Essay Eight Part Two: Why 'Opposing Forces' Aren't 'Contradictions'

 

In what follows I have taken the results of Essay Eight Part One -- Change Through 'Internal Contradiction' -- for granted.

 

Several of the claims made in this Part of Essay Eight are further developed and substantiated in Part Three.

 

Technical Preliminaries

 

Internet Explorer 11 will no longer play the videos I have embedded below. As far as I can tell they play as intended in other Browsers. However, if you have Privacy Badger [PB] installed, they won't play in Google Chrome unless you disable PB for this site (anti-dialectics.co.uk).

 

[I have since discovered they play in IE11 if you have upgraded to Windows 10 or 11. It looks like the problem is with Windows 7 and earlier versions of that operating system.]

 

If you are using Internet Explorer 10 (or later), you might find some of the links I have used won't work properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu); for IE11 select 'Compatibility View Settings' and add this site (address above). Microsoft's browser, Edge, automatically renders these links compatible, as do Windows 10 and 11.

 

However, if you are using Windows 10 or 11, IE11 and Edge unfortunately appear to colour these links somewhat erratically. They are meant to be mid-blue, but those two browsers render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and even red!

 

Firefox, Opera, Vivaldi, DuckDuckGo, Brave, and Chrome reproduce them correctly, as far as I can tell. Edge now seems to be colouring them correctly, too, if you are using Windows 11.

 

Unfortunately, one or two browsers also underline these links inconsistently. Many are underscored boldly in black, others in light blue! They are all meant to be underlined in the same colour as the link itself.

 

If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used; Mozilla often replaces them with an "ş'.

 

There are no problems with Chrome, Opera, Edge, DuckDuckGo, or Internet Explorer, as far as I can determine.

 

Finally: for some reason, Google Chrome will take the reader to the exact spot to which I have linked at this site -- but, it will then automatically scroll down at least half a page! I have no idea why it is doing this. I have tried to correct this glitch but all my efforts have so far failed. Readers will need to keep this in mind, and scroll back up half a page, if they use any of the aforementioned links via Chrome.

 

As far as I can tell, there are no problems with links to other sites or web-pages.

 

In addition, it seems that Firefox, Opera, Edge, Vivaldi, Brave, and DuckDuckGo all take the reader to the exact spot in these Essays, with none of the above scrolling involved.

 

If any of my readers use other browsers (such as Apple's Safari, which I can't check on my computer), and they find that they also take them to the exact spot, I would greatly appreciate it if they informed me to that effect.

 

Preface

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, again depending on the context.]

 

As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack either on HM -- a scientific theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary thirty-nine years ago. The difference between DM and HM, as I see it, is explained here.

 

Some readers might wonder why I have quoted extensively from a wide variety of DM-sources in the Essays published at this site. In fact a good 10-20% of the material in many of them is comprised of just such quotations. Apologies are therefore owed the reader in advance for the length and extremely repetitive nature of most of these passages. The reason for their inclusion is as follows: Long experience has taught me that Dialectical Marxists simply refuse to accept that their own classicists -- e.g., Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao, alongside countless 'lesser' DM-theorists --, actually said the things I have attributed to them. That is especially the case when they are confronted with the absurd consequences that follow from their ideas. That remains the case unless they are shown chapter and verse, in extensive detail. Partial quotes, paraphrases or summaries in my own words they reject as "distortions", "mis-interpretations", "mis-representations", or even "manipulations".  Furthermore, in debate when I quote only one or two passages in support of what I allege they are simply brushed off as "outliers" or "atypical". Indeed, in the absence of dozens of proof texts drawn from a wide range of sources, quoted from across all areas of Dialectical Marxism, and reproduced in full) they tend to regard whatever any one particular theorist might have to say -- regardless of who they are, even if they turn out to be one of the aforementioned classicists -- as either "far too crude", "unrepresentative" or even(!) unreliable. Failing that they often complain that any such passages have been "taken out of context". Many in fact object since -- surprising and sad though this is to say --, they are largely ignorant of the finer details of their own theory, or, perhaps even worse, they simply haven't read the DM-classics and have little to no idea what they contain! [Rather like so many Christians who have never read the Bible!] The only way to counter repeated attempts to deflect, reject and deny along these lines is to quote a wide selection of DM-material frequently and at length.

 

But even that doesn't always work!

 

Furthermore, because of the highly sectarian and partisan nature of Dialectical Marxism, I have also found it necessary to quote sources from across the entire 'dialectical spectrum'. That is because Trotskyists object if I quote Stalin or Mao, Maoists and Stalinists complain if I reference Trotsky -- or even if I cite "Brezhnev era revisionists". Non-Leninist Marxists bemoan the fact that I haven't confined my remarks to what Marx or Hegel had to say, advising me to ignore the confused, even "simplistic", ideas expressed by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Trotsky! This often means I have to quote the lot!

 

That itself has had the (indirect) benefit of revealing how much and to what extent they (the classicists and subsequent epigones across all areas of Dialectical Marxism) largely agree with each other despite sectarian rhetoric to the contrary, at least with respect to DM -- but, clearly, not so much over how to apply it!

 

Some have complained that my linking to Wikipedia completely undermines the credibility of these Essays. When I launched this project on the Internet in 2005, there was precious little material easily available on-line related to the vast majority of topics to which I could link other than Wikipedia. In the intervening years alternative sites have become available (for example, the excellent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Encyclopedia Britannica), so I have been progressively replacing most of the old Wikipedia links with links to these other sources. Having said that, I haven't done so for some of the links -- for instance, those that relate to geographical, historical, scientific, biographical (etc.) topics which aren't deemed controversial, at least among Dialectical Marxists. In every case, I have endeavoured to avoid linking to Wikipedia in relation to key areas of my case against DM, so that at no point do my criticisms depend exclusively on such links. However, it will take several years to complete this change-over!

 

In addition to the above (as readers will soon discover if they consult the Bibliography and End Notes attached to each Essay), I have added copious references to other published academic and non-academic books and articles (posted on-line or printed in hard copy) to the End Notes, which further develop or substantiate anything I argue, claim, allege or propose.

 

Others have complained about the sheer number of links I have added to these Essays (because they say it makes them very difficult to read). Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they believe everything is inter-connected, which must surely apply even to Essays that attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those who find the links make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore them! -- unless, of course, you want to access further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point or a certain topic fires your interest.

 

Still others wonder why I have linked to familiar topics that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of recent Presidents of the USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers, lakes and mountains, the titles of popular films, or certain words that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: My Essays are read all over the world and by people from entirely different backgrounds so I can't assume that something which is part of common knowledge in 'the west' is equally well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies', or any at all. Many of my readers also speak English only as a second language, so any help I can give them I will continue to provide.

 

Finally on this specific issue, several of the aforementioned links connect to web-pages that regularly change their addresses or which even vanish from the Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent that they have changed or have disappeared, I can't possibly keep on top of this. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers informed me of any dead or incorrect links they happen to notice. In general, links to Haloscan no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

It is worth pointing out that at least 30% of my case against DM has been relegated to the End Notes (link above). Indeed, in this particular Essay much of the supporting evidence is to be found there. This approach has been adopted in order to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more smoothly. This means that if readers want fully to appreciate my case against DM, they will need to consult this material, too. In many instances, I have added several qualifications, clarifications and considerably more detail to what I have to say in the main body. In addition, I have raised numerous objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will even have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments, to which I have then responded. [I explain why I have adopted this tactic in Essay One.] If readers skip this material, then my response to any qualms or objections they might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments and clarifications.

 

Since I have been debating this theory with Dialectical Marxists for well over thirty years, I have heard all the objections there are! Many of the more recent debates have been listed here. (Unfortunately, most of the links on that page have now died!)

 

Furthermore, phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" (etc.), employed throughout this site (in connection with Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius). They are intended to highlight theories (or, indeed, "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise, the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. Up until recently, this dogmatic approach to knowledge has almost exclusively been promoted by thinkers who either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run the system for the elite.**

 

However, such questions will become the central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is directed here, here, and here for further details.

 

[**Exactly how this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays published at this site (especially here, here, and here). In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the argument -- but this time written for absolute beginners -- here.]

 

Five final points:

 

First: throughout this site I have used the term "Dialectical Marxism". I have done so in order to distinguish Marxism from the dialectical aberration that has completely dominated (and I claim has helped cripple) revolutionary socialism for over a hundred-and-fifty years. So, the terms "Dialectical Marxism" and "Dialectical Marxist" refer to the mainstream 'Marxist tradition' that has accepted in one form or another the validity of DM and, as a result, has either applied it to all of 'reality' or has restricted it to social and historical development (i.e., where it has largely been inserted into HM). However, I distance Marx himself from this toxic amalgam, to which conclusion many Dialectical Marxists have taken great exception (perhaps more so than anything else published at this site!). Why that is so has also been explained, here and here. Furthermore, why this Hegelianised Hybrid (Dialectical Marxism, not Marxism itself) has been such an abject failure for well over a century is explained here and here. [That argument has been summarised here and here.] The word "Marxist" has been put in 'scare quotes' in this paragraph for the reasons briefly expressed earlier but in greater detail throughout Essay One (link above).

 

Second: readers will soon notice that in what follows the word "reality" has sometimes also been put in 'scare' quotes. That doesn't mean I think the world doesn't exist, or that everything is just an 'illusion', a 'simulation' or even that language actually constructs the world! In so doing I am indirectly highlighting the fact that I disagree with the philosophical use of this word. I explain why that is so here and here -- but in much greater detail throughout Essay Twelve Part One.

 

Third: If readers manage to spot any errors, interpretive mistakes or typos, I would greatly appreciate it if they brought them to my attention. I have absolutely no interest in spreading error or misinformation.

 

Fourth: In what follows, the words, "use-value" and "exchange-value" have been hyphenated (except where I am quoting Marx or other theorists).

 

Fifth: Anyone puzzled by the unremittingly hostile tone I have adopted toward DM and Dialectical Marxism in general might find it helpful to read this first.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

As of May 2026, this Essay is just under 145,000 words long; a much shorter summary of some its main ideas can be accessed here.

 

The material presented below does not represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.

 

[Latest Update: 12/05/26.]

 

Quick Links

 

Anyone following these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections.

 

If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the "Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links below won't work!

 

I have adjusted the font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!

 

(1) Forces And Contradictions

 

(a) Introduction

 

(b) Gravity Is Reassuringly Undialectical

 

(2) Is This An Apt Analogy?

 

(a) Is "Contradictory Force" Merely A 'Dialectical Figure Of Speech'?

 

(b) Are 'Dialectical Contradictions' Mathematical Models?

 

(c) Are 'Dialectical Contradictions' Properties Of Totalities?

 

(3) What Exactly Do Forces 'Contradict'?

 

(a) Different Types Of Force Couples

 

(b) AA-, And RR-Forces

 

(c) Interlude One: The 'Classical Problem Of Forces'

 

(d) Interlude Two: A Few 'Annoying Technicalities'

 

(e) First Attempts At Clarification

 

(f) Interlude Three: Hamlet Without The Prince

 

(g) Interlude Four: 'Limit Or No Limit -- That Is The Question'

 

(h) AR-Forces

 

(i) Interlude Five: 'Opposites'

 

(j) Interlude Six: Magnetic And Other Natural Forces

 

(4) A Contradictory Theory?

 

(a) Literal Forces In Opposition

 

(b) The Revenge Of The Non-Existent

 

(c) Interlude Seven: Further Complications

 

(d) Prevention And Its Discontents

 

(e) Interlude Eight: Tom Weston

 

(f) A Balanced Account Of Prevention?

 

(g) S&M?

 

(h) Hole To Let -- Previous Occupant Self-Destructed

 

(i) Interlude Nine: Objections Neutralised

 

(j) Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth

 

(5) Real Material 'Contradictions'?

 

(a) Sinking In Concrete

 

(b) Interlude Ten: Contradictions, Contradictions Everywhere!

 

(c) Rees, Ollman And 'Concrete Forces'

 

(d) The Impertinent Explanation

 

(e) Conflict Resolution

 

(f) Where The Shoe Pinches

 

(g) Not What The System Ordered

 

(h) An Apparent Contradiction, At Last!

 

(i) Interlude Eleven: Everyday Contradictions

 

(j) Opposite Tendencies I

 

(k) Opposite Tendencies II

 

(l) Interlude Twelve: Opposites, Again?

 

(m) Interlude Thirteen: Ordinary Language

 

(n) Interlude Fourteen: 'Contradiction' In Das Kapital?

 

(o) Heilbroner To The Rescue?

 

(p) Is The Supposed 'Contradiction Between The Proletariat And The Capitalist Class' Even 'Dialectical'?

 

(q) Hegelian Quandary [This sub-section is still under construction.]

 

(r) Last Chance Saloon

 

(6) True Contradictions?

 

(7) Last Rites

 

(a) Dialectics In ICU

 

(b) Back To The Drawing-Board?

 

(c) 'Internally Contradictory'

 

(d) Dialectics And The Revival Of Teleology

 

(e) Coup De Grace

 

(f) For Dialecticians, Truth Is The [W]hole -- Alas, It's Six Foot Deep

 

(8) Notes

 

(9) Appendix A: Kant On 'Real Negation'

 

(10) Appendix B: Plato's Allegory Of The Cave

 

(11) Appendix C: DM-Fans Struggle To Explain Use-Value And Exchange-Value

 

(12) References

 

 

Summary Of My Main Objections To Dialectical Materialism

 

Abbreviations Used At This Site

 

Return To The Main Index Page

 

Contact Me

 

Forces And Contradictions

 

Introduction

 

In this Second Part of Essay Eight I intend to substantiate a claim that was advanced in Part One: i.e., that it isn't possible to equate 'dialectical contradictions' with 'opposing forces', either literally or figuratively. Hence, the aim in what follows is to sever the link that most Dialectical Marxists believe exists between 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

In Part Three, I will further develop the ideas explored in Part Two by answering the question: What sense, if any, can be made of the term "dialectical contradiction"?

 

[Spoiler Alert: None whatsoever!]

 

[As with other Essays published at this site, much of the material below has been deliberately restricted to the use of DM-terminology, the employment of which doesn't imply I accept its validity, or even that it makes any sense. It is only being employed in order to assist in its long-overdue demise.]

 

Be this as it may, Dialectical Marxists nevertheless continue to assert that 'dialectical contradictions' (in nature or society) may be understood as, or be modelled by, the inter-relationship between "opposing forces". These forces allegedly condition one another, operating either in equilibrium or disequilibrium, depending on the prevailing circumstances -- and, of course, on exactly who is telling the story! But, they also claim this view of forces is only valid if it is backed-up (in every case) by a careful scientific and theoretical analysis of all the relevant issues, the results having been thoroughly and repeatedly tested in practice.

 

For example, here is Engels:

 

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter…. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or another form of motion…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter…. Each separate movement strives toward equilibrium, and the total motion puts an end to the equilibrium...." [Engels (1976), pp.74-77. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

"So long as we consider things at rest and lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force...." [Ibid., pp.152-53.]

 

"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…. [This is] the negation of the negation…. [which is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal an the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Ibid., pp.179-80.]

 

"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable…go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…. [T]he transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature -- mechanical force and its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy -- are different forms of manifestation of universal motion…. [W]e have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on the whole…by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself." [Engels (1888), pp.609-11. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

"All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else…. Hence, all attraction and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another…. Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on each other, that the separation and opposition of these poles exist only within their mutual connection and union...." [Ibid., p.72. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance...." [Ibid., p.82.]

 

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature...." [Ibid., p.211. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"[A]ttraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that the true theory of matter must assign a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a theory of matter based on mere attraction is false…. Equilibrium is inseparable from motion…. All equilibrium is only relative and temporary…. Motion of the heavenly bodies [is an] approximate equilibrium of attraction and repulsion in motion." [Ibid., pp.243-46. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

This is how Bukharin made a similar point:

 

"[T]he world consists of forces, acting many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of 'rest', i.e., their actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces, immediately the 'internal contradictions' will be revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the 'conflict,' the 'contradiction,' i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in various directions, determines the motion of the system…." [Bukharin (1925), p.74. Bold emphasis added.]

 

And here are Lenin's thoughts:

 

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

Here, too, is Stalin:

 

"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature." [Stalin (1976b), p.836, quoted from here. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

Mao added his two cents' worth (but he confined his comments to the connection between social forces and contradictions):

 

"What is even more fundamental for the study of the particular features of the two parties is the examination of the class basis of the two parties and the resultant contradictions which have arisen between each party and other forces at different periods. For instance, in the period of its first cooperation with the Communist Party, the Kuomintang stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism and was therefore anti-imperialist; on the other hand, it stood in contradiction to the great masses of the people within the country -- although in words it promised many benefits to the working people, in fact it gave them little or nothing. In the period when it carried on the anti-Communist war, the Kuomintang collaborated with imperialism and feudalism against the great masses of the people and wiped out all the gains they had won in the revolution, and thereby intensified its contradictions with them. In the present period of the anti-Japanese war, the Kuomintang stands in contradiction to Japanese imperialism and wants co-operation with the Communist Party, without however relaxing its struggle against the Communist Party and the people or its oppression of them. As for the Communist Party, it has always, in every period, stood with the great masses of the people against imperialism and feudalism, but in the present period of the anti-Japanese war, it has adopted a moderate policy towards the Kuomintang and the domestic feudal forces because the Kuomintang has pressed itself in favour of resisting Japan. The above circumstances have resulted now in alliance between the two parties and now in struggle between them, and even during the periods of alliance there has been a complicated state of simultaneous alliance and struggle. If we do not study the particular features of both aspects of the contradiction, we shall fail to understand not only the relations of each party with the other forces, but also the relations between the two parties....

 

"There are still two points in the problem of the particularity of contradiction which must be singled out for analysis, namely, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction. There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions. For instance, in capitalist society the two forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions, such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, between the proletariat and the peasant petty bourgeoisie, between the non-monopoly capitalists and the monopoly capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies, are all determined or influenced by this principal contradiction." [Mao (1937), pp,327-31. Bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]

 

Veteran communist philosopher, Maurice Cornforth, had this to say:

 

"If we consider the real, complex movements and interconnections of real complex things, then we find that contradictory tendencies can and do exist in them. For example, if the forces operating in a body combine tendencies of attraction and of repulsion, that is a real contradiction…. [C]ontradiction is the driving force of change…. [O]nly the presence of contradictions in a process…provides the internal conditions making change necessary…. The real universe is…full of contradictions -- the contradictions of attraction and repulsion studied by physics…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-95. Bold emphases added.]

 

The author of TAR, John Rees, remarked as follows:

 

"The conservatism of Hegel's system is thus buried in his notion of contradiction. Contradictions in Hegel are merely intellectual contradictions to be resolved by merely intellectual methods…. The dialectic is therefore only a pseudo-dialectic; its contradictions are never those of opposed material forces capable of doing real damage or of effecting real progress…. Marx was, however, obliged to transform completely the terms of the dialectic when he altered its starting point from abstract concepts to real material forces…. The contradictions are no longer simply between concepts but between real, material forces…. Marx and Engels's dialectic is utterly different from Hegel's. It starts from real, material, empirically verifiable contradictions." [Rees (1998), pp.67-69, 83. Bold emphases added.]

 

Here is leading Trotskyist Dialectician, the late George Novack:

 

"The unified process of development is the universality of the dialectic, which maintains that everything is linked together and interactive, in continuous motion and change, and that this change is the outcome of the conflict of opposing forces within nature as well as everything to be found in it." [Quoted in Green Left, 20/10/1993. I owe this reference to Petersen (1994), p.156. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Our old friends, Woods and Grant [henceforth, W&G] expressed themselves as follows:

 

"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction.... So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving.... The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites.... The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter.... The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls.

 

"Attraction and Repulsion

 

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest. At the base of the atom are immense forces of attraction and repulsion.... Engels points out the universal role of attraction and repulsion:

 

'All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else. Otherwise in time one side would get the preponderance over the other and then motion would finally cease. Hence all attractions and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another. Thus the law of the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion is expressed in the form that each movement of attraction in the universe must have as its complement an equivalent movement of repulsion and vice versa; or, as ancient philosophy -- long before the natural-scientific formulation of the law of conservation of force or energy -- expressed it: the sum of all attractions in the universe is equal to the sum of all repulsions.'

 

"In Engels' day, the prevailing idea of motion was derived from classical mechanics, where motion is imparted from an external force which overcomes the force of inertia. Engels was quite scathing about the very expression 'force,' which he considered one-sided and insufficient to describe the real processes of nature. 'All natural processes,' he wrote, 'are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world, and further from terrestrial mechanics, implies that only one part is active, operative, the other part being passive, receptive.' Engels was far in advance of his time in being highly critical of this notion, which had already been attacked by Hegel. In his History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks that 'It is better (to say) that a magnet has a soul (as Thales expresses it) than that it has an attractive force; force is a kind of property that, separate from matter, is put forward as a kind of predicate -- while soul, on the other hand, is this movement itself, identical with the nature of matter.' This remark of Hegel, approvingly quoted by Engels, contains a profound idea -- that motion and energy are inherent to matter. Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 71-72. The page number for each of these passages is slightly different in the 2nd edition. W&G's reference here is to Engels (1955), pp.95-96, 110. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]

 

It is interesting to note in passing that W&G naively record Engels's approving reference to Hegel's depiction of magnets as having 'souls' while failing to notice its mystical implications. How could that notion -- i.e., 'having a soul' -- be given a 'materialist spin', aimed at putting Hegel's theory 'back on its feet'/'the right way up'? Presumably a soul is a soul, upside down or not.

 

Here, too, are Levins and Lewontin:

 

"What characterises the dialectical world, in all its aspects, as we have described it is that it is constantly in motion. Constants become variables, causes become effects, and systems develop, destroying the conditions that gave rise to them. Even elements that appear to be stable are in a dynamic equilibrium of forces that can suddenly become unbalanced, as when a grey lump of metal of a critical size becomes a fireball brighter than a thousand suns.... This appearance of opposing forces has given rise to the most debated and difficult, yet the most central, concept in dialectical thought, the principle of contradiction.... For us, contradiction is not only epistemic and political, but ontological in the broadest sense. Contradictions between forces are everywhere in nature, not only in human social institutions.... [O]pposing forces lie at the basis of the evolving physical and biological world. Things change because of the action of opposing forces on them, and things are the way they are because of the temporary balance of opposing forces.... The dialectical view insists that persistence and equilibrium are not the natural state of things but require explanation, which must be sought in the actions of the opposing forces.... The opposing forces are seen as contradictory in the sense that each taken separately would have opposite effects, and their joint action may be different from the results of either acting alone.... However, the principle that all things are internally heterogeneous directs our attention to the opposing processes at work within the object.... Thus systems are either self-negating (state A leads to some state not-A) or depend for their persistence on self-negating processes. We see contradiction first of all as self-negation. From this perspective it is not too different from logical contradiction. In formal logic process is usually replaced by static set-structural relations, and the dynamic of 'A leads to B' is replaced by 'A implies B'. But all real reasoning is takes place in time, and the classical logical paradoxes can be seen as A leads to not-A leads to A, and so on.... As against the alienated world view that objects are isolated until proven otherwise, for us the simplest assumption is that things are connected...." [Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.279-87. Bold emphases alone added. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Quotations like these (in addition to those reproduced in Note 1) can be multiplied almost indefinitely.1

 

Admittedly, such passages are often hedged about with numerous qualifications -- again, depending on the context and the author in question -- but the overall message is reasonably clear.2

 

Nevertheless, my concern here isn't so much with whether these passages are consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has ever been made to substantiate the sweeping generalisations they make with anything like adequate evidence -- or, indeed, any at all --, but with whether the theory that 'opposing forces' can be used to model, illustrate or explain 'dialectical contradictions', makes any sense at all.3

 

Gravity Is Reassuringly Undialectical

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; TOR = Theory Of Relativity.]

 

As we are about to find out, the identification of 'forces' with 'contradictions' is about misconceived an idea as anything else we have so far met emerging from the DM-Grimoire -- that is, where any sense can be made of it.4

 

First of all, there are several obvious 'difficulties' with the whole idea. For example, if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are thereby 'contradictory' -- there would presumably have to be at least two of them, with both in simultaneous opposition to each other (actually or potentially), for that to be the case. But, when we consider one of the most important, universal examples of motion in the universe -- i.e., the trajectory of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in Classical Physics, at least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in question toward the centre of mass of the system it is affected by or is orbiting. So, if Classical Physics is to be believed, it isn't easy to see how such 'forces' could be viewed as 'contradictions'.5

 

Admittedly, the picture just painted was greatly simplified, for even in such circumstances there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body, the resultant motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting in, or on, the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of an orbiting body, motion isn't the result of two different sorts of forces -- those of attraction and repulsion -- but a consequence of just one (resultant) force. Hence, orbital motion (at least) is a consequence of the action of only one (resultant) force (in Classical Physics). Plainly, if there is only one force in such a set-up, there can be no 'contradiction'. Now, since orbital motion encompasses most, if not all, motion in the entire universe, that means most of the latter can't be the result of any sort of 'contradiction', 'dialectical' or otherwise.

 

[By the clause, "orbital motion encompasses most, if not all, motion in the entire universe", what is meant is that even seemingly rectilinear motion on a planet (like the Earth) is in fact constrained by the above resultant gravitational forces.]

 

Furthermore, any secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the system) that happens to be superimposed on the primary action (so to speak), only serves to complicate the above picture, it doesn't alter it. This 'extra activity' might also be the result of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces in Classical Physics (once more), which clearly affect the said resultant. While other forces might effect some influence on that resultant, they don't turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic, along with several other alternatives, is examined again in greater detail below.]

 

Of course, it could be argued that orbital motion (of a body around another) is in fact determined by the operation of the two forces of attraction that pass between them, So, concerning two such bodies, A and B: A will attract B and B will attract A in return.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

Maybe so, but it is difficult to see how two attractive forces can be regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories' -- nor yet how they can 'struggle' among themselves and then change into each other -- which is what the DM-Classics tell us must be the case with all such 'dialectical opposites' and all such 'dialectical contradictions'. How does the attractive force originating in A turn into the attractive force originating in B, and vice versa? As we will repeatedly see in what follows, that means any such interaction can't be 'dialectical', whatever else it is. [The reader is encouraged to keep awkward fact this in mind as the Essay unfolds.]

 

Anyway, Engels himself argued that 'oppositional forces' are to be interpreted as forces of attraction and repulsion (even though he also preferred to translate both into differential forms of motion), despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in the universe they seem to have little or no part to play. [Even the pro-DM objection above sees the two forces involved as attractive.] Not only that, but the motion of, say, planet, C, around star, D, is caused by forces originating in D, not C. Of course, the forces originating in C may affect D, which in return may affect C itself or its motion around D. [Such complications will be examined further, below.]

 

It could be argued once more that an inter-connected and reciprocal chain of effects in play between C and D shows that such forces are dialectically-linked. Hence, on this view, D would affect C's motion while C will reciprocate and alter D's motion, which must then also affect C's movement, and so on. But, even then, these attractive forces don't confront each other as oppositional, and hence as 'contradictory'. At best, such forces affect the motion of the two bodies, which motion in turn then affects any other forces in play, and so on. In fact, they appear to augment one another. On that basis, if we insist on anthropomorphising nature in this way, shouldn't we say (and with much greater justification) that such forces aren't contradictory, they are in fact tautological?

 

[On that, see Note 38, below. See also Note 6b.]

 

Moreover, these attractive forces don't turn into each other -- which, once again, is what the DM-Classics tell us must be the case. (Link a few paragraphs back). Nor do they imply one another -- in the way that the proletariat is supposed to imply the capitalist class, i.e., where we are told that neither can even exist without the other (although I have thrown that doctrine into considerable doubt here). So, whatever else they are, these forces can't be 'dialectical opposites', and, as a result, they can't be 'dialectical contradictions', either. That must be the case, or the DM-Classics were seriously mistaken.

 

And, even if we take two such forces into account, it is their combination (in a resultant force) which causes, or which changes, the said motion.

 

Notwithstanding this, Thomas Weston has recently made a valiant attempt to find a 'second force' (or proximate cause) in such circumstances, which he attributes to...inertia!

 

[A rate of change of momentum might be considered a force, or the result of a force, depending on how Newton's Second Law is interpreted, but not momentum itself. Force and Momentum aren't dimensionally consistent. Force is, M1L1T-2; Momentum, is M1L1T-1, where M = Mass, L = Length, and T = Time. (For obvious reasons, Force is often just written as, MLT-2, Momentum as, MLT-1.)] The rate of change of momentum is also M1L1T-2 (or MLT-2), which is why it is dimensionally consistent with Force, but Momentum itself isn't. The situation with Inertia is even worse: Inertia is, M1L2 -- or just, ML2. There is no way that Inertia is a force! (On this, see Resnick, Halliday and Kane (2002), pp.7-8. On Dimensional Analysis in general, see Lemons (2017).)]

 

Anyway, here is Weston:

 

"In the classical mechanics pioneered by Newton, elliptical motion of a body will result if it is attracted to another 'central' body by a force inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them, provided that the body has an initial velocity that is not too large or too small, and not directly toward or directly away from the central body. This situation involves only a single force on the body, which, in the case of a planet orbiting the Sun, is the force of gravity. Gravity is not the only cause of this motion, however. An elliptical orbit is the result of two causes, which produce two tendencies of motion. One tendency results from the force directed toward the central body, which makes the body turn toward that central body. The second tendency is that of the body to continue in a straight line at a constant speed. This tendency is usually called 'inertia'. Inertia is not a force, since forces cause change in speed or direction, and inertia is the tendency not to change speed or direction. Inertia is a causal principle, as Newton recognised, calling it an 'innate force of matter'. He expressed this principle in his first law of motion, while forces are described in the second law. In elliptical motion, these two causes, gravity and inertia, are united by the physical fact that the mass responsible for inertia is proportional to the mass that gives rise to gravity. This fact is an important element in recognising the dialectical contradiction in elliptical motion." [Weston (2012), pp.6-7. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]

 

Admittedly, Weston does deny inertia is a force, but he then quotes Newton to the effect that it is -- or, to be more precise, it is "a force of matter"! Of course, it could be argued that gravity is a force that tends to change motion while inertia resists it, and hence that we do have here opposition and hence a contradiction. But even if that were allowed, we still wouldn't have a 'contradiction' between 'opposing forces'. At best we would have something that could loosely be described as a 'contradiction' between opposing tendencies, but why we might want to call that a 'contradiction' to begin with Weston neglected to say. As we have repeatedly seen with other DM-theorists, Weston just helped himself to this word with no attempt to justify his use of it. Even more problematic: Weston nowhere explains how gravity and inertia can "struggle" with each other (whether or not they are, or they cause, opposing "tendencies"), or how they could possibly turn into one another -- which, for the third time, is what the DM-classics tell us they must "inevitably" do (link a few paragraphs back). Nor are we told if, or how, they imply each other, such that one of them can't exist without the other -- which they will also have to do to be counted as 'dialectical opposites'. So, whatever else the connection is here, it can't be 'dialectical'!

 

Of course, it could be argued that even in the depths of space all bodies move under the action of some force (howsoever remote its source is), so there will always be a tendency to change motion coupled with a tendency to oppose it. In which case, these two factors do imply one another. Again, even if that were admitted, this connection had to be discovered. In that case, it can't be a logical connection (which is supposed to be what inter-links the proletariat with the capitalist class). Logical connections are readily apparent from the concepts involved (which is, once again, what links the proletariat with the capitalist class) -- they aren't discovered. No one discovered that a regicide is a king-killer or that a female deer is a doe. Who on earth has ever looked for evidence that a triangle has three intersecting edges? And, to repeat, these factors do not turn into each other! In that case, and once more: whatever else the inter-connection is here, it can't be 'dialectical'!

 

Having said all that -- as we are about to discover --, gravity isn't even a force! So, Weston ends up with zero forces!

 

Even more revealing, Weston himself admits that Hegel argued that the orbital motion of a planet is governed by the operation of only one force:

 

"We must not therefore speak of forces. If we want to speak of force, then there is but one force, and its moments do not, as two forces, pull in different directions." [Hegel (2004), p.65. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

As pointed out earlier, it is difficult to see how a 'dialectical contradiction' can be cobbled-together from only one force.

 

Another serious difficulty arising from Weston's attempt to shoehorn Marx's comments into this ill-fitting 'dialectical boot' is the inconsistent way he [Weston] uses the word "tendency". One minute "tendencies" aren't causes; they are caused by something else (e.g., in the first of the above passages, where it seems that an elliptical orbit "produce[s] two tendencies of motion"); next they are causes:

 

"Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely." [Weston (2012), p.17. Bold emphasis added. I examine variations on this theme later on in this Essay.]

 

However, we have already had occasion to point out that tendencies not only aren't, they can't be, causes. They are all caused by other factors.

 

Finally, Weston only mentions the TOR once (p.7, ftn.17), but even then he fails to notice that one of the principle factors in the 'contradiction' here -- gravitational force -- has been edited out of the picture! 'The force of gravity' has been replaced by motion along a geodesic. According to the TOR, we no longer have even one force operating in such circumstances, since gravity isn't a force in Contemporary Physics!

 

In which case, post-Classical Physics offers even less help to DM-theorists in their desperate bid to find a physical correlate for the 'contradictions' with which Hegel unhelpfully saddled them. According to the TOR, most, if not all, of the bulk motion in the universe is either a function of the topology of Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been excised), or it is the result of the body in question being located in a tensor, vector, or scalar field, in as many dimensions of phase space as are deemed necessary or appropriate.6

 

As one of the standard textbooks on gravitation points out:

 

"Whatever aspect of gravity one measures, and however one measures it, one is studying the geometry of space-time." [Misner, et al (1973), p.400. Bold emphasis added. (This links to a PDF.)]

 

One history of the concept of force also noted the following:

 

"In Newton's theory the symbol F in F = ma refers to the cause of the acceleration of the body. Force, then, is an external agent that acts on matter with an inertial mass m, causing it to accelerate at the rate a. In the GTR [General Theory of Relativity -- RL], however, there is no external force. Indeed, Einstein was able to derive Newton's equation F = ma from purely geometric considerations. He saw the possibility that all 'external' forces may be only apparent -- that the 'effect' of other matter may be representable by a generalization of the geometry of space-time that describes the motions." [Stinner (1994), p.84. Bold emphases added. (This links to a PDF.)]

 

 

Video One: Why Gravity Isn't A Force

 

Even in Classical Hamiltonian Mechanics, such forces were also edited out of the picture and replaced by dynamical factors -- indeed, along lines suggested by Engels himself.

 

Once again, if there are no such forces, there can be no DM-'contradictions', so conceived.

 

[On this, see Goldstein, et al (2002), pp.34-36, and Jammer (1999), pp.158-264.]

 

And, this isn't just the case with respect to gravity, as physicist, Max Jammer, points out:

 

"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates.... In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v. Paragraphs merged; links and bold emphasis alone added.]6a

 

Of course, this isn't how nature is pictured in the Physics Textbooks used in schools and colleges, where the word, "force", is still employed for heuristic purposes. [On that, see Crundell, Goodwin and Mee (2014), pp.71-79, and Halliday, Resnick and Walker (2011), pp.87-165.] But, as Jammer points out, in "Higher Physics", force has been edited out of the story, replaced by exchange particles (which, as we saw in Essay Seven Part One, are themselves merely 'disturbances in the field' -- link at the end of Note 4).

 

This reconfiguration was re-iterated by Nobel Laureate, Professor Frank Wilczek in the following terms:

 

"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics. In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote

 

'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis and links added. By "sense-suggested", Tait is obviously referring to the origin of the concept of force in human interaction with the world and with other humans, a fact also acknowledged by Engels. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

[The above now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38. It should be pointed out that compared with Jammer, Wilczek in the end is -- shall we say -- 'a little more equivocal about this'.]

 

This view has been criticised quite effectively by Wilson (2007). (This links to a PDF.) Much of Wilson's article is unexceptionable (in that I don't want to take issue with it, and not just because it deals with topics far removed from the aims of this site), but I will take exception to a few of the things she says (and which appear in works she references). Having said that, I am not a Physicist, so this knotty problem will have to be resolved by members of that profession, or by Philosophers of Science. One can only wish them 'Good Luck!', which is a comment that will make a little more sense to readers after they have consulted Essay Thirteen Part Two.] Concerning relevant issues raised by Wilson, there are seven points I wish to make:

 

First, in response to the infinite regress argument against forces (my version of which can be found here, but summarised below) Wilson references a counter-argument published in Bigelow, et al (1988), which she characterises (rather opaquely) as follows:

 

"[Another objection] raised against forces is that these induce a vicious regress.... The worry gets going via the supposition that Newtonian forces mediate between nonforce entities and motions, and are required for the former to bring about the latter: if nonforce entities require forces in order to produce motions, then won’t forces require further forces in order to do so, and so on, ad infinitum? This worry can be easily met, so I won’t treat it further beyond what I will now say. First, one can respond (as Bigelow et al. do) by accepting the supposition, but maintaining that forces are of a different ontological category from nonforce entities, so that there is no reason to suppose that forces are like nonforce entities in requiring forces to bring about motions. Second, one can deny the supposition, as misidentifying the motivation for forces. As I will argue in Section 4, forces are posited not because they are required in order for nonforce entities to produce motions (nonforce entities are perfectly capable of such production) but rather because the characteristic features of forces provide a distinctive unifying basis for explaining and determining these motions. There is nothing in this motivation for forces which requires accepting the supposition, so the regress never gets started." [Wilson (2007), pp,174-75, footnote 1. The original counter-argument, which is much more involved, can be found in Bigelow, et al (1988), pp.621ff.]

 

Whatever the merits of the above remarks turn out to be, they have nothing to do with my version of the infinite regress argument (and the same can be said about the fuller version found in Bigelow, el al (1988), which also deals with 'motions'). My version takes issue with the physical nature of forces: are they particulate or are they continuous (i.e., non-particulate)? I argue first of all that they can't be particulate without postulating further forces internal each particle/object that endow them with sufficient cohesion during or after an interaction with other force particles or objects. But that just pushes the problem one stage further back. So, in order to account for the ability of particles/objects to resist one another (and not pass through each other totally unaffected), yet more forces internal to each particle are required to prevent any such penetration, or, indeed, prevent any resulting distortions tearing one or both apart. But, if these new internal forces are also particulate -- as it seems they must be, given this alternative -- it would require still further internal forces to account for the coherence of these new, inner, inner, 'force-particles', and so on...

 

In order to prevent an infinite regress, at some point there would have to be particles/objects that are perfectly rigid -- but that rigidity would have be the result of no further internal forces, which would ultimately mean that forces can be dispended with. [Why that is so was covered in greater detail in Part One, where further serious problems implied by either alternative were also aired.]

 

Alternatively, if these forces are non-particulate -- i.e., if they are continuous media of some sort --, they would be incapable of maintaining any sort of inner cohesion since they would have no rigidity, etc., etc. in such circumstances, colliding particles/objects would simply pass through one another and register no exchange of momentum. Why there are any changes in motion caused by such forces would be inexplicable.

 

In the end nothing would be accounted for since, at each level, there would be nothing to provide the required resistance or coherence.

 

Admittedly, the above infinite regress argument focuses on particle-particle interaction as opposed to gravitational effects (i.e., if we rule out the yet-to-be-discovered 'graviton'), which was Wilson's concern, but she later half admits that Newtonian forces don't operate at the quantum level (pp.180-81), which clearly counts against the universal application of Newtonian Mechanics. However, the above regress argument was rehearsed simply to counter attempts to re-direct Wilson's response against the argument used in this Essay (and in Part One). Having said that, much of the above still applies to Newtonian gravitational forces and whether they are particulate or continuous. So, the same regress applies here, too.

 

[TOR = Theory of Relativity; QM = Quantum Mechanics; NM = Newtonian Mechanics.]

 

Second, Wilson admits that NM has to be modified (to MN', to use her symbolism) -- and in places that modification has to be quite radical --, so it can accommodate the same phenomena as the TOR [Wilson (2007), pp.178-87)]. Unfortunately, that throws into doubt the equation of the forces she is trying to rehabilitate with those that Newton himself envisaged. [However, the problem goes much deeper than this, as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]

 

Third, we have already seen that Wilson half admits that Newtonian forces as such don't operate at the quantum level, which motivates her into claiming that NM should be regarded as a 'special science'. But, any such theoretical re-brand looks uncomfortably like special pleading. Moreover, given the above infinite regress argument (which directly confronts all interpretations of QM, and that includes any special dispensations extended to Wilson and her 'modified' NM -- NM'), it is clear that any reasonable judge would readily grant a motion to dismiss. So, whether or not or not NM' is a 'special science', the regress argument shows that it is impossible to interpret forces in a way that avoid an infinite regress, which not only completely undermines their explanatory power, it means we have no absolutely idea what these 'occult entities' are (a term we owe to Berkeley and Newton, as we are about to see), or how they can have an affect on anything at all. Indeed, forces uncomfortably resemble the 'angels' that used to push the planets in their orbits around the Earth in Medieval Astronomy!

 

Fourth, Wilson then considers whether or not forces are "useful fictions", and the question soon becomes "Are forces observable?" Here is her answer:

 

"Certainly we seem to experience forces, as anyone who has ever bumped into a table, opened a window, tripped, lifted anything, stood on their head, or been the victim of static cling can attest. We continually seem to experience forces as we come into contact with other entities in the world, and we often seem to feel specific forces, such as gravitational and electromagnetic forces. Whatever the type of force, and throughout the diversity of our experience, we seem to experience these as pushes and pulls, having particular directions and magnitudes; moreover, we experience the features of ‘felt forces’, as I will call them, as specifically relevant to the production of motions, our own as well as those of other objects." [Wilson (2007), p.189.]

 

But, that argument just adds support to Engels's claim that the origin of the force concept is animistic:

 

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Engels (1954), p.82. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Of course, it could be countered that that would also apply to everything else humans experience, like solidity, length, heat, colour... Must we reject those, too, on the basis they have an 'animistic' origin?

 

But, the problem with Wilson's argument is that when we bump into a table, for example, we feel the table not a force! Wilson calling this a force is an inference based on a metaphysical theory that these paradoxical entities (which can neither be particulate or non-particulate) nevertheless exist. Wilson nowhere confronts this neo-Leibnizian regress objection to forces. Even to this day, no one has the slightest clue what forces are or what they are made of. Not even those who believe in them!

 

Berkeley's objection to forces therefore still seems to stand (Wilson even (partially) quoted it (on p.187):

 

"As long as heavy bodies are supported by us, we feel in ourselves effort, fatigue, and discomfort. We also perceive in descending heavy bodies an accelerated motion toward the center of the earth: but beyond this we perceive nothing by sense. By reason however we gather that there is some cause or principle of these phenomena, and this is commonly called 'gravity.' But since the cause of the descent of heavy bodies is unseen and unknown, gravity in this sense cannot properly be called a sensible quality. It is therefore an occult quality. But one can scarcely (and indeed not even scarcely) conceive what an occult quality is, or how any quality could act or effect anything. And so it would be better if, dismissing the occult quality, men attended only to sensible effects; and if setting aside abstract terms in meditation (however useful they may be in discussion), the mind were fixed on particulars and concrete things, that is on the things themselves. 'Force' is similarly attributed to bodies; but this word is taken as if it signified a known quality, and one as distinct from motion, figure and every other sensibile thing as from every affection of a living thing. Yet anyone examining the matter more closely will agree that this is nothing other than an occult quality. Animal effort and corporeal motion are commonly regarded as the symptoms and measures of this occult quality.

 

"It is therefore obvious that gravity or force are taken in vain as the principle of motion: for how can this principle be more clearly known by being called an occult quality? What itself is occult explains nothing. And let us overlook the fact that this unknown active cause would be better called a substance than a quality. Moreover, 'force,' 'gravity', and words of this sort are more often (and not improperly) taken in concrete, so as to mean the body moved, the difficulty of resisting, &c. Yet when they are used by philosophers to signify certain natures prescinded and abstracted from all these things, which neither are the object of the senses nor can be framed by any force of the intellect or the imagination, then indeed they produce errors and confusion." [Berkeley, De Motu, pp.74-75, quoted from here. (This links to a PDF.). Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; several paragraphs merged. Minor typos corrected.]

 

Without doubt, it would be foolish indeed to deny the existence of anything we can't see (etc.) -- or that lacks a "sensible quality" (to use Berkeley's term), and yet it would be the no less unwise to admit the existence of something that is not just insensible, but the nature concerning which it is impossible to make any sense (as the above regress argument shows). So, while Berkeley was right to question the existence of forces, he did so for the wrong reason.

 

Unfortunately, Wilson fails to address this entire topic. Even though she does spend time criticising empiricist objections to the existence of forces, the case against them set out at this site isn't based on any such empiricism. Hence, what she has to say fails to be relevant to the points raised earlier. 

 

Fifth, Wilson next considers claims that forces are ontologically redundant (i.e., they are surplus to requirements in Physics), which means, according to Ockham's Razor, they should be jettisoned. Again, this has zero to do with the argument presented in this Essay.

 

Sixth: Wilson then counters claims that forces should be rejected since any appeal to them "overdetermines" physical explanations of the phenomena. So, while we might say that a brick thrown at a window smashed that window, adding forces would be unnecessary since the brick does all the work (so to speak). Adding a force to the action of that brick 'over-eggs' the explanation. The brick needs no help from these 'occult entities'. Anyway, this alternative seems to be a variation on the redundancy objection, which means it, too, is irrelevant to the negative case developed at this site.

 

Seventh, Wilson then tries to develop a positive account of forces, but soon (inexplicably!) gets bogged down over complex issues in Cognitive Theory and the nature of 'mental causation' (and, indeed, causation in general)! Since I have dealt with this at length in Essay Thirteen Part Three, readers are referred there for more details. Anyway, this too has nothing to do with the negative case advanced at this site.

 

That is it! So, Wilson (i) fails to address the regress argument, and (ii) much of what she has to say is irrelevant.

 

Finally, as noted above, it is up to Physicists to decide this issue, but unless and until they tackle Leibniz's regress objection, all their efforts will run into the ground (no pun intended).

 

So, the case for the existence of forces has yet to be made.

 

[If I can summon up the will, I'll also take a look at Bigelow, et al (1988), and any other academic articles I can find that try to convince us these 'occult entities' -- forces -- actually exist.]

 

Even those two DM-True-Believers, W&G, were forced to acknowledge this (awkward) fact about forces in Contemporary Physics (no pun intended!):

 

"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), p.156; bold emphasis added. The page number for this passage is slightly different in the 2nd edition.]

 

However, and despite what those two might say, it is reasonably clear that a mere "relation" between two bodies is incapable of making either of them move -- unless there were a 'force' of some sort operating between them, or, indeed, something else consequent on that relation, such as a time-based trajectory along a "world-line", perhaps(?) to bring that about.6b

 

Unfortunately, this means that most (if not all!) of the bulk motion in the universe can't be accounted for by DM (that is, if such motion, or, change of motion, is held to be the result of 'contradictions' interpreted as 'opposing forces'). Again: if there is only one force present -- or perhaps even none at all! -- there can't be any 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with.

 

Admittedly, Engels made a weak attempt to solve the orbital 'problem' by inventing a repulsive force, which he implausibly identified with "heat" (see, for example, Engels (1954), pp.73-80).7

 

[I haven't reproduced that material here since it is far too long and mind-numbingly tedious. Readers are invited to check for themselves to see if I have misrepresented Engels or maybe missed something significant.]

 

Nevertheless, it is far from clear what Engels was driving at in those pages. If he meant to say that heat operates as a repulsive force then that would be a desperate and unconvincing move (no pun intended). Not only do cold bodies have orbiting satellites (e.g., Neptune), hot bodies swallow matter up all the time. It is possible that Engels simply copied this idea off a number of theorists who had been working on this phenomenon in the previous century. [On this, see Hesse (1961) and Williams (1980).]

 

Admittedly, Engels considered other repulsive forces that might (plausibly) operate in a planetary system, but his ideas weren't just speculative and fanciful, they were totally ad hoc. I can find no evidence that anyone else -- DM-fan or otherwise -- has followed up on, or has developed any of these ideas in the intervening years.

 

For example, Engels appealed to the original repulsive properties of the "individual particles of the gaseous sphere" from which the Solar System was formed (as a result of "contraction"), to account for its origin by means of an "interplay of attraction and repulsion." [Ibid., pp.73-74.]

