@Nti-Dialectics For Beginners -- Or, Why I Oppose Dialectical Materialism

Preliminaries

Nothing said here is aimed at undermining Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept -- or, for that matter, revolutionary socialism. My aim is simply to assist in the scientific development of Marxism by helping to demolish a dogma that has in my opinion seriously damaged our movement from its inception: Dialectical Materialism [DM] -- or, in it's more political form, 'Materialist Dialectics' [MD].

Naturally, this is a highly controversial allegation; the justification for advancing it is outlined below, and in far more detail in my other Essays. [Why I began this project is explained here.]

Some may wonder how I can claim to be a Leninist and a Trotskyist given the highly critical things I say about philosophical ideas that have been an integral part of these two traditions. However, to give an analogy: we can surely be highly critical of Newton's mystical ideas even while accepting the scientific nature of his other work. The same applies here.

I count myself as a Marxist, a Leninist and a Trotskyist since I fully accept, not just HM (providing Hegel's influence has been fully excised), but the political ideas associated with the life and work of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky. Some might think that this would compromise HM itself, in that it would it resemble a "clock without a spring". In fact, the reverse is the case; as I show below, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

Again, some might wonder why so much effort has been devoted to what many consider to be a peripheral issue, something that is not really of central importance to building revolutionary socialism.

In fact, it's my contention that dialectics is one of the reasons why Marxist -- and particularly Trotskyist -- parties tend to be small, divisive and thoroughly sectarian. Indeed, it's my belief (supported by evidence and argument -- on that see below and in more detail here) that this theory helps ensure such parties stay small, waste valuable time on internecine warfare and petty bickering, thus leaving the ruling-class free to laugh all the way to their next attack on our side.

In addition, I also contend that this theory helps insulate militant minds from the fact that Dialectical Marxism has been a long-term failure, thus preventing the scientific development of revolutionary socialism.

[Note the use of the word "Dialectical" before the word "Marxism"! What I am not claiming is that Marxism itself has been a failure; we just haven't road-tested the non-contaminated version yet.]

All this is quite apart from the impression that has been created in the minds of working people the world over that revolutionaries are little more than a political joke, an impression that has gone so deep into ordinary consciousness that it's now a widely accepted cliché. I believe -- and can show -- that dialectics is indirectly implicated in this. Of course, all this is in addition to the familiar stereotyping of revolutionaries by the capitalist media, some of which is based on these self-inflicted wounds.

Naturally, this means that it's now difficult for our movement to be taken seriously by friend or foe alike.

Once again, these are highly contentious allegations, but in view of the fact that Dialectical Marxism has been such an abject and long-term failure, we have no option but to think things afresh like the radicals we claim to be.

This Essay is targeted at that end. May I suggest then to those who find the above charges far too controversial to accept (or who think them patently false and are tempted to reject them out of hand) that they shelve such qualms until they have examined the arguments I have constructed -- outlined briefly below, but in much more detail in my other Essays.

Even in what follows, readers will no doubt come to see that I have at least constructed a prima facie case against the philosophical theory early Marxists imported into the workers' movement --, a case that is being advanced, it's worth recalling, with the sole purpose of making revolutionary socialism more relevant, less sectarian, and thus far more successful.

[The arguments summarised below are further expanded upon in Essay Sixteen, which is a much longer précis of my ideas. Readers who want to know more are therefore directed toward that Essay after they have read through the material presented here.]

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Please note that this Essay deals with very basic issues, even at the risk of over-simplification.

It has only been ventured upon because a handful of comrades (who were not well-versed in Philosophy) wanted a very simple guide to my principle arguments against DM.

In that case, it's not aimed at experts!

Anyone who objects to the apparently superficial nature of the material below must take these caveats into account or navigate away from this page. It's not intended for them.

It's worth underlining this point since I still encounter comrades on internet discussion boards who, despite the above warning, still think this Essay is a definitive statement of my ideas. It's not.

As noted above, those who want more detail should consult Essay Sixteen or the relevant Essays published at the main site.

Any who find this Essay either too long or too difficult can read two much shorter and simpler summaries of my ideas, here and here.

Finally, I have had to assume that readers already possess a rudimentary grasp of DM.

Anyone unfamiliar with this doctrine should read this, or this, or my short summary here. A much more comprehensive account can be found here.

Main Objections

Formal Logic And Change

Dialectical Fairy-Tales

Unfortunately, dialecticians tell fibs about Formal Logic [FL]; indeed, they regularly say things like the following:

"Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless." [Rob Sewell.]

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition cannot cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity....

"…If a thing is always and under all conditions equal or identical with itself, it can never be unequal or different from itself." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

However, I have yet to see a single quotation from a logic text (ancient or modern) that supports such allegations -- certainly dialecticians have so far failed to produce even one.

And no wonder: it's completely incorrect.

FL uses variables -- that is, it employs letters to stand for objects, processes and the like, all of which can and do change.

This handy device was invented by the very first logician we know of (in the 'West'): Aristotle (384-322BC). Aristotle experimented with the use of variables approximately 1500 years before they were imported into mathematics by Muslim Algebraists, who in turn employed them several centuries before French mathematician and philosopher, René Descartes (1596-1650), introduced them in the 'West'.

Engels himself said the following about that particular innovation:

"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes' variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics, and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels (1954), p.258.]

Now, no one doubts that modern mathematics can handle change, so why dialecticians deny this of FL -- when it has always used variables -- is rather puzzling.

The 'Three Laws' Of FL

Unfortunately, too, and with very little variation between them, dialecticians like to assert the following about FL:

"The basic laws of formal logic are:

"1) The law of identity ('A' = 'A').

"2) The law of contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').

"3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.91. In the above, quotation marks have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Even a cursory examination of a handful of logic texts will reveal that not only are the above claims incorrect, not even Aristotle's logic was based on these so-called 'laws'!

Sure, dialecticians regularly claim that Aristotle founded his logic on such principles, but they have yet to produce the evidence. In fact, Aristotle knew nothing of the 'Law of Identity' [LOI], which was a much later, medieval invention. [More on that here.]

The LOI will be examined presently, but the 'Law of Contradiction' [LOC] merely says that if one proposition is true then its contradictory is false, and vice versa -- or, in some versions found in mathematical logic, it says that no contradiction can be true, but must be false. The LOC says nothing about "equality", or the lack of it, as Plekhanov, Woods and Grant and other dialecticians assert.

Nor is there any connection between the so-called "negative" form of the LOI and the LOC. The former concerns the alleged identity of an object with itself, while the latter expresses the true/false connection between a proposition and its negation; it's not about the relation between objects.

Likewise, the 'Law of Excluded Middle' [LEM] says nothing about objects being identical, or otherwise, merely that any proposition has to be either true or false; there is no third option.

[Plekhanov partly gets this right, but in doing so he confuses predicate negation with predicate term negation. More on that here.]

Some claim that Quantum Mechanics [QM] has, among other things, refuted this 'law', but QM has merely forced us to reconsider what we should count as a scientific proposition. The LEM thus remains unaffected by QM.

And, contrary to what dialecticians often tell us, these 'laws' do not deny change, nor are they unable to handle it. Indeed, we are only able to express change when we are clear about what is or is not true of whatever is changing.

In fact, as we will soon see, it's dialectics that can't cope with change!

The LOI is equally badly handled in DM-circles; that's because dialecticians unwisely copied their ideas on this 'law' from a German Idealist Philosopher called Hegel (1770-1831). [On this, see below, and here.]

The basic idea behind this misguided criticism of the LOI seems to be this:

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

This is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if something changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self. So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine if and when it has occurred. [More on that here.]

Hegel's Howlers

As noted above, the criticisms of FL advanced by most dialecticians were lifted from Hegel, who, alas, committed a series of logical blunders which, even to this day, dialecticians have failed to notice. In fact, the fallout from these blunders is the only way that Hegel could make his 'system' even seem to work.

[Many of his core 'logical' ideas are destructively analysed here; I have omitted this material from this Introductory Essay because of its technical nature. However, a basic outline can be found here.]

Unfortunately, these blunders completely undermine the legitimacy of 'Dialectical Logic'. Since Hegel's entire system is based on these logical errors -- many of which he inherited from medieval Roman Catholic Theologians -- so is 'Materialist Dialectics'.

It's no surprise therefore to discover that when DM has been tested in practice, practice has refuted it.

Motion -- Not Contradictory

According to Hegel, motion is 'contradictory'. Unfortunately, dialecticians have bought into this rather odd idea, too. Almost as if they were singing from the same hymn sheet, they all tend to argue alongside Engels as follows:

"...[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another[,] [t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]

This is an age-old confusion derived from a paradox invented by an Ancient Greek mystic called Zeno (490?-430?BC).

In fact, as should seem obvious, all objects (which are not mathematical points) occupy several places at once. So, for example, while you are sat reading this Essay, your body is not compressed into a tiny point! Unless you have suffered an horrific accident, your head will not be in the exact same location as your feet, even though both of these body parts occupy the same place -- i.e., where you are sat.

[Note the ambiguity here connected with words like "place" and "location"; more on that presently.]

Hence, a material object can be in several places at once (in one sense of "place") -- in one location and in another at the same time. And it can be in one place and in a second place, at the same time, all the while being stationary. [For example, you are in your home/office/room (etc), and in your country at the same time. Note once again the ambiguities involved here.]

Consider, too, this example: a car could be parked half in, half out of a garage. Here the car is in one and the same place and not in it, and it is in two places at once (in the garage and in the yard), even while it is at rest relative to a suitable frame of reference.

In that case, this alleged 'contradiction' does not distinguish moving from stationary bodies. Indeed, it has more to do with linguistic ambiguity than it has with anything allegedly paradoxical taking place in reality.

Of course, exception could be taken to the above use of phrases like "not wholly in" one place or another, on the grounds that Engels was quite clear about what he meant: motion plainly involves a body being in one place and in another at the same time, being in and not in that place at one and the same moment.

But, this objection depends on what Engels actually meant by the following words:

"even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it." [Ibid.]

For example, a cake in a tin on a shelf in a supermarket can be in one place and in another at the same time (in the tin and in the supermarket), and stationary for all that. A cat could fall asleep in the doorway of a room, and would thus be in that room and not in it at the same time. Once again, ambiguities built into language allow for these eventualities. Engels failed to notice this.

In Essay Five I make several attempts to disambiguate Engels's words to try to make sense of what he was attempting to say -- alas, to no avail. As things turns out, there is in fact nothing comprehensible that Engels could have meant by what he said.

Any attempt to circumvent such objections with the counter-claim that moving objects occupy regions of space equal to their own volumes (hence a moving object will occupy two of these regions at the same time, occupying and not occupying each at the same time) won't work either. That's because such a re-description would clearly depict a moving body occupying a region greater than its own volume at the same time (since, according to this view, it will occupy two such volumes at the same moment) -- which, plainly, would mean that such objects would not so much move as expand or inflate!

Worse still, Engels's account depicts objects moving between successive locations outside of time -- that is, he has them moving between locations while time has advanced not one instant --, otherwise the said objects could not be in two places at the same moment. This is impossible to reconcile with a materialist (or even with a comprehensible) view of nature. Here, motion/change would take place outside of time!

Finally, as noted above, this 'contradiction' was created by notorious ambiguities in Zeno's (and thus in Hegel's and Engels's) use of certain words (like "moment", "move", and "place"), which means that when these equivocations are resolved, these alleged 'contradictions' will simply disappear.

[Once again, this disambiguation has been carried out here.]

DM: Imposed On Nature

Has dialectics been read from nature, or simply imposed on it?

The former must, it seems, be correct since we regularly encounter the following apparently modest disclaimers in the writings of dialecticians:

"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), p.13. However, the on-line translation uses "building...into" in place of "superimposing".]

Why is this important? Well, as dialecticians themselves tell us, the reading of certain doctrines into reality is a hallmark of Idealism and dogmatism. So, if DM is to live up to its materialist credentials, its theorists must take care to avoid doing this -- which is, of course, why they often agree with Engels.

Indeed, as, George Novack pointed out:

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

Here, too, are the thoughts of Communist Party theoretician, the late Maurice Cornforth:

"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…." [Cornforth (1976), p.15. Bold emphasis added.]

However, when we examine what dialecticians actually do, as opposed to what they say they do, we find that the exact opposite is the case. For example, Engels himself went on to claim the following about motion:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphasis alone added.]

Had this observation been derived from the facts available even in Engels's day (a policy to which he had just sworn allegiance), he would have expressed himself perhaps as follows:

"Evidence so far suggests that motion is what we call 'the mode of existence of matter'. Never anywhere has matter without motion been observed, but it is too early to say if this must always be the case…. Matter without motion is not in fact inconceivable, nor indeed is motion without matter, we just haven't witnessed either yet…." [Re-vamped version of Engels (1976), p.74.]

[It's worth recalling that motionless matter is not in fact inconceivable. Indeed, that idea had been a fundamental aspect of Aristotelian Physics, which was the dominant scientific theory for well over a thousand years.]

As is easy to demonstrate, all dialecticians do the same (the evidence substantiating that allegation can be found here). First, they disarm the reader with the modest claims we saw rehearsed above; then, sometimes on the same page, or even in the very next sentence, they proceed to do the exact opposite, imposing dialectics on nature.

Why they do this (and what significance it has) will be examined below.

Traditional Thought

In the 'West', since Ancient Greek times, traditional thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature (as Cornforth and Novack pointed out). In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated into traditional thought so deeply that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them. Or, rather, they fail to see its significance.

