked to suppose that workers could understand the Incarnation of Christ and the 'mysteries of the Trinity' by their own efforts.
In that case, not only must workers have DM imposed on them (since it is alien to their experience), we should also expect them to become confused in or by any such imposition. That is because they would have to have an incoherent doctrine foisted on them, one that runs counter to their experience and their language, and one that not even 'DM-experts' seem capable of fathoming.
Or, if the latter can, they have kept that fact well hidden for over 140 years.
Finally, it is worth noting that since workers already understand change (i.e., they know how to use language connected with real material change in everyday life), even if DM provided the bootstraps, workers wouldn't need them.24
In this sub-section, consideration will be given to Option [1], which was:
[1] Some might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of their experiences in the class struggle.
[This was in fact partially covered in the last sub-section.]
Trotsky's probable assent to Option [1] seems to be much clearer and easier to evaluate. Few (if any) socialists would wish to contest the idea that workers have their lives and/or their ideas changed in, or by, struggle.
The only question is: What has Option [1] got to do with DM?
Recall that the whole point of this part of the Essay is to ascertain if there are any ideas exclusive to DM (not HM) that workers can access on their own as a result of the class war.25
But, once again, a necessary detour:
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Interlude Three: Are There Any Proletarian Philosophers?
[The following material used to form part of Note 25.]
It is worth pointing out that issues connected with the "class-consciousness" (or otherwise) of workers aren't under scrutiny in this Essay, and neither is any other topic exclusive to HM. Nor is it assumed that all or even most workers have been introduced to, or have encountered, Marxist concepts. The issue here is solely whether workers can develop a single classical DM-notion on the basis of the class struggle -- or, indeed, from their own experience -- even if only at a rudimentary level. Nor is it being claimed that workers have never accepted DM-concepts at some point or at some level, although that appears to have been more true of workers in the late 19th through to the mid-20th century. [Reé (1984) is very good on this (in connection with the UK and the former USSR), at least over the period just mentioned. See also, Joravsky (1961), Lecourt (1977), Macintyre (1986), Werskey (1988), and Wetter (1958), for additional background.] As far as I can determine, this is no longer the case --, and for reasons explored in Part Two and Essay Ten Part One.
What is being claimed here is that any workers who have either developed 'dialectical theories' of their own, or who have accepted them when they became socialists or communists, did so as a result of one or more of the following:
(i) From their study of the 'Philosophical Classics' (or other texts written by philosophers), including Hegel; or,
(ii) From their study of the work of Dialectical Marxists (Engels, Dietzgen, Plekhanov, Lenin, etc., etc.).
As should seem reasonably clear, Alternative (i) represents a clear and obvious example of 'outside influence' -- that is, 'outside' the workers' movement -- no one supposes that Traditional Philosophers were working class (but see below) --, and, as we will see, it is 'outside' their own lived experience, too. As far as Alternative (ii) is concerned, Lenin has already admitted (as have others) that DM was derived (directly and indirectly) from Traditional Philosophy, so this alternative also represents an 'outside' source.
Hence Alternative (ii) is just an indirect version of Alternative (i).
In what follows, it will be claimed (and, I hope, established) that there are no examples of proletarians who developed DM single-handedly, on their own, free of 'outside influence' (meant in the above manner).
Of course, it is pretty clear that DM-theorists have never even so much as attempted to survey workers to see if there are any "natural dialecticians" out there. Although there have been academic studies concerning the influence DM has had on workers -- Reé (1984), and the works that that book cites, being an excellent example of the genre. But, as we will see, there are no studies that have shown that workers have, or can, develop even basic DM-concepts on their own, without 'outside influence'. Certainly, Trotsky didn't conduct any such survey, and it is reasonably clear why he didn't do so: few workers would be able grasp the basics of DM even if they were communicated to them. Once more, that isn't to denigrate workers; DM-'experts' are themselves incapable of explaining their ideas clearly to one another, let alone to workers!
However, parts of the above paragraph might seem to contradict an earlier statement that there have been workers in previous generations who did accept DM-concepts. But, accepting and grasping are two different things. Christians accept the existence of 'God' but not one of them understands the concept of a 'Deity' (never mind doctrines like The Trinity or The Incarnation), since -- as even they admit -- 'it's all a complete mystery'! The difference here is that Dialectical Marxists reject the accusation that DM is 'a complete mystery', even though, as these Essays have shown, not one of them can explain with any clarity the basics of their theory, let alone anything more complex, and have a propensity to accuse those who ask awkward questions that easily stump them of 'not understanding dialectics' (which accusation is often accompanied by no little abuse -- or possibly even worse than that if and when DM-fans happen to be in power).
In that case, if Dialectical Marxists ever bothered to collect data concerning their own comprehension of DM, they would all fail their own survey!
And this isn't just because each and every one of them seems to believe -- and many actually claim -- that every other Dialectical Marxist doesn't actually 'understand DM' (especially if they belong to a rival party) -- or they are accused of applying it in a 'wooden and lifeless' manner. [I will return to this topic again in Part Two, here and here.] So, this isn't a controversial claim: the vast majority of Dialectical Marxists point fingers at members of rival (Marxist) parties and claim they don't 'understand DM! Their own partisan accusations are simply being generalised, extending them even to the accusers themselves, and I have the receipts, too!]
To return to an earlier point concerning Dialectical Marxist surveys of workers' views and attempts made to communicate DM to workers: to take just one example, standard UK-SWP discussions invariably (but not unsurprisingly) focus on concepts exclusively drawn from HM. Those drawn from DM are almost always omitted; many aren't even mentioned!
But, as we will see, this is in fact typical concerning the wider movement. Whenever Dialectical Marxists are trying to propagandise workers, when was the last time you saw a revolutionary paper argue that Being is identical with, but at the same time different from, Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming? Or, when has a revolutionary party ever printed a strike leaflet that attempts to point out that every single letter of the alphabet printed on that leaflet -- or even in one of their own books a worker happened to be reading -- isn't identical with itself, quoting Trotsky to that effect:
"The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A' is equal to 'A'.... But in reality 'A' is not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens -- they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -- a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is true (sic) -- all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself at 'any given moment'…. How should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Trotsky (1971), pp.63-64. Bold emphasis added.]
Or even Engels:
"Abstract Identity (a=a; and negatively, a cannot be simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself.... The fact that identity contains difference within itself is expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red, where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not covered by the predicate or the subject…. That from the outset identity with itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident." [Engels (1954), pp.214-15. Bold emphasis alone added.]
[If anyone knows differently and can cite examples where Dialectical Marxist have attempted to propagandise workers with nostrums drawn directly, or even exclusively, from DM, please contact me with the details. (I already know about the old WRP, and have dealt with them below). The difference between DM and HM is explained below, too (follow the previous link). Incidentally, I have focused on the UK-SWP since (i) They (and their spin-offs) represent the largest and most influential revolutionary tendency in the UK and Europe, and possibly the world, and (ii) Having once been a member, I know them far better than the rest. Other parties and tendencies -- where they show any interest at all in workers' views -- aren't much different in relevant respects; i.e., those related to the aims of this Essay. (This was, of course, written before the UK-SWP's recent implosion and descent into almost complete political irrelevance on the far left -- and the self-immolation of their US-clone, the ISO, a few years later.) Concerning workers and their relation to HM, cf., for example, Callinicos (2004), pp.153-272; Rees (1988), pp.89-104, and Callinicos (1988), pp.162-71. See also Callinicos and Harman (1987), and German (1996).]
Hence, perhaps by default these days, it is just assumed that DM-concepts either don't matter to, or they don't resonate with, the working class. How else to explain the lack of DM-concepts when communicate with workers? In some quarters, it might even be the case that workers' ideas themselves don't count. That will certainly help explain the denigration of ordinary language and 'commonsense' we see coming from Dialectical Marxists.
To be honest, who really wants to know if a strike has taught workers that two objects can't be identical? Or that a widget isn't equal to itself? Or, whether the whole is greater than the sum of the parts? Or, if freedom 'emerges' from necessity? Or, for goodness sake(!), whether Being is identical with, but at the same time different from, Nothing, etc., etc.?
Will a single DM-concept help the working class overthrow Capitalism? Or even win a strike, for goodness sake?
[Honest answers to the above questions are pretty clear -- "No one", "None", and "No", respectively --, and that is partly because, if DM were true, change would actually be impossible.]
Notwithstanding this, it could be argued that, as a matter of fact, the idea that workers can't comprehend DM, or develop the theory themselves, is incorrect, especially when we consider the life and thought of Joseph Dietzgen. It could be maintained that Dietzgen is a clear example of a proletarian who, on the basis of his own efforts, became a dialectical philosopher. Indeed, Dietzgen independently discovered, or re-invented, DM -- and as a result he was respected (to some extent) by Marx, Engels and Lenin.
Or, so this comforting fable would have us believe...
Now, while Dietzgen's working-class credentials are..., ahem..., shall we say..., highly dubious (but, see below), his revolutionary sincerity isn't open to question. He was clearly a fellow comrade and nothing said here should be interpreted as detracting from that fact. But, this doesn't mean we should appropriate his work uncritically. That would be to turn him into an icon.
Unfortunately, Dietzgen's 'proletarian' credentials are far from convincing. According to the account given by his son [E. Dietzgen (1906), pp.7-33], Dietzgen senior was a "master tanner", who, after having worked in his father's shop, turned his hand to various different occupations. These included opening a grocery store, running a bakery and a tannery business. After that he assumed control of the family firm in Germany. This means that Dietzgen's 'proletarian credentials' are only marginally more 'convincing' than those of Engels himself! Even Jonathan Reé describes Dietzgen as "self-employed". [Reé (1984), p.23.]
However, even if it were true that Dietzgen was a genuine, "horny-handed proletarian", that would still fail to count against the claim made earlier that workers can't form a single DM-idea on their own this side of being 'converted' to the faith by one of the dialectical-elect, or, indeed, the work of ruling-class theorists. That is so for at least two reasons:
(1) Dietzgen's philosophical writings are thoroughly confused and are vastly inferior even to those of Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. [Several examples of his confused ramblings were examined in Essay Two, here.] As the Essays published at this site have shown, the philosophical ideas of the DM-classicists themselves make no sense; in that case, Dietzgen's vastly inferior work stands no chance. Hence, if Dietzgen was a worker, the claim advanced here (that no worker can comprehend DM) finds ready confirmation; Dietzgen clearly didn't understand this sub-Hegelian Farrago!
(2) More importantly: irrespective of whether or not his ideas are comprehensible (or even whether he understood them), Dietzgen didn't actually derive DM-concepts from his own experience. According to his son he learnt them by reading the works of philosophers. [Cf., E. Dietzgen (1906), p.8.] Reé also says Dietzgen was "widely read in the history of philosophy, and spent his spare time composing books and articles on philosophical questions." [Reé (1984), p.23.] Hence, if anything, this substantiates the claim advanced earlier: Option (i): DM-concepts may (ultimately) only be obtained, directly or indirectly, from ruling-class sources, and they have to be imported into the working-class movement "from the outside".
A recent article by Joe Pateman [i.e., Pateman (2021)] has once again tried to argue that Dietzgen was a working class socialist. Unfortunately, Pateman just asserts Dietzgen was working class (p.116), but offers zero proof -- that is, other than repeating what others have said about him, who did so without proof, too. He also says the following about Dietzgen:
"Born in 1828 near Cologne, Germany, Dietzgen had a primary education, and brief stints in secondary school before learning his father's tanning trade. In his spare time Dietzgen studied political economy, literature, and philosophy, including the writings of Aristotle, Kant, and Fichte." [Pateman (2021), p.117. Bold emphases added.]
This suggests Dietzgen was far more petty-bourgeois than he was proletarian! It also conforms the fact that he derived his ideas from ruling-class sources, as alleged earlier. Pateman offers no other evidence in support of the claim that Dietzgen was "working class".
It could be countered that Marx himself called Dietzgen a worker; here is Pateman on this:
"In 1867, after reading a fragment of his work, Marx wrote, in agreement with Engels, that 'the autodidactic philosophy -- pursued by the workers themselves -- has made great progress in the case of this tanner'. A year later, he described Dietzgen as 'one of the most gifted workers I know'. His writings 'contained much that was excellent, and -- as the independent product of a worker -- even admirable'. Then, at the 1872 Congress of the First International, Marx introduced Dietzgen to the assembled delegates with the words: 'here is our philosopher'." [Pateman (2021), p.116. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. I have omitted Pateman's footnote reference numbers.]25a0
Well, unless we want to completely redefine Marx's understanding of class, and thereby add petty-bourgeois master tanners to the proletariat, we are forced to conclude Marx was mistaken about the class position occupied by Dietzgen. Or, at a stretch, we could try to argue that Marx was merely being expansive, making a rhetorical, not a scientific, point. [On this, see Note 25a0 (link above).] It is also worth adding that none of these remarks appear in Marx's more considered, published works. They all come from letters or secondary sources.
But, even if Marx were 100% correct, and Dietzgen was a genuine proletarian, as we have seen, he obtained his philosophical ideas from ruling-class theorists. He might very well have reshaped those ideas, but they were still part of the "ruling ideas of the age".
Hence, Dietzgen can't be recruited to the claim that workers can re-invent DM from scratch.
The same comments apply, mutatis mutandis, to the other alleged examples of 'Proletarian Philosophers' -- such as Tommy Jackson and Gerry Healy.
Jackson, unlike Dietzgen, was a genuine working-class Marxist, but he 'caught dialectics' from Hegel (as well as from Dietzgen -- so, he didn't re-invent DM himself), and his classic book on the subject [i.e., Jackson (1936)] shows that he, too, didn't understand a word of it -- not because it is too difficult, but because, like The Christian Trinity and the Jabberwocky, it is intrinsically incomprehensible. Where Jackson touches on DM, his account is as clear as mud. [Proof? Check out the long quotation from his book and my analysis of it in Essay Three Part One.]
This is what we read about Jackson in Reé's history of the subject:
"In 1897, a talented son was born into the family of a skilled compositor, a Radical named Thomas Blackwell Jackson, in Clerkenwell in the East End of London. At the age of seven, he began to attend the local School Board school in Upper Holloway.... He left school at the age of thirteen, becoming a printer's reader and then an apprentice. But his heart was elsewhere: in a 'passion for book collecting and devouring' which, he recalled later, 'was so inordinate that I used to embezzle my dinner money to buy books'.... [O]ne Christmas Eve he discovered a copy of G. H. Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy in a second-hand furniture shop.... Reading Lewes over Christmas 'changed my mental orientation for life', he wrote, and 'opened before me an entirely new world of adventure.... Thereafter...I wallowed in philosophy.' During the years of his apprenticeship, [he] worked his way through Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel...[and emerged] with a head full of philosophical jargon.... [After converting to socialism] Jackson set off 'hot foot in search of every line of Marx and Engels I could discover'.... One day, however, he 'happened upon a second hand copy of...Engels's Socialism, Utopian and Scientific.... Recalling his adolescent encounter with philosophy, Jackson was to write, much later: 'I was, in fact, unknown to myself, acquiring a grasp of the Universe, objective and subjective, as a unity in multiplicity in perpetual process of self-transformation." [Reé (1984), pp.10-12. Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.]
In a footnote we also read the following (these are Jackson's own words):
"Lewes led me to see a new significance in Plato and Aristotle, led me to realise there was such a thing as philosophic method, led me to really study Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, and better still the mighty 'God-intoxicated' 'master atheist' Spinoza and thereafter Old Man Hegel and ultimately, and in consequence, Marx." [Quoted in Reé (1984), p.128, Note 16. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis added.]
So, just like Dietzgen, Jackson caught philosophy from ruling-class hacks, and DM from other Dialectical Marxists. He didn't re-discover, invent or develop 'dialectics' himself.
Healy also came from petty-bourgeois stock; he drifted in and out of the working class only to 'catch dialectics' from his encounter with Lenin's MEC -- a debilitating condition seriously aggravated by a lethal strain he picked up from prolonged exposure to PN.
[MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism -- i.e., Lenin (1972); PN = Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks -- i.e., Lenin (1961).]
Did Healy understand a word of it? Well, readers can judge for themselves: open a copy of, say, Healy (1990) at any randomly-selected page. It will then be readily apparent that no human could possibly 'understand' dialectics, least of all the printed product of this expert word-mangler.
[Read more, if you can -- or, rather, if you're a closet masochist -- here and here.]
You want even more proof? Ok, here's a pictorial summary of Healy's 'theory of knowledge':
Figure One: Recently Discovered WRP Suicide Note
Reé also tells of another alleged working class philosopher, William White Craik (1881-1967), about whom we read:
"W. W. Craik [was] a railway worker from South Wales, effectively the first editor of Plebs Magazine, one of the original students at the Central Labour College, and subsequently a member of the staff there from 1910 to 1925. Half a century later, he recalled how, in his view, Dietzgen had 'helped to fill the gap left by Marx' by constructing a proletarian view of philosophy.... Under Craik's influence, the early Labour College Movement was deeply suffused with Dietzgenism. Alongside Economics, Industrial History, Literature, Grammar, and Evolution, the local Labour Colleges provided lecture courses on 'Philosophical Logic', based on outlines written by Craik, these in turn being derived from the translations in The Positive Outcome Of Philosophy [i.e., Dietzgen (1906b) -- RL]" [Reé (1984), pp.31-32. Bold emphases and links alone added; paragraphs merged.]
[However, anyone who knows any FL, and who struggles through the Chapter on 'Logic', or the even worse, 'Letters on Logic' (i.e., Dietzgen (1906c)) -- both published in Dietzgen (1906b) --, will surely spit out their morning coffee in astonishment that the word "Logic" has been allowed to appear anywhere near such unmitigated twaddle.]
Then there is Jock Shanley:
"The experience of Jock Shanley illustrates the verve and depth of Dietzgen's influence. Shanley was an upholsterer by trade, with little formal education.... In a recent interview, he recalled how, at that time, he read various Marxist classics [which we are told in a footnote included AD -- RL], but above all, The Positive Outcome of Philosophy [i.e., Dietzgen (1906b) -- RL]. 'This is the one that was central' he said. For Shanley..., contact with philosophy, and especially with the notion of dialectic, produced a revelation.... The notion of dialectic was 'real' to Shanley because it combated an attitude of mind in which he had been brought up -- where something's mere existence was taken as an argument for its permanent necessity. Dietzgenism taught him never to underestimate the changefulness of nature and society." [Reé (1984), p.38. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
[AD = Anti-Dühring -- i.e., Engels (1976).]
In a subsequent article in Radical Philosophy, Reé added these brief remarks:
"Shanley is happy to be described as a 'proletarian philosopher'. His acquaintance with philosophy began when, as an apprentice in Aberdeen in the early 1920s, he attended University Extra-Mural classes in economics. Of the theories surveyed in the course, the only one which made sense to him was Marxism, and he plied the tutor with questions about it. The tutor first reacted by accusing Shanley of being a 'plant' from the National Council of Labour Colleges [NCLC -- RL], a Marxist organisation for independent working-class education, of which Shanley had not in fact heard at that time. But eventually the tutor was sufficiently pleased with Shanley to arrange for him to be offered a scholarship to Aberdeen University, on the understanding that he would spend two years working for the Liberal Party once he had got his degree. Shanley rejected that offer and, with a grant from the Amalgamated Union of Upholsterers, spent two years (1924-26) as a full-time student at the Central Labour College, the residential counterpart of the NCLC, in Earls Court, London. It was there that he learned the materialist and dialectical outlook by which he still organises his life and thought." [Reé (1986), p.3. (This links to a PDF.) Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Much the same can be said about the late Lawrence Daly, subsequently a leading figure in the National Union of Miners [NUM], about whom Reé had this to say:
"Lawrence Daly -- a boy growing up in a Communist miner's family near Fife in the 1930s and 1940s -- received a political and philosophical education which cut across all the lines laid down in Central Committees and capital cities. He and his family revered Tommy Jackson, who would occasionally lecture in Fife; and the library of the local Miners' Welfare Institute provided a range of reading much of which was inevitably out of date in terms of any changing party line. Although he was a Young Communist, Daly took NCLC [National Council of Labour Colleges -- RL] correspondence courses in English Grammar, Social History, and Trade Unionism, and read The Plebs. Encouraged by his father, and with no sense of unorthodoxy, he also got to know Fred Casey's textbook of Dietzgenism, Thinking. His father would talk about the book: 'about phenomena appearing and, growing, developing, declining and dying...there was a struggle inside between the old and the new -- the unity of opposites and the struggle of opposites....' Daly's education in dialectics, then, owed nothing to the 'New Turn' in Russia, but leapt over the decades to join with the illumination received by people like Shanley in the 1920s, or Casey in the early years of the century, or indeed Jackson in the 1890s -- a conviction that change and struggle, so far from being opposed to the natural order of things, are actually intrinsic to it." [Reé (1984), p.76. Bold emphases and link alone added; paragraphs merged.]
Hence, Daly is yet another working class socialist whose introduction to 'dialectics' we can blame on others; but, ultimately, in the last analysis, it was based on ruling-class forms-of-thought, albeit leached into the workers' movement by comrades who clearly meant well, but whose judgement was deleteriously affected by the underdeveloped nature of the UK working class. [I will say much more about that in Part Two -- for example, here and here.]
As we can now see, Dietzgen was a major conduit for the introduction of DM into the workers' movement in the first half of the 20th century, at least with respect to UK workers.
Concerning yet another 'proletarian philosopher', the watch-maker, Fred Casey, we read the following:
"Fred Casey...had been born into a Roman Catholic family in 1876. Like many other working people of his generation, he had moved from a thirst for book-learning to a passion for socialism. He recalled that 'A combination of physics, astronomy, biology and philosophy, including the rationalist literature, spoiled my Roman Catholicism, though it did not settle the "great" questions -- it took the "Positive Outcome" [i.e., Dietzgen (1906b) -- RL] which I met later to do that.' Casey first encountered Dietzgen's work in 1912, when he was 36. This was a result of attending local Labour College lectures given by Craik. His family commitments prevented him from accepting a CLC [Central Labour College -- RL] scholarship that same year, so he devoted himself to studying the Positive Outcome on his own. During the war [clearly WW1 -- RL], he conducted Dietzgen classes in Labour Colleges in the Manchester area, eventually converting his lectures into a brief textbook, published...in 1922." [Reé (1984), p.35. Bold emphases alone added.]
[There is more to be told about Dietzgen, Casey, and the rest, but such detail will take us too far away from the main focus of this Essay. Readers can access that material for themselves in Reé (1984), Chapter Three.]
We needn't labour the point any longer (no pun intended!). Workers (and, once again, these were almost exclusively lived in the late 19th and early 20th centuries), who could conceivably be called 'philosophers', either turned out to be petty-bourgeois and 'caught philosophy and DM' from ruling-class sources (or other Dialectical Marxists), or they were genuine workers who also 'caught philosophy and DM' in the same way -- in other words: Alternatives (i) and (ii) again.
So, to repeat: there are no examples of proletarians who developed DM single-handedly, on their own, free of 'outside influence'.
[If anyone knows of even one, please let me know, and provide sources.]
At this point, it could be objected that the dice have been heavily loaded in favour of the line promoted and at this site -- i.e., against DM -- and therefore in alignment with the idiosyncratic interpretation of HM promoted by RL. So, while it has been maintained that workers can't arrive at an understanding of DM solely as a result of their own experience -- meaning that it has had to be foisted on them "from the outside" -- no such strictures or requirements have been placed on HM. But, if HM can't itself be learned by workers as a result of their own experience, then the alleged contrast between DM and HM is unsustainable, at least in this respect. In addition, the phrase "from their own experience" has been interpreted extremely narrowly, plainly in order to rule out workers learning about DM from books, for example. When that constraint is applied to HM, the same conclusions would surely apply.
Or, so it could be maintained...
It is worth recalling that the assertion that workers can't learn about DM from their own experience wasn't an empirical claim on my part, it was an observation based on the inference that if DM makes no sense, no one (not Engels, not Lenin, not Trotsky, not Mao, not Joseph Dietzgen, not Tommy Jackson, not even Gerry Healy..., no one!) can arrive at a DM-view of the world by any means whatsoever -- including even 'divine intervention'!
That is because there is no such thing as a DM-view of anything, let alone of 'reality' -- at least, no more than there is off-side in chess or the cube root of your left foot in cobbling. DM is far too confused and incoherent for it even to be described as "a view", still less "a theory". The other considerations (mentioned in the above pro-DM objection -- such as this site being prejudicial against DM, etc.) were included solely to illustrate further this contention: there is no DM-view of anything. Period. Those strictures, of course, also apply to Theology and the fictional works of Lewis Carroll and Edward Lear -- but they don't apply to HM. I am just as prejudiced against belief in 'sky-gods' and interpreting fantasy fiction as fact as I am against the philosophical fantasy called DM. I openly and proudly plead guilty on that score.
Moreover, reference was made to "workers' experience" simply because it is a phrase widely used by Dialectical Marxists. However, it isn't to be assumed that I endorse the philosophical employment of that phrase. It appears here strictly rhetorically; that is, "workers' experience" has been used in order to undermine several other ideas that are based on inferences/conclusions already accepted by DM-theorists.
Of course, the ordinary language use of "experience" isn't (seriously) in doubt; indeed, it has been referenced in this Essay several times.25a
It could be objected that there is no other way to learn philosophy than reading books or attending lectures, etc. If so, none of us is a 'sealed epistemological unit' (as it were), totally free from 'outside' influence. HM itself is built on that very premise, after all. If so, the points made above run counter to HM, not just DM.
Or so it could be countered...
Of course, that is why Marx and Engels said this:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65. Bold emphases added.]
That just underlines the point being made here: when philosophical ideas are introduced into the workers' movement, the ideas of the ruling class continue to rule us, but now on home territory, thanks to Dialectical Marxists! There is no way we can prevent this as individuals, but as a movement we can -- especially given the points that are about to be made: the 'natural' disposition workers have toward accepting ideas exclusive to HM combined with the 'sanitising' effect of the class war (on this, see Part Two). By "sanitising" I mean: workers have many of the illusions and false beliefs they hold about the nature of class and the state refined, re-structured or even excised in and by the class war. This often means they learn to reject or dismiss racist, sexist and homophobic ideas --, for example, as a result of strike action and the wider fight against all forms of oppression. Few Marxists are unaware of this. [I will deal with that topic in greater detail in Essay Fourteen Part Two.] But not one of them learns a single idea exclusive to DM by these means.
As noted above, workers' understanding is already pre-disposed toward HM, which informs their experience of life in class-divided society. Hence, few workers need to be informed about, or even be made aware of, most of the following: (i) Class division; (ii) The great disparity of wealth between classes; (iii) The havoc caused by the relentless pursuit of profit; (iv) The de-humanising, de-motivating effect of work under capitalism; (v) The poor education, housing and healthcare they and their families have to endure (without having to fight for improvements); (vi) The bias and partiality of the Government, the Police, the Media, and the Judiciary; and/or (vii) Of the need for unions, etc., etc. The list is almost endless. Survey after survey shows this to be the case, and anyone who knows workers knows they know this, too.
That isn't to suggest this awareness is evenly distributed, or that it doesn't change over time, from generation to generation; but only the most backward sections of the working-class are ignorant of all or most of the above. Nor is it to suggest that workers don't harbour regressive ideas, or hold beliefs and attitudes that socialists shouldn't challenge. But, the plain fact is that, in addition to the aforementioned 'sanitising' effect of the class war, these 'ideological defects' (if that is even the right term!) can all be countered using ordinary language. [Follow that link for an explanation how.]
[On this, see Callinicos and Harman (1987), Callinicos (1987, 1988), German (1996), and Rees (1988). NB., this has nothing to do with the so-called "Dominant Ideology Thesis". More on that in Essay Three Part Three. See also Callinicos (2004), pp.160-68.]
However, in contrast, every single worker would need to be 'informed from the outside' that, for example:
(a) Change occurs as a result of 'contradictions'; even then workers would fail to comprehend how the mere "gainsaying" of someone or something could possibly help a cat move off a mat, let alone how a mere verbal wrangle could possibly have caused the demise of, say, Feudalism. [I develop this point further in the next sub-section.]
(b) Flowers negate seeds; they would probably have a good laugh at that one, perhaps recalling several risible stories about (the former) UK Prince Charles talking to his plants, or maybe be even the childish conversation between the Weed and Bill and Ben of the BBC Children's Programme, Flower Pot Men.
(c) Truth is the Whole/Totality; they would almost certainly view this as some sort of New Age nostrum.
(d) Objects and processes are the same and not-the-same, as well as being not-the-same and not-not-the-same. They would definitely conclude that care in the community had failed whoever invented that gem.
(e) "John is a man" is capable of revealing the essential nature of everything in existence, as Lenin himself believed. That might prompt them to advise whoever came out with that prize specimen to cut out the hallucinogens for a while.
(f) Being is identical with but at the same time different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming; they would definitely agree with Lenin and Trotsky that whoever "divined" that pearl of wisdom was a genius, and no mistake. In fact, I predict it will become a popular bumper sticker, found on workers' cars and vans right across the globe.
So, while HM needn't be learned from books (but it can be), DM ultimately can't be 'learnt' in any other way -- or, as we have actually seen, it can't be learned at all.
[For further background to this topic, see Easton (1958), Emmett (1928), MacIntyre (1986), Reé (1984) and Werskey (1988). See also Steele and Taylor (2004).]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Possible Examples Of 'Class-War Dialectics'
Perhaps, the following might serve as an example of a theory or precept, exclusive to DM (but not HM), that workers can develop on their own as a result of the class war (and not just their everyday experience)?
W5: As a result of the class struggle worker, NN, learnt that change in nature and society occurred through internal contradiction.
But, it is worth reminding ourselves that until Hegel (and perhaps a handful of other Idealists/Mystics) began to employ "contradiction" in a 'new way' approximately 200 years ago no one had ever thought of using it like this; or, indeed, in the manner subsequently employed by DM-fans.26
In which case, it is pertinent to ask: Who today (outside DM-circles) utilises this word in this rather unique manner in ordinary life, or anywhere else, for that matter? As soon as that question is posed the answer becomes patently obvious: no one. Not one soul on the planet (that is, outside of esoteric Hegelian/DM/Buddhist-circles and/or assorted 'Mystical echo-chambers') uses "contradiction" like this, least of all ordinary workers and their families. [Examples of the alleged use of this word in ordinary discourse have been examined here. If anyone knows of any sociolinguistic research that shows differently, please contact me with the details.]
In fact, in ordinary discourse, to "contradict" generally means to "gainsay" something that someone else has said (i.e., to deny what had been communicated, or to assert its negation); a contradiction (in its simples form) is the conjunction of a proposition with its negation. For example:
T1: NN: It's raining.
T2: NM: No, it's not raining.
T3: NP: Someone fully understands Hegel.
T4: NR: You are wrong -- No one fully understands Hegel.
T5: PN: Someone fully understands Hegel and no one fully understands Hegel.
And so on. T1-T4 illustrate one speaker gainsaying -- i.e., contradicting -- another. T5 is a simple, straightforward contradiction.
[For more on this, see Essays Four, Five, Eight Part Three, and Eleven Part One.]
None of this implies everyday speakers don't use "contradiction" loosely or even figuratively, at times. But no ordinary speaker uses this word in the way that Hegel attempted to do, or in the way that Dialectical Marxists do. If that weren't the case, it would hardly have taken Hegel to discover its new role. Hegels' work is virtually unique in this respect, but if ordinary speakers have always used "contradiction" as he tried to do, that would deny him at least this 'innovation' (if, indeed, that is the right term!)
Moreover, the ordinary word "contradiction" isn't even synonymous with its more tightly defined, typographical twin used in FL -- let alone its distant, mutant cousin that surfaces in DL.
[FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Nevertheless, if any workers were naïve enough to conclude from their experience of the class struggle that change occurs simply by "gainsaying" the boss, the police or even the state, they are going to lose far, far more battles than they will ever win. But, that is precisely what the word "contradiction" in W5 would mean to workers (as brought out in W5a, below), based on their own experience -- but not after having read a DM-source --, that is, that change results from merely arguing with someone:
W5a: As a result of the class struggle, worker, NN, learnt that change in nature and society occurred through gainsaying, or denying, what someone has said.
[W5 would be interpreted that way by anyone unschooled in DM -- i.e., the overwhelming majority of language users on this planet with the requisite vocabulary.]
Furthermore, as we have seen several times already, DM-theorists themselves (LCDs and HCDs) have an alarmingly insecure grasp of the term "contradiction" as it is actually used in FL -- and even as it is supposedly used in DL. Hence, it is highly unlikely that workers would succeed in comprehending the Hegelian-, or even the DM-use of this familiar word if countless generations of Dialectical Marxists and Hegel-groupies have signally failed to do so themselves -- confusing contradictions, which they regularly do, with one or more of the following: inconsistencies, contraries, opposites, paradoxes, puzzles, unexpected events and opposing forces -- along with a whole host of other alternatives.
[LCD = Low Church Dialectician; HCD = High Church Dialectician. Both terms are explained in Part Two; follow the links.]
But, why should, or why would, workers bother grappling with this obscure Hegelian term-of-art if they already understand (in use) the original vernacular version? Indeed, few workers would commit the sort of simple-minded mistakes that DM-theorists constantly make, confusing the everyday "gainsaying" of someone with the secret 'inner dynamic of Reality'. Here is the Mystery-Meister Himself (in a passage widely quoted by DM-fans):
"Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The proximate result of opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposited to elements in the completer notion." [Hegel (1975), p.174, §119. Bold emphases and links added. I have used the on-line versions here.]
To be sure, you have to "understand" dialectics really well to swallow that one!
Well, perhaps this is being unfair to Trotsky and other DM-theorists. Maybe then the following is what he/they meant?
W6: As a result of the class struggle worker, NN, learnt that change in society occurred as a result of opposing class forces.
W6 is clearly unexceptional. Many workers who have never heard of Marxism would agree with W6 (or something like it, but perhaps expressed a little more colloquially). Unfortunately, however, W6 doesn't represent an idea exclusive to DM. As noted elsewhere, if this is what Trotsky meant by "dialectics" then it would be perfectly acceptable (since it contains zero DM, and more closely resembles Marx's use of this word). Unfortunately, what we're looking for here are ideas specific to DM that might conceivably pop into workers' heads before they encountered a single DM-Evangelist. Clearly, W6 isn't relevant in this respect since it is a proposition taken from HM. What is required, on the other hand, is an example exclusive to DM that workers might form or grasp, unaided.27
Are there then any other notions exclusive to DM that workers could discover solely by their own efforts? Maybe the following?
W7: As a result of the class struggle worker, NN, learnt that truth is the Whole.
If W7 is meant to be restricted to DM-type ideas about the Totality (assuming, of course, that we are ever told what the Whole, the Totality, actually is (on that, see Essay Eleven Part One)), then it is difficult to see what NN could possibly conclude from the class war that would prompt or motivate this 'new realisation'.