 

It would be difficult to find a better example than this of how the 'dialectical method' has been imposed on nature, not deduced from it. And we can assert that with no little confidence. Even if Engels's 'theory' weren't so obviously fanciful, it certainly couldn't have been deduced from the phenomena since these hypothetical incidents took place billions of years ago. Admittedly, there might be, or there might even have been, theoretical considerations that recommended this approach to Engels as a tentative 'explanation' of how the Solar System could have formed -- although even that is questionable since he explicitly based his ideas on the old Nebular Theory -- proposed by Immanuel Kant and Pierre-Simon Laplace --, which was itself nearly a century old even in his day and has since been replaced by several more recent theories. But, even granting all this, Engels's account is superficial, impressionistic and lacks both mathematical and evidential support. It was clearly motivated by his desire to find some force -- any force -- to counterbalance gravity just because DM requires it, not because the phenomena dictate it -- rather like Thomas Weston, in fact. This is a classic example of Engels using the concepts he inherited from Hegel as a dogmatic "form of representation", and, as we will see, a thoroughly confused one into the bargain.

 

Of course, scientists employ formal devices like this all the time, but Engels turned it into a non-sensical metaphysical theory.

 

[The difference between Metaphysics and Science will be explored in Essay Thirteen Part Two. On Metaphysics and DM in general, see Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

Admittedly, Einstein himself wasn't above inventing forces to suit his theory; the same is also the case with Newton -- cf., Cohen (1970) and Jammer (1999), pp.116-57. Indeed, Einstein introduced the Cosmological Constant to account for the fact that the Universe hasn't collapsed in on itself, an entity that has now morphed into Dark Energy. [Cf., Lerner (1992), pp.131-32.] There are countless examples of moves like this in the history of science. Thomas Kuhn called such 'intellectual structures', "paradigms", if or when they gained traction among the scientific community. [On that, see Kuhn (1970, 1996), and Sharrock and Read (2002).]

 

Incidentally, an appeal to so-called 'centrifugal forces' (i.e., "fictional forces" found in Classical Physics -- e.g., also Coriolis Forces) won't save Engels's theory either, since these 'forces' don't 'exist'. If anything, reference to 'centrifugal forces' is the result of a misleading shorthand for the way that rectilinear, tangential motion will resume if a force responsible for centripetal acceleration ceases to operate, for whatever reason --, but subjectively experienced in certain (non-inertial) rotating frames of reference.

 

[On the connection between fictional forces and frames of reference, as well as a visual demonstration of the difference between inertial and non-inertial frames, check out this video.]

 

The late John Molyneux also weighed in with the following comment:

 

"If anything (a grain of sand, a mountain, a tree, a fish, a human, a society) gives the appearance of stability and permanence it is because it constitutes a particular moment in a longer process of change. That moment constitutes a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change -- a unity of opposites; much as the earth's, or any planet's, orbit around the sun represents a balance between the force of gravity pulling it into the sun and the momentum which would send it flying off into space." [Molyneux (2012), pp.44-45. Bold emphasis added. I suspect Molyneux might have meant to use "inertia" in place of "momentum".]

 

Once again, if the TOR is correct, there is no 'force of gravity'.

 

Even supposing there were any such forces in Molyneux's scheme-of-things, they aren't balanced by any opposing forces, just by "momentum", which, as we have seen, can in no way be interpreted as the 'dialectical opposite' of the 'force of gravity'. [The significance of that particular remark (i.e., why there has to be a unique opposite for each object or process -- something Hegel and Lenin called each factor's "other") is explained here.] But, even assuming Molyneux's attempt to impose DM on nature could somehow be made to work, or was in any way plausible, and "momentum" was the 'dialectical opposite' of the 'force of gravity', the following aspect of his theory would still fail:

 

"That moment constitutes a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change -- a unity of opposites...." [Ibid.]

 

But, what are the 'opposing forces' internal to the Earth that make it orbit the Sun? What are the internal forces in the Sun that make the Earth orbit it? Molyneux is silent on both issues.

 

Of course, it could be replied that such opposites are internal to the Sun-Earth couple, or perhaps even the Solar System itself. But, as we have seen, there are no 'opposing forces' there, either! Nor are there any relevant 'united opposites'. And, even if there were, which of them is actually providing:

 

"a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change...." [Ibid.]

 

Is gravity the cause of change, or does it oppose change? Does "momentum" oppose change or create it? Is the 'dialectical union' of these two factors doing one or the other?

 

[See also my earlier comments about Thomas Weston's recent attempt to recruit inertia, not momentum, to the cause. (No pun intended!)]

 

Furthermore, are we really supposed to believe that gravity "struggles" with momentum? Or that they turn into one another (as the DM-classics tell us they should)? In what way does momentum imply gravity such that neither can exist without the other? But, that ought to be the case if they formed a 'dialectical unity' (once again; rather like the proletariat is said to imply the capitalist class, and vice versa -- where neither can exist without the other, or so we are told)?

 

As usual, in books and articles that attempt to explain DM, we are presented with what are in effect less than half-formed thoughts, hastily composed off-the-cuff musings, and ill-considered throw-away lines, which don't make sense, even in their own terms.

 

Is This An Apt Analogy?

 

Is "Contradictory Force" Merely A 'Dialectical Figure Of Speech'?

 

[DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954); UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism; follow the link for an explanation.]

 

In view of the above, it might be wise to interpret 'opposing forces' as 'figurative contradictions' -- or, maybe, the other way round (i.e., interpreting 'dialectical contradictions' as 'figurative forces'). Either of these options might form a viable, analogical, or perhaps even a metaphorical (but non-literal) depiction of the integration and dynamism in nature and society. Alternatively, forces could be described as 'contradictions' as a sort of shorthand (but again, not to be taken literally, rather like the way that many scientists still talk about 'the force of gravity'), which might then allow the successful modelling of different types of change and/or accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right (which would, at best, mean it was a "useful fiction"). Indeed, Engels seems to have had this option in mind (in the passage quoted below), where he argues that attraction and repulsion shouldn't be regarded as forces, but as simple forms of motion. This major theoretical retreat was perhaps recommended to him by his admission that the concept of "force" was originally derived from ancient, animistic/mystical theories of nature. Hence a literal use of "force" in DM would smack of anthropomorphism:8

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appears] as a resistance." [Ibid., p.82. Bold emphasis added.]

 

However, Engels's revision has two untoward consequences he appears not to have noticed:

 

(1) This move (no pun intended!) makes his version of DM look even more positivistic that it might already seem -- at least as Engels presents it in DN. If an appeal to forces in nature is no more than shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then, plainly, forces will have no real counterpart in nature (since, of course, they have just been edited out of the picture!). as noted above, force would then be little more than a useful fiction, introduced in order to account for the phenomena instrumentally -- rather like the epicycles of Ptolemaic Cosmology. This would make the identification of 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' even more problematic (as will be demonstrated below). Once again: if there are no forces, there can be no DM-'contradictions'. And, as we will also see, there is no way that relative motion can be interpreted in terms of 'dialectical contradictions', either.

 

(2) Given this semantic re-configuration of the word "force", the supposed 'contradictory relationship' between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative motion. [W&G also seem to be thinking along those lines, as we saw earlier.]

 

Unfortunately, if that were so, there would be no 'dialectical inter-connection' between moving bodies, which appears to be an essential 'mediating factor' required by other DM-precepts -- for instance, where we are told that everything is "dialectically inter-connected". The alternative put forward by Engels clearly means that causal interactions of this sort would turn out to be external, not 'mediated' by any forces, and hence they would fail to inter-condition each other 'internally'. [This means there would be no 'dialectico-logical' connection between moving objects -- as explained in the next paragraph.] In which case, the 'unity-in-opposition' between objects and processes (in the "Totality") will have been broken. The theory that change is the result of 'internal contradictions' would be left without any internal, mediating factors. [This fundamental confusion (between internal and external causal factors) was covered in much greater detail in Part One. Readers are referred back to that material for a more complete picture.]

 

Not even the relative motion between bodies travelling in opposite directions would constitute a credible 'dialectical connection'. Indeed, it would fail to reflect the 'internal relations' that DM-theorists claim must exist between interacting bodies, since objects behaving like this wouldn't be internally inter-linked (as parts of a UO). Neither factor or direction would imply the existence of the other, as they should if there were a 'dialectical relation' at work here (again, unlike the relation that is supposed to exist between the proletariat and the capitalist class), since the 'dialectico-logical connection', or 'mediation', between moving bodies would be missing. In that case, any subsequent interaction would be difficult to account for dialectically. To state the obvious: that would be catastrophic news for DM-fans.9

 

As already noted, if events and processes were 'sealed-off from each other' (in the above way) -- for want of a better term --, DM would begin to resemble CAR and 'crude materialism' rather too closely. If this is how DM is supposed to be interpreted, it would differ from 'crude mechanical materialism' in name alone.

 

Of course, even if Engels's version of DM could account for motion (along a certain line of action, but in a diametrically opposite direction), it would still be of little help. That is because most of the bulk motion in the universe isn't of this sort; it is either orbital motion under the action of a central 'force', or it is movement along a geodesic (depending on which version of Contemporary Physics is accepted). In fact, as we will see, matter in general moves in complex ways which are difficult, if not impossible, to depict in such crude DM-'oppositional' terms.

 

Like it or not, Dialectical Marxists need real material forces 'objectively' acting between bodies so that their "Totality" has the holistic, 'mediated' integrity we have been told it possesses. A theoretical fiction (like the above, where forces have been edited out of the picture) is no use at all. If DM is to work, forces must exist, and any reference to them (as 'contradictions') must be both concrete and literal, which in turn means that interacting bodies -- and that includes any relevant forces in the system -- must be 'internally-related' to one another.10

 

Naturally, this quandary highlights an ambiguity exposed by the following questions:

 

(i) Are forces 'dialectical opposites' of one another -- which would mean it is their inter-relation that forms the 'contradiction', here? Or,

 

(ii) Are the bodies and process involved 'dialectically'-, and hence 'internally'-, related to one another?

 

In which case, is the 'contradiction' here the relation:

 

(iii) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(iv) Between the forces operating in the system? Or is it,

 

(v) A 'dialectical union' of both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay and Part Three unfold. Readers are encouraged to keep the above options in mind as these Essays unfold.

 

Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as 'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by Dialectical Marxists that what they are proposing is an 'objective' theory of nature and society. In which case, it isn't easy to see how figurative language is capable of 'filling the gaps' in any explanation that hopes to reflect the physical relationship between objects and processes in the natural and social world -- at least, no more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:

 

"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks? It is the east, and Juliet is the sun." [Romeo and Juliet, Act Two, Scene Two.]

 

Or, indeed, no more than would describing a man as a "pig" imply he actually had a curly tail, four legs and was a potential source of bacon.

 

Despite this, and in view of the above difficulties -- in addition to those that will be exposed below --, interpreting the word "force" figuratively might prove to be the only viable way that 'contradictions' could be 'interpreted' as 'opposing forces', even if it compromises DM's avowedly 'objective depiction' of reality.11

 

Of course, if any such view of the nature of forces (i.e., as figurative, not literal) were to be adopted by DM-theorists, it might prove difficult to distinguish their theory from a 'poetic' version of Instrumentalism -- or even a 'fantastical' form of Conventionalism.

 

On the other hand, it isn't easy to see how 'figurative forces' could account for anything. What sort of explanation would it be to say that 'contradictions' -- already suspiciously figurative themselves -- can be modelled by 'opposing forces' that are themselves just figures of speech in contemporary physics? Once more, while describing a man as, say, a "pig" might account for his crude behaviour (but not because his anatomy/physiology was literally that of a pig). The utility of this metaphor would be virtually nil if it were now admitted that the word "man" was figurative, too. Unlike iterated negation, multiple tropes do not undo one another.

 

Nevertheless, even if this proved to be an acceptable resolution of Engels's 'problem', it would still fail to provide Dialectical Marxists with a viable exit from this impasse. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation of DM-'contradictions' with 'opposing forces' in nature or society can't work.

 

That is so for several reasons -- to which knotty topic I now turn.

 

Are 'Dialectical Contradictions' Mathematical Models?

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

The first of the reasons why "the equation of DM-'contradictions' with 'opposing forces' in nature or society can't work" is connected with the way that forces are already represented, for example, in Applied Mathematics and Physics. As we are about to see, the way (literal) forces are already depicted doesn't appear to be a viable or appropriate way to depict DM-'contradictions'. Consider the following couple of points:

 

(a) 'Forces' in general operate according to inverse square laws (this links to a PDF). [This means that if the distance between, say, a planet and one of its moons is halved the strength of the 'force' operating on that moon will be quadrupled; but if the distance is doubled, the 'force' will be reduced in strength by a factor of four. This means the 'force' will be a quarter of its former strength. Henceforth, I will refrain from putting the word "force" in 'scare quotes', except where I am referring to the DM use of that term.] It is difficult to see how the same could be true of DM-'contradictions'. Presumably, two objects, states of affairs or processes 'contradict' each other in nature and/or society or they don't.12 Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a 'contradiction' could operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its factors were doubled. Do bosses really become more conciliatory if workers walk away from them? Does something like it happen if the local trade union offices are moved to a new location ten miles down the road? Does wealth cause less conflict if the rich stash their money in the Cayman Islands not the local bank? Do appearances 'contradict' reality any the more -- or less -- if someone uses a microscope, or presses their face up against the surface of an object?13

 

Indeed, little sense can be made of the idea that there is a literal separation distance between the factors involved in a DM-'contradiction' -- for instance, that there is, or could be, a physical separation distance between Capital and Labour, that there might be a literal gap between the forces and relations of production, or even between an object and itself as it moves in a 'contradictory sort of way'. What could it possibly mean to suggest, for example, that the "contradiction between use-value and exchange-value" changes if these two terms (or the commodities to which they supposedly apply) are moved further apart? Clearly, they can't be separated (except perhaps in thought), since they aren't the sort of 'things' that could be physically moved away from, or even closer to, one another. But even if they could, they would still be just as contradictory as they were before they had been moved (one presumes!). And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote magnitude unaffected by such changes.

 

Admittedly, Dialectical Marxists speak about the "contradictions" in the capitalist system "intensifying", but that isn't because the 'separation distance' between the relevant classes/factors has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists think they mean by "intensification" in such circumstances (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions" become more obvious, threatening, irresolvable, intractable, crisis-ridden -- or even more violent), they certainly don't mean it in the same way that physicists mean when they talk about, say, the strength of a force intensifying as a relevant separation distance is reduced (or vice versa). Nor has a single DM-theorist tried to apply any mathematics to such DM-goings-on -- i.e., in the way that scientists, for instance, can calculate how much weaker a force will become if a relevant separation distance is doubled or trebled. So, while a scientist, for example, might be dispatched to measure the intensity of certain forces in the earth's crust prior to an earthquake (as part of a genuine scientific research programme), no one, it seems, has ever been asked to do the same with these 'intensifying dialectical contradictions'. In connection with words like "intensifying", DM-contradictions (or at least their supposed 'strength') appear to be permanently locked in some sort of subjective space, stubbornly resistant to scientific investigation or even any sort of everyday measurement (using a tape measure, weighing scales or a wrist watch, for instance). [I have suggested a way out of this 'impasse' in Note 12.]

 

Be this as it may, what sense can be made of the other 'contradictions' alleged to exist in nature? For instance, can a moving object be more 'contradictory' than it used to be at any point along its trajectory? Can it be 'increasingly here and not here'? Or can it be increasing and not increasing at the same time? Perhaps an object can be In more than two places at once, as it accelerates? Maybe an electron can be more of a particle and a wave at the same time if or when that 'contradiction' intensifies? Is it possible for 'appearances' to 'contradict' underlying 'essences' more today than last week?

 

[Anyone who thinks the above are possible, please email me with the relevant numbers, along with the details of the experiment(s) you performed, or the measurements you took, in order to ascertain whatever it is you think you managed to ascertain!]

 

(b) Forces in nature can be (and are) represented by vectors, the use of which is governed by well-understood rules. As such, for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added, subtracted and multiplied (to give inner, vector (cross) or scalar triple products, and the like), by means of which diverse quantities such as areas, volumes, field densities, boundary fluxes (etc., etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors can be parallel or orthogonal (normal) to one another, or to previously defined axes, or to a surface (etc.), just as they can be decomposed into their components and projected onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can also be used to identify and classify the mathematical properties of various manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined in a given vector space, providing it with a base and spanning set. Modulii can be calculated for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can also be determined. Furthermore, matrices may be employed to represent vectors more efficiently, their determinants and inverses ascertained (where they exist). The ordinary and partial derivatives of vectors can also be obtained, and they can be integrated (as part of line, surface or volume integrals), too, and so on.

 

It is difficult to see how any of the above (and many more besides) could possibly be the case with a single DM-'contradiction', interpreted literally or figuratively, as an 'opposing force'. What, for example, is the angle between the 'contradictions' mentioned on the opening pages of TAR:

 

"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction…. Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line? The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2. Paragraphs merged.]

 

And, while we are at it, what is the cross product of the following 'contradictions' (mentioned in Socialist Worker)?

 

"Elvis's career illuminated a contradiction at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism needs to generate profits in order to survive. But to suck profit out of workers it also needs an ideology to ensure that workers know their place in society...." [Ian Birchall, Socialist Worker, 14/08/2007.]

 

"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers. It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to the strikers.... Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence. Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.' Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Simon Basketter, Socialist Worker, 01/09/2007. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]13a

 

Is it possible to find the inner product of the 'contradiction' between freedom and necessity? Is there an eigenvector related to the 'contradiction' between 'appearance' and 'underlying essence'? Is there any way of specifying the extent to which bosses and workers -- Capital and Labour -- contradict one another, individually or as a class? If so, what is the modulus of the 'contradiction' between boss NN and worker MM -- or, between the classes to which they belong? Is the 'contradiction' between ice and water orthogonal to…, well, what? What about the div, curl and grad of the 'contradiction' between a grain of barley and the plant that grows from it? Can we ascertain the Jacobian for the 'contradictory relationship' between wealth and poverty? Is the 'contradiction' between "John" and his "manhood" normal to a given direction or manifold?

 

So many questions, so few answers...

 

In her otherwise excellent book, Lindsey German had this to say:

 

"The Working class has to have a party to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle by an organised minority…." [German (1996), p.87.]

 

If contradictions were indeed literal forces, we would be able to ascertain, say, the i, j and k components of "the contradiction between [the] potential revolutionary role [of the working-class] and its actual situation", differentiate it/them, and find out how quickly any of them were changing, and in what direction.14 The fact that we can't do this -- and no sane Marxist has ever suggested it was even a possibility -- implies that in practice not even DM-fans think this analogy is at all apt, or, perhaps, is all that literal.

 

Plainly, if 'contradictions' could be interpreted literally as 'opposing forces', it would be possible to construct a vector algebra depicting them in nature and society. Do we possess such a 'Vector Algebra of Revolution'? Has anyone ever bothered to construct one?

 

Given the title of his book, the author of TAR was mysteriously, but no less revealingly, silent about this.14a

 

It could be objected that social contradictions were never meant to be interpreted in this crude and inappropriate manner, as vectors (etc.). Maybe not, but this section of the Essay is trying to make some sort of sense of the alleged association between 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions', and the former certainly can be represented by vectors. If it isn't possible to represent social forces in this way, then all well and good. But in that case, we are still no nearer understanding what these 'social contradictions' are, or in what way they can be described as, or be illustrated by, 'opposing forces'. In fact, if anything, we are now much further away!

 

Also in doubt is exactly how something that actually exists (the current state of the working class) can 'contradict' -- in a 'dialectical' sort of way (involving 'forces') -- something that doesn't exist (i.e., the proletariat's potential revolutionary role, as Lindsey German characterised it). We have already seen that Dialectical Marxists use the word "contradiction" almost ad nauseam, often in inappropriate circumstances, to depict things that seem quirky, odd, paradoxical, contrary to expectations, and so on, almost as the mood takes them. [On that, see, for instance, here and here.]

 

"The Working class has to have a party to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle by an organised minority…." [German, op cit.]

 

What German might have had in mind in the above passage was that there is what seems to be a contradiction in revolutionary theory, which depicts the proletariat as the revolutionary class, but that is done in the face of the undeniable fact that workers are often quiescent or compliant (or relatively so) for long periods. But that is no more a contradiction than it would be if, say, we heard that a heavy object near to the surface of the earth didn't actually fall to the ground. As soon as we learnt that this heavy object was held in place by pillars, cables or magnets, the phenomenon would no longer be a puzzle.

 

Three additional questions worth asking in relation to German's remarks are the following:

 

(A) Do the above factors struggle with each other?

 

(B) Do they change into one another (as the DM-Classics say they should)? And,

 

(C) Do they imply each other (like, say, the proletariat implies the bourgeoisie, and vice versa -- although I have thrown even that inference into considerable doubt, here)?

 

The answer is surely in the negative in each case. That being so, whatever else it is, what Lindsey mentioned isn't a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

It could be objected that there is an undeniable struggle going on between the working class and the capitalist class. I totally agree, but there isn't one going on between the former's "potential revolutionary role and its actual situation". One of these (at least) is an abstraction which can't struggle with anything. Furthermore, are the two classes mentioned changing into one another? But, they should be if the DM-Classics are to be believed.

 

Another lesson to be learned is that no law in Physics is 'true' on its own; each is hedged around by all manner of ceteris paribus (i.e., "all things being equal") clauses. [On this, see Cartwright (1983). (This links to a PDF.) However, there is a forceful rebuttal to Cartwright's way of interpreting science, here. See also Earman, et al (2002), and van Brakel (2000), pp.151-69. Naturally, it would be out of place to pursue that topic any further in this Essay; it will be covered in greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

In that case, and analogous with the example cited above (concerning that heavy object), as soon as we know exactly what is holding the working class back, the 'puzzle' disappears.

 

Hence, Lindsey German's worry about overcoming this 'contradiction' can now be shelved -- since there was no 'contradiction'.

 

Naturally, that doesn't mean socialists should just let things drift, fail to intervene, or, indeed, sit back and wait for workers to organise themselves, but since further consideration of this topic would take us into areas involving HM, no more will be said about it here (for reasons set out in Essay One).

 

Are 'Dialectical Contradictions' Properties Of Totalities?

 

The points made below, and the next few sub-sections, heavily depend on a detailed argument developed in Essay Eight Part One (as well as Essay Seven Part One), concerning the interpretation of "internal" and "external" as understood by DM-theorists (in relation to 'dialectical opposites', etc.). That argument will be far better understood by those who have actually read that material.

 

Nevertheless, I have summarised core parts of it below.

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DL = Dialectical Logic; W&G = Woods and Grant; HEX = Hegelian Expansionism; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism. Follow those two links for an explanation.]

 

Here is a brief summary of the argument presented in the above Essay (parts of which were themselves quoted from Essay Seven Part One):

 

The relevancy of the criticisms advanced in this sub-section depend on what dialecticians mean by "internal opposite". Readers should bear this in mind as they read on. As noted in an earlier Essay, DM-theorists sometimes appear to mean by "internal", "spatially-internal", at other times they appear to mean "logically-internal". They also regularly slide between a logical and a spatial understanding of "internal", not noticing either the difference or the effect this has on DM in general....

 

Even though the spatial sense of "internal"...seems reasonably clear, an actual example might help clarify the difference between these two senses of that word: all the lines of longitude on a map are logically-internal to the Prime Meridian in Greenwich, UK. Their geographical location and numerical value depend on that Meridian and are defined by it. Any change to the latter automatically alters each of the former. Remove the Prime Meridian and they disappear with it. Slide the Prime Meridian fifty miles east or west, and they all move with it. The nature and existence of each associated meridian thus depends on the Prime Meridian. Although each meridian line is also geographically related to the Prime Meridian, they aren't spatially internal to it, they are logically internal to it -- where "internal" in this case means "implied by".

 

[Of course, this doesn't mean that if someone deletes the Prime Meridian from a digital map, for example, that all the other lines of longitude will automatically vanish. That would make this a causal link. It means that if at some time in the future a new system is developed which supersedes the system of longitude we now have, all the meridian lines will vanish to be replaced by new lines, or with whatever is entailed by this new system. Alternatively, if the definition of the Prime Meridian is itself changed, that will automatically affect every other line; their nature and existence depends on the nature and existence of the Prime Meridian. Naturally, if the Prime Meridian is actually removed from the definition of the system, then, say, the meridian line 030ş (west) will cease to make sense since there would no longer be a Prime Meridian for it to be 30ş west of!]

 

Even so, the relation between the Prime Meridians and each meridian isn't a 'dialectical UO'. For example, they don't 'struggle' with and then change into one another:

 

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis added.]

 

There is no mystery to this; there is nothing 'logical' in reality, "beneath the surface of appearances", that underpins or 'determines' the logical relation between these lines. They depend on decisions made centuries ago, on human choice and stipulation.

 

So, "internal" is being used in this case metaphorically, and is a carry-over from the theories developed by the philosophers mentioned below.

 

The following is one explanation of the term "internal relation" that I think is (almost) correct:

 

"There are relations which could not fail to obtain since they are given with or (partly) constitutive of the terms (objects or relata), such as white's being lighter than black." [Glock (1996), p.189.]

 

[Some definitions characterise "internal relations" in terms of "essential properties", but, as we will see in Essays Four Part Two and Thirteen Part Two, there are good reasons to reject all such definitions. I will say much more about this topic there, too.]

 

In like manner (one supposes), objects and processes that are said to be 'dialectical opposites' are not only meant to imply one another, they inter-define each other. Plainly this is the logical sense of "internal". The classic example given by DM-theorists is the relationship between the capitalist class and the proletariat; there would or could be none of the former without the latter, nor vice versa. They exist or cease to exist together, just as they inter-define one another. Or so we have been led to believe.

 

[I have said much more about this, and why the link between the capitalist class and the proletariat isn't even logical, and hence isn't dialectical, in Essay Eight Part Two.]

 

On the other hand, "spatially-internal" applies to objects and processes that are merely located inside another object or process. No logical connection is necessarily implied. So, although both your appendix and your brain are both located inside your body, there doesn't appear to be any logical connection between them. If there were, you couldn't ever have your appendix removed without your brain ceasing to exist.

 

Here is an egregious example of this sort of confusion:

 

"Another of these three principles is 'Unity of opposites'. You know, every person has virtues as well as vices. Just as there is no person who has only virtues and no vices, there is also no one with vices only and no virtues. Neither is possible. When we call someone very good or someone else very bad, what do we mean ? Here 'good' and 'bad' are used in the relative sense. That is, the person in whom good traits have a preponderance over the bad ones is called good. Again, if a person has some good traits but these are outweighed by bad ones he is called bad. There may be a question as to why such differences exist between one person and another. This is because, how one's characteristic features would shape out depends mainly upon the contradiction within one's own self. It is well known that a contradiction or conflict between instinct and conscience works within every man. One should know that no one is born with any instincts or conscience, neither are these unchangeable or eternal. In the process of contradiction and conflict, the person in whom instinct succeeds in defeating conscience becomes a mere slave of base instincts. Naturally, the aspect of vices gets predominance in such a person, not the good qualities. We call such a person bad. Conversely, in a person whose conscience is very sharp and active, whose conscience can control his base instincts, the aspect of good qualities gets more and more developed. And we call him good. That is, a man becomes wayward if his base instincts win whereas his life takes a turn for the better and he earns reputation as a good man if his conscience wins. It does not, however, follow from this that no bad or base instincts can creep into a good man, or that conscience can never work in a bad man." [Shibdas Ghosh, quoted from here; accessed 09/07/2021. Bold added.]

 

If we ignore the primitive psychology and physiology apparent in the above passage, it is clear that comrade Ghosh has confused what was supposed to be a logical-, with a spatial-relation. For Ghosh, the fact that these characteristics, or whatever gives rise to them, are located inside a given individual means that the pairs of 'opposites' he mentions constitute a UO. But, there is no way that the existence of whatever gives rise to a given 'virtue' implies that its 'opposite' vice must exist, too, or that the one can't exist without the other (like the proletariat and the capitalist class have to co-exist, so we are told) -- which must be the case if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

Unfortunately, sloppy thought like this is par for the course in DM-circles.

 

Consider another example: even though dialecticians appear to think there is 'dialectical' relation between electrons and protons (or is it positrons?) -- which for them constitutes a classic DM-UO --, it is far from easy to see how this could be logical-, as opposed to its merely being a spatial-, or even a causal-relation. That is because electrons can exist without protons, and vice versa. Nor do they inter-define one another, which they would have to do if they formed a DM-UO. And do they really struggle with and then turn into one another? [But, once more, they would have to do that if they were 'dialectical opposites' -- if the DM-classicists are to be believed (link above).]

 

This confusing use of "internal" dates back at least to Leibniz and Kant. Kant called this type of link "analytic"; in Leibniz it was merely "necessary". For the latter, each substance (or 'monad') 'contained' its own "complete idea" -- i.e., a 'list' of predicates that were true of it, assigned by 'God'. So everything true of that substance, everything that has happened, is happening, or will ever happen to it has been encoded internally (in a 'spatial' sense), so they are all necessarily true of it (in a 'logical' sense), if we but knew it. We might not be able to discern or even ascertain the necessary connections that exist here, but that doesn't mean they aren't there or aren't necessary. Collectively, these predicates uniquely define a given monad. They all reflect one another and are therefore all inter-related -- but not by any 'external factors'. All their inter-connections are spatially-, and logically-internal, programmed by 'god' -- they are all "windowless monads" (which means that nothing, not even light, can get in!). So, the 'logical' and the 'spatial' connotations of "internal" were united in Leibniz's theory. Kant ditched the overt metaphysics apparent here by concentrating on the conceptual connections we are supposedly capable of apprehending -- even if he later attempted to milk some metaphysics from them, too!

 

However, as with most things in Traditional Thought, the seeds of this confusion stretch back to the metaphysical fog created by Ancient Greek Philosophers, an internally-generated mist that engulfed the spurious 'problem' concerning the link between a 'substance' and its 'accidents' (the latter expressed as its 'contingent properties'), often re-appearing in subsequent theories about the link between subject and predicate terms in indicative sentences (covered in detail in Essay Three Part One). This family of confused ideas was later imported into Mediaeval, and then post-Renaissance thought, where one concept was said to be 'internally related' to another if the definition and existence of one automatically implied the existence and nature of the other, or, indeed, of the rest.

 

Here is Leibniz -- where "contained" now appears to carry both spatial and logical connotations:

 

"A notion that determines a certain individual Adam must contain absolutely all his predicates, and it is this complete notion that determines general considerations to the individual.... So: I hold that every true proposition is either immediate or mediate. An immediate proposition is one that is true by itself, i.e., a proposition whose predicate is explicitly contained in its subject; I call truths of this sort 'identical'. All other propositions are mediate; a true proposition is mediate when its predicate is included virtually in its subject, in such a way that analysis of the subject, or of both predicate and subject, can ultimately reduce the proposition to an identical truth. That's what Aristotle and the scholastics mean when they say 'the predicate is in the subject'." [Leibniz to Arnauld, 1686, quoted from here. See also here. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

 

"The nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed." [Leibniz, quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

[The above is an obvious echo of the medieval, Identity Theory of Predication -- once again, considered in more detail in Essay Three Part One.]

 

Christia Mercer brings out this confusion admirably well (although she doesn't call it a confusion!):

 

"To help us in the next part of our story, let's remind ourselves briefly of two related senses of 'essence,' which were widely accepted in the seventeenth century and are relevant here. First, an essence is what is given in the definition of the thing and what can be grasped by the intellect; second, it constitutes the nature of an individual and that from which its properties flow. It is striking that Micraelius asserts in his Lexicon Philosophicum that the 'properties emanate from the essence of the thing.' Scherzer, for example, defines an essence as 'what is first conceived in a thing, without which the thing is not able to be; it is what is fundamental and the cause of other things which are in it.' We need to keep a firm grip on the difference between an essence as something conceived and as something contained in an individual created thing from which the properties of the thing (somehow) flow or emanate." [Mercer (2001), p.227. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and link alone added.]

 

From the above we can see the logical sense of "internal" ("an essence as something conceived") being run together with the spatial sense (an essence as something "contained in an individual", from which "flow" its properties, or 'accidents').

 

Here, too, is Kant (where "internal" -- or rather, "contained" -- and "outside" are now both logical and metaphorical, but not spatial):

 

"In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (if I consider only affirmative judgments, since the application to negative ones is easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic." [Kant (1998), p.130. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

To use a highly clichéd example, bachelor was said to imply unmarried man, and vice versa -- each is 'contained' in the conception of the other.

 

----------------------------------------

 

Added in a footnote:

 

However, it is far from clear what Kant meant by this 'containment' metaphor, or why he chose to use it. He indicates later on in the same passage that this has something to do with merely thinking about the concepts involved:

 

"Analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity, but those in which this connection is thought without identity are to be called synthetic judgments. One could also call the former judgments of clarification and the latter judgments of amplification, since through the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly); while the latter, on the contrary, add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through any analysis; e.g., if I say: 'All bodies are extended,' then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go outside the concept that I combine with the word 'body' in order to find that extension is connected with it, but rather I need only to analyze that concept, i.e., become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein; it is therefore an analytic judgment. On the contrary, if I say: 'All bodies are heavy,' then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment. Now from this it is clear: 1) that through analytic judgments our cognition is not amplified at all, but rather the concept, which I already have, is set out, and made intelligible to me; 2) that in synthetic judgments I must have in addition to the concept of the subject something else (X) on which the understanding depends in cognizing a predicate that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it." [Kant (1998), pp.130-31. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Kant expresses himself slightly differently in the Introduction to the B edition, pp.141-42. Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]

 

[Again, the above is an obvious echo of the medieval, Identity Theory of Predication....]

 

----------------------------------------

 

So, the equivocation mentioned above -- whereby DM-fans slide effortlessly between these two different senses of "internal" -- clearly dates back to Leibniz and Kant (and ultimately to Aristotle), who created this confusion by their ill-considered choice of words like "contained". Hence, it was only a matter of time before the spatial connotation came to the fore and replaced the logical connotation of "internal". This took place in Hegel's system (that is, if it is possible to decide what, if anything, he was banging on about; on this, see Inwood (1992), pp.142-44, 197-99). Or, rather, to be more accurate: for Hegel there appears to be no difference between these two senses of "internal". This cavalier attitude has clearly been passed down without modification to Hegel's progeny among DM-fans.

 

Despite this, there remains a clear distinction between something that is logically-, and something that is spatially-internal. Clearly, the spatial sense of "internal" -- as that connotation found its way into in Dialectical Marxism, whereby two objects or 'concepts' were said to be complementary parts of a UO simply because they were inside something else, or were part of a system (while perhaps also appearing to be 'opposites') -- doesn't of itself make them 'dialectical opposites'. Or, at least, it wouldn't unless (obviously!) there were also some sort of logical connection between them -- whereby the existence of each 'opposite' implies the other's existence, just like the existence of the proletariat is said to imply the existence of the bourgeoisie, and vice versa.

 

Much of the sloppy thought that passes for 'dialectics' in this area is a direct result of this equivocation. DM-fans have appropriated the spatial sense of this term, assuming without proof that any objects and processes involved are also 'dialectical opposites' just because they are located inside a third body, process or system -- or even where there is some sort of causal connection between them. This helps account for their profligate use of 'contradiction', examples of which they see literally everywhere (on that, see here). Clearly, that is because most objects and processes are contained by other objects and processes. That seems to be enough reason to slap the label "contradiction" on them! [We will have occasion to meet this again below when we examine Engels's ideas about life and death, where both of these connotations become hopelessly entangled.]

 

Rarely, if ever, do DM-fans (and this includes the classicists, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Mao), rarely if ever do they try to show how the existence of one of these alleged 'opposites' implies the existence of the other -- or derive one from the other, as the proletariat can be derived from the capitalist class (so we are told). In fact, in the vast majority of examples, if not in relation to every single one of them (outwith the link between the two aforementioned classes), it turns out that there is no such connection. In which case, it is no big surprise that DM-fans draw a veil over this topic when pressed -- or they deflect and simply change the subject.

 

Now, much of the material in the next few sub-sections depends on interpreting "internal opposites" in one way -- i.e., spatially -- since that is how DM-theorists largely understand this term. Even so, the other alternative (i.e., reading "internal opposite" logically) will also be considered where it seems applicable or appropriate.

 

Readers will need to keep this in mind as we proceed.

 

[Any confusion caused by this is the fault of the sloppy thought that passes for 'dialectics', not the present author! Concerning the serious difficulties this equivocation creates for DM-theorists, see here. There is, however, a DM-critic of this site who also wanted to view these "opposites" spatially -- for example, when he speaks about considering the dialectical process externally (i.e., "at the outside"). Follow the previous link for more details.]

 

Furthermore, it is plain that this particular equivocation also arose because of an inappropriate organicist metaphor that dialecticians have likewise borrowed from Hegel. Clearly, the various organs and other parts of an animal or plant are spatially-internal to it --, and some of them might even be logically-internal to a given organism, too (even though their organs/parts aren't logically-internal, or logically-related, to each other; as noted above, for example, we would refuse to call an amoeba "an amoeba" if it lacked a nucleus), although I prefer to call this a "grammatical connection". However, when we move beyond biology this metaphor loses all of its seeming plausibility, where the above equivocation (between the spatial-, and the logical-meaning of "internal") creates serious problems for Dialectical Marxists -- indeed, as we are about to find out.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Moving on: The second reason why this is an inappropriate way to interpret 'contradictions' as 'opposing forces' is connected with a possible response that could be made to the criticisms advanced in earlier sub-sections: it could be argued that it is the inter-relationship between contradictory forces that explains change, and hence it is only within, or against, a network of forces that are embedded in a dialectically inter-connected Totality that their contradictory nature and inter-relationships may successfully be analysed and understood. Indeed, it could further be maintained that the interpretation of contradictions presented so far in this Essay (which clearly pictures them as isolated units -- for want of a better term -- divorced from their surroundings and their inter-connections) completely misconstrues not just their role in DM, but also the way they operate in nature and society in general.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

That volunteered pro-DM objection was in fact dealt with in Part One of this Essay (summarised above) -- but from a slightly different angle (no pun intended) -- where it was pointed out that there are serious ambiguities in DM on this issue. That is because Dialectical Marxists have so far been totally unclear whether 'DM-contradictions':

 

(i) Are internal to objects and processes, causing them to change as a result of an inner dynamic;

 

(ii) Arise externally between objects as they form part of a mediated system or as they form part of an inter-connected group of systems/processes;

 

(iii) Merely result from a certain way of describing objects and processes -- picturing them as 'contradictory' -- which arises from the fact that humanity will only ever have a partial/relative knowledge of reality, etc.;

 

(iv) Emerge somehow from a 'dialectical combination' of all three; or whether they:

 

(v) Result from other factors about which we are currently unaware, or even those concerning which we haven't yet developed the relevant concepts/language.

 

As we have also just seen, unresolved confusions like these have been further compounded by the fact that DM-theorists can't seem to make up their minds about the meaning of two key concepts already in use -- in connection with (a) 'dialectical opposites', (b) 'dialectical relations' and (c) 'dialectic contradictions' -- specifically: the terms "internal" and "external". As we saw in Part One (summarised above), Dialectical Marxists oscillate erratically and confusingly between two competing interpretations of these key terms -- for example viewing "internal" and "external" as:

 

(vi) Spatial terms;

 

(vii) Logical expressions; and sometimes even,

 

(viii) Both at once!

 

As we also discovered (in Part One), while Alternatives (i)-(viii) above face serious difficulties of their own, in the end they all fail to explain change. That is because they simply re-describe it -- and they even do that in a thoroughly obscure and unsatisfactory manner. That is why every one of the above Alternatives so readily fell apart when they were closely examined in Part One. Indeed, as we are about to find out, that will also be the case in connection with the equation of 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions' in this Essay.

 

In response, it could be objected that the problem with the analysis of dialectical systems advanced in these Essays is that it objectifies dialectical contradictions -- i.e., it endeavours to make (isolated) objects out of them. We can see that from the frequent use of "part", "factor" and "component" whenever an attempt is made to characterise dialectical opposites and dialectical contradictions, ossifying them into a rigid, 'formal structure', separating them from the system in which they are embedded and from which they gain their dialectical status/nature. Hence, such a response might continue by pointing out that, in DM, it isn't 'objects' like these that are associated with dialectical contradictions, nor do 'objects' contain them, or even constitute them. On the contrary, systems and/or totalities caught up in continual change reveal their inner contradictions, which may take on many different forms, whose inter-connections motivate further development. In that case, it could be maintained that dialectical contradictions are dynamic aspects of systems and totalities in the process of change, not 'objects' as such.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

In reply to this volunteered pro-DM-objection, it is worth asking where this leaves forces if 'dialectical contradictions' are no longer to be viewed as 'objects' or as 'object-like'. Forces presumably have a physical form of some sort. They aren't just relations, are they? In fact, the above (proffered) pro-DM response makes a mockery of many things the DM-classicists themselves have say about change. Here is Lenin, for example:

 

"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Italic emphasis added.]

 

[Several passages that say more-or-less the same were quoted in Part One of this Essay.]

 

It could now be countered that this misrepresents Lenin's words, since he went on to argue as follows:

 

"The gist of his [Bukharin's -- RL] theoretical mistake in this case is substitution of eclecticism for the dialectical interplay of politics and economics (which we find in Marxism). His theoretical attitude is: 'on the one hand, and on the other', 'the one and the other'. That is eclecticism. Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces. I have shown this to be so on the example of politics and economics.... A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world.... Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more.

 

"Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel. (Let me add in parenthesis for the benefit of young Party members that you cannot hope to become a real, intelligent Communist without making a study -- and I mean study -- of all of Plekhanov's philosophical writings, because nothing better has been written on Marxism anywhere in the world.)" [Ibid. pp.90-93. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

From this it is clear that Lenin actually argued that an understanding of the inter-relation between an object (in change) and the rest of the world (i.e., the Totality) was essential to understanding its contradictory nature and development. [I have discussed this topic in much more detail here and in Part One, again. The above pro-DM rebuttal also creates problems of its own, which will be covered presently.]

 

So, opposing forces may only be interpreted as dialectical contradictions against the inter-relationship they have with the system/totality in which they are embedded, in which they operate, or to which they are inter-connected. It therefore looks like pairs of opposing forces -- viewed dialectically -- in some sense constitute, or actually are relations, not objects. Of course, it could even be the case that such forces are both relations and objects. After all, there are no rigid dichotomies in DM.

 

Or so it could further be maintained...

 

Nevertheless, it seems that Lenin inadvertently torpedoed the proffered pro-DM-reply aired earlier (also echoed in several previous paragraphs) since he specifically spoke about objects involved in contradictory change! In fact, it is difficult to see how DM-theorists could possibly explain change if they ignored objects. Admittedly, Lenin also spoke about situating all such objects against a background of all their "mediacies" (and by that he seems to have meant each object's causal inter-relationships, its history and connections, all interpreted in the light of DL).

 

Furthermore, even if forces were relations, it is far from easy to see what it is that could possibly physically relate objects and processes in nature and society in the manner described earlier (in and by the aforementioned pro-DM-responses) -- that is, other than by a knee-jerk insertion of a few Hegelian 'concepts' (of dubious meaning and even more questionable provenance). Of course, this raises issues aired earlier: are these relations external or internal? And, are those two terms meant to be interpreted spatially or logically?

 

Considering external relations/forces first (and putting to one side for now whether "external" is to be interpreted spatially or logically), it seems that the idea that objects and processes change because of an 'inner dynamic' has once again been lost sight of. If objects only change because of the operation of external forces, or even as a result of external relations -- which might even be 'internal to a wider system' of some sort, mediated, or not, by other factors internal to the yet-to-be-explained "Totality" --, that itself can only mean "external" has now become the new "internal". In that eventuality, 'internal contradictions' will in effect become something an object merely experiences as part of its external relations with other objects and processes -- which are, as noted, internal to the "Totality". In that sense, "external" will simply mean "spatially external" to other factors which are "spatially internal" to the entire system. The logical sense of "internal" will have been bargained away. But, what is the point of arguing that all change is "internally-motivated" if external mediation among, or even between, objects (in a spatial, non-logical sense) is the only game in town, and forces merely turn out to be, or to constitute, 'external relations'? That seems to be the direction that Engels and W&G were trying to go. [No pun intended.]

 

[As we will see in Essay Four Part Two (when it is published), for other DM-theorists, these "relations" (and, in some cases, all of them!) are supposed to be 'logical'. They are clearly reading "internal" in a quasi-Hegelian sort of sense, but they are no less suspect for all that. Until then, readers are redirected here for some (preliminary) critical scrutiny.]

 

Before we proceed, may I remind readers of something that was pointed out several sections ago (slightly edited)?

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here the relation:

 

(1) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(2) Between the forces operating in the system? Or is it,

 

(3) A 'dialectical union' of both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay and Part Three unfold. Readers are encouraged to keep the above options in mind.

 

We are now about to reveal why readers were encouraged to keep those points in mind.

 

The proffered pro-DM-response outlined a few paragraphs back failed to resolve several other problems that were also mentioned earlier.

 

First of all, as we will see in Essay Eleven Part One, there is good reason to question the nature of the nebulous DM-"Totality" -- or, to be more honest, there would be if we knew what 'it' was supposed to be, and there was some sign that DM-theorists themselves also knew what 'it' was supposed to be! In that case its re-appearance here can only hinder comprehension.

 

Secondly, even if a clear account of the "Totality" were (ever!) forthcoming, this way of depicting forces would still fail to work. If contradictions are properties of totalities -- as opposed to properties of their parts -- then those parts couldn't change, since, on this account, contradictions wouldn't belong to them, but to the whole, taken as a whole. In that case, while the whole might change, it would do so only as a result of the rearrangement of its changeless parts (that result was established in Part One). Given this way of thinking, the "Totality" (or, indeed, any sub-system of the "Totality") would be:

 

(α) Composed of infinitely small changeless elementary particles; or,

 

(β) Composed of infinitely complex sub-systems, which enjoy no inter-connections among themselves. [The reader is once again referred back to Part One for a more detailed explanation of this point.]

 

Again, it could be objected that a Totality is constituted by its own internal contradictory relations and processes. That is precisely what a Totality is -- a contradictory, inter-connected, differentiated unity. The account just given once again seems to want to separate the parts from the whole!

 

However, that reply still won't do, for on that basis it would now seem that it is part and whole which are 'contradictory' (and in a manner that has yet to be explained with any clarity). But, parts can't be contradictory in the same way that wholes are. That is because, on this account, parts mutually condition one another. That is, presumably, the nature of the mediated 'unity-in-difference' that constitutes each 'dialectical contradiction' inside the "Totality". However, the "Totality" is related to nothing else that could condition it (one also supposes -- again, should we ever be told what the "Totality" is!). So, if the "Totality" is a contradictory whole (i.e., if it encompasses all of 'Reality'), then it would appear to be so in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense. So far, it has no 'dialectical opposite' that could cause it to change. Is the "Totality" therefore changeless? [I return to consider this question again, below.]

 

There is an analogous problem concerning the relation the "Totality" has with its parts. As we have seen, the 'internal opposites' of a 'dialectical contradiction' are said to imply one another, being a 'reflection' of each other's 'essence-in-development' (the Hegelian rationale behind this is explored in Essay Eight Part Three). Hence, each part can't exist without the other -- just as the proletariat implies, and couldn't exist without, the bourgeoisie, for example. But, not only does the "Totality" fail to imply any of its parts, it could exist without many of them. Nor do the parts imply one another. So, does the entire Universe (or 'Reality' itself) actually imply Venus or the Crab Nebula? The Universe could surely have existed without either of them. As far as the parts are concerned, could The Mississippi River exist without the Andromeda Galaxy? Do they imply one another? I have yet to see any proof they do. [Readers are invited to inform me if they know of any such proof.] If so, whatever else is true of the relation between part and whole in this case, or even between part and part, it can't be "contradictory" in the required DM-sense of that word. If it were, Venus and the Crab Nebula couldn't fail to exist, and The Mississippi would imply the existence of The Andromeda Galaxy!

 

Scientists would then be able to deduce the existence of such distant Galaxies from thought alone -- or, they would be able to do so as soon as they encountered that great river. (Or, indeed, as soon as they encountered anything at all, if every part implies every other! That would surely be the case if everything were logically inter-connected with everything else -- in a 'dialectical sort of way'!)

 

[If true, it would turn DM into some sort of Metaphysical Calvinism, which would view absolutely everything in the Universe as Pre-Determined, Pre-Destined and Inter-Implied in and by The Big Bang! Your left foot, dear reader, would imply the Moons of Saturn, your last meal would imply UY Scuti, and vice versa. That shouldn't surprise us since Hegel's system turns out to be a 'logical form of Calvinism'. (The connection, between Hegel and Calvin, mediated via Luther, is explored in Stern (2025a, 2025b).) I will return to this theme again, below.]