This tradition taught that behind appearances there lies a hidden world, which is more real than the material universe we see around us, and which is accessible to thought alone. Theology was openly built on this idea, but so was traditional philosophy.

This way of viewing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling-class, who also ensured that others were educated to see things this way, too. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers", philosophers, administrators, intellectuals, editors, theorists, etc.) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or is 'natural' and thus cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

All of these were imposed on reality by those who invented them -- plainly, since they cannot be read from it.

Indeed, this is how Marx depicted things:

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

As Marx points out, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system as 'rational', 'natural', or 'divinely ordained'.

In Ancient Greece, with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old myths and Theogonies were no longer relevant. So, in the newly emerging republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC, far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were needed.

Enter Philosophy.

From its inception, philosophers constructed increasingly baroque and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on obscure and arcane concepts, impossible to translate into the language of everyday life -- which their inventors then happily imposed on nature.

Again, as Marx also pointed out:

Philosophers felt they could read their doctrines into nature, since, for them, nature was Mind (or, indeed, the product of Mind/'God'). In that case, the human mind could safely project its thoughts onto a world created by Mind. True thoughts were thus a "reflection" of underlying reality. "As above, so below", went the old Hermetic saying. The microcosm of the mind "reflected" the macrocosm of the universe. The doctrine of Correspondences thus came to dominate all ancient and modern theories of knowledge. On this view, 'philosophical' truth corresponded with hidden 'essences', which supposedly lay 'underneath' the superficial world of 'appearances'. These 'essences' were impossible to detect by any physical means, and were thus were accessible to thought alone. As Novack pointed out, this made all such theories Idealist.

Again, as Marx hinted, and as the record confirms, these systems were based on the idea that language somehow contained a secret code that 'enabled' traditional thinkers represent to themselves the rational order underlying "appearances", the so-called "secrets of nature", and in some cases the very "Mind of God".

As Umberto Eco points out (in relation to the 'western' Christian tradition):

"God spoke before all things, and said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names that he created them and gave them their ontological status....

"In Genesis..., the Lord speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior illumination, in which God...expresses himself....

"...Clearly we are here in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of the nomothete, the name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

Language and thought were thus vehicles for the "inner illumination" of the 'soul'; a hot-line to 'God'.

Unsurprisingly then, the philosophical and theological theories produced by countless generations of ruling-class ideologues invariably turned out to be those that 'coincidentally' rationalised and 'justified' the status quo.

In addition, language was viewed primarily as a means of representation (by means of which 'God' could 'illuminate the soul'), and not as a means of communication, as Marx and Engels had claimed.

[More on this here.]

This ancient tradition has changed many times throughout history with the rise and fall of each Mode of Production, but its form has remained basically the same: fundamental truths about reality can be derived from language/thought alone, which can then be imposed on reality.

So, like Theology, but in this case in a far more abstract and increasingly secularised form, subsequent philosophies came to reflect the 'essential' structure of reality, which supposedly 'justified' and rationalised class society, mystified now by the use of increasingly obscure terminology and technical jargon. [How this is connected with attempts to legitimate class power and oppression is outlined here.]

'Materialist Dialectics' emerged from this tradition, as Lenin himself acknowledged (plainly not appreciating its significance):

"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.

"The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added.]

In its modern form, this doctrine was re-invented and re-packaged by a quintessentially Idealist Philosopher (Hegel), working in the mystical Neoplatonic and Hermetic traditions. It was appropriated by Marxist classicists before the working class could provide a materialist counter-weight. DM was thus born out of Idealism, and, as we will see, it has never escaped from its class-compromised clutches -- despite the materialist flip dialecticians claim to have inflicted upon it.

And that is why dialecticians are only too happy to impose their ideas on nature; it's traditional to do so, as Novack noted. Indeed, since their theory is based on ancient and idealised abstractions, it plainly cannot be derived from the material world, but must be read into it.

Unfortunately, by so doing,  dialecticians were (unwittingly) identifying themselves with a tradition that was wasn't built by working people and which does not serve their interests.

Worse still, since dialectics is not based on material reality it cannot be used to help change it.

Small wonder then that it has failed us for so long.

[Some might think that if the above were correct, it would mean that science is equally flawed, but that is not so. Science has always been dominated by individuals who do not just theorise about nature, they interact with it, and they learn from experience, modifying their ideas accordingly. (On this, see Conner (2005).) Scientific theory is tested and confirmed by its complex relation to material reality; traditional Philosophy not only isn't, it cannot be. However, further discussion of this particular topic would take us way beyond the scope of this Basic Introductory Essay; it is however dealt with in more detail here.]

Hence, for all their claim to be radical, DM-theorists are thoroughly conservative when it comes to Philosophy. Why that is so will be explained below.

Indeed, despite the fact that DM-theorists appear to be challenging traditional ideas, their theoretical practice reveals they belong to a tradition that is quite happy to derive fundamental truths about nature -- valid for all of time and space -- from thought alone, just as ruling-class theorists have always done.

The 'Laws' of Dialectics

Engels's Mickey Mouse Science

This age-old tactic of imposing theses on nature can be seen in practice if we examine Engels's so-called 'Three Laws of Dialectics':

"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [Engels (1954), p.17.]

All dialecticians who accept these 'Laws' impose them on nature (as did Hegel, from whom Engels had copied them). [Again, the evidence for this can be found here and here.] What little evidence dialecticians provide in order to substantiate these 'Laws' is not only woefully insufficient, it is highly selective and contentious.

Anyone who has studied and practiced genuine science will know the lengths to which researchers have to go to alter even minor aspects of current theory, let alone justify major changes in the way we view nature.

In stark contrast, and totally without exception, dialecticians offer their readers a few paragraphs of superficial, trite and constantly re-cycled examples in support of these 'Laws'. Hence, what we find are hackneyed references to boiling/freezing water, balding heads, seeds that 'negate' plants, Mamelukes fighting the French, a character from Molière who has spoken "prose all his life without knowing it", "Yea, Yea" and "Nay Nay", Mendeleyev's Table, wave/particle duality, and the like, all religiously retailed, year in year out.

From such banalities, dialecticians suddenly derive universal laws, valid for all of space and time!

Even at its best (for example, in Woods and Grant (1995), which is one of the most comprehensive attempts to defend classical, hard-core DM there is, and in Gollobin (1986), which is in many ways an up-market version of Woods and Grant), all we find are a few dozen pages of secondary and tertiary information, extensively padded out with repetition and bluster (much of which is taken apart here). Contrary evidence (of which there is plenty) is simply ignored. This is indeed Mickey Mouse Science.

In many ways this weak and superficial endeavour to substantiate Engels's 'Laws' resembles Creationist attempts to show that the Book of Genesis is scientific! It's heavily slanted, trite, repetitive, highly selective and deeply contentious.

'Law' One -- Quantity And Quality

Here is the the First 'Law' -- the alleged change of quantity into quality:

"...the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state." [Hegel (1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. -- Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring. [Engels (1976), pp.82-83.I have used the online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages edition. Bold emphasis added.]

"We gave there one of the best-known examples [of this Law, RL] -- that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water. [Ibid., p.160.]

But, not everything in nature changes in this way; consider melting glass, rock, resin, metal, butter, toffee, and plastic. These change from solid to liquid slowly, with no 'nodal' points anywhere in sight.

Do DM-theorists consider these counter-examples?

Are you joking!?

[More details, including my answers to obvious objections, can be found here.]

And not every change in quality is produced by quantitative increase/decrease (again, contrary to what Engels said). There are in fact countless changes in quality that are not produced in this way. For example, molecules called Stereoisomers share exactly the number and type of atoms, and yet they are qualitatively dissimilar because of the different spatial arrangement of these atoms.

So, here we have qualitative change produced by a change in geometry. And this is just as important a material constraint as any that Engels himself considered.

[Some comrades have objected to this point because there is no "development" here. I have responded to this criticism here.]

Other qualitative changes in nature and society can be produced by different timing or by a different ordering of the relevant events (for the same amount of matter and/or energy involved) -- or even by altering the context. [More examples here.]

Moreover, this 'Law' only appears to work because of the vague way that "quantity", "quality" and "node" (or even "leap") have been defined by DM-theorists -- that is, if they even bother to do so. Indeed, after 25 years of research, I have been able to find only three DM-texts (out of the scores I have had to study) that attempt even superficially to do this: Kuusinen (1961), Yurkovets (1984), and Gollobin (1986)!

[Once more, their arguments have been neutralised in Essay Seven.]

And, in nearly 200 years (if we include Hegel) not one single DM-theorist has even thought to tell us how long a "node" is supposed to last!

In fact, Hegel defined "quality" in the following way:

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85.]

He copied this characterisation from Aristotle. Similarly, the Marxist Internet Archive defines "quality" as follows:

"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.

"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'.

"In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here. This definition has been altered since it was first consulted.]

But, given the above definition, many of the examples dialecticians themselves use to illustrate this 'Law' would in fact fail to be examples of qualitative change. For instance, water (as solid, liquid or gas) is H₂O. Quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative change of the required sort; nothing substantially new emerges. This substance stays H₂O throughout.

In fact, the lack of precision mentioned above 'allows' DM-theorists to see changes in "quality" produced by changes in quantity whenever and wherever it suits them, just as it 'permits' them to ignore the many instances where this does not happen. That, perhaps, helps explain why this 'Law' has been left so vague for so long.

If this is difficult to believe, then ask the very next dialectician you meet precisely how long a 'node'/'leap', for example, is supposed to last. You will receive no answer -- except one perhaps dismissing your query. But, if no one knows, then anything from a Geological Age to an instantaneous quantum leap could be 'nodal'! Plainly, this introduces a fundamental element of arbitrariness into what dialecticians claim is an objective law.

And, it really isn't good enough for dialecticians to dismiss this as mere "pedantry". Can you imagine a genuine scientist refusing to say how long a crucially important time period in her theory is supposed to be, and accusing you of "pedantry" for daring to ask?

The Other Two 'Laws'

The other 'Laws' fare no better. The Second 'Law' -- the Interpenetration of Opposites and change though "Internal Contradiction" -- will be examined in the next sub-section. And, since the "Negation of the Negation" [NON] is really an extension of this 'Law', its credibility depends on the latter. Hence, the next sub-section in effect deals with both 'Laws' at once. [More details here.]

'Internal Contradictions'

Dialectical Vs Mechanical Materialism

Mechanical materialism holds that all things are set in motion by an external 'push' of some sort. In contrast, dialecticians claim that because of their 'internal contradictions', objects and processes in nature and society are in fact "self-moving".

Lenin expressed this idea as follows:

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

However, there are several serious problems with this passage, not the least of which is the fact that it clearly suggests that things are self-moving. In fact, Lenin did more than just suggest this, he insisted upon it:

"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

Other Marxists say the same sorts of things. Here are Woods and Grant (and readers will no doubt note how these two are quite happy to impose this doctrine on nature, making it valid for all of space and time):

"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....

"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....

"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"...Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 72. Bold emphases alone added.]

But, if this were so, nothing in nature would or could have any effect on anything else. Hence, while you might think that it's your kick that moves a ball, according to the above, the ball in fact moves itself!

Now, in order to avoid such absurd consequences, dialecticians have had to allow for the existence of "external contradictions" (or impulses, contrary to what Woods and Grant assert), which are somehow also involved in such changes. [More details can be found here.]

But, as seems obvious, this makes a mockery of the idea that all change is internally-generated, just as it undermines the contrast drawn above between mechanical and 'dialectical' theories of motion. Indeed, what becomes of Lenin's "demand" if there are countless changes that violate it?

In addition, DM-theorists appeal to these "internal contradictions" in order to undercut theism (there was a flavour of this, too, in the Woods and Grant quotation above); here, for example, is Cornforth:

"The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause.

"Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert -- without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls is, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.

"No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the 'initial push'....

"No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organisation of matter,  any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning.... But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning....

"So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained in things themselves." [Cornforth (1976), pp.40-43. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

But, if external causes are now permitted (in order to stop this theory becoming absurd, as we saw above), then that will simply allow 'god' to sneak back in through a side door.

Of course, all this is independent of whether or not it makes sense to say that anything in nature or society can be described as a "contradiction". Dialecticians, following Hegel, certainly believe they can, but up to now they have merely been content to assert this for a fact, neglecting the proof. Apparently, Hegel's mystical authority is sufficient. And it's worth recalling that Hegel's own employment of this term was based on series of sub-Aristotelian logical blunders.

Dialectics Cannot In Fact Explain Change!

But, even if all objects and processes did in fact possess "internal contradictions" exactly as DM-theorists suppose, that would still not explain why anything actually moved or changed.

In fact, as is easy to confirm, dialecticians have been hopelessly unclear as to whether objects and processes:

(1) Change because of a "struggle" between their "internal contradictions" and/or "opposites", or whether they,

(2) Change into these "opposites", or, indeed whether they,

(3) Create such "opposites" when they change.

Here are a few passages that illustrate this confusion:

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature." [Engels  (1954), p.211.Bold emphasis added.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77. Bold emphasis added.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics…. 

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing…. 

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Bold emphases added.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute."  [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

[Dozens of quotations from classical and more contemporary dialecticians, who say the same sorts of things, can be found here.]

Of course, if the third option above were the case, the alleged opposites could not cause change; they would be produced by it, not the other way round.

If the second alternative were correct, then we would see things like males naturally turning into females, the working class into the capitalist class, electrons into protons, left hands into right hands, and vice versa, along with a whole host of other oddities. [On that, see here.]

Moreover, as far as the first and second options are concerned, it is worth making the following points:

[A] If an object and/or process changes because of a struggle with an already existing 'internal opposite', then it can't change into that 'opposite'. That is plainly because that opposite already exists!