Perhaps W7 might imply something about the Andromeda Galaxy, an idea that popped into worker NN's mind as a result of her attending a strike meeting? Or, NN might begin to ponder the deep significance of the mass extinction of life at the end of the Permian Era after her Union won a significant pay rise in the subsequent dispute? Or, maybe W7 implies something about semi-conductors, or the number of grains of wheat in Dallam County, Texas in August 1897 -- these startling ideas perhaps occurring to NN as a result of her Union also securing a big improvement in safety protocols at her place of work? Alternatively, on an anti-war march, NN's thoughts could turn to issues connected with the minimum dimensionality of space required for Superstrings to exist. Or, maybe even whether there exist any Gravitons or Tachyons -- each question arising perhaps because of that nasty look the foreman just gave her? Or, indeed, NN might begin pondering whether or not Being is identical with but at the same time different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming, when that same foreman locked her and her co-workers out?
And, it isn't to the point to object that the above examples are ridiculous. That is because such things, and many more, would have to occur to workers if they are to conclude that "truth is the Whole" as a result of their experience of the class war. So, if in W7 the Totality is meant to be the DM-Totality, one or more of the above thoughts (along with countless others) would have to occur to NN as the sole result of the class struggle, if this is what Trotsky meant.
Again, this isn't to suppose that workers don't think about such things, but they don't appear to do so as a result of the class war. They don't begin to contemplate universal inter-connectedness as a by-product of struggle, nor do they ponder deep metaphysical truths about "Being", "Becoming" and "Nothing" (whether or not these have been materially 'inverted' and put back 'on their feet'), either.
Or, if they do, they have either remained remarkably secretive about it for many few centuries, or DM-fans have unwisely kept the relevant evidence to themselves for far too long.
In addition, if W7 were correct, workers would have to conclude something about the Whole, not just the parts, as a result of struggle, and what they finally conclude must be exclusive to DM (and not be part of HM), if Trotsky is correct, and Option [1] represents what he meant.28
W7: As a result of the class struggle worker, NN, learnt that truth is the Whole.
Even so, I don't propose to examine this particular Option any further; that would be for me to do the hard theoretical work for DM-theorists, a task they have shirked for over 150 years. As far as I am aware, no DM-supporter has even so much as attempted to expand on or develop Trotsky's ideas in this area -- or, indeed, survey workers to see if he was right -- in the intervening years (even though many of them mindlessly regurgitate this passage as if it were Gospel Truth).
Given the insurmountable problems the latter would have faced had they even gestured toward confirming Trotsky's claims -- problems that have merely been hinted at above --, that was doubtless a wise abstention.
On the other hand, maybe Trotsky believed that DM-concepts might occur to workers (or even to "peasant women") in a rudimentary sort of way as a result of their after-the-event reflections on general features of the world, or as a result of their own interaction with it? Alternatively, DM-ideas could have arisen because of their unwitting (i.e., "unconscious") adherence to certain 'dialectical laws', as suggested by Option [3]:
[3] Others might gain a vague or rudimentary grasp of DM as a result of their reflection on their own unconscious compliance with certain dialectical laws.
Hence, in connection with this, Trotsky might have meant something like the following:
W8: Worker/peasant NM realised, as a result of her life-experiences, that a change in quality could only come about through a change in quantity, and vice versa.
Unfortunately, W8 is far too broad a claim to be evaluated with ease because it clearly depends on individual life experiences. However, since Hegel was apparently the first human being in history to 'discover' the alleged 'Law' of the transformation of quantity into quality, and he wasn't a worker, the truth of W8 is somewhat dubious, to say the least.
Nevertheless, the veracity of W8 may only be ascertained after a decision has been made about what it actually means! As we saw in Essay Seven, this so-called "Law" (i.e., Q↔Q) is not only highly questionable, it is irredeemably vague and confused. Worse still, there is a strong suspicion that Hegel himself might not have intended this 'law' to be as universally applicable as Engels and others later believed. [On this, see Note 18.]
[Q↔Q: The Law of the Change of Quantity into Quality, and vice versa.]
Despite these initial worries, it is worth considering the following everyday scenarios (of the sort with which we are all familiar, whether or not we might agree with any of them) that illustrate the peculiar nature of W8 -- if, indeed, it is applicable in such circumstances:
W9: MN drank five times as much tea this week as last week, but found that its quality hadn't changed.
W10: MM watched ten times as much TV this week as last week, but found that the dire quality of the programmes hadn't altered.
W11: The quality of the exercises PP performed improved greatly because she read the keep-fit manual far more carefully this time, even though she spent just as many hours in the gym as she had before.
W12: NP cooked three times as much potato soup today as yesterday, but his children said it tasted no better.
W13: The quality of MP's French homework improved dramatically this week -- even though she spent the same amount of time on it --, because of the superior pen and paper she used.
W14: MR read twice as many books and articles on DM in 2025 as he had in 2024 but found that the quality of the arguments and evidence they contained remained depressingly the same.
This list can be extended indefinitely to cover situations with which we are still all familiar, and the relevant numbers can be made as large as is practicable in each case, but no obvious dialectical conclusions would be drawn from any of them by ordinary workers or their families.
It could be objected that (a) These examples have been deliberately slanted to challenge Option [3]; as a result they are (b) Highly contrived and banal in the extreme, which makes them unsuitable for use in a scientific or philosophical analysis. Anyway, they (c) Fail to consider the sort of situations or processes that illustrate Q↔Q.
However, with respect to (a), it is worth noting that the whole point of this exercise is to see how ordinary people/workers might conceivably grope their way toward a rudimentary grasp of DM-concepts from their own life-experiences. To that end, highly technical or philosophically complex examples would clearly be of little use or relevance. Anyway, Trotsky himself cited trite examples (about bags of sugar and cooking soup) to make his point. Moreover, other dialecticians (including Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin) also cite everyday examples (such as water boiling, balding heads, and rubber bands snapping).
In response to (b), it is worth reminding ourselves that the accusation is that ordinary folk -- except when subject to outside influence -- can't develop DM-concepts. That is because, at best, DM-concepts are either too vague and confused, or, at worst, they are non-sensical and incoherent. Hence, in their practical activity, ordinary individuals would find dialectical concepts were a hindrance; indeed, non-sensical and incoherent 'laws' couldn't fail to impede day-to-day life. The point, therefore, isn't that the prosaic examples listed above were specifically chosen to embarrass Dialectical Marxists -- whether or not they are contrived, or even whether they illustrate this obscure 'Law' -- but whether any day-to-day examples can be found to support Trotsky's claims -- if, that is, Option [3] expresses what he meant.
[The examples that Trotsky himself used will be examined in the next sub-section.]
With respect to (c), the standard examples usually wheeled-out to illustrate the 'three laws of dialectics' were analysed in detail in Essay Seven. There it was shown that not only do they fail to establish what DM-apologists claim for them, there are far more cases where these 'Laws' break down than there are where they even seem to work.
Finally, examples such as W9-W14 are more likely to teach workers that the opposite of Q↔Q is the case, which was all that was required of them. Recall that Trotsky needed to show that workers could gain a rudimentary grasp of something vaguely DM-specific as a result of some experience or other. The examples listed above (along with countless others) seem to indicate that, if anything, the opposite is the case.
Since Q↔Q is the least implausible DM-'Law', it is even less likely that workers would derive any of the other 'Laws' from reflecting on their own experience. Not only have we seen that these 'Laws' make not the slightest sense, Dialectical Marxists have yet to tell us clearly what even they think they mean. Once more, if 'expert' DM-theorists can't quite manage to do it, it is hardly credible that workers could do any better.
Recall, this isn't to put workers down; it is simply to remind us that DM-theorists have yet to tell us precisely what workers are supposed to be aiming for.
As things stand, dialecticians might just as well suppose that workers could airily glide through a looking glass or hunt the Jabberwocky.
To be fair, Trotsky does at least try to give a few examples to illustrate his point, but what he says is decidedly sketchy and far too fanciful to be of much use. Nevertheless, in order to be thorough, they, too, require some consideration:
"Using as his text my remark concerning Darwin, Shachtman has stated, I have been informed, that you are an 'unconscious dialectician.' This ambiguous compliment contains an iota of truth. Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides her self in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality. Similar examples from daily life could be cited without end. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions not only on the basis of the Aristotelian syllogism but also on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty. On sighting a hare, a rabbit, or a hen, a fox concludes: this particular creature belongs to the tasty and nutritive type, and -- chases after the prey. We have here a complete syllogism, although the fox, we may suppose, never read Aristotle. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense, the universe throughout is permeated with 'unconscious' dialectics. But nature did not stop there. No little development occurred before nature's inner relationships were converted into the language of the consciousness of foxes and men, and man was then enabled to generalize these forms of consciousness and transform them into logical (dialectical) categories, thus creating the possibility for probing more deeply into the world about us." [Trotsky (1971), pp.106-07. Italic emphasis in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; minor typo corrected. Vocabulary modified to agree with UK English.]
Unfortunately, it is difficult to take Trotsky's argument here seriously --, even though (amazingly) mega-OTs like Woods and Grant [W&G] went as far as describing this passage as "witty"! [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.47-48.] As we are about to see, "witless" would have been a tad more accurate.]28a
My response below has therefore been coloured by that allegation.
[OT = Orthodox Trotskyist.]
The above passage was analysed in detail in Essay Seven Part One. Here is part of it:
But, what exactly did Trotsky imagine the change of 'quantity' into 'quality' to be, here?
Does an increase in the quantity of salt alter that salt's own quality? Presumably not. Does the quantity of soup even change? Perhaps only marginally as salt is added. But even then the quantity of soup isn't what allegedly changes the quality of the soup; that is supposed to have been the result of the quantity of salt added.
In fact, the quantity of the original soup hasn't actually changed, merely the quantity of the salt/soup mixture; and neither has the quality of the salt altered (just its alleged quantity, in the soup).
What appears to have happened (in this less than half-formed 'thought experiment') is this: the addition (to the soup) of too much salt is supposed to have changed the taste of the resulting salt/soup mixture as perceived by the taster. Hence, at a certain ("nodal") point, a further increase in the quantity of salt alters the quality (i.e., the taste) of the soup, so that its acceptability has changed either side of that "leap".
But, once more, even here, the increased quantity of salt has not passed over into any change in its own quality. What has occurred is that one quality (a palatable taste) has morphed into another quality (an unpalatable taste) as a result of a quantitative change made to one ingredient (salt) added to the salt/soup mixture. So, a certain quality of the soup has changed from being acceptable to being unacceptable as a result of the increased quantity of salt that the mixture now contains.
However, the relevant quality of the added salt remains the same no matter how much is added. Salt is (largely) Sodium Chloride, and it tastes salty whether it is delivered by the spoon, the bucket or the train-load. In that case, neither the quantity nor the quality of the salt has "passed over" into anything in the salt itself. There doesn't therefore seem to be anything in the opening part of this story for that particular aspect of the salt to "pass over" into.
Consequently, the first half of this 'Law' (the 'increase in quantity' clause) is either mis-stated or doesn't apply to the substance being added, the salt.
As far as the second half is concerned (i.e., the alleged alteration in the quality either of the salt or the soup), the postulated change relates to the taste of the soup. But, manifestly, the soup remains salty no matter how much salt is poured in, as we saw. What we seem to have here is this soup becomes increasingly salty as more salt is added.
So, what qualitative change is meant to have occurred? Again, it looks like the change relates to the acceptability of the taste of the soup as perceived by the taster. Hence, at or slightly beyond the alleged "nodal" point, the taste of the soup becomes objectionable. But, this particular change is confined to the one doing the tasting, not the soup. Manifestly, it isn't the soup that alters in this respect; soups do not taste themselves, or perceive their own taste. Tasters experience tastes; tastes exist in tasters, not soups. On one side of the "nodal" point the soup is objectively salty (i.e., it contains dissolved salt); on the other side it is still objectively salty, but with more salt in it. The difference is that on one side the taster tolerated the taste and continued to like it, but on the other side the taste became intolerable and the cook ceased to enjoy what she was sampling. This means that the soup itself hasn't actually changed in this respect, merely the taster's appreciation of it. The relevant change occurs in her not the soup.
It now seems that a change in the quantity (of salt) doesn't actually affect the soup -- except, perhaps, its volume (very slightly) and its composition as a salt/soup mixture. No matter how much salt is dumped into the soup it remains just that, a salt/soup mixture, only with higher proportions of salt -- and that remains the case even at the limit where the soup perhaps turns into sludge or a semi-solid lump, or whatever. A million tons of salt can't change that.28b
Consequently, even with respect to the relevant quality (i.e., soup as soup), the concoction doesn't change (or, at least, not in a way that is relevant to Trotsky's purposes). Hence, a change in the quantity of salt hasn't "passed over" into a change in the quality of the soup (as soup), which means that the second part of this 'Law' (the change in 'quality' part) seems to be defective, too.
If there is a qualitative change anywhere at all that is relevant to the point Trotsky was trying to make, it seems to occur in the third party, here -- that is, the taster. We are forced to interpret his 'thought experiment' this way unless, of course, we are to suppose that tastes actually reside 'objectively' in soups, as one of their alleged 'primary' qualities, perhaps. If that were so, qualities like this (that reside in soups, and not solely in tasters) would have to be able to alter 'objectively', even when they aren't being tasted! But, this example can't imply that; no sane dialectician (one imagines!) believes that tastes reside in the objects we eat. Hence, if this 'Law' is to work in this case, the qualitative change must take place in the taster not the soup.28c
If so, qualitative change in this case must have been induced by a quantitative change in the taster, if this 'Law' is to apply in this case. That is, the taster's 'qualitative' change (if it may be so described) must have been caused by a quantitative change to her, if Engels's 'Law' is applicable. But, what quantitative change has taken place in the taster that caused a corresponding change in (her) quality, or in her changed perception of a quality (taste)? Does she grow new nerve cells or an extra head? A new tongue or a larger mouth? In fact, there are none -- or, none that Trotsky mentioned, and certainly none that are at all obvious.
Plainly, it is a quantitative change in the salt/soup mixture that resulted in the new quality as perceived by that taster. But, that specific quantitative change had no effect on any quality actually in the soup (as previous paragraphs sought to show -- tastes don't reside in soups!). But, there now seem to be no relevant quantitative changes in the taster which could 'pass over' into a corresponding qualitative change in her.
In that case, the most that can be made of this half-baked example is that while quantitative change leads to no qualitative change in some things (i.e., soups), it can prompt certain qualitative changes in other things (i.e., tasters), even though the latter weren't caused by a quantitative change in those things themselves, but by something altogether mysterious. That is, we now have no idea what quantitative change occurred in the taster to make her change in quality.
So, the second part of the 'Law' is now doubly defective.
Of course, it could be objected that there is indeed a quantitative change in the said taster, namely an increase in salt particles hitting her tongue. But, this just pushes the problem one stage further back, for unless we are to suppose that tastes reside in salt molecules (or in Sodium and Chlorine ions), the qualitative change we seek will still have occurred in the taster, not in the chemicals in her mouth , But at just means we are back to where we were a few paragraphs ago. There seems to be no obvious quantitative change to the taster in any of this. She does not grow another tongue or gain more taste buds. It is undeniable that there will have been an increase in salt molecules hitting her tongue, and that these will have a causal effect on the change in taste as she perceives it, but even given that, no change in quantity to the taster herself will have taken place.
Again, it could be objected that there is a material or energetic change here; matter or energy will have been transferred to the taster (or her central nervous system), which causes her to experience a qualitative change in her appreciation of the soup.
In fact, what has happened is that the original salt has interacted with the taster's tongue/nervous system upon being ingested. But, it is at precisely that point that the earlier problems associated with the salt/soup mixture now transfer to the salt/nervous system ensemble. Since tastes don't exist in nerves any more than they exist in soups, we are no further forward. And, as far as changes to any quantity in the taster herself are concerned, that will depend on how we draw the boundary between inorganic salt molecules and living cells. Since this 'difficulty' is considered in more detail below, no more will be said about it here....
In any case, it seems rather odd to describe a change in taste (or in the appreciation of taste) as a qualitative change to a taster, whatever it was that caused it. As the term "quality" is understood by dialecticians, this can't in fact be a qualitative change of the sort they require. Qualities, as they are characterised by dialecticians --, or, rather, as they are by those that bother to say what they mean by this word "quality" -- are those properties of bodies or processes that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body or process into something substantially new:
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity and measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added. Links in the original.]
The Glossary at the Marxist Internet Archive adds:
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else. Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'. In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here. Accessed August 2007. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added. Links in the original.]
This is an Aristotelian notion.
If we apply the above definition to the hackneyed example used by nearly every DM-fan -- water turning into steam or ice if it is heated/cooled --, this 'Law' can't apply to it.
Here is why:
As a solid (ice), liquid, or a gas (i.e., as steam), water remains H2O throughout. No new "kind of thing" has emerged. Consider other examples: Iron is still iron as a solid or a liquid. Oxygen is still oxygen in its liquid or gaseous state. The same can be said about all substances that undergo state of matter changes (i.e., those that don't breakdown/disintegrate on heating or cooling).
Recall:
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else..." [Ibid.]
Furthermore, all substances exist as solids, liquids, gases or plasmas, so that can't be what makes each of them "what it is and not something else". What makes lead, for example, isn't whether is it a solid or a liquid, it is lead because of its atomic structure, and that remains the same whether it exist in a solid or a liquid state. The same goes for every element in the Periodic Table.
Nevertheless, Cornforth gamely tries to tell us what a 'dialectical quality' is:
"For instance, if a piece of iron is painted black and instead we paint it red, that is merely an external alteration..., but it is not a qualitative change in the sense we are here defining. On the other hand, if the iron is heated to melting point, then this is such a qualitative change. And it comes about precisely as a change in the attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a qualitative change." [Cornforth (1976), p.99.]
And yet, no new substance emerges as a result; liquid iron, gold and aluminium are still iron, gold and aluminium. Worse still: as we have seen, metals melt and solidify slowly, not nodally!
It is worth noting at this point how the above DM-'definition' has transferred vagueness from "quality" to "kind". We aren't told what a 'dialectical kind' is! In what follows, I will however assume we all know what such a kind is (even though we don't!). Of course, Cornforth doesn't use the term "kind of thing" -- the second of the above definitions use it -- he uses "the nature of a thing" (p.98), and "a new thing" (p.103), which are both no less vague.
Of course, it could be argued that liquid and solid states of matter are, as the second definition says, "different kinds of things". But, to describe something as a liquid isn't to present a kind of thing, since liquids encompass many different "kinds of things", as noted above. The same is true of gases and solids. So, a state of matter isn't a "kind of thing", but a state possessed by kinds of things. So, we speak about liquid iron, liquid mercury, gaseous oxygen, gaseous nitrogen, a solid ingot of iron, etc., etc. And if a state changes, in the overwhelming number of cases the "kind of thing" that that particular substance is doesn't change. Admittedly, some substances do change into 'something new' when they are heated -- for instance, solid Ammonium Chloride sublimates into Ammonia gas and Hydrochloric Acid, but that isn't typical. [In fact, DM-theorists would be on much firmer ground appealing to this sort of change than they are with their hackneyed water as a liquid, solid or gas example.] Again, liquid mercury, for instance, is still mercury, just as solid mercury is. Melted sugar is still sugar. The same is true of plastics, and every metal. Liquid chocolate is still chocolate. The elements aren't situated where they are in the Periodic Table because they are solid, liquid or gas, but because of their Atomic Number. This shows that states of matter aren't "kinds of things"; if they were, solid mercury would no longer be mercury, and any cooling of liquid mercury would move it to a new place in the Periodic Table!
But, the proffered DM-objection at the beginning of the previous paragraph (i.e., that different states of matter are different "kinds of things") -- should it ever be advanced by a dialectician -- only goes to show just how vague their 'definitions' of "quality" are. Indeed, it allows DM-fans to count different states of matter as different "kind of things", even though they don't also regard shape, colour, heat, or motion as different "kinds of things". Hence, for example, an object in motion isn't counted as a different "kind of thing" from the same object at rest (relative to some inertial frame). A spherical ingot of iron, for instance, isn't regarded as different "kind of thing" compared with a cylindrical ingot of iron. A red box isn't a different "kind of thing" compared with a green box. Sure, gases, liquids and solids have different physical properties, but so do moving and stationary bodies, and so do spherical and cylindrical objects. And the same can be said about different coloured objects. It isn't easy to see why green and red objects aren't different "kinds of things" when liquids and solids are allowed to be. And, it is no use pointing to the "objective" nature of states of matter as opposed to the "subjective" nature of colour, since shape and motion are just as "objective".
[Anyway, the "subjective" nature of colour will be questioned in Essay Thirteen Part One -- as will the philosophical use of the terms "subjective" and "objective".]
But what about this?
"And it comes about precisely as a change in the attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a qualitative change." [Ibid.]
Are such "laws of motion" what make iron what it is and not another thing, so that it is "no longer the same kind of thing"? As we have just seen, even if Cornforth were right about these "laws of motion", that wouldn't re-classify iron and place it in a new location in the Periodic Table. Plainly, it doesn't make iron a "new kind of thing". Furthermore, we have already seen that rapid changes experienced by sub-atomic, or inter-molecular, forces (of the sort Cornforth envisages) can't be recruited to this 'Law', either.
Be this as it may, we have just seen in relation to the 'definition' found at the Marxist Internet Archive:
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else..." [Ibid.]
As noted earlier, countless substances exist as solids, liquids, or gases, so this cannot be what makes each of them "what it is and not something else". Again, what makes lead, for example, lead is its atomic structure, and that remains the same whether or not that metal is in its solid or its liquid state. As such, it remains "the same kind of thing".
Other than Cornforth, Kuusinen is one of the few DM-theorists who seems to make any note of this 'difficulty':
"The totality of essential features that make a particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguishes it from others, is called its quality.... It is...concept that denotes the inseparable distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a phenomenon and without which it cease to be what it is." [Kuusinen (1961), pp.83-84. Italic emphasis in the original.]
We will have occasion to question whether there are any "essential features" or "essential properties" in nature (these terms are sometimes associated with a 'technical term', "natural kind"); readers are re-directed to Essay Thirteen Part Two for more details. [That Essay will be published sometime in 2026. Until then, see Note 8c of Essay Seven Part One. Since the above was written I have added several relevant comments about "natural kinds" to Essay Eight Part Two. Readers are directed there for more details.]
Independently of this, it isn't at all clear that someone's liking or not liking soup defines them as a person -- or as a being "of a particular sort". While scientists might choose to classify certain aspects of nature by placing them in whatever categories they deem fit, as far as I am aware none has so far identified two different sorts of human beings: (i) soup-likers for n milligrams of salt per m litres of soup versus (ii) soup-dislikers for the same or different n or m. And even if they were to do so, that would merely save this part of DM by means of a re-definition, since it is reasonably clear that these two different sorts of human beings don't actually exist --, or, at least, they didn't until I just invented them. Once again, that would make this part of DM eminently subjective, too, since it would imply that changes in quality were relative to a convenient choice of description/re-description. Once again, that would introduce an element of arbitrariness in relation to something dialecticians (at least) claim is a scientific law. How would that be any different from "foisting" DM on nature?
Moreover, as has also been noted, H2O as ice, water or steam, is still H2O. As a liquid or a gas, Helium is still Helium. If so, these changes can't apply to any of the qualities covered by the DM/Aristotelian/Hegelian principles quoted above. So, it now seems that these hackneyed examples of Q«Q either undermine the meaning of a key DM-concept on which this 'Law' had supposedly been based (i.e., "quality"), vitiating its applicability in such cases; or they weren't examples of this 'Law' to begin with!...
Given this new twist, it now seems that quantitative change to material bodies (such as salt/soup mixtures) actually cause changes to the human sensory system (albeit of a vague and perhaps non-quantitative -- or even non-qualitative -- kind). They in turn bring about some sort of qualitative change in the sensory perception of any tasters involved. If so, the original 'Law' (applied in this area) is woefully wide of the mark; it should have been something like the following:
E1: A change in quantity merely causes a change in quantity to the material bodies involved [that is no misprint!], but at a certain point this causes qualitative alterations (but they might not be Hegelian, or even Aristotelian, qualities) to the way some human beings perceive the world, even though these individuals haven't undergone a quantitative change themselves.
Put like this, it isn't at all clear that anyone would conclude this (or anything like it) from cooking soup, as Trotsky tried to suggest. And we can be pretty sure about that -- since not even Engels got close to this more accurate version of his own 'Law'.
Nor did Trotsky!
It is scarcely credible that non-dialectical cooks, workers, or anyone else, for that matter, would advance much further -- or even this far -- based only on their own experience.
Of course, this can only mean that peasant cooks aren't "unconscious dialecticians", and neither is anyone else outside the DM-fraternity --, and that is probably because they aren't quite so easily duped by the vague and barely coherent ramblings of Mystical Christians like Hegel.
'Foxy Dialectics' -- "Fair And Balanced"?
[Readers might be able to detect a facetious tone creeping into some of the above, and, indeed, in what follows. In so concluding wouldn't be mistaken since it is impossible to take Trotsky seriously here. His analogies and parables are so dumb, sarcasm is fully justified.]
Easily the oddest part of Trotsky's argument is the following:
"Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies…. [T]he universe throughout is permeated with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky (1971), pp.106-07. Bold emphases added.]
This appears to mean that there are in nature some animals that actually employ (unconsciously or not) the Hegelian 'Law' -- i.e., that quantity "passes over" into quality, and vice versa --, in their 'reasoning'. One wonders, therefore, why it took human beings so long to 'discover' these 'Laws' if simple beasts are such excellent, closet dialecticians, who discovered them millions of years ago.
The fox in the quoted passage apparently concludes that the wolf will be able to vanquish it (or even eat it), presumably because the wolf is bigger than the fox. The fox, making a 'qualitative judgement' about the relative size of its likely assailant, the wolf, runs away -- these conclusions being forced on the fox by its 'intelligent legs'.
So much for Trotsky's attempt to out-do the Brothers Grimm.
Once again, this 'Law' has been misapplied. That is because in this (imaginary) instance, an apparent quantitative change in the wolf -- one presumes the change here is that the wolf exceeds a certain size, at least in so far as the fox has perceived it -- supposedly induces a qualitative change in the fox, which becomes scared as a result. However, all the while the wolf itself remains qualitatively the same (it doesn't change into a sparrow, for example). Moreover, the fox doesn't alter quantitatively, either -- it neither shrinks nor splits into two.
But, there is no actual quantitative change in the wolf! The alleged 'quantitative change in the wolf' is its apparent size, as perceived by the fox. [But, it isn't even that, as we will see below.] As already noted, the wolf's size hasn't altered at all; no one supposes that wolves grow in size when they confront foxes! Of course, wolves may rear up, or assume a more aggressive posture, but the actual size of the wolf -- as opposed to its perceived, or even misperceived, size -- doesn't actually change.
Similarly, no quantitative change has taken place in the fox, too; nevertheless, it appears to have undergone some sort of qualitative change (if we accept the details of Trotsky's parable).
Hence, howsoever we try to re-phrase it, by no stretch of the imagination can this zoological pantomime be adapted to harmonise with, or even illustrate, Engels's quirky 'Law':
(1) The fox doesn't change quantitatively, but it seems to undergo a 'qualitative change'. Why is that?
(2) The wolf hasn't in fact changed at all, neither quantitatively or qualitatively. In that case, how can this 'Law' apply under these circumstances?
However, the change in the fox can't have been qualitative, either -- that is, if by "qualitative" we mean "appertaining to those features of an object or process that determine its nature", a 'new kind of thing', which is what the rather vague term, "quality", seems to mean in DM-circles. Is there a single Zoologist on the planet who thinks that a defining characteristic of foxes is that they either do, or they do not, run away from wolves of a certain size? Even if we grant all Trotsky needs in order to make this parable seem plausible, the question remains: Has the fox changed into a 'new kind of thing' in this (imagined) encounter? Clearly not. A scared fox isn't 'a new kind of thing'. There are no Zoology Catalogues that have separate entries for foxes and scared foxes!
Let me remind the reader: the Glossary over at the Marxist Internet Archive says this about "Quality":
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else. Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'. In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here. Accessed August 2007. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added. Links in the original.]
Here, too, is Hegel:
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity and measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added. Links in the original.]
Does a fox cease "to be what it is" -- a fox -- when it runs scared?
But, for the type of change envisioned by Trotsky (and Hegel) to apply here, the qualitative change that should have occurred, during or soon after this encounter, is the following:
F1: The fox, when confronted by a wolf that has just grown in size, changes from being defined as an animal that "doesn't run away from wolves of a certain size" into one that "does run away from wolves if their size actually increases beyond a certain limit" (this being an 'essential' quality of all foxes, perhaps having been encoded in their DNA).
In the above fanciful -- but more accurate, if not more consistent -- re-description, we would have a change in quantity in the wolf (it having grown upon encountering the fox) causing a change in a species defining quality in the fox (which mutates from brave to cowardly -- perhaps, as a result of a change in its DNA(??)), after having been confronted this rapidly growing wolf.
However, even then we still wouldn't have a quantitative change that prompts, or is prompted by, a change in quality in the same animal. Even though the wolf might have changed quantitatively in the above fanciful re-configuration, it hasn't itself changed qualitatively (except as perceived by the fox). The obverse is true of the fox: it has undergone no quantitative change even though it has altered 'qualitatively'!
Moreover, no relevant matter or energy has entered the fox, nor has any left the wolf; nor has there been an "interruption in gradualness" as required by the DM-classics.
"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin (1961), p.282. Bold emphases added.]
Hence, it isn't easy to see how Engels's Q↔Q can gain even so much as a paw-hold here. No matter what is done to this lame theory it still limps along badly.
[Several weak puns intended.]
[Q↔Q: The Law of the Change of Quantity into Quality, and vice versa.]
Furthermore, if we return to the original example, Trotsky failed to say what the fox's 'inference' amounted to; he merely hinted that it had something to do with nutrition and taste.29 In fact, the way that Trotsky worded his thoughts suggests foxes actually understand parts of Hegel's Logic (at least implicitly)!
"Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies…. [T]he universe throughout is permeated with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky (1971), pp.106-07. Bold emphases added.]
That is a decidedly odd thing to say since it is considerably more that Lenin attributed to some Marxists!
"It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]
So, if Marxists, or even workers, can't teach themselves dialectics, foxes clearly can!
Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your inferiority to Vulpes vulpes!
Despite this, does the fox actually 'conclude' that wolves of a certain size aren't tasty? Or, does it decide that they aren't nutritious? Is this the quantitative change to which Trotsky was alluding? One that results in a qualitative revision to this fox's 'Hegelian beliefs'?
"Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies…. [T]he universe throughout is permeated with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky (1971), pp.106-07. Bold emphasis added.]
If so, can this 'Law' be generalised? If it can, does this mean that, for example, all large animals aren't nutritious or delicious -- but only if they are perused/pursued by relatively smaller predators? Or, does it mean the opposite is the case for the same animals viewed by still others that are relatively larger than it, the latter of which now regard the very same animals (i.e., the ones at which these keisty foxes might turn their noses up) as nutritious or delicious in return?
Hence, although a mouse might view a larger rat as tasteless or non-nutritious (given the above interpretation), the very same rat might seem to be delicious if confronted by a larger cat. Is relative size the "quantity" that is supposed to be the relevant factor here? And, is the "quality" at work in such cases the taste of one animal as perceived by another, which is also supposedly dependent on relative size? If not, what change in quantity or quality did Trotsky have in mind?
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
Or, is it that certain animals cease to be delicious when they exceed a certain size? Perhaps they become less tasty as they grow larger (as a result perhaps of a DM-UO operating here; in this case, the UO might be this: 'both tasty and not tasty' in dialectical tension, causing them to grow, which is how the DM-classics picture any cause of change)? Maybe animals pass a given "nodal" point as they exceed a certain body mass or volume -- something that has so far (mysteriously) escaped scientific detection?30
But, if so, why do some small animals eat larger ones? For example, why do stoats eat rabbits, which are up to three times their size? Why does a liver fluke eat a sheep? Why do some bacteria consume human flesh? Why, indeed, does a caterpillar eat a leaf?
[Or aren't plants allowed to play this game? Why, for instance, can't a tree scare off a caterpillar? Or, is the possession/absence of legs (or maybe a nervous system) the crucial factor here?]
Looking at this once again: we might wonder what the intended quantitative change is meant to be in Trotsky's parable of the fox:
Are we to suppose that the wolf slowly grows in size so that at a "nodal" point, where there has been a break in "gradualness", the fox ceases to regard the wolf as appetising?
Clearly not.
But if not, what quantitative change did Trotsky intend?
Perhaps, he meant that given an array of animals of increasing size, at an arbitrary point unique to each fox (or is this species-specific?), the said fox will 'conclude' that those one side of the "node" don't taste all that good (or aren't nutritious), while those the other side do (are) -- or, indeed, that they aren't worth the hassle?
If Trotsky was thinking along those lines, he was surely unwise so to do. That is because, even in this case, a quantitative change to some animals (wolves) wouldn't have induced a concomitant qualitative change in that animal (the wolf), as we have seen.31
On the other hand, if we now bravely return to reality, we surely aren't meant to conclude that the taste of wolves is actually linked to their size. As seems reasonably clear, the alleged qualitative change here is the perceived taste of a prey as the latter strikes a prospective predator, but not in the intended prey. But, tastes don't reside in objects. As pointed out above, the fox has itself undergone no quantitative change; its size hasn't altered in any way. So, even if it were possible to say which alteration was qualitative and which was quantitative, it would still be clear that a change of quantity here hadn't 'passed over' into a change in quality in the same animal (nor vice versa).
Even the tenuous link that connects the supposed/imagined change in quantity in the wolf with the change in quality of the fox isn't all it seems, either. Once more: no one supposes that as the fox slopes off into the distance -- having been scared away in the manner described -- it reassesses the food value of its former target (the wolf), so that as that target looks smaller when further away it begins to seem more tasty to the fox. But, if quantitative changes -- of a vulpean sort -- always passed over into qualitative changes, we should expect the wolf to look more appetising the more it recedes into the distance, the smaller it looks to the fox. Of course, this presumes foxes in general haven't had lessons in perspectival geometry or are untutored in the philosophy of perception (even though they seem to know a smattering of dialectics and far more Aristotelian logic than most DM-fans seem capable of grasping, at least according to Trotsky -- not yours truly!).
Indeed, if this 'law' were valid, one would expect the quantitative increase in the number of metres separating the two animals to 'pass over' into a qualitative change in the nutritional value of wolves-as-perceived-by-foxes.
In that case, we should expect separation to make the stomach grow fonder.
Never mind that; can we also generalise Trotsky's 'Law' about legs?
"When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies…." [Trotsky (1971), pp.106-07. Bold emphases added.]
Does size really matter, therefore, when it comes to cowardice? Are all smaller animals practical dialecticians when they encounter larger ones? Do all legs bend the knee to Hegel's 'Law'?