 

It could be objected that the above argument is a ridiculous caricature of DM -- but that isn't so. Since I have covered the above topic extensively, along with objections like this, in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two -- where I have shown (from what Dialectical Marxists and Hegel themselves have to say about the "Totality" and its 'parts') that the last few paragraphs aren't a caricature of DM --, but, because I do not want to reproduce that material here, readers are referred to those Essays for more details.

 

In fact, as seems obvious from what little DM-theorists themselves have said about the "Totality", 'it' must be an Unconditioned Absolute. It certainly can't be conditioned from the 'outside', otherwise it wouldn't be the Whole (one presumes!). If, on the other hand, it were conditioned from the 'outside', an infinite 'exgress' (or inflation -- an infinite exgress is the opposite of an infinite regress, which is sometimes called an "explosion") would be initiated. That is because we should now want to know how, and by what, this 'external' object or process (about which we know even less) is itself conditioned, and so on, forever. But we have been here already.

 

[As we also saw in Part One, similar problems confront 'The Cosmological Argument' for the existence of 'God'. That should surprise few who already know that DM is the poor cousin of Hegelianised Christian Mysticism (upside down of 'the right way up')!]

 

And, it seems these dialectically disconcerting details must have their place, otherwise, for the "Totality" to be a 'contradictory' whole, it would have to 'contradict' its parts. [Ex hypothesi, it would have to do this anyway, since there is nothing else for it to condition. (I will re-examine this question below, where I will also ask what the 'dialectical opposite' of the "Totality" could possibly be -- it must have one if it is to change!)] Moreover, the parts must in turn contradict each other in the same way (i.e., the same way the "Totality" 'contradicts' them), after all.

 

[The opposite supposition -- i.e., that the parts don't do this -- will also be considered presently.]

 

If we now try to ignore the above 'problems', and it is maintained that the "Totality" is composed solely of its 'parts' and their inter-relations (unless, of course, we assume the "Totality" is "more than the sum of its parts" -- that Wholist cliché was exposed for what it is, yet another radically confused DM-Dogma, in Essay Eleven Part Two (link above)), the 'contradiction' between the "Totality" and its 'parts' must now be seen as:

 

(γ) The same as the 'contradiction' between each of the aforementioned 'parts'; or,

 

(δ) More than the 'contradiction' between the 'parts' (since, as we have just seen, DM-theorists also believe that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts').15

 

As far as (γ) is concerned, it seems that the "Totality" must in that case drop out of the picture as merely a shorthand term for the sum total of the 'parts' in 'contradictory change and development' (rather like a pile of sand is just the sum of its parts), thereby becoming a mere fiction, only this time a useless one.16

 

[In addition, if the "Totality" were simply comprised of its 'parts' (howsoever they are themselves conceived) -- again like that pile of sand --, and those 'parts' were deemed 'contradictory' just because of that -- i.e., just because they were 'internal' to the "Totality" (whether or not the latter drops out of the picture along the above lines) --, that would be yet another example of the confusion mentioned earlier. That is because this sense of "internal" is clearly spatial, not logical! In that case, any such 'contradiction' couldn't be 'dialectical', whatever else it turned out to be. On the other hand, if these 'contradictions' (internal to the "Totality") were now simply declared to be 'dialectical' (for no good reason), a proof would be owed demonstrating, for example, that the existence of Venus implied the existence of The Crab Nebula -- or Venus's existence implied the existence of whatever was supposed to be its 'dialectical opposite' -- just as the existence of the proletariat supposedly implies the existence of the capitalist class. (Of course, if it turns out that Venus has no 'dialectical opposite', it couldn't change -- unless the DM-classics are themselves full of it.) As far as can be ascertained, no DM-theorist since Engels first aired this 'theory'/'method' has raised questions like these, never mind attempt to answer them. But, that is just par for the course with those who dote on 'Diabolical Logic'.]

 

On the other hand, if (δ) were the case, we would still be owed an explanation of the alleged 'contradiction' between this 'more' and that 'less' -- i.e., between this 'more-of-a-"Totality"' and all its 'lesser parts'. But, as things now stand, we have absolutely no idea whether or not this new 'contradictory' relation between 'whole and part' is the same as, or is different from, that which operates between the 'parts'!

 

Nagging, unresolved 'problems' like this remind us that DM has more holes in it than a lorry load of Swiss Cheese.

 

 

Figure One: The Whole Truth -- DM Is All Holes

 

Anyone impatient with all this 'nit-picking' should re-direct their complaints to their local Dialectical Magus -- who will simply ignore them, label them 'pedantic' and possibly also cuss you out for not 'understanding dialectics', or for having th temerity to question this Sacred Creed. But, such 'pedantry' is forced upon us because, even now, after more than 200 years, we still have no idea what these 'opposing forces' are, how they can possibly 'contradict' each other -- or even what the mysterious "Totality" is, for goodness sake!

 

[The first two of those 'peremptory allegations' will be substantiated as this Essay unfolds; the third was extensively covered in Essay Eleven Part One.]

 

However, and independently of the above -- shall we say...'difficulties' --, DM faces other serious problems. If the 'contradiction' between 'the whole and its parts' is the same as (but is still not more than) that which exists between the 'parts', then, obviously, the 'whole' couldn't be more than the sum of the 'parts' (in at least this respect). That is because, in that eventuality the whole would be the entire 'contradictory' ensemble, all of whose elements ('whole' and 'part') operate alike and on the same level (as it were). In short: that ensemble would be equal to, but not more than, the sum of its 'parts'. Manifestly, that would run counter to the DM-hypothesis that 'wholes' (whether or not they were 'wholes' made of 'contradictory parts') are more than the sum of their 'parts', whose natures (including the nature of their 'internal contradictions') were said to 'be determined entirely by', while 'not being reducible to', the nature of their 'parts' and the ('dialectical') inter-connection between them.

 

On the other hand, if the 'contradiction' between 'the whole and its parts' weren't the same as that between the 'parts', we would have an unexplained type of 'contradiction' at work here: that which supposedly exists between (i) A mysterious 'whole' that is "more than the sum of the parts" and (ii) Those 'parts' themselves.17

 

Anyway, the claim that the whole 'contradicts' the parts in the same way that the 'parts contradict' each other doesn't appear to be a viable option, even for DM-Über-Loyalists -- i.e., should they ever care enough to give their theory the attention to detail they have so far denied it. The 'parts' relate to each other by some sort of "mediation", so we are told. But how can the 'part-whole relation' be one of "mediation"? The mutually 'contradictory' nature of the 'parts' in development is what constitutes the 'whole'. If now the 'whole' possesses its own 'contradictory' relation with the 'parts' over and above, or in addition to, this (once more assuming -- as we were told -- that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts'), this new 'contradictory' relation can't be one of 'part-on-part' -- unless the 'whole' turns out to be a 'part' of itself! But, if not, what then is this ill-defined 'contradiction' (i.e., between the "Totality" and its 'parts')?

 

Independently of the above, the idea that the "Totality" can contradict anything (else?) would have to be based on the supposed 'dialectical relation' between the "Totality" and its 'dialectical opposite'. But, what is the 'dialectical opposite' of the "Totality"? If it has one, it can't be part of the "Totality" (or it wouldn't then be its 'opposite', one supposes). But if that 'opposite' isn't part of the "Totality", the "Totality" couldn't encompass everything, after all -- since there would now exist something other than the "Totality" -- i.e., its supposed 'opposite' that isn't part of the "Totality"! Clearly, that would mean the "Totality" would fail to be the "Totality" by having such an 'opposite' that isn't part of itself!

 

On the other hand, if this 'opposite' is part of the "Totality", how can it also be its 'opposite'? Surely, the 'opposite' of the "Totality" would be the "non-Totality" -- presumably just as A and non-A are supposed to be such paradigmatic 'opposites'!

 

It now seems that the "Totality" can't have a 'dialectical opposite'.

 

If so, it can't change!

 

Hence, the theory that tells us everything changes now tells us nothing changes!

 

Well, drawing conclusions like this might be a little hasty, in which case I will return to this topic in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two (although much of it has already been raked over in Essay Eight Part One -- whose conclusion was summarised here).

 

So, as is also argued in Essay Eight Part One, it seems that a literal interpretation of DM-'contradictions' in terms of 'opposing forces' lapses either into some form of CAR, or it inflates alarmingly into HEX (or, indeed, into Absolute Idealism). Conversely, if the identification of 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' is merely figurative, then DM would be indistinguishable from Metaphysical Poetry!

 

Notwithstanding this, in order to examine this issue even more thoroughly, it might be useful to suppose that 'some sort of solution' for all of the above 'difficulties' can be found -- by someone, at some point, somehow.

 

However, even if we were to be recklessly generous by assuming this, the analogy drawn between 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions' would still fail to work.

 

The substantiation of that claim brings us to the third reason for questioning the connection between the above two factors.

 

As we are about to see, this third option is even more closely connected with issues raised by the following earlier questions (which the reader was encouraged to keep in mind):

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here the relation:

 

(1) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(2) Between the forces operating in the system? Or is it,

 

(3) A 'dialectical union' of both?

 

Contradictory To What?

 

In what follows, unless stated otherwise, I will assume for the sake of argument that 'forces' do exist in nature. Those that exist in society will be examined in detail later (for example, here and here).

 

Different Types Of Force Couples

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

In a physical system there may be several different combinations of interacting attractive and repulsive forces. If we abbreviate "attractive" and "repulsive" to "A" and "R", respectively, there appear to be only three different types of combinations of just two of these: AA-, AR-, and RR-forces.18

 

Of course, the above assumes these relations are symmetrical -- i.e., that AR = RA, which seems reasonable enough. Another simplifying assumption is that these forces operate in binary form -- that is, the following material will concentrate exclusively on force-couples. So, initially, combinations like these: AAA-, ARA-, and RRR-forces, for instance, will be ignored (as will even more complex permutations and combinations). It is reasonably clear, I take it, that simplifications like these won't significantly affect the conclusions drawn. Anyway, further complications will be introduced as this Essay unfolds.

 

Naturally, a comprehensive scientific (or even philosophical) account of the concept of force would have to include contemporary ideas about gravitational, strong nuclear, weak nuclear and electroweak forces, etc.

 

However, as pointed out earlier, forces in general have been edited out of the picture in favour of (i) exchange particles or (ii) the geometry of space-time; on that, see here The first of these two alternatives is illustrated in this simplified video:

 

 

Video Two -- Exchange Particles And

Apparent 'Forces'

 

The second is illustrated by the following video:

 

 

Video Three -- Visual Representation Of Motion Governed

By The Geometry Of Space-Time

 

[I will return to discuss one or two issues raised by Video Two later in this Essay.]

 

However, it is highly likely that as science develops, reference to forces (even in school Physics) will progressively disappear [cf., Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi (partially quoted earlier)]. In that eventuality, if DM-theorists continue to promote the idea that 'opposing forces' are what lend to 'dialectical contradictions' some sort of material/physical substantiality, their theory would become 'unscientific' by default. Either that or they will have to abandon all talk of the 'objective' nature of both forces and DM -- thereby having to join with Engels and regard them as shorthand for relative motion. Of course, in that eventuality, forces wouldn't just be "useful fictions", they would be useless fictions.

 

[Of course, none of this affects the forces spoken about in HM, which will continue to exist whatever physicists decide to do. More about that later.]

 

On the other hand, should any such scientific development fail to materialise (specifically the editing out of forces from nature), it would be interesting to see how DM-theorists will try to harmonise their fixation on 'attraction/repulsion' with any successful attempt to unify the four fundamental forces in a Grand Unification Theory (or even via Superstring/M Theory, etc.), perhaps into one over-arching 'Force' (but not the one in Star Wars!). That might finally kill-off informed talk in DM-circles about the actual existence of 'contradictory forces' in nature.

 

Clearly, if there is only one Force, it can hardly 'contradict' (i.e., 'oppose') itself.

 

Nevertheless, many of the quotations given earlier (and in Note 1) imply that, as far as DM-theorists are concerned, only AR-forces are considered 'contradictory'. That type of force couple will be examined later. However, AA-, and RR-forces haven't been explicitly ruled out, and in a thoroughgoing and comprehensive analysis of every conceivable option left available to Dialectical Marxists (in order to attempt to rescue their theory), they will also need to be addressed. Hence, it is to them that I now turn.

 

AA- And RR-Forces

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; NM = Newtonian Mechanics.]

 

It is difficult to see how AA-force couples could be interpreted as a unity of opposites, let alone as 'contradictory'. They are the same type of force, so they can hardly be opposites (even if we were to assume the meaning of "opposite", evident in DM-circles, were either clear or acceptable). But, such forces abound in nature. For example, as noted earlier, the accumulation of matter to form stars and planets across the universe is the result of countless such AA-forces. Plainly, in such systems, developments like this are the result of the operation of non-opposites. So, when, say, a planet is in the process of formation, particles begin to gravitate together under the influence of forces of mutual attraction --, i.e., the aforementioned non-opposites.19

 

[Admittedly, any such theory has to adopt the vocabulary of Classical Physics (i.e., largely that of NM). However, no inference should be drawn from its use concerning the present author's views about the 'ultimate ontological status of forces'. As noted elsewhere, such terminology is only being employed here in order to expose the confusions that abound in DM. It is up to scientists to tell us what the world contains, not Philosophers -- or even the present author --, still less confused Mystics like Heraclitus, Spinoza and Hegel.]

 

Nevertheless, with respect to the above scenario (related to the gradual formation of a planet), it is of course assumed that R-forces prevent the collapse of accumulated matter into a 'singularity' under the action of local AA-forces.

 

[If the gravitational field is strong enough a singularity should be expected to form, at least in theory. [On that, see Curiel, et al (2025).] However, physicists have managed to circumvent this (apparently) fatal flaw in their core theory with a handful of ad hoc mathematical dodges, and theoretical/linguistic...(ahem) shall we say...'re-configurations'). That alone should tell us these theories are, at least, incomplete. This process is reminiscent of the wide-spread practice (in the Middle Ages) of adding more and more epicycles in order to make Ptolemaic Astronomy work. On that, see Hanson (1960). (This links to a PDF.) How the epicycles themselves were meant to work is illustrated by this short video.]

 

Clearly, such considerations simply complicate the original point without significantly altering it. In such circumstances we would have an ARA-system-of-forces, which would be even more difficult to interpret as 'contradictory'. As pointed out below, the 'dialectical' meaning of the word "opposite" would have to be adjusted so that systems of forces could then have any number of 'opposites', components or contributory forces. In which case, these artificial 'contradictions' -- "artificial" since any such 'contradiction' would also be the product of arbitrary 'linguistic adjustment' --, won't have been based on 'objective' factors, but on yet more conceptual tinkering.

 

Moreover, if the DM-'theory of change' stands any chance of surviving, let alone succeeding, there has to be only one 'opposite' to each object or process, and that 'opposite' also has to be 'dialectically-', not accidentally-, related to its own uniquely paired 'opposite', or its "other" (as Hegel and Lenin both called them). [On the reasons for this, see here.]

 

Finally, given the classical picture, motion itself is actually altered by the operation of a single resultant force. That awkward fact is even more difficult to square with the idea that 'opposing forces' are, or can be modelled by, 'contradictions'. [More on that later, too.]

 

Similarly, with respect to RR-forces; it is equally difficult to see how they could be interpreted as 'contradictory' -- or even as 'opposites' --, and yet such forces also abound in nature. For example, intra-atomic forces of repulsion prevent atomic nuclei from approaching one another.20

 

Even in DM-terms, it isn't easy to see how such forces could be described as 'opposites'. As noted above, 'dialectical opposites' are not only supposed to imply each other, neither can exist without the other (again, as is supposedly the case with the proletariat and the capitalist class). But, which A-force implies any other A-force? Which of them can only exist if the other does? Indeed, which R-force implies another R-force? Which one can only exist if the other does?

 

An objection to the above 'difficulty' immediately springs to mind: it ignores the fact that such forces operate in the manner they do because they work in opposition to one another; that is, they do so in a way that brings them (or the system to which they belong) into, or out of, equilibrium. Unfortunately, that response relates to forces acting as AR-couples, which will be examined presently. It can't, therefore, assist us in our attempt to analyse, interpret or understand AA-, and RR-forces as 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

Despite this, even if it were true that two A-forces were opposites of each other, in order for them (still) to be regarded as 'contradictory', they couldn't also be viewed as the opposite of R-forces -- unless, that is, A-forces are once again allowed to have two sorts of "opposites": (i) other A-, and (ii) other R-forces. But, in that case, it would make a mockery of several earlier comments, alongside the claim that there are "polar opposites" at work in natural (or even social) systems. That remains so even where such forces are involved either in change or in stasis, and are still to be viewed as 'dialectical contradictions':

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

 

It is difficult to see how one A-force could be the (unique) "polar opposite" of another A-force while at the same time being the (unique) polar opposite of an R-force. In which case, how A-, and R-forces could possibly have two "polar opposites" becomes something of a mystery -- or at least not without having to alter the meaning of "polar opposite", again. Even then, if the meaning of that term were modified in order to 'neutralise' this difficulty, it would only have only succeeded because of yet more linguistic tinkering. In that case, any 'truths' that suddenly 'sprang into existence' as a result would plainly be a by-product of such terminological juggling, not because of the way the world happens to be. Clearly, that would mean this part of DM (at least) will have been read into nature, not read from nature.21

 

[However, there are several Dialectical Marxists who claim that objects and processes not only can, they actually do, possess many "opposites"; for example Gollobin (1986), p.122 (but even he says they are still "paired"). Gollobin clearly failed to appreciate that any such concession blows a gaping hole in Hegel and Lenin's answer to Hume. That material (drawn from another Essay published at this site) has been reposted below.]

 

Of course, this entire metaphysic originated in the defective 'logic' Hegel concocted when he posited a unique opposite (an "other", as he called it) for each and every item implicated in change. He did so in order to forestall the criticism that if everything changes into 'what-it-is-not' (i.e., into its 'opposite'), then, since everything else in the universe is 'what-it-is-not' in relation to any given object or process, every object/process could or would change into anything-else-whatsoever. [Follow the link in the previous paragraph for more details.]

 

Without such 'conceptual guardrails', instead of growing into a barley plant, a barley seed, for instance, could turn into a volcano, an unexploded bomb, Stalin's moustache or even your left foot -- and much else besides -- since all of these are 'what-a-barley-seed-is-not'.

 

[However, in Part Three of this Essay, we will see that in the end Hegel had to abandon the idea that objects and processes were somehow linked to a logical(?), or unique, 'opposite'/ "other". In Essay Seven Part Three it will be shown that this 'theoretical retreat' fatally damaged Hegel's attempt to respond to Hume's criticisms of Rationalist theories of causation, posted below (link a few paragraphs back).]

 

But, once more: if objects and processes are allowed to have many (and possibly an infinite number of) 'opposites' -- all of which they could change into if the aforementioned 'guardrails' are removed or don't even exist --, that would completely undermine what little is left of Hegel's already moth-eaten system, which, as we have just seen, claims that everything is paired with its own unique "other". As we have seen, if that weren't the case, if an object/process can have any number of 'opposites', it would once more mean that the Empire State Building, for example, could change into, say, a T Rex, and the Pacific Ocean could morph into a bottle of Tennessee Whiskey, and much else besides. Since such things don't happen, so far as we know, we must conclude that, either:

 

(i) Hegel was right to claim that objects and processes have only one unique "other", which is either:

 

(a) 'Dialectically'-, or logically-'internal' to that object or process, which would mean that no object or process could turn into its unique 'other' (as Hegel and the DM-classics maintain), since the latter already exists; or it is,

 

(b1) 'External' to that object or process, meaning that the cause of change can't be internal to objects and processes (as we were told must be the case); or, it is perhaps even,

 

(b2) 'External' to that object or process, which object or process turns into that 'other', meaning that change can't have been caused by that 'other' (since it isn't 'dialectically-related to it') -- and the whole point of accepting this 'theory' will now have vanished;

 

Or:

 

(ii) Objects, processes and forces have many opposites, which must mean our eyes are deceiving us since we don't see things like elephants turning into passenger jets, packets of chips morphing into alligators, taxis changing into satellites of Jupiter, and the like, even though they should do so on a regular basis according to this 'modified' theory.21a

 

Nevertheless, it could be objected (once again) that in a dialectical context the word "opposite" really means "oppositional". That change of emphasis would now highlight the active inter-relation that exists between forces rather than their passive inter-connection, which is something the above argument seems to have ignored. In which case it would seem perfectly natural to speak of RR-, or AA-forces as contradictory, in this respect --, i.e., in the sense that all and only those forces that are oppositional (i.e., which engage in, or are part of, some sort of "struggle", howsoever that is understood) should be classed as contradictory.

 

Or, so it might be countered...

 

However, any such 'revision' seems to be inconsistent with the claims made in several of the DM-passages quoted earlier. [Indeed, neither Hegel nor Lenin described forces this way, nor has any other DM-classicist. If anyone knows differently, please contact me with the details.] The aforementioned passages suggest that it is only certain forces that are to be regarded as inseparable from matter. Others indicate that forces are merely the consequence of the complex inter-play between quanta of energy (or motion). For example, Engels maintained the latter when he asserted the following:

 

"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

 

But, as we have seen, the above appears to lose sight of 'internally-connected' oppositionality, since Engels seems to have edited out of the picture the 'dialectical inter-relationship' between forces, replacing it, or them, with "forms of motion".

 

Now, "forms of motion" aren't in any obvious way inter-connected -- that is, if the relevant forces are edited out of the picture by these means. But, DM requires bodies in motion to be inter-connected. That is why an appeal to intermediary 'oppositional forces' seemed so useful and relevant. No, strike that -- why they seemed so crucially important to Dialectica Marxists. The interpretation of 'opposing forces' as 'dialectical contradictions' was clearly meant to provide this inter-connection -- i.e., 'opposing forces' were meant to form part of the 'connective tissue of reality', as it were. If such forces are now re-branded as little more than "useful fictions" -- i.e., as relative "forms of motion" --, there would seem to be nothing physical left in nature to act as the bearer of, or the mediator between, supposedly inter-connected, episodic motion. Without a material substrate (pictured as these forces), it would seem that 'contradictions' could only operate on bodies or processes magically, or, perhaps even supernaturally. Forces at least appeared to supply a physical link that 'forms of motion' manifestly fail to do.

 

Ignoring these serious. perhaps fatal, difficulties (again!) -- at least for the present -- the above objection could be re-phrased more favourably, in the following way:

 

F1: All and only those forces that are oppositional -- or are implicated in struggle -- are contradictory.

 

But, if F1 were the case, motion itself couldn't be the result of 'contradictory forces' -- unless, of course, we confine our attention solely to accelerated motion -- since, ex hypothesi, no net forces operate in cases where there is no acceleration (i.e., in post-Aristotelian Physics). Even then, accelerated motion (under gravity, for instance) is subject to only one force (or, rather, one resultant force) in Classical Physics, and none at all in Relativistic Physics.

 

At best, therefore, adopting a 'classical view', accelerated motion in the universe (which, as far as we know, covers all of the motion in the universe, at least in any relevant inertial frame) is the product of only one force (the resultant, again). But, given F1, it is hard to see how any such motion could be part of a 'contradictory' "Totality", if the 'classical view' were correct, where only one force (the resultant) is involved. So, if F1 does indeed express what DM-theorists mean, most (perhaps all) of the motion in nature can't have been induced, caused, changed or sustained by a single DM-'contradiction'.

 

With that observation much of classical DM falls apart.22

 

It could be objected that, as a matter of fact, all motion in the universe is the result of a disequilibrium between oppositional forces; that is precisely what a resultant force is. In that case, therefore, bodies would move, or their state of motion would change, because of just such an imbalance between forces. Hence, for example, the trajectory of every planet in the Solar System -- which move along what seem to be relatively steady orbits around the Sun -- are determined by resultant forces internal to the entire System. [In fact, their trajectories are also influenced by wider forces internal to our Galaxy -- and, indeed, beyond -- each of which is the product of complex, inter-relating systems of forces.]

 

Or, so it could be argued, once more...

 

That rejoinder will be considered in more detail later, but for present purposes it is sufficient to point out that it is difficult to see how such forces could be regarded as oppositional. Presumably, they don't affect each other; they operate on, or they merely change, whatever motion is already present in the system. At best, then, they would 'oppose' the impressed motion already apparent, which motion would itself have been the result of still other forces operating earlier, or elsewhere, in the system. This can be seen from the fact that if the moving bodies in question hadn't been in the said 'force field', the above forces would have had nothing on which they could act. In 'empty space', plainly, we would see no new motion.23 Forces without bodies (etc.) to operate on don't interfere with each other, as far as we know -- unless they are themselves regarded as particulate in some way, or are carried by particles, which would, of course, mean they weren't forces, they were bodies to begin with.24

 

Readers are again reminded of something they were earlier advised to keep in mind (which is connected with the above remarks):

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here the relation:

 

(1) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(2) Between the forces operating in the system? Or is it,

 

(3) A 'dialectical union' of both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay and Part Three unfold. Readers are encouraged to keep the above options in mind.

 

Interlude One: The 'Classical Problem Of Forces'

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

 

The above considerations are, of course, just one aspect of the classical 'ontological problem' concerning the precise nature of forces, which is (partly) why it has proved to be so difficult to comprehend them. Indeed, the detection of forces seems exclusively to depend on the effects they have on bodies, or on instruments -- or, indeed, the effect they have on other 'fields'. Perhaps even better: a 'force' appears to be little more than the way scientists either depict or measure certain relationships between bodies -- as Engels, in an uncharacteristically sober mood, pointed out. [On that, see Note 4.]

 

However, if forces are to be viewed as particulate (that is, if certain particles are taken to be the 'bearers' of a given force -- on that, see Video Two), the 'problem' will simply reappear at a lower level (as it were), and we would be no further forward. [No pun intended!] This represents a conundrum that Leibniz was, I think, among the first to recognise. [On that, see here, here, here and here.]

 

So, it looks like an interaction between forces could only take place if they are modelled as particulate in some way -- that is, if they register some sort of resistance to one another (i.e., if they are impenetrable to a greater or lesser extent -- howsoever that is interpreted).

 

On the other hand, if forces aren't particulate, it is hard to see how they could interact at all, let alone 'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no (obvious source of) impenetrability, which would seem to a necessary requirement if they were deemed capable of exerting forces of any sort -- except, of course, as a figurative extension to what is meant by particulate interaction, after all.

 

[This has been questioned by Smith (2007). My response to that article will be posted in Note 30 at some point in the future.]

 

But, there are well-known classical problems associated with the idea that forces are particulate (they were outlined here -- see also this earlier discussion), not the least of which is the realisation that if forces were particulate, they could only interact if they exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of reaction, and so on, which would hold them together or lend to them some sort of physical cohesion), so that they could act on other particulates, and hence resist their own penetration/disintegration. But those factors would, plainly, initiate an infinite regress. Hence, in order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another (and not pass through each other totally unaffected), we would need to appeal to yet more forces internal to each particle to stop, say, one of them penetrating the other, or prevent any resulting distortions tearing them apart, if or when two or more collide/interact. But, if the forces internal to bodies are particulate, too -- as it seems they must be, given this interpretation of forces -- it would require still further forces to account for the internal coherence of these new, smaller, 'force-particles', and so on...

 

In order to prevent an infinite regress, at some point there would have to be particles that were perfectly rigid, or nothing could interact in the above way' [Again, why that is so was covered in greater detail in Part One, and earlier (links above), where the serious problems implied by either alternative were also noted.]

 

But even with 'perfect rigidity' there are problems since that 'rigidity' would have be the result of the action of no further internal forces (or the above regress would kick in again), which would ultimately mean that forces can be dispended with.  

 

Alternatively, if these 'internal forces' are non-particulate -- i.e., if they were continuous media of some sort --, they would be incapable of sustaining any sort of inner coherence, once again, since they would have no rigidity, etc., etc. Colliding 'particles' would simply pass through one another and register no exchange of momentum.

 

In the end nothing would be accounted for since, at each level, there would be nothing to provide the required resistance or coherence.

 

So, it seems that reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies explains nothing. It also implies that particles can't 'contradict' one another without also exerting non-particulate forces on each other -- which would mean, once again, that they were incapable of exerting their own forces, having no rigidity to do so, etc., etc.

 

[It is important to add that I am not arguing that there can be no interactions -- as Kline and Matheson (1987), for example, maintains -- just that we have as yet no idea how they could possibly happen! I have said more about this in Note 30.]

 

Unfortunately, even exchange particles (in Quantum Field Theory) would succeed in exerting forces only if there were still further reaction forces internal to each interacting body -- that is, if they were bodies, to begin with. However, as noted earlier (but in more detail in Essay Seven Part One), most physicists now speak of such 'particles' as 'disturbances in the field' (and, it is worth reminding ourselves, fields are mathematical, not physical, objects/structures):

 

"We learn in school that the basic building blocks of matter are particles. In fact, we often continue to teach this in universities where we explain that quarks and electrons form the lego-bricks from which all matter is made. According to our best laws of physics, the fundamental building blocks of Nature are not discrete particles at all. Instead they are continuous fluid-like substances, spread throughout all of space. We call these objects fields. The most familiar examples of fields are the electric and magnetic field. The ripples in these fields give rise to what we call light or, more generally, electromagnetic waves. If you look closely enough at electromagnetic waves, you'll find that they are made out of particles called photons. The ripples of the electric and magnetic fields get turned into particles when we include the effects of quantum mechanics. But this same process is at play for all other particles that we know of. There exists, spread thinly throughout space, something called an electron field. Ripples of the electron field get tied up into a bundle of energy by quantum mechanics. And this bundle of energy is what we call an electron. Similarly, there is a quark field, and a gluon field, and Higgs boson field. Every particle [in] your body --- indeed, every particle in the Universe --- is a tiny ripple of the underlying field, moulded into a particle by the machinery of quantum mechanics." [Quoted from here; accessed 13/12/2017. Paragraphs merged. Italic emphases in the original. Minor typo corrected.]

 

However, such an approach would generate a few problems of its own. The forces exerted in the above manner (inside exchange particles -- if we can even speak about the 'inside' of a 'disturbance'!), or, indeed, inside any other particle that is acted upon) must themselves be the result of rigidity, cohesion, and contact (etc.), if they are capable of stopping the force carrier particle passing right through the affected particle without acting on it or changing its motion. Of course, as pointed out above, contemporary physicists appeal to fields, energy gradients, Feynman diagrams and the like, rejecting 'mechanistic' notions like those rehearsed in the previous couple of paragraphs. But, if fields and particles are both continuous, the above problems will simply re-emerge at this new level. On the other hand, if forces are particulate, after all, this merry-go-round will just take another spin across the metaphysical dance floor.

 

So, according to the picture painted in Video Two, repulsive forces may be illustrated by an analogy drawn between a pair of individuals standing opposite each other in two closely aligned boats floating on a lake. If one individual throws a heavy ball to the other individual, conservation of liner momentum will mean both boats move apart, which will make it seem there is a repulsive force acting between the two boats or between the two individuals. Clearly, this scenario will only work if the first individual's body is rigid enough to allow the ball to be thrown, in the first place, and the second individual's body is rigid enough to stop that ball passing straight through their body, unopposed. But, if they are both rigid enough, that will be because of forces internal to their bodies, which can't now also be explained in the same (particulate) terms without an infinite regress being initiated, once again. So, if forces are communicated by carrier particles (and they are pictured this way, as bodies that have an imputed rigidity) nothing will have been explained. On the other hand, if forces aren't particulate, but are continuous, then nothing would actually happen (for reasons explored in the previous few paragraphs).

 

Of course, it could be objected once more that the above remarks are based on an out-dated, 'mechanistic' view of interaction and hence, as a result, are completely misguided. However, the modern 'mathematical' approach has clearly abandoned any possibility of giving a causal, or even physical, account of forces -- or at least one that provides an explanation which doesn't itself depend on a figurative extension to the meaning of the sort of verbs we use in the vernacular to account for physical interactions or why certain things happen in everyday life -- so that we might make sense of sub-atomic interactions. To that end, we successfully employ such everyday verbs as: "push", "pull", "drag", "move", "throw", "catch", "resist", "hit", "collide", "deflect", "interact", "stop", and the like; but they can't be used in QM without their use becoming figurative and non-literal -- even on the admission of those who reply in the above manner! But, in order to work in the way that these sub-atomic interactions are depicted (for example, in Video Two (link above)), the analogy on which that approach depends requires a literal, not a figurative, interpretation of just such verbs! And yet, figurative bodies and figurative verbs can't effect a literal exchange of momentum! Or, no more than poetry can make the Sun set.

 

So, if a particle is viewed as the carrier of a force, and that force can be given no physical content -- for want of a better term -- and it is still deemed capable of making anything happen (for instance, deflecting other particles from their line of action (etc.)), then the above verbs must themselves lose contact with the meaning of typographically identical everyday expressions as they are successfully used to talk about analogous macro-phenomena.

 

Now, there is no problem with any of this providing we are aware of it and don't make the mistake of interpreting any such a technical use of verbs literally, thereby making the mistake of trying to understand them in their everyday sense.

 

In that case, if Video Two, for example, doesn't intend a literal interpretation of "throw" or "catch", then it is employing a useless analogy. On the other hand, if such verbs are meant to be take literally, all the above problems resurface. [Of course, I am picking on Video Two, but the analogy it uses is quite common in popularisations of the physics involved. On that, see here and here (this links to a PDF); in addition, cf., for instance, Giancoli (2016), p.922, which also uses an everyday example (in this case, two children holding pillows!) to explain 'attractive forces'.]

 

Even so, as a result of the above considerations, a purely 'mathematical account of interactions' (which abandons the 'mechanistic interpretation' of such interactive verbs) must be purely descriptive, not explanatory. Differential Equations, Hamiltonians, vectors, tensors and abstract spaces can't make anything move or alter the path of a single particle -- or, at least, not without theorists interpreting the verbs used to that end literally! Clearly, that would plunge us right back into the infinite regress from which we thought we had extracted ourselves.

 

Undeniably, scientists can model such phenomena using mathematical structures, language and symbols as they see fit (not that they need my permission or acquiescence!), thus enabling them to 'balance the books of nature', as it were. But, the downside is that mathematical models can't explain why anything actually happens.

 

[Admittedly, that depends on what is meant by "explanation". I will say more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two. However, for more recent qualms in this area, see Note 30. Cf., also my comments over at Wikipedia, here (at the foot of the page) and here. Readers shouldn't conclude at this point that I am questioning the existence of any of the fields postulated by physicists. What I am doing is questioning whether they can account for anything physical, or explain why anything actually happens. On that, see the discussion between myself and Paul Cockshott, here, and another between myself and a comrade who posted under the name "Lynx", here. (Unfortunately those links are now dead! At some point, I will try to locate these discussions on the internet somewhere and post them as an Appendix to this Essay.]

 

All this perhaps helps account for Engels's own underlying suspicion of forces. Ontologically, they appear to be deeply mysterious, if not entirely animistic. He isn't alone.

 

[Other relevant aspects of the nature of forces were covered here.]

 

Clued-in physicists already appear to be aware of this problem (i.e., that it presents them with serious difficulties connected with the language they use). Here, for example, is the late David Peat:

 

"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as Lee Smolin's The Trouble with Physics and Peter Woit's Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that string theory, the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use Stephen Hawking's words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'. So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.' At first sight that seems strange. What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result. Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of 1925, when the young Werner Heisenberg worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values. Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.

 

"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts. This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox. Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist Michael Green a few years after he and John Schwartz published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory mainstream. Green remarked that when Einstein was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply in philosophy. In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done. The American quantum theorist David Bohm embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably hindered. Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role.... Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat (2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases and several links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

Now, I don't want to suggest for one moment that I agree with what Peat has to say about the nature of language (or even about scientific language), but his remarks certainly show that at least some leading scientists are aware there is a problem here.

 

[Admittedly, Peat concurs with Bohm over the suggestion that we need to learn from Native American languages, many of which seem to have rather peculiar grammars. Nevertheless, it is to be wondered how a culture that has produced no advanced science/technology of any note has much (in this respect) to teach one that has. (Again, this topic will be explored in greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, to be published in 2027.) Nor is it at all clear what it means to say that language itself contains certain assumptions. In fact, as this sub-section of the present Essay aims to show, that isn't the case. Having said that, it is important to add that when I say Native American culture has produced "no advanced science/technology of any note ", I don't mean to disparage, demean or depreciate that culture! Plainly, Native Americans wouldn't have survived had they failed to develop any scientific ideas or any technology, nor would they have flourished for centuries without a range of highly sophisticated, diverse cultures. Clearly, they managed all three (and much else besides!). What I am alluding to is the vastly superior scientific knowledge and technology that has been enabled by the growth of capitalism -- even if the class war has greatly abused, deflected and distorted it --, upon which the very possibility of socialism and human emancipation are predicated. As impressive, amazing and unique as Native American culture in all its forms was, and still is, a socialist economy and society can't be built on its basis. Not that a socialist society would threaten or attempt to eradicate such cultures. Quite the opposite: a socialist society will protect, preserve and enhance them! On this, also see Essay Eleven Part One.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Classically, forces seem to work only on bodies by altering their motion, not on each other. In which case, the supposed opposition isn't between bodies, nor is it between bodies and forces, nor yet between forces and forces; it is between forces and any motion already in the system. But, this picture is difficult to square with the idea that there are countless UOs at work here. Nor does it tally with the claim that 'dialectical', polar opposites are what ultimately induce motion and change. That is because (once again) forces don't oppose each other; they oppose or augment whatever motion is already present in the system, howsoever it was caused.

 

In short, given this 'revised' view, the term "contradiction" wouldn't apply to 'opposing forces' (i.e., to forces that oppose each other), nor to bodies. On the contrary, 'contradictions' would involve the inter-relation between forces and whatever movement is already present. But, as yet, no DM-theorist has given any clear sense to the idea that a force could 'contradict' the impressed motion in a system. And rightly so. There are no opposites here for a single DM-'contradiction' to latch onto. Whatever forces turn out to be, how could a single one of them be the 'dialectical opposite' of movement -- i.e., the 'dialectical opposite' of 'a change of place'?

 

It could be objected that as a matter of fact forces in nature do oppose (in the sense that they change) motion. Indeed, it could be argued that DM-theorists' focus is on forces that actually operate in nature and society (as opposed to those abstracted from it). These opposites objectively exist and can't be analysed or hand-waved away.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

That much won't be disputed here (even if its wording might). But, in what way can such a set-up be said to involve 'inter-connected opposites' required by the theory? What sense can be given to the idea that motion in one direction is the opposite of a force that affects it? Certainly the latter aren't unified opposites (i.e., opposites of the same type, so they can legitimately be said to be 'dialectically'/'logically inter-connected' -- that is, where the existence of one implies the existence of the other, in the 'Hegelian sense' of that word, which, as we have seen, is a core DM-requirement). So, whatever the connection between motion in a given system and any force acting on it turns out to be, it can't be 'dialectical'. That is because movement itself doesn't imply the existence of the force that supposedly opposes it, nor does any such force imply the existence of the motion it is opposing. Each can exist without the other (unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which supposedly imply one another). If this were a 'dialectical interaction', they would imply one another such that neither could exist without the other.

 

That is quite apart from the fact that many 'forces' augment motion, they don't oppose it!

 

At best, any such forces involved might tend to produce an opposite motion -- i.e., motion in an opposite direction, or even a change of motion in the same direction -- or perhaps none at all. But, to describe these two factors -- force and motion -- as "opposites" would appear to make as much sense as claiming that "left" was the opposite of "television", even if, as a matter of fact, someone moved a television to the left. The actual connection in reality (between a force and a moving body) has nothing to do with whether it is sensible to describe such factors as unified opposites, or even as oppositional. These terms -- "force" and "motion" -- are categorically different and dimensionally inconsistent. Hence, it isn't a question of whether or not DM-theorists are dealing with 'objective' facts. The question that should be asked is: why can the above counter-claim only be advanced by mis-describing the relevant phenomena?25

 

Interlude Two: A Few 'Annoying Technicalities'

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism/Reductionist, also depending on the context; UO = Unity of Opposites; DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954).]

 

When they are viewed as vectors, it is undeniable that velocities, accelerations and forces can in some circumstances be represented as 'opposites', but that is given within vector algebra and follows from a series of definitions. By no stretch of the imagination are these 'dialectical opposites'. They can all exist without any other vector existing and they don't imply one another -- (once more!), for example, in the way that the capitalist class implies the existence of the proletariat, and vice versa. According to the DM-classics (link a few paragraphs back), this means they can't be 'dialectical opposites', whatever else they are.

 

Vectors have been written into a wide variety of mathematical structures, but their supposed 'dialectical' nature can only be read into the world by countermanding the assurance volunteered by most DM-theorists that they never do this -- i.e., they say they refuse to foist their ideas on the facts. Unless we are prepared to admit all the absurdities outlined earlier (which would have us believe that vectors can 'struggle' among themselves), any attempt to picture vectors as 'contradictory' is without foundation.

 

On the other hand, if opposite vectors aren't 'internally related' to each other (in the above sense), the dialectical theory of change, interpreted this way, simply falls apart. If so, Dialectical Marxists need to come up with an effective response to the above criticisms or witness their theory crash and burn.

 

Anyway, if vector, v, has an opposite, -v, that vector could be a billion miles away or it could be adjacent to v. Either way, these two vectors do not 'struggle' with one another, nor do they turn into each other (which is what they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed -- link a few paragraphs back). Again: whatever else they are, opposite vectors aren't 'dialectical'.

 

In addition, as will be argued in Interlude Six, mathematics can in no way be regarded as an abstraction from reality. Anyway, as pointed out earlier, most vectors aren't opposites. Many augment, while others operate at various angles to, each other.

 

[In fact, this topic is connected with 'real negation', a concept introduced into Philosophy by Immanuel Kant. I will have much more to say about this in Appendix A. Other related issues will be examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published. Finally, this is also connected with the fact that, where there is more than one force at work in a system, any change of motion will be caused by a resultant force, a topic discussed at greater length, here.]

 

As already noted, when forces are represented as vectors they can induce accelerations that appear to 'oppose' the motion already present in the system. Ignoring for now the fact that the use of such language is arguably anthropomorphic (or, it is at best metaphorical), in such cases we would be establishing connections between objects, events, and processes drawn from the same category (i.e., vectors connected with movement), which clearly makes sense. In this way, forces could be replaced with relative accelerations by means of Newton's Second Law, etc. [As Engels himself seemed to believe.] But, even then, an acceleration in an opposite direction doesn't oppose the original velocity. An acceleration (in vector algebra, which is what we are dealing with, here) just is a changing velocity, it doesn't produce that velocity or create it. A relevant force is supposed to have done that (in Newtonian Physics). Accelerations aren't 'disembodied beings' that inhabit the world, throwing their weight about, bullying velocities to do their bidding. They simply are changing velocities (i.e., they are rates of change of rates of change of displacement), no more, no less. In like manner, a velocity simply represents the rate of change of displacement. So, even in DM-terms, the idea that accelerations might 'contradict' each other seems rather odd (to say the least!). That is because no accelerating body implies the existence of the velocity (or its rate of change) present in any other body, and both can surely exist without the other. Once again, that is totally unlike the connection between the capitalist class and the proletariat, which do imply one another -- or so we are told.

 

However, in vector algebra no sense can be made of the addition (or subtraction) of a force and a velocity vector, unless this is mediated by the Second Law (etc.). Even then, the relation between acceleration and velocity vectors has to be established by well-known equations. The various physical quantities represented by these equations can only be linked by means of such translations, which set up analogies between categorically different items, but in a dimensionally consistent manner. That is one reason why no mathematical (or physical) sense can be given to 'equations' like the following:

 

(1) F = -v (sic)

 

(2) a = kv (sic)

 

[Where "F" stands for "force", "v" for "final velocity", "a" for "acceleration", and "k" is a constant of proportionality.]

 

Equations like those would be regarded as dimensionally incoherent (unless further dimensions had been built into the 'constant' -- but that would now make that 'constant' -- k -- a variable(!)). Compare the above with the next series of examples:

 

(3) s = ut + ˝at2

 

(4) a = -ω2r

 

(5) F = -m2

 

[Where "r" represents radial displacement, "u" is initial velocity, "t" is time, "ω" is angular velocity, "m" represents mass, "F" centripetal force, and "a" centripetal acceleration in (4), but linear acceleration in (3). (Concerning Dimensional Analysis, see here.)]

 

In Classical Physics, by means of translational, or analogical, equations like these -- or, perhaps making the same point a little more clearly: by the use of algebraic rules that enable inferences involving physical quantities to be drawn, in which forces feature as factors in a "norm/form of representation", we can 'convert' forces into accelerations, compare magnitudes, and thus account for changes in motion, etc., etc.

 

Unfortunately, this is of little help to beleaguered Dialectical Marxists since the translation of forces into relative accelerations means that forces turn out to be "useful fictions", the realisation of which would re-introduce all the difficulties mentioned earlier (and covered again, below).

 

[That isn't a problem for the account presented at this site, for reasons expressed in the previous paragraph but one. (That rather enigmatic remark will be clarified in Essay Thirteen Part Two.)]

 

However, even if the above comments were rejected for some (currently unspecified) reason, that would still lend scant support to DM, for such representations aren't oppositional. Clearly, they don't slug it out on the page, screen or whiteboard. And, manifestly, they don't turn into one another (as we are told they should by the DM-classics).

 

Hence, if two ('opposite') forces (for instance, F and G, inclined at θo to the x axis, in R2) are in equilibrium, are then resolved (into their i and j components), and are then expressed as follows:

 

|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ = 0,

 

|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ = 0,

 

no one supposes (it is to be hoped!) that these symbols are locked in a life-or-death 'struggle' with one another, and, as a result, will one day change into each other.

 

[I deal with what they supposedly express, below.]

 

Naturally, the above conclusions aren't affected in any way if these forces aren't in equilibrium:

 

|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ > 0

 

|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ < 0

 

and/or:

 

|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ > 0

 

|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ < 0

 

Furthermore, it would be little use arguing that while it is true that the above expressions themselves may be lifeless (and thus incapable of struggling among themselves, and then turning into each other), what they represent in the real world not only can struggle in that way, they actually do struggle and then turn into one another. It would be little use because the above considerations were aimed at undermining the idea that vector calculus is 'dialectical'. The supposedly 'dialectical nature of forces in reality', represented by the above symbols, is an entirely separate issue, which has been systematically demolished throughout this Essay, as well as here. However, it would be interesting to see if there are any DM-supporters out there who can explain how such forces actually do manage to struggle with, and then turn into, each other (as they should if the DM classics are to be believed, etc., etc.). Exactly how does either F or G, above (or whatever they 'reflect') turn into the other, and vice versa?

 

[On a separate but related issue: the allegedly 'dialectical nature of Higher Mathematics and the Calculus' has been neutralised here.]

 

Incidentally, some readers might be a little puzzled by the use of the word "analogical" in an earlier paragraph. The appearance of that word is connected with:

 

(i) The history of the development of mathematical language associated with this area of Physics and Applied Mathematics; and,

 

(ii) The way we make sense of such equations.

 

More specifically, a significant change in terminology (or at least in connection with what it supposedly signified) arose out of:

 

(iii) The reservations expressed by Ancient Greek mathematicians concerning the relationship between so-called "incommensurables" (i.e., physical quantities from different categories for which no common noun or predicate could be found that allowed them to be 'co-measured' -- i.e., "commensurated"); and then with,

 

(iv) How those problems were resolved by mathematicians in the High Middle Ages.

 

Following on the growth and development of market economies in Mid-, to Late-Feudal society, the artificial barriers between the above categories were progressively eroded as new grammars ('concepts') were introduced into language by merchants and traders to help account for the exchange of quantities drawn from just such different kinds. Since they had to be co-measured (in order to balance the books and continue trading!), language and mathematics were 'adjusted accordingly'.

                                                                                                                                                                                

Hence, these new concepts were introduced by mathematicians, merchants and bankers so that what had been regarded as incommensurable quantities could be compared analogically -- enabling, for example, the calculation of the exchange-value of a widely diverse range of use-values/commodities. As a spin-off, these conceptual innovations -- when they were also incorporated into the physics of the day -- allowed theorists to move beyond an earlier 'commonsense' approach to motion encapsulated in Aristotelian Physics, thus enabling the foundations of modern mechanics to be established in the period between the 13th and the 18th centuries.