Clearly, no object or process can change into something that is already there!

Hence, if object/process A is already composed of a dialectical union of A and not-A, and it 'changes' into not-A, this can't happen if not-A already exists. In fact, all that would seem to happen here is that A must disappear. So, given this 'theory', A does not in fact change into not-A, it's just replaced by not-A.

Moreover, this account of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-A itself originally came about. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.

It can't have come from A, since A can only change because of a struggle with not-A, which doesn't exist yet! And pushing this process into the past will merely reduplicate the problem.

[B] On the other hand, if A changes into not-A, then, if the DM-classics are to be believed, this can only come about if A struggles with not-A. But, not-A doesn't exist yet, since A has not changed into it. And if not-A doesn't exist, A can't struggle with it, and so can't change!

Of course, this doesn't deny that change occurs, only that dialectics can explain it.

Alternatively, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible!

If the above argument is regarded as far too 'abstract, then consider a more concrete example: a live cat that changes into a dead cat.

Consider cat C. According to the dialectical classicists, cat C can only change because of a "struggle" with its internal opposite, because of its "internal contradictions". Let us call the opposite of cat C, C*. But, DM-theorists also tell us that C will change into that opposite; so the opposite that it changes into must be C*. Since C changes into a dead cat, that dead cat must be this opposite, it must be C*.

But, if C is to "struggle" with C*, then, plainly, C* must already exist. In other words, in order to die, live cat C must struggle with dead cat C*!

Have you ever witnessed a live cat struggling with its future dead self so that it can die?

On the other hand, if dead cat C* already exists so that C can struggle with it, C can't change into it, since C* already exists! In that case, according to this 'theory', cat C can't die!

Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider intermediate stages in the life and death of cat C:

Let us assume that cat C goes through successive stages C(1), C(2), C(3)..., C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally pops its clogs.

[And, if we introduce the NON into the mix, and each of the above stages was the "sublated" result of a previous stage, the result would be no different. The full details have been worked out here.]

But, according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2) because of a "struggle" of opposites. They also tell us that C(1) "inevitably" changes into that opposite. So C(1) and C(2) must be opposites.

But, if the DM-classics are correct, C(1) must not only "struggle" with C(2), it must change into it.

However, the problems we met earlier simply re-emerge: C(1) can't change into C(2) since C(2) already exists! If it didn't, C(1) couldn't "struggle" with it. On the other hand, if C(2) doesn't yet exist, C(1) can't change since there is as yet no C(2) to struggle with to bring that about.

By n applications of the above argument, this 'theory' implies that all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist if it is to change, including the final 'dead stage', C(n+1). But, if that were so, no cat could change, or die, since every stage of a cat's life must co-exist!

'Dialectical cats', therefore, not only have vastly more than nine lives, they can't in fact die! They are, it seems, eternal beings.
 

Once more, this doesn't deny change, only that dialectics is capable of explaining it.

[This argument is worked out in considerable detail here, where several obvious and less obvious objections are neutralised.]

Forces And 'Contradictions'

In order to translate Hegel's theory into an allegedly materialist form, some dialecticians appeal to forces of attraction and repulsion to explain how 'contradictions' are capable of actually moving matter about the place.

Unfortunately, the physical nature of forces is a mystery even to this day. This is one reason why scientists have abandoned them, preferring to talk about exchange of momentum instead.

Of course, in popular and school physics, people still talk about forces, but since there is no way of giving them any sort of physical sense (other than as part of a vector field, etc., which is impossible to interpret in physical terms, too), advanced physics translates forces in the way indicated in the previous paragraph, appealing to "exchange particles". Indeed, in Relativity Theory, the 'force' of gravity has been completely edited out of the picture and replaced by the movement of objects along "geodesics".

Even Woods and Grant conceded this point:

"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

However, Woods and Grant failed to tell us how a "relation" can make anything move; still less how the items they mention are 'opposites', let alone 'internal opposites'.

Physicist Max Jammer notes the following about forces:

"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]

This is re-iterated by Nobel Laureate, Professor Wilczek (of MIT):

"Problems with F = ma

"Newton's second law of motion, F = ma, is the soul of classical mechanics. Like other souls, it is insubstantial. The right-hand side is the product of two terms with profound meanings. Acceleration is a purely kinematical concept, defined in terms of space and time. Mass quite directly reflects basic measurable properties of bodies (weights, recoil velocities). The left-hand side, on the other hand, has no independent meaning. Yet clearly Newton's second law is full of meaning, by the highest standard: It proves itself useful in demanding situations. Splendid, unlikely looking bridges, like the Erasmus Bridge (known as the Swan of Rotterdam), do bear their loads; spacecraft do reach Saturn.

"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote

"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense-suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

[This now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38. It can be accessed here. (This links to a PDF.)]

This is probably why Engels himself said the following:

"When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), p.71. Bold emphasis alone added.]

But, if there are no classical forces, then there can't be any 'dialectical contradictions' in nature --, 'external' or 'internal' (or, at least, none that could make anything happen) -- if opposing forces are used to model them.

Hence, even if there were any 'dialectical contradictions' in nature, they would/could do no work, and DM, the erstwhile philosophy of change, would be unable to account for it!

Faced with this, some DM-apologists have tried to argue that modern science is either dominated by 'positivism', or is 'reactionary'. In other words, to save their theory, they are prepared to cling on to an animistic view of nature, one that even Engels was ready to abandon. [Even so, they will struggle to tell us in physical terms what a force is. Expect a lot of hand waving...]

Of course, dialecticians might be using the word "contradiction" in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense; but what is it? We have yet to be told.

They could be using this word metaphorically, but, if so, what is its "cash value" (to use William James's happy term)? For example, if someone were to describe a man as "a pig", we'd perhaps take that to mean he is uncouth, slovenly, has appalling table manners, or that he treats his partner very badly. That is this metaphor's "cash value". So, how is this metaphor, if it is one, to be cashed out? Again, we have yet to be told.

Even so,  we would still have to take into account the fact that changes in nature are produced by resultant forces -- that is, by forces that are the result of other forces combining, not struggling. In that case, if any metaphor/phrase were applicable here, it would be 'dialectical tautology', not 'dialectical contradiction'.

However, this is a complex issue; for more details I can only refer the reader to my extensive discussion here, and especially here.

The Mysterious "Totality"

Dialecticians tell us that everything is interconnected in something they call the "Totality":

"Dialectics is the science of universal interconnection." [Engels (1954), p.17.]

"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms, indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the last named. In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion." [Ibid., p.70.]

"Nothing exists or can exist in splendid isolation, separate from its conditions of existence, independent from its relationships with other things…. When things enter into such relationships that they become parts of a whole, the whole cannot be regarded as nothing more than the sum total of the parts…. [W]hile it may be said that the whole is determined by the parts it may equally be said that the parts are determined by the whole….

"Dialectical materialism understands the world, not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which all things go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away....

"Dialectical materialism considers that…things come into being, change and pass out of being, not as separate individual units, but in essential relation and interconnection, so that they cannot be understood each separately and by itself but only in their relation and interconnection….

"The dialectical method demands first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in their interconnections with other things…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.46-48, 72.]

"Here the key is to see all the different aspects of society and nature as interconnected. They are not separate, discrete processes which develop in isolation from each other. Mainstream sociological and scientific thought 'has bequeathed us the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, detached from the general context'. Much of our schooling today still follows this pattern -- the development of the arts is separated from that of the sciences, and 'technical' subjects are separated from languages, history and geography. Our newspapers and TV news programmes divide the world up in the same artificial way -- poverty levels and stock exchange news, wars and company profit figures, strikes and government policy, suicide statistics and the unemployment rate are all reported in their own little compartments as if they are only distantly related, if at all. A dialectical analysis tries to re-establish the real connections between these elements, 'to show internal connections'. It tries, in the jargon of dialectics, to see the world as 'a totality', 'a unity'." [John Rees.]

Once more: notice how these ideas have been foisted on nature and society.

Despite this, and readers are invited to check the writings of the above comrades fro themselves, or those of other dialecticians I haven't quoted: we are never told what this "Totality" actually is! This is rather odd if the "Totality" is as important as we have been led to believe. It's about as odd as if Darwin had forgotten to tell us what natural selection was. [More details here, where several possible candidates are batted out of the park.]

Belief in a "Totality" is, of course, something that dialecticians share with all known mystical systems of thought (see, for example, here and here). As Glenn Magee points out:

"Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines 'As above, so below.' This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is reflected.

"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies." [Magee (2001), p.13. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

[Compare this with the quotations given above from Engels, Rees and Cornforth.]

John Rees (in a continuation of the passage quoted earlier) tried to argue that it is possible to distinguish his denomination of 'dialectical mysticism' from 'non-dialectical' versions since the latter don't try to account for change by appealing to "internal contradictions". [These are of course my words, not his!]

However, contrary to what Rees asserts, we find that the vast majority of mystical systems (ancient and modern) do in fact try to account for change and/or stability by an appeal to the unity and interpenetration of opposites (or 'contradictions; by any other name). Consider these for instance:

"For everything must be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise." [Copenhaver (1995), p.38. Bold emphasis added.]

"The Taoists saw all changes in nature as manifestations of the dynamic interplay between the polar opposites yin and yang, and thus they came to believe that any pair of opposites constitutes a polar relationship where each of the two poles is dynamically linked to the other. For the Western mind, this idea of the implicit unity of all opposites is extremely difficult to accept. It seems most paradoxical to us that experiences and values which we had always believed to be contrary should be, after all, aspects of the same thing. In the East, however, it has always been considered as essential for attaining enlightenment to go 'beyond earthly opposites,' and in China the polar relationship of all opposites lies at the very basis of Taoist thought. Thus Chuang Tzu says:

"'The "this" is also "that." The "that" is also "this."... That the "that" and the "this" cease to be opposites is the very essence of Tao. Only this essence, an axis as it were, is the centre of the circle responding to the endless changes." [Fritjof Capra. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

"Buddhist enlightenment consists simply in knowing the secret of the unity of opposites -- the unity of the inner and outer worlds....

"The principle is that all dualities and opposites are not disjoined but polar; they do not encounter and confront one another from afar; they exfoliate from a common centre. Ordinary thinking conceals polarity and relativity because it employs terms, the terminals or ends, the poles, neglecting what lies between them. The difference of front and back, to be and not to be, hides their unity and mutuality." [Alan Watts, quoted from here. Bold emphases alone added.]

"The three major gods of Hinduism are Brahma (the creator; paradoxically of minor importance in actual practice -- possibly, since his work is completed), Vishnu (the preserver), and Shiva (the destroyer), each with a wife, to symbolize the androgyny of ultimate reality. By theologians and educated Hindus in general, these gods and their innumerable manifestations are viewed as pointing toward one transcendent reality beyond existence and non-existence, the impersonal world-spirit Brahman, the absolute unity of all opposites....

"Hindus envision the cosmic process as the growth of one mighty organism, the self-actualization of divinity which contains within itself all opposites." [This has been taken from here. Bold emphases added.]

[More examples of the same sort of material can be found in Note 1.]¹

Finally, there is this revealing comment:

"The ancient Egyptians believed that a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A similar premise, that the interaction between yin (the female principle) and yang (the male principle) underlies the workings of the universe, is at the heart of much Chinese thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy from the fourth century B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many Chinese who are not Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the Chinese. Peoples all over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, have come to the conclusion that the cosmos is a combining of opposites and that one of the most important aspects of this dualism is the opposition between male and female." [Maybury-Lewis (1992), p.125. Bold emphases added.]

It wouldn't be difficult to extend this list indefinitely until it became plain that practically every mystic who has walked the earth thought/thinks 'dialectically'.

[Once again, we can see that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.]

The only obvious difference between overt mystics and the covert 'Dialectical-Marxist Tendency' lies in the extent to which the former employ openly religious language. Even so, both are quite happy to borrow obscure jargon from traditional Philosophy, and then impose it on nature.

Independently of all this, it's worth asking exactly how Dialectical Marxists know that everything in the entire universe is interconnected.

It's no use dialecticians appealing to modern Physics to support this doctrine; the latter merely hypothesises that everything was once connected (in the alleged Big Bang), not that everything is now interconnected. Indeed, certain theoretical considerations suggest that most things cannot now be connected, let alone interconnected.

[BBT = Big Bang Theory.]

Moreover, the BBT is associated with the 'Block View' of time (wherein everything is regarded as part of a four-dimensional manifold); in such a set-up nothing changes. Or, rather, change amounts to no more than our subjective view of how things appear to us to alter and develop. So, if the BBT is true, 'objective reality' is changeless. In which case, this aspect of modern Physics is no friend of DM. [More on that, here and here.]

A similar appeal to "Quantum Entanglement" cannot help either. At best, experimental evidence shows that certain states of matter are interlinked locally, not across billions of light years -- nor indeed are they interconnected with the past (unless we believe in backwards causation!). This is quite apart from the fact that there are Scientific Realists who question the validity of this anti-realist aspect of modern Physics.

But, even if DM-theorists are correct, the thesis of universal interconnection is incompatible with the doctrine of change through "internal contradiction", for if all change is internally-driven, then no object or process could be interconnected with any other. Naturally, this odd idea would imply that the Sun, for example, doesn't actually ripen fruit, it ripens itself!

Alternatively, if everything is interlinked, then interconnection could play no causal role in change (otherwise change would not be the sole result of "internal contradictions", once more). Of course, if the Sun actually does ripen fruit, as indeed it does, then this change, at least, would not be the result of its alleged "internal contradictions" in fruit, even if there were any.