But, what about a lion that impertinently breaks this 'Law' by killing a much larger wildebeest?32 And what are we to say of a small snake that attacks a man (even if that reptile has no legs)? And, why do many insects (and some spiders) bite human beings? Are they unconscious metaphysical rebels, railing against Hegel's 'Iron Law' (about legs)?
On the other hand, with biting insects, is the leg ratio significant here? That is: the insect-to-human leg-ratio, which favours the biter over the bitten by a factor of at least three to one? And if we throw in spiders, by a factor of four to one? Are insect/arachnid legs and/or wings, therefore, law-breakers by sheer force of numbers? As a sort of counter-measure, if humans grew more legs (or carried, say, five extra limbs with them as some sort of insect repellent), would that ward off midges, mosquitoes and horseflies? What if humans carried with them seven spare legs to ward off spiders and crabs? Or maybe even more limbs to scare away octopuses? But, does this mean double amputees are more tasty than the less 'leg-deficient' among us? And what does this tell us about the gustatory appeal of rugby scrums and centipedes? How many legs would be need to frighten off a millipede?
Figure Two: 'Dialectical Insect Repellent'?
But, why then will a horse run away from a small dog (where there seems to be rough parity in the leg department)? Why will a man swim away from a shark (where, leg-wise, the man wins feet down, every time -- or, at least, before the first few bites)?
Perhaps these animals/humans don't 'understand' dialectics? Might they all be 'unconscious' anti-dialecticians?
Finally, it is worth asking whether this 'Law' can be reversed (which is what Engels's 'definition' would have us believe, given the vice versa codicil he attached to it). Does, therefore, 'quality pass over into quantity' in such cases? If it does, we should expect a lack of tastiness to have some effect on size, as that qualitative change turns the tables and induces an associated quantitative development.
Perhaps, then, evolution 'selected' certain animals to be large because they weren't nutritious -- indicating, again, that this particular quality (i.e., food value) had not only 'passed over', it descended with modification by natural selection into quantity (i.e., size). If so, does this mean the dinosaurs tasted awful? But, why then do humans still eat whales? On the other hand, though, this seems to imply that viruses should taste absolutely delicious. Did their (excellent) taste mean they were 'selected' to be microscopic?
If this 'Law' is to work in 'reverse gear', something like the above would have to be the case, it would seem.33
However, as whacky as these flights-of-fancy might appear to be (and actually are!), not one of them would occur to workers -- not because they aren't intelligent, but because they aren't stupid --, even if they knew anything (like this) about the antics of foxes, wolves and chickens.
[I have said more about this particular example in Essay Seven Part One, here.]
Dialectical Marxism -- A Long-Term Failure
As noted above, Trotsky admitted that "in most cases" workers and peasants obey dialectical laws "unconsciously", in view of which it could be argued that they might become aware of (some of) these 'Laws' at some point in their lives, by some means, somehow. Indeed, it could also be maintained that the objectivity of these 'Laws' would also allow socialists to alert workers to the general validity of 'dialectical thought', maybe as a result of a long history of successful interventions in the class war (etc.). Hence, the argument might go: if it hadn't been the case that DM delivers an increasingly objective picture of the world (i.e., if it had been "subjective", "idealist", or even "mystical"), revolutionaries wouldn't have been able to intervene effectively in this way, meaning there would have repeated set-backs and failures over many decades. In that case, it could be concluded that that alone shows, in practice (despite the 'academic', 'nit-picking' points made above), that (a) where DM has been tested it has proved to be increasingly objective, and (b) workers have actually benefitted from learning about it.
Or, so a response might go...
Questions about practicalities will be addressed at length in Essay Ten Part One; they will also will be examined presently (as well as in Part Two of this Essay), where it will be shown that Dialectical Marxism is just about the most unsuccessful (leading) political or social movement in human history.
So much for 'increasing objectivity', then.
Historical Materialism -- Introduced From The 'Inside'
However, the intervention of revolutionaries in workers' struggles will, of necessity, involve the use of concepts drawn from HM, not DM. The problem with the volunteered pro-DM-response outlined above is that it still leaves it unclear:
(i) Which laws or concepts specific to DM are of any relevance at all in the class struggle; and,
(ii) Which are consonant with workers' experience.
Furthermore, it is even more difficult to comprehend,
(iii) Why workers would need DM if concepts drawn from HM actually speak to their experience and reveal how to fight more successfully.
That is especially so if no sense whatsoever can be made of DM, even by its most avid fans.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]
Of course, the fact that HM so easily meshes with workers' lives is why some of them actually become revolutionaries. HM relates to ordinary human beings in a way that DM can't since it speaks to them in terms they readily connect. In that way, HM captures what they in effect "already know", a fact that becomes increasingly apparent as they encounter it.34
Plainly, that is because HM is not only consonant with, it is dependent on, concepts that have been developed out of material practices that relate to, and which underlie, human history, language and communication. In addition, HM also speaks to the oppression and exploitation experienced by the vast majority of working people throughout recorded history, let alone under Capitalism. The central tenets of HM revolve around not just an understanding of history, but focus on the self-emancipation of the working class (this links to Draper (1971)), just as its tenets have in return depended on socialists themselves learning from the collective labour, social organisation and working class resistance to exploitation and oppression. Since HM is predicated on the social nature of language it can't help but harmonise with workers' experience of exploitation and oppression, as well as with aspects of life and alienation all of us share as members of the same "form of life". Since ordinary language is the language of the working-class, it can't help but reflect working-class experience -- but only if it isn't misused in the way that philosophers have always done; i.e., when it hasn't been distorted, as Marx himself argued.
[This isn't to suggest that there are no other distorting forces at work here. This topic will be taken up again in Essay Twelve Part Seven, summary here.]
All of these factors find expression in the language that working people across the planet have developed as a result of their interaction with each other and with the natural and social world over countless centuries. Because of this, HM (when it is expressed in the vernacular -- with any remaining technical terms clearly paraphrased) is capable of being used to explain to workers, in their own language, the significance of their experience in class society and how they can fight back to win control over society and their own lives.
This means that HM doesn't have to be brought to ordinary people from the "outside"; its core ideas are already present, expressed in working class experience.
In that case, all that workers need in this respect are reminders.
It is in this sense that the (non-dialectical) revolutionary party can be the memory, not just of the class, but of the human race. The approach developed at this site partially explains how and why that is so.
[More details will be added in Essay Twelve (link above).]
As the context indicates, HM speaks to workers because of their experience of oppression, exploitation and consequent alienation, In addition it does so because it provides them with a coherent social and political account of how oppression, exploitation and alienation can be eradicated through their own activity, their own struggle.
This is partly why HM makes immediate sense to most workers (when they are ready to listen), and why it appears so obvious to Marxists -- and, indeed, to anyone who has had to work for a living under Capitalism. In fact, it is difficult to believe that anyone with such a background could read, say, Marx's 1844 Paris Manuscripts and fail to appreciate the profound insight into their condition that Marx there expressed (that is, if they ignore the Hegelian flourishes). [Marx (1975b).]
Marx's analysis speaks to workers' collective experience of alienation, their sense of fragmentation from their "species being", aggravated by the division of labour, compounded by class oppression. It also addresses the connection these have with collective and individual self-development, the relationships we have with other human beings and with nature itself, and thus with the de-humanisation we all feel in class-divided society. These profound insights don't need to be taught (as would be the case if they were merely empirical facts); most human beings (who have had to work for a living) only need to be reminded of them -- or, perhaps, merely apprised of their significance.
As most revolutionaries know, it isn't difficult to convince workers -- when they are on strike, for example -- about the realities of class division, the nature of the class war, the role of the Police or Courts, along with a host of other ideas exclusive to HM. In fact, much of it will already be known to some workers, some to most, as attitude surveys consistently reveal across most 'developed countries', and beyond. All that revolutionaries need bring to this (apart from the factors mentioned below) is greater detail, political generalisation, deeper analysis and revolutionary organisation.
This means that revolutionaries shouldn't view themselves as prophets or visionaries (as 'Great Helmsmen', for instance), but as organisers and administrators. Anything else would amount to substituting themselves for the class. HM reminds them of this; DM makes them forget it.
The following point has been made elsewhere (in answer to the question "Why is DM a world-view?"):
The founders of this
quasi-religion [DM] weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their
children in the classics, the Bible, and Philosophy. This tradition taught that
behind appearances there lies a 'hidden world', accessible to thought
alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.
This way of seeing 'reality' was, of course, originally concocted by ideologues of the ruling-class. They invented it because, if you belong to, benefit from,
or help run a society that is based on gross inequality, oppression and
exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.
The first and most obvious way is through violence. That will work for a time,
but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation
(among other things).
Another way is to win over the majority (or, at least, a significant
proportion of
'opinion
formers', bureaucrats, judges, bishops, 'intellectuals', philosophers, administrators,
teachers, editors, 'bloggers', 'influencers', journalists, etc.)
to the view that the present order either: (i) Works for their benefit, (ii)
Promotes and defends 'civilised
values', (iii) Is ordained of the 'gods', or (iv) Is 'natural' and can't be
fought, reformed or negotiated with.
Hence, a world-view (that rationalises one or more of the above) is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling
"in the
same old way". While the content of ruling-class ideology may have changed with
each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same
for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth (about this 'hidden world') is ascertainable by thought alone, and therefore
can be imposed on reality dogmatically and
aprioristically.
So, the non-worker founders of our movement -- who had been educated from
an early age to believe there was just such a 'hidden world' lying behind
'appearances', and which governed everything -- when they became
revolutionaries, naturally looked for a set of
a priori, 'logical' principles within that abstract world that told them
that change was inevitable, since it was part of the 'cosmic order'. Enter
dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of that ruling-class mystic, Hegel. Hence, the dialectical classicists were happy to impose
their theory on the world (upside down or the 'right way up') -- as, indeed, we saw in
Essay Two
--
since they had been socialised almost from the beginning into believing 'that genuine philosophy' is practised
this way.
That 'allowed' the
founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets
of the new order, which 'superior knowledge' workers, alas, couldn't quite grasp
because of their defective education, their reliance on ordinary language, and the 'banalities
of commonsense'.
Fortunately, history had predisposed these 'prophets' to ascertain the truth about
reality on behalf of the rest of humanity, which implied these 'special' individuals were the
'naturally-ordained' leaders of the workers' movement. That in turn meant that
they were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who
could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in
'their own interests', of course -- since the masses were hopelessly
blinded by 'commodity fetishism' and 'formal thinking'; they were thus incapable of seeing
'the truth' for themselves.
Some might object that philosophical ideas can't have remained the same for thousands of years across different Modes of Production since that notion itself runs counter to core principles expressed in and by HM. I agree, which is why I specifically referred to the general form at work behind Traditional Thought: the belief that there exists a hidden world 'beneath appearances', accessible to thought alone.
Anyway, we don't argue the same with respect to religious belief, that nothing changes. Marx put no time stamp on the following, for example:
"The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man -- state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people." [Marx (1975c), p.244. Italic emphases in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
The above remarks applied back in Babylon and
the Egypt of the Pharaohs,
just as they did in Ancient China and the rest of Asia, The Americas, Greece,
Rome and throughout Europe, Africa, Australasia, and as they have done right across the planet ever since.
The same is true of the core thought-forms that run through Traditional
Philosophy: that there is an invisible world, accessible to thought
alone -- especially since Marx also argued that:
"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. Bold emphasis added.]
And:
"[O]ne fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." [Marx and Engels (1968b), p.52. Bold emphasis added.]
Of course, that also helps explain why Marx thought this entire discipline (Philosophy) was based on distorted language and contained little other than empty abstractions and alienated thought-forms -- and, indeed, why he turned his back on it from the late 1840s onward. [On that, see here.]
So, just like Theology, but in this case in a far more abstract and increasingly secular form, philosophers sought to construct and hence reflect the 'essential' structure of reality, the 'rational order' that 'justified' class division and oppression, mystified now by the use of increasingly arcane terminology and obscure jargon. Again, as Marx noted:
"Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118.]
Small wonder then that all too many DM-fans act as if they think they are prophets, set above the working class as their 'Teachers' (and in several well known cases, they imagine they are "Great Teachers", whose pronouncements must be viewed as Holy Writ).34a
Revolutionary politics actually brings to workers a developed theory (HM) that generalises their experience (relating it to previous generations of the oppressed and the exploited, to other individuals and groups in similar circumstances, many of whom also fought back), providing the strategy, tactics, and organisation necessary to further their cause, the final and irrevocable eradication of Capitalism. In fact, this is all that needs to be "brought to workers".
No ruling-class form-of-thought need be anywhere in sight.
Because HM is based on and addresses their experience and their suppressed awareness of their own de-humanised condition, their struggle, and in their language, it is actually introduced to workers, as it were, from the inside.
That is why HM, unlike DM, can't form the ideological basis for substitutionism.
At a stroke, that solves Lenin's 'problem'.35
Ordinary Language -- An Obstacle Or An Indispensible Resource?
An emphasis on the supposed limitations of ordinary language appears to be an important issue for some Marxists; unfortunately, that includes the author of TAR, John Rees. He clearly believes that everyday understanding -- left to itself -- is incapable of developing, or allowing to be developed (it mighty even hinder) a 'dialectical conception of reality', which, oddly enough, runs contrary to what Trotsky himself appeared to believe. This is how Rees expressed himself:
"Hegel is also difficult for reasons that are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms and concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of which everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes…. It is the search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past commonsense definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998), pp.45, 50. Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]
Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed something quite remarkable -- if not startling -- in this passage: Rees claims that it was 'the Hegelian dialectic' that allowed humanity to discover that "things and ideas" change!
This is a decidedly weird thing for a socialist to have to say. Quite frankly, it is difficult to imagine Rees actually believes his own words on this. He must have mis-spoken. How on earth does Rees think humanity managed to survive for so long if our ancestors failed to spot that things (or even their own 'ideas') changed? Did they not notice their relatives ageing and dying, rain falling, rivers flowing, the seasons cycling, night becoming day (and vice versa), hot things cooling down, animals chasing other animals, huts, shoes and clothes wearing out, children coming into the world and growing taller as they were fed, crops ripening, alongside countless other transformations and developments? Were even their ideas the same as they had been when they were, say, ten years old? Did any of them think the same about everything as they did when they were children? Does Rees even think his own ideas are identical with those he held when he was, say, fifteen? Or the even same as they were before he learnt about Marxism? Is Rees seriously telling us that had Hegel not put pen to paper, he (Rees) wouldn't have been able to detect, or even comment on, say, the onset of winter and/or his changing opinions and beliefs?
It seems he must conclude something along those lines if "the fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change."
Perhaps Rees simply meant that humanity wouldn't be able to understand change had Hegel not written about it in the way he did. That can't be right, either, for we have seen that Hegel's system (upside down or the 'right way up'), can't itself account for change.
[On this see Essays Four through Eight Part Three. On the alleged limitations of ordinary language, see here.]
Despite this, Rees quotes Hegel some more:
"The battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding has reduced everything…. The double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognise in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere Either-or of understanding." [Hegel (1975), The First Attitude Of Thought To Objectivity §32, p.53, and The Doctrine of Being §96, p.142; quoted in Rees (1998), pp.45-46.]
From this we can see that Hegel himself didn't openly disparage ordinary language as such, since he thought he saw within it the seeds of his own ideas.36 Contrast that approach with Rees's claim that ordinary language (which he appears to confuse with "everyday thought") "assumes" things are stable.37
[Others have also argued along similar lines about Hegel and vernacular German. I have covered that topic here.]
However, Hegel in fact regularly appeared to blame a rather obscure entity -- which he labelled the "abstract understanding" -- for the "rigidity" we allegedly find in "ordinary thought" (although the latter phrase isn't Hegel's, so far as I can ascertain). Rees himself certainly believes that ordinary language constrains thought, restricting it to a limited range of 'static forms', perhaps committing its users to the LEM, for example (which, one presumes, was the significance of the "Either-or" reference in the first of the two passages quoted above).38 Hence, as pointed out earlier, it looks like Rees believes ordinary language is defective, restrictive or misleading in some way or to some extend. Like other DM-theorists, Rees seems to think that when the vernacular is used in ordinary situations in everyday life it works reasonably well, but when it is employed in more technical and philosophical areas -- or, more specifically, when it is used in relation to certain forms of change -- it is seriously limited, if not completely misleading.
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
Of course, the vernacular has its limitations, otherwise human beings wouldn't have found it necessary to invent technical, scientific, mathematical or other specialised forms of discourse. But, that doesn't mean ordinary language is defective -- at least no more than it is a defect of a DVD player that it can't cure the common cold or cook your dinner.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that the invention of new terminology will solve the philosophical 'problems' that arose solely and exclusively as a result of the misuse of language. The solution is, of course, to understand (or, indeed, to use) the vernacular correctly, which most of us manage to do with ease every single day -- that is, when we aren't attempting to do a little 'amateur philosophising'.
On the other hand, if we fail to understand -- or we misuse -- ordinary language, we stand no chance of comprehending the tangled verbal spaghetti churned out by the likes of Hegel.39
Nevertheless, one obvious consequence of Rees's belief that ordinary language operates with 'fixed categories' is the claim that it renders workers incapable of understanding DM without "outside" assistance -- plainly, since, by implication, workers must as a result also think and operate with 'fixed categories', a situation further compounded by their adherence to 'the banalities of commonsense'.
Of course, another alternative here involves us having to tale account of Trotsky claim that when workers begin to reflect on their experience, they somehow can't fail to adopt DM-concepts, at some level -- even if "outside" assistance is necessary for them to be able to grasp them 'more fully'. In which case, when workers begin to appreciate that their own language is inadequate in certain respects that reveals itself, perhaps, in their own move away from an adherence to "trade union consciousness" and edge toward "revolutionary consciousness".
Or so this fable would have us believe...
A third, far less popular alternative (among DM-fans) is, of course, to reject both options.40
Indeed, and to that end, we have already seen that it is the language employed by Dialectical Marxists -- not ordinary language -- that is incapable of depicting change, or, for that matter, picturing anything at all.
By way of contrast, the vernacular contains countless words capable of expressing every conceivable form of change, in the minutest of detail, in seemingly limitless ways. Compared to the vernacular, 'Hegel-speak' (upside down, or 'the right way up') employs obscure and wooden terminology, much of it arising out of, and dependent on, an inept 'analysis' of the verb "to be", seriously compounded by a ridiculous reconfiguration of subject-predicate propositions!
Hence, workers would have to be talked into turning their backs on the inexhaustibly rich resource that is ordinary language; and then they would have to be conned into using unintelligible philosophical gobbledygook that is completely alien to their experience and common understanding, and, as we have also seen, they would then have to process completely opaque jargon -- verbiage that also escapes the comprehension of the pedlars of this Hegelian Tripe. Indeed, they would have to be bamboozled into accepting an impoverished lexicon (which fails to deliver even what had been touted for it) in order to help them comprehend something which they manage to cope with each and every day of their lives -- change! --, which they have hitherto be able to navigate without such ham-fisted, lame-brained, mystically-sourced 'assistance'!41
In this way, bringing 'dialectics' to workers "from the outside" would run against the grain of their materialist good sense, not just their collective experience. This would only succeed in undermining the expressive sophistication inherent in the vernacular, which enables workers to understand change incomparably better than the lexical rats nest touted by those who use the verbal spaghetti found throughout 'dialectics' (upside down or 'the right way up').
[Apologies are owed reader for all those mixed metaphors!]
It seems this is the true significance of Hegel's comments, quoted earlier:
"The battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding has reduced everything…. The double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognise in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere Either-or of understanding." [Hegel (1975), The First Attitude Of Thought To Objectivity §32, p.53 and The Doctrine of Being §96, p.142; quoted in Rees (1998), pp.45-46. Bold emphases added.]
As we can now see, Hegel's elitist philosophy finds fault, not with the abstractions he disarmingly blames on "the understanding", but with the language workers use. But ordinary language is the medium which alone allows them (and, indeed, anyone) to understand the material world, and comprehend how it actually changes. [Exactly how it is able to do that will become a major theme of all Seven Parts of Essay Twelve, along with Parts Two and Three of Essay Thirteen.]
In which case, it is no big surprise to see the vernacular has to be denigrated by DM-Proselytisers before 'dialectical' concepts can be substituted into workers' heads, 'from the outside'.41a Proletarians recruited to Dialectical Marxism have to endure what is in effect the equivalent of an intellectual lobotomy in order to have this 'alien-class program' installed between their ears. Small wonder then that few of them bother to learn DM and remain monumentally 'un-seized' by Dialectical Marxism all their lives. The few that DM does manage to "seize" are rendered theoretically passive for their pains -- their brains having seized up as a result.42
However, and alas for DM-fans (but hopefully not for the rest of us), there is a non-dialectical sting in the tail. As we have seen, any direct (or even indirect) attempt to undermine ordinary language soon backfires on would-be detractors. Hence, if the ordinary word "change", for example, is inadequate to depict change, then the meaning of that word itself, when used by Dialectical Marxists, automatically becomes problematic. This then throws into doubt any attempt to specify exactly how far the ordinary word "change" falls short of the now obscure target of any proposed revision. This means that every sentence containing the word "change" (when used by DM-Evangelists) is thereby rendered senseless -- including any sentence in which such suspicions had first seen the light of day.
[I have developed and defended the above argument in depth, and at length, in Essay Four Part One, here.]
On the other hand, if we already know what "change" means, we need of assistance from a bumbling Hermetic Mystic like Hegel. In either event, any attempt to augment, or even criticise (in howsoever a nuanced manner), the word "change" and its associated vocabulary -- as both are used in every day life -- will prove to be pointless, vacuous, and hence self-defeating.
To the annoyance of metaphysicians: ordinary language buries its own gravediggers.
Perhaps this is the real spectre haunting Dialectical Marxism...
This is another Hegelian fantasy that needs exposing for the fraud (or even the Freud) it is. Hegel famously claimed the following:
"Apropos of this, we should note the double meaning of the German word aufheben (to put by or set aside). We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a law or regulation is set aside; (2) to keep, or preserve: in which sense we use it when we say: something is well put by. This double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognise in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere 'either-or' of understanding." [Hegel (1975), The Doctrine of Being, p.142, §96.]
In the above passage, Hegel specifically refers to the German word "aufheben", which he says has a "double meaning", but that clearly depends on how we count words and 'meanings'. In that case, the next question is: Do we have here one word with two meanings or two words each with a different meaning? [More on that presently.]
In fact, it isn't clear why the use of these two typographically identical words ("aufheben" as "annul", and "aufheben" as "preserve") are 'opposites'; in fact, they plainly relate to totally different subject matters; at least, as Hegel himself explained them. [On that, also see below.]
Furthermore, are there only a handful of such "double meanings"? Or, do all words exhibit 'duality'? One would expect they should if the "speculative spirit" of language is a general feature of discourse and not an insignificant, minor or atypical quirk. If language (i.e., what it supposedly captures or how it is employed) were quite as 'speculative' as Hegel imagines, we might be forgiven for expecting to find thousands of words that exhibit 'double'/'opposite' meanings. If so, what, for example, is the negative meaning of the following: "table", "chair", "broom", "sitting", "hot", "up", "on", "the", "middle", "opposite", "positive", "neutral", "word", or even "Hegel"?
Admittedly, some of the above words may be prefixed with a negative particle, but Hegel specifically spoke about "the double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and a negative meaning" (emphases added). He didn't say that additional words (or prefixes) would have to be pressed into service in order for them to be able to do what he alleged of certain words.
Perhaps Hegel meant that several of the above words could be paired with their antonyms? For example, "up" can be paired with "down", "hot" with "cold", "on" with "off", and so on. It is undeniable that many words have antonyms, but, unfortunately, that isn't what Hegel said. He didn't claim that other words (i.e., antonyms) could be paired with any given word so that these alleged "double meanings" might become apparent; he said that it was "the double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and a negative meaning" (emphases added, again). "Same word", not "another word". In that case, it is still unclear what the negative meanings of the above listed words (and countless others) might be.
One wonders then why 'Being' chose only a few words to play around with? These days this atypical feature of certain words is called "enantiosemy". What then is so special about enantiosemes that means they, and they alone, supposedly have a 'double' meaning?
In fact, the whole idea seems to imply that words as such enjoy a life of their own, independent of the agents who use them. If each did possess 'their own meaning', which they carried about with them like so much baggage, or which accompanied them everywhere they went (like an ever-faithful lap-dog), that would suggest words were agents of some sort, and that they dictate to users what their 'correct' meanings are. If so, that would further imply each speaker was a passive vehicle that words use for their own ends! [Compare this idea with Richard Dawkins's 'Memes' -- criticised effectively in McGrath (2005).] Clearly, any such theory could only work by fetishising language, endowing words with what are in effect human capacities.
Of course, that implication might very well suite Hegel's intentions, whereby not just words, but concepts appear to act as agents of some sort, capable of driving human thought in a certain direction by mysteriously 'developing'. But, it isn't easy to see how any sort of materialist spin can be put on the theory that words are capable of acting on their own behalf, determining what we are to make of them.
In that case, regardless of the magnitude of the angle through which Hegel should be, or even has been, rotated (in order to put him 'the right way up', so we have been told), words still can't be viewed as agents by consistent materialists. Nor is it possible for materialists to attribute to words opposite meanings that users haven't collectively given them. Admittedly, we might use certain inscriptions in opposite ways, but if or when we do so, that will still mean we are the source of these contrary meanings (should there be any), not the words themselves.
["Inscription" here applies to physical marks on a page/computer-screen/wall/blackboard/whiteboard/cavewall that aren't considered random, but are held to be the product of intentionality, part of a natural-, or even a formal-language -- or perhaps even a work of art, no matter how 'primitive' or 'rudimentary' it proves to be.]
Hence, speaker, NN, might employ a given word in several unique or idiosyncratic ways, which could suggest (to her audience) that each such use had an opposite meaning for her. Furthermore, these 'opposite meanings' might even catch on -- rather like the words "bad" and "sick" have attracted two seemingly opposite-looking colloquial connotations of late. [Even then, as we will see, it is still arguable that in each case we would still have two separate words here, each with a different meaning, not one word in both instances that had two meanings.]
[For those who might not know, "bad" can now mean bad/evil or good/tough! And "sick" can now mean sick/awful or impressive/excellent/risky. Something similar is currently taking place with "brat". But, whatever is happening to these words (and others), changes like this have been motivated by human agents, not the words themselves.]
In response, it might be argued that Hegel actually said: "The double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and a negative meaning…" (emphasis added, once more). Hence, it could be maintained that the allegations above (concerning the fetishisation of language) are completely misguided, and as a result don't apply to anything Hegel asserted, since he explicitly says that it is our employment of language that gives such words their double meaning. It could also be objected that Hegel didn't mean, and he certainty didn't say, that words dictate to us what they mean, which would, of course, be absurd.
The irony of such a response might be lost on those who scarcely blink at the countless absurdities there already are in Hegel's work while balking at this supposed example! However, in response to the above counter-claims it is sufficient to point out that Hegel also went on to say: "We should rather recognise in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere Either-or of understanding" (emphasis added, again). If anything, that is worse for it seems to attribute to "language" (i.e., words in general) an intelligence that elevates it above the disembodied entity he hypostatised and labelled the "abstract understanding". Clearly, language couldn't possess such autonomous capacities without also acquiring anthropomorphic or even magical powers.
Be this as it may, as far as Hegel's actual words are concerned, he conspicuously failed to say what the negative sense is of the familiar terms listed earlier, or how 'our' use supplies each with positive and negative meanings simultaneously -- or is it serially? Hence, in view of the unfortunate anthropomorphisation of "language" obvious in the latter part of the above passage, it isn't easy to absolve Hegel of having fetishised discourse. In that case, the blanket denials recorded earlier themselves fail, especially when we recall that Hegel's entire work was aimed at anthropomorphising (i.e., fetishising) 'Reality Itself' (even if he might not have put it that way).
[I will say much mire about this in Essay Twelve Part Six; until then readers are directed to Essay Three Part Two (for example, here, here and here).]
In a recent book [i.e., Watson (1998), pp.292-300], an old friend of mine, Ben Watson , attempted to say what he thought Hegel might have meant by his rather odd claims about such words. Unfortunately, Ben forgot to say which of the alleged antithetical meanings were positive and which were negative -- or even why this particular antithesis was either interesting or in any relevant to 'dialectics' -- or, indeed, to anything whatsoever, except, perhaps, the writing of poetry.
Nevertheless, in support of his thesis, Ben quoted another (relevant) passage from Hegel:
"It is much more important that in a language the categories should appear in the form of substantives and verbs and thus be stamped with the form of objectivity. In this respect German has many advantages over other modern languages; some of its words even possess the further peculiarity of having not only different but opposite meanings so that one cannot fail to recognise a speculative spirit of the language in them: it can delight a thinker to come across such words and to find the union of opposites naively shown in the dictionary as one word with opposite meanings, although this result of speculative thinking is nonsensical to the understanding." [Hegel (1999), pp.31-32, Preface to the Second Edition, §14, quoted in Watson (1998), pp.294-95. Bold emphases added.]
To which we can also add the following:
"'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative elements, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated. The two definitions of 'to sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings of this word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the same word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative meaning; the German language has a number of such. The double meaning of the Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: tollendum est Octavium [the dual meaning here being 'Octavian must be removed' or 'Octavian must be honoured' -- RL]) does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only a lifting-up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment." [Hegel (1999), p.107, §185-186. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]
Ben further illustrated what he imagined was Hegel's meaning by listing a number of examples he borrowed from Freud, Lenin and Trotsky, among others. For example, he quoted Freud as follows:
"Man has not been able to acquire even his boldest and simplest conceptions otherwise than in contrast with their opposite; he only gradually learnt to separate the two sides of the antithesis and think of the one without conscious comparison with the other." [Freud, quoted in Watson (1998), p.293.]
But, Ben failed to say how Freud could possibly have known all this; or, indeed, how Freud was able to translate this fable into modern German; or even how Freud's words could successfully be translated from German into any other language.
The point of that seemingly opaque remark should become clear when it is realised that if, say, only twenty words were chosen at random, and we assumed that each had just two (opposite) meanings, then from this rather diminutive set alone at least 220 possible overall meanings can be generated [220 = 1048576], for each twenty-word sentence. [Naturally, this assumes no word appears more than once. It also assumes that words like "or" and "if" have opposite meanings! To avoid this, we might consider sentences with twenty words that do have opposite meanings embedded in a sentence of thirty words, ten of which don't. We arrive at the same result.]
Hence, if words in general (or even predominantly) had only two meanings, it would be impossible either to interpret or translate any of Freud's writings, since for each sub-set of twenty such words (in sentential form, with the above assumptions applied) there would be over a million different possible interpretations ascertainable from them alone. Clearly, the same applies to any passage written in Medieval German to which Freud himself referred. In that case, he couldn't know which sub-set of these many 'possible meanings' expressed in or by any passage, let alone in any book, were the 'correct' ones. Nor could Hegel or Ben.
[And, it is no use appealing to context to help discriminate among the possibilities; except in the case of highly clichéd examples, or in a minority of instances, meaning isn't sensitive to context. Why that is so is explained at length in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4) to (6). Anyway, context is certainly no help here, for the context of the original Medieval German is no longer available to us, to say nothing of the context surrounding Freud or Hegel's work. In addition, as noted, this assumes every word used has two (opposite) meanings, which isn't what Hegel or Freud claimed (at least in print!). And, it is far from clear if this is what Ben is arguing, but since he referenced Voloshinov, who certainly believed something similar (on that see here and here), the above argument might very well (also) be directed at Ben. (Or, at least until he is clear about what he does mean! His other remarks about 'theme' do not, however, inspire much confidence.)]
Perhaps this is being a little unfair to Hegel, Freud and Ben. It could be maintained that they (collectively or severally) meant that only a few words (in each language) possessed such an equivocal, contrary nature, not every single word. But, that itself is rather odd. If, according to Hegel, everything is contradictory, and a 'union of opposites', then every word should have its own "other" or 'opposite', too.
Or did Hegel mean by "everything" its own opposite, too: i.e., "something"?
[Yes, I know the logical opposite of "everything" is "something...not", but if Hegel and Ben can be so cavalier with meanings, it is open season for the rest of us.]
On the other hand, perhaps 'Being' Itself doesn't "understand" dialectics?
There is, believe it or not, a substantive point to all this lexical merriment, illustrated by Ben's next quotation from Freud:
"To our bös (bad) corresponds bass (good); in Old Saxon compare bat (good) with English bad; in English to lock with German Lücke, Loch (hole); German kleben (to stick, to cleave to) English to cleave (divide)." [Freud, quoted in Watson (1998), p.293. Italic emphasis in the original.]
To which Ben added the following comment:
"Freud cites examples of antithetical meanings in Latin (altus means both 'high' and 'deep'; sacer means both 'holy' and 'accursed') and in German (Boden means both 'attic' and 'ground floor')." [Watson (1998), p.293. Italic emphases in the original.]
Clearly, Ben regarded this as an important insight (certainly one worth highlighting), with each 'dual word' perhaps signalling the presence of a hidden DM-style UO. But, why it is only these words that have had some 'dialectics' inflicted on them by the 'speculative spirit' of our ancestors, not others, Ben neglected to say. Did part of the 'antediluvian selection process' (required in order to decide which words were to be allowed dual (opposite) meanings and which wouldn't) involve 'Being' throwing a dialectical dart at an 'Ethereal Lexicon' while blindfolded? Or, did 'Becoming' randomly pull certain words out of a Cosmic Hat? Maybe 'Nothing' combined the two lists (of opposite meanings) into one -- or was it 'one into two'?
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; UO = Unity of Opposites. Follow the above link for the 'dialectical' significance of the phrase, 'one into two'.]
Nevertheless, in support of these lexicographical flights-of-fancy, Ben also quoted Trotsky:
"The identity of opposites. Little Paul says 'donne!' both when he wants to take, and when he wants to give." [Trotsky (1986), p.103; quoted in Watson (1998), p.300. Italic emphasis in the original.]
[Say what you will about Dialectical Marxists, they certainly know how to produce overwhelming evidence in support of their 'innovative' ideas. (I trust the reader's 'Sarcasm Detection Module' hasn't been sent away for its annual service at this point!)]
I will return to consider Trotsky's remarks in a minute, but, putting to one side the fact that Freud had to use words drawn from different languages (in some cases) to make his point, the problem with all this is that, even in DM-terms, none of it makes the slightest sense.
But, surely, "attics" and "ground floors" aren't 'opposites'; the opposite of an attic, if it has one, is a cellar. Anyway, even if a case could be made that they were 'opposites', Ben isn't suggesting that "attics" and "ground floors" are dialectically united opposites. If he were, then at some point in the future -- because these two would now be locked in some kind of 'dialectico-logical tension' with each other -- and, after struggling among themselves, one of them would have to turn into the other, which is what the DM-classics tell us all such 'opposites' must do.
[I.e., those classics claim that all 'dialectical opposites' struggle with, and then turn into, that 'opposite'. Follow the above link for textual proof.]