 

[At this point, it might be wondered why incommensurability presents a problem, but a moment's reflection with return an answer: apples and oranges, or cats and dogs, may only be added by finding a common noun or noun phrase that enables it to happen: e.g., in the case of apples and oranges it will be "fruit", or even "pieces of fruit"; with cats and dogs, it will be "mammals" or even "animals". In language we don't have nouns/noun phrases, such as "apple-oranges" or "cat-dogs". So, with that in mind, we can now do some addition: two apples and three oranges yield five pieces of fruit; five cats and six dogs yield eleven mammals. Of course, extra-linguistically we can add together almost anything (physically or just in 'the mind's eye) -- in this instance by, say, putting two apples and three oranges in a bag. Readers can even lump together a hungry lion with their left foot (even if that would be an unwise move IRL). Nothing (obvious) stops us doing the first, but, clearly, the second can only be achieved safely in the imagination. Nevertheless, there is no way we can describe the results in either case except by the use of a commensurating common noun/noun phrase: such as "pieces of fruit" -- or, in the case of the hungry lion and your left foot, "objects" or even "mental images". A similar but less concrete 'problem' affects how fractions are added when they fail to share a common denominator -- for instance, 1/2 and 1/3. These two fractions can only be added when they are converted into equivalent fractions that share the lowest/least common denominator (which is 6, in this case): that done we would have, 1/2 = 3/6 and 1/3 = 2/6. The addition can now proceed: 3/6 + 2/6 = 5/6. Of course, this process becomes far more complicated when we turn to the interpretation of the sort of equations considered earlier -- or even the accounting and trading problems that confronted Medieval bankers, traders and merchants --, but the overriding principle is still the same.]

 

This emphasis on the analogical nature of modern algebraic forms depicting motion follows on from an approach to mathematical development that sees it as conditioned by contingent, historico-economic factors predicated on wider material and social relations. This view of mathematical innovation also helps undermine the idea that mathematics is solely concerned with, or is uniquely derived by, 'abstraction'. The latter approach represents a social and anti-abstractionist orientation that further undercuts theories based on the (unsupported) dogma that there is an Ideal World anterior to, but more real than, the world we see around us -- mathematics, when it is interpreted on Platonic/Realist lines, being a prime example of this. Since this covert 'Ideal World' may be accessed by thought alone, it appeared to make sense that mathematics must be solely based on thought, too. From there it was but a short step to conclude that mathematics is founded exclusively on thought processes, on 'abstraction', and, much later still, on logic itself.

 

In their own way, both approaches divorced mathematics from social practice and development.

 

Platonism (and its off-shoots) appeared to put mathematics/mathematicians in direct touch with the 'Divine', and hence with pure concepts originally called into existence by 'God' (or which only existed in 'God'). In fact, the universe itself was regarded as a reflection and almost a concretisation of 'Divine Thought', which, of course, implied that 'God Himself' was a Mathematician, which in turn meant that the world itself was a 'mathematical object' of some sort. That paradigm, in one form of another, currently dominates much of Contemporary Physics (indeed, as we will see in Note 30). Disappointingly, that allegation includes the ideas of Physicists who at least claim to be agnostics or atheists, but who have in reality adopted a watered-down version of this ancient world-view -- now called "Mathematical Realism". Given that approach, the development of mathematics is nothing less than a voyage of discovery not one of invention. One can only discover what is already there, even if it can't be detected by any physical means, and never will be.

 

Here area just a few recent examples of this genre:

 

"All science proceeds from the assumption that the cosmos is ordered in an intelligible way. Beneath the bewildering richness of natural phenomena there lies an elegant mathematical unity. How astonishing that the human mind is attuned to this hidden subtest of nature!" [Physics Professor, Paul Davies, quoted in the flyleaf to Livio (2009); also quoted at the publisher's website (expand the 'Praise' section). Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes (I mean the universe) but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to comprehend a single word of it, and without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth." [Galileo, quoted in Livio (2009), pp.76-77. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The Higgs Boson was predicted with the same tool as the planet Neptune and the radio wave: with mathematics. Galileo famously stated that our Universe is a 'grand book' written in the language of mathematics. So why does our universe seem so mathematical, and what does it mean? In my new book 'Our Mathematical Universe', I argue that it means that our universe isn't just described by math, but that it is math in the sense that we're all parts of a giant mathematical object, which in turn is part of a multiverse so huge that it makes the other multiverses debated in recent years seem puny in comparison." [Max Tegmark, excerpted from Tegmark (2015). Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis and link added.]

 

"In [Plato's] famous cave analogy, he likened us to people who'd lived their entire lives shackled in a cave, facing a blank wall, watching the shadows cast by things passing behind them and eventually coming to mistakenly believe that these shadows were the full reality. Plato argued that what we humans call our everyday reality is similarly just a limited and distorted representation of the true reality, and we must free ourselves from our mental shackles to begin comprehending it. If my life as a physicist has taught me anything at all, it's that Plato was right: modern physics has made abundantly clear that the ultimate nature of reality isn't what it seems.... Our external physical reality is a mathematical structure." [Tegmark (2015), pp.8, 254. See also Tegmark (2008).] Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added. I have posted a lengthy passage from Plato (1997b) to Appendix B, where 'The Allegory of the Cave' first saw the light of day (no pun intended).]

 

However, one wonders why Professor Tegmark trusts any experiments or observations made by physicists -- or, indeed, by any other scientists. These he appears to take for granted, failing to regard them as illusory. But, that would be true of them all if we only ever have access to 'shadows', based on 'subjective experience' -- and that must also include everything ever written by mathematicians, like Tegmark for instance! Does he have direct and unfiltered access to this 'hidden world' in a manner that is denied the rest of us? Is he somehow able to apprehend mathematical objects and theorems in this 'hidden/ultimate world' by bypassing the senses? If not, then just as soon as anything mathematical has been committed to paper, typed onto a screen, or chalked on a blackboard it must be a 'shadow', too -- which means it can't reflect 'reality'.

 

Anyone who thinks this misrepresents Tegmark should read Chapter Nine of his book (Tegmark (2015)). There, the author tries to sell the reader a downmarket, revamped theory of the world first aired by John Locke and David Hume, while he fails to explain -- nor does he even consider -- how anyone might so much as attempt to construct "external reality" out of what he calls "internal reality", never mind how on earth they might succeed in that impossible task.

 

Now, I have no wish to praise Immanuel Kant, but Tegmark's amateur metaphysics would put epistemology back to where it was before the Critique of Pure Reason (this links to a PDF) rolled off the presses two-and-a-half centuries ago!

 

[I have covered this specific topic -- the bogus philosophical distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality' -- in Essay Three Part Two, here. Readers are directed there for more details.]

 

Something like this, but which (mercifully) looks far less extreme, appears to be motivating Greene (1999, 2004) and Penrose (1989, 1995, 2004). The same might be said with slightly less justification about Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006).

 

For example, here is Roger Penrose:

 

"But are mathematical notions things that really inhabit a 'world' of their own? If so, we seem to have found our ultimate reality to have its home within that highly abstract world. Some people have difficulties with accepting Plato's mathematical world as being in any sense 'real', and would gain no comfort from the view that physical reality itself is constructed merely from abstract notions. My own position on this matter is that we should certainly take Plato's world as providing a kind of 'reality' to mathematical notions..., but I might baulk at actually attempting to identify physical reality with the abstract reality of Plato's world.... [Penrose then commits himself to the 'three worlds' theory, somewhat similar to Karl Popper's view (this links to a PDF), that there are mathematical, physical and 'mental' components to 'the world' -- RL.] I like to think that, in a sense, the Platonic world may be the most primitive of the three, since mathematics is a kind of necessity, virtually conjuring its very self into existence through logic alone." [Penrose (2004), p.1029. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphases and link added.]

 

Earlier in the same book Penrose expressed himself as follows:

 

"If the model itself is to be assigned any kind of 'existence', then this existence is located within the Platonic world of mathematical forms. Of course, one might take a contrary viewpoint: namely that the model is itself to have existence only within our various minds, rather than to take Plato's world to be in any sense absolute and 'real'. Yet, there is something important to be gained in regarding mathematical structures as having a reality of their own. For our individual minds are notoriously imprecise, unreliable, and inconsistent in their judgements. The precision, reliability, and consistency that are required by our scientific theories demand something beyond any one of our individual (untrustworthy) minds. In mathematics, we find a far greater robustness than can be located in any particular mind. Does this not point to something outside ourselves, with a reality that lies beyond what each individual can achieve?... Mathematics itself indeed seems to have a robustness that goes far beyond what any individual mathematician is capable of perceiving. Those who work in this subject, whether they are actively engaged in mathematical research or just using results that have been obtained by others, usually feel that they are merely explorers in a world that lies far beyond themselves -- a world which possesses an objectivity that transcends mere opinion, be that opinion their own or the surmise of others, no matter how expert those others might be." [Ibid., pp.12-13. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

 

Clearly, Penrose is a moderate compared to Tegmark, for whom the world is an illusion, and where only mathematical structures/objects are really 'real'. [If he has children, I hope he thinks they are real! Why feed 'shadowy children'?]

 

By way of contrast, the approach adopted at this site also helps counter another core DM-thesis: that scientific development somehow depends on the ability of theorists to 'abstract' concepts, or general terms, into existence in the privacy of their own heads.

 

Abstractionism has already been destructively analysed here and here. There is a detailed discussion of these issues (concerning mathematical developments unfolding in the High Middle Ages) in Hadden (1988, 1994), upon which much of this part of the Essay was based. Hadden's pioneering work is only prevented from being Marxist classic by the absence of a clear account of the nature of language and the logic of analogical reasoning. However, in view of the fact that the latter -- the logic of analogy -- hasn't advanced significantly since Aristotle's day (although it has certainly proliferated in detail), that is hardly Hadden's fault. On what has been achieved in this area, see White (2010). [White's book is in fact a pioneering study, only slightly spoiled by the author's attempt to divert his many clear insights into trying to make sense of talk about 'God'!]

 

[Hadden's conclusions are themselves a development of ideas originally found in Borkenau (1987), Fleck (1979) and Grossmann (1987). Cf., also Sohn-Rethel (1978). Clagett (1959) contains many of the original medieval sources. See also Zilsel (2000), and the more detailed historical study, Kaye (1998).]

 

In that case, while the admission that forces can be edited out of the picture (so that relative acceleration and relative motion may be viewed as opposites) might succeed in winning this particular battle, it would only do so at the cost of losing the war. Once again, that is because it would imply the universe was much more CAR-like than DM-theorists seem prepared to admit. If that account were valid, any references to DM-UOs would be little more than a confused way of alluding to relative acceleration or relative velocity. The connection between events could only then be explained in one or more of the following ways, by:

 

(a) An appeal to the topology of spacetime; or by,

 

(b) A detailed analysis of the vector and scalar fields in which the said processes were embedded.

 

In either case, the connection between events and processes wouldn't be governed by any sort of physical mediation (nor, indeed, any equivalent relation with the rest of the "Totality"), which is what DM requires. That is because, on this view, a moving body would have no 'internal (logical) connection' with any other moving body. Any links that do exist would all be 'external' -- and hence no longer 'rational'.

 

At least an appeal to forces had the advantage of appearing to provide some sort of mediating link between bodies in motion -- again, as required by DM. At first sight forces appear to be capable of inter-connecting moving bodies in some sort of 'dialectical relationship' (but only if the latter is left hoplessly vague). Of course, that is because a literal interpretation of "force" depends on accepting what is in effect an animistic view of nature and all that occurs within it.

 

In which case, any attempt to edit forces out of the picture would result in the disappearance of the 'dialectical connective-tissue of reality' (as it were); and with that DM would become indistinguishable from mechanical materialism (i.e., it would devolve into a version of CAR itself), which Dialectical Marxists had (vainly) sought to replace, or even surpass.

 

As noted earlier, DM-theorists require forces to be part of the 'ontological fabric of the universe', which is why they become so defensive, if not highly agitated and emotional (on that, see for example here and here) when the existence of forces is not just questioned, their connection with 'contradictions' is exposed for the nonsense it is. Even after what Engels had to say about forces is brought to their attention, they totally ignore the fact that he, at least, had begun to question their existence and nature, choosing to replace force with relative motion. Clearly, DM-fans pick and choose which parts of Engels's ideas they are prepared to accept. That one -- i.e., replacing "force" with ''relative motion" -- might prove to be a bridge too far.

 

So, in order for DM even to seem to be able to work, its theorists require the world to be populated by the correlates of these anthropomorphic concepts -- in this case, 'opposing forces' --, which were themselves the result of a fetishisation of the products of social interaction as if they were real objects and processes in nature and society. That is, of course, just another toxic consequence of the much vaunted 'inversion' of Hegelian 'logic'.

 

[Why that is so is explained here, here, here and here.]

 

Hence, whether or not DM-fans are prepared to acknowledge it, the language they use suggests that objects and processes in nature are quasi-intelligent 'beings', engaged in what can only be described as some sort of mystical conversation, or shouting match, with other objects and processes (other quasi-intelligent 'beings'), as they 'contradict' and 'negate' each other.

 

As has already been pointed out, in parts of DN Engels pictured motion in dynamical terms, portraying it as no more than a transfer of energy. [Engels (1954), pp.69-102.] That seems to connect his rather sketchy ideas with more recent theories of motion, modelled by vector and scalar fields -- maybe also with the Laws of Thermodynamics. Or perhaps even with concepts deployed in the study of non-Euclidean Spacetime, where talk is no longer of forces. Hence those ideas might connect what he had to say with theories that began to take shape late on in his life, and were largely completed a generation or so after he died. Unfortunately for Dialectical Marxists, such a fundamental re-configuration (of 'opposing forces' merely as 'relative motion', etc.)  would mean that familiar DM-concepts (such as "contradiction", "polar opposite", "UO", "internal relation", etc., etc.) would thereby become just as obsolete as "natural place", "substantial form", "accident" and "substance" are in Contemporary Physics --, notions that once featured prominently in ancient, medieval and early modern scientific and metaphysical theories.

 

Indeed, it is difficult to see how, for instance, an energy gradient (depicted as a Scalar Field) could be interpreted as 'contradictory' in any shape or form, even though gradients like this abound in contemporary theories of motion. Well, no more perhaps than, say, a ladder should be regarded as contradictory if someone fell off it.

 

Far worse: it is even more difficult see how states of affairs involving vector and scalar fields, the geodesics of Spacetime -- or even the 'strings' of M-theory -- could form part of, or even fully comprise, a material universe. If everything in nature is just a complex array of energy gradients, vector fields and differential curvatures in Spacetime (which, as we have just seen, many Physicists now suppose to be the case) -- spruced up here and there with a few probability density functions -- there would seem to be no place left for anything that looks even remotely material. Given the 'modern', mathematical picture of reality, matter itself becomes a "useless fiction", explanatory of nothing at all. Small wonder then that Lenin was highly suspicious of the Idealism implicit in the Physics of his day (even if he had no answer to it). The situation has only deteriorated markedly since.

 

[On that, see Essay Thirteen Part One. I hasten to add -- but it should be obvious by now -- that I don't accept this 'mathematical picture of reality'; or, to be more accurate, I view it as thoroughly metaphysical -- and hence non-sensical -- if interpreted along such Realist/Platonic lines. (No pun intended!)]

 

Quite apart from this, the 'ontological status' of 'energy' itself is highly problematic -- and that situation is unlikely to change any day soon. [On that, see here.] Energetics is therefore no friend of DM. Hence, Engels's own turn in that direction late in life was (perhaps) just another serious mistake.

 

[I have said more about this topic in Essay Seven Part One, here. Independently of that, I regularly ask Physics Professors and Doctors of Physics who post, for example, on Quora, what energy actually is. I either receive no answer, or they admit they don't really know -- see, for example, here and here (in the comments section).]

 

Of course, in DM-writings, clear definitions of matter are as rare as hens' teeth -- as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part One. Indeed, DM-theorists like Lenin and Engels actually tell their readers that matter is just an 'abstraction'!

 

And then they have the  cheek to point fingers at mechanical materialists!

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Only those who feel confident that they can give a clear, detailed explanation of the claim that 'opposite forces' and relative motion are 'dialectical opposites' -- which can therefore form part of a 'dialectical contradiction' -- will be in any position to respond effectively to an objection advanced earlier with something a little more convincing than dismissive waves of the hand. Unfortunately, the provision of such an explanation has been rendered even more challenging for Dialectical Marxists since -- as we will see -- forces often augment motion, they don't always "oppose" it. Indeed, most of the bulk motion in the universe is of that sort, as pointed out earlier.26

 

However, even if it were possible to give a perspicuous sense to the theory that 'opposite forces' and relative motion are 'dialectical opposites', it would still be bad news for DM-fans. That is because any other 'oppositional force' in the system couldn't also be the opposite of the original pairing between a given force and a specific change of motion. And that in turn would mean systems of 'opposing forces' couldn't function (in DM) as currently imagined. In any such eventuality, it wouldn't be forces that opposed one another (as had originally been claimed). Far from it; in such a re-jigged set-up, as we have already seen, 'opposite forces' would oppose motion already present in the system, not other forces. In that case, the theory that change is the result of systematically inter-related forces acting on one another would have to be abandoned.

 

Readers are again reminded of something they were earlier asked to keep in mind:

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here the relation:

 

(1) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(2) Between the forces operating in the system? Or is it,

 

(3) A 'dialectical union' of both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay and Part Three unfold. Readers are encouraged to keep the above options in mind.

 

As should now seem reasonably clear, given the above attempt to make DM a little less obscure, each factor in a complex array of interacting forces would have to be viewed as 'the opposite' of every other factor. In that case, a moving body would have countless 'opposites' (i.e., all the other forces and/or moving bodies in the system).27 That would once more put pressure on the 'dialectical meaning' of the word "opposite", in effect rendering it meaningless. And in that condition it would remain until this 'difficulty' had been ironed out --, or, at least, until this attempt at clarification had been modified to such an extent that it now allowed several distinct factors to be regarded as the "opposite" of any one or more of the rest. Under such circumstances, as we have already seen, polar opposites would lose their key role in DM, and might have to be jettisoned. In fact, that term would itself become meaningless, too -- i.e., if everything in the system possessed countless "polar opposites", the word "polar" would cease to mean what it might ordinarily be taken to mean. And that would be quite apart from the fact that any such attempt at clarification would totally undermine the DM-theory of change -- since, (i) none of these forces or moving bodies (in a given system) would imply any of the others, and (ii) each could exist without the rest -- which shouldn't be the case with DM-'opposites'.

 

Not only that, but, as we have also seen several times, ad hoc linguistic tinkering like this (e.g., concerning words like "opposite" and "polar") means this theory/method will now only apply to systems in nature and society because of yet more subjectively engineered, terminological 'adjustment'. That would, of course, amount to another imposition of DM on the facts, something we were told Dialectical Marxists never do. But, modifying words in favourable ways in order to rescue a theory is to impose that theory on 'reality'.

 

Unfortunately, this jellyfish-of-a-theory -- DM -- can't be squeezed anywhere without some of it being forced through the fingers somewhere else:

 

 

Figure Two: Getting To Grips With DM?

No Problem!

 

[This is an AI Image I generated using the free software available here.]

 

Given this interpretation of 'opposing forces' as 'contradictions', what had been touted all along as a grand theory capable of explaining change and development -- because it took account of the 'contradictory nature of Reality' interpreted as the interplay between opposite forces --, now amounts to little more than a few vague gestures in the direction of an appeal to the oppositional relation between a force and the motion already in the system. [No pun intended!] And, as if to make things worse, this tall tale has been further compounded by the realisation that the DM-"Totality" is now a mediated system of forces only because the definition of a "polar opposite" has been 'corrected' so that it delivers the 'right result' -- except, that term no longer means what it used to mean, but its opposite! If this is what DM-theorists mean when they come out with their impressive sounding 'dialectical' theses, their theory can only be rescued from oblivion if 'reality' turns out to be Ideal. [That is, the 'nature of reality' is now to be determined by the words we feel constrained to use in order to save a favoured theory from an ignominious crash and burn. The ersatz 'reality' that emerges at the end of all this impressive, but no less dizzying, word-juggling, was cobbled-together by means of language mostly imported from notorious Idealists, ruling-class hacks and assorted Mystics. As we will see in Essay Twelve, this is a direct consequence of making the 'truth' of Dialectical Marxism's 'laws' depend on a heady brew of ad hoc linguistic 'tinkering' and Hegelian word-magic.]

 

However, even if the above anti-DM objections turn out to be misguided in some way, none of this makes any sense in DM terms, since not one of these opposites (i.e., force and motion) morphs into the other, as the DM-classics tell us they should:

 

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels  (1954), pp.17, 62. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Engels (1976), p.179. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]…. [Ibid., pp.221-22. Last set of parentheses in the original; bold emphasis added.]

 

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

 

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute."  [Mao (1937), pp.340-42. Bold emphases added.]

 

[Dozens of additional passages that make the same points were posted here.]

 

So, consider any given force and the motion it supposedly opposes: clearly, that force doesn't change into that movement, nor does that movement change into that force, contrary to what the above DM-theorists assert should happen if this were a 'dialectical process'.

 

[Incidentally, that disposes of Weston's attempt to re-brand the second force supposedly involved in a gravitational field, inertia -- Weston (2012), p.7.]

 

It could be argued that contemporary physicists interpret each such force as an exchange of momentum. Hence, force and movement are connected, contrary to the above counter-claims.

 

Or so it might be objected...

 

But, in Contemporary Physics -- by the admission of scientists themselves -- there are no forces, just exchanges of momentum. So force and movement can't be connected if one half of this pairing doesn't actually exist. And, as we saw earlier, any attempt to replace force with relative motion (which is what this refocus on momentum attempts to do) only succeeds in shattering the 'dialectical unity and integrity of the "Totality"'.

 

Someone could now respond that the above factors do change into each other -- perhaps via an exchange of energy, or as part of equal and opposite reactions, etc., etc.

 

With such a rebuttal, one can almost hear sounds of the wood at the bottom of a new barrel being scraped!

 

But, even if the above pro-DM-response were acceptable, another problem would immediately assert itself. If force, F, were to turn into new movement, V, then the second of these two would follow the first -- i.e., we would have F first, V second. In that case, F would create V at a later time, otherwise it couldn't turn into it. [Recall that according to the DM-classics, objects and processes turn into that with which they have 'struggled'.] But, V doesn't yet exist for it to struggle with anything! On the other hand, if V already exists, F couldn't turn into it. [To add to the woes of anyone who might raise a pro-DM objection like this, unanswerable questions would soon be asked about where V came from! It can't have been the result of an earlier force, Fe, since the same questions will now be asked about this force that had been asked about F itself -- and so on to infinity.] Moreover, F and V can't 'struggle' with each other since they can't simultaneously exist if one of them has to turn into the other. If, on the other hand, F were to change as a result of some other, as yet unspecified, factor, X, then X, not V, would be the opposite of F, and F would turn into X, not V! The same would be the case, vice versa. And the latter would still apply if we substituted "inertia" for "momentum" (or even "movement").

 

Alternatively, consider force, R, and episodic movement, V*, the first supposedly opposing, or 'contradicting', the second. R could even be the reaction force of a body that has just collided with another body. It might now be argued that in this case, the motion, V*, of the second body is what produces the reaction, R, and that reaction then alters V* in return.

 

[It is worth recalling that we are here considering the relation between a force and the motion already in the system, not the relation of a force with a body. That is because we are trying to make sense of the idea that forces contradict motion. We will return to consider the relation between forces and bodies (whether moving or stationary), later.]

 

In response, let us imagine that two bodies, A and B, collide (and to simplify things, let this collision take place between A and B where their lines of action are inclined at 180ş to each other, before and after the collision). Let the motion of both be VA1 and VB1, respectively, before the collision, and VA2 and VB2, after. Further, let the reaction force produced in each body be RA and RB, respectively. Hence, in this scenario, VA1 results in RB, and VB1 results in RA. In turn, RA then induces VB2, and RB induces VA2. [In fact, of course, RA and RB induce each other, via Newton's Third Law, but I am here examining the alternative theory that force and opposite movement 'contradict' one another. Whether 'opposing forces' are capable of 'contradicting' each other directly or indirectly will be examined later.]

 

But, according to the DM-classics (link above), an object or process turns into that with which it has 'struggled' -- its 'dialectical opposite'. So, since VA1 turns into VA2, it must have 'struggled' with it. The same must be the case with VB1 and VB2. But, that can't happen since neither of VA2 and VB2 yet exist for VA1 and VB1 to 'struggle' with! On the other hand, if VA2 and VB2 already do exist, VA1 and VB1 couldn't change into them, since they are already there! [Again: if VA2 and VB2 do not already exist, there would be nothing with which VA1 and VB1 could 'struggle', and hence change.] So, according to this interpretation of DM it must mean VA1 and VB1 can't change, after all!

 

[Or, they can't do so in the above way. I have omitted the negative signs usually employed in Applied Mathematics in such circumstances in order to reduce complexity -- which would also require the setting up of a co-ordinate system, etc. So, for instance, one or other of VA1 or VB1 should be -VA1 or -VB1. The same should be the case with several of the other symbols -- e.g., one or other of RA and RB should be -RA or -RB, etc., etc. Sceptical readers are invited to play around with the above symbols; not much will change as a result (no pun intended!).]

 

On the other hand, if RA 'struggles' with VB1, then, according to the DM-classics, it must change into it. The same applies to RB and VA1. But, VB1 changes into VB2, not RA, and VA1 changes into VA2, not RB!

 

Not even the two bodies involved, A and B, turn into each other!

 

Once more, we smack into the same non-dialectical brick wall.

 

Howsoever we try to re-package this ill-considered, half-baked, jelly-fish-of-a-theory, none of it makes the slightest sense.

 

If a force 'contradicts' a moving body (and not the motion already in the system), then that force must change into this body and that body must change into that force -- if the DM classics are to be believed (link above).

 

[The above examples simply represent specific instances of more general, but fatal, defects lodged right at the heart of the 'DM-theory of change', exposed in detail in Essay Seven Part Three. Nevertheless, this point can, and will be, generalised later in order to show that no two or more forces could 'contradict' each other in the way that Dialectical Marxists fondly imagine.]

 

Nevertheless, in order to examine every conceivable alternative available to DM-fans, I propose to analyse this particular option in even more detail. To that end, I will now present an alternative clarification of what it might mean.

 

First Attempts At Clarification

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; UO = Unity of Opposites.]

 

Perhaps the following re-configuration might succeed in repairing the gaping holes in the above interpretation of DM, at the same time as preventing the theory that UOs operate everywhere in nature from being completely undermined:

 

F2: A UO involves the opposition ('struggle') between a force, P1, and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has produced (or would have produced) in a body, B, had P1 never existed. The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this interaction.

 

F2 links the operation of one force (P1) with that of another force, or set of forces, Q. However, it is difficult to distinguish what F2 says about the factors involved from the vector resultant of two forces if we subjected this set-up to the usual mathematical analysis. If so, the word "struggle" would amount to little more than an anthropomorphic re-write of the functional relations that exist within the vector calculus, only now applied to just one force, the resultant. In that case, if and when P1 and Q interact, they will produce just one resultant force, R, and it is that force which would induce the recorded change in motion.28

 

But, if that is so, a contradiction between 'oppositional forces' can't arise, in this instance: if there is only one force operating in the system (R), there can be no contradiction -- i.e., if we adopt this interpretation of DM. In that case, F2 threatens to undermine the standard interpretation of this theory, killing it for want of forces.29

 

One obvious, DM-inspired answer to the above criticisms might proceed along the following lines (no pun intended!): the contradiction here is precisely the relation between P1 and Q. The fact that this results in the production of one force, R, is just the way scientists mathematically process the cause of the ensuing motion. That in no way affects the contradiction that produces the final outcome.

 

Or so it might be objected...

 

We will return to consider in much greater detail this sort of reply later on (in addition, an entire sub-section has been devoted to this question), but for present purposes it is sufficient to point out that whatever else it is, this can't be a 'dialectical contradiction' (and it certainly isn't an ordinary -- or even a formal -- contradiction, either!), so the above proffered pro-DM rebuttal can't offer any assistance help to beleaguered DM-supporters.

 

But, why can't this be a 'dialectical contradiction'? Anyone who asks that question has been paying scant attention to a couple of questions that have repeatedly been asked throughout this Essay (and will be asked again many more times before the end): Do these forces, P1 and Q change into each other? No they don't Do they imply one another such that one of them can't exist without the other (like the capitalist class both implies and can't exist without the proletariat, so we are told)? Again no they do not. But they should do both if the DM-classics are to be believed.  Admittedly, F2 does assert that these forces form a UO, but what is the proof that this is always a 'dialectical UO' and not just a coincidence of applied forces? Where is the derivation of one force from the other?

 

As we will see as this Essay unfolds: since the beginning Dialectical Marxists have adopted the slap-dash habit of labelling a wide range of interactions and states of affairs "contradictory" without bothering to inter-derive the factors involved along the lines Hegel attempted -- on this, see Interlude Ten. [For instance, Hegel tried to show that the concept, 'slave', was 'logically related' to the concept, 'master' (which 'derivation' will be debunked later on, anyway), or when he endeavoured to do something similar with "Nothing" and "Being" (which will also be taken apart in Essay Twelve Part Six).] So, Hegel at least tried to inter-derive such concepts. But, except for the relationship between the capitalist class and the proletariat, Dialectical Marxists rarely do the same for the vast majority of 'contradictions' they see all over the place (in nature and society), which they simply assert are 'contradictions' -- without attempting to inter-derive the factors involved. That is why questions like those in the previous paragraph have constantly been asked -- i.e., to underline the fact that DM-theorists are quick to label, slow to prove, that a given 'contradiction' is indeed 'dialectical', just as they are slower still to prove that they are even (ordinary or formal) contradictions to begin with!

 

The rest of this Essay will examine a range of alleged examples of 'dialectical contradictions' -- and Essay Five, Essay Eight Part Three, Essay Eleven Part One and Essay Twelve Parts Four, Five and Six, will examine several more -- by which time the completely bogus nature of DM should be plain for all to see.

 

Interlude Three: Hamlet Without The Prince

 

[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism; HEX = Hegelian Expansionism.]

 

Some might be tempted to dismiss this section of the Essay as just the latest unsympathetic and misleading interpretation of yet another artificially constructed and then unsympathetically-modified DM-'proposition'.

 

Maybe so, but the reader will find that Dialectical Marxists themselves consistently fail to examine or explain their own theory in anything even remotely like the detail attempted at this site, despite the fact that DM is supposed to represent the best, if not the very pinnacle, of scientific and philosophical thinking. The present Essay, by way of stark contrast, has endeavoured to set-out -- in more detail than has ever been attempted anywhere else before in the entire history of Marxism -- the implications of this aspect of DM. As such, it ventures into entirely unexplored territory. Hence, it is impossible to say whether or not it misrepresents DM. Indeed, DM-fans themselves would be hard-pressed to decide among themselves whether or not that is the case. For one thing, they can't even decide what matter is! More-or-less the same can be said of "dialectical contradiction"!

 

As Essay Thirteen Part One shows, their 'materialism' is rather like Hamlet without the Prince!

 

In addition, it is worth pointing out (once more!) that F2 was itself motivated by the idea that forces contradict impressed motion. As we have just seen, because change in motion is the consequence of just one resultant force (when analysed classically), the alleged 'contradiction' between two forces simply disappears.

 

F2: A UO involves the opposition ('struggle') between a force, P1, and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has produced (or would have produced) in a body, B, had P1 never existed. The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this interaction.

 

It would therefore take an especially alert, eagle-eyed Dialectical Marxist to be able to spot 'contradictory' forces in a system, or even a "Totality", where there is only one force responsible for the said change in motion!

 

Worse still, F2 postulates a 'contradiction' between a force and the motion that is (or might be) produced as the counterfactual result of the action of other forces -- in this case, Q. That is, F2 considers what would or could happen if the results of Q's 'normal' activity hadn't themselves been interrupted by P1. But since some, or all, of Q's effects won't have been actualised (having been prevented from doing so by P1), the alleged 'contradiction' here contains only one real term.

 

Even the most orthodox, committed and devoted of DM-fans might find it difficult to visualise (let alone explain) a 'contradiction' between something that is real and something that isn't (in the sense that the latter either never existed or was prevented from being actualised): i.e., the motion that would have occurred if the impeding force, P1, hadn't acted.

 

It could be objected that these other forces (those comprising Q) don't vanish; they are still there, as is the resultant. If they were to vanish, so would the resultant. That (proffered) pro-DM reply will be examined later in the Essay.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

In which case, it might be a good idea to reconsider an option that was left unexplored earlier --, where it was argued that forces are the only legitimate candidate pairs to be placed in such oppositional couples, not the motion they change or induce, or the bodies upon which they act. [That is, if we ignore what Engels had to say when he tried to re-interpret forces as relative forms of motion.] To that end it might prove useful to focus on a modification of F2 aimed at providing support for the theory that the forces involved contradict each other before they combine to create the resultant, R.

 

Given this revised view, only forces are capable of 'contradicting' other forces, not bodies (as such), nor any motion already in the system. The following might, therefore, bring out more clearly the implications of this revised alternative:

 

F3: Given a body, B, and a system of forces, V, comprising n vectors, v1-vn, operating on B, a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between these contradictory force vectors. In this scenario, R needn't be fixed, but could itself be subject to countless changes as B moves under the influence of V, which would also change accordingly.

 

One immediate problem with this is that the specification of the forces belonging to V will depend on the choice of (a) co-ordinate system and (b) inertial frame.30 Such considerations show that even if F3 were acceptable, the representation of 'opposing forces' as 'contradictions' is perhaps more convention-sensitive than it is reality-driven -- which would mean, of course, that 'dialectical contradictions' are no more 'objective' than, say, latitude or longitude are.

 

However, even if this latest 'difficulty' is put to one side (for whatever reason), it is still worth asking whether any sense can be made of F3.

 

As pointed out above, F3 seems to bring us back full circle to the idea that 'opposing forces' -- not bodies, or the motion of bodies -- are mutually 'contradictory'. And yet, as we have seen, it isn't possible to depict AA-, and RR-forces as 'contradictory', unless their effects are involved in some way.

 

On the other hand, as we have also noted several times, if the word "force" itself is just a convenient shorthand for relative motion, it would mean that this part of DM is more consistent with a CAR-like picture of reality. That is because factors at work in the "Totality", if pictured this way, would now be externally-, not internally-related to each other.

 

To repeat: it isn't easy to see how the motion of one body could be internally-related to that of others without re-introducing the theory that a given body exercises some sort of an effect any another, independently of how they are moving. While an episode of relative motion might subsequently affect the movement of other bodies, that still wouldn't internally-link the bodies involved (in the 'dialectical' sense of that term -- which means these factors would have to imply one another, not just be fortuitously connected, like the proletariat is supposedly internally-connected with the capitalist class, and vice versa) And yet, this is precisely the difficulty that exercised Traditional Philosophers in relation to the classical, metaphysical problem of the nature of force. DM has simply reproduced this 'conundrum' in an even more obscure form. If relative motion were an 'internal'-, or 'logical'-link of the sort required by DM, then the movement of one body in one direction would imply the movement of another body in a different (or even the same) direction. The existence of one would imply the existence of the other; they would 'interpenetrate' one another, such that neither could exist without the other -- just like the capitalist class can't exist without the proletariat, and where those two classes imply each other, for example -- although, once more, I have thrown that inference into considerable doubt, here). But, unless DM-theorists have kept the details to themselves for well over a century, that isn't the case with relative motion (and for the above reasons). Until we see proof to the contrary, relative motion remains an external, not an internal, relation. So, given this interpretation, DM certainly seems to be morphing into a CAR-type theory!

 

So, the relative motion of bodies can't be a 'dialectical' relation, whatever else it is. The same comment also applies to forces. They don't imply one another, and can exist without each other.31

 

Ignoring these fatal defects for now, perhaps the above unhelpful degeneration into CAR could be prevented by means of the following re-wording of F3:

 

F4: Given a system of forces, V, comprising n vectors, v1-vn, a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between these n force vectors.

 

F5: The above ensemble is only contradictory within a Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.

 

F5 clearly represents one strand of the DM-theory that 'the whole determines the nature of the parts and the parts determine the nature of whole'. Hence, F4 and F5 appear to restore the dialectical unity and mediated inter-connectivity that earlier paragraphs seem to have abandoned or excised.

 

Unfortunately, this bring us back full circle to a consideration of the relationship between the "Totality" and its parts. That is because F5 introduces its own pernicious version of HEX, because it seems impossible to determine (given this interpretation) whether or not anything is actually  'contradictory' unless the nature of 'the whole' had already been ascertained. But, since the latter is always changing, no element in this 'cosmic wild-goose chase' will ever be hunted down and trapped, as it were. [We met different versions of this fatal defect in DM-epistemology in other Essays at this site; see, for example here, here and here. Readers are directed there for more details. Much of what follows takes those conclusions for granted.]

 

The most important aspect of this (latest) DM-'quandary' -- at least as far as the main issues covered in this Essay are concerned -- centres on the idea entertained by several Dialectical Marxists (follow that link for the supporting quotes), that the growth of science means that 'contradictions' that currently seem to be holding up, or preventing, the growth and refinement of knowledge will (one day) somehow be (wholly or partially) 'resolved'. Presumably, this implies that in the limit (i.e., in a future ideal 'state of knowledge', where humanity possesses (at least in theory) the 'Absolute Truth about everything' -- this taking place in a fully communist society and economy, one supposes), there will be, or there should be, no contradictions at all in or between scientific theories, or in or between theory and 'reality'. The problem here is that, according to DM-theorists, in order for a scientific theory to be true (or even 'relatively true') it must 'reflect' the world to some extent (after having been tested in practice); the 'more true' it is the more faithfully it will do this, which also seems to mean any such theory will contain or imply fewer contradictions. But the state of knowledge in this hypothetical 'Ideal'/'Absolute Limit' -- when scientific theory will be 'maximally true' --, also appears to mean it will contain no contradictions at all. That in turn implies that the world itself can't contain any contradictions, otherwise any remaining contradictions in reality would be reflected in or by this 'maximally true' theory. But that possibility has just been ruled out -- i.e., a 'maximally true' theory must contain no contradictions -- as Engels himself conceded (see below). But, this also seems to imply that even if humanity never actually reaches this blessed state (i.e., 'Absolute Knowledge'), we can, in the here-and-now, draw the following conclusion: the Absolute Truth is that not only is the world not contradictory, motion itself and the operation of forces aren't, either.32

 

That also appears to be Engels's opinion, and not just the 'unwelcome' view of the present author:

 

"If one does not loiter here needlessly, but presses on farther into the immense building, one finds innumerable treasures which today still possess undiminished value. With all philosophers it is precisely the 'system' which is perishable; and for the simple reason that it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind -- the desire to overcome all contradictions. But if all contradictions are once and for all disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth -- world history will be at an end. And yet it has to continue, although there is nothing left for it to do -- hence, a new, insoluble contradiction. As soon as we have once realized -- and in the long run no one has helped us to realize it more than Hegel himself -- that the task of philosophy thus stated means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that which can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive development -- as soon as we realize that, there is an end to all philosophy in the hitherto accepted sense of the word. One leaves alone 'absolute truth', which is unattainable along this path or by any single individual; instead, one pursues attainable relative truths along the path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of dialectical thinking. At any rate, with Hegel philosophy comes to an end; on the one hand, because in his system he summed up its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and on the other hand, because, even though unconsciously, he showed us the way out of the labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world." [Engels (1888), p.590. Bold emphasis added. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected.]

 

So, according to Engels (expressing himself in a published work, too, so these are his considered thoughts), if and when humanity arrives at a 'state of absolute truth', knowledge will contain no contradictions at all! In fact, it must now be true that there are no 'extra-mental contradictions', for if it weren't now true -- that there are no, 'contradictions' in the 'Ultimate Future State of Knowledge' -- then either:

 

(a) The theory concerning the above limit -- where all contradictions have been resolved (or "disposed of") -- must itself be false; or,

 

(b) The belief that humanity is converging on this limit must itself be mistaken -- since there is no such limit to converge on!

 

As we have seen (follow the links in Note 32 (link above)), these anti-DM conclusions are implied by the DM-'theory of knowledge' itself -- i.e., that 'reality' is a contradiction-free zone.33

 

This argument  is continued below.

Interlude Four: 'Limit Or No Limit -- That Is The Question'

 

[DN = Dialectics Of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954); AD = Anti-Dühring, i.e., Engels (1976); W&G = Woods and Grant.]

 

So, to re-cap -- either:

 

(i) There is no limit toward which knowledge is converging; or,

 

(ii) As knowledge advances, 'external reality' alters accordingly; or even,

 

(iii) It is now true to say that, in the limit, 'reality' contains no contradictions whatsoever.

 

Plainly, unless we are Idealists of some sort, Option (ii) couldn't be true. We aren't to suppose (it is to be hoped!) that our understanding of the world alters the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly give life to, or which ultimately power, the whole of reality -- so that as knowledge increases 'objective contradictions' slowly, even magically, disappear -- like the Cheshire Cat's Smile:

 

 

Video Four: Cheshire Cat Dialectics?

 

Of course, many 'social contradictions' might be resolved (i.e., eliminated) in a socialist society (so we are told), but that can't apply to  those that allegedly exist in the natural world. Does anyone who genuinely believes that motion is contradictory, for instance, think that anything humans can do, or will ever come to understand, is able to alter that supposed fact -- which if that were possible would mean motion isn't really contradictory? If what humans claim to know can 'edit this supposed fact out of reality', how could it be, or have been, 'objective'?

 

But, if not, then as Option (iii) suggests, it must now be true that absolute knowledge of the world (even if we never attain to it) implies that nature isn't contradictory. In that case, a state of complete knowledge of 'reality' will have removed all contradictions from our thought, and/or from our theories about the world. Furthermore, if 'Absolute Knowledge' 'reflects reality' (which it must do or it would not be knowledge, let alone be absolute), that must mean 'reality' can't contain any contradictions.

 

[I hasten to add, the above remarks do not represent my views; I am simply trying to explore the (fatal) implications of this aspect of DM.]

 

It doesn't matter if we never reach this blessed state, the very possibility of complete/'absolute knowledge' means that nature itself must be a contradiction-free zone. [However, on that see here.]

 

Of course, it might be false to conclude that every single Dialectical Marxist believes that as science advances all contradictions will be resolved -- they might even castigate Engels for saying so! --, even though it isn't easy to see how they could consistently deny it. Faced with each new contradiction in or between theories -- and if they are committed to the view that science can only advance if it overcomes/resolves such contradictions -- it seems DM-supporters must also concede that it is at least possible for them to be resolved, if we but knew more about the world or practice and technology had progressed sufficiently. Otherwise, they will have to admit that science can't advance beyond a certain point. But they deny that, too. In which case, they must either believe that:

 

(iv) There is no limit to scientific advance; or,

 

(v) There is a limit (because there are irresolvable contradictions in nature and hence in our theories about it).

 

But, if they also believe that scientific advance has no limit, then they must believe both of the following, too:

 

(vi) There is no limit to scientific advance; and,

 

(vii) There is a limit to scientific advance.

 

[Option (vi) follows from the asymptote metaphor to which Engels referred, and to which Lenin and subsequent DM-theorists have lent their support. On that, see the quotations listed below. Option (vii) is just a re-write of Option (v), and is based on a rejection of the idea that every single contradiction will be resolved, which clearly implies there must be a limit to the advance of science. (On whether DM-theorists believe that science can or will remove all or most contradictions as it advances, see here.)]

 

But, the combination of Option (vi) and Option (vii) is itself a contradiction, and it lies right at the very heart of DM (if the above reasoning is sound).

 

Of course, this means that DM itself can only advance if this contradiction (between those two Options) is itself resolved! But, since DM-theorists don't even recognise this blatant contradiction in their own theory, that can only mean DM can't itself advance!

 

Hence, either:

 

(viii) DM can't advance; or,

 

(ix) Dialectical Marxists must believe that all contradictions are in the end resolvable. [And that Option (vi) must be accepted.]

 

But, and once more, if Option (ix) is the case, by the above argument, we are now in a position to declare that there are no 'objective contradictions in reality'. It is only our lack of knowledge (and/or consistency!) that fools us into thinking otherwise.

 

So, in terms of DM's own theory, it would seem that nature can't be fundamentally contradictory!

 

Again, the only apparent way of avoiding that fatal result is either to:

 

(a) Deny science can only advance by resolving all contradictions; or,

 

(b) Deny that Absolute Truth 'exists'.

 

However, the rejection of Option (i) from earlier (i.e., "There is no limit toward which knowledge is converging") would mean that there is a (non-Absolute) limit to knowledge, after all. In which case, plainly, the DM-thesis that human knowledge is unlimited would have to be abandoned, and along with that would go the idea that knowledge is converging on it. In addition, the belief that there is an 'objective reality' (out there) for us to know (even if we never fully attain to it) would have to be jettisoned, too.

 

This would leave Dialectical Marxists with no way of deciding which of the allegedly irresolvable contradictions that their theory throws up is:

 

(c) An 'objective feature of reality'; or is,

 

(d) A by-product of their own imperfect, or even their own fundamentally defective, theory -- which would or could itself be resolved if only humanity had more knowledge.

 

These observations, of course, assume that the universe might be both 'infinite' (a view certainly held by many Dialectical Marxists) and constantly changing (which not one single DM-fan denies!). But, neither of the latter affects the conclusion that there must now be a set of truths (possibly infinite) about 'reality' toward which human knowledge is asymptotically converging (even if that set itself were to grow over time) -- that is, if Engels and Lenin are correct when they said the following:

 

"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35; paragraphs merged.]

 

"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them (sic), the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept (sic) and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975a), p.457.]

 

"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object." [Lenin (1961), p.195.]

 

"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -– provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Ibid., p.171. Emphases in the original.]

 

Of course, if there is no such set of truths, no such limit, then Engels's metaphor is defective, and Lenin was mistaken --, since, once again, there would be no such thing as 'objective truth' (if the latter is defined as the limit toward which human knowledge is heading).

 

However, in this regard, W&G quote a revealing passage from DN:

 

"The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and that consequently too in the final analysis they can't be in contradiction to one another in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), p.349; quoting this source. Bold added. The page number for this passage is slightly different in the 2nd edition.]

 

Admittedly, the above remarks weren't included in the 'official'/final version of AD, but, along with the passage quoted earlier, it does tend to suggest that Engels believed either that:

 

(e) Despite appearances to the contrary, the 'objective' world is actually free from contradiction; or,

 

(f) In the end there will be no contradiction between our thoughts about reality and reality itself (the first of which alternatives, (e), it must be admitted, is impossible to distinguish from the second, (f)); or even that,

 

(g) In the limit there will be no contradictions at all in any of our theories.

 

So, to take just one example (and assuming Engels is to be believed): if any randomly-selected Dialectical Marxist were to conclude that motion is 'contradictory', then that subjective thought can't actually contradict 'objective' reality -- or, can't contradict 'Absolute Knowledge' of 'objective reality' itself, one presumes (even if that blessed end state is never actually attained). So, if knowledge is to advance, even this 'contradiction' (i.e., the subjective belief that motion is 'contradictory' and the supposed fact that it objectively isn't) must itself be resolved, and hence removed/"disposed of". This, too, is a 'contradiction' that should/will be eliminated if and when humanity learns more, or when our species finally attains 'objective knowledge' of the world. If we can say that now, then it must have always been true that motion isn't 'objectively' contradictory; our actual knowledge has just got to catch up.

 

[But, of course, as we saw in Essay Five, motion isn't even contradictory, to begin with!]

 

Naturally, that doesn't conclusively commit Engels to the view that reality is, in the limit, a contradiction-free zone, but if science can only advance by resolving contradictions in our (subjective -- or our 'less-than-completely-objective') theories, so that they become progressively more 'objective', the conclusion (given above) seems inescapable: In the limit, human knowledge of the world must picture nature as progressively, if not totally, free from contradictions!

 

However, in the absence of any clear indication from Engels that he genuinely believed what the above passage says, little more can be asserted here with 'absolute confidence'.

 

It is a reasonably safe bet that because the DM-classics are silent on this topic, contemporary Dialectical Marxists won't even be able to decide among themselves about this -- that is, without first being branded 'Revisionists', perhaps sparking yet another Dialectical Dog Fight, followed by more debilitating expulsions and splits.

 

Rinse and repeat...