We have already seen that DM-theorists try to get around this fatal consequence of their theory by appealing to both alternatives (i.e., on the one hand claiming/insisting that everything is a sealed unit --, and is thus "self-moving" --, while on the other, "demanding" that everything is interconnected, and is therefore 'full of holes', so to speak, for external causes to sneak back in), which is a rather fitting contradiction in itself.

Nevertheless, dialecticians are fond of pointing to the alleged contradictions that bedevil other, rival and thus supposedly defective systems of thought as a reason for rejecting them, but they conveniently ignore this glaring contradiction in their own theory. [The evidence substantiating this latest allegation can be found in Essay Eleven Part One, here.]

However, this particular contradiction is of such prodigious proportions that it dwarfs any that have so far been found in rival non-dialectical theories. Indeed, this contradiction is bizarre enough to make the usual pronouncements of "peace, freedom and democracy" --, which so easily slip off the forked tongues of US imperialists just before they invade the next 'Third World' country to steal their wealth and install 'business-friendly' regimes --, look honest, straight-forward and true in comparison.

Just think about it: how can everything in the entire universe be maximally-interconnected and totally causally isolated from everything else at the same time? And, how is it possible for all change to be internally-driven yet externally-motivated (or "mediated", to use the jargon) as part of a unified Totality?

[These 'problems', and others, are explored at length in Essays Eight Parts One and Two, and in Eleven Parts One and Two, along with every conceivable objection to the above claims.]

Practice Refutes DM

Or Does It?

Is Marxism is true? How can we tell? Dialecticians have a novel answer: the validity of theory must be tested in practice.

But, what if it turns out that in practice dialecticians themselves reject or ignore the results of practice?

Indeed, and far worse: what if it should turn out that practice has actually refuted Dialectical Marxism?

[Note the use of the phrase "Dialectical Marxism"; I'm not claiming that Marxism has been a failure, only its mystically-compromised alter-ego.]

Should we abandon the criterion of practice as a test of truth, or bury our heads in the sand and hope that no one will notice we have saddled ourselves with a turkey?

Up to now dialecticians have opted for the latter strategy.

But, is this impertinent accusation as hasty as it seems grossly unfair?

As we will see, it's neither.

In order to substantiate this latest batch of allegations, we need to back-track a little.

According to Lenin, truth can only be confirmed in one way:

"From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality." [Lenin (1961), p.171. Italic emphases in the original.]

He was, of course, merely underlining ideas that all dialecticians accept. Hence, in their view, it's not enough for Marxists to try to develop the right sort of theory in splendid isolation to try to explain the world, their ideas must be tested and refined in practice if they are to succeed in helping change society. Indeed, no theory could be correct, or "objective", without an intimate, long-term and "dialectical" connection with political activity -- or, at the very least, with some form of material practice. As Marx himself argued:

"The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question....

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." [Marx and Engels (1976), pp.3-5. Italic emphases in the original.]

Rob Sewell continues:

"Marxists have always stressed the unity of theory and practice. 'Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it', as Marx pointed to in his thesis on Feuerbach. 'If the truth is abstract it must be untrue,' states Hegel. All truth is concrete. We have to look at things as they exist, with a view to understanding their underlying contradictory development. This has very important conclusions, especially for those fighting to change society....

"The idealist view of the world grew out of the division of labour between physical and mental labour. This division constituted an enormous advance as it freed a section of society from physical work and allowed them the time to develop science and technology. However, the further removed from physical labour, the more abstract became their ideas. And when thinkers separate their ideas from the real world, they become increasingly consumed by abstract 'pure thought' and end up with all types of fantasies." [(Unfortunately, including DM!) Quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

Woods and Grant concur:

"The ability to think in abstractions marks a colossal conquest of the human intellect. Not only 'pure' science, but also engineering would be impossible without abstract thought, which lifts us above the immediate, finite reality of the concrete example, and gives thought a universal character. The unthinking rejection of abstract thought and theory indicates the kind of narrow, Philistine mentality, which imagines itself to be 'practical,' but, in reality, is impotent. Ultimately, great advances in theory lead to great advances in practice. Nevertheless, all ideas are derived one way or another from the physical world, and, ultimately, must be applied back to it. The validity of any theory must be demonstrated, sooner or later, in practice." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.84-85. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

[Despite what these two quotations say, and surprising though this might seem, abstraction actually destroys the capacity language has for expressing generality, thus undermining scientific knowledge. On that, see here.]

Unfortunately, the results of "practice" have not been too kind to Dialectical Marxists of every stripe. Indeed, they have been even less kind to Trotskyists like Woods, Grant and Sewell, comrades not known for their mass following.

And they are not alone in this; practice has not looked at all favourably on Dialectical Marxism in general for close on a hundred years. All Four Internationals have gone down the pan and the 1917 revolution has been reversed. Indeed, we are no nearer, and arguably much further away from, a workers' state now than Lenin was in 1918. Practically all of the former 'socialist' societies have collapsed (and not a single worker raised his/her hand in their defence -- indeed, many joined in the attack). Even where avowedly Marxist parties can claim some sort of mass following, this support is passive --, or, at best, merely electoral. Moreover, these parties themselves have openly adopted reformist policies (despite the contrary-sounding rhetoric).

So, if truth is tested in practice, practice has delivered a rather clear verdict: "materialist dialectics" does not work; so it can't be true.

Excuses, Excuses...

However, when confronted with disconcerting facts like these, dialecticians tend to respond in one or more of the following ways:

1) They flatly deny that Dialectical Marxism has been an abject failure.

2) Even if they admit to failure, they invariably blame it on "objective factors" --, or, perhaps, on other, rival Marxist parties and their failure of "revolutionary leadership".

3) They simply ignore the problem.

4) They say it's too early to tell.

Now, there doesn't seem to be much point in dialecticians claiming that "materialist dialectics" guides all they do, avowing that truth is tested in practice, if, when the latter reveals its long-term verdict, that verdict is rejected, disregarded or explained away.

In that event, it might well be wondered what sort of practice could possibly constitute a genuine test of dialectics if, whatever the results, dialectics is always either excused or exonerated. What exactly is being tested if the outcome of every test cannot be deemed other than a success?

Indeed, what (permanent) successes can we actually point to over last 80 years or so?

Hence, it's not so much that materialist dialectics hasn't been tested in practice as it is that dialecticians are practiced at refusing to test it against practice.

In that case, why not just declare that Dialectical Marxism is and always has been a success, with or without any need for a practical test, thus abandoning Marx and Lenin's criteria?

This would seem to be a much more honest and appropriate response, based as it is on the sort of practice that continually ignores the results of practice!

If we know beforehand that dialectics can never fail, no matter what happens, why waste time and effort telling the world that we can only decide if DM is true if we test it in practice?

What sort of empty charade are DM-fans trying to fool themselves with?

Faced with this challenge, DM-fans invariably respond with the counter-claim that the "incorrect" use of dialectics can and does lead to failure, and since everyone else misuses the dialectic, it's no surprise that they have been unsuccessful.

Anyone who doubts this allegation can test it in a small experiment: for example, the very next Orthodox Trotskyist [henceforth, OT] you meet, try telling him/her that the Stalinists and Maoists also use "materialist dialectics". Then, the very next Stalinist/Maoist you meet, try telling her/him that OTs use "materialist dialectics", too. Try the same on the Maoists/Stalinists in relation to each other. Extend this impromptu survey and permute the name of every group you can think of and tell each of them that their opponents/rivals also use "materialist dialectics" to guide all they do. Unless you are incredibly unlucky, you will be told the same thing over and over: "Those other guys misuse/distort/ignore the dialectical method; they are all wedded to formal abstractions...". [Plenty of examples of this phenomenon are given in the End Notes to Section Seven of Essay Nine Part Two.]

In fact, there is no objective way of deciding if or how the dialectic has been, or can be employed 'correctly'. Indeed, as we will soon see, it can and has been used to defend any theory you like and its opposite -- often by the very same dialectician!

However, taking each of the above excuses one at a time:

1) Those who think Dialectical Marxism is a ringing success have so far failed to reveal where and how it enjoys this blessed condition.

Presumably there's a Workers' State on the outer fringes of the Galaxy?

Systematic denial of reality of this order of magnitude clearly requires professional help; argument and evidence are useless.

In fact, there is no debating with hardcore Idealism of this sort -- that is, with an attitude that re-interprets the material world to suit the comforting idea that Dialectical Marxism is a success despite clear evidence to the contrary, and which then encourages its adepts to bury their heads in their own idea of sand.

Anyone who can look at the international situation and fail to see that our movement is not only riddled with deep and irreconcilable divisions, it's in long-term decline, is probably more of a danger to themselves than they are to the ruling-class.

Not only have the overwhelming majority of workers never been "seized" by dialectics, the larger the working class becomes, the less influence Dialectical Marxism seems to have upon it.

[This should not be taken to mean that I think that things cannot change! Indeed, this site was set up to help reverse this trend!]

In fact, dialecticians would be well advised to avoid using practice as a test of the correctness of their theory.

That's because, when a list is drawn up of all the 'successes' our side has 'enjoyed' over the last 150 years or so it soon becomes obvious that it is depressingly short. Worse still: our 'successes' are easily out-numbered by our 'failures'. A shortened list of both is given in Figure One, below:

Figure One: The Dialectically-Depressing List

In response, it could be argued that this list is highly prejudicial since it is padded out with dozens of failures that pre-date revolutionary Marxism, and/or with those that have nothing to do with 'Materialist Dialectics'.

But, if these are filtered out -- along with the corresponding successes enjoyed by non-Dialectical-Marxist forces -- the list would be even more depressing!

Also worth pointing out is the relatively massive scale of the 'defeats' our side has suffered compared to the modest and temporary gains made over the last 150 years. For example, the catastrophic blow delivered to our side by the failure of just two revolutions (e.g., those in Germany and Spain between 1918 and 1939) far outweighs all our successes put together, and by several orders of magnitude.

More on this here (along with replies to obvious objections).

2) It's undeniable that "objective factors" have seriously hindered the revolutionary movement. These include a relatively well-organised, rich, powerful and focussed ruling-class, the effects of imperialism and economic growth -- all of which have been compounded by racism, sexism, nationalism and sectionalism among workers --, and so on.

But, dialecticians are quite clear: the veracity of a theory can only be tested in practice. Now, since that requires the subjective input of active revolutionaries (who tell us that this theory informs all they do and think), this aspect of practice has plainly not worked. [Or, if it has worked, then the meaning of the word "success" must have changed.]

In view of the above, there are only three possible conclusions: (a) "materialist dialectics" has never actually been employed by revolutionaries, (b) dialecticians have in fact been using a different theory all along (about which they were remarkably quiet), or (c) their core theory has been a monumental failure.

Since (a) and (b) are manifestly absurd, we are forced to conclude that (c) is the case.

However, as we have seen, whenever revolutionaries have reluctantly brought themselves to acknowledge the subjective side of failure, they almost invariably blame it on a lack of "revolutionary leadership" and/or an 'incorrect' use of dialectics. And this is then blamed on other parties, never their own!

To repeat: if dialectics is as central to Marxism as its supporters would have us believe, it can't be unrelated to the long-term lack of success enjoyed by Dialectical Marxism.

Indeed, those who reject the connection between "materialist dialectics" and the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism cannot claim in one breath that all things are inter-related, but in the very next deny this clear link.

Unless, of course, we are to suppose that in a world where everything is supposed to be interconnected, the only two things in the entire universe that are not inter-linked are the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism and its core theory!

If you believe that, then, as the saying goes, you'll believe anything.

So, whether or not there have been "objective factors", practice itself has refuted the subjective side of Marxism: the use of "materialist dialectics".

Either that, or truth isn't tested in practice.

Moreover, since the Essays posted at the main site show that DM is not so much false as far too confused even to be assessed for its truth or falsity, the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism is no big surprise. One should expect such a confused theory to screw with practice.

Furthermore, because this theory originated in the speculations of card-carrying ruling-class hacks and religious mystics (like Hegel), this is doubly no surprise.

Indeed, under such circumstances, had Dialectical Marxism been a success, that would have been the surprise!

Case Studies

The remarks above are largely  theoretical. What we need now are concrete examples of the deleterious effect dialectical concepts have had on revolutionaries. In Essay Nine Part Two I present evidence and argument to show that the monumental blunders listed in the next three sections are attributable in whole or part to this 'theory'.

[It's also important to note that in that I advance materialist reasons why (1) this theory is quite as deleterious as I claim it to be, (2) why it has colonised the brains of generations of Marxists, and why they cling to it like drunks to lampposts.]

Stalinism

DM was used by the Stalinised Bolshevik Party (after Lenin's death) to rationalise the imposition of an undemocratic (if not an openly anti-democratic and terror-based) structure on both the Communist Party and the population of the former USSR (and later elsewhere).

This new and vicious form of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was justified by Stalin on the grounds that since Marxist theory holds that everything is 'contradictory', increasingly centralised control by the party was compatible with greater democratic freedom. The "withering-away of the state" was in fact confirmed by moves in the opposite direction: the ever-growing concentration of power at the centre. So, and paradoxically: less democracy was in fact more democracy!

Indeed, Stalin claimed that this contradiction illustrated the truth of dialectics!

Hard to believe? Doubt no more:

"It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Moreover, it became possible to 'justify' the idea that socialism could be built in one country by, among other things, the dubious invention of "internal" versus "external" contradictions, later bolstered by the further invention of "principal" and "secondary" contradictions, along with the highly convenient idea that some contradictions were, and some were not, "antagonistic". Hence, the obvious class differences that remained, or which soon emerged in the USSR were either non-existent or were in fact "harmonious". The real enemies (i.e., the source of all those nasty, "principal" (or perhaps even the "antagonistic") contradictions) were the external, imperialist powers.