Would this 'dialectical wrangle' be the result of some sort of architectural struggle -- motivated perhaps by a 'contradiction' between base(ment) and superstructure? Or, maybe it arises out of the conflict between attics and ground floors, which, upon completion, results in a mutually agreed upon resolution ("sublated" -- or should that be "sublet"?) in the shape of the first floor as the middle/mediated term? Alternatively, could it be there is some sort of "development" going on here, arising from a dynamic internal to buildings? Who can say, in this crazy Hermetic Universe that Hegel dreamt up?
[The facetious tone obvious in the above remarks should once again tell the reader it is impossible to take any of this 'dialectical melodrama', any of these half-formed 'mental burps', seriously. But highly intelligent comrades, like Ben, lap up page after page of this ''Blaahdee Rraahbeesh" (as Tony Cliff might have called it, if he weren't an avid DM-fan, too)!]
Even worse, if these terms represent, or even 'reflect, 'dialectical opposites', they would have to imply each other, such that one of them couldn't exist without the other, just as the proletariat is said to imply the capitalist class, and neither can exist without the other (so we are told). But does a ground floor imply an attic such that the former can't exist without the latter? That might come as a surprise to those who live in bungalows, or even those with homes that have no attics (or cellars). Architects might have something to say about it, too, if 'Being' tried to force their hands into adding an attic every time they sketched in a ground floor!
Wags might even ask: Is the phrase "a flat contradiction" testimony to the ('dialectical') fact that language contains a secret DM-message, indicative of the force of change operating in apartment blocks behind the backs of tenants and landlords alike?
Perhaps, like the 'Evil One' (and thanks, at least, to Judas Priest), 'the dialectic' has programmed into language secret messages. But, in that case, shouldn't we be reading Hegel backwards?
Maybe his 'Logic' will make more sense that way? Just a thought...
Be this as it may once more, is Trotsky's reference to the child ("Little Paul") intended to be taken seriously? Is it really meant to show that "giving" and "taking" are 'united opposites'? But, surely, one can take without giving, and give without taking. For example, if I take the A2 to Dover, am I necessarily given, or even giving, something in return? If you give first aid, who or what takes anything? If a thief steals your car while you're in the Supermarket, did you subconsciously give it to him/her? If I give you advice (that you should ditch Hegel and his crazy ideas), are you forced to take it?
Anyway, what 'dialectical' -- or even materialist -- sense does any of this make, even supposing Trotsky were 100% right that all giving is taking, and all taking is giving? Does it imply one of these activities is struggling with the other and will thus change into that other, or into something else? Or that this Linguistic Fandango will somehow cause several other incidental changes, once again as the DM-classics assure us they must? [Links above.] Or that there is a struggle going on between these words (or their 'mental counterparts') in this child's mind? Or even one in Trotsky or Ben's?
But, is Trotsky genuinely serious -- is anyone at all serious -- that we can draw scientific conclusions concerning fundamental aspects of 'Reality' based on an infant's limited/defective understanding of language?
One wonders what profound truths might have been extracted from domestic scenes like this had the infant called its mother "Daddy", by mistake.
More to the point: did Trotsky (does anyone as an adult) ever mean "give" when he (they) say "take"? If Trotsky ever did so intend, we might well wonder how the Red Army managed to emerge victorious in the Russian Civil War if it had been led by so confused a leader. Did Trotsky ever say to regiments of the Red Army: "Take that town over there from the Whites!", when he really meant "Give that town to the Whites!"? Or, worse, "Dialectically, both take and do not take that town!"? If not, what exactly is the point of all this word-juggling? Why emphasise antithetical meanings if they fail to relate to real material change -- or even to the intelligent use of language -- never mind the success of battles waged against Tsarist forces?
How far does one's thought have to be debased to take this as anything other than a sick joke?
And who the hell is this child, anyway? Did Trotsky just make him up? [Did he 'Do A Trump' long before Donald Trump slithered onto the scene?] As usual in DM-writings (recall, this is Mickey Mouse Science and Minnie Mouse Philosophy we're dealing with here!), we once again encounter what turn out to be less than half-baked 'thoughts' -- or possibly even outright inventions -- impossible to make sense of even in DM-terms!
Another important question worth asking (and hinted at earlier): What makes Freud or Ben think that any of the words to which they refer count as antithetical examples of the same word? Admittedly, the inscriptions upon which they focused look similar when paired in the way they were, even though several are typographically quite different from their alleged semantic twin (i.e., where they have one!) -- e.g., "bat" and "bad", "bös" and "bass". But, why should we conclude that any of them represents one word with (what are supposed to be) two 'opposite meaning', instead of (and, what is far more likely) two or more different words each with a distinct meaning? What is the criterion of identity applicable here for the phrase "same word"? What tells us whether we have one word or two typographically identical words?
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
In fact, given Trotsky's strictures on the LOI, alongside his comments about the word "equal" (to say nothing of Hegel's criticisms of the very same 'law' (irony intended)), no DM-theorist should agree with Ben that, concerning any of the above examples, the same word occurs with at least two different meanings. If Trotsky is correct that no single letter, "A", ever equals any other letter, "A", how could "altus" (meaning "high") equal "altus" (meaning "deep")? If A fails Trotsky's test for identity, how can "altus" possibly be given a free pass? In fact, Trotsky advised his readers to check those two letter As under a lens:
"The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A' is equal to 'A'. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality 'A' is not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens -- they are quite different from each other." [Trotsky (1971), p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
Did Ben (or even Freud) apply Trotsky's 'complex investigative method' when they examined those two occurrences of "altus"? Did they examine them under a microscope? If not, why not?
But we all know the answer to that one. Had Ben followed Trotsky's advice and wielded a magnifying glass, or even a microscope, the ridiculous nature of this entire line-of-thought would have immediately been clear. If Trotsky were right (but there are excellent reasons for concluding he was way off the mark even here -- on that see Essay Six, where Trotsky's entire argument has been taken apart), Ben should have seen two different words, not one word with two meanings. That is because, according to Trotsky, sufficient magnification will always show that similar looking marks on the page (like the word "altus" and the word "altus") are ever so slightly different and so can't be the 'same word'!
Surely, and far more plausibly, what we have here isn't one word with two opposite meanings, but two words with two different meanings.
[In many cases, this actually turns out to be the case! On that, see below.]
But, would Ben conclude the same about, say, the word "bank"? With respect to that word, the same four letters in the same order can mean any one of the following: (i) A system of institutionalised credit/theft, (ii) The side of a river, (iii) The way that aeroplanes turn, (iv) An expression of trust (which could in fact be a dead metaphor). So, in this case, do we have one word with four meanings or four words with four different meanings? They certainly have different entries in every dictionary I have so far consulted, on-line and those in my library. In fact Merriam-Webster lists at least twenty different meanings for this one word! Clearly, each of these occurrences of the word "bank" is comprised of a set of typographically identical letters, but their various meanings, to state the obvious, are connected with the way speakers use them. So, this set of four letters can appear in identifiably different four-letter inscriptions -- in this case, "bank", "bank", "bank" and "bank". Even though they look exactly the same and are arranged in the exactly same order, they all mean something different (when used in the four ways suggested above). If according to one dictionary, the same set of letters has up to twenty different meanings, indicating the presence of twenty different words, why not conclude something similar with "altus" and "altus"? Why are supposedly 'opposite meanings' powerful enough to meld together two separate occurrences of "altus" to make one word (not two), when we don't allow 'different meanings' to do that with "bank"? Why does 'opposite meaning' wear the trousers here?
However, it could be countered that even though these set of letters ("b", "a", "n", and "k") all combine into the same spelling, they aren't antithetical, so the above remarks are beside the point.
Or so it could be maintained...
But, why is that decisive? Why is it that we can easily tell the difference between the following four typographically identical sets of letters (i.e., "bank", "bank", "bank", and "bank", if we confine our attention to the four examples listed above), because their different meanings indicate the presence of four words, not one, when, on the other hand, we are supposed to believe that there is only one word signified by the occurrence of two typographically identical signs (i.e., "altus" and "altus" or "Boden" and "Boden") just because they have what are supposed to be 'opposite meanings'? To be consistent, why don't we argue that we have in fact two pairs of words in this case not one?
Or, failing that, why don't we conclude that "bank" illustrates the:
"The twenty-ruple usage of language, which gives to the same word a host of meanings…. We should…recognise…the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere Either-or-or-or-or-or-or-or-or-or... of understanding." [Deliberate misquotation of Hegel.]
Even if only to annoy Hegel-fans?
No good reason seems apparent, here.
[If anyone can think of a good reason, please let me know!]
We could then set about investigating at least the 'quadrialectical' link that 'must exist in reality' if we confine ourselves to the for cases listed above: i.e., between a bank (source of finance, etc.), a bank (side of a river), to bank (trust) and to bank (to change the direction of flight) -- or, indeed, stretching this suggestion almost to its breaking point, the connection which must exist between Banks (the late ex-England goalie), Banks (the late UK Labour MP) and Banks (the fashion designer). In this way we would be transcending the "not-either-or" of Hegelianism (as in "Either there are two words here with one meaning, or one word with two opposite meanings"), which would in turn mean we could then say that each word can have any number of non-opposite meanings, rising above the 'either-or-or-or' of anyone's mis-understanding, or mis-use, of the English language!
Or even that: (a) The present tense of "read" (as in "Hegel's Logic isn't a book one can read with pleasure") is the same as, (b) The past tense of "read" (as in "I read Hegel's Logic yesterday and threw it across the room!"), and (c) The future tense of "read" (as in "Tomorrow I will read Hegel's execrable book and then dump it in the trash") constitute a powerful hint, beamed to us by 'Being', that time itself transcends the 'either-or-or-or' etc., etc., and represents a unity in the fourth-dimension --, existing as space-time --, when we begin to acknowledge that each 'here-and-now' is linked to every 'where-and-when'. Who knew the 'speculative nature' of language was quite so advanced? Who knew that this proves everything is inter-connected, after all!
What other ontological clues are out there for those who have eyes to see?
Or dictionaries and thesauruses to ignore...?
Maybe this? Since the word "dresses" can refer to: (i) Items of female apparel (as in "A lorry load of dresses went up in smoke this afternoon"), (ii) The act of putting clothes on (as in "She dresses quickly"), (iii) One's style (as in "He dresses well"), or even to (iv) How men 'hang' (as in "He dresses to the right"), this suggests that clothing secretly 'hangs' one way, wears women's clothes, has an expensive wardrobe, and girds itself rapidly?
To say nothing of the odd use to which several other typographically identical words in the English language can be put, as illustrated in and by Figure Three:
Figure Three: Same Or Different Words/Meanings?
How much 'dialectics' can we milk out of inscriptions such as these? Perhaps 'Being' missed a few dialectical word-tricks here? Good job we're on the case to help it out...
Consider, too, the word "spell":
"Etymology: Middle English, to mean, signify, read by spelling out letters, from Anglo-French espeleir, of Germanic origin; akin to Old English spellian to relate, spell talk. Transitive verb:
1: to read slowly and with difficulty -- often used with out
2: to find out by study: come to understand -- often used with
out <it requires some pains to spell out those decorations -- F. J.
Mather>
3a (1): to name the letters of in order; also: to
write or print the letters of in order (2): to write or print the
letters of in a particular way b: to make up (a word) <what word
do these letters spell> c: Write
1b <catnip is spelled as one word>
4: to add up to: mean
<crop failure was likely to spell
stark famine -- Stringfellow Barr>
Intransitive verb: to form words with letters <teach children to
spell>; also: to spell words in a certain way <spells
the way he speaks>
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, talk, tale, from Old English; akin to Old High German
spel talk, tale
1a: a spoken word or form of words held to have magic power b:
a state of enchantment
2: a strong compelling influence or attraction
Function: noun
Etymology: probably alteration of Middle English spale substitute, from
Old English spala
1a: archaic: a shift of workers b: one's
turn at work
2a: a period spent in a job or occupation b chiefly Australian: a period of rest from work, activity, or use
3a: an indeterminate period of time <waited a spell before
advancing>; also : a continuous period of time <did a spell
in prison> b: a stretch of a specified type of weather
4: a period of bodily or mental distress or disorder <a spell of
coughing> <fainting spells>" [Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.
Odd formatting and italic emphases in the original. This was originally
accessed in 2005. The dictionary entry for this word has changed considerably
since then.]
Perhaps we should now conclude -- 'speculatively', of course(!) -- that because the word "spell" has many different meanings, temporal intervals themselves (as in "time spell") not only (a) Work for a living, (b) They know how to compose words out of letters, and (c) Can perform startling feats of magic?
And, what are we to say of words that are spelt the same in the singular and the plural case, such as "sheep" (as in "She owns a sheep" and "He bought five sheep"), "moose", and "chad"? Has 'speculative thought' buried in language a schizoid mentality? Indeed, we could argue that because the word "sheep" is both singular and plural, the 'speculative spirit' of language suggests that parts of nature are suffering from some sort of multiple personality disorder.
Even worse, what about the many words we have in English that usually occur in plural form but normally allude to one object -- such as "trunks" (i.e., swimwear, not a rather unique part of an elephant, a piece of luggage, or an item of furniture), "scissors", "pliers", "secateurs", "trousers"? What deep and meaningful message is 'Being' trying to send us with peculiar words like this?
Perhaps we're all dolts and none of us 'understands dialectics'!
What, too, are we to conclude about words (i.e., the same word, but not the same inscription) that have two different spellings, for example "gaol" and "jail". What should we say about the different spelling of the same word in UK and US English, such as "colour" and "color"; or "labour" and "labor"? Is there some easy, off-the-peg, Metaphysics to be extracted here on the basis such quirks of language? If not, why not? After all, 'Being' might be trying to tell us something and we're just not listening!
Think, too, about words that are spelled differently but are pronounced the same (these are officially called "homophones") but have different meanings -- as in "mist" and "missed", "past" and "passed", "to", "too" and "two", "aisle" and "isle", "ate" and "eight", "shake" and "sheikh", "mail" and "male", "chord" and "cord", "deer" and "dear", "bare" and "bear", "which" and "witch", "or" and "ore", "rain" and "reign", "you" and "ewe", etc., etc. What is 'Being' desperately trying to tell us?
[A list of over four hundred homophonic pairs (which is way more than the number of enantiosemes Hegel, Ben or Freud manage to dredge up -- which might be a clear hint that 'Being' is far more intent on communicating something to us about homophones than 'It' is about enantiosemes) can be accessed here.]
Maybe we just don't understand 'Being' at all?
In fact, many jokes and puns depend on this quirky aspect of English. [E.g., "What does a sheep's Valentine's Day card say?" "I love ewe!" Ok, I didn't say they were good jokes!]
Nevertheless, the belief that there is a hidden code of some sort built into language is an ancient idea (one that will be examined in Essay Twelve Part Two), so it is no big surprise to see Hegel, the Mystic's mystic, enthusiastically propagating it.
[This 'theory' underlies, for example, the belief that the Bible also has just a secret code buried in its use of letters and words, which is, of course, a guiding principle of Kabbalism (as well as several Sci-fi/fantasy-fiction books and films), a belief system that we know fascinated Hegel. On that, see Magee (2008).]
The fact that we don't conclude such crazy things suggests few of us think there is a secret code built into language -- or, even that it implies the (mythical) 'speculative spirit' of language' controls many of us; mercifully it seems to afflict no more than a tiny minority of the denizens of this planet --, that supposedly 'reveals' the presence of 'hidden forces' controlling both nature and the social/psychological development of 'concepts' (but only in certain befuddled heads), nor any of the other peculiar things that type-identical words appear to suggest to the over-heated thoughts of the philosophically gullible among us.
Of course, it could be objected that most of the above points are limited to the English language, so, at best, they are highly parochial.
Or so it could be argued...
But, Hegel spoke about language, not a specific language:
"Apropos of this, we should note the double meaning of the German word aufheben (to put by or set aside). We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a law or regulation is set aside; (2) to keep, or preserve: in which sense we use it when we say: something is well put by. This double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognise in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere 'either-or' of understanding." [Hegel (1975), The Doctrine of Being, p.142, §96. Bold emphases added.]
To argue that what Hegel says applies only to German would constitute a dangerous concession to national chauvinism, at best, racism, at worst. What next? The 'sacred destiny' of the German Volk?
That is quite apart from the fact that Ben himself reminded us that Freud had tried to make these points about Latin and Old Saxon, and Trotsky did the same with a French word.
So, the above points are relevant -- or, should we conclude that 'speculative thought' fails to work in, or with, English?
And, as far as several of Ben's examples are concerned, this is what the late W. V. O. Quine had to say:
"A distant kin of [this appeal to alteriety] is occasionally encountered in an owlish allusion to 'identity of opposites.' [With respect to an earlier example of this] we have seen that each [half] is accounted for without appealing to any mystical principle. A case for identity of opposites that is invariably cited is altus, Latin for both 'high' and 'deep'. What we actually have here, however, is a case rather of parochial outlook on our part. What is objective about height and depth is distance from top to bottom. We call it height or depth according to our point of view; Latin simply tells us how it is with no thought of opposites. Another tempting case for the identity of opposites is cleave: 1. adhere, 2. sever. However, Skeat argues that this is a convergence of two words, independent in origin.... May identity of opposites be manifested not only by sameness of word for opposite senses, but also for sameness of sense for opposite words? Well there is fast...and its opposite loose: there are fast women, I am told, and loose women, and no clear distinction between them. A little and a lot are opposites, but quite a little is quite a lot." [Quine (1990), pp.51-52. On this, see Skeat (1993), p.84. Paragraphs merged; links added. Italic emphases in the original. Follow the first link above to find out what Quine meant by "owlish".]
Hence, it is worth asking: Are Quine's last two examples instances of the non-speculative spirit in language, which combines opposite words into the same meaning? Or, is this an example of the belated revenge of the LOI, 'working behind the backs of the producers' of wall-to-wall non-sense?
Following on from Quine's remarks, we might note what one on-line etymological dictionary had to say about the two separate origins of "cleave" (which is somewhat similar to Skeat's listing):
"cleave (1): strong verb, past tense cleaf, past participle clofen), from P.Gmc. *kleubanan, from PIE [Proto-Indo-European? -- RL] base *gleubh -- 'to cut, slice.' The old, strong p.t. clave was still alive at the time of the King James Bible; and the p.p. [past participle -- RL] cloven survives, though mostly in compounds. Cleavage in geology is from 1816. The sense of 'cleft between a woman's breasts in low-cut clothing' is first recorded 1946, when it was defined in a 'Time' magazine article as the 'Johnston Office trade term for the shadowed depression dividing an actress' bosom into two distinct sections' [Aug. 5].
"cleave (2): 'to adhere,' O.E. [Old English -- RL] clifian, from W.Gmc. [Western Germanic? -- RL] *klibajanan, from PIE *gloi- 'to stick.' The confusion was less in O.E. when cleave (1) was a class 2 strong verb and cleave (2) a class 1 verb; but it has grown since cleave (1) weakened, which may be why both are largely superseded by stick and split. Cleaver 'butcher's chopper' is from 1483." [Quoted from here. Formatting in the original.]
So, it looks like we have here a case where two different words have merged, not an example of one word with two opposite meanings.43
And, here is what Professor Larry Horn had to say:
"Date: Fri, 24 Mar 95 21:12:19 EST [Eastern Standard Time -- RL] From: Larry Horn. Subject: Re: 6.430. Words that are their own opposites; Jane Edwards calls our attention to Abel's and Freud's contributions to our topic, citing this passage from Lepschy (1982) on Carl Abel's Gegensinn der Urworte (1884) inter alia:
'His [i.e., Abel's] theory on the importance and interest of words with opposite meanings (which were, he suggested, particularly frequent in the early stages of languages) finds its place in a long tradition of studies, from the Stoic's grammar and the etymologies e contrario [...], to the chapter in Arab linguistic tradition devoted to the [...] contraries, or words of opposite meanings [...] to the medieval Jewish grammarians' discussions on parallel phenomena in Hebrew [...] to Christian biblical scholars who at least since the 17th century examine cases of 'enantiosemy' in the Sacred, classical, and modern languages, commenting on words like Hebrew berekh 'he blessed' and 'he cursed', Greek argo's 'swift' and 'slow', Latin altus 'high' and 'deep' [...] Nearer to Abel, in the first part of the 19th century, we find the German romantics meditating on opposite meanings [...] and it is impossible not to remember Hegel's comments on a key term in his logic, aufheben, which means both 'to eliminate' and 'to preserve', illustrating a coexistence in language of opposite meanings which has great speculative import.' Lepschy also writes that Abel's ideas 'were taken seriously by people of the calibre of Pott, Steinthal, and Schuchardt', and that Freud repeatedly quoted Abel's work, viewing it 'as a linguistic confirmation' of his own theory that 'for the unconscious, opposites are equivalent to each other.' (pp.28-29)
"I also delve into Abel and Freud in the 'Negation East and West' section of my book, A Natural History of Negation (Chicago, 1989; cf. esp. pp.93-94). [I.e., Horn (1989/2001) -- RL.] I ended up taking a rather sceptical stance toward both Abel's thesis that 'primitive languages' tend to contain a significant number of Urwoerte that simultaneously denote two contraries and Freud's borrowing of Abel's work as evidence for the 'antithetical meaning of primal words' as reflected in the absence of the law of contradiction within dreams ('Hearing the analysis and insist of a dream character 'It's NOT my mother', the analyst immediately translates 'So it IS his mother'.) The nature of the examples marshalled by Abel and Freud, unfortunately, are such as to raise the eyebrows of even the most fervent megacomparativist among us, although some of them (Lat. clamare 'cry' vs. clam 'softly') are indeed cute. Some do involve what another poster just asked about, albeit with the inaccurate label 'palindrome' -- the idea being that the sounds or letters of one word can be reversed to produce an antonym [or in some of the Abel-Freud cases, a synonym] of that word, and many involve cross-linguistic pairs: Ger. Topf 'pot'/Eng. 'pot', Ger. Ruhe 'rest'/Eng. 'hurry', 'care' vs. 'wreck'. (If THIS is what Pott and Schuchardt 'took seriously', I'm disappointed, especially in the former, who had the good taste to discover the phenomenon of negative polarity.) In my book, I also -- like Lepschy -- try to deal with the Hegelian notion of aufhebung, arguing that whatever its importance for the theory of dialectic, this particular antilogy/auto-antonym/enantioseme does not comfortably sit on the Abel-Freudian roster of primal antithetical words. Indeed, the strongest examples of this phenomenon we have (cleave, sanction, etc.) are remarkably non-primal. And some of the others mentioned by Abel/Lipschy/Edwards -- as other posters on this thread have observed -- are simply misdiagnosed (Lat. 'altus', for one). The case of the Hebrew berekh 'he blessed/he cursed' I imagine is just like the use of Fr. 'sacre' 'blessed, cursed' -- whether we want to invoke irony, euphemism, or some other trope to explain this development (cf. the Eumenides, et al.). In none of these cases is the thesis of an unconscious identification of opposites particular economical or explanatory, although it does make a nice story. (The relevant Freud papers are 'The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words' [1910] and 'Negation' [1925], both of course to be found in Strachey's Standard Edition; the passage from Hegel's Logic on Aufhebung is also discussed by Walter Kaufmann in his Hegel (1995, pp.192-93). [This is pp.179-82 in the edition I have used, i.e., Kaufmann (1978) -- RL.] Larry." [Quoted from here. Formatting modified to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some italic emphases have been added; capitals in the original. Several paragraphs merged.]
[For more on this, including background details, see Horn (1989/2001), pp.90-96.]
Of course, language is highly complex and words can acquire all sorts of meanings in use (and over time), but if we read too much into this, we will on the one hand end up with the sort of absurdities that not even Ben would put in his book, or, on the other, with a hopelessly garbled mess that could in no way serve as a means of communication, least of all to an audience of workers.
To illustrate this last point, consider an example that Ben himself highlighted: the alleged double meaning of English word "cleave". We can use it to mean either "join" or "divide". [Admittedly, in Ben's book, "cleave" was given several other connotations, but, as we have seen, it is in fact a merged word historically derived from two different sources.] But, ordinarily, when we use a word in one way its other supposedly 'opposite meaning' drops out of the picture. Indeed, as already noted, we would all recognise that in cases like this we would have a pair of typographically identical inscriptions that possessed two different meanings. If that weren't so, irredeemable confusion would soon follow. For example, when someone says of a man or woman that they cleave to their partners, none of us misunderstands this or takes it to mean that one of them has been chopped (i.e., divided) into pieces by the other. Similarly, when we refer to an axe cleaving wood no one imagines there to have been a life-long pair-bond (a joining) between a hatchet and its beloved tree trunk.
Creative writers and poets may certainly play around with words as much as they like (not that they need my permission!), but in the ordinary world if you want firewood, you don't usually pledge your troth to a towering oak, and if you desire a life-long partner, you don't normally search through a forest with an axe.
In practice, we typically settle on one meaning in a given context, and totally ignore any other associated meanings (again, unless we want to create confusion, crack a joke, write poetry, or publish rather odd books with head-scratchingly weird titles). Or, even better still, we recognise the presence of two different words -- and, in the case of "spell" and "bank", maybe three or more.
To a professional wordsmith like Ben this is going to sound completely unsatisfactory, and, given the (unreal) world he inhabits for part of the day (writing strange books, etc.), that reaction is entirely understandable. Creative writers like Ben experiment with words and with meanings all the time. No problem with that (once again, not that he or they need my permission or acquiescence!). However, Ben may only indulge in such fanciful word-play for a fraction of the time. In everyday life he would soon come to grief, finding himself unable to function for very long if he displayed such a cavalier attitude toward word-meaning. And the same comment applies to Trotsky, Freud and Hegel (when they were alive), whatever else their rather odd theories might have told them.
Consider the following scenario: One day, Ben is selecting fruit at a market stall. The stallholder gives him a rotten apple. When Ben complains that it is bad the crafty old stallholder, who has, unfortunately for Ben, read his book, says that the apple is in fact also good because of the antithetical meaning of the Saxon root word. Is Ben forced to agree and accept this 'bad/good' apple on the basis of that rather dubious 'dialectical' argument? Maybe he would, but few workers would be so easily conned. And, it is reasonably clear that Freud, Hegel and Trotsky wouldn't have been so easily duped, either.
On his way home, Ben walks past a building under repair. A brick falls out of the attic and is heading his way. Upon being warned that a brick has fallen out of the attic, Ben first of all looks towards the ground floor (since he is in the grip of an unhelpful idea, having unfortunately recalled the point he made about attics in his book), and is subsequently flattened by this very material brick before he could look up -- since his thoughts dutifully and 'dialectically' rummaged through the two 'opposite' meanings of Boden.
In ordinary life there is no place for such antithetical meanings -- whatever unbalancing effect an obscure theory/method might have on an individual's theoretical or poetical musings. Ben's everyday practice confirms this. Otherwise he'd be dead.
Thankfully, he isn't.
Nevertheless, Bertrand Russell once said: "Most people would rather die than think. In fact they do." Ben might end up proving that elitist saying true (in his particular case) if he goes about his daily affairs believing everything he reads in Hegel and Freud -- or even his own book!
In the artificial world of syrupy meanings -- where Ben's book is clearly at home -- we might even find time to reflect on, and experiment with, the various nuances and connotations we could place, or could have placed, on many of our words. Perhaps this might even enable the creation of new words or concepts. But in the end, understanding words literally is what generally helps keep us alive and even win strikes. Humans have to live before they can think -- or, indeed, write meandering and obscure books with quirky titles. And that is why we can say for certain that Hegel and Freud were wrong -- and Ben was unwise to have allowed himself to be so easily led astray -- about these 'antithetical double meanings'.
Tested in practice -- as opposed to it being passively contemplated in 'theory', or employed experimentally in creative writing -- our ordinary use of language, in tandem with our everyday experience, fails to reflect these 'double meanings' as a matter of course.
Independently of that, Ben's infatuation with Freud's sex-obsessed brand of cocaine-induced, dogmatic, a priori 'psychology' is itself rather puzzling. Except for the fact that Freud's 'theory' so easily allows (nay, invites) totally unqualified amateurs to suppose that -- by entering into an imaginary world where they can pretend they are the opposite of unqualified -- they can indulge in a little armchair psychiatry (inflicted on themselves, or, but far more likely, on others whom they have never even met in person!), and thereby confidently indulge in unsupervised and untested 'psycho-analysing' without having to worry about the consequences, or, indeed, without bothering to obtain a single relevant qualification...apart from that, there is little to recommend Freud's dangerous fantasies.
As a matter of fact, Freud's life and work were characterised by complex, interwoven layers of duplicity, fraud, fabrication, intellectual dishonesty, invention, plagiarism, monomania, cocaine-induced madness, delusion, client maltreatment (if not abuse), bluster, dissembling, lying and bullying (all of which, even to this day, are obscured by the abject hero-worship displayed by his cultish 'disciples', which phenomenon warrants analysis itself!), unmatched in the career of almost any other prominent figures in recent history outside of big business, the 'news media', politics and organised crime.
Newton was a rank amateur in comparison!44
And, of course, the above comments apply with equal force to the work of anyone influenced by Freud (such as Lacan and Zizek) --, which observation alone takes out about 95% of recent 'French Philosophy', along with large chunks of contemporary (academic) 'Marxist theory'. [On that, see Essay Thirteen Part Three. Chomsky's comments on 'High Theory' are also relevant.]
Finally, Ben may be impressed by Freud's use of language, but that is about all one can say on his behalf: he could write well. Big deal! So could Cicero (the Roman Jurist, ruling-class enabler and slum landlord) and so could Edmund Burke (Tory ideologue). This eminently superficial aspect of Freud's work should fool no one -- least of all those who claim to be Marxists -- into taking anything Freud said (about psychology) seriously. It is a sad reflection on just how uncritically tolerant certain Dialectical Marxists have become of a priori speculation and dogmatic thesis-mongering that many of them regard Freud so highly.
Incidentally, on a related topic, this is also why we can be sure Voloshinov was also wrong when he said this:
"Such discriminations as those between a word's usual and occasional meanings, between its central and lateral meanings, between is denotation and its connotation, etc., are fundamentally unsatisfactory. The basic tendency underlying all such discriminations -- the tendency to ascribe greater value to the central, usual aspect of meaning, presupposing that that aspect really does exist and is stable -- is completely fallacious." [Voloshinov (1973), p.102. Quoted in Watson (1998), p.323. Italic emphases in the original.]
The problem with the above remarks is that Voloshinov's argument itself depends on the use of a number of ordinary words -- such as: "usual", "occasional", "meaning", "between", "unsatisfactory", "basic", "all", "such", "presupposing", "does", "and", and "word", etc. --, all of which are operating with their usual meanings!
Otherwise no one would understand what he was trying to say!
As we discovered earlier (in connection with Trotsky's ill-advised attempt to criticise the LOI), we may only agree with Voloshinov on the condition that we refuse to do so! That is because we may only succeed in grasping his point if we actually ignore his theory and decide to take the words he used with their usual meanings.
Any attempt to undermine, question or limit the usual import of words like those above (or, indeed, any others) will always backfire on anyone who tries. That is because, as we saw here, each aspiring 'reviser of the vernacular' is forced to employ words that possess the very meanings they seek to question, modify or undermine in order to back-reflect doubt on those very words! Such 'revisers' invariably question everyone else's use of the ordinary terms in question while the meanings of the same words they are employing to make that very point remain fixed with their usual meanings so that their critique not only appears to be 'successful', it remains comprehensible to themselves and others.
This strategy is really a form of linguistic parasitism; it is little more than an attempt to feed off the very thing it aims to countermand or even question, which, in this case, is the primacy of the usual meaning of words. However, as parasites soon discover, any such tactic is self-defeating, for if the words an aspiring critic uses don't possess their usual meanings, it becomes impossible for them to construct a valid argument. That approach kills itself as fast as many parasites do.
Even an attempt to entertain the bare possibility that ordinary words fail to retain their everyday meanings requires the use of the very same words with their ordinary meaning in place so that that possibility can even be aired. Hence, if such words fail to retain their ordinary meanings precisely here --, as part of that specific criticism -- the sentences expressing any such proposed revision will be devoid of sense. That is because those sentences would now contain words that possess dubious, or even unknown, meanings, which would in turn cause that proposed revision to fail for lack of determinate content.
[To see how this works, follow that earlier link.]
However, we don't have to appeal to what is in effect an informal reductio (like the above) in order to make the same point; we only have to consider what would happen if we tried to communicate with, say, workers in a revolutionary situation, or even when they are on strike, after reading Voloshinov -- or, and what is perhaps worse, actually taking his advice.
Imagine, for example, being asked by the organisers of a picket line to help stop a group of strike-breakers breaking through a gate. Only a complete fool would begin to question "central meanings" at this point, wondering if the phrase "that gate" was really being used with its usual denotation or maybe referred instead to "that pub over there", and whether "stop them getting through…" really possessed its accepted import, or perhaps meant "buy the scabs a drink in…".
Fortunately, no one in their left mind would dream of questioning ordinary meanings in such circumstances -- that is, this side of receiving a hefty material boot up the 'Ideal Passage' from angry pickets.
The plain fact is that anyone who has a weak spot for "Militant Esthetix" (who positively adores the colour pink and desperately wants to inflict pain on their eyes!), while they might eschew the normal connotations and denotations of words (and, indeed, who might thus prefer to day-dream about secondary senses, or play around with word meanings and the like), in their creative writing or when they spend part of the day as authors of fantasy fiction, as poets or auteurs, when confronted with material reality they will soon discover that the normal connotations and denotations of words take precedence every time, otherwise they can expect a few highly predictable, and, in some cases, damagingly irreversible consequences.
[Another example of radical confusion is given below, but in relation to Hegel's recklessly unwise criticism of the LEM.]
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle'; HCD = High Church Dialectician -- follow the link for an explanation.]
Despite countless knee-jerk and -- one is almost tempted to say -- disingenuous references to "practice" that regularly slide off the keyboards and pens of Dialectical Marxists (particularly those belonging to the HCD-Tendency), DM-fans regularly promote philosophical theories they would never be able to sell to workers (in practice), theories they would find impossible to translate into action, which would spell disaster if anyone even attempted to apply them in, or to, the class war. Not that this remark, or even those untoward prospects, will slow them down by so much as one millimetre per second! As my old Professor of Logic used to say, their heads are "too full of noise". They aren't even listening. Witness the supercilious and juvenile replies directed at me shortly before I was banned from a website founded by Ben Watson and Andy Wilson -- for the heinous crime of thinking to question the 'sacred dialectic'. So, it is precisely here, in practice, that such 'dialectical-nostrums' become all the more obviously crazy -- that is, should anyone be foolish enough to try them out on workers, or test them in everyday life.
[Indeed, as we will see, the above considerations are part of the reason why Dialectical Marxism has been such an abject, long-term failure -- allied with its inability to "seize the masses" -- and hence why it remains impotent, generation after generation. All this dialectical tomfoolery unfolds in the face of a far more focussed, far less-crazy, ruling-class, well supported by their highly motivated ideologues in colleges, universities and the media. Dialectical Marxists keep bringing the equivalent of an ideological water-pistol to a right-wing gun fight. Marx was right: the ideas of the ruling class always rule, but it certainly helps them do so when, as noted earlier, DM-fans insist on appealing to a theory that would give the term "fourth-rate" a bad name!]