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Again, if this is what Dialectical Marxists mean when they speak about 'contradictory forces',34 then nothing may be so described until everything has been so described. [Once more, I am taking for granted the conclusions mentioned earlier. If readers find this latest rather brash assertion hard to accept, they should consult the full argument presented in the Essays referenced.] And yet, this reverses the dialectical order of events, for, as we have seen, there are several DM-theorists who appear to believe that things only look 'contradictory' because we don't yet possess the Big Picture -- i.e., an 'Absolute View of Reality' --, and that if humanity ever were to ascend to such an 'all-encompassing vantage point', 'contradictions' would disappear (or largely disappear -- the story gets a little vague at this point). In contrast, the idea seems to be that we may only depict forces in nature as absolutely 'contradictory' after 'The Epistemological Trumpet' has finally been blown on 'Dialectical Judgement Day' -- when humanity, at last, hits the asymptotic buffers to which Engels referred. The problem is that this Blessed State may only be achieved when all (or most) 'contradictions' have been resolved!

 

Paradoxically, that in turn appears to mean 'objectively' these 'contradiction' both exist and do not exist -- or maybe even, we do and we don't know whether they do or they don't!

 

So, one horn of this dilemma seems to suggest that 'dialectical contradictions' don't really exist (because they are merely the artefacts of 'partial'/'relative'/'incomplete' knowledge), and, therefore, if they don't really exist, they can hardly play a part in change and development. The other horn of the dilemma appears to suggest that we are currently in no position to assert that 'dialectical contradictions' do in fact exist (since we aren't in possession of 'Absolute Knowledge'). In which case, because we aren't in possession of 'The Complete Picture', we can't claim to know whether 'dialectical contradictions' actually cause change!

 

Either way, yet another core DM-Thesis crashes and burns!35

 

[Readers shouldn't conclude from the above that the present author either accepts or rejects the theory that there is a 'Complete and Final Theory of Reality', since, as Essay Twelve Part One shows, any such theory would be Metaphysical, and, as a result, it would be both incoherent and non-sensical. As before, I am merely trying to expose the ridiculous consequences of this aspect of DM.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

At any rate, and to return to the main theme, if AA-, and RR-forces are mutually oppositional, change would still be caused by resultant forces. But, as we saw in Essay Seven, it is far is easier, and more natural, to interpret that scenario as 'tautological', not 'contradictory' -- that is, if we really must insist on viewing nature in such anthropomorphic/animistic terms.

 

Of course, if we resist any such capitulations to Mystical Primitivism, as indeed we should, then both descriptors (i.e., "contradictory" and "tautological") ought to be fed into the 'Obsolete-Concept-Shredder', and the sooner the better.

 

[There is more on this here.]

 

Perhaps, then, it would be wise to draw a veil over this (self-imposed) dialectical impasse, and turn to a much more likely source for these DM-'contradictions'. To that end I will return to F4 and F5, but consider them from a more promising angle -- as AR-force couples.

 

F4: Given a system of forces, V, comprising n vectors, v1-vn, a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between these n force vectors.

 

F5: The above ensemble is only contradictory within a Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.

 

AR-Forces

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

In the previous few sub-sections, it became clear that little sense could be made of the equation of 'dialectical contradictions' with AA-, and/or RR-forces -- but that turned out to have nothing to do with the difficulty of seeing whether or not such force-couples contained 'opposites', since they manifestly do not. An A-force isn't the opposite of another A-force; the same is true with respect to two R-forces.

 

However, a prima facie case might be made for regarding AR-force couples as the polar opposites to which DM-theorists refer (in their endeavour to link forces with 'contradictions'), at least as they supposedly operate in DM and/or HM.

 

Unfortunately, as we are about to discover, this slender straw once clutched soon turns into a dead weight that will sink this already doomed 'theory'. Quite apart from the considerations outlined above, no clear sense can be made of the idea that AR-forces may be recruited to the cause,  in an endeavour to model 'dialectical contradictions', anywhere, any way, any how.36

 

 

Figure Three: Comrades! Grab This!

It's A 'Dialectical' Lifeline!

Honest!

 

An initial 'problem' immediately confronts this particular option: AR-couples don't appear to operate in nature in quite the manner their handy prefix seems to suggest: i.e., as AR-forces.

 

Consider a straightforward case: the accumulation of matter to form stars, planets and moons (etc.) over billions of years. There, R-forces (operating at the nuclear level) apparently prevent (for a time) the catastrophic collapse of these growing masses into 'singularities' by balancing-out the A-forces that presumably set the whole thing in motion.

 

However, the problem with these R-forces is that, while they look as though they oppose any other A-forces in the system, they aren't their polar opposites (in the way that, say, the North and South poles of a magnet are said to be) -- that is, they aren't opposite manifestations of the same type of force. So, the inter-atomic forces preventing the above collapse aren't the same type of force as the gravitational forces that initiated the process.37 While a case might be made for depicting North and South poles of a magnet as polar opposites, magnetic forces (but on that, see below), gravitational and nuclear forces aren't 'interpenetrated' opposites of the same type, and so can't, it seems, 'contradict' each other in the 'dialectical' sense required. For example, neither of these forces turns into the other, contrary to what the DM-classics tell us they should.

 

Maybe we need to learn a little more about such mysterious, almost inscrutable, 'dialectical opposites'?

 

Interlude Five: 'Opposites'

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

[Much of this material was written before I had read McGill and Parry (1948). [That link will automatically download a saveable PDF of the article.] I will add several detailed comments about the latter to a future re-write of Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

So, even though, for example, male and female, up and down, dead and alive are said to be 'opposites', a male dog isn't the opposite of a female flower, an upstroke isn't the opposite of a downdraft, and a dead cat isn't the opposite of a live wire. Such contrasts can only work as opposites if they apply to, or implicate, the same substantival (or, at least, if they involve a use of the same common noun). Hence, given this modified view, a male dog will be the opposite of a female dog, a dead cat the opposite of live cat, an up direction will be the opposite of a down direction, and so on. Logical (or even grammatical) connections of this sort are essential if objects and processes are to count (in DM) as 'interpenetrated opposites'. Hence, for Dialectical Marxists, the proletariat is the 'dialectical opposite' of the bourgeoisie only in so far as they are both social and economic classes.

 

Or, so the story goes...

 

Naturally, this undermines much of what Dialectical Marxists themselves have to say about UOs; but since this ground was covered extensively in Essay Seven Parts One and Three, no more will be said about it here.

 

Nevertheless, a hot stove can certainly heat a cold can of beer even though neither is the 'dialectical opposite' of the other. In which case, it is difficult to see how in DM-terms they can possibly interact -- i.e., where the one heats the other. But who doesn't know a hot oven can heat up all manner of things, including cold cans of beer? Who doesn't know that cold hands can be warmed by a hot fire, even if they, too, aren't 'dialectical opposites', and even if they don't imply one another or even turn into each other (which they would have to do if they were 'dialectical opposites')? And yet, if we were to accept what we read in Hegel's work and the DM-classics (follow the previous link) -- both of whom tell us that only 'dialectical opposites' can motivate change or are capable of interacting with each other --, it wouldn't be possible to warm a pair of cold hands on anything other than a pair of warm hands! Nor would it be possible to cool a hot can of beer with anything other than a cold can of beer!

 

It could be objected that the above is just another ridiculous caricature of DM, of the sort we have witnessed countless times at this site. In which case, it might be pointed out that the above interactions (for instance, between cans of beer) would be explained in terms of the molecules involved and the laws of thermodynamics, etc. No DM-theorist of any intelligence would even attempt to explain such phenomena without a reference to those laws and the molecules involved.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

If we confine ourselves to water molecules (at least in order to simplify the principles involved), the above pro-DM response would have to regard an energetic molecule of water -- label one such, "WMe" -- as the 'dialectical opposite' of a less energetic water molecule -- label one such, "WMle". So, in terms of energetics, WMe > WMle. If we interpret the first as a hot water molecule and the second as a cold water molecule -- labelling them, "HWM" and "CWM", respectively -- we can now ask the following question: do these molecules imply one another such that neither can exist without the other (like the proletariat both implies, and can't exist without, the capitalist class (and vice versa), so we are told)? Surely not. For example, CWMs exist in many places in the Solar System with no HWMs anywhere in sight. [On that, see this NASA article.] Nor do these molecules struggle with each other and then turn into one another. [Which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed.] What happens when they interact is that HWMs lose kinetic energy to CWMs until they have (roughly) the same energy. But the molecules themselves don't change into each other.

 

In that case, whatever else they are, these aren't 'dialectical opposites', and whatever else this is, it isn't a 'dialectical change/interaction'. Hence, the above anti-DM points remain valid.

 

[Readers are invited to rehearse the above argument, but applied to more complex molecules found in the average can of beer. The result will not be significantly different! The analysis developed here continues in Interlude Twelve.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

At this point, readers are again reminded of something they were asked to keep in mind as this Essay unfolds:

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here the relation:

 

(1) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(2) Between the forces operating in the system? Or is it,

 

(3) A 'dialectical union' of both?

 

However, even if A-, and R-forces were opposites of the same type, they actually alter the motion of bodies. As such they don't directly confront each other as opposing forces, and hence they don't 'struggle' with one another. Admittedly, they can be represented as 'oppositional' in a vector calculus, but we have already seen that a formal translation like this is of little use to Dialectical Marxists. That is partly because the relevant forces disappear, to be replaced by a single resultant force, which is the actual cause of the subsequent action.

 

It could be argued that these initial difficulties could be resolved if emphasis were placed once more on the oppositional nature of AR-forces as a way of explaining change and development.

 

Unfortunately, that alternative turns out to be no more successful here than it was when it was considered earlier, in relation to AA-, and RR-forces. More to the point, AR-forces don't imply one another such that neither of them can exist without the other (once again: unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which are supposed to imply one another). In that case, and once more: whatever else they are, AR-forces can't be 'dialectical opposites'. They don't 'interpenetrate' each other.

 

Even if this recurring 'problem' were shelved (for now), it would still prove difficult to see how AR-forces could be interpreted literally or figuratively as 'dialectical contradictions' (especially as they supposedly operate in HM). That is because of the way in which they can combine and augment one another.

 

For example, consider two forces operating in diametrically opposite directions, tangentially placed around a rotating body (hence, not acting in the same line -- even if they act in the same plane). These two forces -- although 'opposites' at their point of action -- exercise a combined, augmenting effect on the angular acceleration of that body, thus ceasing to be oppositional in any plausible sense of that word.38

 

But, this is a familiar feature of force vectors. In some instances they do seem to 'oppose', in others they appear to 'augment', each other, while in still others they look like they do both at once.39, 40

 

And the above is no flight-of-fancy on the part of the present author. This principle was even recognised in the Ancient World and prompted Hero of Alexandria, for example, into inventing the very first stream engine:

 

 

Video Five: 'Opposing Forces' That Augment One Another

 

Interlude Six -- Magnetic And Other Natural Forces

 

[AR = Attraction-Repulsion; UO = Unity of Opposites; DN = Dialectics Of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954); DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

Engels himself regarded the two poles of a magnet as a clear example of the unity of AR-opposites in nature (another idea he borrowed from Hegel and other German Idealists, and which has been parroted down the ages by countless 'highly original' DM-echo-chambers!).

 

Here is Hegel:

 

"Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. The two however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be transferred to the other. Thus, for example, debts and assets are not two particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative to the debtor is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also a way to the west. Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically conditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. The north pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and vice versa. If we cut a magnet in two, we have not a north pole in one piece, and a south pole in the other. Similar, in electricity, the positive and the negative are not two diverse and independent fluids. In opposition, the different is not confronted by an other, but by its other." [Hegel (1975), §119, p.173. Bold emphasis added. (There are somewhat similar comments to these in Hegel (2004), §312, p.165. This links to a Scribd page which features a photographic reproduction of this book.) Clearly, Hegel borrowed some of these ideas from Kant's theory of 'real negation'. On that, see Appendix A.]

 

And here is Engels, in places almost copying Hegel, word-for word:

 

"Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on one another, that the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and inter-connection, and, conversely, that their inter-connection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition. This once established, there can be no question of a final cancelling out of repulsion and attraction, or of a final partition between the one form of motion in one half of matter and the other form in the other half, consequently there can be no question of mutual penetration or of absolute separation of the two poles. It would be equivalent to demanding in the first case that the north and south poles of a magnet should mutually cancel themselves out or, in the second case, that dividing a magnet in the middle between the two poles should produce on one side a north half without a south pole, and on the other side a south half without a north pole. Although, however, the impermissibility of such assumptions follows at once from the dialectical nature of polar opposites, nevertheless, thanks to the prevailing metaphysical mode of thought of natural scientists, the second assumption at least plays a certain part in physical theory." [Engels (1954), p.72. Bold emphasis added.]

 

The alleged 'unity' in this case clearly revolves around the presumed fact that the North and South poles of a magnet can't exist independently of each other -- or even without one another. Their 'opposite' nature is supposedly revealed by the affect they have on magnetically susceptible bodies and upon the effect each pole has on its opposite pole.

 

[Of course, if the legendary Magnetic Monopole is ever discovered (as it seems it might have been!), this classic DM-example will go the way of other defunct ideas -- rather like the Celestial Spheres of Ancient and Medieval Astronomy, for instance.]

 

However, upon closer examination, it is clear that the relationship between the poles of a magnet is actually an example of AA-, or RR-, but not AR-opposites. That is because, in this case non-opposites -- i.e., like poles --, repel each other (i.e., two Norths or two Souths). On the other hand, opposites attract -- i.e., a North and a South. Consequently, in the way that its poles inter-relate, magnets illustrate AA-, and/or RR-type forces. A moment's thought will also confirm this: since when do magnets attract and repel each other at the same time? In that case, how could they represent an AR-type force?

 

Hence, it turns out that the magnet isn't a clear-cut example of an AR-type force -- 'united in opposition' --, that Dialectical Folklore has been trying to sell its gullible audience for at least two centuries.

 

Mysteriously, DM-theorists, en masse, have failed to notice this obvious flaw in one of their most important and most often cited examples!

 

So much for the claim that DM has been read from -- not imposed on -- the facts.

 

The same comments apply in equal measure to electrical, and hence to sub-atomic, phenomena in general. There, we find the same situation: like charges repel, unlike charges attract. This means that much of the (sub-atomic) 'dialectical evidence' published in, for example, Woods and Grant (1995/2007), is seriously flawed. How on earth do electrons and protons, for instance, manage to 'struggle' among themselves (as a DM-UO) if they actually attract one another?

 

[There will be more on this in Essay Seven Part Two (when it is published).]

 

It could be objected that while it might be true that two unlike poles are examples of AA-forces, their continued motion toward each other will be prevented at some point by structural forces within the magnets themselves, and it is these couples that function as AR-forces. In that case, R-forces operating between approaching atoms of the material from which the magnets are made will at some point prevent two opposite poles closing in on one another, counteracting the A-forces that brought them together. This confirms that the relationship between the poles of a magnet is in fact that of an AR-couple.

 

Or, so an objector might try to claim...

 

Unfortunately, this means that, as magnetic opposites, the poles themselves still fail to be AR-UOs. Certainly, other forces might come into play, but that doesn't affect that salient point. In which case, these new forces coupled with the original magnetic forces aren't opposites of the same Aristotelian/Hegelian type (as noted above).

 

Furthermore, the above pro-DM objection would reduce the oppositional relationship between forces originating in these magnets to the effect that the poles have on motion (since, manifestly, these opposite forces don't affect each other, just the relative motion induced by either or both of them). Hence, once more, the two poles aren't inter-related to each other directly as opposite AR-forces. All they do is oppose any motion that either or both of them induce in the system. But, we have already had occasion to dismiss that alternative, since it turned out to be inimical to DM.

 

In which case, the inter-atomic forces governing the operation of AA-, RR-, or even AR-couples, actually oppose, limit or augment whatever motion is already present in the system -- or, they restrict the freedom of bodies to move, once set in motion. But, they still don't seem to oppose -- i.e., 'contradict' -- each other as force-on-force.

 

Again, this is probably one reason why Engels toyed with a positivistic re-interpretation of forces (in DN, as pointed out in Note 4), since no physical sense can be given to any such relation between forces (as was also established earlier) -- that is, over and above seeing any such relation as an obscure/obsolete way of attempting to paraphrase the relative motion between bodies.

 

Of course, it could be argued that the force field induced by each pole does affect a force field of other poles; hence, the above claims are incorrect. But, these force fields are merely the expression of the motion of, or the motion induced in, measuring instruments (or, indeed, patterns created by scattered iron filings, for instance) placed near the said poles, so the above anti-DM conclusions aren't false. Such forces are a shorthand for relative motion-- as even Engels maintained. Leaf through any Physics textbook that deals with this, and it will tell the reader that a field is just an array of numbers (scalars), or vectors, etc.

 

[Fields in Physics are not to be confused with Fields in Mathematics! (This links to a PDF.)]

 

There thus appears to be no more substantiality to them than this.

 

 

Figure Four: Force Fields And Iron Filings

 

Here, for example, is how The Encyclopedia Britannica defines a field:

 

"Field, in physics, a region in which each point has a physical quantity associated with it. The quantity could be a number, as in the case of a scalar field such as the Higgs field, or it could be a vector, as in the case of fields such as the gravitational field, which are associated with a force. Objects fall to the ground because they are affected by the force of Earth's gravitational field (see gravitation). A paper clip, placed in the magnetic field surrounding a magnet, is pulled toward the magnet, and two like magnetic poles repel each other when one is placed in the other's magnetic field. An electric field surrounds an electric charge; when another charged particle is placed in that region, it experiences an electric force that either attracts or repels it. The strength of a field, or the forces in a particular region, can be represented by field lines; the closer the lines, the stronger the forces in that part of the field." [Quoted from here; accessed 19/05/2026. Links in the original; bold emphasis added.]

 

This is how one University Physics Department defined a field:

 

"A field is a representation of what is going on in a region of space. It's defined as a function that takes a point in space and returns either a scalar (a number) or a vector (a number and a direction). Fields that are functions that return scalars are called scalar fields. You can see an example of a scalar field when you open a weather app and look at a map showing the temperatures in different locations. Fields that are functions that return vectors are called vector fields. Gravitational, electric, and magnetic fields are all examples of vector fields. We often call them just fields for short, as we care about vector fields more often than scalar fields in introductory physics. These fields can show us regions of space in which a mass or a charge within this space experiences a non-contact force. We can represent a field using vectors in a field diagram, and in the case of gravitational, electric, and magnetic fields, we can use fields to figure out forces on objects." [Quoted from here; accessed 16/06/2026. Links in the original; paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]

 

And this is how one Philosopher of Science defines a field:

 

"A particular field is represented by an assignment of number (or, if the relevant quantities have direction, vectors) to each point of space at each moment of time." [Dainton (2001), p.355.]

 

In that case, a field is just a set of numbers or vectors. In other words, a field is little more than how bodies (such as iron filings), instruments or other measuring devices behave in certain regions of space. In that case, it might prove rather difficult to explain how one set of numbers (or even one set of vectors) can affect another set of numbers (or vectors) in any physically meaningful sense, and hence provide a materialist depiction of a 'dialectical contradiction' -- which, given this reading of DM, turns out to rely on non-physical foundations (such as numbers and/or directions recorded by a set of instruments)!

 

So, if by "force field" we mean the mathematical structures postulated by Contemporary Physicists, they can't affect one another, for they aren't physical. They certainly affect the theorists in question, those who do the calculations or draw the diagrams, but that is about the extent of their physical contact with anything in this world.

 

[That topic was covered in more detail in Interlude Two, and will be again, below.]

 

Anyway, as we have seen, the nature of the UO here clearly depends on what is meant by "opposite" and "unity". North and South poles aren't united in the sense that they are one (as DM-theorists would be among the first to acknowledge). They are connected in the sense that they 'depend' on each other. But, this 'dependence' is causal, not logical. Magnetism is the result of the vector configuration of the 'motion' and 'spin' of electrons. There is nothing in nature that logically forces this physical interrelation on these poles (as, for example, the capitalist class supposedly 'implies' the proletariat, and vice versa). Indeed, the idea that such a configuration represents a 'dialectical'-UO is misconceived, since the 'forces' involved are the consequence of a vector field, which is no more 'contradictory' than your front and back are. And, as we have already seen, it isn't easy to see how vectors can be interpreted as 'contradictory', or, indeed, seen as UOs.

 

Moreover, in ferromagnetic substances, the magnetic field is built up by the cooperative alignment of individual magnetic moments (perhaps illustrating the fundamentally cooperative nature of reality, once again, created by all those helpful 'dialectical tautologies' we met elsewhere in this Essay). [For the benefit of those who might draw the wrong conclusion: I am being ironic here!]

 

Certainly, given Engels's use of the term "force" (whether forces themselves are interpreted realistically, or positivistically as a "useful fiction"), this is a disappointingly poor example of a DM-UO. It is follows from a particular sort of mathematical analysis (i.e., it is based on the alignment of electrons, which orients the vector field that aligns the direction of the magnetic field). Calling this a UO would be to substitute an obscure metaphor for a clear mathematical description, but for no explanatory gain.

 

Of course, there is no UO here anyway, since the field in question is the result of one sort of cause, the electron, which is a single, charged elementary particle (or wave?) that isn't itself a UO. (That DM-busting fact has already been established here and here.)

 

In relation to this, it is worth asking: Do the following arrows form a DM-UO? But that is how we picture vectors (especially those associated with magnetic fields).

 

→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→

 

Figure Five: A 'Dialectical Tautology'?

 

 

Figure Six: Where's Waldo? Where Exactly Is The DM-UO?

 

Naturally, deflationary conclusions like these will satisfy few DM-fans since those conclusions depend on a non-standard view of the nature of mathematical 'objects' (i.e., concerning vectors, matrices, manifolds, dimensions, abstract spaces, etc., etc.). Hence, in response it could be argued that mathematics in fact reflects what is objectively out there in the world. That is because it has been abstracted from nature by the human mind as a result of the practical activity of our species and our social development -- or so the story goes. This means that mathematics presents us with an abstract representation of reality.

 

[Chapter Sixteen of Woods and Grant (1995/2007) contains a classic (but nonetheless confused) version of that idea. Because of its influence, I will be devoting a special Essay to that (execrable) book, which will be posted at this site (as Essay Seven Part Two) at some point in the future.]

 

However, that interpretation of mathematics is seriously mistaken. Mathematics can't be a description of the world (nor an 'abstraction' from it) for reasons rehearsed in Essay Three Parts One and Two and Essay Thirteen Part One (as well as earlier). Mathematics is based on systems of concepts that aren't causally inter-linked. The concepts that mathematicians construct do not exercise any sort of causal influence on material bodies; nor do they 'correspond' to anything in reality that could conceivably so behave, unlike material bodies and processes that both can and do. [On that, see here and here.]

 

Mathematical propositions and theorems yield neither an abstract nor a concrete picture of reality. That is because they aren't pictures to begin with -- nor could they be. They express rules for the manipulation of certain symbols that licence inferences we make about objects and events in nature and society (or, indeed, purely in a formal system). At best, they set up complex analogies and models that assist in our understanding of structures and processes in the material world.

 

The development of Field Theory since Maxwell's day doesn't alter that interpretation in any way. Vector and scalar fields are typically built into mathematical models that not only enable scientists to study nature, they assist in the derivation and interpretation of the empirical consequences of hypotheses and theories. To imagine otherwise (to suppose that mathematics is an abstract description or picture of the world -- i.e., that it 'reflects' the world in an 'abstract' or 'formal' mode) would reduce its structures to absurdity. For example, it would imply that, say, a vector field -- in reality -- is actually composed of, or 'reflects', a set of infinitely thin and infinitely strong wire-like curves, or curve segments (of mysterious composition and provenance) that aren't actually made of anything. Or, that a scalar field really is, or 'reflects', an invisible array of real numbers 'floating' in (abstract?) space -- or, worse still, that it is an infinite n-dimensional set of dimensionless connected, dense but disjoint points (which can't themselves physically exist -- since they have no shape (circular, spherical, or otherwise), or they wouldn't be points, or even volume intervals) --, and so on.

 

Such an approach might try to picture, for instance, a mathematical point as an 'infinitely small dot' -- or it somehow 'reflects' one such in 'reality' -- if it helps mathematicians/scientists make appropriate inferences, but, as already noted, a dot, no matter how small, has a shape (which is circular to normal vision, irregular under a microscope), otherwise it would vanish or cease to exist. [An abstract 'dot' could reflect nothing in 'reality' if that were the case.] But no mathematical point has a shape, circumference, radius, diameter, or even a centre. What then can a mathematical point possibly share with anything physical in the universe? What can it possibly 'reflect'? More-or-less the same can be said about all other mathematical structures. In that case, what can mathematical points, lines or surfaces possibly be abstracted from, or be a generalisation of, if they share absolutely nothing with the material points, lines, or surfaces they supposedly represent or 'reflect'? Of course, at this point (no pun intended), abstractionists go suspiciously quiet. And that isn't just because they have nothing with which to work.

 

Here is a comment I left on Quora a few years ago, aimed at those who think mathematics is some sort of 'abstract picture of reality' (slightly edited):

 

Clearly, a mathematical point has no shape, circumference, diameter or radius -- they aren't even circular or have a centre! Nor are they containers, so no other point can 'occupy' them. Otherwise they'd be volume intervals, not points.

 

We sometimes say lines are 'made of points', but that can't literally be so or they'd fall apart rather quickly (and they would be rather bumpy, like a string of pearls) -- since there is no 'mathematical' force to hold those points together. Lines are also perfectly strong and rigid, they neither age nor begin to fray at the edges -- and yet they can be easily cut or intersected by other lines and planes, as well as bent into any shape we please by a suitable homeomorphism. But even then the original line is still there in 'mathematical space', 'unbent', so that someone else can use it as many times as they like and for whatever mathematical purpose they choose -- as can any number of other mathematicians, and they can all do so at the same time. They don't need to form a queue.

 

Lines are supposed to intersect other lines at a 'common point', but if neither line is made of points, they can't have 'common points', can they? How then do they intersect? And if planes aren't made of points, either -- otherwise we could ask the same questions about them as those above about lines --, how can a line intersect a plane at a 'common point'? Furthermore, planes can't be made of lines (or they'd be like an array of really thin knitting needles with nothing to 'hold them together'); and if that is so, planes can't intersect at a 'common line', either.

 

Furthermore, there are no 'perfect circles', since there are no mathematical circles to begin with. If there were, we might well ask where they exist, and what their size or thickness is -- or even what they are made of. Are they solid, or do they have a big hole in the middle, like a rarefied polo mint, with an extremely thin non-minty rim? The same goes for rectangles, squares, cubes, cones, ellipses, spheres, ellipsoids, paraboloids…

 

As [the original Quora] answerer rightly says, we mathematicians deal with 'objects’ that not only do not exist, they can't exist, and not just in real life -- but, anywhere. They soon exhibit contradictory properties when we think otherwise or we confuse them with physical objects. But are they even 'non-physical' objects, or, indeed, 'objects' of any sort? If they were 'non-physical', how could they be perfectly rigid, for example? Is a line comprised of 'non-physical' points? And how does that hold together? What exactly are 'non-physical points', anyway? They, too, have no shape, circumference, or centre. They, too, aren't containers, otherwise they'd be 'non-physical volume intervals'! If that is so, no other 'non-physical point' can occupy them, either.

 

Much of traditional analytic and differential geometry, as well as topology, will need to be re-written if we are to free them of such crude interpretations, and, indeed, avoid such awkward questions. [That is if we regard mathematics as a picture of 'reality', or we view 'reality' as fundamentally mathematical.]

 

The above approach to mathematical 'objects' and 'processes' confuses mathematics with physical science -- and physicists return the compliment with interest by treating the universe as a mathematical object in its own right. Hence all those 'worm holes', 'parallel universes', 'branched' time zones, 'warped spacetime', 'branes' -- and, of course, the 'paradoxes' of 'time travel'. No wonder physicists face insuperable problems explaining 'force', 'energy', 'space' and 'time' -- not to mention all those particles that seem to be wave and particle, can be in two places at once and can 'pop into existence' whenever they feel the urge.

 

And such problems don't stop there; the 'paradoxes' of number theory (and, indeed, set theory) also arise from viewing even them as if they were physical objects or collections of some sort.

 

Of course, this means that there are no viable versions of mathematical Platonism, which theory positively invites such awkward questions.

 

And that also goes for 'bargain basement' Platonism — i.e., 'Mathematical Realism'.

 

Added on edit: You can see this confusion spreading through many of the comments in this thread as Quorans, for example, try to work out the 'pressure' exerted by a mathematical sphere (!!) (as if such objects are subject to gravity, or any other force!), or when they make comments about the size (!!) of a mathematical point. If it had any size, it wouldn't be a mathematical point, for goodness sake, whatever else it was. They are still conflating mathematical objects with physical objects, hence their irresolvable puzzlement, the 'contradictions' this generates, and all those inexplicable 'infinities' that so 'effortlessly' emerge from nowhere.

 

[The above does not deny that mathematical lines, for instance, are 'made of points', or that planes are 'made of lines', etc., only that any attempt to picture them as actual, or physical-like, objects, which supposedly 'reflect reality', or which have been 'abstracted from reality', when they share nothing with anything in the material world, leads to the sort of absurdities outlined above. Nor is it to suggest that sophisticated mathematicians view the objects and structures they study in the above crude way -- although a case could be made that Platonists and Mathematical Realists rather too often stray in that direction when they try to popularise their ideas (Max Tegmark being an excellent example of this foible, but there are many others).]

 

Furthermore, if abstractionism were true, no two mathematicians would, or could, agree with each other. Indeed, if abstractionism were true, mathematicians would be able to dispense with all those useless definitions, theorems, lemmas and proofs, and just brain scan each other.

 

[On Maxwell, cf., Buchwald (1985); on mathematics, as it features in Physics, see Morrison (2000), pp.62-108. In addition, the last chapter of Harré and Madden (1976) is also relevant. Other literature related to this topic has been listed here. More has been added to several later Essays concerning the nature of mathematics and 'mathematical objects', for instance, this. See also here.]

 

But, even if DM-theorists were correct about the nature of mathematics, it would still fail to explain how, for example, the arrows from earlier could possibly form part of a UO. Again: this is how mathematicians represent vectors on the page, white board or screen (but, of course, not always arranged in a single line!):

 

→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→

 

Figure Seven: Is This Still A 'Dialectical Tautology'?

 

So, even if mathematical objects and structures were 'abstractions from reality', or they 'reflect' what exists in the physical world, DM-theorists would still owe their readers an explanation of exactly how the above arrows constitute a UO.

 

Indeed, it would be as ridiculous to regard the above alignment as a UO as it would be to regard a column of ants as a UO if they were all marching in the same direction.

 

 

Figure Eight: Anti-Dialectics?

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Examples like those considered prior to Interlude Six illustrate the fact that forces aren't rigidly fixed as permanent opposites, nor are they always oppositional, even when they act as opposites (or they are aligned along the same line-of-action, but at 180ş to one another). Hence, it isn't easy to see how viewing forces only as polar oppositional pairs could accommodate this widely instantiated property of natural forces.

 

In that case, this is unwelcome news, since little 'dialectical' sense can be given to the idea that opposites can switch in this way.41

 

Of course, that remark itself could very well be regarded as a serious interpretive blunder given the fact that universal change is a core DM-precept. But, the point being made above was specifically targeted at the theory that all change is a consequence of an interplay between polar opposites. Clearly, if polar opposites can combine in a way that results in their augmenting one another, the term "opposite" can't fail to lose its 'dialectical bite'. [An actual example of this was given earlier.] If change can occur as a result of 'opposites' that don't work as 'opposites' (still less as "polar" opposites), in any ordinary sense of that term, then this particular DM-'law' stands in real danger of violating the dialectical equivalent of 'The Metaphysical Trades Description Act'.

 

If the picture is now widened to encompass HM, and if, for example, we consider the operation of "opposing" forces in the class war, it isn't easy to see how, say, one social force could switch around in the way that forces operating in nature manifestly can and do. Is it possible, therefore, for the capitalist class to swap sides (as a class force -- not as individual members of that class) to augment workers' battles in the latter's interests and on their terms? Admittedly, the detailed structure of, and the processes within, the class war are complex; elements from each side may detach themselves (or be detached), and can work against their own (misperceived) class interests on a temporary or even semi-permanent basis, but that isn't something upon which revolutionaries can or should rely -- still less ought they to trust in the outcome. If they were to do this, it would clearly encourage reformism and centrism, let alone invite defeat, or something far worse. Even at the margin (where whole class forces aren't involved), switches are sporadic. We only have to look at what happened in the Chinese Revolution of 1926-27 to see what disasters result from trusting forces aligned with the class enemy.

 

[I don't expect Marxist-Leninists to accept the analysis of that revolution developed in the article to which I have linked above, but to get the point they only have to think about how they might explain what happened to Stalin's legacy in the former Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern Block after 1953, or what has taken place in China since Mao passed away. Overt or covert opposing forces cannot be relied on -- to state the 'bleeding obvious'!]

 

But, such things occur all the time in nature. Hence, the crude analogy that attempts to relate 'opposite forces' to 'contradictions' at work in DM is, at best, useless when imported into, and then applied in, HM.

 

Again, it could be objected here that the above is a gross distortion since the sort of phenomena mentioned are consistent with DM. Dialectical Marxists themselves reject the idea that there are fixed and unchanging forces in nature. Hence, the recognition that forces can change and operate in 'opposite directions' is one of DM's strengths not one of its weaknesses.

 

Or, so it could be maintained...

 

However, if it achieves nothing else, the above volunteered, pro-DM response succeeds in at least one respect, it helps focus on what has been a recurring problem throughout this site: DM is so vague and equivocal that it is impossible to say with any certainty, let alone with any clarity or finality, what its implications are --, or even if it has any. Under close examination, the theory that 'dialectical contradictions' in nature can be viewed as 'opposing forces' has turned out to mean that they might not actually oppose one anther -- indeed, according to Engels, the concept of a force could simply be a convenient shorthand for relative motion. It now seems even that is incorrect, for oppositional forces may actually augment one another, but only if they aren't viewed as shorthand for the relative motion of bodies! And, as if to cap it all, we have just discovered they can't even be 'dialectical opposites'!

 

As a result, it is impossible to decide which of these DM-type forces are genuine opposites (or which are even polar opposites -- that is, if any are), or distinguish those that are opposites from those that aren't. But, if every force can work in any manner whatsoever, it becomes deeply problematic why only some are depicted as opposites, others aren't. What actual work does the word "opposite" do if it is so easily ignored, or its apparent consequences are so often nullified? And, what has become of the AR-typology Engels regarded as fundamental?

 

Given such vague and ambiguous language, little meaning can be attributed to a single DM-concept (in this area); still less to the idea that 'dialectical forces' operate anywhere in nature.

 

Imagine a Chemist, for instance, who identified an element as having just so many protons in its nucleus, except it didn't really have that number of protons, and those protons weren't really protons, and the element rarely if ever had a nucleus, and anyway it wasn't an element to begin with! Suppose further that this chemist claimed that she knew what she was talking about (even if no one else did) because she was an expert player of the 'Nixon Card' -- and, as such, was skilled in the art of "grasping contradictions" as and when that was required --, but which lack of 'flexibility', compounded by a slavish adherence to 'formal concepts', prevents her critics from seeing the 'truth' not only for what it is but exactly as she sees it.

 

Few, I think, would take her seriously. I suggest the same judgement should also be reserved for Dialectical Marxists whenever they try to tell the rest of us that 'dialectical contradictions' can be interpreted as 'opposing forces'.

 

Unfortunately, such vague and confused 'contradictions' simply provide more grist for the DM-mill to work on, but this isn't something about which Dialectical Marxists should feel a atom of pride. If Capitalists (as a social force), for example, can indeed operate in such a contradictory manner, who is to say whether a revolution is necessary to overthrow them? Perhaps -- as result of yet another 'dialectical inversion' -- that class enemy could become the strongest, most reliable ally of the working class? In such a topsy-turvy, 'dialectical universe' anything might happen. Capitalism might be reformed away; Imperialists could lead the fight against oppression; the Nazi's might one day help bring about 'racial' harmony; the Ku Klux Klan might even lend their whole-hearted support to Black Lives Matter. Who knows? The ruling-class might even overthrow itself42

 

If it is a central postulate of a theory like DM that 'contradictions' are 'oppositional forces', and that they themselves are capable of  changing in 'contradictory' ways to become 'non-oppositional', then reformism, centrism, class collaboration (and the prospect of having the Fascists (etc.) as our best allies) can't be ruled out. On the other hand, if these 'possibilities' are to be rejected -- as surely they must! -- then the importation of such 'contradictory' DM-nostrums into HM must be resisted no less emphatically.

 

In fact, as we will see in Essay Nine Part Two, class collaborationists have indeed argued along the above lines. For example, as noted above, the supposedly 'contradictory' nature of the Kuomintang 'allowed' the CCP 'justify' the formation of an alliance with them. DM also supplied the -- shall we say -- flexible theoretical atmosphere that 'allowed' the Stalinist regime to enter into a pact with the Nazis, which then helped rationalise such treachery in the face of the communist movement world-wide. As we will also see, this contradictory theory, DM, can be, and has been, used to defend whatever is deemed expedient or opportune, and its opposite -- often by the very same Dialectical Marxist, in the very next breath, sentence or paragraph!

 

Of course, it could be argued that the type of forces that operate in history are vastly more complex than those we find in nature, so the above analogy with natural forces (and the KKK, etc., etc.) is completely misguided, especially when applied in the crude manner we have just witnessed.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

Unfortunately, if that rebuttal were itself apposite, or even accurate, it would still be misleading to describe 'oppositional' natural-, and social-forces as 'contradictory', for if, according to the above pro-DM rebuttal, the analogy between 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions' is inapt, it is inapt. End of story.

 

Clearly, any such admission would amount to the abandonment of this unhelpful analogy in its entirety -- i.e., that 'dialectical contradictions' may be interpreted as 'oppositional forces' -- anywhere, in any shape whatesoever.43

 

Nevertheless, even if all of the above criticisms turn out to be completely misguided, there are other, far more fundamental, reasons for ruling-out the identification of 'opposing forces' with 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

It is to them that I now turn.

 

A Contradictory Theory?

 

'Literal Forces' In Opposition

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

The above objections to classical versions of DM were largely aimed at demonstrating that the analogy often drawn between 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions' seriously mis-fired. Despite this, it could be countered that none of that material affects the fact that the identification of 'opposing forces' with 'dialectical contradictions' is meant to be taken literally, not figuratively.

 

Or so it might be maintained...

 

In response, it is worth pointing out that despite the key role it plays in DM, the precise details underlying a literal connection between 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions' have never actually been worked-out or even specified by a single Dialectical Marxist! Those who have made it this far, and have read the other Essays published at this site will no doubt find that claim unsurprising. Indeed, that is why DM was labelled Mickey Mouse Science and Minnie Mouse Philosophy in Essay Seven Part One.

 

[Anyone who thinks differently, and can show where this aspect of DM -- the equation of 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions' -- has ever been set out in detail (on a par with that found in this Essay), is invited to email me with the information.]

 

One reason for this gaping hole in their core theory might be that DM-theorists consider this identification to be so obvious, so clear and straight-forward, that the specifics either don't matter or they are deemed so trivial that they warrant no further explanation. On the other hand, it might also turn out to be the case that nothing could have been said in this regard, which would more obviously explain the deafening silence over the last century-and-a-half. Indeed, as will soon become apparent, that does appear to be the reason. As we are about to discover, this long-term silence/omission isn't the least bit surprising: the connection between 'opposing forces' and 'dialectical contradictions' turns out to be entirely illusory, howsoever it is configured, re-packaged or spun.

 

In order to substantiate those rather bold claims it might help if we back-track a little. Part of the argument in favour of the identification of 'opposing forces' with 'dialectical contradictions' at first seemed to depend on an analogy drawn between literal contradictions and conflict, a view that was a clear call-back to ancient, animistic theories concerning the origin of all forms of conflict, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here). In the Ancient World, conflict was located in, or it was attributed to, the activities and antics of the 'gods' and/or other invisible, personified forces at work 'behind the scenes' or 'beneath appearances'.

 

Unfortunately, for religious mystics, ordinary, everyday contradictions simply report or express what turn out to be boring, verbal wrangles, which can, in certain circumstances, look oppositional. When one person asserts "p", and another person denies it (or asserts "not p", where "p" stands for a spoken token indicative sentence), then, at least, at the level of discourse, some sort of opposition sometimes seems to be implied (but on that, see here). So, analogously, it seemed to some that a 'contradiction' in nature signals, or even reveals, the existence of real material opposition -- but, alas, this move only proved plausible to those who were happy to fetishise and thereby alienate social relations (i.e., those expressed in and by language) as if they represented real relations in nature, or even 'Reality Itself'.

 

[In Essay Twelve Part Four this ancient projection onto nature of human and linguistic categories will be labelled "The RRT" -- "The Reverse Reflection Theory". Until that Essay is published (sometime in 2027), the RRT has been very briefly explained here.]

 

Nevertheless, DM-theorists view real, 'material contradictions' as their primary concern; verbal wrangles are only of peripheral interest. Having said that, many Dialectical Marxists refer their readers to the origin of 'the dialectic' in the verbal wrangles recorded in Plato's dialogues. Here are just a few examples:

 

"In his Phänomenologie des Geistes [Hegel] compares human life with dialogue, in the sense that under the pressure of experience our views gradually change, as happens to the opinions of disputants participating in a discussion of a profound intellectual nature. Comparing the course of development of consciousness with the progress of such a discussion, Hegel designated it by the word dialectics, or dialectical motion. This word had already been used by Plato, but it was Hegel who gave it its especially profound and important meaning." [Plekhanov (1917), p.601. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature...." [Stalin (1976b), p.836. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Let us inquire into the sources of dialectics in antiquity. Why was it that in antiquity man had already come upon the foundations of the dialectical method of thinking? 1. The old philosophers of nature, Heraclitus, Anaximander, etc., investigated the emergence and decline of the world. They thus had to arrive at the concept of the universal change and the universal motion of all things. I refer to Heraclitus especially. 2. Social relations, meditation on the form of the State, on religion, etc., stimulated the consideration of all things as changeful and self-contradictory. (This applies especially to Socrates, Plato, etc.) The immediate stimulus was that in public life contradictory viewpoints clashed one with another. Public life in Athens was a very lively affair. In the market-place discussions were constantly taking place concerning what is good and what is evil, how the State should be constituted, etc. One said A, another Not-A. This was true of all things in public and private life. From this there ultimately developed an art of conversation, and this art of conversation became the source of the art of dialectics. Dialectics was originally called the art of discourse because it grew out of discourse." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.98-99. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"This consideration enables us to understand the original meaning of the term 'dialectics.' The word is derived from the Greek dialego, meaning to discuss or debate. It was considered that to discuss a question from all sides, and from all angles, allowing different one-sided points of view to oppose and contradict each other during the debate, was the best method of arriving at the truth. Such was the dialectics employed, for example, by Socrates. When anyone claimed to have a formula which answered some questions once and for all, Socrates would enter into discussion with him and, by forcing him to consider the question from different angles, would compel him to contradict himself and so to admit that his formula was false. By this method Socrates considered that it was possible to arrive at more adequate ideas about things." [Cornforth (1976), pp.60-61. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

"For the Greeks, the word dialectic meant an exchange of ideas; in Plato, it was used to mean a dialogue in which opposing positions interacted so that the truth emerged to the greatest possible degree. Hegel, who was interested in the formulation of a philosophy of history, used the dialectic to explain the historical process as the unfolding and coming to self-consciousness of the Idea of Freedom." [Curtis (1997), p.175. Bold emphasis alone added.] 

 

"Elaborated first by the Greek philosophers (dialego – I debate), dialectics remained something of an intellectual curiosity, a philosophical cul-de-sac, particularly when religious beliefs dominated." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Dialectics is derived from the Greek word 'dialego' which means to discourse or debate. Many of the old Greek philosophers were dialecticians like, Aristotle and Plato. Heraclitus formulated masterpieces of dialectic. Plato used the 'dialectical method' in his dialogues, whereas Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic intellect among these philosophers, investigated the most essential forms of dialectical thought." [Quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Dialectics was initially a particular kind of dialogue invented in Ancient Greece in which two or more people holding different points of view about a subject seek to establish the truth of the matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments.... Today dialectics denotes a mode of cognition which recognizes the most general laws of motion, contradiction and new development. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by exposing the contradictions in arguments of opponents and overcoming these contradictions. They thought that the clash of opinions was the best method of eventually getting to the truth." [Quoted from here. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The word dialectics refers to a method of intellectual discussion by dialogue. It is a term of logic. The meaning of dialectics is the conflict between two mutually opposite forces or tendencies. According to the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) it referred to the art of deputation by question and answer." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added]

 

Even so, the theory that there are 'contradictions', even 'dialectical contradictions', in nature and society is still plainly analogical. The human race was certainly aware that (everyday) contradictions often involved verbal wrangles well before they were informed (by Hegel) that there were any such in nature. In that case, Hegel's argument must have proceeded from the social to the natural world, which is indeed what the history of the subject reveals: 'Hegelian dialectics' didn't exist in pre-historic times (nor even before the 18th century -- although there were earlier precursors of his ideas -- a few of which have been itemised here, several more here and here), even though humans have been arguing and contradicting one another for countless centuries.43a Hence, social interaction of this sort clearly takes precedence. In Hegel's hands, this meant 'contradictions' had to be analogically projected onto nature and society, not read from it. Dialectical Marxists subsequently relied on his analogy -- i.e., the one drawn between the way human beings often argue or verbally wrangle and the way conflict seems to occur in the natural and social world. Unfortunately, this makes the interpretation of 'opposing forces' as 'dialectical contradictions' depend on analogical and figurative language, leaving non-believers perplexed with absolutely no clue what literal meaning -- if any -- could possibly be attributed to this way of re-configuring conflict. Even to this day, we are still in the dark about the material grounding that DM-theorists assume underpins their idiosyncratic, analogical use of the word "contradiction". Labelling them "dialectical" in no way helps resolve this difficulty, but in the eyes of DM-fans that word clearly operates like "abracadabra" does in stage magic shows. Wave that word around and the highly receptive, DM-faithful nod their heads sage agreement, no further questions asked.

 

While critics are still in the dark, so are Dialectical Marxists, since they all struggle to explain themselves, as this Essay and several others have shown.

 

[Of course, it could be argued that conflict in nature existed long before human beings invented language or formed social structures that enabled verbal wrangles (and other forms of social conflict) to develop. I have tackled that proffered pro-DM response here.]

 

We certainly have a much clearer grasp of the role of contradictions in language -- and arguably also in Logic --, but we have none at all when it comes to those that allegedly occur in nature -- or, indeed, those that supposedly litter class-divided societies --, as we are about to discover.

 

Having said that, there is this minimal consideration in favour of the application of DM to society: 'contradictions' in capitalism, for example, are based on the presumed fact that certain concepts (or what they supposedly 'reflect') are 'dialectically inter-linked'. For instance, the capitalist class not only implies the working class (the proletariat), and vice versa, neither class can exist without the other, so we are told. [Although, I have thrown that clichéd inference into considerable doubt here.] Hence, these two classes are said to be 'dialectically-united opposites', 'interpenetrating' one another (or so the story goes, once again). But, as we have discovered, there is nothing in the natural world that enjoys this sort of 'logical' inter-connection. Indeed, as we have seen, not even the opposite poles of a magnet, or positive and negative charges in atomic theory and electrodynamics can be viewed this way -- even though both perhaps constitute the best (and only) two examples of this phenomenon (allegedly) in the natural world, regularly hauled out of the DM-box-of-tricks by Dialectical Marxists. In that case, the application of DM to the non-social world is, at best, figurative and non-literal -- which interpretation, as we found out in the first half of this Essay, won't wash either.

 

Nevertheless, the above considerations would at least account for the figurative way that 'dialectical contradictions' continually surface in DM (and are seriously over-hyped in HM!) -- and why Dialectical Marxists regularly conflate these social and material examples.44

 

Once more, even if we were to ignore this latest problem, one thing is clear: for DM-theorists verbal contradictions represent perhaps the least significant, least interesting, least relevant form of opposition. Changes in nature and society are (for them) the result of much more fundamental 'contradictions' than those occasioned by the mere gainsaying of another person's words. In some cases, of course, discursive contradictions -- verbal wrangles -- might turn out be a 'reflection' of deeper-seated conflicts in society, but it still remains the case that the latter are of far greater interest to Dialectical Marxists.

 

However, when this 'neat' DM-picture is examined a little more closely, it completely disintegrates.

 

The Revenge Of The Non-Existent

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism; DL = Dialectical Logic; FL = Formal Logic.]