In which case, under 'socialism' strikes are 'unnecessary' -- or, they just 'don't happen', hence, they shouldn't happen -- but, when they do, they must be suppressed. And so they were suppressed with a level of violence rarely seen anywhere else outside of openly fascist states. [On this, see Haynes (2002), and Kozlov (2002).]

Any attempt made by workers to rebel (e.g., Hungary 1956) were blamed on "external forces", or agents outside the working class  (a familiar excuse used by ruling classes the world over to account for, and thus ignore or explain away the significance of strikes and riots -- all caused, of course, by the ubiquitous "external agitator"), i.e., in this case, "imperialist powers", "fascists", or even Tito (but not ordinary workers fighting for and on behalf of their own interests), once more.

So, for several decades, in the former Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe, we were treated to an absurd spectacle: the supposed ruling-class (i.e., the proletariat) was systematically oppressed and exploited by the 'Bolshevik' Party! A ruling class (i.e., workers) that never actually seemed to rule! Soviet Russia without genuine soviets.

All so quintessentially contradictory.

More practice, more oppressed, exploited and dead workers.

With hindsight we can see for ourselves the effect that all this 'applied dialectics' had on the former USSR and its satellites. Only those who still wearing their dialectical blinders will disagree with the conclusion that these failed states weren't exactly a ringing endorsement of the practical application of 'Materialist Dialectics'.

And when these dysfunctional regimes finally fell apart (between 1989 and 1991), the fact that not a single proletarian hand was raised in their defence amply confirms this negative assessment.

Indeed, and on the contrary, many workers assisted in their demise.

Several of the dire political consequences of the idea that socialism could be built in one country can be seen (1) in the use to which dialectics was put to defend and rationalise this counter-revolutionary idea, and (2) in the way it was employed to try to limit and/or deny the catastrophic damage this inflicted on revolutionary socialism by blaming these errors on those, like Trotsky, who don't "understand dialectics":

"Lenin and Stalin showed that this scheme [of Trotsky's]…was false. For if the revolution did not take place in the advanced capitalist countries, the alliance of workers and peasants in the Soviet Union had still the forces to build socialism….

"In [this example]…it will be seen that the acceptance of some ready-made scheme, some abstract formula, means passivity, support for capitalism, betrayal of the working class and of socialism. But the dialectical approach which understands things in their concrete interconnection and movement shows us how to forge ahead -- how to fight, what allies to draw in. This is the inestimable value of the Marxist dialectical method to the working class movement." [Cornforth (1976), pp.79-80. Bold emphases added.]

Anyone who thinks the above is prejudicial to Stalinism only needs to reflect on the fact that the contrary idea --, that is, that socialism could be built in one country --, has also been refuted by history.

But, this is where DM comes into its own: lunatic policies -- many of which were changed overnight into their opposites -- were sold to party cadres (world-wide) by means of this theory. As noted above, that's because dialectics can be used to defend anything and its opposite, often by the very same dialectician.

Stalinism and Trotskyism (rightly or wrongly) parted company largely because of their differing views on international revolution. Of course, this rift wasn't just about ideas. Hard-headed decisions were taken for genuine, political reasons, but in order to rationalise each contradictory turn of events and sell them to the international communist movement, they were liberally coated with dialectical jargon.

Those who know the history of Bolshevism will also know the incalculable damage this split has inflicted on Marxism world-wide ever since.

Later, dialectical arguments were used to 'justify' the catastrophic and reckless class-collaborationist tactics imposed on both the Chinese and Spanish revolutions, just as they were employed to rationalise the ultra-left, "social fascist" post-1929 about-turn. This fatally crippled the fight against the Nazis by suicidally splitting the left in Germany, pitting communist against socialist, while Hitler laughed all the way to the Reichstag.

This 'theory' then helped 'justify' the rotation of Communist Party tactics through another 180 degrees in the next, class-collaborationist phase, the "Popular Front", and then through another 180 (in order to rationalise the unforgivable Hitler-Stalin pact) -- as part of the newly re-discovered 'revolutionary defeatist' stage --, and through yet another 180 two years later in the shape of 'The Great Patriotic War', following upon Hitler's predictable invasion of the 'Mother Land', 'Holy Russia'.

Post-1945, one more flip saw the invention of "peace-loving/progressive" nations versus the evil US Empire. History was now a struggle between "progressive/peace-loving" nations and reactionary regimes, the class war lost in all the dust kicked up by so much dialectical spinning.

[Indeed, Marx would by now be doing much more than a mere 180 degrees in his grave!]

Every single one of these somersaults had a catastrophic impact on the international workers' movement. Collectively, they cast a long shadow across the entire Communist Movement, reducing it to the sad, reformist excuse that we see among us today.

However, far, far worse, as noted above: these 'contradictory' about-turns helped pave the way for fascist aggression and the Third Reich. Hence, this 'theory' has played its own small, shameful, but indirect part in the deaths of millions of workers, countless millions of Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Slavs -- alongside the many hundreds of thousands of mentally-ill and handicapped victims abandoned to the Nazis.

Because of their continual, dialectically-inspired twists and turns, STDs in effect all but invited the Nazi tiger to rip European humanity to shreds.

And, it was only too happy to oblige.

[STD = Stalinist Dialectician.]

The negative effect of all this on the reputation of Marxism among the great mass of workers cannot be over-estimated, howsoever hard one tries. Talk to anyone about Marxism (and not just Communism), and you will be regaled with much of the above. Everyone 'knows' Marxism "does not work". We can only put all this hostility down to "capitalist propaganda" if we are keen to see yet more of the same.

Of course, not all of this is the sole fault of this mystical 'theory'; but it's undeniable that it was a major ideological factor in helping to rationalise these political gyrations (for whatever other reasons they might in fact have been taken), and thus in selling them to party cadres. Over the years, this has had an inevitable and seriously demoralising effect.

Moreover, no other theory could have excused with such ease the adoption of continual, almost overnight, changes in strategy and tactics --, or have rationalised so effectively the pathetic reasons that were given for the criminally unacceptable political about-turns imposed on the Communist Party internationally by post-1925 Stalinism.

[Some comrades have reacted to this claim by arguing that any theory can be used by both sides in a dispute to justify their side of the story, so why pick on DM? This is undeniable, but no other theory (except, perhaps, Zen Buddhism) can be used by the very same individual (and/or party) to justify a particular thesis and its opposite, often in the very next breath (as we saw Stalin do earlier), or the very next day.]

Nor, indeed, could any other theory have so effortlessly licensed the grinding to dust of the core of the old Bolshevik Party in the 1930s, as scores of leading comrades were put on 'trial' on trumped-up charges, and then executed -- along with countless thousands of others. What other theory -- other than Zen Buddhism, again --, can be used by one and the same dialectician to justify anything at all and its opposite?

Millions dead, Bolshevism in tatters, Marxism a foul stench in the nostrils of workers everywhere.

DM: tested in practice?

A resounding success?

Too right!

But, only for the ruling-class.

Maoism

Nevertheless, such deep dialectical devotion has meant that the anti-democratic and class collaborationist tactics adopted by the CPSU were copied by the CCP under Mao (even if this was so for locally different reasons). For example, the use of "principal" and "secondary" contradictions to justify the suicidal alliances with the Guomindang, the use of UOs to rationalise one-party, autocratic rule, and the reference to "leaps" to excuse the lunatic and murderous "Great Leap Forward".

[UO = Unity of Opposite.]

Consider the first of these: class-collaboration. Familiar 'dialectical' arguments were deployed in the mid-1930s rationalising the abrupt change from outright opposition to the Guomindang to the formation of a united front with them. To be sure, this might look contradictory to non-dialectical observers trapped in 'formal thinking', but to the trained dialectician, all this makes eminent good sense.

Consider next, the second of these: the 'contradiction' between centralised state power and greater social accountability. Dialectical dodges, similar to those employed by Stalin, were used by Mao and his acolytes to rationalise this 'paradox' by an appeal to the alleged 'contradictory' nature of socialist democracy. [The evidence for all this can be found here.]

DM: tested in practice?

Indeed so. And we can see for ourselves the results today in that model 'socialist' state: China.

Of course, at the very least, this means that approximately 20% of the population of this planet cannot now (and might not in the foreseeable future ever) be won over to any credible form of Marxism, since the vast majority have been inured to it, having seen the dire consequences of this contradictory theory, which preaches 'proletarian democracy', but won't actually trust them with any of it -- alongside the "mass-line", while practicing mass oppression --, these dialectical 'contradictions' rationalised along sound Stalinist lines.

Chinese workers and peasants need no one to inform them of the results of 'practice'; the vast majority can see for themselves the dire political and social consequences of this theory.

And now 'Materialist Dialectics' is being used to justify the existence of 'socialist' billionaires!

What's that you say? A contradiction in terms?

You clearly do not "understand" dialectics...

Once again: yet more 'dialectical contradictions' --, yet more dead workers, and yet more ordure heaped on Marxism.

Trotskyism

Trotskyism has similarly been cursed by the Dialectical Deity; its founder succeeded in super-gluing his followers to the discordant dialectical doctrine that the 'socialist' regime in the former USSR was contradictory -- as Alex Callinicos notes:

"There is, moreover, a third respect in which the classical Marxist tradition is relevant to understanding the Eastern European revolutions. For that tradition gave birth to the first systematic attempt at a social and historical analysis of Stalinism. Trotsky's The Revolution Betrayed (1937) pioneered that analysis by locating the origins of the Stalin phenomenon in the conditions of material scarcity prevailing in the Civil War of 1918-21, in which the bureaucracy of party officials began to develop. He concluded that the USSR was a 'degenerated workers' state', in which the bureaucracy had succeeded in politically expropriating the proletariat but left the social and economic foundations of workers' power untouched. The contradictions of that analysis, according to which the workers were still the ruling class of a state which denied them all political power, did not prevent Trotsky's more dogmatic followers extending it to China and Eastern Europe, even though the result was to break any connection between socialism and the self-emancipation of the working class: socialism, it seemed, could be imposed by the Red Army or peasant guerrillas." [Callinicos (1991), pp.18-19. Bold emphasis added; minor typo corrected.]

In which case, it made perfectly good dialectical-sense to suppose that the ruling-class (i.e., the proletariat) exercised no power at all, and were systematically oppressed for their pains, even while they were still the ruling class!

"The bourgeois norms of distribution, by hastening the growth of material power, ought to serve socialist aims -- but only in the last analysis. The state assumes directly and from the very beginning a dual character: socialistic, insofar as it defends social property in the means of production; bourgeois, insofar as the distribution of life's goods is carried out with a capitalistic measure of value and all the consequences ensuing therefrom. Such a contradictory characterization may horrify the dogmatists and scholastics; we can only offer them our condolences." [Trotsky (1977), p.54. Bold emphasis added.]

Hence, because "materialist dialectics" demanded it, all good Trotskyists were told to defend the USSR as a workers' state --, albeit deformed and/or degenerated. As Trotsky argued at length [in Trotsky (1971)], only those who do not "understand" dialectics would think to disagree.

All this helped cripple the politics of the Fourth International and demobilise militants in the run-up to WW2 -- whose cadres, even while they were advocating a principled anti-imperialist stance, were quite happy to defend Stalinist Imperialism.

Yet more 'dialectical contradictions' to match any that the STDs and MISTs were capable of inventing.

[MIST = Maoist Dialectician,]

And, as if to compound this dialectical clanger, Trotsky used 'Materialist Dialectics'  to defend the murderous Stalinist invasion of Finland!

Yet more dialectical practice, yet more dead workers, yet more ordure heaped on Marxism.

Are you beginning to spot a pattern here?

After Trotsky was murdered by a Stalinist agent, the application of 'scientific dialectics' to the contradictory nature of the USSR (and its satellites in Eastern Europe) split the Fourth International into countless warring sects, who have continued to fragment to this day.

Indeed, this is the only aspect of 'practical dialectics' that Trotskyists have managed to perfect, as the movement continues to splinter under its own 'internal contradictions'.

Chief among which is the following: Trotsky's heirs couldn't quite decide which was the more important principle -- loyalty to their founder's 'dialectical method' or to Marx's belief that the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself. If the latter, the emancipation of the working class can't be an act of the Red Army (in Finland, Eastern Europe or even North Korea), 'Third World' guerrillas (in China, Cuba, Nepal, Peru, etc.), nationalist/'progressive' dictators, or even radicalised students, to name just a few of the groups that have been 'dialectically substituted' for the working class by assorted Trotskyists ever since. Socialism from below replaced by socialism from above.

Dialectics has been, and is still being used to justify every conceivable form of substitutionism. Just to take one example: it prompted Ted Grant to invent the contradictory idea of "Proletarian Bonapartism". He did this so that he could account for the fact that the Stalinist regime in the former USSR and the Maoist clique in Beijing were able to oppress and exploit the alleged ruling-class -- i.e., the proletariat -- even though they were supposed to be running these (degenerated/deformed) workers' states!

As I argue in detail Essay Nine Parts One and Two, dialectics is indeed the ideology of substitutionist elements in Marxism.

All this has fatally wounded Trotskyism.

It might never recover.

Current signs are not encouraging...

The above are just three concrete examples of the thoroughly malignant effect this Hermetic theory has had on our movement. There are many others.

Is it any wonder then that since at least the 1920s Dialectical Marxism has been to success what George W Bush is to intellectual achievement and peace in the Middle East?