Naturally, Ben is invited to disprove these allegations by attempting to agitate the next group of striking pickets he meets with any of his odd ideas -- or, indeed, any other nostrum exclusive to DM. He might find that audience a tad less sympathetic than I have been.
Some might be tempted to accuse the present author of "anti-intellectualism" because of the highly critical, if not consistently disparaging approach to 'high theory' adopted at this site. But as I have argued in more detail in Essay Twelve Part One, these Essays represent no more of an example of "anti-intellectualism" than would arguing that theological doctrines -- such as Transubstantiation or Consubstantiation -- have no practical consequences (other than negative).
It should hardly surprise fellow Marxists (but apparently, it does) that non-sensical theories have no practical implications (again, other than negative). [On that, see here and here.]
And, that is why we can be certain that Ben is mistaken, too, about Finnegans Wake:
"Max Eastman's inability to think dialectically, to understand the simultaneous advance and regression in capitalism, means that he was deaf to the resounding negation voiced by Modern Art to its bourgeois 'audience'. It meant he ended up serving just those reactionary castes he hated. His patronising concern for a working class who find Modern Art 'unintelligible' reveals a subject-positioning over the heads of the workers; only those who learn from every strike, riot and demonstration can grasp how artistic negations chime with the spirit of revolt. Every head on every pillow babbles a Finnegans Wake." [Watson (1998), p.315.]
The only response one could make to this is that Ben must have attended strikes, riots, and demonstrations when high on something (although he looked pretty normal to me when I last saw him on that huge anti-war demonstration in London, 15th February 2003).
Like it or not, you are about as likely to find workers interested in Finnegans Wake as you are to discover they are fascinated with the contents of Horse and Hound or Debrett's Peerage. Of course, that doesn't mean Joyce's book is flawed in any way, or that workers shouldn't try to read it. But, unless Ben has been listening to workers who are about to go insane, few if any of them utter 'sentences' like those found in Joyce's work --, that is, this side of going insane or trying to eat the aforementioned pillow.
[I have examined 'occasionalist' theories of meaning and "inner speech", alongside Voloshinov's 'theory' of language and meaning (as well as the ideas of several comrades who are -- somewhat inexplicably -- impressed with his work) in Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections (4) to (6).]
The Revenge Of The 'Either-Or Of Commonsense'
Returning now to Hegel's reference to the "Either/Or" of "abstract understanding", which largely motivates the general disdain for the LEM displayed by DM-fans, we find few crumbs of comfort for beleaguered dialecticians.
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
Unfortunately for Dialectical Marxists and Hegelians, these terms ("either" and "or") have been lifted from ordinary language, and, as we have seen several times already it is unwise for anyone (least of all Hegel-groupies) to criticise the vernacular, since that tactic invariably backfires on those foolish enough to try. Admittedly, Hegel wasn't attacking the use of "either-or" in that specific area, simply the restrictive dichotomy he claimed these words introduced into thought --, one imagines by that philistine (but nonetheless mysterious), disembodied, inner alter ego, the "abstract understanding" -- very helpfully and 'scientifically' identified for us by Hegel without the use of a laboratory, any evidence whatsoever, or even so much as a consulting couch! Freud would have been most impressed:
"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphases added.]
Nevertheless, it is difficult to comprehend what Hegel is trying to say here. That is because any attempt to interpret him requires the implicit, or even an explicit, use of the very terms he claims are misleading. The interpretation of his work requires decisions be taken about whether he meant either this or that by what he actually said. If an author always means both -- or maybe even neither -- then interpretation is rendered impossible and any attempt to unravel her/his meaning becomes self-defeating (as we are about to discover).
So, if Hegel were correct, if absolutely "everything is opposite" and there is no "either-or" anywhere in the universe, it would be impossible to disentangle what he meant from what he didn't, since we would be unable to decide whether he believed of, say, any two sentences, P and Q, one or more of the following:
H1: (i) Both P and Q; (ii) either P or Q; (iii) neither P nor Q; or (iv) either P or Q, but not both.
But, if P and Q were inconsistent (that is, if, for instance, Q implies not P, or vice versa -- for clarity's sake an example illustrating one such possibility will be given below), and we attempted to interpret Hegel's words one way -- perhaps that he believed both P and Q, since to do otherwise would involve the implicit or explicit use of the dread 'either-or' --, then, plainly, we would have to conclude that he accepted both as part of an "unfolding of truth" (as he might have put it). By his own lights that would mean, of course, that he would be unfolding error, not truth!
Hence, in order to reject one or other of the above options, we, too, would be forced to appeal to, or employ, an "either-or" -- that is, we would have to conclude that Hegel accepted P or he accepted Q, but not both.
On the other hand, if we were to remain true to Hegel's dictum -- that "neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains" --, we would have to conclude he accepted both.
So, any attempt made now to specify exactly what Hegel somehow thought he meant would undermine what he actually said about the use of the "either-or of understanding", for we would have to accept that Hegel asserted one thing, P, or he asserted something else, Q, but not both. Without that assumption it would become impossible either to comprehend or defend him. If Hegel genuinely cast doubt on the "either-or of understanding" (and he wasn't being deliberately enigmatic, disingenuous, mendacious or merely playful) -- and assuming he was correct in so doing --, then any attempt to interpret him as asserting P or asserting Q would have to conclude that he asserted both. [Again, I give a clear example of this, below.]
In that case, any determinate interpretation of Hegel (that is, any interpretation that settled on one option, not both) would have to ignore his own advice by reluctantly accepting the protocols expressed in or by the "either-or" of ordinary language (or of 'commonsense', along with its corollaries), and acknowledge that, concerning either P or Q, Hegel accepted only one of them, not both -- that is, that he was a fully paid-up member of The Society For The Promotion Of The Either-Or Of Abstract Understanding.
If so, truth would advance -- as a result of yet another (ironic) dialectical inversion -- by forcing us to disregard Hegel!
In order to make this point more concrete, let us suppose that:
"P" is: "Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains";
And,
"Q" is: "There is in fact an abstract 'either-or' somewhere in the world of mind and of nature (etc.)."
[As above, Q implies not P, and vice versa.]
So, either Hegel accepted P or he accepted Q -- which would, of course, imply that there is at least one 'either-or' "in heaven or in earth (etc.)" -- i.e., here, in front of us, right here, right now.
On the other hand, if Hegel took his own advice and accepted both P and Q -- thereby rejecting this particular "either-or" --, not much sense could be made of what he was trying to say.
Incidentally, the above criticism isn't affected by Hegel's own interpretation of the controversial words reproduced above, nor any technical meaning his epigones might now want to attribute to them, since they, too, would have to conclude that he meant this or he meant that, not both. The issue here solely concerns how we are to understand him now, in this world, by a consideration of those very material words (in print, or reproduced on a screen), quoted earlier.
Hence, it is beside the point whether the rationale for Hegel's criticism of the use of such words by the "abstract understanding" is legitimate or not (irony intended). His writings now appear before us as phenomenal objects; in that case, given the additional fact that they aren't self-interpreting (especially when we recall that Hegel is no longer alive to explain himself -- but, even then we would have to accept he meant either P or Q, not both), his words face the ordinary cannons we employ elsewhere to understand anyone's speech. In order to read and perhaps interpret Hegel as believing this or that, but not both, we are forced to ignore his advice and employ the anathematised "either-or". 'Abstract understanding' -- if we accept for one moment any such thing exists -- forces our hand. And even if we were to reject its existence (or wait for an atom of proof that it does), this is just one more reason why the everyday use of ordinary language can't be by-passed or undermined, no matter which philosopher of 'genius' tries to fool some of us into thinking otherwise.
Once more, it is little use complaining that this is not how Hegel wanted his use of the "either-or" of "understanding" to be interpreted (i.e., that we should perhaps view it ironically -- that is, that we should interpret it this way but not that), since he himself holed that response well below the water line when he said this:
"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]
So, if "everything is opposite", and it is accepted that Hegel's work was written somewhere on this planet, and copies still take on a physical form in this universe, then anything he committed to paper must be its own opposite, too -- or, he was wrong.
[Irony intended, again.]
Either way, it would be foolish to believe Hegel was serious -- or, and what is far more likely, that he had thought things through with due care -- when he wrote the above words, while also agreeing with what he said about the LEM, and the dreaded "either-or".
Taking Hegel's advice about everything in existence being opposite, the above passage should perhaps be re-written -- more consistently -- along the following 'Hegelian', deny-there-is-an-'either-or', lines:
"Instead of both speaking and not speaking by the maxim both of Excluded Middle and not Excluded Middle and (which is and is not the maxim of abstract understanding) we should and we shouldn't rather say: Everything is, and some things are not, opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, and both in heaven and in earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, and both in the world of mind and of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains, but there is, and it is everywhere, too, while it is nowhere as well. Whatever exists is concrete, and it isn't, with difference and opposition, and also without difference or opposition, in itself, and not in itself, too. The finitude of things will and will not then lie in the want of correspondence, but also with actual correspondence, between their immediate being, and what they essentially are, or are not, and, indeed, both. Thus, in inorganic nature, and outside it, the acid is and is not implicitly at the same time, and at other times, the base, but it isn't the base, either: in other words, but also in the same words, its only being, and its many other beings, consist, and do not consist, in its relation, and absence of any relation, to its other, and whatever isn't its other. Hence also the acid is not something, and it is something, that persists quietly, and not quietly, in the contrast, or the accord: it is always, and is it is never, in effort to realise what it potentially is, and what it actually is not." [Hegelianised version of Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119.]
Everyday, boring old non-abstract understanding will, I think, readily see what arrant nonsense results from Hegel's 'genius' when we apply his ideas to his own words -- providing, of course, we remain in this universe.
Any who object to the above re-write can neutralise its implications with relative ease by demonstrating that Hegel's work wasn't actually written in this universe, or on real paper, but was printed on Ideal paper, neither in heaven nor on earth -- and that they themselves don't exist anywhere, either (or both, or neither), in order to do that (or not).
[Concerning the 'acid and base' example -- even if we were to take Hegel's comments about such reagents seriously -- see here.]
In a recent book [Stewart (1996)], several misinterpretations and misrepresentations of Hegel's work were 'corrected' by a handful of Hegel scholars. However, there would seem to be little point to such an exercise if Hegel's ideas about "either-or" are to be believed. If he were right -- that in the entire universe there is no "either-or" -- there would be some truth even in the wildest allegations about him and his work.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
For instance, these: that (i) Hegel fully accepted without question the unlimited applicability of the LOI in every conceivable circumstance, without any qualifications whatsoever (and that includes its use in dialectical and speculative thought, as well as in relation to change, conceptual or material), and he did not; that (ii) he flatly denied that reality or thought is contradictory in any sense at all, and he did not; that (iii) he doubted the truth of every single one of his own ideas all the time, and he did not; that (iv) he wrote nothing at all in German in his entire life, and he did not; that (v) everything he wrote was actually written by Schelling -- in fact it was published only yesterday, and it wasn't --; that (vi) he was a Shape-shifting Martian, and he wasn't...
[Anyone who attempts to reject one or more of the above alternatives -- on the grounds that Hegel must have accepted one of them, or one of them must be true, but not both, or, indeed, that such objectors must do likewise -- will, alas, have to employ the dreaded LEM in order to do that, vitiating Hegel's challenge, as well as their own objections to the above argument. And we can go further: anyone who rejects that paragraph out-of-hand as ridiculous must also employ the accursed "either-or", on the basis that that paragraph is either ridiculous or it isn't! That hasty rejecter must opt for one alternative in place of the other. At which point they will once again have enrolled themselves in The Society For The Promotion Of The Either-Or Of Abstract Understanding. Welcome home! It's a puzzle why you ever left.]
It could be objected that this completely misunderstands the nature of DL, at least as Hegel himself conceived it. Unfortunately, that response itself is expressed in ordinary language -- and, it was foolishly written in this universe! --, so, since a decision has to be taken over whether or not what it says is valid, a quick reference to DL will indicate it is both.
[DL = Dialectical Logic.]
This means that until DL-fans commit themselves to one or other view (but not both), it is impossible even to begin to evaluate anything they say -- and neither can they!
However, just as soon as they specify what they mean (i.e., that they genuinely intend this but not that), we must cease to take them seriously, since they would then have employed the infernal LEM, thereby undermining their own criticisms of it!
Either way, such defenders of Hegel may be ignored even before they decide whether they agree with the above critical comments, or not (or both).
It could be countered that the above conclusions are completely absurd and fail to follow from a consistent application of the dialectical method; hence Hegel can't be saddled with any of them.
Once more, these 'absurd conclusions' either do or they do not follow from what Hegel wrote. If the above pro-DM, pro-Hegel, rebuttal is correct, and those conclusions don't follow, then there is at least one either-or at work in the universe, namely this one -- since, in that case, both options wouldn't be correct -- only one option would be the right one, namely, that they don't follow. And, if that is so, these 'absurd conclusions' do indeed follow, after all, since Hegel would, in that case, be wrong to assert there is no either-or anywhere in existence when one such has just been used to reject one option in favour of the other!
So, taking each 'absurd conclusion' individually: if we maintain that one of them doesn't follow, we will have applied the LEM, once again. That is because we would thereby have denied that that particular 'absurd conclusion' does and does not follow, and thus that an either-or option obtains in this case. Hence, we arrive at the same result.
On the other hand, if they do follow, then they do, anyway.
Either way, they follow.
The problem with sweeping claims like the one quoted above (which litter Traditional Philosophy and not just Hegel's ill-considered 'Logic') -- in this case, concerning the supposed limitations of certain principles of FL (and especially those that express patterns of inference mirrored in our use of ordinary language, such as the LOI, the LOC and the LEM) -- is that they invariably collapse into incoherence, as we have just seen.
[FL = Formal Logic; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]
Which is why we can say with complete confidence that no one -- not even Hegel -- could possibly understand Hegel!
Interlude Four -- DM Not The Same As HM
[This used to form part of Note 27. It is also worth pointing out that the material below depends heavily on evidence and argument presented in other Essays at this site, which have demonstrated time and again that DM makes not one ounce of sense, that its core ideas soon fall apart when closely examined, and, indeed, that they are far too vague and confused to be assessed even for their truth or falsehood. On this, see Essays Three Part One to Eight Part Three. That isn't the case with HM.]
It could be objected that the distinction drawn between DM and HM at this site is completely spurious; hence, the controversial claims made in this Essay are completely misguided, if not downright mendacious.
However, as will be argued at greater length in Essay Fourteen Part Two, HM contains ideas that are non-sensical only when they are translated into, or are corrupted by, DM. The eminent good sense made by HM -- even as it is understood by workers when they encounter it (often in times of struggle) -- testifies to this.
[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context; LOI = Law of Identity.]
The clear distinction that exists between these two theories isn't just a wild idea advanced at this site; it can be seen clearly in the day-to-day practice of revolutionaries themselves. No Marxist of any intelligence would use slogans drawn exclusively from DM to communicate with workers; indeed, few militants would even attempt to agitate strikers, for example, with the conundrums found in DM. On a picket line the alleged contradictory nature of motion or the limitations of the LOI don't often crop up. How frequently does the link between part and whole loom large in the fight against the Nazis? How many times do revolutionary socialists have to explain the distinction, or even the link, between 'quantity and quality' in the fight against, say, austerity?
Consider, for example, the following slogans: "The Law of Identity is true only within certain limits and the opposition to sanctions on Venezuela!" Or "Change in quantity leads to change in quality and the defence of pensions!". Or: "The whole is greater than the sum of the parts and the campaign to keep hospital HH open!" Or even, "Being is identical with, but at the same time different from, Nothing, the contradiction resolved by Becoming, and the fight against the deportation of Abrego Garcia!"
Slogans like these would be employed by militants of uncommon stupidity and legendary ineffectiveness.
[Other excellent examples of the utter uselessness of the above 'laws' can be found here and here.]
In contrast, active revolutionaries employ ideas drawn exclusively from HM as it applies concretely to the current state of the class war, if they want to communicate effectively with workers (or even look sane!). The vast majority of revolutionary papers, for example, use ordinary language coupled with concepts drawn from HM to agitate and propagandise; rarely do they employ DM-phraseology. [A handful examples where the latter occurs have been considered here.]
As Ian Birchall informs us:
"[Red] Saunders thinks that the IS [which was the forerunner of the UK-SWP -- RL] attracted the best of the 1968 generation through its politics -- 'Neither Washington nor Moscow' -- but also through the accessibility of its publications, it used ordinary language rather than the jargon of other far-left groups." [Birchall (2011), p.422. Bold emphasis and link added.]
Only deeply sectarian rags of exemplary unpopularity and impressive lack of impact use ideas and terminology lifted from DM to try to educate or propagandise the working class. Newsline (the daily paper of the old WRP) was notorious in this regard; but, like the Dinosaurs it resembled, it is no more. [The NON, it seems, took appropriate revenge on these, the least of its dupes. Of course, other splinter groups have descended with modification from the old WRP, but the original party is now defunct. There is a new WRP, and Newsline has morphed into The News Line. I have no idea if that paper is still dialectically-afflicted in the way it used to be. If any of my readers know, please drop me a line. (No pun intended!)]
[One of the fragments left over after the old WRP disintegrated later coalesced around Corinna Lotz and Paul Feldman, finally forming A World To Win, which is far more Healy-esque than WRP 2.0 above. Naturally, that helps explain why you might need a microscope to find them. Anyone interested in acquiring a serious case of Dialectical Migraine should follow the previous link, which will take those masochists to a page of articles by Healy and other DM-Evangelists. I have covered the implosion of the old WRP throughout Part Two.]
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
It could be objected that no one would actually use slogans drawn from certain parts of HM to communicate with or agitate workers. That doesn't mean HM is of no use, so the same must be true of DM. For example, who shouts slogans about "Base and Superstructure", or "Relative Surplus Value" on paper sales? Who tries to propagandise workers with facts about the role of the peasantry in the decline of feudalism? This shows that the distinction drawn in this Essay, and at this site, is entirely bogus.
Or, so a counter-claim might proceed...
While it is true that no one shouts slogans about the relation between "Base and Superstructure" on paper sales, or prints strike leaflets reminding militants of the role of the peasantry in the decline of feudalism, they nevertheless still use slogans (often popularised versions) drawn exclusively from HM, or which connect with HM as it relates to current events in the class war. Hence, virtually every revolutionary article, leaflet or slogan is informed by ideas drawn from HM.
In stark contrast, again, none at all are drawn from DM.
Admittedly, revolutionary publications in general casually employ a handful of jargonised expressions drawn from DM -- in the vast majority cases this is confined to the use of the word "contradiction" -- in some of their articles, but they form a tiny fraction of their total output, even though few, if any, comrades will use such terms in slogans on street sales, on demonstrations or in discussions on a picket line.
Anyway, as will be shown in Part Two of this Essay, the use of DM-terminology like this is merely a nod in the direction of tradition and orthodoxy. Indeed, we are forced to conclude this since no sense can made of DM-jargon -- as we have seen, for instance, here, here, here and here. Hence, the employment of 'dialectical-terminology' simply amounts to a declaration, or an admission, of 'orthodoxy' on the part of the individual or group using it, which therefore amounts to an 'in-group'/'out-group' marker, as is argued here. Such jargon does no real work (other than negative) in circumstances like these, unlike concepts and terminology drawn from HM. [On this, see Montell (2021). In case of misunderstanding, readers are encouraged to check out my remarks about cults posted here.]
[Claims to the contrary have been neutralised here, here and here.]
So, just like Marx in Das Kapital, revolutionary papers merely "coquette" with Hegelian jargon -- and even then, only "here and there".
Hence, at least at the level of practice, where the party interfaces with the working class and the material world, DM is totally useless.
[As we will also see here, there is no evidence that DM, or any of its jargon, was actively used by the Bolsheviks even in October 1917, or, indeed, for several years after.]
Consequently, tested in practice -- or, rather, tested by being left out of practice -- the status of DM is plain for all to see: At best, it is a hindrance; at worst, it would isolate revolutionaries and make them look ridiculous.
This shows that the distinction drawn at this site between DM and HM isn't spurious in the least.
When they communicate with workers, active revolutionaries draw this distinction all the time.
Nevertheless, it could be objected in response that this attempt to separate HM and DM would fragment and compartmentalise our knowledge of nature and society. Such an 'alternative approach' to knowledge would possess obvious Idealist implications, suggesting that human beings are unique by implying that mind is independent of matter. If mind is dependent on matter (howsoever that link is conceived), there must be laws that span across the divide (so to speak). And that is partly where DM comes in.
Or, so it could be argued...
But, that isn't so. As noted above, DM is far too vague and confused for it to function in that way. It is incapable of accounting for anything, social or natural (as the Essays at this site have repeatedly demonstrated -- indeed, as we have seen, if DM were true, change would be impossible). Hence, even if there were natural laws that governed nature and society (I will register no opinion concerning that possibility here, but will do so in Essay Thirteen Part Three), and an inventory were drawn up of all the viable alternative theories capable of accounting for it, DM wouldn't even make the bottom of the reserve list of likely candidates. Again: it is far too vague and confused.
In response, it could be countered that the above response is totally unacceptable since it ignores the fact that some of the best class fighters in history have not only put DM into practice, they have stitched it into the fabric of each and every classic and post-classic Marxist text. Without that theory/method there would be no Marxism. Indeed, without DM, HM would be like "a clock without a spring":
"While polemicising against opponents who consider themselves -- without sufficient reason -- above all as proponents of 'theory,' the article deliberately did not elevate the problem to a theoretical height. It was absolutely necessary to explain why the American 'radical' intellectuals accept Marxism without the dialectic (a clock without a spring)." [Trotsky (1971), p.56. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
That idea isn't unique to Trotsky; we find something analogous in a dusty old Stalinist text (who says their 'dialectic' is 'wooden and lifeless?) -- here is Tommy Jackson (criticising Max Eastman and Raymond Postgate):
"Eastman's attack upon the Marxian Theoretical System is not only an attack upon its dialectic. It is an attack upon its Materialism. Postgate falls into the tactical error of trying to explain what he dislikes about the Dialectic. He wants to keep the 'historical materialism' and, with reservations, the Marxian Economics. He does not see that, once their objective dialectical movements are abstracted, the processes of history and economics cease to be conceivable materialistically. With their movement gone they become lifeless and dead: history an unintelligibly arbitrary panorama of abstract sequences and successions; economics a welter of contradictory metaphysical categories. As we have demonstrated above, the Dialectic of Thought is valid precisely because it has a material origin in the objective world of material practice, because it is in itself a subjective practice which reflects in its content and formal movement the corresponding movements in objective reality; and, above all, because itis able to survive the acid test of objective practice." [Jackson (1936), p.540. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
That passage hasn't aged too well: the "objective practice" to which comrade Jackson refers [i.e., the existence and alleged progress of the fSU] has now passed round the u-bend of history. Moreover, as far as "movement" is implied by all this 'dialectics', it, too, is stone dead. In fact, it never even took its first breath.
Figure Four: The Former Soviet Union -- Flushed With Success?
I have dealt with the above objection more fully in Part Two, so readers are directed there for more details. The other claim -- concerning matter and 'mind' -- was tackled (in detail) in Essay Thirteen Part Three (link above).
Conclusion: Failure Substituted For Success
But, we have yet to consider the flip side of this: The effect the importation into Marxism of ruling-class thought has had on revolutionaries themselves. How is that connected with the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism? How is it connected with their class origin and current class position?
More to the point: How and why have leading revolutionaries fallen for this ruling-class con-trick? How is it even possible for exemplary Marxists (and those who at least claim to be Marxists) to be so easily duped?
These and other questions will be tackled in Part Two, where it will be revealed for the first time anywhere just how DM has seriously damaged Marxism, how this was possible because of the class origin and current class position of those who shaped Dialectical Marxist theory and who lead the movement.
For those who might still think otherwise, the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism will actually be demonstrated in Essay Ten Part One (link in the first paragraph above), as will the connection it enjoys with DM.
Appendix A -- Aristotle's Remarks About His 'Dialectical Method'
"Our treatise proposes to find a line of
inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally
accepted about every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when
standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. First,
then, we must say what reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in order to
grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the
treatise before us.
"Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down,
something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a
'demonstration', when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and
primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through
premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is
'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things
are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else
but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is
improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first
principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those
opinions are 'generally accepted' which are accepted by every one or by the
majority or by the philosophers -- i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the
most notable and illustrious of them. Again (c), reasoning is 'contentious' if
it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not really
such, or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be
generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted
actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call
generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the
case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy
in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power
of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former
really deserves to be called 'reasoning' as well, but the other should be called
'contentious reasoning', but not 'reasoning', since it appears to reason, but
does not really do so. Further (d), besides all the reasonings we have mentioned
there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the
special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her
sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the
reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things
that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not
fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either
by every one or by the majority or by philosophers -- that is to say, by all, or
by most, or by the most illustrious of them -- but he conducts his reasoning
upon assumptions which, though appropriate to the science in question, are not
true; for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the semicircles
wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be
drawn....
"First, then, a definition must be given of a 'dialectical proposition' and a 'dialectical problem'. For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds, nor yet make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people: for the latter admits of no doubt, while to the former no one would assent. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e. either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these, provided it be not contrary to the general opinion; for a man would probably assent to the view of the philosophers, if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those generally accepted; also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted, and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts. Thus, supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same, it might probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception of contraries is the same: also, supposing it to be a general opinion that there is but one single science of grammar, it might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science of flute-playing as well, whereas, if it be a general opinion that there is more than one science of grammar, it might pass for a general opinion that there is more than one science of flute-playing as well: for all these seem to be alike and akin. Likewise, also, propositions contradicting the contraries of general opinions will pass as general opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good to one's friends, it will also be a general opinion that one ought not to do them harm. Here, that one ought to do harm to one's friends is contrary to the general view, and that one ought not to do them harm is the contradictory of that contrary. Likewise also, if one ought to do good to one's friends, one ought not to do good to one's enemies: this too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the general view; the contrary being that one ought to do good to one's enemies. Likewise, also, in other cases. Also, on comparison, it will look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate belongs to the contrary subject: e.g. if one ought to do good to one's friends, one ought also to do evil to one's enemies. it might appear also as if doing good to one's friends were a contrary to doing evil to one's enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality as well will be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries. Clearly also, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical propositions; for people are likely to assent to the views held by those who have made a study of these things, e.g. on a question of medicine they will agree with the doctor, and on a question of geometry with the geometrician; and likewise also in other cases.
"A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion either way, or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers, or the philosophers to the masses, or each of them among themselves. For some problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance, e.g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not, while some it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge, e.g. whether the universe is eternal or not: others, again, are not useful in and by themselves for either of these purposes, but yet help us in regard to some such problems; for there are many things which we do not wish to know in and by themselves, but for the sake of other things, in order that through them we may come to know something else. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (the difficulty then being whether so-and so is so or not, there being convincing arguments for both views); others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give our reasons, e.g. the question whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire. Problems, then, and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid. A 'thesis' is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion; e.g. the view that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said; or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion; or that Being is one, as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men's usual opinions would be silly. Or it may be a view about which we have a reasoned theory contrary to men's usual opinions, e.g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian 'is' so without ever having 'come to be' so, or being so eternally. For even if a man does not accept this view, he might do so on the ground that it is reasonable. Now a 'thesis' also is a problem, though a problem is not always a thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way. That a thesis, however, also forms a problem, is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis, or that the one or the other class disagree among themselves, seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called 'theses'. But it should make no difference whichever description is used; for our object in thus distinguishing them has not been to create a terminology, but to recognize what differences happen to be found between them." [Aristotle (1984b), pp.167-74. I have used the on-line version here. Links added; several paragraphs merged.]
Appendix B -- The 'Controversial Passage' From Lenin's What Is To Be Done?
Here is the on-line version of the 'controversial passage' from WITBD, followed by Lars Lih's new translation:
We have seen that the conduct of the broadest political agitation and, consequently, of all-sided political exposures is an absolutely necessary and a paramount task of our activity, if this activity is to be truly Social-Democratic. However, we arrived at this conclusion solely on the grounds of the pressing needs of the working class for political knowledge and political training. But such a presentation of the question is too narrow, for it ignores the general democratic tasks of Social-Democracy, in particular of present-day Russian Social-Democracy. In order to explain the point more concretely we shall approach the subject from an aspect that is "nearest" to the Economist, namely, from the practical aspect. "Everyone agrees" that it is necessary to develop the political consciousness of the working class. The question is, how that is to be done and what is required to do it. The economic struggle merely "impels" the workers to realise the government's attitude towards the working class. Consequently, however much we may try to "lend the economic, struggle itself a political character", we shall never be able to develop the political consciousness of the workers (to the level of Social-Democratic political consciousness) by keeping within the framework of the economic struggle, for that framework is too narrow. The Martynov formula has some value for us, not because it illustrates Martynov's aptitude for confusing things, but because it pointedly expresses the basic error that all the Economists commit, namely, their conviction that it is possible to develop the class political consciousness of the workers from within, so to speak, from their economic struggle, i.e., by making this struggle the exclusive (or, at least, the main) starting-point, by making it the exclusive (or, at least, the main) basis. Such a view is radically wrong. Piqued by our polemics against them, the Economists refuse to ponder deeply over the origins of these disagreements, with the result that we simply cannot understand one another. It is as if we spoke in different tongues.
Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain this knowledge is the sphere of relationships of all classes and strata to the state and the government, the sphere of the interrelations between all classes. For that reason, the reply to the question as to what must be done to bring political knowledge to the workers cannot be merely the answer with which, in the majority of cases, the practical workers, especially those inclined towards Economism, mostly content themselves, namely: "To go among the workers." To bring political knowledge to the workers the Social Democrats must go among all classes of the population; they must dispatch units of their army in all directions. We deliberately select this blunt formula, we deliberately express ourselves in this sharply simplified manner, not because we desire to indulge in paradoxes, but in order to "impel" the Economists to a realisation of their tasks which they unpardonably ignore, to suggest to them strongly the difference between trade-unionist and Social-Democratic politics, which they refuse to understand. We therefore beg the reader not to get wrought up, but to hear us patiently to the end.
Let us take the type of Social-Democratic study circle that has become most widespread in the past few years and examine its work. It has "contacts with the workers" and rests content with this, issuing leaflets in which abuses in the factories, the government's partiality towards the capitalists, and the tyranny of the police are strongly condemned. At workers' meetings the discussions never, or rarely ever, go beyond the limits of these subjects. Extremely rare are the lectures and discussions held on the history of the revolutionary movement, on questions of the government's home and foreign policy, on questions of the economic evolution of Russia and of Europe, on the position of the various classes in modern society, etc. As to systematically acquiring and extending contact with other classes of society, no one even dreams of that. In fact, the ideal leader, as the majority of the members of such circles picture him, is something far more in the nature of a trade union secretary than a socialist political leader. For the secretary of any, say English, trade union always helps the workers to carry on the economic struggle, he helps them to expose factory abuses, explains the injustice of the laws and of measures that hamper the freedom to strike and to picket (i.e., to warn all and sundry that a strike is proceeding at a certain factory), explains the partiality of arbitration court judges who belong to the bourgeois classes, etc., etc. In a word, every trade union secretary conducts and helps to conduct "the economic struggle against the employers and the government". It cannot be too strongly maintained that this is still not Social-Democracy, that the Social-Democrat's ideal should not be the trade union secretary, but the tribune of the people, who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects; who is able to generalise all these manifestations and produce a single picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation; who is able to take advantage of every event, however small, in order to set forth before all his socialist convictions and his democratic demands, in order to clarify for all and everyone the world-historic significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat. [Quoted from here. Link and bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged.]
Here follows Lars Lih's translation:
We saw that carrying out the broadest possible political agitation and, therefore, the organisation of all-sided political indictments are unconditionally necessary tasks - the most urgent of all the tasks -- of our activity, if it is to be genuinely Social-Democratic activity. But we came to this conclusion based only on the pressing requirement of the worker class for political knowledge and political education. In itself, this way of putting the question is too narrow and ignores the general democratic tasks of any Social Democracy in general and of present-day Russian Social Democracy in particular. In order to explain this thesis as concretely as possible, let us try to approach the problem from the angle that is 'nearest' to the 'economist', that is, the practical side. 'All are agreed' that we must develop the political awareness of the worker class. Let us now ask ourselves how to do this and what is required for doing it. The economic struggle 'pushes the workers to face' only issues about the relation of the government to the worker class and therefore -- no matter how much we labour over the task of 'imparting a political character to the economic struggle itself' -- we will never be able to develop the political awareness of the workers (up to the level of Social-Democratic political awareness) within the framework of this task, because the framework itself is too narrow. Martynov's formula is valuable for us, not only because it illustrates his capacity to confuse issues, but also because it vividly expresses the basic mistake of all 'economists' -- the conviction that it is possible to develop class political awareness from within, so to speak, the economic struggle, that is, proceeding only (or even just for the most part) from that struggle, basing oneself only (or primarily) on that struggle. This view is radically mistaken -- precisely because the economists, angry as they are about our polemics against them, do not want to think hard about the source of our differences, with the result that we literally do not understand one another and we speak in different languages.
Class political awareness can be brought to the worker only from without, that is to say from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of the relations of workers to owners. The only area from which this knowledge can be taken is the area of the relations of all classes and [social] strata to the state and to the government -- the area of the interrelations between all classes. Therefore, one cannot answer the question 'what is to be done to bring political knowledge to the workers?' with the response that the majority of praktiki [practical workers -- RL] are contented with, namely: 'go to the workers'. In order to bring the workers political knowledge, the Social Democrats must go to all classes of the population, must send the detachments of its army in all directions. We have deliberately chosen such a harsh formulation and deliberately expressed ourselves in sharp and simplified fashion -- not because of any desire to speak in paradoxes but in order to 'push the "economists" to face' the tasks that they unforgivably disdain and the distinction that they do not want to understand between [trade unionist] politics and Social-Democratic politics. And, therefore, we ask the reader not to get upset but to follow us attentively to the end.