 

As has already been pointed out, DM-theorists have so far failed to offer a clear account of the precise nature of the connection between 'dialectical contradictions' and 'opposing forces' that their theory both postulates and requires. In which case, once again, this will have to be done for them!45

 

Presumably, when Dialectical Marxists claim that 'contradictions' are represented in nature by 'opposing forces' they have something like the following in mind (if they but knew it):45a

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2, taken pair-wise respectively from each set, form oppositional couples.46

 

[Here, the content of C1 could include any other local or remote forces and/or processes operating in the system. Alternatively, the forces themselves may even be 'edited out' along the lines envisaged by Engels (as a sort of shorthand for relative motion, etc.). In addition, all the internal "mediations" between these forces, events and processes in the "Totality" (T) may also be incorporated at any point. Other 'dialectical' caveats and protocols could, of course, be stirred into the pot if and when they are deemed necessary or appropriate. ("Disjoint" means that no element of one set belongs to the other set; they are mutually exclusive sets. Why that is a necessary assumption will be explained presently.)]

 

In ordinary terms, F6-F9 are saying this: Consider two 'oppositional forces' operating in nature: the first force produces certain effects that prove to be the opposite of the effects the second force would have produced had the first not been operating. It is worth re-emphasising this point: the second force's effects are prevented from occurring by the operation of the first force, which (obviously) means they either do not exist or fail to take place.

 

[Whether or not this captures what DM-theorists think they mean by their equation of 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' will become the subject of much of the rest of this Essay, where every conceivable alternative interpretation, combination and re-configuration will be taken into account.]

 

It is also worth emphasising that P1 and P2 must operate 'independently' in C1.47 This seems to be an essential assumption so that sets E1 and E2 may be disjoint themselves -- and so that some sort of comprehensive, non-trivial change actually results from this.

 

[If this weren't the case, several elements of either set might prove to be changeless, which seems to run contrary to the DM-theory that everything is constantly changing. This is quite apart from the fact that the elements of each set can hardly be the opposite of elements of the other set if those sets themselves aren't disjoint. Anyway, later on, alternative possibilities will be considered, such as: (a) The above sets aren't disjoint, and (b) There is a 'dialectical interaction' between elements of one of the sets and the opposing force.]

 

Having said that, it looks like mutual exclusivity was a condition Marx himself required, at least in connection with the following:

 

"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed. No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx and Engels (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [
Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]

 

If factors like these mentioned by Marx are "mutually exclusive", it isn't easy to see why that wouldn't also be the case with the elements of the above two sets -- E1 and E2.

 

Admittedly, this qualification (i.e., that P1 or P2 must operate 'independently' in C1) runs foul of the idea that everything in the "Totality" (T) is inter-linked, but we can circumvent that untoward consequence by modifying the stated condition to something like "relative independence" -- a verbal sleight-of-hand often used throughout the DM-literature, where the word "relative" seems to work like a universal solvent when attached to other words like "truth", "knowledge", and even "inter-connected" itself. Naturally, that would mean several other comments in this part of the Essay (originally aimed at trying to make this aspect of DM clear -- and for the very first time ever!) would become rather too vague by default. However, as will readily be appreciated, a 'theory' like this -- beset as it is on all sides by internally-generated fog, further aggravated by its supporters continually lobbing metaphysical smoke bombs in its general direction -- will always resist any attempt to dispel the Stygian Gloom in which it is permanently engulfed. Anyway, the 'independence' clause needn't suggest a CAR-like scenario since it could form part of the 'dialectical development' of new forces and processes as C1 and the rest of T 'develop'. Naturally, this simplifying assumption can be modified at a later stage, if or when the need arises.

 

The first problem with this attempt to explain what DM-theorists might mean by their equation of 'opposing forces' with 'dialectical contradictions' centres on the term "opposites" in F9. Something a little more precise than merely speaking about "opposites" seems to be required in order for DL to surpass FL in its ability to account for change and development, etc.48

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2, taken pair-wise respectively from each set, form oppositional couples.

 

Unfortunately, the difficulty here lies in seeing whether even this minimal condition is actually implied by F6-F9, and whether the rather weak concept of an "opposite" is capable of bearing all the weight usually placed on it. The factors mentioned in F6-F9 can't be 'dialectical opposites', anyway, since they don't imply one another. As we have seen several times with respect to other presumed 'opposites', effects can (and, in this case, actually do) exist independently of one another -- unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or so we have been told. Hence, whatever else they are, the factors mentioned in F9 aren't 'interpenetrated opposites', which means they can't be 'dialectical opposites', either.

 

[I have resisted the temptation to represent E1 and E2 propositionally since I want to concentrate on real material opposites rather than their (supposed) linguistic correlates. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling, once again, that in FL two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false at once. They (necessarily) have opposite truth-values. One implication of this condition is that the claim that two allegedly contradictory states of affairs could both exist at the same time (expressed by two supposedly true 'contradictory' propositions) must rest either on a mis-description or on an un-discharged ambiguity --, or even, of course, on an anthropomorphic projection of logical categories onto nature. Logical complexities like those will be analysed in more detail in a later sub-section -- indeed, as they already have been in Essay Five from a more general direction. They will be further examined in the following: Interlude Eleven, Essays Eight Part Three and Eleven Part One.]

 

However, independently of these (latest) 'difficulties', far more problematic is the fact that given F6-F9, it would be impossible to say what the 'contradictory' state-of-affairs here is meant to be, whether or not it turns out to be 'dialectical'.

 

That is because F6-F9 imply that E1 and E2 do not in fact obtain together, for if just one of P1 or P2 operates normally (i.e., if one of these forces is prevented from 'doing its thing' by the other force), only one of E1 or E2 will be instantiated.

 

Clearly, in such circumstances, there could be no 'contradiction' -- even if we were charitable enough to accept the usual vague and confused DM-'definition' of a 'dialectical contradiction'. That is because at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction wouldn't actually exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented from acting/existing by the operation of one or other of P1 and P2!49

 

Interlude Seven -- Further Complications

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; MECW = Marx and Engels Collected Works.]

 

Of course, the above conclusion (i.e., that at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction wouldn't actually exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented from occurring by the operation of one or other of P1 and P2) itself depends on the peculiar Hegelian doctrine that contradictions can somehow exist, extra-linguistically (as 'inter-connected objects and processes', etc.). However, if that thesis is abandoned, DM falls apart, anyway.

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2, taken pair-wise respectively from each set, form oppositional couples.

 

It could be objected that the disjunction of the effects of P1 and P2 (as in "E1 or E2", defining these two sets as mutually exclusive) completely distorts the picture. Indeed, it might be argued that what is missing here is an account of how P2 interacts with E1, which would itself be dialectical. [One variation on that (possible) scenario will be considered presently, others later on -- for example, in Interlude Nine.]

 

Admittedly, what hasn't been taken into consideration is the counter-claim that any change induced in E1 by its interaction with an 'opposing force' clearly implies that the theory that development is motivated by 'dialectical contradictions' -- modelled by 'opposing forces' -- actually turns out to be true.

 

Hence, it could be argued that the contradiction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes, say, E1a. In that case, and contrary to the above argument, we would have here genuinely real (i.e., existent) terms for a 'contradiction' to reflect, which clearly means we do have a concrete example of change through 'internal contradiction', vindicating Engels and other DM-theorists.

 

Or, so it might be maintained...

 

But, plainly, that would only be so because a decision had already been taken to describe these forces as "contradictory", when it hasn't yet been established whether that is an accurate, or even an appropriate, way to depict the relationship between them.

 

Nevertheless, ignoring even that rejoinder for now -- and as has already been emphasised -- what actually happens here is that the resultant of the above two forces is what causes the said change. If so, labelling this as 'change motivated by a dialectical tautology' would be far more accurate. [That particular alternative, among others, will be re-examined below.]

 

Moreover, even if the pro-DM-objection volunteered above were valid -- whereby the interaction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes E1a -- it would still be of little use to Dialectical Marxists. That is because, in this instance E1 itself will have been altered externally, and so change here wouldn't have been the result of E1's own 'internal contradictions'. That is because, as we have seen many times, the factors involved in the above scenario don't imply each other (or, rather, we still wait for the proof they do!), so they can't be 'internally-connected' in the way that the proletariat is supposedly 'internally related' to the capital class -- which means that neither class can exist without the other, these two classes supposedly implying one another. Hence, and for the nth time, whatever else this is, it can't be an example of 'dialectical change' through 'internal contradiction'.

 

Worse still, if this is to be the model for all DM-change, then no change whatsoever would be 'internally-generated'. We saw that problem recur throughout Part One of this Essay, where no matter how we tried to re-package DM, the result was always the same: if everything is "self-moving" (according to Lenin and several other DM-theorists, quoted in Part One), the universe must be populated by:

 

(i) Eternally changeless simples; or by,

 

(ii) Non-interacting systems.

 

On the other hand, if systems of forces actually change the objects internal to the system to which they belong, then, plainly, those objects can't be "self-moving". The volunteered anti-DM objection outlined above simply reproduced that fatal defect in a more abstract form.

 

[The terms, "system" and "simples" were also defined in Part One.]

 

Anyway, the above volunteered pro-DM-response will be tackled later in this Essay -- and in more detail below, in Interlude Nine.

 

That is quite apart from the fact that the DM-classics tell us that objects and processes change into that with which they have struggled, their 'dialectical opposites'. In that case, it seems that if a force, P1, alters E1 then -- if the DM-classics are to be believed -- E1 must change into P1, not E1a (and vice versa)!

 

Do forces really change into their effects? If they do, DM-fans have kept that rather important fact well hidden for over hundred and fifty years.

 

Since this Essay was originally written, a superficial attempt has in fact been published that at least tries to specify the precise nature of the link between 'oppositional forces' (or, to be more honest, oppositional "tendencies") and 'dialectical contradictions' -- i.e., Weston (2012).

 

Weston focuses on a (throw-away!) passage that appears in Volume One of Das Kapital. Here are two different translations (one offered by Weston himself, the other quoted from the published version), along with what I have said about it in Essay Nine Part One:

 

Tom Weston refers his readers to this passage from Das Kapital (I have quoted it as it appears in Weston's article first, and then as it has been rendered in MECW):

 

"We saw that the process of exchange of commodities includes relations that contradict and exclude one another. The development of the commodity does not overcome [aufhebt] these contradictions, but creates a form within which they can move themselves. This is in general the method through which real [wirkliche] contradictions solve [losen] themselves. It is a contradiction, for example, for one body to continuously fall into another, and just as constantly fly away from it. The ellipse is one of the forms of movement in which this contradiction is actualised [verwirklicht] just as much as it is solved [lost]." [Quoted in Weston (2012), pp.5-6. This links to a PDF; italic emphases in the original.]

 

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Marx and Engels (1996), p.113. This links to a PDF; italic emphases in the original.]

 

Weston takes exception to several of the translated phrases in the second of the above two passages, such as "it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another", on the grounds that:

 

"[T]he phrase 'it is a contradiction to depict' conveys an idea directly opposite to the assertions of the German text. The contradiction is not only in the depiction of elliptical motion; it is in the motion itself. This is the clear sense of the German text's assertions that the contradictions are 'real [wirklich]', are 'actualised [verwirklicht]', and that the sides of the contradiction are the two tendencies of motion that are mentioned, not their depictions." [Weston (2012), p.28. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

Weston must mean "not merely their depictions" in the last sentence above since it would seem reasonably clear that if a 'contradiction' is 'real' then its depiction can't fail to be contradictory, too.

 

Be that as it may, for this and other reasons, Weston clearly prefers the first translation to the second.

 

The following is also a passage from Weston's article we have already had occasion to quote in part, concerning the above obscure, off-the-cuff comment taken from Das Kapital, about the elliptical motion of planets around the Sun:

 

"As we saw above, an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two sides interfere with each other.... Although tendencies can interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest the following criterion is a sufficient condition for negativity of, or interference between, opposing tendencies A and B:

 

Tendency A, if strong enough, with cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely.  

 

"This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its actually flying away (a parabolic or a hyperbolic orbit [in that case, the last of these wouldn't be an orbit, just a trajectory, unless we count it as an orbit around a common centre of the galaxy -- RL]) if the tangential velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity. On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both may be partially realised." [Weston (2012), pp.17-18. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

I will return to this passage later in this Essay, in a section where I plan to discuss these and other possibilities in much greater detail. For present purposes it is sufficient to point out that:

 

(1) Just like other DM-theorists, Weston simply helps himself to the word "contradiction" with no attempt to justify its use in such circumstances, that is, over and above merely stipulating that these phenomena are to be so described. Plainly, this is a rather blatant attempt to foist this concept on nature (in defiance of what DM-fans constantly assure us they never do);

 

(2) We have already seen that "tendencies" aren't in any way causal, and can only be called forces by those with an agenda (which is, in this case, to foist this Hegelian mess on Marx!);

 

(3) Weston had to appeal to "tendencies" as an artificial way of trying to link these phenomena since "force" won't work here, nor will "inertia" (his other favoured word);

 

(4) Even if the DM-use of "contradiction" were justifiable, and had ever been justified(!), how can "less fully realised" be viewed as the equivalent of "dialectical contradiction"? Weston pointedly failed to say;

 

(5) Do these "tendencies" turn into each other? And how exactly do they "struggle" with one another? But they should do both if the DM-classics are to be believed; and finally,

 

(6) As we saw in Essay Nine Part One, Marx told us he was merely "coquetting" with Hegelianisms like this in Das Kapital. Hence, in conjunction with the points made above (and again below), no weight can be placed on a literal interpretation of Marx's use of Hegelian jargon in this passage.

 

So, and once again: whatever else it is, this relation can't be 'dialectical', either.

 

But what else could anyone expect of a throw-away line like this, with which Marx told us he was merely 'coquetting'?

 

It is also worth pointing out that Newton's First Law (which appears to be integral to Weston's attempt to defend the 'neo-Hegelian world-view' he hopes to foist on Marx) says nothing about "tendencies":

 

"Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon." [Quoted from here. Accessed 04/07/2016.]

 

Moreover, the Classical Law of Gravity [this links to a PDF] also fails to mention "tendencies":

 

"Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation states that any two objects exert a gravitational force of attraction on each other. The direction of the force is along the line joining the objects.... The magnitude of the force is proportional to the product of the gravitational masses of the objects, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them." [Quoted from here. Accessed 04/07/2016.]

 

"Newton's Law of gravitation: every particle attracts any other particle with a gravitational force whose magnitude is given by

 

F = G m1m2

         r2

"Here m1 and m2 are the masses of the particles, r is the distance between them, and G is the gravitational constant." [Halliday, et al (1993), p.412. Link added.]

 

Which means that Weston's theory clearly depends on a series of Persuasive Definitions -- or even Persuasive Re-descriptions. That is the only way he can even attempt to sell these regressive ideas to his readers.

 

[I have said more about Weston's 'argument', here, here, here, here and here.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Later on, I will examine the question whether E1 and E2 (from earlier), even though 'opposites', can legitimately be described as 'contradictory'. In what follows, I will simply assume they are.50

 

Prevention And Its Discontents

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

Despite this, it could be argued that the following propositions are all that DM-theorists really need (which, if some of the language is modified appropriately, appears to be analogous to Weston's attempt to make this doctrine a little less opaque):

 

F10: P1 prevents E2, and P2 prevents E1.

 

F11: Anything that prevents something else from happening contradicts it.50a

 

F12: Therefore, P1 and P2 contradict each other's effects.

 

[The above schematic letters were explained earlier -- P1 and P2 are opposing forces; E1 and E2 are sets of events that either of those two force prevents or could prevent.]

 

If so, plainly P1 and P2 fail to contradict one another, just each other's effects. In that case, it is far from clear whether or not DM-theorists (i.e., those intent on promoting the 'orthodox view' that 'opposing forces' 'contradict each other') will want to embrace F10-F12 too enthusiastically. It is also worth recalling an earlier fatal objection to this attempt to do CPR on this rapidly dying theory: we saw that, for example, when P1 prevents E2 it can't be contradicting it in a 'dialectical' sense of that word. That is because they don't imply one another and both can exist without the other (unlike the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which do imply one another, so we are told). Hence, whatever else this is, it, too, can't be a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

That anti-dialectical point remains (and will continue to remain) a fatal objection to this entire way of viewing 'dialectical contradictions' and 'opposing forces' -- an insurmountable obstacle we have met several times already in this Essay (and which we will meet several more times before this aspect of DM is finally 'sent to join the choir invisible' -- a saying popularised, but not invented, by the comedy sketch feature in Video Six).

 

Nevertheless, I will once again ignore this lethal defect so that other flaws in this theory may be highlighted. I will, however, introduce it again from time-to-to-time to remind the reader that DM is rather like the Monty Python Parrot: it is an ex-theory that has gone to meet its maker, killed by its own poisonous implications.

 

 

Video Six: DM -- As Dead As This Parrot?

 

Interlude Eight -- Tom Weston

 

[LOI = Law of Identity.]

 

Returning to consider F11, again:

 

F11: Anything that prevents something else from happening contradicts it.

 

Once more, this appears to be the line promoted in Weston (2012):

 

"Hegel distinguished contradiction from opposition by the category of negativity, which means, roughly, conflict of the opposite sides: 'Opposites...contain contradiction in so far as they relate to each other negatively in the same respect or are both mutually canceling...and indifferent to each other.' It is the negativity of a contradiction that is responsible for its key role in dialectical theory, that contradiction causes motion: 'The sides of a manifold only become active and lively against each other when they are driven to the peak of contradiction, and contradiction contains the negativity, which is the indwelling pulse of self-movement and liveliness.'... (p.12) [Weston is here quoting Hegel (1999), p.441, §960, but the published version posted on-line at the MIA renders this sentence slightly differently: 'Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each other and are indifferent to one another.' (Italic emphases in the original. In what follows I have used Weston's version (for reasons that will soon become apparent) - RL.]

 

"For  Marx as for Hegel, the main difference between opposition and contradiction is negativity, the internal activity of a contradiction.... (p.13)

 

["Negativity is an abstraction of conflict, not of the absence of something.... (Footnote p.13)]

 

"As we saw above, an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two sides interfere with each other. From Marx's brief comments, he appears to have thought that it is obvious that falling into a body and flying away from it are contradictory tendencies, but we can reinforce his conclusion. Although tendencies can interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest that the following criterion is a sufficient condition for negativity of, or interference between, opposing tendencies A and B:

 

Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely.

 

(α) "This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its actually flying away (a parabolic or hyperbolic orbit) if the tangential velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity. On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both may be partially realised.... (pp.17-18)

 

"A reasonable interpretation of increased intensity or sharpness of a contradiction is an increase in the mutual interference of the two sides. As the contradiction undergoes the fullest possible development and nears resolution, this interference is increased to such an extent that the two sides cannot coexist any longer, and one must defeat the other, either by destroying it or by weakening it so completely that it can no longer interfere with the victorious side.... (p.24)

 

(β) "In that case, the inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity. Thus the two tendencies interfere with each other, and represent a contradiction." (p.34) [Weston (2012), pp.12-34. Italic emphases in the original; the Greek lettering has been added in order to make reference easier.]

 

Weston here appeals to a handful of rather obscure ideas connected with "negativity" (which appears to be a reference to Hegel's adoption and use of a highly questionable concept, "real negation", examined in detail in Appendix A), the latter of which we are told is "an abstraction of conflict" and "interference" (whatever that means!). This implies Weston's analysis doesn't rely on 'one side' of a contradiction preventing the 'other' from operating, but merely "interfering" with it. Nevertheless, it is clear from this that, for Weston, the two sides of a 'contradiction' must co-exist (in such circumstances), or no 'interfering' could take place.

 

If so, it should be possible to adapt what was said earlier (except, of course, it was pointed out that Weston has dropped the use of "force" and replaced it with "tendency") in order to summarise Weston's argument, as follows: 

 

W1: Let force/"tendency", P1, oppose/"interfere" with force/"tendency", P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

W2: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

W3: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1 (comprised of sub-events, E1a- E1n), and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2 (comprised of sub-events, E2a- E2n). For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

W4: By W2, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2, taken pair-wise respectively from each set, form oppositional couples.

 

From what Weston says in paragraphs (α) and (β) above the word "opposite" can -- perhaps even should -- be given a Weston-style make-over so that it means something like "the opposite result of...", or maybe even, "prevent the full realisation of...", one or more events. This means that one or more of E1a- E1n and E2a- E2n will be prevented from occurring in this manner. That seems to be the only plausible way of interpreting the following sentence:

 

"[T]he inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity." [Ibid.]

 

So, P1 might prevent, for instance, event, E2i, while P2 will prevent, for example, event, E1j. In which case:

 

W5: P1 and P2 contradict one or more of each other's effects.

 

But, if these effects don't happen, or don't take place (even Weston's concedes this), they can't exist to be contradicted by anything, let alone by a force/"tendency". More to the point, these two forces/"tendencies" don't actually 'contradict' one another, just each others effects. As noted earlier (edited):

 

In that case, it is far from clear whether or not DM-theorists (i.e., those intent on promoting the 'orthodox view' that 'opposing forces' 'contradict each other') will want to embrace W1-W4 too enthusiastically.

 

No surprise then: we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall!

 

[I will return this side-argument again later, after a few peripheral 'difficulties' have been ironed out.]

 

It could be objected that Weston doesn't mean events are totally prevented from happening, he means that some of them are prevented from being "fully realised". But, it is far from clear what that itself means. Of course, this depends on how we identify and count events. However, since Weston doesn't enter into that knotty problem, no more will be said about it here. [Anyone who wants to sink into that quagmire might like to begin with Simons (2005) and Casati and Varzi (2025). See also Davidson (1963, 1967a, 1967b, 1969, 1970a, 1970b, 1971) {these link to PDFs}, and the following responses to Davidson: Hacker (2007), pp.57-89, Glock (2003), pp.233-67, and Schroeder (2001b).]

 

Independently of that, "not fully realised" seems to be a million miles removed from what we read in the DM-classics (and scores of other DM-theorists) -- i.e., that objects and processes 'struggle' with their 'dialectical opposites' and then change into them. There is nothing there -- nor is anything even implied -- about effects not being "fully realised". Quite the reverse: objects and processes involved in 'dialectical change' develop into their 'opposites'. It is hard to see how "not fully realised" can, under any circumstances, be interpreted as an 'opposite'. If event, E, is expected and not-E emerges as a result, it isn't the case that E hasn't been "fully realised", it has vanished!

 

But even if Weston is taken at his word (and we ignore the DM-classics, which Weston appears to have done!), "not fully realised" seems to mean that the following remarks might still be valid:

 

From what Weston says in paragraphs (α) and (β) above the word "opposite" can -- perhaps even should -- be given a Weston-style make-over so that it means something like "the opposite result of...", or maybe even, "prevent the full realisation of...", one or more events. This means that one or more of E1a- E1n and E2a- E2n will be prevented from occurring in this manner. That seems to be the only plausible way of interpreting the following sentence:

 

"[T]he inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity." [Ibid.]

 

So, P1 might prevent, for instance, event, E2i, while P2 will prevent, for example, event, E1j. In which case:

 

W5: P1 and P2 contradict one or more of each other's effects.

 

But, if these effects don't happen, or don't take place (even Weston's concedes this), they can't exist to be contradicted by anything, let alone by a force/"tendency". More to the point, these two forces/"tendencies" don't actually 'contradict' one another, just each others effects.

 

Independent of that, too: Weston's earlier words -- here repeated -- seem to imply that the aforementioned planet will orbit the Sun when the "tendencies" involved have balanced each other out:

 

"Hegel distinguished contradiction from opposition by the category of negativity, which means, roughly, conflict of the opposite sides: 'Opposites...contain contradiction in so far as they relate to each other negatively in the same respect or are both mutually canceling...and indifferent to each other.' It is the negativity of a contradiction that is responsible for its key role in dialectical theory, that contradiction causes motion: 'The sides of a manifold only become active and lively against each other when they are driven to the peak of contradiction, and contradiction contains the negativity, which is the indwelling pulse of self-movement and liveliness.'... (p.12)

 

"For  Marx as for Hegel, the main difference between opposition and contradiction is negativity, the internal activity of a contradiction.... (p.13)

 

["Negativity is an abstraction of conflict, not of the absence of something.... (Footnote p.13)]

 

"As we saw above, an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two sides interfere with each other. From Marx's brief comments, he appears to have thought that it is obvious that falling into a body and flying away from it are contradictory tendencies, but we can reinforce his conclusion. Although tendencies can interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest that the following criterion is a sufficient condition for negativity of, or interference between, opposing tendencies A and B:

 

Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely.

 

"This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its actually flying away (a parabolic or hyperbolic orbit) if the tangential velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity. On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both may be partially realised.... (pp.17-18)

 

"In that case, the inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity. Thus the two tendencies interfere with each other, and represent a contradiction." (p.34) [Ibid., bold emphases added.]

 

So, according to Weston, it looks like the "tendency" to fly off at a tangent is balanced by the "tendency" to fall into the Sun, and when that happens the planet enters into an orbital pattern.

 

I take up this notion (i.e., "balancing"), alongside several other related issues below (here, here, and here), but in more detail in Interlude Nine, where I consider one or two additional variations on Weston's theory. [See also here.]

 

Independently of that, too, as pointed out above, Weston's repeated use of "negativity" is clearly a reference to Hegel's theory of 'real negation'. However, we have already had occasion to note that that theory itself was thoroughly misconceived since it was based on:

 

(i) An egregious mis-interpretation of the LOI (where we also saw that contradiction has nothing to do with cancellation); and,

 

(ii) Kant's introduction of the concept of "real negation", which has been taken apart in Appendix A.

 

Finally, it is far from clear that the two "tendencies" Weston has recruited to his cause are 'dialectical opposites', anyway. Once again (and for the n+1th time!): they clearly don't imply one another, which they would have to do in order to qualify as 'internally-connected opposites'. In what way does a "tendency" to fall into a planet imply a "tendency" to continue to move along the same line of action -- i.e., in the same way that one class under capitalism (the bourgeoisie) is said to imply the existence of the other (the proletariat), such that neither can exist without the other -- or so we have been told? Like so many other Dialectical Marxists, Weston blithely ignores of this core Hegelian principle, and it isn't hard to see why: it allows him to hide the fact that this isn't by any stretch of the imagination a 'dialectical relation', which means it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction', either -- whatever else it is. [On that, see here.] What is so offensive about all this is that Weston seems quite happy to associate Marx's great name and reputation with this theoretical travesty, failing to note Marx had already told he was simply playing around with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital -- he was simply "coquetting" with it!

 

[I will offer a different reading of this passage in Essay Nine Part One -- and it will be one that absolves Marx of any involvement in this 'Hegelian farce' (which turns out not to be Hegelian or 'dialectical', after all!).]

 

But, what about the "fully realised" aspect of Weston's argument?

 

"Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely." [Ibid.]

 

This has already been covered: If a 'tendency' is "less fully realised" then some of its effects won't follow or take place, just as we have found out. We have also discovered that, whatever else it is, this can't be a 'dialectical interaction' since these 'tendencies' don't imply each other. In which case, Weston's entire analysis is devoid of rational support, at any level -- even in Hegelian/DM-terms!

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Despite this, and in order to examine every possible way of reviving this moribund theory, I will concede for the purposes of argument that E1 and E2 are 'contradictory' sets after all (exactly what that might mean isn't too clear -- not least because, according to the above argument (repeated below), one of these sets doesn't exist, having been prevented from occurring by one of the opposing forces --, but it will be further explored later). It now seems (from earlier considerations and those mentioned in F10-F12) that not only does E1 'contradict' E2, but also that P1 'contradicts' E2, and P2 'contradicts' E1, as well! I will return to consider these added complications, below, too.

 

F10: P1 prevents E2, and P2 prevents E1.

 

F11: Anything that prevents something else from happening contradicts it.

 

F12: Therefore, P1 and P2 contradict each other's effects.

 

However, there now appears to be no good reason to accept F11, and every reason to reject it. Consider the following scenario -- which is aimed at showing why F11 is unacceptable (even if the truth of other DM-precepts is accepted for the sake of argument); this involves a passerby seeing a young child in difficulties in a body of water, upon which he dived in to rescue the infant and pull her out onto the bank:

 

F13: NN saved child MM from drowning.

 

F14: NN prevented the drowning.

 

F15: So, NN contradicted the drowning (by F11).

 

The problem here lies not so much with the non-standard use of language evident in the above sentences, but with the fact that if a drowning (or if anything) is prevented from happening, it never actually took place. In that case, if the said incident didn't happen it can't have been 'contradicted' by any of the forces or events doing the preventing -- since there would be no 'it' for anything to contradict. Unless we are prepared to envisage forces 'contradicting' something that doesn't exist, or we imagine they can 'contradict' unrealised possibilities -- or that they can even 'contradict' certain ideas (perhaps those in NN's mind or in the mind of a bystander) --, the word "contradiction" gains no grip here, even in DM-terms!

 

It might also become 'problematic' trying to explain how something that exists can 'struggle' with something that doesn't -- a 'struggle' the DM-Classics tell us has to take place between co-existing 'dialectical opposites'.

 

Indeed, it would be even more 'problematic' trying to explain how this 'contradiction' is 'dialectical' to begin with, in the above sense. That is because what an individual (like NN) does or doesn't do in no way implies whatever it is they hope to prevent by their actions -- in this case, the drowning. These two situations/scenarios (i.e., (i) what an individual does or doesn't do, and (ii) what they hope to prevent) can certainly exist without each other -- unlike the proletariat and the capitalist class, or, so we have been told. In which case, and once again, whatever else this is, it isn't 'dialectical'.

 

It might be objected that if NN formed the intention to prevent the aforementioned drowning, that intention implies there exists a drowning to prevent.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

In fact, all that is implied here is that NN believed a childe was drowning (or about to drown) and intended to save her. It certainly doesn't imply that there is someone who is drowning, since NN could be mistaken, delusional, or even a publicity seeker.

 

After all, if beliefs implied existence, beggars would ride...

 

Even more problematic: did what NN attempt to do turn into the drowning? But that is what the DM-classics tell us must happen (link a few paragraphs back) -- i.e., that the 'opposite sides' of a 'dialectical contradiction' must turn into each other after struggling among themselves -- if a series of events is to be counted as a 'dialectical'. If these are 'dialectical opposites locked in struggle', they must change into one another! Do attempts to save drowning children always turn into that drowning, and vice versa? DM-fans might like to share with us details concerning the last time a drowning turned into the attempt to prevent it...

 

Once again: whatever else this is, it can't be 'dialectical'.

 

[Of course, on some occasions an attempt to save someone from drowning can go badly wrong, leading to the drowning of the one attempting to prevent it, but that isn't an example of one side of a DM-contradiction turning into the other. That is because NN did not jump into the water intending to prevent his own drowning, but MM's drowning. If things do go badly, we can assume NN will then try to prevent his own drowning, and he might fail. If he succeeds, he didn't drown, which means there is no 'dialectical' outcome here. In that eventuality, he certainly prevented his own drowning, but he didn't turn into it, so he didn't 'contradict' it. According to the DM-classics, he would have had to turn into that with which he struggled -- i.e., into the water or his drowning, take your pick! Had NN drowned instead, even then he didn't turn into his own drowning. Whenever in all of human history has a single human being turned into a drowning? Or even into the water in which they perished? Howsoever we try to spin this, none of it makes the slightest sense in DM-terms!]

 

One obvious fall-back position for Dialectical Marxists to occupy (in response to the above) would be to argue that the action mentioned in F13 halted a series of events that would have led to the said drowning. Hence, that intervention contradicted this series of events (or, at least, the last event, or the last few events, leading up to the drowning). That objection will be examined in Interlude Nine -- and again, presently, below.

 

However, just in case this latest counter-example (concerning the drowning) is considered prejudicial, or even contentious (in that it doesn't deal with real forces, or with the sort of forces concerning which DM-theorists are interested), then perhaps the following considerations might prove to be more acceptable. To that end, let us begin with this rather obvious -- and it is hoped perfectly uncontroversial -- assumption:

 

F16: Any process or series of events that is prevented from occurring does not exist (or take place).51

 

It is clear that while F16 is a truism, it does seem to ignore protracted or extended (series of) events and processes, so it might not be fully acceptable as a clarification of the 'contradictions' that are of interest to Dialectical Marxists. Consider, then, the following clarification:

 

F17: Event, E, consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.

 

F18: E1-En form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.

 

F19: Let P2 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.

 

F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist, never will exist, or do not take place.

 

["T" stands for "The Totality", "P2" stands for an opposing force.]

 

Hence, because of the operation of P2 certain events failed to materialise, which generalises the point made in relation to the drowning example covered earlier. Even if it were (charitably) assumed that the vague and confused DM-use of "contradiction" were itself in the end valid, it is still difficult to see how anything could 'contradict' anything else if that 'anything else' doesn't actually exist or never even occurred. Hence, in the above example, if P2 halted certain unspecified elements of the series of events -- perhaps, Ek-En --, which would have led to the said drowning had they not been stopped, those 'prevented events' never happened (so, nor did the drowning), which means they can't have been 'contradicted'.

 

That objection also appears to be fatal to DM in a what seems to be novel way: it tells us that, if anything, forces actually prevent 'contradictions' from arising or emerging!

 

Of course, all this is independent of the fact that even if it could be shown that the above factors could validly be described as a contradiction, it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction', since the elements involved -- i.e., the actions that were aimed at preventing the drowning and the events that led up to the drowning -- don't imply one another, and can all exist without each other -- unlike the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (so we have been told) -- nor do they turn into one another.

 

As we have seen, time and again, this is a recurring problem that has so far nullified every single attempt to breath life into this rapidly fading theory.

 

So, far from 'opposing forces' being DM-friendly they appear to be among its very worst enemies. Any Dialectical Marxists who still want to cling to this aspect of DM will clearly be clutching a viper to their breast.

 

In that case, if this recurring 'problem' is to be neutralised, a novel and more consistent account of the relationship between 'contradictions' and 'opposing forces' must be found -- indeed, as a matter of some urgency.52

 

A More Balanced Account Of Prevention?

 

In order to construct a more viable, pro-DM account we need to reconsider a difficulty encountered earlier that was temporarily put to one side: the claim that 'opposing forces' -- not 'forces and their effects', or simply 'effects in general' -- but, 'opposing forces', directly 'contradict' each other. Consider then the following scenario:

 

F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.

 

Again, this perhaps puts too much weight on the term "prevent"; it might prompt F21 to self-destruct just as fast as F17-F20 did -- for if one of the said forces fails to operate (it having been prevented from doing so), no 'contradiction' would be implied.

 

[Whether or not the actual act of prevention is what constitutes the 'dialectical contradiction' in this instance will be considered below -- here and Interlude Nine.]

 

But, drawing the above conclusion might still prove to be a little too hasty. For example, both of the above forces could still exist even if one ceased to operate (in an F21-style configuration), and no problem need arise because of that -- because no reference has been made to the non-existent effects of either one of them (an outcome that undermined several earlier attempts at clarification).

 

This means that even though one of P1 or P2 might have been prevented from acting, they could both still exist in some form or other. [This appears to be one version of the interpretation promoted by Weston.] If so, F21 appears to be the viable option Dialectical Marxists are looking for. One further advantage would be that F21 connects 'opposing forces' directly with 'contradictions', rather than linking 'contradictions' with the effects of such forces.

 

Could this be the lifeline Dialectical Marxists desperately need?

 

Alas, upon closer examination, this 'promising lifeline' soon turns into a noose.

 

 

Figure Nine: Surprise! Surprise! Yet Another DM-'Lifeline'

Turns Into A Noose

 

The fatal consequences that this latest alternative presents DM-theorists become apparent when we attempt to unravel what it means for a force to be 'prevented' from operating.

 

Despite disclaimers, it seems that if a force no longer operates, it no longer exists (in some sense of that word). Perhaps the problem lies not so much with the precise physical form that forces take (which, even to this day, is still a mystery; on that, see Interlude One), but with the fact that the word "operate" is itself ambiguous. Consider the following examples of forces that are capable of being rendered inoperative:

 

F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate when worker NN threw the switch.

 

F23: An aerofoil produces the lift necessary to keep an aeroplane in the air provided that there is sufficient relative velocity between that aerofoil and the ambient medium to prevent the force of gravity from operating normally, pulling the aircraft to the ground.

 

[In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, I have left F23 in a more colloquial form -- for instance, by the use of "pulling".]

 

In F22, the relevant force simply ceased to exist (or it was converted (or it perhaps reverted) into another force, 'potential force', or some 'form of energy', etc.) when the switch was thrown. But, in F23, a second force (lift) 'opposes' the effects of the first force (gravity) -- which, of course, still exists (perhaps appearing as part of the resultant force operation on in the system).

 

[In this, and for the sake of argument, I am, of course, assuming gravity is a force! That concession doesn't affect other statements made in this Essay that throw it into doubt.]

 

The question now is: Can F21 be interpreted along lines similar to those suggested by F23? This way of viewing the relation between P1 and P2 would still see them both existing (or operating) even while they counterbalanced each other. In which case, it might prove helpful to re-write F21 in the following manner:

 

F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.53

 

[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]

 

Now, F24 doesn't appear to face any of the existential problems that F21 faced since the relevant forces co-exist, counterbalancing one another. Perhaps then we have here a clear statement of the relation between 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions' that DM-theorists require?

 

Alas not.

 

A new difficulty emerges just as soon as we ask: Why should only counterbalancing forces be considered 'contradictory'? This is relevant since F24 simply restricts our attention to situations where there is an equilibrium between forces, and ignores dis-equilibria.54 But surely, it is largely as a result of the latter that (significant) change occurs -- certainly changes of the sort that interest Dialectical Marxists. Clearly, this means 'contradictions' should be connected with dis-equilibria rather than equilibria. If so, F24 ought to be re-written in the following way:

 

F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether or not it counterbalances P2.

 

Unfortunately, F25 can't now provide the clarity that was missing from previous attempts to shed some light on this part of DM. That is because F25 fails to distinguish between the circumstances surrounding equilibria and dis-equilibria. F24 seemed to express a clear definition of 'contradictory forces', but in order to make it applicable to the real world, F25 had to be recruited in support, completely undermining F24. F25 informs us that forces are 'contradictory' whether or not F24 is true! Worse still, F25 could be true even when F24 is false:

 

F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

 

F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether or not it counterbalances P2.

 

Hence, if the following were true (which is what F25 at least allows), F24 would be false:

 

F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it doesn't counterbalance P2.

 

Now, anyone reading the above sentences (and taking them for an accurate exposition of this aspect of DM) would rightly complain that nothing had actually been explained, since there is nothing about the relationship between the forces involved that explains what the overall theory is committed to. If F25 (and hence F26) were true, forces would appear to have no part to play, at least in connection with DM-'contradictions'.

 

In response, it could be argued that this latest 'difficulty' is not just spurious, it is clearly a result of the use of the phrase "only if" in F24. Its removal should eliminate the problem.

 

Or so it might be maintained...

 

Unfortunately, the removal of the "only if" in F24 would plunge the theory back into all the existential problems it had been introduced to eliminate. That can be seen if we try to re-word F24 in the following manner:

 

F27: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.

 

Although F27 might look acceptable, it merely expresses a sufficient condition; hence, it fails to rule out the following:

 

F28: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.54a

 

[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]

 

[F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate when worker NN threw the switch.]

 

But, F28 is just a resurrected version of F21, which we found didn't rule out F22 with its non-existent forces. What was required instead was a description of 'contradictory forces' that doesn't imply one of the forces operating ceased to exist as a result of the action of other force in the system. Furthermore, we also required an account that doesn't rely on forces merely 'contradicting' the effects of other forces -- because of the serious difficulties that that particular alternative faced earlier.

 

That is why an appeal had to be made to forces that counterbalance each other, since (clearly) they must exist to do so. Hence, an "only if" had to be introduced, making this a necessary condition. But, as we discovered, the more restrictive version ruled out forces that didn't counterbalance one another, which Dialectical Marxists seem to need. Reintroducing them at a later stage then ruined the neat picture.

 

Unfortunately, it now looks like F24 and F26 divorce 'contradictions' from equilibria, since the presence or absence of the latter is in no way affected by the former.

 

F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

 

F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.

 

This means that if F24 and F26 'reflect the real nature of things', 'contradictions' would be unrelated to the balancing effects of 'opposing forces'. As paradoxical as this might seem, DM-theorists should reject the conjunction of F24 and F26 if they want to maintain their belief that there is some sort of a connection between 'opposing forces', 'contradictions', equilibria and disequilibria, in nature and society. Alas, in order to account for the 'contradictory nature of reality', DM-theorists can't actually afford to do that. For, as soon as F24 and F26 are adopted, DM ceases to be explanatory; but the minute F24 and F26 are rejected, this attempt to render comprehensible the nature of the relationship between DM-'contradictions' and 'opposing forces' itself begins to circle the drain.

 

Nevertheless, the above 'unhelpful' anti-DM conclusion might also appear to be a little too hasty, and even contrived. But, with so little in the writings of Dialectical Marxists to guide us, how is it possible for anyone to decide whether or not the above attempt to understand DM is itself misleading, prejudicial or contrived? Indeed, how could Dialectical Marxists themselves arrive at a clear and unambiguous decision on this score without (novel) theoretical innovation of some description -- an otherwise eminently reasonable option that has so far been complete anathema to the 'Orthodox' DM-community, who are only too eager to wave the 'Revisionism' (or even the 'pedantry') card at anyone who has the temerity to try to 'think outside the box' on this and other 'difficulties' this theory continually faces?

 

[Apologies for those mixed metaphors!]

 

Nevertheless, if we are to maintain some sort of commitment to the DM-requirement that 'contradictions' are capable of explaining change -- when pictured as 'opposing forces' (that is, if we attribute 'contradictions' with some sort of physical bite, some sort of materiality) --, then this theory must self-destruct by the above argument. That is because this reconfiguration of DM maintains that forces are 'contradictory' whether what its theorists claim about them is true or not -- if this is, indeed, what DM-theorists claim, or it is even what DM itself actually implies!

 

Naturally, all this is independent of the far more fundamental question whether the theory that 'contradictory forces' are capable of counterbalancing each other can itself be explained without referring to the sort of 'prevented' or 'non-existent' effects we met earlier. If it can't, this latest 'rescue attempt' would prove to be just another 'theoretical blind alley', since 'prevented effects' don't exist to be contradicted. On the other hand, if DM can be explained without referring to such effects, it is difficult to see what impact, if any, that 'theory'/'method' could possibly have on the real world. How could such forces genuinely be described as "material" if they have no effect on anything physical?

 

Of course, whether or not the above considerations are themselves valid, they are still independent of the fatal defect mentioned numerous times throughout this Essay: these forces don't imply one another, nor do the forces themselves and their effects (unlike the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, once more!), so they can't be 'dialectical contradictions', whatever else they are. For example, gravity doesn't imply the existence of the lift created by a wing (or anything else that can provide lift). Gravity existed for billions of years, and wings for maybe a couple of hundred million (in winged insects, flying dinosaurs, birds, or plants that use the air to spread seeds, etc., etc.). Of course, if there were no 'force of gravity', such things wouldn't have evolved; but then, if there were no 'force of gravity', there would be no universe. Clearly, gravity can exist without such 'flying devices/contraptions', so the relation between the force provided by a wing and gravity itself can't be 'dialectical'. Even if such forces proved to be 'opposites' -- in some-as-yet-unspecified sense --, they certainly do not 'interpenetrate' each other, and so can't be 'dialectical'.

 

Well, this is yet another 'unforced error' -- unforced, since no one held a gun to anyone's head; it was all done voluntarily --, this yet another 'dialectical hole' out of which DM-fans will have to dig themselves. I am merely content to remind them that it is a hole; it is very deep, and it is one they have dropped themselves into by taking 'logical' and philosophical advice from a notorious Christian Mystic.

 

 

Figure Ten: Inveterate DM-Fan Still Looking To Hegel For Sound Advice

 

Yet More S&M?

 

Maybe even this is being a little too hasty? In that case, perhaps we should begin again.

 

To that end, it might help if we re-examined a passage from one of Cornforth's books, quoted in Part One of this Essay:

 

"The unity of opposites in a contradiction is characterised by a definite relation of superiority-inferiority, or of domination, between the opposites. For example, in a physical unity of attraction and repulsion, certain elements of attraction or repulsion may be dominant in relation to others. The unity is such that one side dominates the other -- or, in certain cases, they may be equal. Any qualitative state of a process corresponds to a definite relation of domination. Thus, the solid, liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic of the molecules of bodies.... Domination relationships are obviously, by their very nature, impermanent and apt to change, even though in some cases they remain unchanged for a long time. If the relationship takes the form of equality or balance, such balance is by nature unstable, for their is a struggle of opposites within it which is apt to lead to the domination of one over the other.... The outcome of the working out of contradictions is, then, a change in the domination relation characteristic of the initial unity of opposites. Such a change constitutes a change in the nature of a thing, a change from one state to another, a change from one thing to another, a change entailing not merely some external alteration but a change in the internal character and laws of motion of a thing." [Cornforth (1976), pp.97-98. Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]

 

[This is in fact a differently worded version of Weston's argument, where forces/"tendencies" 'interfere' (to a greater or lesser extent) with one another -- Weston (2012). I have examined Weston's alternative analysis elsewhere in this Essay.]

 

The above argument might appear to work if it is applied to human social systems and their development, where agents (individually or in groups) are capable of 'upsetting' any number of 'balanced' configurations, and who don't need too much in the way of external motivation to do so (although, in order for Cornforth to be able to say even that much with any clarity, he found he had no use for the obscure jargon Hegel had inflicted on humanity). However, when this theory is applied to nature as a whole, it can't work. Consider, therefore, the following:

 

F29: Let FD be a set of force 'elements' in a 'dominant' relation to FS, which is a 'submissive' set of forces (i.e., FD > FS), and let both operate in system, S, howsoever that is defined or characterised.

 

F30: For this relation to change so that a qualitative transformation occurs in the overall system, S, one or other of FD and FS will have to change first.

 

F31: If the change occurs in FD it will have to do so because of the latter's own 'internal contradictions', otherwise the theory must fall at the first hurdle. [The same applies to FS, or, indeed, to both taken severally or collectively.]

 

F32: But, if that is so, then the same analysis will now apply one more level down, as it were: whatever causes FD to change will have to be the result of further 'dominant'/'submissive' relations inside, or internal to, FD itself. In turn, the pre-conditions noted in F31 will also apply at, or to, these 'lower level' relations; they must change because of their own 'internal contradictions'.

 

F33: Either this continues forever or it will halt at some point.

 

F34: If it halts at some point, then there must be fundamental units that don't change because of their 'internal contradictions', and the theory will fail at this point. [In fact, these 'fundamental units' can have no effect on each other for reasons set-out in detail in Part One of this Essay.]

 

F35: If this process continues forever, there would be nothing to condition anything internal to anything else, just more and more layers, tailing off to infinity (i.e., to "who knows where?"). DM would thus have its own "bad infinity". [We saw that this was a non-viable alternative, anyway, in Part One, as well as here.]

 

F36: All this is independent of whether or not an external cause (or causes) initiated these internal changes in FD or FS. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to Cornforth), external causes can't bring about the internal, qualitative changes required (again, according to Cornforth himself). The latter must be internally-generated in the last analysis.

 

It looks, therefore, like this 'theory' can't be rescued if this particular line is adopted.

 

Of course, the above considerations are independent of the fact that Cornforth failed -- just as all other Dialectical Marxists have failed -- to show that the factors mentioned imply one another, such that neither can exist independently of the other (like the proletariat and the capitalist class can't exist in splendid isolation, so we are told). In which case, and once more, whatever else these 'relations' are, they can't be 'dialectical'. 

 

Hole To Let -- Previous Occupant Self-Destructed

 

Howsoever we try, there seems to be no way of rescuing this self-destructing theory -- killed-off by its own internal obscurities.

 

In short: if a force prevents something from happening, that force can't contradict that 'something'. Once prevented, whatever it was that had been prevented doesn't exist or take place. Moreover, when any effects of that force have also been prevented, they can't contradict any other effects that haven't themselves existed, or don't yet exist, either.55

 

Interlude Nine: Objections Neutralised

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; NON = Negation of the Negation; LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction; STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Dialectician.]

 

However, some may still object and claim that if a force prevents something coming into being, or happening, it must have contradicted it.

 

In that case, let us say that:

 

Ω1: If event, Ei, at time, t1, belonging to process, Δ (normally comprising sub-events, E1-En), is prevented from becoming Ei+1, at time, t2, by force, P, then Ei will have been contradicted by P. [t2 > t1. As before, ">" in this context means "later than".]