This is not just a short-term or ephemeral feature of Dialectical Marxism, but one that has dogged it since the beginning, and which shows no sign of improving -- quite the reverse, in fact!

Heads Back In The Sand, Comrades!

3) This is probably the safest option for dialecticians to adopt: ignore the problem (or explain it away). It's certainly the tactic that inadvertently helps further the interests of the ruling-class, since it prevents the serious theoretical problems our movement faces from ever being addressed, thus helping guarantee another century of failure.

Indeed, the bosses couldn't have designed a better theory to screw with our heads if they had tried, initiating in our movement a monumental waste of time as our very best theorists vainly try to grapple with Hegel's fluent Martian in order to make some sort of sense of it -- clearly, no luck so far!

All this is quite apart from the fact that practice cannot distinguish between correct and incorrect theories. The latter often work and they can do so for many centuries. For example, Ptolemaic Astronomy was highly successful for more than a thousand years, and it became increasingly accurate over time.

Furthermore, correct theories can sometimes fail, and for many centuries, too. For instance, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which wasn't observed until the 1838, with the work of Friedrich Bessel three hundred years after Copernicus's work was published.

[More examples of both alternatives can be found in Essay Ten Part One.]

And if success were an unfailing criterion of truth, since there is as yet no socialist society on earth, we will only know if Marxism is correct after the event. Hence, this criterion cannot tell us whether Marxism is correct now. [That disposes of Excuse Four.]

It could be objected that the above clearly ignores wider and/or longer-term issues. For example, the Ptolemaic system was finally abandoned because it proved inferior to its rivals in the long run.

This is undeniable, but the above response is unfortunately double-edged: if it's only in the long run that we may determine whether or not a theory is successful, then that theory might never be so judged.

That's because future contingencies could always arise to refute a given theory -- no matter how well it might once have seemed to 'work', or to have been confirmed. In fact, if history is anything to go by, this has been the fate of the vast majority of previous theories. Even though most, if not all, at one time 'worked', or were well-supported, the overwhelming majority were later abandoned.

As Stanford notes:

"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18^th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19^th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

[See also Stanford (2000, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2009, 2011), and Lyons (2002, 2003). (Several of these link to PDFs.)]

So, if anything, practice shows that practice is unreliable!

In fact, the following declaration could become true:

"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." [Marx and Engels (1848), pp.35-36. Bold emphasis added.]

According to these two, the "contending classes" could wipe each other out --, or at least the class war could result in their "common ruin" -- which outcome itself is not at all easy to square with the NON. [Why that is so will be explored in Essay Three Part Five, when it is published.]

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

However, judging from the way that dialecticians themselves disregard the deliverances of practice, this suggests that, in practice, even they do not accept their own criterion!

For in practice, they ignore it.

Unfortunately, pragmatic theories (like this) are hostages to fortune; those who rely on, or promote them should feign no surprise if history pays no heed of their dialectically-compromised day-dreams, and delivers decade after decade of refutation.

There are other (much better, and more materially-based) ways of confirming the validity of HM -- these will be explored in an Essay to be published at the main site at a later date.

All this means that if we want our practice to be more successful, we will have to ditch the theory that has helped drop our movement into this bottomless pit of failure: "materialist dialectics".

[It is important to add that I am not blaming this 'theory' for all our problems, only for some of them; however, no matter how many times I repeat this, I still encounter comrades on internet discussion boards who claim the opposite, that I am blaming dialectics for all our woes. Why they do this will be revealed below.]

Finally, the argument that 1917 confirms DM, since the 'party of dialectics' won this historic victory, is shown to be no less misguided, here.

Why Revolutionaries Cling To DM Like Grim Death

Boss-Class Theory

[It's worth pointing out that my argument below isn't as follows: DM is a boss-class theory, therefore it's wrong. It is in fact: DM is far too confused for anyone to be able say whether it is true or not. Moreover, because of this and its origin in traditional thought, it's no wonder it has failed us for so long.]

No matter how deep, long-term, devastating or repetitive the refutations history keeps delivering, and despite the cogent arguments ranged against it in my Essays and elsewhere by others, the DM-faithful remain hopelessly mesmerised by this 'theory'.

Why is this? And why have revolutionaries of the stature of Engels, Lenin and Trotsky sold their radical souls to this demonstrably conservative thought-form? [Marx was an exception; on that, see here and here.]

The actual source of the philosophical tradition from which DM emerged is not in any doubt (a summary can be found here), and neither is the petty-bourgeois, non-working class origin of DM-classicists (such as Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Trotsky). Unfortunately, this means that DM has an impressive boss-class pedigree.

It is important to note, however, what is not being alleged here: that the above comrades imported these class-compromised ideas into the workers' movement knowingly or duplicitously. On the contrary, it is being asserted that they did this honestly and unwittingly.

Unwittingly, because the only theories on offer in their day were those that had already been infected with ruling-class forms-of-thought. They certainly did not intend to saddle our movement with a class-compromised theory.

Honestly, because of their class origins and education they genuinely thought that the workers' movement needed a Philosophy, a 'world-view' of some sort. They weren't workers, but came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy.

As I pointed out earlier:

This tradition taught that behind appearances there lies a hidden world, which is more real than the material universe we see around us, and which is accessible to thought alone. Theology was openly built on this idea, but so was traditional philosophy.

This way of viewing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling-class, who also ensured that others were educated to see things this way, too. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers", philosophers, administrators, intellectuals, editors, theorists, etc.) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or is 'natural' and thus cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

So, a 'world-view' is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have altered with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and can therefore be imposed on reality, dogmatically.

Hence, the non-worker founders of our movement -- who had been educated from an early age to believe there was just such a hidden world lying behind appearances, and which governed everything -- when they became revolutionaries, looked for 'logical' principles in that abstract world that told them that change was inevitable, and was part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of that ruling-class mystic, Hegel. Hence, the dialectical classicists latched onto this theory and were happy to impose it on the world (upside down or the "right way up"), since, to them, because of their socialisation and education, it seemed quite natural to do this. After all, that's what 'genuine' philosophy is -- or, so they had been socialised to conclude.

This does not of course mean that only workers can be good socialists, but it does mean that we should be alert to the class-compromised origin of the ideas that DM-classicists brought with them into our movement -- before the working class could provide them with an effective materialist counter-weight.

Today, a hundred or so years later, there is no longer any excuse for continuing to import these ideas into Marxism since that counter-weight now exists.

Even so, this helps explain a rather curious anomaly: as the working class steadily grows in size, the influence that Dialectical Marxism has on it dwindles even faster. [More on that in Essay Nine Part One.]

Parallel to this, our movement continues to fragment and split, which means that it enjoys a steadily declining influence on the class struggle. Moreover, the fact that workers ignore our movement en masse means that their counter-weight has no influence where it counts: on our ideas.

So DM-Idealism lives on as its theorists think of new ways to make such awkward facts disappear.

The lack of active socialist workers means that the unifying force generated by the class struggle by-passes, and thus has no impact upon, the revolutionary movement. Because it is dominated by petty-bourgeois individuals, Dialectical Marxism does little other than fragment (for well-known social-psychological reasons -- on that, see here).

Hence, the same social forces that motivate workers to unite, drive professional revolutionaries in the opposite direction, toward fragmentation.

A rather ironic 'dialectical' inversion for readers to ponder.

But, are these accusations enough to condemn DM?

Clearly not on their own.

DM is demonstrably flawed from beginning to end (as my Essays show); that alone is sufficient to condemn it.

However, the alien-class origin of both "materialist dialectics" and its inventors explains why this theory has had such a deleterious effect on militant minds for so long, rendering our movement all but impotent. This also helps account for the disastrous effect this theory has had on post-1920s Marxism.

The Dialectics Of Defeat

But, why do hard-headed revolutionaries cling to this lamentable theory like drunks to lamp posts?

Marxists are aware that in defeat there is a tendency (even among revolutionaries) to turn to mysticism to (1) explain/rationalise these set-backs and (2) serve as a source of consolation. This was indeed one of the main reasons why Lenin wrote Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. However, Lenin failed to note that the defeats suffered in Russia in and around 1905 turned him toward dialectics, a theory about which he had largely been silent up until then.^1a

Unfortunately, Dialectical Marxism has known little other than defeat, disaster and failure for most of its history. And that is partly why DM-fans cling to this theory.

This means that the theory that has played an important subjective role in helping to engineer this catastrophic state of affairs also 'allows' its adherents to rationalise and/or ignore its consequences.

It does this in at two ways:

1) The NON persuades true believers that any and all retreats are only temporary; the onward march of Dialectical Marxism is assured by the underlying logic of the universe. [We saw this surface in Excuse Four, above. Indeed, it helps motivate the other excuses, too.]

2) DM-epistemology teaches that 'appearances' contradict underlying 'essences' -- that is: how things appear to be is the opposite of the way they really are. That being so, what might seem (to the dialectically untrained eye) to be a series of defeats is really part of the long-term, onward march of Marxism --, or, perhaps, part of a run of successes about to begin, any day soon...

This is the dialectical equivalent of 'pie-in-the-sky' -- i.e., this theory works as a materialist-sounding source of consolation for past failures, and a means by which they can be ignored/rationalised.

So, the theory that has helped engineer these set-backs also says that (1) they have not really happened, or if they have, (2) they are really the opposite of what they seem, or even that (3) they don't matter.

Anyone who doubts this should try telling any randomly-selected, dialectically-distracted comrade that Dialectical Marxism is highly unsuccessful. Unless you are extraordinarily unlucky, you can expect to be subjected to some ludicrously tortured logic that will attempt to prove otherwise.

The latter will no doubt include a convoluted explanation why, when 99% of the working class ignores Marxism --, and has done so for many generations --, and all four Internationals have gone down the pan, and the vast majority of the former 'socialist' states have gone into reverse, and Marxist parties everywhere (especially those in the Trotskyist 'movement') are a by-word for in-fighting, splits and divisions (indeed they are a standing joke in this regard),² and even though practically every communist party on the planet has embraced open reformism --, meaning that we are now further away from establishing a Workers' State than the Bolsheviks were in 1918 --, that none of this matters, or that none of this has actually happened, or is really now happening, or is any part of the particular 'tradition' to which this sad soul belongs.

You see, it's the fault of those other "sects"; it's a failure of revolutionary "leadership". Those who have an 'incorrect', or no "understanding" of dialectics are to blame -- those fools in the Workers' Yada Yada Party, you see, not ours...

Alternatively, the "objective circumstances" ploy will be dusted-off, and given another spin around the dialectical exercise yard.

Doubtless, you will then be informed of the good news that the latest stunt, conference, intervention, split, or expulsion that the party to which this sad dreamer belongs has just pulled off (or is about to stage) heralds the long-awaited turning-point for the international proletariat.^2a

Without a hint of irony -- still less of embarrassment --, this comrade will propound such verities on behalf of at most 0.0000001% of the population of this planet (this being the entire membership of his or her tiny grouplet (formed largely of non-workers)), some of whom are about to be expelled from the Workers' Yada Yada Party, anyway --, probably for failing to 'understand'/apply "materialist dialectics"!

And, as sure as eggs aren't dialectical eggs, this comrade will fail to see the connection between such facts and such failures --, and no doubt will then give you a hard time for even thinking to question the sacred gospel that preaches the exact opposite.

Or, if you belong to a different "sect", you can expect to be called a "revisionist!", a "bourgeois stooge", or worse.

Those familiar with revolutionary papers will already know about their unsinkable optimism -- anger is always "growing", movements are always "gaining strength", meetings are always "historic", victory is always "around the corner" --, how almost all of them claim to be the only ones who are "leading the class", and how Capitalism is once again entering its "final crisis", the latter apparently having more lives than a lorry load of cats.

All that this will confirm is how unreasonable dialecticians are, and how they are prepared to bend every rule and every fact, to lie and invent in order to protect the sacred dialectic.

So, Dialectical Marxists cling to this 'theory' because without it not only would their entire world-view fall apart, their source of consolation would evaporate. Hence, they are super-glued to dialectics for the same sorts of reasons that the religious among us cling to their faith.

[More on this, here.]

That, of course, explains the mind-numbing and mantra-like repetitiveness of DM, the pathological fear of the "R" word ("Revisionism"), the sacred books, the constant appeal to 'orthodoxy', the heroic pictures of the Dialectical Saints carried on parades (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Che, Kim Jong-il, etc., etc.), and the inexplicable adherence to the Stone Age Logic found in a thinly-disguised work of mystical theology that celebrates the goings-on of an invisible 'Being' (i.e., Hegel's 'Logic').

If this wasn't quite so serious, you'd roll about laughing.

Ruling-Class Theory

One of the main reasons why I reject not just DM, but all forms of traditional Philosophy, is that, as Marx noted above, both represent a boss-class view of the world.

In earlier times, the vast majority of Philosophers were either members of various ruling-classes, or were patronised by them. These theorists saw the state as an earthly embodiment of the cosmic order. In that case, just as society was ruled by "law", so was reality.

In ancient and medieval class societies, rulers and/or their representatives employed highly specialised language to frame their civil legal law in order to (1) reflect the above connection, (2) secure property and (3) help keep the 'great unwashed' in their place.

In all of this, these theorists failed to see this social form (language) for what it was: a means of communication. On the contrary, they regarded discourse as a means of representation, a secret code that (1) linked each thinker with the 'mind of  god' -- allowing the deity to re-represent his thoughts to each adept, and that (2) contained within itself hidden clues capable of revealing the 'essential' nature of 'Being'.