Let us examine the type of Social-Democratic circle found most commonly in recent times and look closely at its work. It has 'links with the workers' and is content with that; it publishes leaflets in which factory abuses are flayed along with police violence and the government's actions that are so biased toward the capitalists; during conferences with workers, the conversation does not ordinarily go beyond or barely goes beyond the limits of these same themes; very rarely are there reports and conversations on the history of the revolutionary movement, on issues of domestic and external policies of our government, on issues of the economic evolution of Russia and Europe and the position in modern society of this or that class and so on; nobody even thinks of obtaining and broadening links to the other classes in society. In essence, the ideal activist as pictured by members of these circles -- in the majority of cases -- is something much closer to a secretary of a [trade union] than to a socialist political leader.... The secretary of any, let's say, English [trade union] always helps the workers conduct their economic struggle, organises factory indictments, explains the injustice of laws and of measures that hinder the freedom of strikes or the freedom to establish pickets (to warn all and sundry that there is a strike at a given factory), explains the partiality of the arbitration court judges who belong to the bourgeois classes of the people, and so on and so on. In a word, any secretary of a [trade union] conducts and helps others conduct the 'economic struggle with the owners and the government' . We cannot insist too strongly that this is not yet Social Democratism and that the ideal of the Social Democrat should not be a secretary of a [trade union] but a people's tribune who can respond to each and every manifestation of abuse of power and oppression, wherever it occurs, whatever stratum or class it concerns, who can generalise all these manifestations into one big picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation, who is able to use each small affair to set before everybody his socialist convictions and his democratic demands and to explain to each and all the world-historical significance of the liberation struggle of the proletariat. [Lih (2006), pp.744-46. This links to a PDF; bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged.]
01a. Dialectical Marxist have their own idiosyncratic and self-serving definition of Metaphysics (which they also uncritically imported from Hegel!). I have dealt with that topic in Essay Twelve Part One.
01. It could be argued that if the statement that Philosophy is one of the "ideological forms in which men become conscious" of the class war and then "fight it out" is itself true, Philosophy must surely be of use to revolutionaries and workers, and not just ideologues of the ruling-class. [On this, see also, here.]
As will be argued in Part Two, Traditional Philosophy has been used by ruling-class ideologues for countless centuries -- as well as by the ideologues of other, insurgent classes seeking to usurp the power and wealth of the incumbent ruling elite, endeavouring to replace them as 'the rightful rulers' -- in order to 'justify' their status, already established, newly acquired, or about to overthrown.
With suitable changes, that is also true of the substitutionist elements operating in Dialectical Marxism; i.e., it is true of those who shaped its primordial set of ideas -- which were imported from Traditional Philosophy for that very purpose. [I have explained the meaning of that rather dark statement in Part Two, here, here and here.] DM has also served to that end, cobbled-together by this 'Marxist' insurgent class fraction in order to prosecute the class war -- 'from the left' -- just as it was later used in order to rationalise and 'justify' the substitution of party hacks for the working class (i.e., after the Bolshevik Party was hollowed out in the early 1920s), thus forming a new ruling-class. This happened, for example, in the former Soviet Union [fSU] after Lenin's death, in Mao's China, and the rest of the old 'Communist Block', where DM became an integral part of each state's core ideology, purposely aimed at rationalising the new 'communist' status quo in the subsequent "class war" between this new elite -- for example, the Nomenklatura in the fSU, party hacks elsewhere -- and workers themselves, famously expressed by Stalin himself:
"The flowering of cultures that are national in form and socialist in content under the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country for the purpose of merging them into one common socialist (both in form and content) culture, with one common language, when the proletariat is victorious all over the world and when socialism becomes the way of life -- it is just this that constitutes the dialectics of the Leninist presentation of the question of national culture. It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction is bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27, 1930. Bold emphasis alone added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
By way of contrast, the working class themselves have never appealed to, or used, Philosophy, and if the arguments presented in this Essay are valid, they never will. They don't need it. HM is all they need
[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]
[Some have claimed Dietzgen is living disproof of this; I have tackled that objection in Interlude Three.]
Which is, of course, one of the reasons why Marx advised his readers to abandon Philosophy and align themselves with "ordinary" men and women who have no need of it:
"One has to 'leave philosophy aside'..., one has to leap out of it and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality...." [Marx and Engels (1976), p.236. Bold emphases added.]
To that end Marx enjoined them to use ordinary language, plainly because the obscure jargon concocted by philosophers turns out to be "the distorted language of the actual world":
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
1. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of this Essay.
2. Except for the belief that workers (supposedly) can't develop a socialist frame-of-mind on their own, I have only included these commonplace remarks about the Party to indicate my agreement with them and to forestall any suggestion that the comments in the main body of this Essay might suggest otherwise -- which they don't.
Where I part company is over the importation of ruling-class ideas from Hegel and other boss-class hacks -- i.e., "from the outside".
Of course, it is important to add that Lenin's concept of the party isn't the same as the Stalinist model might have us believe -- that is, a regimented body of leather-faced 'Bolsheviks', totally controlled by the centre. [On this see Cliff (1975-1979).]
2a. This idea is now commonplace in DM-circles; here are just a few examples:
"Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic co-existence of opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life and motion. That was already understood by Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.) two and a half thousand years ago. It is even present in embryo in certain Oriental religions, as in the idea of the ying and yang in China, and in Buddhism. Dialectics appears here in a mystified form, which nonetheless reflects an intuition of the workings of nature. The Hindu religion contains the germ of a dialectical idea, when it poses the three phases of creation (Brahma), maintenance or order (Vishnu) and destruction or disorder (Shiva). In his interesting book on the mathematics of chaos, Ian Stewart points out that the difference between the gods Shiva, "the Untamed," and Vishnu is not the antagonism between good and evil, but that the two principles of harmony and discord together underlie the whole of existence.... In Heraclitus, all this was in the nature of an inspired guess. Now this hypothesis has been confirmed by a huge amount of examples. The unity of opposites lies at the heart of the atom, and the entire universe is made up of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. The matter was very well put by R. P. Feynman: 'All things, even ourselves, are made of fine-grained, enormously strongly interacting plus and minus parts, all neatly balanced out.'" [Woods and Grant (1995), p.64. Bold emphasis and link added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
"In this chapter we will discuss dialectics proper. Previous chapters have shown that dialectics has a history which embraces many thousands of years and that it has passed through various stages of development. Disregarding the beginnings of dialectics in Indian and Chinese philosophy, the following main stages can be distinguished: (the dialectics of the old Greek philosophers of nature, Heraclitus; (2) the second and higher stage, the dialectics of Plato and Aristotle; (3) Hegelian dialectics; and (4) materialistic dialectics. Dialectics itself has undergone a dialectical development. Heraclitus, representing the first stage, develops the dialectics of one-after-the-other; Plato and Aristotle, representing the second stage, develop the dialectics of one-beside-the-other. The latter is in opposition to the dialectics of the first stage, being its negation. Hegel embraces both preceding stages of development and raises them to a higher stage. He develops the dialectics of the one-after-the-other and the one-beside-the-other, but in an idealistic form; in other words, he develops an historico-idealistic dialectics. The dialectics of antiquity was limited. I pointed out earlier where the basis of this limitation is to be found: namely, in the mode of production and the class relations of ancient Greece, particularly in the slave economy and in the social relations resulting from this slave economy. Not until the advent of materialistic dialectics were these limitations completely overcome. This new dialectics is not restricted; it is universalized. And here too I will briefly point out the relation of this universalized dialectics to the fundamental relations of class and production. Materialistic dialectics is developed by workers who have the working-class point of view, the point of view of the proletarian revolution. This point of view demands the elimination of classes, and consequently the elimination of class society. As a result of the elimination of classes and class society, the last limitation on social development and on the idea of development in general collapses. For Aristotle as well as for Plato and even Hegel, class society itself was something that development could not transcend. For Plato and Aristotle slave economy was the final and absolute limitation; with Hegel it was bourgeois society. In dialectical materialism, however, or from the viewpoint of the working class, class society is not in itself ultimate or final; it is by no means the absolute limit of social development. It is itself subject to dialectical development and is part of the stream of social evolution. The generalized and at the same time materialistic form of dialectics is a natural result of the generalization of this point of view. Incidentally, bourgeois scholars have of late again turned to dialectics. In one form or another Hegel's dialectics has been revived in Germany. In France the philosopher Bergson has developed a peculiar form of dialectics. However, this bourgeois form of dialectics, as it has reappeared in recent years, is idealistic throughout; or, as in the case of Bergson, it is an idealistic dialectics which at the same time reverts to the first stage of dialectics, i.e., to the point of view of Heraclitus." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.157-59. Bold emphasis added.]
"In order to move forward from capitalist society the working class needs an ironclad philosophy, one that can be of use in the storm and stress of revolution. Making sense of a turbulent world requires a method of thinking that is flexible, fluid and takes evolutionary transformation into account. This world outlook of Marxism is called dialectical materialism, a philosophy that is the direct descendent of the great Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century but which revolutionized their thinking by introducing a historical dimension. The achievement was scientific materialism enriched with the theory of evolution propounded by G. W. F Hegel. Materialism states that our ideas are a reflection of the material universe that exists independently of any observer. It's dialectical in that it is always in a state of movement, and change.... One of the early dialectical philosophers was the Greek Heraclitus, 'the obscure' (535-475 BCE). He is famous for saying that 'you never step into the same river twice.' He also noted, 'The way up is the way down,' and that 'Everything is pregnant with its contrary.' This conflict, or continual contradiction, he called strife. Strife, he claimed, is the basis of all movement, and propels everything forward...." [Taken from here; accessed 13/09/2013. Link in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
Plainly, the above comrades either failed to read Marx's comment about the ideas of the ruling-class, or they did read them, totally ignored them and merrily went on their way. [For other striking similarities between DM and all forms of mysticism, see here.]
3. It could be argued that the revolutionary career of Joseph Dietzgen, among others, refutes the assertion that workers can't develop a dialectical view of nature and society for themselves. That widespread belief will be examined and shown up for what it is -- i.e., false -- in Interlude Three.
4. Worse still, this theory prompts Marxist theoreticians into defending the indefensible, including:
(i) Hegel's sub-Aristotelian 'logic' (as we saw, for example, in Essay Eight Part Three);
(ii) The systematic oppression and exploitation of workers in the former 'socialist states';
(iii) Political, economic and social domination by an undemocratic, self-perpetuating elite; and, of course,
(iv) Substitutionism itself.
The first of these means comrades end up writing incomprehensible books and articles about useless Idealist/'dialectical' concepts, which no worker will ever understand -- or, mercifully, will ever read. [Examples will be dissected throughout all Parts of Essay Twelve. Others will be analysed in Part Two of this Essay. See also here.] Again, this isn't to suggest workers lack the intelligence to comprehend difficult ideas, merely point out no one is capable of understanding incomprehensible gobbledygook, least of all those who concocted it. Any who think that claim is patently false, or even absurd, should read this -- where I show that not even Hegel could possibly understand the tangled mess he inflicted on his readers --, and then perhaps think again.
5. In order to short-circuit accusations that this line-of-thought commits the so-called 'genetic fallacy' -- i.e., the accusation that I am claiming that DM is false because it is a ruling-class theory --, it is worth pointing out that I am not claiming that the provenance of this mystical theory is sufficient to invalidate it. What has been established so far in these Essays is that DM is far too confused for anyone to be able to say whether or not it is correct, wherever it came from.
My purpose in Essay Nine Parts One and Two, Essay Twelve Part Two, and Essay Fourteen Parts One and Two, is simply to trace DM back to its mystical roots, exposing the role it has helped play, and still plays, in the conceptual ruination of Marxism.
In which case, it is no surprise that DM has, in its own small way, helped make Dialectical Marxism synonymous with long-term, abject, systematic failure.
[Once again, notice the use of the word "helped" above. It isn't my claim that DM is the sole reason for our lack of success, only that it is part of the reason Dialectical Marxism screws up so many times.]
6. Any readers who might be tempted to disagree with these seemingly controversial claims are invited to check the other Essays posted at this site and then let me know where they think my detailed criticisms of DM have gone wrong.
But, I have been asking this of dialectically-distracted comrades now for close on 40 years. The following picture neatly sums up the vast majority of responses I have received so far:
Figure Five: Cue Tumbleweed, Cue Rustling Leaves, Cue Distant Church Bell...
What few criticisms I have so far received have been shown to fail in several Essays published at this site --, for example, here, here, and here.
The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude One.
7. The so-called 'Three Laws of Dialectics' were taken apart in Essay Seven Part One.
8. This is a very common reaction that any criticism of DM faces on the Internet. On this page, I have posted numerous links to sites where I have tried to 'debate' this topic with DM-fans. Putting a few rare exceptions to one side, almost every single dialectician with whom I have 'debated' these issues has (a) Invented things to put in my mouth that I don't believe, nor have said, nor could reasonably have been inferred from anything I have said; (b) Deliberately or accidentally misread even the simplest of things I have said; (c) Demanded of me levels of proof they have inconsistently failed to require of the DM-classicists and contemporary Dialectical Marxists; (d) Appealed to the hackneyed, tried-but-not-tested, standard issue DM-examples to support their 'theory' (these were listed in the main body of this Essay); (e) Pontificated about the alleged 'limitations' of FL when it is obvious they know less about it than the average cat; (f) Ignored whatever they didn't like or couldn't answer; (g) Claimed my ideas aren't new (when most of them are); or (h) Accused my work of being based on 'bourgeois' theory -- when we all know the 'father of the dialectic', Hegel, was a coal miner and a blood red socialist, don't we?
[Unfortunately, since most Marxist on-line discussion forums have closed, or are closing, debate has now migrated onto Facebook -- so I am told --, many of the links on the above page are now dead.]
[FL = Formal Logic.]
While the aforementioned comrades have been considerably less polite than Trotsky even was to Burnham (but no less full of themselves, arrogant and cock-sure, while vastly more abusive), the dismissive reception he gave Burnham has clearly served as a blueprint for DM-fans to copy: ignore what you don't like, misrepresent wherever you can, pontificate about FL (even after it has been shown you haven't a clue what you are talking about), and under no circumstances address your opponent's actual arguments -- except, perhaps, merely to disparage them and their author.
Engels, of course, set the tone even earlier, in Anti-Dühring, as did Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism -- "Philosophy practised with a mallet", as someone once described it. Other DM-theorists (quoted in these Essays) have marched lock-step in unison with the DM-classicists in this regard. I have said much more about this topic in Essay One, here and here.
[Please note: I am not complaining. I expect this level of knuckle-headed ignorance and abuse, and for reasons spelled out in Part Two and Essay One (links above).]
9. Of course, it is entirely possible that Lenin was merely commenting about contemporaneous Marxists, thus absolving Engels. However, what he actually says fails to support that interpretation:
"It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]
This looks pretty clear: in the fifty years prior to Lenin, "none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" (emphasis added) --, not (note!) "some of the Marxists", but "none of the Marxists". In TAR, John Rees suggests that the above comment was aimed at Plekhanov or Second International Marxism. That is entirely possible, but once again, Lenin's use of the phrase "none of the Marxists" fails to support Rees's rather narrow interpretation.
Nevertheless, as Rees also has this to say:
"In these fragmentary notes, Lenin formulates some of the most precise definitions of key concepts in Marxist philosophy available anywhere. The dialectic itself, for instance, has never been better explained…." [Rees (1998), p.185.]
Such high praise can only mean that Engels's contribution (to say nothing of other work --, like, for example, Plekhanov's) was deficient in some way.
But, in what way would that be?
The answer seems rather obvious: Engels's version of DM wasn't aligned closely enough with Hegel's 'Logic'.
That can only mean that, according to Lenin, Engels didn't understand Das Kapital!
On the other hand, if the dialectic has never been better explained, and Lenin's book is itself full of incomprehensible sentences -- with little attempt on Lenin's part to explain what Hegel actually meant -- what does that say about 'the dialectic'? Can anyone explain it in comprehensible terms? Has anyone ever done so?
[Let me know if you think someone, anyone, has.]
In order to counter such seemingly ridiculous implications, two comrades -- i.e., Woods and Grant [W&G, in Woods and Grant (1995), p.76] -- argued that Lenin was deliberately exaggerating, here. Again, that is entirely possible, but it is certainly not the way that Lenin has been interpreted by subsequent Marxists. [Indeed, W&G quote the above passage from Lenin (here) with no qualifications at all attached to it.]
On this, readers might like to take note of Andy Blunden's comments (who strangely waters down what Lenin actually said):
"Hegel is the philosophical predecessor of Marx, and we have Lenin's word for it that Marx cannot be understood without first understanding Hegel." [Empson (2005), p.166.]
Naturally, this passage of Lenin's helps account for something that would otherwise be inexplicable: the fascination Hegel's Logic has ever since exercised on prominent revolutionaries -- including STDs, MISTs, and OTs -- but more specifically 'academic dialecticians' (i.e., HCDs). If Lenin were merely exaggerating --, or if this were how he has always been understood --, that wouldn't have happened.
[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Dialectician; OT = Orthodox Trotskyist; HCD = High Church Dialectician -- follow the link for an explanation.]
For example, not only do we find a Trotskyist of the stature of Raya Dunayevskaya writing several (largely incomprehensible) books in the vain attempt to prove that there is someone on this planet capable of comprehending Hegel's Logic, we also witness her reiterating this famous claim (albeit also watered-down):
"Here, specifically, we see the case of Lenin, who had gone back to Hegel, and had stressed that it was impossible to understand Capital, especially its first chapter, without reading the whole of the Science…." [Dunayevskaya (2002), p.328.]
And, this is what Bertell Ollman had to say:
"Even from this brief outline, it is apparent that Marx's Hegelian heritage is too complex to allow simple characterization. Hegel never ceased being important for Marx, as Lenin, for example, perceived when he wrote in his notebook in 1914, 'It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapters, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx.'" [Ollman (1976), p.35; a copy of this book can be accessed here.]
[There is a list of other prominent Marxists who agree with Lenin -- as well as another list of those who don't -- in Burns (2000), p.99, notes 2 and 4. See also, Anderson (2007), pp.123, 127.]
Nevertheless, if this is the only way that these remarks of Lenin's can be defused by W&G (i.e., by claiming that Lenin was indulging in hyperbole), the question naturally arises: Why did they take other -- but even more absurd -- statements of Lenin's (in PN) either literally or seriously? Was he exaggerating there, too?
Furthermore, it is worth adding that Lenin himself admitted that he found certain parts of Hegel's Logic impossibly obscure, unclear, or just plain nonsense. For instance, Lenin (1961), pp.103, 108, 117, 175, 229.
Hence, if Lenin is to be believed, that would mean even he didn't understand Das Kapital!
"It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]
Notice that Lenin didn't refer to just 99.9% of Hegel's Logic, but the "whole" of it, which had to be "thoroughly studied and understood" (emphasis added).
Is this yet another internal contradiction that forces us to change our view of Hegel and his badly mis-titled book? Surely, it must be if Lenin were correct when he also insisted that "everything existing" -- including the existing passage above -- is a UO. In that case it too must change.
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:]…[I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]… as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…. In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics…. The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-60. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]
Or, is the above just another "exaggeration"?
Finally, there is no evidence that Marx himself set anything even remotely like this as a pre-condition for anyone trying to understand his work. Nor is there any solid evidence that Marx had ever thoroughly studied and fully understood Hegel's 'Logic'. [Notice the highlighted "and" here!] That either means the Logic is largely irrelevant to any and all students of Das Kapital, or Marx didn't understand his own book!
This isn't to pick on Marx. There is no evidence that anyone has ever completely understood Hegel's Logic, or even that there is anything in that book capable of being understood, to begin with!
[However, on this, see Interlude Two.]
10. While there are two different works commonly called Hegel's Logic (one of which the author was in the process of revising when he died -- on that, see Carver (2000)), Lenin's Notes largely, but not exclusively, focus on the Science Of Logic (i.e., Hegel (1999)).
Nevertheless, Lenin was unaware of the important changes Hegel had made to the Science Of Logic before he died, which he intended to be included in the next edition of the book. So was Marx. Does this mean that one or both (Lenin and Marx) didn't understand Das Kapital? It seems that must be so if Lenin is to be believed. [Again, on this, see Carver (2000).]
Of course, that doesn't mean workers can't understand Das Kapital, but if Lenin were right, it would be remarkable if anyone could!
11. I for one won't be holding my breath. We have already seen one attempt fail badly (here and here). [More on this in Essay Twelve.]
However, the best book I have so far read on this, which attempts to make Hegel comprehensible, is Beiser (2005). But, Beiser found he had to paper over the serious problems facing anyone attempting to interpret/understand Hegel. Even Beiser had to translate Hegel's impenetrable prose into ordinary-ish sort of English to complete the job. [On that problem, see here.]
Naturally, that prompts the following question: Is Beiser's Hegel Hegel's Hegel, or is it just Beiser's Hegel? And that, like all such questions, is unanswerable --, especially in relation to Hegel because of the impenetrable verbal jungle that confronts all his readers.
12. Again, this isn't to suggest that the roots of sectarianism are merely ideological, just that it helps considerably if 'the faithful' have in their possession an obscure book (or set of books) on which to base their ideas, which, as we can see with respect to open and honest religionists, helps anyone so minded to manufacture spurious, factional and sectarian 'differences'.
For example, the existence of such 'holy books' has always motivated calls for 'orthodoxy', and that in turn fosters the belief that only certain 'leaders' are 'orthodox' enough to guide everyone else, and are thereby 'authorised' to impose the 'right interpretation' on the rest of the party/sect.
To that end, of course, the more obscure the book, the better. Without doubt, Hegel's Logic wins the Gold Medal in that event.
[As TV cop, Kojak, once said (but not about Hegel's work), "It sure beats the hell out of whatever's in second place!"]
13. Lest this comment appears to associate the present author with the views of (certain well-known) anti-Marxists, who seem to say somewhat similar things, it is worth adding that the points made here are specifically aimed at the ideological use of mystification -- whosoever indulges in it, and that includes anti-Marxist critics themselves. [On this, see Essay Twelve again -- summary here.]
As will be agued in Part Two of this Essay, if Lenin was guilty of doing this, he did so unwittingly. He was clearly unaware of the unwholesome significance of the ideas that he, Engels and Plekhanov had imported into the movement. The same goes for other great revolutionaries (including Engels himself). My argument isn't therefore with their sincerity -- nor yet with their revolutionary integrity -- but with their philosophical judgement and their psychological susceptibility.
14. Once more, to some, the comments in the main body of this Essay might appear to be a re-hash of the hackneyed idea that Marxism is a quasi-religion. However, as will be argued in more detail in Part Two (link below), only in so far as DM seduces revolutionaries into adopting a dogmatic metaphysic is the analogy with Theology apposite. In fact, as we will see in Part Two, the motivations underlying the acceptance of DM aren't at all dissimilar to those that induce a commitment to religious belief.
So, while Marxism itself isn't a religion, certain aspects of Dialectical Marxism uncannily resemble religious affectation.
That isn't a wild idea on my part; even Marx underlined the connection between philosophy and theology:
"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis and link added.]
15. Even if this supposition were incorrect, and it should turn out that most scientists have studied the classics in their field, their practice is certainly not now informed by this (presumed) fact, and only this.
Rather fittingly, the opposite is the case with Dialectical Marxists and their 'DM-classics'.
The material about Marx and DM that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Two.
16. Note 16, no longer exists. Its entire content has been moved to Interlude Two.
17. Comrades who are, even now, still impressed with Trotsky's arguments might like to reflect on the fact that he used 'dialectics' to 'prove' that the fSU of his day was a degenerated Workers' State, and that it should therefore be defended by revolutionaries. He even argued (again, on the basis of DL) that only the enemies of Marxism would reject such a conclusion.
[DL = Dialectical Logic; OT = Orthodox Trotskyist.]
[Knowledgeable OT DM-fans are already aware of the above, but they either ignore it, explain it away or fail to note its significance. Of course, the latter are happy to accept the validity of 'dialectical reasoning' like this (which meant they openly and publicly defended the fSU, and in some cases lamented its fall), but they also fail to ask themselves why Dialectical Trotskyism is by far and away the most unsuccessful wing of Dialectical Marxism. On that, see Part Two of this Essay, here, and Essay Ten Part One.]
DM-fans might also like to re-read the actual arguments Trotsky used to justify the indefensible Stalinist military aggression against Finland (in Trotsky (1971)) -- once again, supported by an appeal to 'dialectics', and little else.
Oddly enough, John Rees neglected to mention these salient, but no less embarrassing, facts in TAR.
So much for 'testing theory against reality'!
[Also worth reading is Burnham's highly effective reply to Trotsky on this topic.]
Although it is no part of the argument advanced here that from contradictions "anything follows" (the so-called Ex Falso Quodlibet argument), the history of DL illustrates that almost anything can and does 'follow' from DM-'contradictions', and that these consequences were defended by DM-theorists solely on that basis.
[Again, more details and references substantiating these claims have been set out in Part Two of this Essay.]
18. It is important to add that Trotsky's universal extrapolation of "Hegel's Law" was somewhat..., shall we say, exaggerated. Hegel certainly didn't think this 'Law' was applicable everywhere; it only applied in certain prescribed areas, as, indeed, Trotsky himself pointed out:
"Hegel himself did not give the law of the transition of quantity into quality the paramount importance it fully deserves." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88-89.]
On this, see Levine (1984), pp.111-13.
19. The fact that none of Trotsky's epigones appear to have spotted this serious error can only mean that the inability to tell whether or not a counter-example even applies to the same law isn't just confined to The Master. In this respect, at least, one follower of Trotsky seems to be equally in the dark as any other. Ironically, this further implies that Trotsky's attack on the LOI has inadvertently created countless logically-challenged clones who exhibit exactly the same defects in this respect. Hence, there seem to be numerous epigones that are identical in their inability to spot a correct application of the LOI, and, indeed, identical in their ability to misconstrue this 'law' along the same lines. Since Trotsky is responsible for making them this way, then he, at least, succeeded in making more than two followers who are equally confused. [Heavy irony and sarcasm intended.]
Naturally, it could be objected that the above conclusions are farcical since the aforementioned 'followers' aren't identical in all respects, hence Trotsky hasn't created more than two identical copies of allegedly confused comrades.
Now this is, of course, where our use of words for identity becomes rather complicated. So, in order to make the above counter-objection work a hypothetical objector will have to use words for identity exactly as the rest of us do (and there is no room for approximation here, or this counterclaim would itself fail because its use of language would be different from the way the rest of us employ the same words, which would mean that no one would be able to understand him/her!), transferring this objection from the individual or the objects mentioned onto the application of identically the same words to exactly the same examples. In that case, I am quite willing to withdraw the above criticism of Trotsky in exchange for an admission that at least here, with respect to our use of words for identity, we all do exactly the same thing.
On the other hand, if someone were to claim that our words for identity and difference were only approximately the same, or that the above 'followers' weren't absolutely identical in all respects, then that individual must have a way of deciding whether such objects of enquiry (words, 'followers' or even applications of 'the same law') fall short of being absolutely identical, and hence are only approximately the same. But, in that case, that individual must know what counts as exactly the same so that they can say that these items fall short of it by so much or so little.
I have developed this point extensively and in detail in Essay Six -- in all the sub-sections of the latter between here and here. Readers are directed there for more details.
Either way, the DM-criticism of the LOI takes another body blow.
It might be objected that we don't use our words for identity in exactly the same way, even though we might use them in approximately the same way. Again, I have dealt with that objection, and many others, in Essay Six (links above).]
Independently of this, there is another serious difficulty implied by Trotsky's actual 'argument':
"Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of a bearing-brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones which should not, however, go beyond certain limits…. By observing the norms of tolerance, the cones are considered as being equal. ('A' is equal to 'A')…. Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously." [Trotsky (1971), pp.65, 106.]
Trotsky failed to notice that the alleged limitation he underlined (in the making of two identical items) doesn't appear to affect whoever it is that applies the "norms of tolerance" he speaks about. According to Trotsky's own description, such workers are at least able to determine what constitutes the same application of these norms to different cone bearings -- otherwise there would be no way of telling whether or not the conclusions drawn about those cone bearings (that they aren't identical), because of certain micro-changes in their eyesight, for example, was the source of any such differences or whether it was because these bearing were themselves slightly different. Does the 'fault' (if such it might be called) reside in the worker or in the object itself? Or is it even a combination of both?
If the 'problem' lies in the object itself and not in the worker, that would mean:
(i) Each worker would have to use a norm [henceforth, "N"] encapsulating the LOI in order to apply it equally between each case. That is, they would have to know (in practice) what constituted an identical application of N over time, since an approximate application of N to two very similar-looking cones might very well pass them off as identical! Hence, in order for a worker to do what Trotsky says, they would have to know precisely what constitutes the correct application of exactly the same N to at least two different cone bearings. Even if these workers were to reject the LOI (which possibility, even if they knew what it was, is somewhat doubtful, but we will let that slide for now), they would still have to use an N that encapsulated that 'Law' in order to be able to agree with Trotsky that it fails to apply to cone bearings, or that is shows they aren't all exactly the same!
Furthermore, if the 'problem' doesn't lie in each worker, it would also mean:
(ii) That the perceptual capacities belonging to the same worker (between their different inspections of a series of cone bearings) remained identical. If that weren't the case, the above problems would now emerge in this new area. Hence, approximately identical perceptual modalities would be no use since, and once more, an application of approximately identical eyesight to two very similar-looking cone bearings might very well pass them off as identical!
In fact, as we can now see, workers could only concur with Trotsky after completing a practical refutation of what he declared they all implicitly knew! They would have to assume their eyesight remained identical between inspections and that they had also applied N identically between cases, too. They would all have to be conscious anti-dialecticians!
We saw similar practical refutations of Trotsky's claims about the LOI repeatedly surface in Essay Six, here.
20. It is worth adding that since Trotsky misconstrued his own version of the LOI -- even though, at least according to his followers, he is supposed to be a consummate dialectician and wordsmith --, few workers should be expected to draw the suggested 'dialectical conclusion' from their own productive activity.
Not even Trotsky got this right!
Despite this, what Trotsky actually said is patently incorrect. His comments clearly ruled out the possibility that (a) two different objects could become the same, (b) a worker could make two distinct objects into one and the same thing, and (c) workers know this. In fact, ordinary language and common understanding allow for these eventualities (about which workers would already be well aware).
Examples of two things becoming one include the following:
(1) Two streams can flow into the same river.
(2) Two items of cloth can be combined into the same garment.
(3) Two cricketers/baseball players can become the same fielder (at the same time in different matches, or at different times in the same match), or two soldiers/union officials could be promoted to the same rank (with similar provisos).
(4) Two scabs could become the same target of the one brick; or two bricks could form part of the same defence against a police attack.
(5) Two workers could form the same small picket in the same or different strikes.
(6) Two copies of The Daily Mail could become the lining of the same pigsty -- but, only after suitable apologies had been offered the pigs, of course.
Examples of two items being made into one include the following:
(1) Two rivets can be made into the same seal between two plates of metal.
(2) Two buckets of paint can be mixed to form the same colour (i.e., green and red, making brown).
(3) Two wooden posts can form the same support in a mine.
(4) Two ropes can form the same towline.
(5) Two plastic pipes can comprise the same outlet.
(6) Two miscounted Widgets can create the same excuse for a strike.
(7) Two sentences can form the same paragraph in the same, or even different, strike leaflets.
(8) Two (or more) of the above can constitute the same excuse for dialecticians to ignore them.
Of course, if we were no longer restricted to considering only two items, it would be possible to multiply the above examples indefinitely. For instance, one hundred thousand workers could form the same revolutionary column, or two million people could form the same march against the war in Iraq. Or even: two thousand police officers could constitute the same panic-stricken retreat from one or other of the former.
It could be objected that these 'counterexamples' beg the question since, if Trotsky were right about the defects of the LOI, none of the above would be genuine identity statements.
However, as was argued in Essay Six, our ordinary use of words for identity (i.e., "the same as", "exact", "similar", "identical", "not different", "precisely", etc.) is highly complex. It is far more sophisticated and involved than anything Trotsky or Hegel imagined in their 'theoretical' deliberations -- although in their everyday lives they couldn't have been unaware of this. They would have used sentences employing terms like the above countless times throughout their lives.
The vernacular --, which, it is worth reminding ourselves yet again, is derived from everyday practice -- allows for the expression of countless examples of complex identities and similarities; those above constitute a tiny fraction of the ones available to ordinary users. [More were given, here.]
Anyone who couldn't recognise these as examples of sameness and identity (etc.) would be deemed not to understand their own language -- since they would be incapable of recognising, using and comprehending the same words from that language in the same way as other speakers, or from moment-to-moment. Indeed, in certain circumstances they could, or would, become a danger to themselves. In which case, such individuals would hardly be in a position to criticise the 'law' that supposedly lies behind the use of words like these.
Indeed, the employment of words like these in such contexts tells us more about their meaning than could be learnt from reading the same comments in Hegel an indefinite number of times (irony intended). Hegel's narrow, metaphysical use of a few of our words for identity and change shares nothing with their ordinary employment. As such, his use of language like this is devoid of sense. [Why that is so has been explained at length in Essay Twelve Part One.]
If, on the other hand, these examples fail to tell us what our words for identity (etc.) mean -- if they are defective in some way -- then even those who criticise their use must fail to grasp what they themselves are criticising (i.e., the ordinary use of words they have failed to grasp!), since they wouldn't be able to put into words what constitutes the same use either of that word (i.e., "same"), or associated terms (like, "very", "almost", "approximately", etc.). [An appeal to 'approximate' identity here would be of no use, again, as we saw in Essay Six (links above).]
Furthermore, as we also saw in Essay Six, it turns out to be impossible to decide what (if anything) Trotsky actually meant by his attack on the LOI. This tells us that the above examples represent a far more legitimate use of words for identity than the severely limited jargon found in Hegel, Trotsky or his latter-day clones. Hence, as far as ordinary language is concerned, it is quite easy to speak about making two or more things exactly the same -- which is all that us non-Idealists require of the vernacular.
It is certainly all that workers need.
Finally, as was also noted in Essay Six: it isn't to the point to object to the examples given above on the grounds that the objects or processes listed above are all subject to change, for even if that were the case, any such object and processes will change at a rate equal to anything with which it is identical, including itself.
Hence, the LOI is no enemy of change.
Once again, I have dealt with this topic in extensive detail in Essay Six (links above), where I have responded every conceivable objection. Since I have been debating this topic with DM-fans for more than thirty years, I know every objection they come up with.
21. Here is some of the material devoted to this topic taken from Essay Six:
Physicists tell us that every photon, for example, is identical to every other photon (this phenomenon has been neatly illustrated at this web site). Here is how Philosopher of Science, Steven French, put things:
"It should be emphasised, first of all, that quantal particles are indistinguishable in a much stronger sense than classical particles. It is not just that two or more electrons, say, possess all intrinsic properties in common but that -- on the standard understanding -- no measurement whatsoever could in principle determine which one is which. If the non-intrinsic, state-dependent properties are identified with all the monadic or relational properties which can be expressed in terms of physical magnitudes associated with self-adjoint operators that can be defined for the particles, then it can be shown that two bosons or two fermions in a joint symmetric or anti-symmetric state respectively have the same monadic properties and the same relational properties one to another. [French and Redhead (1988); see also Butterfield (1993).] This has immediate implications for Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles which, expressed crudely, insists that two things which are indiscernible, must be, in fact, identical."