 

[Here, "event" can be interpreted as widely or as narrowly as is required so that it is compatible with any plausible/acceptable 'dialectical' theories of "causation", or even of any such "mediations", and their effects. I have had to use Greek letters "Ω" and "Δ" here since I have run out of viable Latin capital letter options that haven't already been co-opted! I originally used the letter "T" (now replaced by "Ω"), but decided that it might be confused with the "T"s I have also employed to stand for "time" and for the "Totality". On events, see here.]

 

Hence, it could be argued that in this sense it is clear that forces have prevented the effects of other forces from being realised, and this they have done by 'contradicting' a given event, stopping it from occurring.

 

But, even here forces still fail to 'contradict' each other as force-on-force; they merely prevent the events, or the effects, induced by other forces from happening. So, this alternative can't help us understand how 'opposing forces' actually 'contradict' one another.

 

Nevertheless, this objection still needs to be examined a little more closely so that every conceivable alternative has been explored and shown not to work.

 

To that end, therefore, consider the following:

 

Ω2: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω3: Had these events proceeded as 'normal', Ei would have been followed by Ei+1, but as things turned out, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented it.

 

Ω4: Hence, P contradicted Ei+1.

 

However, since Ei+1 never existed or occurred, it can't have been 'contradicted' by P -- unless, once more, we assume that a force can 'contradict' non-existent objects, events or processes.

 

Moreover, since P didn't prevent Ei itself, it can't have 'contradicted' it, either.

 

And, as we have seen several times, P and Ei+1 fail to imply one another; both can (and do) exist without each other (indeed, as we have just seen). Hence, whatever else this is, it can't be a 'dialectical relation'/'contradiction'.

 

We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall, yet again.

 

It might now be objected that the above force prevented one event following on from another, so in that sense it (or the series of events) was contradicted.

 

Or so it might be claimed...

 

So, consider this variant on Ω3:

 

Ω5: P contradicted Ei by stopping it producing Ei+1.

 

But, this alternative is no good, either. That is because events aren't like eggs that produce other egg producers (i.e., chickens!). If so, events themselves can hardly be prevented from producing other events if they don't produce them in the first place.

 

In that case, perhaps the following revision will work in its place:

 

Ω6: P contradicted Ei by stopping Ei+1 following on from Ei.

 

But, again, the alleged 'contradiction' amounts to the prevention of something that doesn't now exist (and never did) -- namely Ei+1. If forces can only 'contradict' something by preventing or stopping non-existent objects, processes or events from taking place, then all the above objections still have their place. [No pun intended! In case the above comment is unclear: no force can contradict something that does not exist or take place!]

 

It could now be argued that if the chain of events above is replaced by a series of causes and their effects, the contradiction will become clear -- perhaps along the following lines:

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the normal course of events, let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

This looks a little more promising, but there still remain several problems:

 

(i) Once again, if this were so, DM-fans will have to drop their claim that forces contradict each other;

 

(ii) Force, P, and event, Ei, aren't 'internally related' -- how can a force be 'internally related' to an event? So, to repeat, whatever else this is, it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction' (we saw something similar to this obstruct Weston's attempt to recruit Marx to this own mystical view of nature, just as we have seen it neutralise other, alternative rescue attempts);

 

(iii) Even if it were a legitimate example of a 'dialectical contradiction', P and event, Ei, would have to turn into each other, if the DM-classics are to be believed. Plainly, they don't!

 

Consider, therefore, a more concrete example of the above scenario: Imagine a forest fire that had been started by a match inadvertently dropped on some tinder dry grass. All things being equal, the resulting conflagration will (at least) be maintained by the following factors: (a) The organic material in the grass, (b) The energy released by this fire, and (c) The oxygen in the surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the burning grass with a fire broom before the blaze has a chance to grow, putting it out. Plainly the force of the blow from the broom deprived the nascent conflagration of enough oxygen to keep it going and so quelled the fire. In that case, one cause (the supply of oxygen) was prevented by the force of the broom; had it been left alone the above contributory causes would have further caused a series of damaging events. But, does the blow from the broom turn into the oxygen? Or, into the organic material comprising this tinder dry grass? What if that fire were extinguished by a rain storm? Would such a fire turn into a rain storm? And yet all of these ought to happen if the DM-classics are to be believed. As we have seen several times, those classics tell us that objects and processes turn into that with which they have struggled, their 'dialectical opposites'.

 

[Anyone interested can read the doomed attempts made by one or two comrades to defend the DM-theory of change (among several other things) in the face of objections like those above (or aired in other Essays), here. (Unfortunately, that link is now dead.) Added on Edit: Fortunately, a Web Archive Site has captured the entire debate here.]

 

However, one of the biggest problems with the above proffered pro-DM-response lies in its almost total lack of detail -- a failing not helped by the difficulty of trying to span this theoretical chasm on behalf of DM-fans, who don't seem at all bothered to do it for themselves!

 

In that case, consider a different situation where a match is used to light a trail of gunpowder. The match sets off a series of chemical reactions that pass along that trail, each of which causes the next reaction in line. Label this series of events, or causes, "C1-Cn". Let us further imagine that some force -- for example a violent thunderstorm, S, which either blows the trail of gunpowder away or drenches it with rain in the ensuing downpour -- stops this series of events/causes at the Ci-th stage, preventing the next cause/event, Ci+1, from happening. In that case, should we not say that S contradicted cause, Ci?

 

But, the problems we met with Options (i)-(iii) above still apply in this case (as they also did with the forest fire considered earlier -- i.e., when the details are filled in). If the DM-classics are to be believed, 'dialectical'-objects/events should turn into that with which they have 'struggled'. In that eventuality we should expect any such thunderstorm to turn into the chemical reaction in the gunpowder, and the latter to turn into the thunderstorm!

 

In fact, the idea that causes necessitate their effects (whether or not those effects are themselves causes in their own right), upon which the above example might seem to depend, is itself predicated upon an anthropomorphic view of nature. Since I have considered that topic in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three, I will say no more about it here.

 

Exactly why this view of causation depends on necessitation is connected with the points raised in Essay Seven Part Three (concerning Kant and Hegel's response to Hume's criticisms of Rationalist theories of causation). There, it was demonstrated that in order to defuse Hume's attack, Hegel had to find a 'dialectical-logical', and therefore necessary, link between a cause and its effects:

 

Hume had argued that there is no logical or conceptual connection between cause and effect. [Yes, I know that this has since been challenged -- for example, by Strawson (2014) -- but my argument here is aimed at those who accepted the (then) received view of Hume, outlined below.] This struck right at the heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume and the Empiricists were radically mistaken. Kant had already attempted to answer Hume, but his solution pushed necessitating causation off into the Noumenon, about which we can know nothing. That approach was totally unacceptable to Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect; he found it in (1) Spinoza's claim that determination is also negation (which, Hegel rendered as "Every determination is negation" -- by the way, neither Spinoza nor Hegel even so much as attempted to justify this 'principle' -- more about that in Essay Twelve Part Five; on this, see Melamed (2015)), and in (2) His argument that the LOI "stated negatively" implies the LOC (which, unfortunately for Hegel, it doesn't).

 

Based on this, Hegel was 'able' to argue that for any concept A, "determinate negation" implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A. [I am, of course, simplifying greatly here! I have reproduced Hegel's argument below for those who think I might have misrepresented him.]
 

This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built into it as A transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This move provided him with the logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A, which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it), not-A, its 'internal' and hence its unique 'opposite'. Hegel was forced to derive this consequence since, plainly, everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't introduced this limiting factor, this unique "other".

 

From these moves was born the "unity of opposites". So, the link between cause and effect was now given by a 'logical' unity, and causation and change were the result of the interaction between these logically-linked "opposites".

 

Plainly, this paired, unique opposite, not-A, was essential to Hegel's theory, otherwise, he could provide his readers with no explanation why A should be followed by a unique not-A as opposed to just any old not-A -- say, B, or, indeed, something else, C, for example -- all of which would also be not-A.

 

So, since B and C (and an indefinite number of other objects and processes) are all manifestly not-A, Hegel had to find some way of eliminating these, and all the rest, as candidates for the development of A, otherwise he would have had no effective answer to Hume.

 

[Hume, of course, wouldn't have denied that A changes into "what it is not", into not-A, he would merely have pointed out that this can't provide the conceptual link that rationalists require unless all the other (potentially infinite) not-As could be ruled out in some way. He concluded that it is only a habit of the mind that prompts us to expect A to change into what we have always, or what we have in general, experienced before. There is no logical link, however, between A and what it develops into since there is no contradiction in supposing A to change into B or C, or, indeed, something else. (In saying this the reader shouldn't conclude that I agree with Hume, or that Hume's reply is successful!)]

 

Hence, as an integral part of his reply, Hegel introduced this unique "other" with which each object and process was conceptually linked -- a unique "other" that was 'internally' connected to A --, something he claimed could be derived by 'determinate negation' from A.

 

[How he in fact derived this "other" will be examined in Essay Twelve Part Five, but a DM-'explanation' -- and my criticism of it -- can be found in Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

This special not-A was now the unique "other" of A. Without it Hegel's reply to Hume falls flat.

 

Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Marxist dialecticians) bought into this spurious 'logic' (several of them possibly unaware of the above 'rationale'; although, as far as I can see, of the DM-classicists, only Lenin seems to be explicitly aware of it!), and attempted to give it a 'materialist make-over'. And, that is why this Hegelian theory (albeit "put back on its feet") is integral to classical DM. It supplied Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.

 

[There are in fact far better ways than this to neutralise Hume's criticisms, as well as those of more recent Humeans, which do not thereby make change impossible. More details will be given in Essay Three Part Five. Until then, the reader is directed to Hacker (2007), and Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

 

Here is Lenin's open acknowledgement and endorsement of this theory:

 

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Lenin (1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

"But the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentially contained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961), p.225, quoting Hegel (1999), pp.833-34, §1795. Emphases in the original.]

 

Lenin wrote in the margin:

 

"This is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961), p.225.]

 

To which he added:

 

"Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians and Humists [Humeans -- RL] more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than of Hegel." [Ibid., p.179.]

 

This shows that Lenin understood this to be a reply to Hume, and that it was integral to comprehending dialectics.

 

It is worth quoting the entire passage from Hegel's Logic (much of which Lenin approvingly copied into the above Notebooks -- pp.225-28):

 

"Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated -- contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists of such.

 

"Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simple determination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its predicate; for example, the finite is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgment it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form of the positive judgment, is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the negative judgment, would at least have to be added as well. In the judgment the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a proposition.

 

"The second determination, the negative or mediated, is at the same time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a relation or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself. Because the first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and consequently is also only implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in it the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgment, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation." [Hegel (1999), pp.833-35, §§1795-1798. Bold emphases alone added. I have used the on-line version here, correcting a few minor typos.]

 

The most relevant and important part of which is this:

 

"It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself." [Ibid. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

This "reflection", as Hegel elsewhere calls it, of the "other in its own self", a unique "other", provides the logical link his theory required. Any other "other" would be "indifferent", and not the logical reflection he sought. It is from this that 'dialectical contradictions' arise, as Hegel notes. Hence, Lenin was absolutely right, this "other" is essential for "understanding" dialectics -- except he forgot to mention that dialectics is in fact rendered incomprehensible and unworkable as a result!

 

Hegel underlined this point (but perhaps less obscurely) in the Shorter Logic:

 

"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphases added.]

 

[The problems these rather odd ideas in fact create for Hegel have been highlighted here.]

 

Hence, any attempt to (1) Eliminate the idea that change results from a 'struggle of opposites', or (2) Deny that objects and processes change into these 'opposites', or even (3) Reject the idea that these 'opposites' are 'internally'-related as one "other" to another specific "other", will leave DM-fans with no answer to Hume, and thus with no viable theory of change.

 

[For Hegel's comments on Hume, see Hegel (1995b), pp.369-75.]

 

In which case, Hegel's theory (coupled with the part-whole dialectic) was at least a theory of causation, change and of the supposed logical development of history; so the above dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into DM. It allowed them to argue that, among other things, history isn't accidental -- i.e., it isn't just 'one thing after another' -- it has an inner logic to it. Hence, Hegel's 'logical' theory enabled them to argue, for example, that capitalism must give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to nothing else. Hume's criticisms -- or, rather, more recent incarnations of them (which, combined with contemporary versions of Adam Smith's economic theory (Smith was, of course, a close friend and collaborator of Hume's) in essence feature in much of modern economic theory and large swathes of contemporary philosophy, and thus in criticisms of Marx's economic and political theory) -- are a direct threat to this idea. If these bourgeois critics are right, we can't predict what the class struggle will produce. Or, rather, if Hume is right, the course of history is contingent, not necessary, not "rational" -- and there is no 'inner logic' to capitalism.

 

[This dependency on Hegel's theory of causation and change also supplies us with an explanation for the implicit teleology and determinism apparent in DM, providing its acolytes with hope in a hopeless world. More on this in Essays Nine Part Two and Fourteen Part Two. The mystical and rationalist foundations of this approach to change are outlined here, here, here and here.]

 

As far as I can tell, other than Lenin, very few dialecticians have discussed (or have even noticed!) this aspect of their own theory. The only authors that I am aware of who take this aspect of DM into consideration are Ruben (1979), Lawler (1982), and Fisk (1973, 1979). I will examine Fisk's arguments, which are the most sophisticated I have so far seen (on this topic), in other Essays published at this site. Lawler's analysis is the subject of Essay Eight Part Three. [However, since writing this I have also come across some of Charles Bettelheim's comments that suggest he, too, understood this point.]

 

Incidentally, this puts paid to the idea that there can be such things as 'external contradictions' (a notion beloved of STDs and MISTs). If there were any of these oddities, they couldn't be 'logically' connected as 'one-other-linked-with-another-unique-other' required by Hegel's theory. For Hegel, upside down or the 'right way up', this would fragment the rational order of reality, introducing contingency where once there had been 'logico-conceptual' or 'necessary' development. Hence, any DM-fan reckless enough to introduce 'external contradictions' into his or her system/theory would in effect be 're-Hume-ing' Hegel, not putting him 'back on his feet'! In which case, it is no surprise to find that 'external contradictions' were unknown to Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov.

 

[I have analysed several other fatal defects implicit in the idea that there can be 'external' and/or 'internal contradictions' (in nature or society) in Essay Eleven Part Two, here and here. See also here, where I develop the above argument in response to a 'Marxist-Leninist' who seems not to know his own theory.]

 

Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is precisely this which makes the entire theory unworkable, as Options (i)-(iii) above demonstrate.

 

How this is connected with my reply to the earlier volunteered pro-DM-response will now be explained. Here is that response again:

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the normal course of events, let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

The first point worth making (once more!) is that for this to be a 'dialectical contradiction', P and Ei must be 'internally-connected opposites'; indeed, P must be the "other" of Ei (just as Hegel and Lenin argued). But, P and Ei belong to logically different categories, so they can't be 'internally-related opposites'. In which case, the above pro-DM-response also falls at the first hurdle! Moreover, P and Ei don't imply each other (i.e., both can exist without the other, unlike the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, so we are told). In that case, they can't be 'dialectical opposites', to begin with.

 

[That depends, of course, on what dialecticians mean by "internally-related opposite" -- but, we have already seen they oscillate erratically between spatial and logical interpretations of that phrase.]

 

Moreover, as we witnessed in detail here, if, in the normal course of events, Ei is to cause, or to change into, Ei+1, they must also be 'dialectical opposites' (which means that P can't be the 'dialectical opposite' of either of them, after all!), and they must 'struggle' with each (i.e., Ei must struggle with Ei+1), if the DM-classics are to be believed. But, they can't struggle with one another since Ei+1 doesn't exist yet! [Unless, of course, we are to suppose it exists before it exists! After all, what could be more 'contradictory' than that? Items existing even before they have the decency to exist!]

 

On the other hand, if Ei+1 already exists, so that Ei is able to 'struggle' with it, and thus cause, or change into, Ei+1, Ei can't do so since Ei+1 already exists! In that case, Ei would no longer be the cause of Ei+1, which implies P couldn't have prevented it from causing Ei+1. either! The alleged 'contradiction' has simply vanished! The same applies to the supposed relation between S and Ci mentioned earlier.  

 

Either way, if DM were 'true', change in such circumstances would be impossible. [Which was the general conclusion reached in Essay Seven Part Three.]

 

Admittedly, there is an obvious and critically important clause missing from Ω7-Ω10, above -- namely, Ω11:

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the normal course of events, let each event, Ei, cause  the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

Ω11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of sub-events, W1-Wn.

 

Ω11 must be the case otherwise, at the Ei-th stage we would have to suppose that Ei was no longer part of the 'causal structure of the world', and hence ceased to have an effect on anything at all, ever.

 

Consider again the concrete scenario examined earlier:

 

Imagine a forest fire that had been started by a match inadvertently dropped on some tinder dry grass. All things being equal, the resulting conflagration will (at least) be maintained by the following factors: (a) The organic material in the grass, (b) The energy released by this fire, and (c) The oxygen in the surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the burning grass with a fire broom before the blaze has a chance to grow, putting it out. Plainly the force of the blow from the broom deprived the nascent conflagration of enough oxygen to keep it going and so quelled the fire. In that case, one cause (the supply of oxygen) was prevented by the force of the broom; had it been left alone the above contributory causes would have further caused a series of damaging events....

 

No one supposes that if this fire is put out, the grass that was burning, and is now out, simply disappears from the world or ceases to have an effect on anything else ever again. It, too, will initiate or take part in another series of causes/events, depicted schematically, perhaps by Ω11:

 

Ω11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of sub-events, W1-Wn.

 

But, if that is so, Ei will now be the 'dialectical opposite' of W1, its new 'unique other' (that is because, as we have seen several times, 'dialectical objects'/'processes' turn into their opposites, into that with which they have 'struggled', their 'unique other', as both Hegel and Lenin called them). That would mean Ei's earlier 'unique other' -- Ei+1 -- must have been deposed, 'knocked off its perch' as its 'unique other', becoming just another 'other' -- thereby making a mockery of the claim that each changing object or process has a 'unique other'.

 

[Anyway, it has already been shown that Hegel's entire theory is defective to the core (or, at least what sense could be made of it).]

 

Even so, what hasn't yet been made clear is how this is connected with my reply to the volunteered pro-DM-response outlined earlier. Given the fact that causes, E1-En, aren't accidentally linked (i.e., they aren't linked in that way in the DM-scheme-of-things), but are connected by a 'necessary law' (or a 'law of necessity') of some sort, Ei itself isn't just plain-and-simple-Ei. In fact, in DM each of the causes, E1-En, is also identified by what it is not -- its unique 'other'. [That was the whole point of "determinate negation" in Hegel's theory, as we saw earlier.]

 

So, Ei isn't just Ei, it is also not-Ei (since, by 'determinate negation', Ei is 'identical' with what it is not -- why that is so was explained here, but more concisely here) -- which is also Ei+1. Hence, Ei+1 is also not-Ei, its Hegelian 'other' -- it is what Ei turns into. But, by the NON, Ei is also not-not-Ei -- and hence Ei is not-itself, and thereby not-itself by 'reflection'. This is what supposedly causes Ei to develop, according to Hegel: the lack of identity between itself and its 'concept'. This is 'reflected' in and by what it subsequently becomes -- i.e., Ei+1.

 

[This is how Hegel and Lenin describe such relationships; this isn't my description! For proof, follow the links given above.]

 

That means Ei is both identical with and different from Ei+1, in an 'identity-in-difference' 'dialectical sort-of-way'; this is what links these two factors together, 'logically', in a 'Hegelian sort-of-sense'. So, Ei isn't now just Ei, it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1 (except, perhaps, that will need translating back into something a little more Hegelian -- maybe along these lines).

 

'Dialectical moves' like these highlight the necessary link between a cause and its effect(s), engineered in Hegel's theory by 'determinate negation'. So, these 'dialectical relations' reveal/express the 'logical' connection between a cause and whatever comes next in this (necessary) causal sequence/chain. Since Hegel imagined he had 'proved' this 'logically', he clearly didn't think it required confirmation from experience or from supporting evidence. So, for him, even if it isn't possible to observe these 'necessary' links -- after all, how could they be observed? -- they nevertheless must exist, if we are prepared to buy into this Idealist Fever Dream.

 

Empiricist-inspired denials of such links are what gave superficial plausibility to Hume's infamous attack on rationalist theories of causation (and, updated, they still accomplish it for Contemporary Empiricists). Hegel's theory nevertheless tells us these 'necessary' links are there since he had (presumably) shown they exist of necessity -- which seemed to him (and his acolytes) to be a perfect, a priori 'answer' to Hume, Kant and all subsequent anti-Rationalists.

 

[No, I am not claiming Kant was an anti-Rationalist! He merely denied we can know the ultimate causal nature of whatever it is that lies beyond experience. Hegel imagined he had shown that this was now possible.]

 

And that is why P 'contradicts' Ei: P doesn't simply just affect Ei; it fundamentally changes Ei from being Ei-that-causes-Ei+1 (its 'normal' casual relation to Ei+1) into Ei-that-causes-W1, and hence by implication, it also changes Ei-that-causes-Ei+1 into Ei-that-doesn't-cause-Ei+1 (that is, Ei's 'normal effects' are changed into their opposite), based on Ω7-Ω11:

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the normal course of events, let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

Ω11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of sub-events, W1-Wn.

 

So, the following now seems to be what emerges as a result of all this:

 

Ω12: It isn't the case that it is Ei that causes Ei+1;

 

which is, of course, the contradictory of:

 

Ω13: It is the case that it is Ei that causes Ei+1.

 

[I am well aware that this is unsatisfactory as it stands, since P can't 'contradict' Ei by altering it in the above manner, but this is the only way I can make sense of the idea that P could conceivably 'contradict' Ei. If anyone can make clearer sense of it, please enlighten me.]

 

So, the operation of P now means Ei fails to cause Ei+1.

 

But, if there are no necessary links here (and we have seen why there can't be any -- in Essays Seven Part Three, Twelve Part One and Thirteen Part Three), P can't affect Ei in this way. That is because, in any such eventuality, it isn't the case that it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1. And that in turn is because there is no such defining condition for Ei, and hence no such thing as is supposedly represented by the term "Ei-that-causes-Ei+1", to begin with, as we have just seen. If there are no necessary causes, it would be incorrect to identify Ei in this way --, i.e., as  Ei-that-causes-Ei+1, since Ei could be the cause of any one of these: A, B, C, D..., instead. Of course, this line-of-argument strikes at the heart of 'determinate negation' --  but that obscure notion was laid to rest earlier (i.e., in Essays Three Part One and Eight Part Three) -- and, as a result, it strikes at the heart of the 'dialectical theory of change'.

 

In short, because of the incoherencies of 'determinate negation', this entire way of viewing 'contradictions' falls apart (yet again!).

 

[But, the real problems lie much deeper even than this, as we will see in Essay Twelve Part Five.]

 

Of course, in an Ideal 'Hegelian Universe' (not our universe!) this 'theory' might be ironed out so that it (somehow!) works. I will pass no comment here on that bare possibility. Nevertheless, as we will see in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six, Hegel's 'theory' in the end collapses faster than a portfolio of Enron shares.

 

However, in the real world (the one in which Dialectical Marxists actually exist!), where we are told that change results from a 'struggle between dialectical opposites', and where everything supposedly changes into its 'opposite', this theory can't work (even in its own terms), as we have just seen.

 

In which case, P can't 'contradict' anything at all.

 

At this point, it could be objected that this entire approach to 'events', 'forces' and all the rest is completely misguided since it atomises the factors involved, putting them in rigid categories, compartmentalising and thus fragmenting the fluid, inter-connected nature of reality. In stark contrast, dialectics deals with the unified, fluid and organic nature of existence, which means it pictures interactions like those above in a totally different, albeit contradictory, light. Hence, the analysis presented in this Essay, and at this site, is totally wide of the mark.

 

Or, so it might be argued...

 

But, unless and until DM-apologists tell us with some clarity what it is they do intend, or what, for example, the "fluid nature of reality" actually amounts to (that is, over and above the phrase "fluid nature of reality" looking like an inappropriate metaphor -- or, indeed, informing us what that odd metaphor about 'fluidity' could possibly mean), that objection is itself devoid of content (since it contains several empty terms). [Anyway, it has been neutralised here.]

 

Independently of that, in what way does the phrase "fluid nature of reality" help explain how any of the forces involved in change are 'internally-related'? For example, how are force, P, and event, Ei, from earlier 'dialectical opposites'? How can a force be 'internally related' to an event? How is a thunderstorm, for instance, 'dialectically-linked' to a forest fire (also from earlier), even if the first extinguishes the second? They don't imply each other (like the proletariat and the capitalist class do, so we are told). Thunderstorms happen all the time with no forest fires anywhere in sight -- and vice versa. But there can be no proletariat without there also being the capitalist class (again, so we are told). Furthermore, thunderstorms don't turn into forest fires (nor vice versa), which they would do if the DM-classics were to be believed.

 

So, whatever else it is, the much vaunted 'fluid nature of reality' can't itself be 'dialectical'.

 

[The allegedly 'fluid nature of reality' will be examined in more detail in a later re-write of Essay Eight Part Three. It is reasonably clear, though, that this metaphor is based on Heraclitus's dogmatic 'theory' that 'everything flows'. But, we have already seen that Heraclitus solely 'derived' that 'universally valid' conclusion from what he thought was the case when someone steps into a river! So this DM-'principle' is supposed to be valid across all regions of space and time, even though all it is based on based on is an obscure mystic's 'thought experiment' about dangling his foot into a river! And, Heraclitus even got those details wrong! That is quite apart from the fact that we have also seen there are countless trillion particles in each microgram of matter that don't change unless acted upon externally. And, yes, I am fully aware that DM-theorists base their ideas about universal change on more than Heraclitus's fever dream, an issue I have tackled at length in Essay Eleven Part One. Readers are directed there for more details. The only point being made here is that this metaphor (concerning the 'fluid nature of reality' is based on Heraclitus's 'thought experiment'. whatever other 'evidence' is subsequently adduced in its support.]

 

Once again, faced with the above, there is a simple solution staring us in the face: Dialectical Marxists should tell us what, if anything, they do mean by their use of obscure, incoherent Hegelian jargon -- which hasn't been helped by the introduction of inappropriate figures of speech like this.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Alternatively, if forces affect one another externally (as seems to be the case), then, clearly, change can't be the result of 'internal contradictions'. On the other hand, if forces have an internal influence on each other (in some as-yet-unspecified way), and they change as a result of their own 'internal contradictions', then either they are composed of simple units that don't change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing internal to them can condition anything else 'internally', for there would be no such thing.

 

[The above conclusions were established in Part One.]

 

Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth -- Or Is It Too Few? blik

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; [HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context; FL = Formal Logic.]

 

It could be objected that these spurious results have been cherry-picked, tailored, and even deliberately skewed to fit a pre-determined result, the motivation behind which is clearly to malign DM, come what may. The choice of F24 (repeated below) is a prime example of this 'anti-dialectical' mindset.

 

In that case, the following could represent a much better way of picturing the oppositional and contradictory nature forces, which could even meet with approval from the DM-community (in fact, with suitable changes in wording, it is the line taken in Weston (2012), for example):

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.

 

[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]

 

This means that the 'contradictory' relation between two or more forces would operate along a sort of continuum, or sliding scale -- as it were -- with no fixed relation operating between them. The arguments presented above clearly make the link between 'contradictory' forces an "either-or", all-or-nothing sort of affair. But that isn't at all the case with dialectical contradictions or dialectical opposites.

 

Or so a counter-argument might go...56

 

At this point, an example from mechanics might help illustrate the complex relationship that is intended here: un-damped Simple Harmonic Motion. [SHM -- that link requires JAVA; try here if you have no JAVA installed (and scroll down the page!).]

 

Consider a body set in motion under the operation of two forces such that its acceleration is proportional to its displacement from the point of equilibrium and directed toward that point. Since the acceleration of this particle changes in proportion to its position, the net force operating on it must also change accordingly. This is due to the fact that the resultant force in this system is the vector sum of these two distinct but changing forces, which, at the equilibrium point [EP], counterbalance each other, but at any other point they either augment or partially 'nullify' one another, depending on the overall physics of the situation. Because these two forces work in opposite directions and cause the resulting acceleration (achieving this by their -- let us say for now -- 'dialectical interaction') we appear to have here an example of F37-type motion.

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.

 

[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]

 

In this highly simplified picture of just one type of motion, the forces present in the system appear to 'contradict' one another in complex, changing ways, just as DM seems to require. But, if this scenario actually does succeed in illustrating F24-, or F37-type 'contradictions', several untoward consequences also seem to follow from it:

 

(1) Clearly, this analogy means that 'contradictions' (just like forces) operate on a continuum. Hence, at any point along the path of the above particle (other than the EP), the net force operating isn't equal to the net force at any other point (in the same cycle). So, at a specific displacement, the modulus of the net force might be, for instance, 1% of its maximum; at another it might be 99% of it; while at a symmetrical location on the other side of the EP, the same would be true but in an opposite sense. Even so, it isn't easy to see how such a picture may be made to fit seamlessly into the DM-interpretation of the term, "contradiction". In addition, as we saw above, such a model would have unacceptable consequences for HM (involving, for example, the Nazis leading the fight against racism!).

 

(2) This trope depends on forces viewed as basic 'units of reality', as opposed to the product of the relations between bodies in motion.

 

[Recall, Option (2) here appears to be one that Engels himself rejected when he spoke of relative velocities replacing forces. However, if the term "force" is just a shorthand for relative motion (or if it depends on the presence of a "field"), then, as we have also seen, the 'dialectical unity of nature' would be thrown into question. On that basis, the links between bodies and processes would be external -- even while DM requires them to be 'internal', with such forces providing the 'connective tissue of reality' (as it were). However, if forces themselves depend on bodies in relative motion, reality would be fundamentally discrete, not continuous.]

 

But, DM-theorists have yet to tell us what the physical nature of a single force actually is. In general, Physicists themselves have ceased to use this word (except as a sort of shorthand, as noted earlier). If forces have no physical nature, can they really be part of nature? How could such 'useful fictions' feature in a materialist theory of the universe?

 

(3) This neat picture, tailor-made so that it is consistent with F37 (repeated below), obscures the complexity found in nature. Even so, it isn't easy to see how such a neat and tidy model could cope with systems of forces, which, given this view, indicate that several things must be 'contradicted' at once by countless others. Or, indeed, which also suggest that bodies and/or processes could have any number of 'contradictories'/'dialectical opposites'. That would, of course, divorce DM-type 'contradictions' completely from FL-contradictions and Hegelian 'contradictions'. While this might not be totally unacceptable to some, it would mean that the former sort of 'contradiction' would be even more tenuously linked to the latter (or, for that matter, linked with 'contradictions' that supposedly occur in everyday life). In that case, the meaning of the word "contradiction", as it is used by Dialectical Marxists, would be even more obscure than it already is. It would also imply that any object or process in nature had more than one 'opposite' at any point in time. The word "opposite" would thereby cease to have any clear 'dialectical meaning'. But, we have been here several times already.

 

Despite these niggling problems, it might be felt that F37, suitably modified, could still capture essential features of the 'contradictory' nature of 'opposing forces'.

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.

 

In order to investigate this alternative further, let us suppose that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57

 

F38: Let the first force be, F1, and the second, F2.

 

F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.

 

F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.

 

F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0. [t3 > t2 > t1. (As before, ">" used between each letter "t" means "later than"; elsewhere ">" means "greater than" and "<" means "less than".)]

 

[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]

 

F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the system, in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where no (relevant) net force exists.

 

But, as we saw earlier, we face immediate problems with this way of depicting forces -- i.e., those we encountered in relation to an inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects/structures like these (i.e., in connection with forces represented by vectors).

 

Ignoring that 'problem', too, it is worth pointing out once more that F40 implies there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only one force -- the resultant -- at work. On that basis, F37 would collapse for want of forces. As we have seen, no contradiction seems possible if only one force -- the resultant -- is present in the system. Still less if no forces are at work (as is the case in F40).

 

F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.

 

F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.

 

F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0. [t3 > t2 > t1. Again, ">" means "later than".]

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.

 

It could be objected that in the above both of the original forces (F1 and F2) still exist, since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in the system (as they do in F39 and F41). So, F27 is still valid.

 

The problem with any such reply is that it is difficult to see how the two original forces may also be said to exist alongside this third force -- the resultant --, whether the latter is zero or not. If they do exist in this way, there would plainly be three forces at work here, not two.

 

That would, of course, create energy out of nowhere.58

 

Admittedly, our ability to calculate resultant vectors/forces involves us in 'mathematically processing' the relevant components, but that doesn't mean nature itself does the calculating. If it did, that would clearly imply nature was Mind, or the product of Mind! No one, it is to be hoped(!), thinks that in nature there are three forces here where there once were only two. And yet, it is this third force that does all the work.

 

It could be objected that there is no third force at work here, no resultant. That is just how we express the relation between two genuine forces (or their components) in the system. Resultants are therefore just mathematical fictions -- or so it might be argued.

 

The drawback with that response is that resultant forces can be measured, and what subsequently happens to the bodies involved can be predicted from the magnitude and direction of that resultant. If we can reject resultant forces so easily, then what are we to say to those who reject forces altogether, even though they can also be measured and their effects predicted? Aren't forces in general just 'mathematical fictions' that we can edit out of nature in favour of the relative motion of bodies --, indeed, just as Engels concluded?

 

If we rid the world of resultant forces (as mathematical fictions), all forces would threaten to follow them out of the window. With that will go any attempt to equate 'contradictions' with 'opposing forces'. If the latter are in some way fictional, what does that say about the former?

 

Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or between the forces and relations of production), for example, produces a resultant third social force, the nature of which has, to this day, remained not just completely obscure, but totally unacknowledged. Based on this model, since all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this mysterious "third force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the utmost importance!59

 

It might be felt that this view of forces is simplistic in the extreme. In HM, social forces are far too complex to be represented as vectors, which means that the criticisms aired above are once again completely misguided.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

In response, it is worth recalling that the analysis developed in this Essay has been forced upon us (no pun intended) because Dialectical Marxists have so far failed to say what they mean (if anything) when they equate 'dialectical contradictions' with 'opposing forces'. Dialectical Marxists seem content to claim that 'contradictory forces' operate everywhere in the universe, even though that approach has been adopted in the absence of any clear or detailed account of the supposed relationships at work here. Except in connection with the proletariat and the capitalist class, no DM-theorist has even so much as gestured in the direction of 'dialectically' deriving one of the factors involved in a 'contradiction' (in nature or society) from any other, or show that one element in the relationship can't exist without the other. [Examples of this are given in Interlude Ten.] In its place, DM-supporters offer little other than assertion and assumption, with no attempt to explain the alleged 'dialectical relation' in any detail or with any clarity -- certainly not to the level explored in this Essay.

 

This means, of course, that erstwhile critics of this Essay are almost totally in the dark about their own theory and its implications! They are surely in no position to point fingers.

 

Is this not yet another example of DM-fans foisting their theory on nature and society?

 

[It is worth reminding the reader that the existence of opposing forces in society isn't being questioned by the present author (nor will it be), merely the assumption that they can be equated with, or modelled by, 'contradictions'. But see also Note 61.]

 

Apart from simply conforming to tradition -- as has been argued here -- DM-theorists appear to use the phrase "contradictory forces" in order to provide their theory with a scientific-looking veneer or façade -- thereby linking it to a genuine and successful sciences like Physics and Chemistry. Otherwise, why do it?

 

If that (seemingly impertinent) allegation is correct, it would be disingenuous of Dialectical Marxists to complain that the analogy given above (i.e., using SHM to illustrate changing forces) doesn't apply to social forces. If the word "force" wasn't meant to be taken in its usual scientific sense (as a vector), the analogy would indeed be inapt. But, in that case, the exact meaning of the word "force" (as Dialectical Marxists use it) would be even more opaque and obscure. If "force" isn't being employed in the way that physicists use it (as a vector), what other scientific way is there?

 

Anyway, as far as the complexity of social forces is concerned, the counter-argument (mentioned above) itself fails to address the problem of the identification of 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' in nature and society. If it is impossible to give a clear sense to an avowedly simplified picture of such forces as 'contradictions' (i.e., as they seem to operate in nature), more complex versions (applied in HM) stand no chance.

 

As has been pointed on many occasions at this site, if DM-theorists object to any of the comments made in this Essay, there is a simple, rather obvious remedy: they should say clearly and in detail for the first time ever what they do mean when they equate 'opposing forces' -- or the relations between them -- with 'contradictions'.

 

Moreover, such forces appear to be 'contradictory' when and only when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans with a certain level of aesthetic satisfaction (in that such a picture is triadic), but it would sink their theory faster than a lead-lined diving suit sinks a diver. That is because change would then be a result, not of contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.

 

And, as we have already seen, it is just as easy to describe such a set-up as 'tautologious' as it is to picture it as 'contradictory' -- even though both options should rightly be fed into the 'mystical-concept-shredder' as irredeemably anthropomorphic. Moreover, we have also seen that, whatever else they are, these forces aren't involved in a 'dialectical contradiction'/'relation' with each other since none of them implies the existence of any other -- again, unlike the alleged 'dialectical contradiction' between the proletariat and the capitalist class (so we have been told).

 

Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' turns out to be as misconceived as anything could be. When interpreted metaphorically it looks entirely inappropriate (if not paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally it crumbles into incoherence and confusion, even in DM-terms.

 

In order to avoid these difficulties we need to re-think everything. Perhaps the reconsideration of an alternative that was briefly examined earlier could provide DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting 'opposing forces' as 'contradictions'. However, before that promising alternative is re-examined in greater detail, it is necessary to counter an objection that should by now have occurred to the reader:

 

This entire analysis is abstract and fails to consider "real material forces".59a1

 

It is to this that I now turn...

 

Real 'Contradictions'?

 

Sinking In Concrete

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

As noted above, considerations like those aired above would stretch the patience of most Dialectical Marxists. Indeed, they would probably be the first to complain that this Essay has signally failed to consider real material, empirically verifiable contradictions --, and by this they generally (but not exclusively) mean the 'contradictions' at work in HM, in the class war and which help account for the dynamism in, and the development of, human history.

 

First of all it is worth reminding ourselves that many of the examples considered earlier were in fact typically concrete, and undeniably material! What else are gravity and magnetism, for instance?

 

However, if no sense can be made of 'contradictory forces' in nature (indeed, as we have seen), that automatically throws into question their supposed role in HM.

 

Now, as is easy to demonstrate, revolutionaries seriously, almost neurotically, overuse the word "contradiction" in their endeavour to depict, not just capitalism, but the class war in general. Dialectical Marxists seldom bother to justify their profligate application of this word to everything and anything they just happen to be discussing or analysing. Few, if any, attempt to show the relations, concepts, processes or objects in their preview are 'dialectical' by deriving one for the other (as they at least endeavour to do with the proletariat and the capitalist class). They seem content merely to assert that this or that is a 'contradiction' or a 'dialectical relation'.59b

 

You doubt this? Then check out the following:

 

Interlude Ten: Contradictions, Contradictions Everywhere!

 

Here are just a few examples of the aforementioned profligate use of the word "contradiction": 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (in this article alone there are fifty-five uses of the word "contradiction"!). There is a particularly crass list or examples posted here -- which link will take the reader to a site called Dialectics For Kids [DFK], so it can perhaps be forgiven somewhat for its sub-sophomoric level of ultra-simplification. Several more instances were itemised earlier (with even more below). Readers should also check out the handful of egregious examples aired in that embarrassingly poor film, Half Nelson, a movie not unconnected with the aforementioned site -- DFK. [Indeed, the director of that film is the son of the owner of DFK!]

 

Updates: December 2011 and October 2013: See also my recent debate with Mike Rosen (in the 'Comments' section at the bottom; organise them "Newest First"). [Unfortunately, that link is now dead!] See also here, again in the comments section at the bottom.

 

Here is another recent example:

 

"The current debate over stem cells provides a very good illustration of the contradictions inherent within capitalism. On the one hand it is capable of generating amazing new technologies. However, the amount of money flowing into stem cell research is still miniscule compared to that being used for developing new ways to kill people. A recent report concluded that while stem cell research was pioneered in this country, lack of funding was compromising the ability of British scientists to keep things moving forward in this area. Meanwhile, as the leader of the richest country on earth talks about the sanctity of a ball of cells, in Iraq the most sophisticated weapon systems are being used to murder real, living human beings." [Parrington (2007), p.9. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]

 

In fact, this illustrates the by-now-familiar fact that Dialectical Marxists like Parrington are only too ready to conflate 'contradictions' with unacceptable, paradoxical, irrational or unexpected events, as I pointed out in Essay Five.

 

Even in DM-terms this makes no sense: Does one 'half'/'side' of the above 'contradiction' struggle with the other? Does one turn into the other -- which they should do, if the dialectical classics are to be believed? Is George W Bush (mentioned as "the leader of the richest country on earth"), or even the rest of his class, about to 'develop' into a bunch of under-funded scientists, or new equipment, and vice versa? Does the one imply the other, such that neither can exist without the other? If so, Parrington was rather unwise to omit the evidence.

 

So, what is the 'dialectical contradiction' in the above example? What 'dialectical'/'logica;' argument proves we have here a pair of 'dialectical opposites' struggling with each other?

 

As they say in the US media: Crickets...

 

 

Figure Eleven: Dialectical Marxist Attempt Derive A Dialectical Contradiction.

Cue Tumbleweed, Cue Rustling Leaves, Cue Distant Church Bell...

 

Update, October 31/10/2021:

 

Not to be outdone, David Harvey thinks there are seventeen basic contradictions in capitalism, and here they are:

 

"The direct provision of adequate use values for all (housing, education, food security etc.) takes precedence over their provision through a profit-maximising market system that concentrates exchange values in a few private hands and allocates goods on the basis of ability to pay.

 

"A means of exchange is created that facilitates the circulation of goods and services but limits or excludes the capacity of private individuals to accumulate money as a form of social power.

 

"The opposition between private property and state power is displaced as far as possible by common rights regimes -- with particular emphasis upon human knowledge and the land as the most crucial commons we have -- the creation, management and protection of which lie in the hands of popular assemblies and associations.

 

"The opposition between private property and state power is displaced as far as possible by common rights regimes -- with particular emphasis upon human knowledge and the land as the most crucial commons we have -- the creation, management and protection of which lie in the hands of popular assemblies and associations.

 

"The appropriation of social power by private persons is not only inhibited by economic and social barriers but becomes universally frowned upon as a pathological deviancy.

 

"The class opposition between capital and labour is dissolved into associated producers freely deciding on what, how and when they will produce in collaboration with other associations regarding the fulfilment of common social needs.

 

"Associated populations assess and communicate their mutual social needs to each other to furnish the basis for their production decisions (in the short run, realisation considerations dominate production decisions).

 

"New technologies and organisational forms are created that lighten the load of all forms of social labour, dissolve unnecessary distinctions in technical divisions of labour, liberate time for free individual and collective activities, and diminish the ecological footprint of human activities.

 

"Technical divisions of labour are reduced through the use of automation, robotisation and artificial intelligence. Those residual technical divisions of labour deemed essential are dissociated from social divisions of labour as far as possible. administrative, leadership and policing functions should be rotated among individuals within the population at large. We are liberated from the rule of experts.

 

"Monopoly and centralised power over the use of the means of production is vested in popular associations through which the decentralised competitive capacities of individuals and social groups are mobilised to produce differentiations in technical, social, cultural and lifestyle innovations.

 

"The greatest possible diversification exists in ways of living and being, of social relations and relations to nature, and of cultural habits and beliefs within territorial associations, communes and collectives. Free and uninhibited but orderly geographical movement of individuals within territories and between communes is guaranteed. Representatives of the associations regularly come together to assess, plan and undertake common tasks and deal with common problems at different scales: bioregional, continental and global.

 

"All inequalities in material provision are abolished other than those entailed in the principle of from each according to his, her or their capacities and to each according to his, her, or their needs.

 

"The distinction between necessary labour done for distant others and work undertaken in the reproduction of self, household and commune is gradually erased such that social labour becomes embedded in household and communal work and household and communal work becomes the primary form of unalienated and non-monetised social labour.

 

"Everyone should have equal entitlements to education, health care, housing, food security, basic goods and open access to transportation to ensure the material basis for freedom from want and for freedom of action and movement.

 

"The economy converges on zero growth (though with room for uneven geographical developments) in a world in which the greatest possible development of both individual and collective human capacities and powers and the perpetual search for novelty prevail as social norms to displace the mania for perpetual compound growth.

 

"The appropriation and production of natural forces for human needs should proceed apace but with the maximum regard for the protection of ecosystems, maximum attention paid to the recycling of nutrients, energy and physical matter to the sites from whence they came, and an overwhelming sense of re-enchantment with the beauty of the natural world, of which we are a part and to which we can and do contribute through our works.

 

"Unalienated human beings and unalienated creative personas emerge armed with a new and confident sense of self and collective being. Born out of the experience of freely contracted intimate social relations and empathy for different modes of living and producing, a world will emerge where everyone is considered equally worthy of dignity and respect, even as conflict rages over the appropriate definition of the good life. This social world will continuously evolve through permanent and ongoing revolutions in human capacities and powers. The perpetual search for novelty continues." [Harvey (2014), pp.294-97; I have quoted the above from here. Spelling altered to agree with UK English.]

 

Does Harvey even attempt to derive any of the factors in the above list from any other in the same pair? Do any of them imply any of the others? Can each one exist without the other? Do they struggle with and then turn into one another? But, once more, all of those should happen on a regular basis if what the DM-classics say is correct.

 

Readers can check for themselves: Harvey simply asserts the above are contradictions; he nowhere makes any attempt to show they are even 'dialectical', let alone that they are any other sort of 'contradiction'.

 

But, that is just par for the course on Planet Dialectics.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Indeed, this word/concept seems to operate almost as a code word --, a Shibboleth -- the use of which signals to others of like mind that the one employing it belongs to their 'speech community' with its own distinctive and definitive jargon. This use of 'exclusivising language' helps define an 'in-group', which succeeds in excluding other who belong to the 'out-group', rather than demonstrate how and why such terminology genuinely applies in each case -- or in a way that 'reflects' anything at all 'concrete', which isn't imaginary.

 

[Why DM-fans do this will be revealed in Essays Nine Part Two and Fourteen Part Two.]

 

But, perhaps this, too, is a being little unfair?

 

In order to investigate the accuracy of the above allegations it might prove helpful to consider a few -- generally agreed upon -- examples of "real material contradictions in capitalism" that supposedly drive change and social development.60

 

Rees, OLLMAN And 'Concrete Forces'

 

[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998); HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

TAR, for example, opens with several apposite and well-observed examples of the irrational and destructive nature of Capitalism. As its author, John Rees, correctly points out, while life expectancy, for instance, has increased dramatically over the last hundred years or so (even in the poorest regions of the planet), other factors have grown alongside them that counteract or undermine such seeming progress:

 

"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction…. Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line? The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]60a0

 

Bertell Ollman had something similar to say:

 

"Like virtually everyone else in his day, Marx was astounded by the scope and rapidity of the changes that were occurring all around him, but also by their contradictory nature. The enormous growth in the production of wealth, for example, came along with an increase in the worst forms of poverty; progress in science and technology that had a potential for making work much easier only succeeded in speeding up the pace of work and lengthening the working day; even the increase of personal freedom due to the abolition of various feudal ties came on the back of an even greater decrease in freedom due to the unforgiving conditions in which people were forced under pain of starvation to live and work (or what Marx was later to call the 'violence of things'). Meanwhile, more and more of the world was becoming privatized, commodified, fetishised, exploitable and exploited, and alienated as 'all that is solid melts into air.'" [Ollman (2005); quoted from here. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; bold emphasis added.]

 

First of all, it is important to emphasise upfront that in what follows the validity of the above criticisms of Capitalism won't be questioned -- nor will the explanation given by Rees or Ollman for these and other intolerable aspects of the political, economic and social system that still dominates this planet. The sole aim here is to ascertain what, if anything, these two mean by calling such unacceptable developments "contradictions", or why they and other Dialectical Marxists insist on linking that word with material/opposing forces in nature and society.

 

Second, I have chosen the above passages since few DM-fans belonging to other wings of Marxism (whether they are Stalinists, Maoists, anti-Leninists, Orthodox Trotskyists, Libertarian Marxists or even Academic Marxists) would disagree that what the above two call "contradictions" are indeed contradictions. While they will certainly disagree over some of their causes, or even over what to do to remedy them, they will all characterise them in the same way as the above two authors, as 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

In what follows, I will focus mainly on Rees's remarks.