This encouraged them to think that if language was capable of ordering servants effortlessly about the place, if words codified into law actually controlled the state, and secured power, property and privilege, then language must possess a power of its own, and must likewise control reality -- since the state was a reflection of the cosmic order. Indeed, as the record shows, the idea soon suggested itself to ruling-class hacks that language must not only constitute the underlying fabric of reality, it must be capable of making things move. [So, this belief is not just found in magic.]

To paraphrase Marx: what had once been the product of the relations between human beings (ordinary language) became inverted and fetishised into a secret code that represented the real relations among things, or which constituted those things themselves.

Indeed, it also became natural for the ruling-class and their ideologues to think that this is how the 'gods' must have constituted the universe. As early creation myths reveal (and as we saw earlier), this is exactly how the ancients saw things: the 'gods' merely had to speak and not only did everything spring into existence, all of reality did as it was told -- as everything effortlessly obeyed the 'word of god', materialised now as physical law. So, just as good citizens observed the civil and criminal code, everything in nature bends its knee to 'divine law'.

According to this world-view, reality was either controlled by language or was constituted by it. In that case, language alone could be used to derive truths about it.

This doctrine I call "Linguistic Idealism" [LIE].

LIE, in one form or another, dominated all subsequent philosophical theories, and that is why all traditional philosophers think it quite natural to impose their ideas on reality. [More on that here and here.]

It thus became natural for ruling-class theorists to think of law and order, conflict and change in linguistic or conceptual terms -- as 'unities of opposites'.

And that is why mystics all argue and think in the way they do (as we saw above --, and will see again below, this time in connection with Heraclitus (540-475BC)): for them, language was indeed a secret code, invented by 'god'.

Hence, those who conceptualised reality in this way would naturally think that, if the status quo on earth is the product of language (which deliberately or accidentally masked the realities of class power, hidden now behind this superficially 'benign' façade) --, and if reality reflected, or was a reflection of, the state --, then thought alone could unmask, and then perhaps control, the secrets of nature.

Thus was born Philosophy, the most abstract form of ruling-class ideology.

Philosophical theories could now be imposed on nature because 'God' originally constituted the world this way, which meant that reality was little other than condensed thought/discourse -- after all, nature was Mind, constituted by the Divine Logos, the 'Word'.

This doctrine, as far as we know, was invented by the very first dialectician in history, Heraclitus:^2b

"Heraclitus, along with Parmenides, is probably the most significant philosopher of ancient Greece until Socrates and Plato; in fact, Heraclitus's philosophy is perhaps even more fundamental in the formation of the European mind than any other thinker in European history, including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Why? Heraclitus, like Parmenides, postulated a model of nature and the universe which created the foundation for all other speculation on physics and metaphysics. The ideas that the universe is in constant change and that there is an underlying order or reason to this change -- the Logos -- form the essential foundation of the European world view. Every time you walk into a science, economics, or political science course, to some extent everything you do in that class originates with Heraclitus's speculations on change and the Logos....

"In reading these passages, you should be able to piece together the central components of Heraclitus's thought. What, precisely, is the Logos? Can it be comprehended or defined by human beings? What does it mean to claim that the Logos consists of all the paired opposites in the universe? What is the nature of the Logos as the composite of all paired opposites? How does the Logos explain change? Finally, how would you compare Heraclitus's Logos to its later incarnations: in the Divided Line in Plato, in foundational and early Christianity? How would you relate Heraclitus's cryptic statements to those of Lao Tzu?" [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

The short answer to those questions is, obviously: The ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class!

From then on, for most traditional thinkers, Logic depicted the underlying form of reality, its essential structure. This further justified the imposition of the products of thought onto nature (these days as 'Dialectical Logic').

Although recently there have been notable exceptions to the above generalisations, for most philosophers, a priori knowledge was the only reliable form of knowledge. Empirical knowledge (that is, knowledge based on evidence and experience) was considered unreliable since it reflected the debased experience and life of ordinary folk.

[This is brought out particularly well in Conner (2005).]

So, from the beginning, philosophers denigrated the material language of working people -- just as they undervalued their view of the world -- gradually transforming the vernacular into a complex, jargon-dominated code that represented 'divine truth' and the 'rational' structure of reality.

And, surprise, surprise: dialecticians do the just same -- and we can now see why.

Which is rather odd, since Marx emphasised the opposite approach:

"For philosophers, one of the most difficult tasks is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they had to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content....

"...The philosophers would only have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases alone added.]

Traditional Philosophers thus sought to invent a priori theses that revealed the underlying 'essence' of reality -- i.e., fundamental features of existence inaccessible to the senses, and hence 'safely' irrefutable by any material means.

In every single case, but in different forms depending on which Mode of Production was dominant at the time, Philosophers derived their theses from words (or from 'concepts') alone -- either from specially-concocted jargon (such as, "Being", "Entelechy", "Substance", or "Nothing"), or from suitably distorted ordinary terms (like "cause", "law", "thought", or "determined"), just as Marx pointed out.

Such theses were imposed on nature, and were not only held to be true everywhere and everywhen, they determined the form of any and all possible worlds.

Moreover, because these doctrines have been derived from language alone, they appeared to be 'self-evident' (that is, no external material evidence was required to establish their truth; they were thus self-certifying). In that case, these super-truths were not only easy to invent (a few moments reflection on the 'real' or 'hidden meaning' of a handful of words was all that was required), but once concocted, they seemed impossible to question.

The same is true of the theses dialecticians lifted from Hegel (upside down, or the 'right way up').

Of course, that is just one more reason why practice has never been a test of the truth of DM, and never will be. Dialectics is self-certifying. It doesn't require testing in practice, nor does it need 'revising'. In which case, whatever happens, this theory will always appear to ratify itself.

Small wonder then that actual practice has shown that the deliverances of practice are consistently ignored.

This approach to 'knowledge' is well summarised by James White (in this case in relation to German Idealism):

"Already with Fichte the idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of finding a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be based. Thinkers from Kant onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error, incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied in the laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996), p.29. Bold emphasis added.]

It's worth noting here how the word "law" was lifted from legal theory and projected onto nature -- the use of which term plainly suggests that reality is governed by a cosmic will of some sort. [After all, who enacted these 'universal laws'? And who enforces them? And how is 'unintelligent 'matter able to 'obey' them unerringly?]

Hence, for traditional theorists, if nature is deemed to have an underlying rational structure, then not only was it easy to 'justify' the status quo (as a reflection of that underlying order), it was equally easy to argue that those who rebelled against it could be opposed on 'legitimate' and 'rational' grounds.

In fact, opposition was futile; the cosmic order will always re-assert itself. [These days, that task has been hived-off to our genes.]

The above is further amplified by the following two authors:

"Empirical, contingent truths have always struck philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained…. Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere, e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in quantum mechanics today. One feature that explains philosophers' fascination with truths of Reason is that they seem, in a deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential relations of Simple Natures; mathematical truths are apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build upon them mythological structures.

"We think of necessary propositions as being true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as the truth-functions or (in Frege's case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics. So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a supra-empirical domain (a 'third realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however these authors record this erroneously as p.139, RL] or the 'mineralogy of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g., Pascal, admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal. Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again, these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41, RL]. Logic seems to investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….

"In our eagerness to ensure the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent 'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell (1937), p.xv; again these authors record this erroneously as p.v, RL], then the mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of physical theorising, such as Planck's constant." [Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original have been altered to conform to those adopted here.]

DM-theorists attempt to do something similar: from a few specially-selected, jargonised expressions they suddenly produce a host of a priori theses, which they then impose on nature. For instance, from what he imagined was the 'real' meaning of the word "move", Engels thought he could derive what he imagined was true of every single example of motion in the entire universe, for all of time:

"...[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another[,] [t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]

Unfortunately for Engels (and Hegel), there are many legitimate uses of words connected with movement (including "move" and "place") that do not imply this. [More details can be found here.]

Anyway, even if Engels were right, this use of language is no less a 'brute fact', too. After all, why should a 'contradiction' make anything change or move? And, why should quantity change into quality? Why should the whole be more than the sum of the parts? The only possible answer is that they too are just brute facts about reality.

Hence, just as metaphysics cannot in the end explain anything, neither can 'Materialist Dialectics' -- even if either or both were true! In that case, not only have Dialectical Marxists bought a pig in a poke, there is in fact no pig and no poke!

Once more, all this is not the least bit surprising since, as we have just seen, these ideas originated from within an ancient ruling-class, Idealist tradition. Moreover, as we have also seen, without exception every single DM-classicist was a non-worker, educated to think along these lines.³

So, DM is based on and has replicated the thought-forms of a well-entrenched ruling-class.

No wonder then it has presided over little other than defeat, failure, and disaster.⁴

Conclusion

And that is why I am implacably opposed to DM.

In fact, it is difficult for me to understand why most revolutionaries are not.

Notes

1. For anyone interested, there is an entire site devoted to the unity/identity of opposites in mystical thought.

Here are few more quotations from assorted mystics that show they too appealed to 'unities of opposites', and the like, to account for change and stability, etc.:

"Sufism is usually associated with Islam. It has developed Bhakti to a high point with erotic imagery symbolising the unity of opposites. The subtle anatomy and microcosm-macrocosm model also found in Tantra and Taoism is used by it, dressed in its own symbols. Certain orders use ecstatic music and/or dance which reminds one of the Tantric celebration of the senses. Sometimes, the union of opposites is seen as a kind of gnosis. This is similar to Jnani Yoga." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

"The fact that the Reality of God which is disclosed through the cosmos can be described by opposite and conflicting attributes explains, in the Muslim view, why the cosmos itself can be seen as a vast collection of opposites. The two hands of God are busy shaping all that exists. Hence, mercy and wrath, severity and gentleness, life-giving and slaying, exalting and abasing, and all the contradictory attributes of God are displayed in existence. These opposing pairs of names act together in a manner analogous to yin and yang. One way in which we perceive this constant interaction of the names is through change (haraka) and transmutation (estehala). Here Chuang Tzu could say: 'The existence of things is like a galloping horse. With every motion existence changes, at every second it is transformed' (Chuang Tsu 17. 6). For their part, the Ash'arite theologians said that nothing stands still in creation and no phenomenon remains constant in its place for two successive moments. Everything is in constant need of divine replenishment, since nothing exists on its own. Things can exist only if God gives them existence. If God were to stop giving existence to the universe for an instant, it would disappear. Hence, at each moment God re-creates the cosmos to prevent its annihilation." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

"According to Acharya Mahaprajna, opposition is a fundamental rule for existence. 'There is no type of existence in which opposites do not co-exist. In a sense, existence may also be defined as the coming together of opposites. It is the principle of the quest for unity between two apparently different characteristics of a substance. It tries to point out that the characteristics which differences have, also have an identicality. Reconciliation, which is a principle of anekant, comes about only with the recognition of the identity principle.'...

"In the opposite lies the affirmation of an attribute. This seems to be true at all levels. Even within the atom, the electron has an anti-particle called photon (sic). Writes Richard Feynman, 'Photons look exactly the same in all respects when they travel backwards in time...so they are their own anti-particles.'" [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle -- the Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,' and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree'; and that the 'universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything. They begin by showing that Spirit and Matter are but the two poles of the same thing, the intermediate planes being merely degrees of vibration...." [The Kybalion, reputed by some to be the third most important book of Hermeticism, quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

Finally, there is this revealing comment, again:

"The ancient Egyptians believed that a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A similar premise, that the interaction between yin (the female principle) and yang (the male principle) underlies the workings of the universe, is at the heart of much Chinese thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy from the fourth century B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many Chinese who are not Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the Chinese. Peoples all over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, have come to the conclusion that the cosmos is a combining of opposites and that one of the most important aspects of this dualism is the opposition between male and female." [Maybury-Lewis (1992), p.125. Bold emphases added.]

Notice how both the arguments and examples used by the above mystics are broadly similar to those found in DM-texts. It seems that open and honest mystics (the traditional sort) also like to appeal to the same sort of Mickey Mouse Science to substantiate their 'theories' as many of our (closet) Dialectical-Mystical comrades do.

Exactly why both sets of mystics (i.e., the traditional and the dialectical sort) do this is explained in Essay Nine Part Two, and Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here).

1a. This isn't to argue that Lenin was totally uninterested in DM before 1905, only that this theory assumed a much more important role in this though after 1905.

2. This was made into a famous joke by the Monty Python crew:

BRIAN: Are you the Judean People's Front?

REG: Fuck off!

BRIAN: What?

REG: Judean People's Front. We're the People's Front of Judea! Judean People's Front. Cawk.

FRANCIS: Wankers!

BRIAN: Can I... join your group?

REG: No. Piss off!

BRIAN: I didn't want to sell this stuff. It's only a job. I hate the Romans as much as anybody.

PEOPLE'S FRONT OF JUDEA: Shhhh. Shhhh. Shhh. Shh. Shhhh!

REG: Schtum!

JUDITH: Are you sure?

BRIAN: Oh, dead sure. I hate the Romans already.

REG: Listen. If you really wanted to join the P.F.J., you'd have to really hate the Romans.

BRIAN: I do!

REG: Oh, yeah? How much?

BRIAN: A lot!

REG: Right. You're in. Listen. The only people we hate more than the Romans are the fucking Judean People's Front.

P.F.J.: Yeah...!

JUDITH: Splitters!

P.F.J.: Splitters...!

FRANCIS: And the Judean Popular People's Front.

P.F.J.: Yeah. Oh, yeah. Splitters. Splitters...!

LORETTA: And the People's Front of Judea.

P.F.J.: Yeah. Splitters. Splitters...!

REG: What?

LORETTA: The People's Front of Judea. Splitters!