However, the above was published in 2011, but French has now (i.e., in 2019) re-written it as follows (over at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy):
"Now, of course, both quantum and classical objects of the same kind -- such as electrons, say -- are indistinguishable in the sense that they possess all intrinsic properties -- charge, spin, rest mass etc. -- in common. However, quantum objects are indistinguishable in a much stronger sense in that it is not just that two or more electrons possess the same intrinsic properties but that – on the standard understanding -- no measurement whatsoever could in principle determine which one is which. If the non-intrinsic, state-dependent properties are identified with all the monadic or relational properties which can be expressed in terms of physical magnitudes standardly associated with self-adjoint operators that can be defined for the objects, then it can be shown that two bosons or two fermions in a joint symmetric or anti-symmetric state respectively have the same monadic properties and the same relational properties one to another. [French and Redhead (1988); see also Butterfield (1993).] This has immediate implications for the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles which, expressed crudely, insists that two things which are indiscernible, must be, in fact, identical." [French (2019). Bold emphases and links added. Referencing conventions altered in line with those adopted at this site.]
The above passage has been slightly modified, again; this is the new version [i.e., French and Bigaj (2024)]:
"Now, of course, both quantum and classical objects of the same kind -- such as electrons, say -- are indistinguishable in the sense that they possess all intrinsic properties -- charge, spin, rest mass etc. -- in common. However, it may be argued that quantum objects are indistinguishable in a much stronger sense in that it is not just that two or more electrons possess the same intrinsic properties but that -- on the standard understanding -- no measurement whatsoever could in principle determine which one is which. If the non-intrinsic, state-dependent properties are identified with all the monadic or relational properties which can be expressed in terms of physical magnitudes standardly associated with self-adjoint operators that can be defined for the objects, then it can be shown that two bosons or two fermions in a joint symmetric or anti-symmetric state respectively have the same monadic properties and the same relational properties one to another. [French and Redhead (1988); see also Butterfield (1993), Dieks and Versteegh (2008).] This has immediate implications for the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles which, expressed crudely, insists that two things which are indiscernible, must be, in fact, identical." [French and Bigaj (2024). Bold emphases added. Referencing conventions altered in line with those adopted at this site.]
Admittedly, French offers his own solution to this difficulty, but it isn't one that challenges the identity of quantal particles, just their lack of individuality. And, Nobel Laureate, Paul Dirac, made a similar point this way:
"If a system in atomic physics contains a number of particles of the same kind, e.g., a number of electrons, the particles are absolutely indistinguishable. No observable change is made when two of them are interchanged…." [Dirac (1967), p.307.]
However, as pointed out here, one might well wonder how anyone could possibly know whether or not two particles had been interchanged if they are all indistinguishable. On the other hand, Pure Mathematician that he was, Dirac might merely be making a theoretical point on a par with the following: "If we swap one number in this equation for another (identical) number, no change will be observed: 2 + 3 = 5". We can see this perhaps more clearly with this example: "Two plus three equals five" is mathematically indistinguishable from "2 + 3 = 5" even though "2" and "Two", for instance, are plainly distinguishable.
In that case, every time a worker turns on a light, he or she makes or generates countless trillion identical objects per second -- which must mean that they are "unconscious" anti-dialecticians, if we apply the same sort of reasoning here as Trotsky did.
Naturally, contentious anti-DM claims like these can only be neutralised by an a priori stipulation that every photon in existence (past, present and future) must be non-identical -- despite what scientists tell us and in abeyance of the impossibly large (finite) body of data that would be required to support such a cosmically ambitious claim. At this point, perhaps, even hardnosed dialecticians might be able to see in this a blatant attempt to impose DM on the facts.
It could be objected that photons don't occupy the same spatio-temporal co-ordinates as other photons, and so can't be absolutely identical, but this certainly isn't how Trotsky (or even Hegel) argued. When confronted with two letters "A"s on the page, Trotsky didn't ague that they occupied different spatio-temporal co-ordinates and hence weren't identical (nor did Hegel). Trotsky appealed to their assumed physical differences to make his point. But, photons are physically indistinguishable, according to the above physicists.
Independently of that, photons falsify Trotsky's claim that we can't make two identical objects (which must be located in different spatio-temporal locations), for here we can.
Despite this, hardcore DM-fans might still maintain that the above pro-DM spatio-temporal objection means that photons aren't identical, but that objection is based on a certain definition of identity forced on nature in defiance of the assurance that DM-supporters never do this.
[A recent discussion of these issues can be found in Brading and Castellani (2003), and Castellani (1998). An even more recent discussion can be found in Saunders (2006) (this links to a PDF), as well as French and Krause (2006). See also Hilborn and Yuca (2002), Ladyman and Bigaj (2010), and the Wikipedia entry here.]
It might further be objected that Trotsky would surely have been unaware of developments in Physics that took place after he died, but, as the references given above show, these facts were largely true of classical particles; quantal particles merely present a more extreme form of strict identity. And, Lenin it was who reminded us that science is ever revisable; hence, no Dialectical Marxist who agrees with Lenin could consistently rule out the possibility that scientists would one day discover identical particles -- as indeed they have.
Even so, Trotsky was quite happy to impose this view on nature before all (or most of) the evidence had been collected, in defiance of what he said elsewhere:
"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator from painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it." [Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]
"Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), p.233. Bold emphasis added.]
And the facts tell us that photons are identical -- and in all likelihood, changeless, too.
I now turn to that topic, changeless identical sub-atomic particles.
[On that, see here.]
22. However, if Trotsky is committed to the belief that workers do in fact know about change -- and why they reject the LOI in practice -- are we now to conclude that "sound common sense" isn't "metaphysical" after all?
Note that in the passage quoted in the main body of this Essay (repeated below), Engels all but says that ordinary people can't attain a 'dialectical view' of things on their own, contradicting Trotsky:
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
As far as the alleged "insoluble contradictions" of metaphysics are concerned, one wonders what Engels would have said if metaphysicians decided they were going to copy DM-fans and simply 'Nixon' them? What if they declared they were just going to "grasp" both halves of these 'contradictions', DM-style, and then claim this 'solved' the problem? What could Engels possibly have said in response? That it was inconsistent or contradictory? If so, he should have praised them for adopting this DM-tactic, if he were consistent. And yet, dialecticians adopt the 'Nixon tactic' all the time in relation to the many contradictions that litter their own theory, the universal existence of which DM predicts, anyway.
In that case, we have here an excellent example of the dialectical-kettle calling the metaphysical-frying pan, "sooty".
"Nixon" refers to the following: In the run-up to the 1968 US Presidential Election, Richard Nixon announced that he had "secret plan" to bring the war in Vietnam to a 'successful' close. When pressed, he refused to go into details for "security" reasons. [Donald Trump came up with the same dodge in relation to fighting ISIS in the 2016 Presidential Election.] Hence, this 'problem' (how to end that war) was solved just by saying it was; it had been "Nixoned". DM-fans do the same whenever they encounter a contradiction in their own theory, they just "grasp" it, claiming that that 'solves' the problem (but they somehow can't say exactly how it manages to do this, except that only those who 'understand' dialectics will agree), and they then promptly ignore it -- they Nixon it. There is more on that, here.
[As we will see in Essay Eleven Part One there are at least four different types of 'contradiction', some of which are regarded a 'good', the rest not so much.]
We find Trotsky almost flatly contradicting himself on the same page as the passage quoted earlier (about what workers might or might not conclude about making two identical objects):
"Our scientific thinking is only a part of our general practice including techniques. For concepts there also exists 'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic issuing from the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A,' but by dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing. 'Common sense' is characterized by the fact that it systematically exceeds dialectical 'tolerance.' Vulgar thought operates with such concepts as capitalism, morals, freedom, workers' state, etc. as fixed abstractions, presuming that capitalism is equal to capitalism, morals are equal to morals, etc. Dialectical thinking analyzes all things and phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which 'A' ceases to be 'A', a workers' state ceases to be a workers' state. The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of a reality which consists of eternal motion. Dialectical thinking gives to concepts, by means of closer approximations, corrections, concretizations, a richness of content and flexibility; I would even say a succulence which to a certain extent brings them close to living phenomena. Not capitalism in general, but a given capitalism at a given stage of development. Not a workers’ state in general, but a given workers’ state in a backward country in an imperialist encirclement, etc. Dialectical thinking is related to vulgar thinking in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion. Dialectics does not deny the syllogism, but teaches us to combine syllogisms in such a way as to bring our understanding closer to the eternally changing reality. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradictions, conflict of content and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc., which are just as important for theoretical thought as is the simple syllogism for more elementary tasks." [Trotsky (1971), pp.65-66. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
In the above, Trotsky, perhaps even more than Engels, argued that vulgar (i.e., common) thought -- the thought of ordinary folk, which must include workers -- is stuck in a static, a non-dialectical view of reality, which he contrasts with 'dialectical thought'.
Not to be outdone, our friends comrades Woods and Grant [W&G] add their own two cents' worth:
"The most common method of formal logic is that of deduction, which attempts to establish the truth of its conclusions by meeting two distinct conditions a) the conclusion must really flow from the premises; and b) the premises themselves must be true. If both conditions are met, the argument is said to be valid. This is all very comforting. We are here in the familiar and reassuring realm of common sense. 'True or false?' 'Yes or no?' Our feet are firmly on the ground. We appear to be in possession of 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.' There is not a lot more to be said. Or is there? ...Formal logic (which has acquired the force of popular prejudice in the form of 'common sense') equally holds good for a whole series of everyday experiences. However, the laws of formal logic, which set out from an essentially static view of things, inevitably break down when dealing with more complex, changing and contradictory phenomena. To use the language of chaos theory, the 'linear' equations of formal logic cannot cope with the turbulent processes which can be observed throughout nature, society and history. Only the dialectical method will suffice for this purpose." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.90, 94; a copy is available here. Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]
[W&G have clearly confused a sound argument (often called a "proof") with a valid one. If these two weren't quite so 'logically-challenged', they would know that a valid inference can proceed from false premisses, while a sound inference can't.]
Exactly what FL has to do with 'commonsense' these two neglected to reveal; in fact, anyone who studies even AFL will initially be surprised by many of its results, which they wouldn't be if AFL were identical with 'commonsense'. The mis-match here is even more pronounced when 'commonsense' is compared with the more sophisticated results available in MFL. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that a single ordinary human being has ever reasoned along AFL-, still less MFL-lines.
[FL = Formal Logic; AFL = Aristotelian FL; MFL = Modern FL.]
But, this is just par for the course for W&G, whose book is full of errors of fact and logic (as we have seen many times), to such an extent that it might just as well have been called "Reason in Remission".
[Concerning the denigration of ordinary language and 'commonsense', see Note 41a. On the difference between 'commonsense' and ordinary language, see Note 23 and Note 24.]
23. Nevertheless, it could be objected that workers in general have all manner of confused and superstitious ideas in their heads. DM succeeds in replacing them with sound philosophical and scientific concepts.
First of all, DM-theories make no sense (as earlier Essays published at this site have shown), so even if this latest objection were valid, it would represent no advance at all to proselytise workers with any of the Good News contained in the DM-Gospel. Replacing mystical or superstitious ideas with Hegelian gobbledygook (upside down or 'the right way up') would represent no more of an advance that would advocating Roman Catholicism or Zoroastrianism.
Second, common sense and ordinary language aren't identical; any of the deliverances of the former can be contradicted by means of the latter. [On that, see below, but in more detail, here.]
Finally, the propensity ordinary folk have for adopting superstitious beliefs or for concocting crude metaphysical theories should no more impress us than their tendency to accept religious beliefs does. Anyway, every one of the latter is challengeable in the vernacular; for every superstitious belief, every ideologically-compromised idea capable of being uttered by the most backward elements imaginable, its negation can easily be formed in ordinary language. As I pointed out in Essay Four:
That is why socialists can assert such things as: "Blacks aren't inferior"; "Human beings aren't selfish"; "Wages aren't fair", "Women aren't sex objects", "Belief in the after-life is baseless", "LGBT individuals aren't 'unnatural'", "Muslims aren't terrorists", and still be understood -- even by those held in thrall to the ideas repudiated in this way but who might still hold the opposite view. If ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense' -- and if it were ideological (per se) in the way that some suggest -- you just couldn't say such things. We all know this to be true -- certainly, socialists should know this --, because in our practice we manage to deny, reject and challenge ideas like these every day.
So, as noted above, ordinary language might be used to express patent of falsehoods, as well as any number of offensive, reactionary and regressive of ideas; in order to express their contemptible thoughts, reactionary, racist, sexist, Islamophobic, or homophobic individuals might depend on ordinary language in order to give voice to their vile ideas or anti-socialist, anti-human opinions. However, the fact that socialists can reject all such ideas, using the very same medium -- the vernacular --, shows that ordinary language as such can't itself be associated with the expression of those ideas. Again, if it were, socialists wouldn't be able to do this.
In which case, it is more than a little puzzling why socialists fail to advance the opposite claim, namely the following: because we can with relative ease explain socialist ideas using the vernacular -- just as we can challenge the objectionable ideas mentioned above -- ordinary language is inherently progressive. Now, I'm not promoting that idea myself, merely asking why socialists are quite so quick to malign, or depreciate, the language of the working class, and assume that because there are regressive ideas expressible in the vernacular that that automatically condemns it, while at the same ignoring their own use of the vernacular to propagandise and agitate the working class, or promote progressive ideas in general. [On this, see Grant (n.d).]
In this regard, it is as ironic as it is inexcusable that there still are revolutionaries who, while they are only too ready to regale us with the alleged limitations of ordinary language -- on the grounds that it reflects "commodity fetishism", "false consciousness" or "formal/static thinking" --, while they are ready to that, they are also quite happy to accept (in whole or in part) impenetrably obscure ideas lifted from the writings of a card-carrying, ruling-class hack like Hegel. Not only are his theories based on alienated thought-forms (i.e., Neoplatonism, Mystical Christianity and Hermeticism), his Absolute Idealism was a direct result of the systematic fetishisation of language -- indeed, as Marx argued:
"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement [alienation -- RL] of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases and link added.]
Long experience has taught me that most comrades, especially those who hale from the HCD-Tendency, find this point impossible to accept -- i.e., that ordinary language is "alright as it is" (to quote Wittgenstein, once more). Again, I have explained why they react this way in Essays Nine Part Two, and Twelve Part Seven (summary here).
However, I have disposed of the three main reasons many on the left tend to adopt a negative attitude toward ordinary language (and, indeed, Wittgenstein) -- e.g.,, (i) Marcuse's criticisms of OLP (dealt with here); (ii) The belief that Wittgenstein was a conservative mystic who wanted to "leave everything as it is" (dealt with here and here), and (iii) The idea that Wittgenstein's emphasis on ordinary ways of speaking represents a capitulation to, or an accommodation with, bourgeois ideology, the status quo, and the 'banalities' of 'commonsense' (dealt with here).
Compare (iii), above, with Marx's own words on the same topic:
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis added.]
[OLP = Ordinary Language Philosophy.]
When they are confronted with the above passage, the overwhelming majority of Dialectical Marxists with whom I have debated such matters simply ignore it.
24. This isn't to suggest that workers possess a 'scientific' grasp of change (whatever that is!), only that whatever we mean by "change" in ordinary life can be articulated by any worker who has a grasp on the vernacular. Moreover, scientists themselves wouldn't be able to understand the complex changes in nature without a prior grasp of the vernacular.
[There is more on this in Essay Three Part Two, and here.]
Be this as it may, as we have seen, the obscure language and concepts DM-theorists employ actually prevent them from understanding change.
It is worth pointing out at this stage that the comments in the main body of this Essay don't mean that workers have no need of revolutionary theory; quite the opposite in fact. [That caveat will be explained presently.]
Furthermore, this doesn't imply that workers have access to a source of knowledge unavailable to others. Anyone who is able to use the vernacular (and who isn't learning-impaired or intellectually-challenged in some way) can access, and thus employ, the countless words it contains related to topics like change, identity, difference, motion, place, time, the material constitution of itinerant objects, etc., etc. In connection with change, this is what I have argued in Essay Four:
This is no mere dogma; it is easily confirmed. Here is a greatly shortened list of ordinary words (restricted to modern English, but omitting simple and complex tensed participles and auxiliary verbs) that allow speakers to talk about changes of almost unbounded complexity, rapidity, or scope:
Vary, alter, adjust, adapt, amend, make, produce, revise, rework, advise, administer, allocate, improve, enhance, deteriorate, depreciate, edit, bend, straighten, weave, merge, dig, plough, cultivate, sow, reap, twist, curl, turn, tighten, fasten, loosen, relax, ease, tense up, slacken, fine tune, bind, wrap, pluck, carve, rip, tear, mend, perforate, repair, puncture, renovate, restore, damage, impair, scratch, diagnose, mutate, metamorphose, transmute, sharpen, hone, modify, modulate, develop, upgrade, appear, disappear, expand, contract, constrict, constrain, shrivel, widen, lock, unlock, swell, flow, glide, ring, differentiate, integrate, multiply, divide, add, subtract, simplify, complicate, partition, unite, amalgamate, fuse, mingle, disseminate, connect, entwine, unravel, link, brake, decelerate, accelerate, fast, slow, swift, rapid, hasty, protracted, lingering, brief, heat up, melt, freeze, harden, cool down, flash, shine, glow, drip, bounce, cascade, drop, pick up, fade, darken, wind, unwind, meander, peel, scrape, graze, file, scour, dislodge, is, was, will be, will have been, had, will have had, went, go, going, gone, return, lost, age, flood, swamp, overflow, precipitate, percolate, seep, tumble, plunge, dive, float, sink, plummet, mix, separate, cut, chop, crush, grind, shred, slice, dice, saw, sew, knit, spread, coalesce, congeal, fall, climb, rise, ascend, descend, slide, slip, roll, spin, revolve, circulate, bounce, oscillate, undulate, rotate, wave, splash, conjure, quick, quickly, slowly, instantaneously, suddenly, gradually, rapidly, briskly, hurriedly, absolutely, lively, hastily, inadvertently, accidentally, carelessly, really, energetically, lethargically, snap, drink, quaff, eat, bite, devour, consume, swallow, gulp, gobble, chew, gnaw, digest, ingest, excrete, absorb, join, resign, part, sell, buy, acquire, prevent, block, avert, avoid, forestall, encourage, invite, appropriate, lose, find, search, pursue, hunt, track, explore, follow, cover, uncover, reveal, stretch, distend, depress, compress, lift, put down, fetch, take, bring, carry, win, ripen, germinate, conceive, gestate, abort, die, rot, perish, grow, decay, fold, empty, evacuate, drain, pour, fill, abduct, abandon, leave, abscond, many, more, less, fewer, steady, steadily, jerkily, intermittently, smoothly, awkwardly, expertly, very, extremely, exceedingly, intermittent, discontinuous, continuous, continual, emit, push, pull, drag, slide, jump, sit, stand, run, sprint, chase, amble, walk, hop, skip, slither, crawl, limp, swim, fly, hover, drown, submerge, immerse, break, abrogate, dismiss, collapse, shatter, split, interrupt, charge, retreat, assault, squash, adulterate, contaminate, purify, filter, clean, raze, crumble, erode, corrode, rust, flake, demolish, dismantle, pulverise, atomise, disintegrate, dismember, destroy, annihilate, extirpate, flatten, lengthen, shorten, elongate, crimple, inflate, deflate, terminate, finish, initiate, instigate, augment, replace, undo, redo, analyze, synthesise, articulate, disarticulate, reverse, repeal, abolish, enact, quash, throw, catch, hour, minute, second, instant, moment, momentary, invent, devise, teach, learn, innovate, forget, rescind, boil, freeze, thaw, cook, liquefy, solidify, congeal, neutralise, evaporate, condense, dissolve, process, mollify, pacify, calm down, excite, enrage, inflame, protest, object, challenge, confirm, deny, repudiate, reject, refute, expel, eject, repel, attract, remove, overthrow, expropriate, scatter, distribute, equalise, surround, gather, admit, acknowledge, hijack, assemble, attack, counter-attack, charge, repulse, defeat, strike, occupy, picket, barricade, revolt, riot, rally, march, demonstrate, mutiny, rebel, defy, resist, lead, campaign, educate, agitate, organise...
[In each case, where there is a noun form of a word its verb form has been listed (for instance, "object" as in "to object"). Moreover, where I have listed the word "ring", for example, I also intend cognates of the verb "to ring" -- like "ringing" and "rang". I have also omitted many nouns that imply change or development, such as "river", "runner", "wind", "lightning", "tide", "cloud", and "fire". Anyone who didn't know such words implied changing processes in the world -- that rivers flow, fires burn, runners run, and winds blow -- would merely underline their lack of comprehension of English (or whatever language theirs happened to be), compounded by a dangerously defective knowledge of the world. Not knowing that fires burn, for example, would endanger life. In addition, several of the above also have verb forms, such as "fired" or "winding". Other nouns also imply growth and development, such as "tree", "flower", "mouse", "day", "human being". Anyone who thought "human being", for example, reflected a 'fixed and changeless' view of the world would perhaps be regarded as suffering from some form of learning disability; either that, or they were in the grip of an off-the-wall philosophical theory of some sort.]
Naturally, it wouldn't be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally thousands of entries -- on that, see here and here --, all capable of depicting countless changes in limitless detail (especially if it is augmented with words drawn from mathematics, science and HM). It is only a myth put about by Hegel and DM-theorists (unwisely echoed by Rees, and others -- such as Woods and Grant) that ordinary language can't depict change adequately, since it is supposedly dominated by 'the abstract understanding', a brain module helpfully identified for us by Hegel without a scrap of supporting evidence, still less a brain scan. By way of contrast, ordinary language performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that wasn't broken.
Hence, anyone capable of using the vernacular is in the same position as ordinary workers, which means, of course, that they, too, can grasp the ideas encapsulated in HM. Naturally, this more readily makes HM the 'world-view' of the proletariat, since (a) It is framed in their language (or it can be -- and easily, too); (b) It systematises their experience of class society; and, (c) It is universally accessible.
Finally, once more, this isn't to belittle or denigrate the achievements of scientists, but since the word "change" is an ordinary language term already, scientists can no more tell us how to use that word correctly than they can tell us how to use "table", "garage" or "inadvertently".
25. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of the Essay.
25a0. As Reé notes:
"Dietzgen was naturally delighted when Marx presented him to the Hague Congress of The First International in 1972 as 'our philosopher'. [But in Note 20, Reé adds this comment: 'This phrase, often quoted with pride by Dietzgenites, may have had a sting of mocking condescension in the tail. Certainly an exchange of letters between Marx and Engels in November 1968 was less complementary: "The man is not a born philosopher.... His terminology is of course still very confused..." (Engels). "It is hard luck that it is precisely Hegel whom he did not study" (Marx).'" [Reé (1984), pp.29, 144. Reé is here quoting Engels's letter to Marx dated 06/11/1868 and Marx's letter to Engels dated 07/11/1868 {Marx and Engels (1988), pp.152,154.}]
In which case, Marx's supposed endorsement of Dietzgen is hardly unequivocal or crystal clear.
25a. However, any who take exception to my use of what some might imagine is an ad hominem argument in the main body of this Essay (about "workers' experience") would do well to reflect on the fact that much that is written and said about ad hominem is highly inaccurate, and to such an extent that the situation can't now be rectified. Politicians, for example, regularly use "ad hominem" to mean "personal attack" or "abuse". Indeed, on the Internet and in the media it is widely regarded as synonymous with "abuse". Ad hominem has in fact got nothing to do with abuse as such. Furthermore, ad hominem arguments are perfectly acceptable if they expose the inconsistencies in another's position, which is precisely how it is often deployed in these Essays.
An ad hominem argument is one that infers from some (assumed or actual) idiosyncrasy, failing, quirk or foible in an opponent to the conclusion that their argument is invalid just because of that. Ad hominem has nothing to do with personalising a criticism as such, but with what can be 'inferred' from that personalisation. It has nothing to do with abuse, simpliciter, either. One can infer, ad hominem, from praise just as much as from abuse. It is the erroneous inference that is ad hominem, not the personalisation, the abuse, or even the praise, otherwise it wouldn't be a logical fallacy, just bad manners. So, this would be plain and simple abuse: "NN is an idiot" -- but it isn't ad hominem. This is: "NN is an idiot, therefore what he says is false". So is this: "NM is intelligent, therefore what she says is true." [Where in both cases "what he/she says..." refers back to an argument or assertion put forward by an opponent or interlocutor in a conversation or debate, etc.]
[I have attempted to correct several on-line misconceptions of the term "ad hominem" in an article originally published on Quora -- reposted here -- but I'm not naive enough to believe it will have any impact on the continued general misuse of the term -- no more than my comments about the misuse of "amount" in place of "number" will, either. Other words are also beyond redemption: for example, the word "refute" has now been totally skunked. (For what "skunked" means in this context, see here.)]
26. This needs qualifying; vaguely analogous terms were employed by assorted mystics; on this see Essay Fourteen (summary here). See also here and here.
For instance, the 'sacred text' of Hermeticism had this to say:
"For everything must be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise." [Copenhaver (1995), p.38. Bold emphasis added.]
Inwood notes, too, that in the ancient world Heraclitus used somewhat similar concepts; more recently that the arch-mystic, Jakob Böhme, employed comparable language -- as, indeed, did Novalis (who was Böhme's populariser in 18th century Germany). [Cf., Inwood (1992), pp.63-64.] In Essay Two, we learnt that mystics right across the planet have always used jargon like this.
Indeed, Della Volpe records the employment of somewhat similar language in Semën Frank's work -- Frank was a follower of Nicholas of Cusa (whose ideas will be examined in greater detail in Essay Fourteen Part One) --, which is uncannily reminiscent of Hegel's use of language. [Della Volpe (1980), p.72, note 52.] But, since Frank lived from 1877-1950, his work plainly isn't an example of the ancient use of these vague notions; indeed he might have lifted some of them Hegel, who in turn shared much with Cusa himself.
The truth is, of course, that Hegel had to change the meaning of a perfectly ordinary German word ("Widersprechen" -- "to speak against") to make his point. Ordinary Germans -- that is, those who haven't already been initiated into Böhmean Mysticism, or those not yet corrupted by the Idealism prevalent in German intellectual circles of the day -- wouldn't have been able to understand Hegel's peculiar use of this term.
One Hegel scholar, Stephen Houlgate, has recently tried to defend Hegel's use of language; here is how I have responded to what he had to say in Essay Twelve Part One:
We have already seen that Hegel's reference to the implicit 'speculative nature of the German language' was about as genuine as a video showing Rembrandt using his cell phone to post a list of his favourite rock songs on Facebook.
Nevertheless, Houlgate then argues that Hegel was actually using ordinary German words in his Logic, not a specialised vocabulary. Apparently, Hegel did so in order to reveal its inherently 'speculative nature' (which in effect suggests language is really a secret code the meaning of whose words is clear only to a tiny minority -- in fact, a minority of one, Hegel!). So, while English readers might (mistakenly) think that Hegel's argument is obscure, tortuous and opaque because of his convoluted use of what appear (to some) to be ordinary German words, apparently that isn't the case for those who can read him in the original German, according to Houlgate:
"At this point, those who know Hegel's work only through English translation may be forgiven a distinctly sceptical smile. Hegel uses ordinary vocabulary? Can that be true? Do Germans really go around talking about 'determinateness' (Bestimmtheit) and 'being in and for itself' (Anundfürsichsein)? Well perhaps not precisely in the way Hegel does, but they do use related expressions in everyday speech. Ask a German if he or she thinks national reunification was good thing and you may hear in response 'bestimmt' ('definitely'), or 'an für sich, schon' ('in principle, sure')." [Houlgate (2006), pp.76-77. Italics in the original.]
This flies in the face of the fact that other highly competent German speakers --, like, say, Schopenhauer --, find it almost impossible to work out what Hegel was banging on about, even in his day:
"If I were to say that the so-called philosophy of this fellow Hegel is a colossal piece of mystification which will yet provide posterity with an inexhaustible theme for laughter at our times, that it is a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking, and, by the most outrageous misuse of language, putting in its place the hollowest, most senseless, thoughtless, and, as is confirmed by its success, most stupefying verbiage, I should be quite right. Further, if I were to say that this summus philosophus [...] scribbled nonsense quite unlike any mortal before him, so that whoever could read his most eulogized work, the so-called Phenomenology of the Mind, without feeling as if he were in a madhouse, would qualify as an inmate for Bedlam, I should be no less right.... At first Fichte and Schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point of talent -- I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel." [Schopenhauer, quoted from here. Bold emphasis alone and links added; paragraphs merged.]
"But the height of audacity in serving up pure nonsense, in stringing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously been known only in madhouses, was finally reached in Hegel, and became the instrument of the most barefaced general mystification that has ever taken place, with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity, and will remain as a monument to German stupidity." [Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2, p.22. Bold emphasis added.]
"Fichte is the father of the sham philosophy, of the disingenuous method which, through ambiguity in the use of words, incomprehensible language, and sophistry, seeks to deceive, and tries, moreover, to make a deep impression by assuming an air of importance in a word, the philosophy which seeks to bamboozle and humbug those who desire to learn. After this method had been applied by Schelling, it reached its height, as everyone knows, in Hegel, in whose hands it developed into pure charlatanism.... In Germany it was possible to proclaim as the greatest philosopher of all ages Hegel, a repulsive, mindless charlatan, an unparalleled scribbler of nonsense.... If indeed I now chose to call to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions have abused such wide and empty abstractions, I should have to fear that both the reader and I myself would be ill; for the most nauseous tediousness hangs over the empty word-juggling of this loathsome philophaster.... It may be said in passing that one can see how important the choice of expressions in philosophy is from the fact that that inept expression condemned above, and the misunderstanding which arose from it, became the foundation of the whole Hegelian pseudo-philosophy, which has occupied the German public for twenty-five years." [Ibid., quoted from here. Bold emphases and link added; paragraphs merged.]
So, if Schopenhauer, a sophisticated German speaker if ever there was one, found that the language of the verbose Waffle-Meister, Hegel, was full of "senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously been known only in madhouses" and "empty abstractions", that it was "incomprehensible", "inept", amounting to "empty word juggling", was full of "the most outrageous misuse of language" and "stupefying verbiage", what hope is there that ordinary Germans will comprehend this tidal wave of obscurantism coming from Hegel?
This adds support to much of what has been argued at this site: metaphysicians like Hegel take ordinary words and use them in radically non-standard ways, nominalising verbs -- for example, the verb "to be" is transmogrified into "Being"; "is identical with" reified into "Identity"; the use of the negative particle morphed into "Difference"/"Negativity" --, and transforming general words (i.e., common nouns) into the Proper Names of Abstract Particulars.
[On a personal note: I think Schopenhauer was being rather kind, here.]
This is, of course, quite apart from Marx's own highly critical comments about Hegel's language and 'method'.
Naturally, there is nothing wrong with altering the meaning of certain words to suit a particular purpose, but in Hegel's case there were only two reasons for doing this: (i) His novel use of "contradiction" followed on from a defective analysis of the LOI (on that, see here and here), and (ii) Hegel was thereby situating his ideas in a well-established mystical tradition in which this weird way of speaking was de rigeur.
[LOI = Law of Identity; FL = Formal Logic.]
On the other hand, if dialecticians want to re-define the word "contradiction" as "conflict", their theory would merely become a form of stipulative conventionalism -- since there is nothing in the meaning of either the everyday word "contradiction", nor in its FL-twin, that remotely suggests such a connotation; nor is there vice versa with "conflict".
In that case, it is now clear that "contradiction" has been re-defined in order to try and make DM even seem to work. But, we should be no more be conned into accepting of that move than we would be if, say, an apologist of Capitalism 'defined' it as "natural" and "beneficial to all". If the re-definition of terms provided a "royal road" to truth, those with the best dictionaries would surely win Noble Prizes.
To be sure, one online dictionary lists the following as a definition of the word "contradiction":
"contradiction, n 1: opposition between two conflicting forces or ideas...."
However, dictionaries are repositories of usage, and are neither normative nor prescriptive (except in the senses mentioned below). In this case, the above dictionary is clearly recording the 'dialectical', post-Hegelian, use of the word -- by Dialectical Marxists! But, that certainly doesn't imply it means anything when used the way Dialectical Marxists employ it, especially since they themselves can't tell us what they mean by it!
The same dictionary also defines the word "Nirvana", but, are there any Dialectical Marxists out there who are prepared to acknowledge it actually means anything? That is, over and above the emotional impact it might have on gullible believers.
Indeed, dictionaries 'define' many things
about which Dialectical Marxists would have serious reservations.
For example:
"God: A being conceived as the perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, the principal object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions.
"The force, effect, or a manifestation or aspect of this being.
"A being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a
people, especially a male deity thought to control some part of nature or
reality.
"An image of a supernatural being; an idol.
"One that is worshiped, idealized, or followed: Money was their god...."
And:
"negation n 1: a negative statement; a statement that is a refusal or denial of some other statement 2: the speech act of negating 3: (logic) a proposition that is true if and only if another proposition is false."
No mention there of "sublation" or of the NON, but does that force Dialectical Marxists into accepting this 'definition'? Of course not; they pick and choose when and where it suits them.
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
Consider, too, the definition of "wage":
"1. Payment for labour or services to a worker, especially remuneration on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis or by the piece.
"2. wages Economics The portion of the national product that represents the aggregate paid for all contributing labour and services as distinguished from the portion retained by management or reinvested in capital goods.
"3. A fitting return; a recompense." [Quoted from here; spelling altered to conform with UK English.]
"An amount of money paid to a worker for a specified quantity of work, usually expressed on an hourly basis." [Quoted from here; spelling altered to conform with UK English.]
Are there any Marxists on the planet who are prepared to accept this definition of what wages really are?
So, dictionaries record ideology just as much as they register use or meaning.
In that case, with respect to "contradiction", the writers of the above dictionary have plainly recorded the anthropomorphic use of this word by DM-fans themselves.
None of this denies the role that dictionaries have in establishing accepted spelling and settled grammatical norms.
[There is a useful analysis of Hegel's use of language in Inwood (1992), pp.5-18, and a more extensive one in Cook (1973). This topic will be examined much more extensively in Essays Twelve and Fourteen.]
That is quite apart from the fact that a 'dialectical contradiction' is supposed to be a 'unity of dialectical opposites', such that one opposite can't exist without the other (for example, in the sense that the proletariat can't exist without the capitalist class, so we are told), and where each implies the other. Moreover, if the DM-classics are to be believed, these opposites must both struggle with, and then turn into, each other. But the word "conflict" carries none of these implications, which is why Hegel and the DM-classicists nowhere equate conflict with contradiction. If one individual conflicts with another individual, they aren't 'dialectical opposites' and each one can surely exist without the other. If you, dear reader, conflict with a policeman, do you turn into that cop, or he into you? If that cop dies, does that mean you're next?
In that case, "conflict" can't mean the same as "dialectical contradiction".
27. The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Four.
28. Again, this isn't meant to question the fact that workers in struggle -- on strike, for example -- often learn to see things more clearly; for example, that the social, political and economic structures of Capitalism are inter-connected (etc.). As noted in Essay Eleven Part One, the inter-connected nature of Capitalism isn't being questioned at this site (nor anywhere else, for that matter!) since it has been drawn from HM. In that context, sense can be made of the inter-relatedness of human history and its diverse Modes of Production, etc. Given the strictures detailed in the aforementioned Essay, it might be difficult to specify the nature and extent of all these inter-connections, but that topic will have to be left for another day.
Naturally, since we have all descended from the same limited set of ancestors, all of whom have lived on the same planet and experienced an interlocking series of historical developments and class societies, only a rather benighted (post-modern?), or ideologically-motivated 'scientist' would try to explain human history in a fragmentary way.
The immediacy of HM (in the above respect) is not only reflected in the fact that it is possible for it to be expressed in and by ordinary language (even if that might sometimes be done more succinctly using the specialist vocabulary of HM itself), it is also confirmed by the way that children above a certain age can be taught HM with relative ease. That also helps explain why HM seems so plausible to workers -- i.e., when they are ready to read about it or have it explained to them, often in times of struggle.
28a. Woods and Grant also refer us to another passage of Trotsky's:
"The chicken knows that grain is in general useful, necessary and tasty. It recognises a given piece of grain as that grain -- of the wheat -- with which it is acquainted and hence draws a logical conclusion by means of its beak. The syllogism of Aristotle is only an articulated expression of those elementary mental conclusions which we observe at every step among animals." [Trotsky, quoted in Woods and Grant (1995), p.89. A copy is available here (near the bottom of the page). In fact this brief remark comes from Trotsky (1973a), p.400.]
Unfortunately, Trotsky failed to say how he knew so much about the logical acumen of these Avian Aristotles, or why, if animals have known about these things for so long, it took a genius like Aristotle to 'discover' them about 1 million years after we left the animal kingdom proper, and countless million since 'we' branched off from the common ancestor we share with the birds!
And, if chickens are such natural logicians, then perhaps among them there is a Feathered Frege, a Poultry Peano, or a Rooster Russell?
Figure Six: Avian Aristotle, Feathered Frege,
And Rooster Russell?
28b. It could be objected that in the soup's transition from a liquid to a sludge, then to a semi-solid, and next perhaps into a full-blown solid as more salt is dumped in the soup, we have a clear example of change of quantity into quality. But even here, this change will be gradual and non-"nodal". [On that, see Note 28c.]
Moreover, solid soups are still soups, it seems, so no change in that specific "quality" will take place here, either.
Figure Seven: Trotsky In The Soup?
Again, as we saw in Essay Seven Part One, the vague and confused DM-'understanding' of "quality" at work here makes it impossible to decide what is and what isn't a correct application of this 'Law'!
28c. Even if tastes were to be regarded as relational properties, or even a series of qualitative reactions undergone by some of our senses --, which would mean it was in fact the response of the taster (or her senses) to the chemicals in the soup that constitutes, or results in, the taste it is perceived as having --, taste is still registered in and by the taster, not the soup. And it is there, in the taster, that the supposed change in 'quality' takes place, not in the soup itself.
But, as it turns out, dialecticians can't afford to call relational properties like these 'qualities', either. While that might save this example from the waste bin of history, it would trash this 'Law' elsewhere.
Hence, if this DM-'Law' were modified to include the relational properties of bodies as (part of) an object's 'qualities', then there would be countless qualitative changes where there is no increase or decrease in matter or energy to that object. Several examples have already been given in Essay Seven Part One, but here are a few more:
(A) NN is watches her friend, MM, walk away from her. As MM recedes into the distance, MM seems to grow smaller in size. [This would also happen if NN walked away while MM remained rooted to the spot.] Here we have a change in quality (size) prompted by no increase in quantity.
It would be to no avail appealing to the quantity of metres that separate the two, for Engels was quite specific:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphases added.]
"Matter or motion" added to or subtracted from a body are the relevant factors here -- not separation distance. And, of course, it is MM who moves in this case -- but nothing at all has been added to her, even though her apparent size (perceived by NN) changes in 'quality'.
Still less use would it be any help appealing to Engels's reference to "motion" in this instance, since he was also clear that he meant the addition of "energy". Admittedly, it could be argued that it takes energy to make MM move. Maybe so, but unless MM moves to a different height above or below NN, no energy will have been added to her (as noted earlier). And, motion itself can't change the apparent size of either party to this example; we can see that is so if MM covers the same distance as before, but this time merely circles around NN, or NN accompanies MM into the distance.
Even so, no energy has been added to NN -- the stationary viewer --, in whom these changes in 'quality' were perceived, or in whom they take place. No one supposes (it is to be hoped(!)) that even if MM were to walk up a hill, thereby adding potential energy to her body, or if she speeded up (adding kinetic energy), she would actually shrink and not just look smaller to NN as a result! Furthermore, and once again, if NN accompanies MM up this hill, neither of them would grow smaller -- as perceived by either of them.
Moreover, if MM turns round, NN, who is sat on that bench and hasn't moved, will also appear to shrink, as perceived by MM. But what energy/motion has been added to NN?
(B) Consider another example: three animals are lined up in a row, a mouse, a pony, and an elephant. In relation to the mouse, the pony is big, but in relation to the elephant it is small (but, note, these observations only apply if we decide to relax definition of "quality" in the above manner, not otherwise). So, here we have change in quality with no matter or energy added or subtracted. There are countless examples of this sort -- with respect to the relations that hold between any object, or set of objects, and the rest of the local (or remote) universe -- in this set of examples alone.
Someone could object that the mouse-pony-elephant example really involves the perception by an observer, and so this isn't a genuine counter-example, after all.
That can't be correct, for it is surely the case, independently of any and all observers, that a pony is bigger than a mouse while it is also smaller than an elephant. Anyway, we have already seen that Engels informed us that this 'Law' applies to thought, too:
"Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976), p.180. Bold emphasis added.]
Hence, if, as a result of inspecting (or even thinking about) this line-up, someone judges the second animal larger than the first, and the first smaller than the third, it will be covered by Engels's 'Law'.
Moreover, even if the above objection were valid, the qualitative change in perception of the alleged observer wasn't the cause of a change in quantity in that individual. So, this is a genuine counter-example, after all.
[And, of course, Trotsky's example of the fox revolves around the alleged perception of the wolf by the fox.]
Still others could object that these animals don't "develop" into one another; maybe so, but that response has already been dealt with, here and here. But, if we now try to argue that the change in "quality" occurred in the perceiver, then there was a development in her, after all -- she changed from someone who judged the pony bigger one moment, then smaller a few seconds later.
It is also worth recalling that the above example has only been introduced as a warning to DM-fans of the implications for their theory if they decide to water-down their already vague characterisation of "quality" by introducing the relational properties of bodies -- always assuming, of course, that they ever manage, or even decide, to be clear even about this aspect of their 'theory'!
Finally, when confronted with this particular counter-example, some dialecticians object that it is a ridiculous counter-argument. Indeed it is, but it is a direct consequence of relaxing the definition of "quality" in the above manner. Again, I have responded to such critics at length here and here.
29. There is no Note 29 any longer.
30. As we saw in Essay Seven Part One, we are still waiting for a clear definition of a dialectical 'node'/'leap' -- or, indeed, any definition at all, clear or otherwise!
31. But, it isn't even that. In this lampoon of Trotsky's parable, we would have an array of animals of relatively stable but different sizes stood in a metaphorical or imaginary line. No one supposes that such lines really exist, or that prey actually line up for inspection, smallest to largest, waiting to be selected by a predator as part of some sort of crazy Zoological line up -- do they?
Or even the other way round, as prey inspect an array of predators.
Figure Eight: Law Of Identity Parade?
32. Again, it could be argued that the example of the lion attacking a larger wildebeest actually illustrates the 'reverse law', that quality can pass over into quantity -- in that the superior qualitative nature of the lion is equal to a quantitatively larger but qualitatively inferior prey.
But, nothing "passes over" here, and nothing relevant changes. Both animals are quantitatively and qualitatively the same as they were before they met. No matter or motion has been added or subtracted from either of them. There is no "break in gradualness" here, either.
Anyway, what new 'quality' is supposed to be at work in this case? The ability to hunt and kill wildebeest? That would make this 'reverse law' tautologious.
Incidentally, anyone who still thinks Trotsky is right in what he says about animals should watch these videos, one of which shows an ordinary-sized domestic cat confronting, and then chasing off, two large alligators. A second video shows a domestic cat chasing off a larger dog. Is this another catastrophic failure of Engels's 'Law'?
[Of course, Trotsky didn't have access to YouTube, but his epigones do. In that case, they will no doubt be interested to see footage of rabbits chasing off larger cats and dogs, and a whole host of other non-dialectical animal antics (such as a domestic cat chasing a larger fox away).]
It looks like the animal kingdom is well stocked with more than a few very conscious anti-dialecticians!
33. As will no doubt be obvious from the facetious tone of many of the comments in this part of the Essay, it isn't easy to take Trotsky's remarks here at all seriously.
In which case, it might be wondered why the members of his personal and political entourage didn't think it wise to bring a little good sense to Trotsky "from the outside" -- i.e., from the non-dialectical natural world -- and alert him to the risible nature of his own comments.
On the other hand, considering the negative response James Burnham and Max Eastman received from that great revolutionary, maybe the size of that particular task adversely affected the quality of their thinking and their intellectual courage -- or, indeed, vice versa.
34. This is in fact an allusion to a mystical doctrine aired by Plato in several of his dialogues --, for example, the Phaedo, the Meno and the Republic. There, Plato argues that all knowledge is in fact recollection.
Oddly enough, this notion resurfaces in Wittgenstein's work in an anthropological, non-mystical form as part of the idea that we are capable of accessing knowledge only in so far as we have been socialised in a pre-existent speech community. Recollection (in this sense), therefore, forms part of the possibilities this opens up, enabling those who have been socialised in this way to appropriate the collective knowledge of that community (to a greater or lesser extent, distorted, cramped or even amplified, of course, by class division, etc.). More importantly, such individuals have access to the full range of distinctions that have been built into that community's historic use of language --, and, even more significantly, most of them will have shared in the collective oppression and exploitation of their class, and they will thus have access to the memory of that class in all its forms.
[This isn't to suggest, though, that this is how Wittgenstein saw things! Nor is it to suggest that the experience of the working class, or its response to exploitation and oppression, isn't uneven. Nevertheless, the connections between this aspect of Wittgenstein's work and HM will become a little clearer in other Essays posted at this site. On Wittgenstein's clear and unambiguous left-wing sympathies and associations, however, see here.]
The following passage from Wittgenstein's later work is relevant to this and other themes explored at this site:
"Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language…. [Philosophical problems] are not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language…. What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use…. The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language…. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. -- Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain…. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree with them." [Wittgenstein (1967), pp.43-50. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
Also compare the above with these two passages:
"What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use…. The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language…." [Ibid.]
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
Of course, the Essays published at this site are (partly) aimed at using and applying these ideas in order to expose the non-sensical and incoherent nature of DM.
[The relevance of the above is explained here. I have also said much more about this topic, here. For what Wittgenstein meant by "Grammar", see here.]
34a. Some might object that philosophical ideas can't have remained the same for thousands of years, across different modes of production, a supposition that runs counter to core HM-concepts.
But, we don't argue the same for religious belief. Marx put no time stamp on the following, for example:
"The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man -- state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo." [Marx (1975c), p.244. Italic emphases in the original; paragraphs merged.]
The above remarks applied
all the way back, in Babylon and
the Egypt of the Pharaohs,
just as they did in Ancient China and the rest of Asia, in The Americas, Greece,
Rome and throughout Europe, Africa, Australasia, as they have done right across the planet ever since.
On the contrary, Marx said this:
"[O]ne fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." [Marx and Engels (1968b), p.52. Bold emphasis added.]
The same is true of the core thought-forms found throughout Traditional Philosophy -- that there is an invisible world underlying 'appearances', accessible to thought alone --, especially since Marx also argued that:
"...philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381.]
That, of course, helps explain why he thought this entire discipline was based on distorted language and contained little other than empty abstractions and alienated thought-forms -- and, indeed, why he turned his back on it from the late 1840s onward.
35. How this solves Lenin's 'problem' will be explored further in Part Two of this Essay.
It is also worth pointing out (once more!) that this Part of Essay Nine doesn't represent a capitulation to naïve humanism, or to a simple-minded faith in workers. Again, more will be said about that in Essay Twelve Part Seven.
I will address the alleged 'contradictory' nature of workers' 'consciousness' in Part Two of this Essay, and in Essays Three Part Four and Twelve Part Seven.
36. Note 36 no longer exists. Its content has now been moved here and here.
"[Hegel's] theories use terms and concepts that are unfamiliar, because they go beyond the understanding of which everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change because they embody conflicts that make them unstable…. It is to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes." [Rees (1998), p.45.]
From this, it is reasonably clear that Rees connects ordinary language with "everyday thought". Earlier, he summarised Hegel in the following manner:
"[E]veryday commonsense thought was a mass of contradictions that could only be resolved by moving to progressively greater abstractions." [Ibid., pp.41-42.]
However, as we have seen throughout this site -- and in Note 36 above -- the truth is that it is in Hegel's work (and derivatively in DM) that "thought" regularly disintegrates.
Nevertheless, in passages like this (from TAR) it is easy to detect an echo of a tediously familiar theme running through Traditional Thought: a depreciation of the experience, language and understanding of ordinary human beings, in favour of incomprehensible metaphysical jargon invented by non-workers. [On this, see Conner (2005), and Eamon (1994). See also Note 41a, below.]
Marxists are supposed to be tribunes of the oppressed, not imitators and echoes of the oppressor!
There will be more on this in Essay Twelve (summary here).
38. In this regard Rees at least agrees with Engels. Cf., the passage quoted in Note 37 and Note 22, above.
Several consequences of the rejection of the LEM were examined in this earlier sub-section. [However, the genuine limitations of this 'Law' lie elsewhere; cf., Peter Geach's article "The Law of the Excluded Middle", in Geach (1972), pp.74-87.]
39. This topic will be discussed at length in Essay Twelve, and in other Essays published at this site. In the meantime, see here.
40. That is, apart from the last clause (i.e., the one about the capacity of workers to develop a revolutionary 'consciousness')!
41. Of course, up to now workers in their hundreds of millions have resisted such attempts to con them in this way, or in this direction, which, thanks to DM, is one of the reasons why Dialectical Marxism has never "seized" the masses. DM-Evangelists -- who blithely ignore what has actually happened in the real world, partly as a result of their determination to give credence to the obscure musings of Mystical Idealists like Hegel (upside down or 'the right way up') --, still think Dialectical Marxism is a resounding success, or it is about to be one any day soon, just you wait...
Naturally, in La La Land, Dialectical Marxism is the very epitome of success...
Figure Nine: Welcome To 'La La Land', The Blessed State Where
Dialectical Marxism Is A Ringing Success
41a. This will be substantiated in Essay Twelve, where the history of the denigration of ordinary language (promoted by ruling-class hacks, and now, alas, by DM-theorists) will be traced back to its origin in Aristocratic myth and fable in Ancient Greece, alongside other ancient class-divided societies.
Until that is published readers are directed to Conner (2005) and Eamon (1994) --, especially Chapters One and Two of the latter, "The Literature Of Secrets In The Middle Ages" and "Knowledge And Power". Eamon's study connects the emphasis on 'secret knowledge' with political and economic power, two areas that ruling-class thought has always inter-linked, and which have always been co-opted to further the intellectual, political, economic, social, and 'legal' suppression of 'the great unwashed'.
In this case, Eamon connects the novel Renaissance view of nature, which was dressed up as (i) 'empirical knowledge', and (ii) having been "read from nature" (where have we heard that before?), with (iii) the demise of Feudal authority -- where the 'newly emerging philosophies' of the Renaissance (and beyond) challenged the prerogative of the Church to control and dispense truth --, and on to (iv) the rise of bourgeois 'science' itself (although Eamon himself doesn't put it quite like this!).
[On Giambattista Della Porta, an important figure in the above moves, see here.]
42. This is, of course, an hyperbola, but the work of Gerry Healy can serve as Exhibit B for the prosecution.
With Joseph Dietzgen's writings next on the subs bench -- or, failing that, the work of almost any randomly selected HCD.
43. Moreover, Freud's own examples have been shown to fail here (the linked page is, however, in German).
44. While the above considerations aren't enough to discredit Freud's work, the following are: Cioffi (1999, 2005), Crews (1995, 1998), Dufresne (2003), Ellenberger (1970/1994), Gellner (1993), Grayling (2002), Grünbaum (1985), Macmillan (1997), Sulloway (1992), Thornton (1986), Webster (1995), Welsh (1994) and Wilcocks (1994).
There is an extensive bibliography of anti-Freud books and articles in Crews (1998). Cf., also these review articles, Borch-Jacobsen (2000), Cioffi (1996), and Gardner (2001). In addition, see here and here.
Several of Marx and Engels's works listed below have been linked to the MIA, but since Lawrence & Wishart threatened legal action over copyright infringement many of these links no longer work.
However, all of their published works can now be accessed here and here.
Over the next few months I will be progressively linking directly to the first of the above sites.
Althusser, L. (2001), Lenin And Philosophy And Other Essays (Monthly Review Press). [Parts of this book can be accessed here.]
Anderson, K. (2007), 'The Rediscovery And Persistence Of The Dialectic In Philosophy And In World Politics', in Budgen, et al (2007), pp.120-47.
Aristotle, (1984a), The Complete Works Of Aristotle, Two Volumes, edited by J. Barnes (Princeton University Press).
--------, (1984b), Topics, in Aristotle (1984a), pp.167-277.
Ball, T., and Farr, J. (1984) (eds.), After Marx (Cambridge University Press).
Beiser, F. (2005), Hegel (Routledge).
Birchall, I. (2011), Tony Cliff. A Marxist For His Time (Bookmarks).
Blackledge, P. (2006), 'What Was Done: Rediscovering Lenin', International Socialism Journal 111, pp.111-26.
Borch-Jacobsen, M. (2000), 'How A Fabrication Differs From A Lie', London Review of Books, 13/4/2000, pp.3-7.
Brading, K., and Castellani, E. (2003) (eds.), Symmetries In Physics. Philosophical Reflections (Cambridge University Press).
Budgen, S., Kouvelakis, S., and Zizek, S. (2007) (eds.), Lenin Reloaded. Toward A Politics Of Truth (Duke University Press).
Burns, T. (2000), 'Marx And Scientific Method: A Non-Metaphysical View', in Burns and Fraser (2000), pp.79-104.
Burns, T., and Fraser, T. (2000) (eds.), The Hegel-Marx Connection (Macmillan).
Butterfield, J. (1993), 'Interpretation And Identity In Quantum Theory', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 24, pp.443–76.
Callinicos, A.
(1987/2004), Making History (Polity Press, 1st ed., Brill 2nd ed.).
--------, (1988), 'Making History: A Reply To John Rees', International Socialism 39, pp.162-71.
Callinicos, A., and Harman C. (1987), The Changing Working Class (Bookmarks).
Carver, T. (1980), 'Marx, Engels And Dialectics', Political Studies 28, pp.353-63; reprinted in Cowling and Wilde (1989), pp.49-60.
--------, (1981), Engels (Oxford University Press).
--------, (1983), Marx And Engels (Harvester Press).
--------, (1984a), 'Marx, Engels And Scholarship', Political Studies 32, pp.249-56.
--------, (1984b), 'Marxism As Method', in Ball and Farr (1984), pp.261-79.
--------, (1989), Friedrich Engels (Macmillan).
--------, (1991) (ed.), The Cambridge Companion To Marx (Cambridge University Press).
--------, (1998a), 'Philosophy And Politics: Marx's Hegel', in Carver (1998b), pp.181-205.
--------, (1998b), The Postmodern Marx (Manchester University Press).
--------, (1999), 'The Engels-Marx Question', in Steger and Carver (1999), pp.17-36.
--------, (2000), 'Hegel And Marx: Reflections On The Narrative', in Burns and Fraser (2000), pp.34-55.
Castellani, E. (1998) (ed.), Interpreting Bodies. Classical And Quantum Objects In Modern Physics (Princeton University Press).
Cioffi, F. (1996), 'Through The Psychoanalytoscope. Review Of Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth Of The Unconscious By Jacques Bouveresse', London Review of Books 18, 25/01/1996, pp.22-23. [Register for free to read the full article.]
--------, (1999), Freud And The Question Of Pseudoscience (Open Court).
--------, (2005), 'Was Freud A Pseudoscientist?'
Cliff, T. (1960), 'Trotsky On Substitutionism'; reprinted in Cliff (1982), pp.192-209, Cliff, et al (1996), pp.56-79, and Cliff (2001), pp.117-32.
--------, (1975-1979), Lenin: Four Volumes (Pluto Press). [The first three volumes can be accessed here.]
--------, (1982), Neither Washington Nor Moscow (Bookmarks).
--------, (2001), International Struggle And The Marxist Tradition (Bookmarks).
Cliff, T., Hallas, D., Harman, C., and Trotsky, L. (1996), Party And Class (Bookmarks, 2nd ed.).
Cohen, G. (2000), Karl Marx's Theory Of History. A Defence (Oxford university Press, Expanded Edition).
Collins, H., and Abramsky, C. (1965), Karl Marx And The British Labour Movement: Years Of The First International (Macmillan).
Conner, C. (2005), A People's History Of Science. Miners, Midwives And "Low Mechanicks" (Nation Books).
Cook, D. (1973), Language In The Philosophy Of Hegel (Mouton).
Copenhaver, B. (1995), Hermetica. The Greek Corpus Hermeticum And The Latin Asclepius In A New English Translation With Notes And An Introduction (Cambridge University Press).
Cornforth, M. (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5th ed.). [A copy of the 1968 edition is available here.]
Cowling, M., and Wilde, L. (1989) (eds.), Approaches To Marx (Open University Press).
Crews, F. et al (1995), The Memory Wars (Granta Books).
--------, (1998) (ed.), Unauthorized Freud (Viking).
Davidson, D. (2004), Problems Of Rationality (Oxford University Press).
Della Volpe, G. (1980), Logic As A Positive Science (New Left Books).
Dietzgen, E. (1906), 'Joseph Dietzgen: A Sketch Of His Life', in J. Dietzgen (1906a), pp.7-33.
Dietzgen, J. (1906a), Some Of The Philosophical Essays On Socialism And Science, Religion, Ethics, Critique-Of-Reason And The World At Large (Charles Kerr). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1906b), The Positive Outcome Of Philosophy (Charles Kerr).
[This links to the last half of Dietzgen (1906b).]
--------, (1906c), 'Letters On Logic', in Dietzgen (1906b), pp.175-331.
Dirac, P. (1967), The Principles Of Quantum Mechanics (Oxford University Press, 4th ed.).
Draper, H. (1971), 'The Principle Of Self-Emancipation In Marx And Engels', Socialist Register.
--------, (1977), Karl Marx's Theory Of Revolution. Volume One: State And Bureaucracy (Monthly Review Press).
--------, (1999), 'The Myth Of Lenin's "Concept Of The Party": Or What They Did To What Is To Be Done?', Historical Materialism 4, pp.187-213.
Dufresne, T. (2003), Killing Freud. Twentieth Century Culture And The Death of Psychoanalysis (Continuum).
Dunayevskaya, R. (2002), The Power Of Negativity. Selected Writings On The Dialectic In Hegel And Marx (Lexington Books).
Eamon, S. (1994), Science And The Secrets Of Nature (Princeton University Press). [Part of this book can be accessed here. (This links to a PDF.)]
Easton, L. (1958), 'Empiricism And Ethics In Dietzgen', Journal of the History of Ideas 19, pp.77-90.
Ellenberger, H. (1970/1994), The Discovery Of The Unconscious (Harper Collins, 1970; Fontana, 1994).
Emmett, D. (1928), 'Joseph Dietzgen, The Philosopher Of Proletarian Logic', Journal of Adult Education 3,1, pp.26-35.
Empson, M. (2005), 'Marxism On The Web', International Socialism 105, pp.164-68.
Engels, F. (1892), Socialism: Utopian And Scientific, in Marx and Engels (1968a), pp.375-428.
--------, (1976), Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Press).
French, S., and Bigaj, T. (2024), 'Identity And Individuality In Quantum Theory', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2024 Edition).
French, S., and Krause, D. (2006), Identity In Physics: A Historical, Philosophical And Formal Analysis (Oxford University Press).
French, S., and Redhead, M. (1988), 'Quantum Physics And The Identity Of Indiscernibles', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39, pp.233–46.
Gardner, M. (2001), Did Adam And Eve Have A Navel? Debunking Pseudoscience (WW Norton).
Geach, P. (1956), 'On The Law Of Excluded Middle', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 30; reprinted in Geach (1972), pp.74-87.
--------, (1972), Logic Matters (Blackwell).
Gellner, E. (1993), The Psychoanalytic Movement (Fontana, 2nd ed.).
Gentzler, J. (2001) (ed.), Method In Ancient Philosophy (Oxford University Press).
German, L. (1996), A Question Of Class (Bookmarks).
Grayling, A. (2002), 'Scientist Or Storyteller?', Guardian Review, 22/06/02, pp.4-6.
Grünbaum, A. (1985), The Foundations Of Psychoanalysis (University of California Press).
Harman, C. (2010), 'Lenin Rediscovered?', Historical Materialism 18, 3, pp.64-74.
Healy, G. (1990), Materialist Dialectics And The Political Revolution (Marxist Publishing Collective).
Hegel, G. (1975), Logic, translated by William Wallace (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed.).
--------, (1999), Science Of Logic, translated by A. V. Miller (Humanity Books).
--------, (2004), Hegel's Philosophy Of Nature. Part Two Of The Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences. Part One: Science of Logic (Oxford University Press).
--------, (2015), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Basic Outline (Cambridge University Press).
Hilborn, R., and Yuca, C. (2002), 'Identical Particles In Quantum Mechanics Revisited', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53, 3, pp.355-89.
Horn, L. (1989), A Natural History Of Negation (University of Chicago Press).
--------, (2001), A Natural History Of Negation (CSLI Publications, 2nd ed. of ibid. (1989)).
Houlgate, S. (2006), The Opening Of Hegel's Logic (Purdue University Press).
Inwood, M. (1992), A Hegel Dictionary (Blackwell).
Jackson, T. (1936), Dialectics. The Logic Of Marxism And Its Critics (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
Joravsky, D. (1961), Soviet Marxism And Natural Science 1917-1932 (Routledge).
Jordan, Z. (1967), The Evolution Of Dialectical Materialism (Macmillan).
Kaufmann, W. (1978), Hegel. A Reinterpretation (University of Notre Dame Press).
Kettler, D. (2005), Adam Ferguson: His Social And Political Thought (Transaction Books).
Kneller, J., and Axinn, S. (1998), Autonomy And Community: Readings In Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy (State University of New York Press).
Kuusinen, O. (1961) (ed.), Fundamentals Of Marxism-Leninism (Lawrence & Wishart).
Ladyman, J., and Bigaj, T. (2010), 'The Principle Of The Identity Of Indiscernibles And Quantum Mechanics', Philosophy of Science 77, 1, pp.117-36.
Lecourt, D. (1977), Proletarian Science. The Case Of Lysenko (New Left Books).
Lenin, V. (1947), What Is To Be Done? (Progress Publishers).
--------, (1961), Collected Works Volume 38 (Progress Publishers).
--------, (1972), Materialism And Empirio-Criticism (Foreign Languages Press).
Levine, N. (1975), The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Hegel (Clio Books).
--------, (1984), Dialogue Within The Dialectic (George Allen & Unwin).
--------, (2006), Divergent Paths. Hegel In Marxism And Engelsism. Volume One: The Hegelian Foundations Of Marx's Method (Lexington Books).
Lih, L. (2006), Lenin Rediscovered. What Is To Be Done? In Context (E J Brill). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (2010), 'Lenin Disputed', Historical Materialism 18, 3, pp.108-74.
MacIntyre, S. (1986), A Proletarian Science. Marxism In Britain, 1917-1933 (Lawrence & Wishart).
Macmillan, M. (1997), Freud Evaluated. The Complete Arc (MIT Press).
Magee, G. (2008), Hegel And The Hermetic Tradition (Cornell University Press). [Chapter One can be accessed here.]
[MECW = Marx & Engels Collected Work.]
Marx, K. (1859), Preface To A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy, in Marx and Engels (1968a), pp.180-84. [The complete work can be found in Marx and Engels (1987b), pp.257-417. This links to a PDF.].
--------, (1968b), Wage Labour And Capital, in Marx and Engels (1968a), pp.64-93.
--------, (1973), Grundrisse (Penguin Books).
--------, (1975a), Early Writings (Penguin Books).
--------, (1975b), Economical And Philosophical Manuscripts, in Marx (1975a), pp.279-400.
--------, (1975c), A Contribution To The Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy Of Right, in Marx (1975a), pp.243-57.
--------, (1976), Capital Volume One (Penguin Books).
--------, (1983), Mathematical Manuscripts (New Park).
--------, (1986), Economic Manuscripts Of 1857-58, MECW Volume 28 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1989), MECW Volume 24 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1991), MECW Volume 45 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1996), Capital, Volume One, MECW Volume 35 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1998), MECW Volume 37 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
[Several of the above volumes, of course, contain both Marx and Engels's work, but I have attributed many of them to Marx alone where I have referenced his work in those volumes, not Engels's.]
Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1968a), Selected Works In One Volume (Lawrence & Wishart).
--------, (1968b), Manifesto Of The Communist Party, in Marx and Engels (1968a), pp.31-63.
--------, (1970), The German Ideology, Students Edition, edited by Chris Arthur (Lawrence & Wishart).
--------, (1976a), The German Ideology, in MECW Volume 5, pp.19-581 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1976b), MECW Volume 6 (Lawrence & Wishart).
--------, (1987a), MECW Volume 25 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1987b), MECW Volume 29 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
--------, (1988), MECW Volume 43 (Lawrence & Wishart). [This links to a PDF.]
McCarthy, G. (1992) (ed.), Marx And Aristotle (Rowman and Littlefield).
McGrath, A. (2005), Dawkins' God. Genes, Memes, And The Meaning Of Life (Blackwell).
Meek, R. (1954), 'The Scottish Contribution To Marxist Sociology', in Meek (1967).
--------, (1967), Economics And Ideology And Other Essays (Chapman & Hall).
Meikle, S. (1995), Aristotle's Economic Thought (Oxford University Press).
Molyneux, J. (1978), Marxism And The Party (Pluto Press).
Montell, A. (2021), Cultish. The Language Of Fanaticism (Harper Collins Publishers Inc.).
Novack, G. (1978), Polemics In Marxist Philosophy (Monad Press).
Ollman, B. (1976), Alienation (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed.).
Pateman, J. (2021), 'Joseph Dietzgen And The Socialist Politics Of The Working Class', Socialism and Democracy 35, 1, pp.116-41. [This links to a PDF.]
Quine, W. (1990), Quiddities (Penguin Books).
Reé, J. (1984), Proletarian Philosophers (Oxford University Press).
--------, (1986), 'Proletarian Philosophy: A Version Of Pastoral', Radical Philosophy 44, pp.3-7. [This links to a PDF.]
Rees, J. (1988), 'On Making History', International Socialism 38, pp.83-104.
--------, (1994), 'Engels' Marxism', International Socialism 65, pp.47-82.
--------, (1998), The Algebra Of Revolution (Routledge). [This links to a PDF.]
Reeve, C. (2001), 'Dialectic And Philosophy In Aristotle', in Gentzler (2001), pp.227-52.
Rigby, S. (1992), Engels And The Formation Of Marxism (Manchester University Press).
--------, (1998), Marxism And History (Open University).
--------, (1999), 'Engels After Marx', in Steger and Carver (1999), pp.109-43.
Roberts, W. (2017a), Marx's Inferno: The Political Theory Of Capital (Princeton University Press).
--------, (2017b), 'The Value Of Capital', Jacobin, 27/03/2017.
Rosenthal, J. (1998), The Myth Of Dialectics (Macmillan).
Saunders, S. (2006), 'Are Quantum Particles Objects?', Analysis 66, 1, pp.52-62. [This links to a PDF.]
Sheehan, H. (1993), Marxism And The Philosophy Of Science (Humanities Press).
Skeat, W. (1993), A Concise Dictionary Of English Etymology (Wordsworth Books).
Stanley, J., and Zimmermann, E. (1984), 'On The Alleged Differences Between Marx And Engels', Political Studies 32, pp.226-48.
Steele, T., and Taylor, R. (2004), 'Marxism And Adult Education In Britain', Policy Futures in Education 2, Numbers 3 & 4. [A PDF of this is available here.]
Steger, M., and Carver, T. (1999) (eds.), Engels After Marx (Manchester University Press).
Stewart, J. (1996) (ed.), The Hegel Myths And Legends (Northwestern University Press).
Sulloway, F. (1992), Freud. Biologist Of The Mind (Harvard University Press, 2nd ed.).
Thalheimer, A. (1936), Introduction To Dialectical Materialism. The Marxist World-View (Covici Friede Publishers).
Thomas, P. (2009), Marxism And Scientific Socialism: From Engels To Althusser (Routledge).
Thornton, E. (1986), The Freudian Fallacy (Paladin).
Trotsky, L. (1971), In Defence Of Marxism (New Park).
--------, (1973a), The Writings Of Leon Trotsky (1939-40) (Pathfinder, 2nd ed.).
--------, (1973b), Problems Of Everyday Life (Monad Press).
--------, (1986), Notebooks 1933-35 (Columbia University Press).
Voloshinov, V. (1973), Marxism And The Philosophy Of Language (Harvard University Press).
Watson, B. (1998), Art, Class And Cleavage. Quantulumcunque Concerning Materialist Esthetix (Quartet Books).
Webster, R. (1995), Why Freud Was Wrong (Harper Collins).
Welsh, A. (1994), Freud's Wishful Dream Book (Princeton University Press).
Welty, G. (1983), 'Marx, Engels And "Anti-Dühring"', Political Studies 31, pp.284-94.
Werskey, G. (1988), The Visible College (Free Association Books, 2nd ed.).
Weston, T. (2012), 'Marx On The Dialectics Of Elliptical Motion', Historical Materialism 20, 4, pp.3-38. [This links to a PDF.]
Wetter, G. (1958), Dialectical Materialism (Routledge).
Wilcocks, R. (1994), Maelzel's Chess Player. Sigmund Freud And The Rhetoric Of Deceit (Rowman and Littlefield).
Wittgenstein, L. (1967), Philosophical Investigations, translated by Elizabeth Anscombe (Blackwell, 3rd ed.). [This links to a PDF.]
Wood, A. (1998), 'Kant's Historical Materialism', in Kneller and Axinn (1998), pp.15-37.
--------, (1999), Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press).
Woods, A. (ND), The History Of Philosophy.
[The online copy of the above work contains many serious errors, some of which I have pointed out to its author. It is to be hoped that these will be corrected, since I have learnt that a print edition will be released in the near future.]
Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995/2007), Reason In Revolt. Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications, 2nd ed., 2007). [The on-line version still appears to be the first edition.]
Latest Update: 21/12/25
Word Count: 101,130
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