REG: We're the People's Front of Judea!

LORETTA: Oh. I thought we were the Popular Front.

REG: People's Front! C-huh.

FRANCIS: Whatever happened to the Popular Front, Reg?

REG: He's over there.

P.F.J.: Splitter!

There are literally hundreds of tiny Trotskyist groups on the planet, all with the 'correct' dialectical line, just as there are nearly as many anarchist, left communist, communist and Maoist parties.

[Anyone who doubts this should look here, here, here and here.]

Indeed, this is what Hal Draper had to say about the situation thirty odd years ago in America alone:

"American socialism today has hit a new low in terms of sect fragmentation. There are more sects going through their gyrations at this moment than have ever existed in all previous periods in this country taken together. And the fragments are still fissioning, down to the sub-microscopic level. Politically speaking, their average has dropped from the comic-opera plane to the comic-book grade. Where the esoteric sects (mainly Trotskyist splinters) of the 1930s tended toward a sort of super sophistication in Marxism and futility in practice, there is a gaggle of grouplets now (mainly Maoist-Castroite) characterized by amnesia regarding the Marxist tradition, ignorance of the socialist experience, and extreme primitivism. The road to an American socialist movement surely lies over the debris, or around the rotting off-shoots of, this fetid jungle of sects." [Quoted from here.]

2a. Here is a recent example of this sort of unsinkable, revolutionary megalomania:

"Thus, we understand that the 10th Congress has been the congress of the triumph of the revolutionary working class cause and of its party of vanguard, too." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

A vanishingly small Maoist sect in Argentina thus speaks for all workers!

And here is another (from the IMT -- the International Marxist Tendency):

"In the first week of August 2004 a meeting of almost 300 Marxists from 26 countries, including Venezuela and Cuba, met in Spain to discuss the world situation and the tasks of the international revolutionary Marxist tendency. This was for many reasons an historic turning point that registered a qualitative advance of the forces of Marxism on a world scale." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

And two years later, here is more of the same from the same:

"July 30, the 2006 World Congress of the International Marxist Tendency opened in Barcelona. This was a truly amazing congress, characterized by terrific energy, enthusiasm, and optimism combined with an extremely high level of political discussion and debate. Above all, there was a firm determination to build the International in the coming period. It was the largest congress ever, with 320 present, cramming the meeting hall almost to capacity....

"This world congress is dedicated to the memory of Ted Grant and we pledge ourselves to continue in his work. I will finish with the words inscribed on the tomb of Wren, the great architect: 'If you want a monument, look around you.'" [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added. No doubt, readers will now be able write the entry for 2007*, and then 2008...**]

If you patrol little else but the flatlands of failure, then, when you stop to "look around you", every molehill will indeed look like a mountain, and 320 comrades seem a big deal.

[After ten years of not achieving very much, these comrades are still (not) going strong --, here.]

Anyone familiar with all shades of Dialectical Marxism will know that constant hyperbole of this sort is almost de rigueur.

The beginnings of an explanation for this phenomenon can be found here.

[The latter is in fact Tourish (1998). More details can be found in Tourish and Wohlforth (2000). I must add, however, that I distance myself from the negative comments made about democratic centralism and Leninism by these two.]

*2008 update: We can now can see if you were right:

"The International Marxist Tendency held its World School in Barcelona this year from July 29 to August 3. This followed on last year's successful 2006 World Congress. Present were 300 comrades from 26 countries, including El Salvador, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Russia and most European countries....

"The school was in the first place a political event that aimed to raise everybody's political level. This we believe was achieved with the excellent leadoffs and debates throughout the week. The comrades were enthused by the event and given a feeling that they belong to something great, a genuine Marxist International, with comrades on all continents working for the same goal, the emancipation of the working class and a genuine classless society....

"Above all, what this World School showed was the enthusiasm and confidence in the ideas of Marxism and the organisation that is putting these into practice on a world scale. This was reflected in the collection: this year, as in previous years, the record was broken and no less than 37,700 Euros {approximately $55,000 --  2008 rates, RL} were collected! This money will undoubtedly be put to good use and will enable us to pay for more trips to different sections and sympathising groups, the hosting of this website, and other expenses for the promotion of Marxist ideas and the building of a strong organisation on a world scale." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added. Yep, still upbeat about having gone nowhere in the last 12 months!]

See you next year...

**2009 update:

"[The 2008] Congress of the International Marxist Tendency met in Barcelona at the end of July. It is difficult to convey the sense of momentum present in every session of the congress. This was not just another meeting of left activists searching for answers. All of the 350 delegates and visitors could feel that after years of preparation, after decades of defending the ideas of Marxism against the attacks of the bourgeois, the reformists, revisionists and sectarians, these are now being vindicated by events. All other previous gatherings of the IMT felt like preparations for this World Congress, a congress that lays the groundwork for the advance of Marxism internationally." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

So, still pootling about in Oblivionsville.

See you in 2010...

Er.., except, in 2010 the IMT split, losing much of its Spanish-speaking sections. Some estimates put the loss at half their membership. Another significant defeat for the international proletariat?

Not a bit of it! Here's a report from April 2010 (04/2010):

"The Venezuelan comrades of the IMT held their re-founding Congress in Caracas, taking the opportunity to launch their new paper, Lucha de Clases (Class Struggle). The comrades have had to deal with very difficult internal conditions over the past year but have been able to re-found the Venezuelan section of the IMT with great enthusiasm and optimism. The unanimous feeling was that the organisation was now on a qualitative higher level than before. Having purged the organisation of harmful ultra-left and sectarian deviations, they are prepared to play a decisive role within the PSUV and the Venezuelan revolution." [Quoted from here. Bold added.]

So, splits and expulsions somehow 'strengthen' the movement! The exact opposite of what you'd expect.

But that's Diabolical Logic for you...

Here's more of the same from the 2010 report:

"2010 Congress of the IMT – a great step forward.

Fewer members and delegates is a "great step forward"!

"Building the party" is also to demolish it!

See you next year...

Here's the 2011 report:

"The IMT World School that was held in Italy between 31 July and 5 August was a tremendous success. About 225 comrades from many different countries and continents travelled to the Italian seaside resort of Marina de Massa in order to attend a week of intense but enjoyable and educational meetings....

"The 2011 World School was wound up by an inspiring speech by comrade Alan Woods, after which all those present rose to their feet in a truly rousing rendition of The Internationale.

"The mood throughout the School was enthusiastic both inside and outside the sessions. In addition to the commissions and plenary sessions there were numerous discussions and small commissions in which comrades from different countries could exchange experiences and learn from each other.

"At the end of the School, there was a very lively social, when comrades from every section sang revolutionary songs. The mood of enthusiasm was shown in the magnificent collection, which raised over 30,000 euros {approx $39,000 -- 2011 rates, RL} for the building of the International Marxist Tendency." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

So,  less money collected, fewer delegates, and another year of going nowhere..., but who's counting?

[I must apologise for picking on the IMT; any Trotskyist sect could have been chosen. It's just that the IMT's reports are more readily available.]

2b. The following comment about Heraclitus is of interest:

"Although he does not speak in detail of his political views in the extant fragments, Heraclitus seems to reflect an aristocratic disdain for the masses and favour the rule of a few wise men, for instance when he recommends that his fellow-citizens hang themselves because they have banished their most prominent leader...." [Quoted from here; spelling altered to conform to UK English. Bold emphasis added.]

As is this one by Heraclitus himself:

"81. Men should speak with rational mind and thereby hold strongly to that which is shared in common -- as a city holds onto its law, and even more strongly. For even more strongly all human laws are nourished by the one divine law, which prevails as far as it wishes, suffices for all things, and yet somehow stands above them." [Quoted from here. This links to a PDF.]

3. Some might think the work of Joseph Dietzgen is an exception to this rule, but that is not so. On that, see here.

4. The dynamics of this process are outlined here and here.

References

Baker, G., and Hacker, P. (1988), Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity, Volume Two (Blackwell, 2^nd ed.).

Callinicos, A. (1991), The Revenge Of History. Marxism And The Eastern European Revolutions (Polity Press).

Clarke, S., and Lyons, T. (2002) (eds.), Recent Themes In The Philosophy Of Science. Scientific Realism And Commonsense (Kluwer Academic Press).

Conner, C. (2005), A People's History Of Science. Miners, Midwives And "Low Mechanicks" (Nation Books).

Copenhaver, B. (1995), Hermetica. The Greek Corpus Hermeticum And The Latin Asclepius In A New English Translation With Notes And An Introduction (Cambridge University Press).

Cornforth, M. (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5^th ed.).

Eco, U. (1997), The Search For The Perfect Language (Fontana).

Engels, F. (1954), Dialectics Of Nature (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1976), Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Press).

Gollobin, I. (1986), Dialectical Materialism. Its Laws, Categories And Practice (Petras Press).

Haynes, M. (2002), Russia. Class And Power 1917-2000 (Bookmarks).

Hegel, G. (1975), Logic, translated by William Wallace (Oxford University Press, 3^rd ed.).

--------, (1999), Science Of Logic (Humanity Books).

Jammer, M. (1999), Concepts Of Force (Dover, 2^nd ed.).

Kozlov, V. (2002), Mass Uprisings In The USSR: Protest And Rebellion In The Post-Stalin Years (M. E. Sharpe).

Kuusinen, O. (1961) (ed.), Fundamentals Of Marxism-Leninism (Lawrence & Wishart).

Lenin, V. (1921), 'Once Again On The Trade Unions, The Current Situation And The Mistakes Of Comrades Trotsky And Bukharin', reprinted in Lenin (1980), pp.70-106.

--------, (1961), Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works Volume 38 (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1980), On The Question Of Dialectics (Progress Publishers).

Lyons, T. (2002), 'Scientific Realism And The Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens', in Clarke and Lyons (2002), pp.63-90.

--------, (2003), 'Explaining The Success Of Scientific Theory', in Mitchell (2003), pp.891-901.

Magee, G. (2001), Hegel And The Hermetic Tradition (Cornell University Press). [The Introduction to this book can be found here.]

Marx, K. (1843), Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy Of Right, in Marx (1975), pp.243-57.

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Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1848), The Communist Manifesto, in Marx and Engels (1968), pp.31-63.

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--------, (1970), The German Ideology, Students Edition, edited by Chris Arthur (Lawrence & Wishart).

--------, (1976), MECW, Volume Five (Lawrence & Wishart).

Maybury-Lewis, D. (1992), Millennium: Tribal Wisdom And The Modern World (Viking Penguin).

Mao Tse-Tung, (1961a), Selected Works Of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume One (Foreign Languages Press).

--------, (1961b), 'On Contradiction', in Mao (1961a), pp.311-47.

Novack, G. (1965), The Origins Of Materialism (Pathfinder Press).

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[This has been reprinted in a slightly different form in the online Marxist journal What Next? 27, 2003, here. Anyone interested can follow the ensuing debate here.]

Tourish, D., and Wohlforth, T. (2000), On The Edge. Political Cults Right And Left (M E Sharpe).

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Caveats

The above Essay will be updated continuously.

That endeavour is connected with the my aim to make these ideas as straightforward and clear as possible. However, several factors mean this objective will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve:

1) Since I allege that Dialectical Materialism makes no sense, any criticisms levelled against it risk a similar fate. For example, DM-theorists refer to 'internal contradictions' to account for change in nature and society, but they seem totally incapable of explaining what these mysterious 'entities' are (that is, after 150 years of not trying very hard!).

Even the best account of 'dialectical contradictions' I have ever read -- to be found in an article by James Lawler -- is itself hopelessly confused. [That is demonstrated here.]

Hence, in this case and in others, my objections are directed at an irredeemably obscure set of 'doctrines'.

So, in most places, it's been impossible to turn this 'dialectical pig's ear' into even a plastic purse.

I doubt anyone can.

If after reading this Essay, the reader still hasn't a clue what dialecticians are banging on about, that failing is not down to me.

2) My criticisms of DM form part of a wider critique of Philosophy in general. This involves me in having to challenge ideas that have penetrated very deep into Western (and, indeed, human) culture -- in fact I claim they form part of the "ruling ideas" to which Marx referred --, and thus into dialectics itself.

In turn, this has meant that I have had to challenge forms-of-thought which have dominated intellectual life, 'East' and 'West' --, and which few have even thought to question --, for nigh on 2500 years, addressing extraordinarily deep problems that have been missed (or have been passed over) by some of the best minds in human history.

This being so, it's virtually impossible to give a 'simple' account of the criticisms I aim to make of such well-entrenched "ruling ideas", especially if they relate to problems that have been missed by such towering intellects.

I hasten to add, however, that I am only in a position to do this because of the work of Wittgenstein. So I claim originality for these ideas only in the manner of their presentation.

[I have defused several Marxist-inspired criticisms of Wittgenstein here and here.]

Incidentally, this is partly why my ideas have faced implacable resistance and hostility from practically every quarter: they break entirely new ground, and run against 2500 years of traditional patterns of thought. However, had this not happened that would have indicated I was on the wrong track!

Of course, the above factors will not stop me from trying to make my ideas increasingly clear, since it is fundamental to my project that if I can't explain myself in ordinary language, then not even I understand what I am attempting to say!

And that is why this Essay will need to be re-written many times.

Anyone who still finds anything I have said here incomprehensible should e-mail me, and I will do my best to put it right.

In fact, one or two comrades have already complained that this Essay is still far too long and/or complicated. In that case, I have written an "Anti-Dialectics For Dummies" Essay, which attempts to summarise some of the above in simpler language and in under 7000 words.

Latest Update: 30/01/12

Word count: 29,680

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