 

The Impertinent Explanation

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

Of course, a trite and impertinent answer to the question, "Why do DM-theorists use 'contradiction' in the way they do?" would be to point out that they do so simply because it is part of the 'Marxist tradition', employment of which helps define a DM-'in group', as noted earlier. It is perfectly clear that the use of this term is part of 'Materialist Dialectics' only because of contingent features in the lives of Marx and Engels -- i.e., those related to (i) when and where they were born, (ii) the class to which they belonged, (iii) how they were socialised and educated, and (iv) whose ideas/theories they studied -- specifically, Hegel's.

 

Hence, as fate would have it, the world-view adopted by Dialectical Marxist like Rees and Ollman was conditioned by their own "social being" -- as Marx himself pointed out. Had Hegel died of Cholera (or whatever it was that finally shuttled him off this "mortal coil") 45 years earlier than he actually left our company, does anyone really think we would be using "contradiction" in the way DM-theorists do? Would we even be bothering with 'dialectics'?60a

 

[Atheists often point out to believers (of all faiths) that the only reason they have adopted their particular belief system is because of when and where they were born and how they were socialised. We might perhaps say the same about the DM-classicists. (The evidence supporting that allegation can be found in Essay Nine Part Two.)] 

 

Be this as it may, because of the towering authority that Marx and Engels have (rightly) assumed on the revolutionary left ever since, all subsequent Dialectical Marxists talk, think and reason along similar lines. They find they have to use the obscure terminology bequeathed to them or risk being be accused of 'Revisionism', branded 'anti-Marxist', and maybe suffer political isolation, ostracism, expulsion, or, in some cases, far far worse.

 

[Or, of course, face the same sort of ritual abuse to which I am constantly subjected. Not that I am complaining; given what has been revealed in Essay Nine Part Two, I expect it and would be puzzled had there been none.]

 

In short, it is quite clear that DM-theorists (again, like Rees and Ollman) use obscure Hegelian jargon -- particularly "contradiction" -- because leading comrades have always used it; they are merely conforming to 'tradition', identifying their theoretical loyalties.

 

Naturally, the impertinent nature of that 'trite' explanation won't win much support among Dialectical Marxists -- not that is was expected either -- but since a less impertinent explanation stands no chance either, there is little to lose by advancing it here.

 

In that case, there is a pressing need to try to find a better reason why hard-nosed materialists should want to anthropomorphise nature and society in this manner, using terms drawn from Christian and Hermetic Mysticism -- such as "contradiction" -- in what is supposed to be a scientific theory.

 

Unfortunately, as we are about to discover, there isn't a better explanation why self-confessed materialists have allowed themselves to be conned into accepting the use of such jargon, or for employing it quite so indiscriminately -- as we have seen.

 

We have also seen that each and every attempt to render viable the analogy drawn between 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions' fall apart; hence, it should come as no surprise to witness the very same thing happen when we try to examine the use of "contradiction" in HM, below.

 

[Spoiler Alert: The result will be that, apart from the ideological and political motivations mentioned in the next paragraph, the impertinent reason mentioned above turns out to be the only option 'left standing'.]

 

[The political rationale underlying the use of "contradiction" will be examined in detail in Essay Nine Part Two (link above), but more generally in Essay Twelve (summary here), where the class-, and social-background of the DM-classicists will be examined in order to link the latter with the reason why they were -- and why subsequent Dialectical Marxists still are -- pre-disposed to accept such a threadbare, confused, ill-supported, badly-explained, decrepit, class-compromised and failed world-view. The political and ideological reasons -- over and above the impertinent explanation -- for this debacle have been exposed in Essay Nine Part Two, specifically here.]

 

Conflict Resolution

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

The underlying cause of the many absurdities capitalism has created is, as TAR rightly points out, the complex, changing interplay between the "material productive forces of society" and the associated "relations of production". [Rees (1998), p.2, quoting Marx.] That account of the driving force behind this rotten system (interpreted humanistically, in terms of the class struggle, shorn of every trace of Hegel), I totally accept.

 

However, this brings us no closer to understanding what it is about 'opposing (social) forces' that merits calling them 'contradictions'. Why turn a clear employment of an ordinary word, "contradiction", drawn from the vernacular, into an obscure concept, which forms part of a doctrine peppered with other unintelligible jargon imported from Mystical Idealism (i.e., phrases such as "determinate negation", "unity and identity of opposites", "identity in difference", "negation of the negation", "mediate", and the like) -- the use of which completely undermines our ability to explain change?

 

In HM, we can certainly make sense of the word "force" -- and even of words like "opposing" and "struggle" --, but what is there to gain by calling these 'contradictions'?61

 

Some might regard this as a perfectly harmless use of this word, but, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), in this instance there is no such thing just as there is no such thing as a neutral use of the word "oppression". We will also see in Essay Nine Part Two that this particular word 'allows' DM-evangelists to impose contradictory (even counter-revolutionary) tactics, strategies and theories on the party faithful in order to 'justify' and rationalise class collaboration, substitutionism, splits, expulsions, and even mass murder (among other things). These 'accommodations' and 'adjustments' were all based on the theory that if reality is contradictory, the Party should be, too. Indeed, as Lenin noted, this concept lies at the centre of, and cannot but affect, the party itself:

 

"The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts...is the essence (one of the 'essentials,' one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics.... The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute...." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

 

"Splitting" is here called an "essential" part of DM (and hence a core aspect of the 'dialectically-compromised' version of HM that has dominated Marxism for a century-and-a-half), with "struggle" described by no less a figure than Lenin as an "absolute". That must also involve the relations between comrades (how could it fail to do so?). Hence, an emphasis on intra-party strife and splitting sits right at the heart of Dialectical Marxism!

 

In that case, we needn't sit around waiting for the ruling-class to divide us, we are experts already!

 

But, why do we act surprised when the theory we are all told is essential to Marxism informs us to expect just such fragmentation, just such splits and divisions -- and that is precisely what has happened?

 

[An excellent example of the use of this theory to 'justify' a regressive political dogma (which would be roundly condemned if anyone else were to do it) is the way that Trotsky used 'dialectics' to justify the revolutionary defence of the former USSR on the (sole!) basis of its 'contradictory' nature as a "degenerated workers' state" -- a "workers' state" where workers exercised no power and were systematically oppressed and exploited for their pains. A man of Trotsky's great intelligence and political sophistication actually fell for this! Add to that his defence of the murderous invasion of Finland by the Stalinists. Another is the way that Ted Grant, for instance, used 'Materialist Dialectics' to 'justify' his confused and contradictory theory of 'Proletarian Bonapartism' (sic), which 'allowed' him to rationalise the substitution of the Maoist ruling-clique for the Chinese working class -- a topic I have debated here. (That link is unfortunately now dead!)]

 

So, these mystical concepts aren't 'innocent, neutral bystanders', as it were; their use helped turn Dialectical Marxism into a spectacularly unsuccessful, long-term, exemplary disaster.

 

[Notice the use of "helped" here. DM is just one of the reasons for the protracted failure of Dialectical Marxism.]

 

Where The Shoe Pinches

 

[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]

 

Nevertheless, the relevant part of the argument developed in TAR appears to be the following:

 

F42: Capitalism seems to offer unprecedented possibilities for human development.

 

F43: But, in reality Capitalism delivers only partial or faltering progress.

 

F44: Alongside this progress we have witnessed major regression.

 

F45: Thus, Capitalism actually delivers a mixture of progress and regression.

 

For Rees, it looks like the "contradiction" here is based on the fact that Capitalism holds out or creates certain possibilities, which it either can't fully deliver or can't provide at all. Almost invariably the opposite of what is promised (to the majority of ordinary working people, one presumes) actually unfolds.

 

Rees clearly believes that the involvement of opposites is important here: so, instead of peace we find war; in the place of prosperity we have poverty (where it need not be); the growth in human need isn't catered for by the incessant search for profit; the waste of human potential conflicts with the increased capacity society has for augmenting and satisfying its members' needs, and so on. Hence, it looks like 'contradictions' arise either from the incongruity that exists between what might be expected of Capitalism (presumably by those who don't understand its nature or who have yet to learn) and what it actually delivers. Or, perhaps 'contradictions' arise from the yawning gap that exists between the system's potential to satisfy human need and its obvious inability to do so (at least for the majority). In that case, while the forces and structures brought into existence by Capitalism seem capable of freeing humanity from want and oppression, ignorance superstition, just as they also appear to be inextricably linked with other forces and structures that create and intensify the opposite.

 

However, these by-now-familiar observations still leave the supposed link between 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions' entirely unclear. In order to clarify Rees's point we perhaps need to consider various plausible interpretations of what he might have meant.

 

There appear to be several distinct possibilities, among which are the following:

 

F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.

 

F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A as well as B and C.

 

[The denotation of the above capital letters will be revealed as the argument unfolds.]

 

Doubtless there are many other combinations that could be imagined along similar lines, but I think they will merely be elaborations on these six possibilities. I propose, therefore, to examine each of them in turn, beginning, naturally, with the first.

 

Not What The System Ordered

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

The first option was:

 

F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.

 

[F46a: Capitalism offers abundance, but delivers only scarcity (i.e., 'not-abundance', or 'non-abundance').]61ao

 

But, F46/F46a presents us with a scenario we have met already; it resembles several earlier unsuccessful attempts to solve the overall problem. As we discovered, whatever forces there are in the system that actually produce not A, no contradiction can arise between A and not A because A itself does not exist, since only not A will have been actualised in place of A. Nor can any forces that are at work in the system contradict what they themselves actually produce (viz., not A in this case) --, especially if whatever they 'offer' (i.e., A) doesn't exist.

 

F46 and F46a are, therefore, of no use in our search to find a viable way of equating 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions' in HM.

 

But, do these factors even struggle with and then turn into each other? Does abundance struggle with and turn into scarcity, or vice versa? But, they would do both if they were 'dialectical opposites' (according to the DM-classics). Once again: whatever else this is, it isn't a DM-'contradiction'.

 

An Apparent Contradiction, At Last!

 

[FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998).]

 

The second alternative went as follows:

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

This seems to be a little more promising since "A and not A" certainly looks like a genuine contradiction. However, because F47 appears to depict contradictory outcomes it can't illuminate the alleged contradictory connection between 'opposing forces' in nature and society that exist prior to their emergence (i.e., the emergence of A and not-A). That is because F47 is manifestly not about the forces themselves, but about their results, their effects.

 

So, even here, we don't seem to have 'contradictory forces'.61a

 

It could be objected that there are (opposing) forces in capitalism that produce just such opposites, and those forces can most certainly be described as contradictory. For example, competition forces individual capitalists to accumulate capital, but this accumulation has a tendency to reduce the rate of profit for the whole capitalist class. So, here we have one tendency imposed on individual units in the system (in order to maintain or increase their own share of surplus value), which, when actualised, produces the opposite result for the entire class. The search for increased profit only succeeds in eroding it in the long term.

 

Maybe so, but in what way is this a 'contradiction'?

 

It would be if this were the case:

 

Q1: Individual capitalists search for increased profits and they don't.

 

Or, this:

 

Q2: Profit both rises and doesn't rise at the same time and in the same respect.

 

But, no sane Marxist would argue in support of either of these as an example of what they mean by "dialectical contradiction".

 

Of course, Dialectical Marxists might be using the word "contradiction" in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense. If so, what is it? [On that, see here and here.]

 

It is worth emphasising at this point that I am not objecting to new or innovative uses of the word "contradiction" (or, indeed, any other word). [However, on this, see Interlude Fourteen.] Dialectical Marxists can certainly use words as they see fit (not that they need my permission or acquiescence!). But, if or when they do, they can't also claim to be using any of these 'new words' with their old meanings still locked in place. Hence, with respect to "contradiction", they can't also use it to justify claims about, say, the 'contradictory' nature of the former Soviet Union [fSU], either -- where that word is now being used in a more ordinary, familiar sense. [Although, it has to be admitted, not even that is certain! On that, see below.] If so, this new use of "contradiction" will bear no relation to its meaning in FL or ordinary language, which in turn implies that DL fails to 'surpass' both FL and 'banal common sense'. In fact, any such 'new use' of this word will mean DL by-passes FL, ordinary language and common sense. [I enter into this in much more detail here. See also here, here, and here.]

 

Not that ordinary language is the same as 'common sense', anyway.

 

Dialectical Marxists can't have it both ways. If their use of "contradiction" is indeed new, then 'dialectical contradictions' (whatever they are) can't be a 'superior form' of logical contradiction, as Hegel and all subsequent dialecticians appear to have believed.

 

[Although, there are Hegel scholars who deny this is what Hegel actually intended -- for example, Hahn (2007). Of course, it could be argued that the above assertion -- that "contradiction" is being used in a more ordinary, familiar sense when describing the fSU as contradictory, is seriously mistaken. That response will be covered in detail in Essay Nine Part Two.]

 

Once again, and far more importantly, do these forces, whatever they are, struggle with and then change into each other, which (once more!) is what the DM-classics tell us they must do?

 

Call these (supposed) forces, F1 and F2, respectively. If these they are capable of struggling with one another they must coexist. [Follow the above link for a detailed explanation, but it should seem reasonably clear that no force is capable of struggling with another force if that second force fails to exist!] If so, F1 can't change into F2 since it already exists! If it didn't, no struggle could take place.

 

[This general objection to the 'dialectical theory of change' has been expanded upon in extensive detail in Essay Seven Part Three, where I have responded to several objections, some obvious, some not so obvious.]

 

Independently of this, it is clear that we are once again talking about the effects of certain forces -- not the forces themselves -- being contradictory. In that case, it now seems clear that these forces are being described as 'contradictory' because their effects run contrary to expectations, not that they (i.e., the forces themselves) actually 'contradict' one another.

 

In fact, what we have here is one economic factor (the accumulation of capital) that somehow produces the opposite effect to what might be expected (by those who don't understand the nature of capitalism, clearly!), not two forces doing so, but with one of them predominating.

 

But, by no stretch of the imagination can this be the option we are looking for in our attempt to find out what Rees thought he meant. There aren't even two forces at work here!

 

[Or, if there is a second force operating here, Rees was rather coy about what it actually is!]

 

Nevertheless, this section is aimed at considering the last few alternatives left open to Dialectical Marxists in any endeavour to render their theory comprehensible, so F47 won't be abandoned just yet.

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

However, as noted above, F47 actually corresponds to a relation depicted abstractly in an earlier sub-section (i.e., between E1 and E2, in F6 to F9, reproduced below) -- but interpreted here concretely (albeit schematically).

 

In which case, it looks like we might at last have found a genuine interpretation of E1 and E2 that is undeniably 'contradictory' (if we now interpret "A" as "E1" and "not-A" as "E2").

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2, taken pair-wise respectively from each set, form oppositional couples.

 

Unfortunately, any apparent success turns out to be illusory since the conjunction of A and not A can't be considered contradictory until it is clear what (concrete) interpretation is to be given to the schematic letter "A" in F47. [Replacing them with other schematic letters, E1 and E2, for instance, is no help.]

 

At this point, it is worth recalling that we are searching for a literal interpretation of the term "contradiction" that will allow DL to surpass FL -- not a metaphorical or an analogical extension to this word, still less one that possesses a secondary or derivative connotation (or even one that possesses the 'special' DM-meaning that has yet to be explained, with any clarity). As should seem obvious, this search is of the utmost importance if we are to rescue from oblivion the idea that 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions' may be equated objectively -- and not, for instance, poetically, or in some other fanciful manner.

 

Clearly, there are several different ways of reading the expression "A and not A"; some of them will be contradictions, others not.

 

In what follows, I shall reference another example taken from TAR (quoted above), which seems to many DM-theorists to be a genuine contradiction (i.e., that which supposedly exists between wealth and poverty). In that case, this might involve interpreting "A" as "wealth", and "not A" as "not wealth" (it clearly can't be "not poverty"!). In that case, "A and not A" becomes "wealth and not wealth".62

 

Unfortunately, the problem with this way of interpreting "A and not A" is that it actually creates a phrase, not a clause, indicative sentence or proposition.63 As such, it can't be a literal contradiction.

 

[The vast majority of DM-supporters will fail to appreciate this point since their knowledge of logic is woefully defective. That, of course, hasn't stopped them pontificating about FL as if they were all latter-day Aristotles. (Oddly enough, the term, "Dunning-Kruger", comes to mind at this point!)]

 

The only apparent way to situate the schematic noun phrase -- "A and not A" -- in a propositional (or clausal) context (so that it can, at a minimum, qualify as a possible contradiction) would be to interpret it a little more loosely -- perhaps along the following lines:

 

F52: Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.64

 

As such, F52 would be a paraphrase of F52a:

 

F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not wealth.

 

Or perhaps even:

 

F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not wealth for others.65

 

F53 is itself short for:

 

F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism produces not wealth for others.

 

None of these look at all promising; they are not just stylistic monstrosities, their meaning is rather unclear. Anyway, F53 and F53a aren't contradictory -- that is, no more than, say, a tap would be contradictory if it supplied water to some but not to others, or no more than the claim that "opposing forces are contradictory" would itself be 'contradictory' if it convinced some but not others. No one would think they had been contradicted if they asserted that a certain factory, say, produced several batches of defective Widgets, and someone else clamed it also produced some that weren't defective.66

 

Anyway, F52a is far too vague as it stands -- it is certainly no more of a 'contradiction' than F53 and F53a were, and probably for the same reason. If sentences like these have no clear meaning, they can't possibly assist in any serious attempt to clarify DM. Hence, a further widening of the interpretation of "A and not A" is called for if we are to gain a clearer understanding of the implications of F47. Perhaps the following will suffice?

 

F54: Capitalism produces capitalists who are wealthy and Capitalism produces workers who aren't wealthy.

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

[F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not wealth for others.

 

F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism produces not wealth for others.]

 

As was the case with F53 and F53a, F54 isn't even a contradiction. Again, anyone who asserted the first clause of F54 -- "Capitalism produces capitalists who are wealthy" -- but who was then confronted with the second -- "Capitalism produces workers who aren't wealthy" -- wouldn't feel that they had been contradicted. That is plainly because the first clause is about capitalists, while the second is about workers. For F55 to be contradictory, it would have to be something like the following:

 

F55: Capitalism produces worker, W1 (or Capitalist, C1), who is both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.

 

But, quite apart from the fact that no one would assent to, or even want to assert F55, it has no clear meaning, either! The situation becomes no better even if it were re-written as:

 

F55a: Capitalism produces a set of workers, W (or Capitalists, C), who are both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.

 

It is reasonably certain that Rees meant neither F55 nor F55a.

 

[If he had intended either, it would be entirely unclear what he could possibly have meant by either of them!]

 

At best, F55 and F55a might be re-interpreted in a comparative sort of way, as follows:

 

F55b: Capitalism produces a set of workers, W, that is both wealthy (in comparison to a set of peasants, P) and not wealthy (in comparison to a set of Capitalists, C), at the same time and in the same respect.

 

But, F55b is no more contradictory than this would be:

 

F55c: John Rees wrote a book that is both long (when compared with the average short story) and not long (when compared with Das Kapital).

 

The observation that TAR is both long compared with the average short story and not long compared with Das Kapital is not, one imagines, what most DM-theorists mean by a 'contradiction'. If it were, their theory would plainly be based on logico-linguistic naivety, or even linguistic incompetence, and little else.

 

Consequently, it looks like F47 can't be shoe-horned into this ill-fitting dialectical boot, after all.

 

More problematic, however, is finding a convincing answer to the following question: Is either of the above factors going to turn into the other?

 

In the above example, is W going to turn into C, or C into W? Indeed, is wealth going to turn into poverty? But, if they were genuine 'dialectical opposites' or 'dialectical contradictions', they would. In which case, whatever else this is, it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction'.66a

 

Further attempts to interpret "A and not A" can be extended almost indefinitely. DM-enthusiasts are welcome to play around with that phrase as much as they like, the end result will be no different. There are no literally true contradictions that can be manufactured out of "A and not A" -- where these relate to the same person, persons, groups, forces, etc., etc. (in the same respect, at the same time), which will be acceptable to Dialectical Marxists. [As we saw was the case with F55/F55a, for instance.]

 

And as we have just seen, howsoever it is re-interpreted, "A and not A" can't even be a 'dialectical contradiction'!

 

In addition to the reasons given above: that is because, if a supposed 'contradiction' were held true, it would thereby (and on that basis alone) cease to be a literal contradiction. [Indeed, just as a Marxist would cease to be a Marxist is he or she fought alongside the White Army in 1920!] As was established in Essay Five, if such a 'contradiction' were ever to be encountered in everyday life, it would be viewed either as figurative or based on an undischarged ambiguity of some sort. There is no way to by-pass, circumvent or avoid this socio-linguistic convention, at least not without altering the meaning of the word "contradiction" itself. [On this, see also Interlude Eleven, below.] And, even that would be of little use to DM-theorists since such a move would 'solve' this 'problem' by means of yet more subjective, question-begging, 'linguistic tinkering' -- which would, of course, amount to imposing this aspect of DM on the facts.67

 

Interlude Eleven: Everyday Contradictions

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

Linguistic tinkering (of the sort we have witnessed so often at this site) creates 'contradictions' by fiat when what was required is an example of a real material contradiction -- not a reified linguistic expression for one -- hastily cobbled-together just to save the theory (or to re-confirm 'orthodoxy').

 

Nevertheless, some readers might object that the claim advanced earlier (i.e., that contradictions would normally be regarded as figurative or ambiguous, if held 'true') is itself both controversial and contestable.

 

Or, so it might be argued...

 

But, as Essay Five demonstrated, that approach is based on how we would respond -- and do so respond -- in ordinary life (and in the sciences) when faced with the odd things others sometimes say, especially with respect to contradictory statements they might come out with. Hence, that earlier claim (i.e., that contradictions would normally be regarded as figurative or ambiguous, if held 'true') is controversial only in the sense that some have thought to controvert it.

 

Whether it is contestable, we will have to see.

 

[There is a partial explanation of the background to the above approach (based on Wittgenstein's work), here.]

 

Naturally, this means that the earlier claim (to which the above objector took exception) isn't a consequence of the present author having been 'corrupted by Analytic Philosophy' (nor is based on an 'excessive tenderness toward the world'). On the contrary, it is informed by the way workers themselves speak, and how anyone not suffering from 'dialectics' converses in everyday life. Indeed, it is based on the way DM-theorists themselves would have to talk in order to make themselves understood (also in everyday life), let alone when they try to agitate or propagandise workers. [Substantiation for such sweeping statements will be given in Essay Twelve Part Seven; arguments in support were aired in Essay Five.]

 

Nevertheless, the following comments will test the patience of any Dialectical Marxists who might have made it this far. They will no doubt regard the examples of contradictions aired below as discursive-, not dialectical-, contradictions. That is, they will view them as purely linguistic, and hence of little interest, or use, when trying to understand, and then change, society. That 'concern' will be laid to rest in Essay Eight Part Three, where examples of the sort of 'contradictions' advanced by DM-theorists themselves (applied to nature, for instance) will be considered. [Anyway, much of Essay Five along with significant sections of Essay Eleven Part One were devoted to just such DM-'contradictions'.] The only reason the following material has been published is to remind us how we generally proceed should anyone utter (and try to mean, or attempt to regard as true) genuine contradictions in everyday life.

 

In that case, in order to illustrate how we would now handle such 'contradictions' (weird and wonderful contexts excepted), consider how worker, NN, would respond if she were faced with the following situation:

 

C1: Boss BB: "NN, you are being paid Ł9.50 an hour and not being paid Ł9.50 an hour."

 

C1a: "NN, you are being paid Ł9.50 an hour and not being paid Ł9.50 an hour."

 

[Of course, no one who isn't the worse for drink, drugs or mental confusion would speak like this, but other than the examples considered here, it isn't easy to cite actual (or plausible) instances where ordinary human beings (again, those not in the grip of some theory, or under the influence of Zen Buddhism, etc.) feel constrained to utter 'true contradictions' -- or, indeed, fully intend to utter 'contradictions' and genuinely mean them (experimental literature, poetry and second language errors (etc.) excluded).]

 

At first sight, in all likelihood C1 would be interpreted as a joke of some sort, a slip of the tongue, or a mistake. If BB insisted that none of the latter were the case, the only way to proceed would be to ask what on earth he meant by the sentence quoted in C1a. In the event, a viable explication of this particular, non-standard use of that quoted sentence might involve interpreting the word "paid", for example, in one of three ways:

 

(1) It might refer what NN was going to earn, regardless of whether or not she will ever receive the money. Hence, in a round-about sort of way, the sentence quoted in C1a could be alluding to the effect of taxation and other deductions from NN's pay. It might even refer to the boss's intention to pay the worker in 'kind'. Or:

 

(2) It could mean that although the money in question had been earned, it wouldn't actually be paid to NN for some reason. So, it might be withheld as a part of the boss's attempt to victimise NN for helping lead a successful strike, for example. Or:

 

(3) It could mean that although NN will be paid at the stated rate, the true value of her contribution to production can't be measured in cash terms. Hence, it might suggest that BB intends to reward NN with more than mere money (or maybe with none at all!) -- but, with his/her 'highest esteem', etc. A clue to this way of viewing the sentence quoted in C1a would be the inflection in the boss's voice -- a note of sarcasm or condescension, perhaps.

 

[Of course, there might be other ways of interpreting C1a, but the above seem the most obvious.]

 

However, 'contradictions' like this would never be regarded as literally true, for as soon as NN was actually paid the said money the second half of the sentence quoted in C1a would become false, which means that the conjunction of a falsehood with a truth (in C1a) could never become literally true (short of altering the meaning of several its key words -- or the meaning of any other terms used to assert that it is true -- or, indeed, without altering the meaning of "literal" itself). Weird and wonderful situations to one side, we wouldn't be able to make sense of anyone who thought that the outcome expressed by C1a could arise (save in the ways indicated above, etc.). Certainly, without Alternatives (1)-(3) -- or, perhaps, other options expressed by alternative plausible/implausible interpretations --, no worker (or anyone else, for that matter) would be able to understand the sentence quoted in C1a.

 

C1a: "NN, you are being paid Ł9.50 an hour and not being paid Ł9.50 an hour."

 

This brings us back to a difficulty DM-theorists will always face if they persist in holding (some) 'contradictions' true, or they continue to use the word "contradiction" in the loose and indiscriminate way to which they have become accustomed, where one minute they sort of half mean the word in its ordinary-, or even its FL-sense, the next they sort of half mean it in this new, and as-yet-unexplained, DL-sense. When we bring this word back to its ordinary meaning (thus following Marx's advice, quoted below), any sentences that express a contradiction -- if they are still to be regarded as (literally) true -- could only ever be understood in a non-standard way, or be disambiguated along lines suggested earlier (and here).

 

Exactly why we should want to bring words back to their ordinary meaning was made clear by Marx himself:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

In other words, unless we want to base our ideas on distorted language, it might be a good idea to take Marx's advice to heart.

 

If, on the other hand, the word "contradiction" is meant to be taken in a special or a technical (but as-yet-unspecified) sense, Dialectical Marxists risk being misunderstood at every turn. In such circumstances their words would fail to communicate anything determinate, especially if they hope to depict the kinds of situations that are familiar to ordinary workers and their families, or try to agitate/propagandise them. Furthermore, that risk will remain in place unless and until DM-apologists make it clear (and for the first time ever) what they mean by their odd use of this word, in such contexts.

 

This means that in practice, when faced with sentences like C1a, DM-theorists themselves would interpret the alleged "contradictions" they express in a standard way, in line with the vast majority of ordinary human beings; hence they, too, would paraphrase such contradictions away. Despite their commitment to DM, few (if any) Dialectical Marxists would understand the words attributed to the fictional boss (who uttered C1a) literally. In fact, only the most useless trade union organiser in history would allow such a boss to get away with the nonsense reported in C1a. Representing and defending the material interests of the working-class certainly doesn't mean that we let bosses off the hook by adopting, or accepting, a way of speaking that was invented by ruling-class hacks, card-carrying Mystics and confused Idealists.

 

C1a: "NN, you are being paid Ł9.50 an hour and not being paid Ł9.50 an hour."

 

However, socialists, who are usually alert to the dangers of class collaboration if and when they surface elsewhere, seem only too happy to allow ordinary language to suffer ideological contamination of this sort, when it comes to 'doing a little Philosophy'.

 

Even if Dialectical Marxists intend to take the word "contradiction" literally in sentences they use (never mind C1a), they themselves would struggle to explain what it was in nature or society that a 'true contradiction' could depict without helping themselves to yet more figurative (or 'philosophical') language. [On that, see Essay Eight Part One.]

 

If, per impossibile, they could avoid using any such language, and were able to give a literal explanation of their use of "contradiction", then the word "literal" would have to be taken non-literally!

 

In Essay Five we saw every attempt to unravel the confusions that plagued Engels's (brief, almost off-the-cuff) 'theory' of motion fail. It turned out that it was impossible to make sense of what Engels thought he might have meant by the words he used -- that is, if we attempt to take what he said literally.

 

[Any who disagree are invited to check out that Essay and then contact me with a detailed explanation of (i) where I go wrong and (ii) what the f*** Engels did mean.]

 

So, it is no big surprise to find that DM-theorists have remained consistently vague and equivocal about such a core aspect of DM for well over a century (and even longer of we throw in Hegel and his Groupies). There is in fact nothing that anyone could say, or could have said, to make the incomprehensible comprehensible. Just like 'the mysteries' of Transubstantiation and the Incarnation of Christ, DM-propositions resist all attempts at clarification. Indeed, as David Stove argued:

 

"If a statement 'p' is impossible to understand if taken literally, it will also be impossible to understand the statement 'So-and-so believes that p', taken literally. If you could understand the statement that knowledge is literally a poached egg, then you could understand the statement that Smith literally believes that knowledge is a poached egg; but since you can't understand the former, you can't understand the latter either." [Stove (1991), p.28.]

 

[However, readers should also check out the warning I have posted about Stove, here.]

 

At present, unless DM-theorists come up with the goods, it is impossible to understand anything they say about these mysterious 'dialectical contradictions'. Hence, it is equally impossible to understand anyone who tries to tell the rest of us that DM-theorists themselves understand what they mean.

 

Over the last thirty-five years, when I have made this point to DM-fans in 'debate', they tend to respond with something like the following:

 

"Just because you can't make sense of this use of 'contradiction' doesn't mean it makes no sense. Your failings can't be attributed to our theory!"

 

To which I invariably reply:

 

 "I agree. But in that case, help me out. What do you mean by your odd use of 'contradiction', for example?"

 

That is usually met with a barrage of abuse, silence, or further attempts at deflection. But in all the years I have been arguing with DM-fans, not one of them has been able to help me out. Not that I ever expected them to be able to do so -- or, no more than I expect Christians to explain with any clarity, or even candour, the precise nature of The Trinity.

 

At this point, DM-apologists might be tempted to complain about the continual use of contradictions drawn from FL to make points against their use of "dialectical contradiction". The obvious response to this is (once again!) to request a clear explanation of what a 'dialectical contradiction' itself could possibly be so that those advancing this complaint could themselves convince critics that they actually mean something (anything?) by that term, as opposed to their having used an empty string of words for over a hundred and fifty years, just because it is traditional to do so.

 

Until then, the volunteered complaint (recorded at the beginning of the previous paragraph) would itself be devoid of meaning -- since it contains a phrase that is so far meaningless, "dialectical contradiction".

 

Dialectical Marxists might just as well use "schmontradiction" for all the good it does.

 

Finally, the claim that there literally are 'true contradictions' (advanced by philosophers like Graham Priest) will be examined in a later Essay. [However, it is a moot point whether the examples (and the paradoxes) Priest considers are, or ever could be called, "dialectical". Strike that; they aren't.]

 

[Until then the reader is directed toward the following: Goldstein (1992, 2004), Slater (2002, 2007b, 2007c), and this review, by Hartry Field. Field has now published a book about the paradoxes, where he shows that the Dialetheic and Paraconsistent Logics that Priest favours and promotes can't even handle the paradoxes of truth, which had been one of the main motivators for launching this branch of non-standard logic -- i.e., Field (2008), pp.36-92.]

 

[An entire sub-section on 'dialectical contradictions' that used to appear here has now been moved to Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Opposite Tendencies I

 

Returning to John Rees's quote, F48 might be the (favourable) reading we are searching for?

 

F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.

 

Unfortunately, as we have seen several times already, since A doesn't exist -- Capitalism not having delivered it --, it can't 'dialectically contradict' B. This means that F48 doesn't appear to be a viable reading of Rees's intentions, either. Even if B 'contradicted' any of the forces and/or processes already present in the system, that would just return us to where we were when we considered several earlier scenarios, such as the following (but substituting the word "society" for "nature"):

 

F6a: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in society.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2, taken pair-wise respectively from each set, form oppositional couples. 

 

It looks like this is yet another dialectical dead-end, for here we have even more non-existents 'contradicted' by existents.

 

Opposite Tendencies II

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

Perhaps F49 will provide us with a DM-lifeline?

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

This seems a little more promising; but looks can be deceptive.

 

If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we would appear to have the following:

 

F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.68

 

But, before F49 and F63 can themselves be examined we need to make another brief detour.

 

Interlude Twelve: Opposites, Again?

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

[This follows on from Interlude Five and depends on the conclusions reached there.]

 

But, are opposites always contradictory? At this moment I am sat in front of my computer looking at the house opposite. Is my house therefore in some sort of 'struggle' with that house? Or, indeed, am I 'struggling' with it? Does it even 'contradict' me and/or my house?

 

A little unfair? Certainly. Indeed, DM-supporters would be the first to point out that the opposites they regard as contradictory are those that are involved in a dialectical union of some sort (i.e., each forms a UO). Since my house and the one opposite aren't so linked (and neither am I), they aren't therefore in 'struggle', don't 'contradict' one another, nor could they.

 

Well, how do we know? Clearly we don't. Nature often surprises us. Anyway, isn't everything inter-connected in DM?

 

Be this as it may, consider the opposite sides of an equilateral triangle (one that has been carefully drawn on paper, so this isn't an abstract example). Such a triangle has two opposite sides; do they 'contradict' each other? Are they both battling against the third side, or with one another? Here, these sides are both physically-, and logically-, or 'internally'-, linked: (i) They are inter-connected, and (ii) they imply one another -- otherwise this wouldn't be a triangle! Even so, they steadfastly refuse to contradict one another. If we now extend this example to cover more complex manifolds, similar 'difficulties' multiply alarmingly.

 

But, once again it could be argued that this latest batch of counter-examples aren't even remotely relevant since the items involved aren't dialectico-logically linked.

 

Well, it seems then that only certain logical connections are allowed to be or to constitute a DM-UO, which means that objects and processes that are merely physically-, or even those which are formally-, connected (as they are in such shapes) can't be (automatically) described this way.

 

However, on a purely empirical basis, since no house has yet been observed to be engaged in a life-or-death struggle with another property across the way, can they be ruled-out conclusively (as UOs)? Who is to say? And yet, who has ever actually witnessed a set of use-values slugging it out with a set of exchange-values? Or seen 'appearances' locked in a life-or-death struggle with 'underlying essences'? Or even witnessed a billiard ball battle with itself as it rolls along? But, which Dialectical Marxist would now disagree with Engels -- who claimed that motion like this is contradictory -- simply on the basis that it is impossible to observe that alleged contradiction? If so, empirical niceties (such as observation) can't in the end be crucially important, in such cases.

 

We are still in the dark, therefore.

 

Some might object to the banal examples covered in this Essay. But Hegelian opposites look pretty banal themselves (and so do those that litter most DM-texts -- for example: opposite poles of a magnet, males and females, up and down, seeds that negate plants, etc., etc.) -- and they don't work, either, even in their own terms.

 

Oddly enough, and by sheer coincidence (I'm sure), acceptable 'dialectical opposites' turn out to be (by-and-large) those dreamt-up by Idealist Philosophers thousands of years ago (and, indeed, by those who lived more recently). Now, since this doctrine (that there are UOs everywhere) is also a core precept of Hermeticism, that should be enough to malign it in the eyes of anyone concerned to remain consistent with atheistic materialism:

 

"For everything must be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise." [Copenhaver (1995), p.32. Bold emphasis added. (This has been quoted from here. These are the words of an Ancient Greek, or possibly even Egyptian, Mystic, Hermes Trismegistus.)]

 

[In fact, pointing out that DM has appropriated the ideas of previous generations of Mystics and Idealists has absolutely no effect on Dialectical Marxists. (Why that is so will be revealed in Essay Nine Part Two.)]

 

To test this allegation, readers should now try to spot the difference (over and above a handful of superficial, stylistic variations) between the following two passages:

 

"CHAPTER X POLARITY 'Everything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled.' -- The Kybalion.

 

"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle -- the Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,' and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree'; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything

 

"Light and Darkness are poles of the same thing, with many degrees between them. The musical scale is the same-starting with 'C' you moved upward until you reach another 'C,' and so on, the differences between the two ends of the board being the same, with many degrees between the two extremes. The scale of colour is the same -- higher and lower vibrations being the only difference between high violet and low red. Large and Small are relative. So are Noise and Quiet; Hard and Soft follow the rule. Likewise Sharp and Dull. Positive and Negative are two poles of the same thing, with countless degrees between them....

 

"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests; everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.

 

"The great Third Hermetic Principle-the Principle of Vibration-embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the Universe-that nothing is at rest-that everything moves, vibrates, and circles. This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.

 

"The Hermetic Teachings are that not only is everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences' between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL, in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter. Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes of vibration.

 

"Modern Science has proven that all that we call Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion. Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in matter and energy.

 

"In the first place, science teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same things-it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes. The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc., which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first has been posted here; the second here. Spelling altered to conform with UK English. For more quotations along the same lines (taken from other mystical systems/theorists), see here and here.]

 

Compare the above with this:

 

"The Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites

 

"Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic co-existence of opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life and motion. That was already understood by Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.) two and a half thousand years ago. It is even present in embryo in certain Oriental religions, as in the idea of the ying (sic) and yang in China, and in Buddhism. Dialectics appears here in a mystified form, which nonetheless reflects an intuition of the workings of nature. The Hindu religion contains the germ of a dialectical idea, when it poses the three phases of creation (Brahma), maintenance or order (Vishnu) and destruction or disorder (Shiva). In his interesting book on the mathematics of chaos, Ian Stewart points out that the difference between the gods Shiva, 'the Untamed,' and Vishnu is not the antagonism between good and evil, but that the two principles of harmony and discord together underlie the whole of existence.... In Heraclitus, all this was in the nature of an inspired guess. Now this hypothesis has been confirmed by a huge amount of examples. The unity of opposites lies at the heart of the atom, and the entire universe is made up of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. The matter was very well put by R. P. Feynman: 'All things, even ourselves, are made of fine-grained, enormously strongly interacting plus and minus parts, all neatly balanced out....' The question is: how does it happen that a plus and a minus are 'neatly balanced out?' This is a contradictory idea! In elementary mathematics, a plus and a minus do not 'balance out.' They negate each other. Modern physics has uncovered the tremendous forces which lie at the heart of the atom. Why do the contradictory forces of electrons and protons not cancel each other out? Why do atoms not merely fly apart? The current explanation refers to the 'strong force' which holds the atom together. But the fact remains that the unity of opposites lies at the basis of all reality.

 

"Within the nucleus of an atom, there are two opposing forces, attraction and repulsion. On the one hand, there are electrical repulsions which, if unrestrained, would violently tear the nucleus apart. On the other hand, there are powerful forces of attraction which bind the nuclear particles to each other. This force of attraction, however, has its limits, beyond which it is unable to hold things together. The forces of attraction, unlike repulsion, have a very short reach. In a small nucleus they can keep the forces of disruption in check. But in a large nucleus, the forces of repulsion can't be easily dominated.... Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the 'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion; north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and anti-matter; male and female in biology; odd and even in mathematics; even the concept of 'left and right handedness' in relation to the spin of subatomic particles. There is a certain symmetry, in which contradictory tendencies, to quote Feynman, 'balance themselves out,' or, to use the more poetical expression of Heraclitus, 'agree with each other by differing like the opposing tensions of the strings and bow of a musical instrument.' There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract....

 

"Moreover, everything is in a permanent relation with other things. Even over vast distances, we are affected by light, radiation, gravity. Undetected by our senses, there is a process of interaction, which causes a continual series of changes. Ultra-violet light is able to 'evaporate' electrons from metal surfaces in much the same way as the sun's rays evaporate water from the ocean. Banesh Hoffmann states: 'It is still a strange and awe-inspiring thought, that you and I are thus rhythmically exchanging particles with one another, and with the earth and the beasts of the earth, and the sun and the moon and the stars, to the uttermost galaxy....' The phenomenon of oppositeness exists in physics, where, for example, every particle has its anti-particle (electron and positron, proton and anti-proton, etc.). These are not merely different, but opposites in the most literal sense of the word, being identical in every respect, except one: they have opposite electrical charges -- positive and negative. Incidentally, it is a matter of indifference which one is characterised as negative and which positive. The important thing is the relationship between them....

 

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter. The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), pp.64-68; quoted from here. Several paragraph merged; links added. The page number for this passage is slightly different in the 2nd edition.]

 

"'Everything Flows'

 

"Everything is in a constant state of motion, from neutrinos to super-clusters. The earth itself is constantly moving, rotating around the sun once a year, and rotating on its own axis once a day. The sun, in turn, revolves on its axis once in 26 days and, together with all the other stars in our galaxy, travels once around the galaxy in 230 million years. It is probable that still larger structures (clusters of galaxies) also have some kind of overall rotational motion. This seems to be a characteristic of matter right down to the atomic level, where the atoms which make up molecules rotate about each other at varying rates. Inside the atom, electrons rotate around the nucleus at enormous speeds.... The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based upon contradiction. Whereas traditional formal logic seeks to banish contradiction, dialectical thought embraces it. Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites...." [Ibid., pp.45-47; quoted from here. Paragraphs merged. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Again, the page number for this passage is slightly different in the 2nd edition.]

 

Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed the same low level Mickey Mouse Science prominent in the Hermetic Tract that we also find in DM-literature, exemplified above by comrades W&G.

 

Even so, a century-and-a-half after Engels and Plekhanov concocted this theory, Dialectical Marxists have still made no attempt to explain with any clarity what it could possibly mean to suggest that 'dialectical opposites' 'contradict each other'. For example, who taught those opposites to speak?

 

Another unfair anti-DM talking point?

 

Not so.

 

Not, unless Dialectical Marxists mean something different by their use of "contradiction", which they have so far studiously kept to themselves. If these 'opposites' do indeed 'contradict' one another, they must be able to talk.

 

[On this, see here, Interlude Eleven and Essay Eight Part Three -- where I have published a lengthy analysis of the best pro-DM account of UOs I have encountered in over 35 years, i.e., Lawler (1982); readers are referred to that Essay for more details. There is also more on this in Essay Seven Part One. In addition, check out the analysis of Kant's concept of "real negation" in Appendix A. Also: since writing much of this Essay I have found out that this topic (concerning DM-UOs) is covered in detail in McGill and Parry (1948). (This link will automatically download a saveable PDF of that article.) Several thoughts about the latter will be added to future re-write of Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Returning to the main feature, once more; here again is F49:

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty", we obtain the following:

 

F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.

 

However, there are several problems with that paraphrase and, indeed, with this alternative. One such concerns the supposition that capitalism actually does offer wealth to all. Admittedly, for propaganda purposes its ideologues often claim it does, but who believes them? Certainly, blatant lies like this can't be part of an HM-analysis of Capitalism.69

 

The following might therefore be regarded as a more acceptable option:

 

A1: Capitalism has the potential to offer wealth to all but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.

 

[F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.]

 

In fact, that alternative has already been considered; it is just a variant of F49a. Once again, an unrealised potential can't contradict anything (in the sense that DM-theorists require), since it doesn't exist. So, even if it were true, A1 would be of no help in an attempt to understand what Dialectical Marxists mean by their equation of 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' (in HM).

 

Of course, this raises wider questions about the semantic status of propositions about non-existents. That topic will be entered into in greater detail in Essay Twelve, but for present purposes we need only consider the following:

 

It might now be argued, for instance, that the fact that there will be a sea battle tomorrow is contradicted by the fact that there won't be one -- to use Aristotle's example. Neither of those scenarios is actual, but that doesn't stop them from contradicting one another.

 

Or so it could be maintained...

 

Certainly, those two sentences look contradictory (who has ever denied it?), but the question is, can both be true? That would have to be the case if this were an example of a 'dialectical contradiction'. In addition, and not insignificantly, they would have to imply each other (like the proletariat implies the capitalist class, so we have been led to believe), which they clearly don't.

 

Once again: whatever else this, it isn't a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

[The reader is also referred to the discussion below concerning the distinction between "contradictory" and "contradiction".]

 

DM-enthusiasts regard their 'contradictions' as real material forces ('dialectical contradictions' are supposedly a consequence, or they are the effects, of such forces -- even though Dialectical Marxists are 'a little unclear' about the fine details, as we have seen), and these forces can only "contradict" (in the DM-sense of that word) whatever they can -- or, rather, whatever they actually -- interact with, which (clearly) means that they have to co-exist -- as, indeed, Mao himself pointed out:

 

"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below'.... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'how opposites can be and how they become identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity." [Mao (1937), p.338. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Indeed, as Ira Gollobin agreed (quoting Engels):

 

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.113; the first quote is from Engels (1954), p.72; second is from Engels (1891), p.286. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

The proletariat could hardly 'contradict' the capitalist class if one of them didn't exist! [Not that only one of them could exist, according to Dialectical Marxists!] The same must be the case with the forces and relations of production, and, indeed, with forces of attraction and repulsion.

 

Hence, while propositions about unrealised potentialities (or 'tendencies' -- or even sentences about future contingencies) might be contradictory (in the sense that they can't both become true or both become false, at once and the same respect), in DM-terms, an unrealised potential (or a non-actualised 'tendency') can't 'contradict' (in the sense that it could actively oppose) something that didn't itself exist.

 

While it is possible to speak about 'contradictory tendencies' in an object or process, the point of referring to these as "contradictory" is that they can't both be actualised at once (and in the same respect). So, for example, while it is possible for one end of a rather long iron bar to cool down while the other end is being heated (at the same time), it makes no sense to suppose that the same section of that bar (which could be specified in terms of precise volume intervals) could be in both states at once (and in the same respect).

 

[If anyone thinks differently, they should contact me with their best shot. On the alleged 'contradictory tendencies' in capitalism, see here, here, here, here, and here.]

 

Perhaps then F49 should be modified along the following lines:

 

F57: Capitalism develops productive forces capable of delivering wealth to all, but it actually delivers wealth to a minority and poverty to most of the rest, where wealth and poverty are opposites.

 

[F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.]

 

[Of course, "poverty" can also be interpreted as "relative poverty", etc.]

 

However, in F57 we are confronted with a subtle change in the way that the "A" of F49 has been interpreted in the opening clause; it now stands for "develops the productive forces capable of delivering wealth to all", but, in the last clause it simply stands for "wealth", as before. Hence, F57 is actually an interpretation of the following schematic sentence:

 

F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C instead, where B and C are opposites.

 

Or perhaps even:

 

F49b: Capitalism develops D (which has the potential to generate B or C), but in the end it produces B and C, where B and C are opposites.

 

Here, the 'contradiction' would either seem to be between:

 

(a) The capacity Capitalism has for delivering/producing wealth and its actual delivery/production of poverty; or,

 

(b) The wealth it delivers to, or produces for, some and the poverty it delivers to, or imposes on, the rest.

 

In the first case, clearly we don't have a contradiction. That is because, as we have just seen, a capacity is an unrealised potentiality, and, as such, it can't contradict something which does exist -- no more than, say, a woman's un-actualised capacity to play the flute contradicts her actualised mastery of the piano, or even her actualised state of not having a flute -- or, indeed, her not being able to play the flute while she has to make do with a piano.

 

Alternative (b) isn't a contradiction either, however much it offends our sensibilities. It is no more a contradiction than, say, Ł10,000 ($13,000) in one pocket contradicts Ł0.15 ($0.20) in another. Or no more than a Ł5 (or a $10) note in a millionaire's wallet (assuming that is all she has on her at the time) contradicts the Ł1000 ($1300) in a worker's pocket (who has just won an injury compensation claim) -- even if these two are sat next to each other at a UK Labour Party rally. To call these "contradictions" would be bizarre -- even in DM-terms! Do they 'struggle' with one another? Do they turn into each other? Does each imply the existence of the other? But they would do all of those if they were 'dialectical'.70

 

As we saw earlier, anyone who thought otherwise would simply be advertising their own logico-linguistic naivety, if not perversity.

 

In any case, as we have also seen, there can be no literal contradiction between something that doesn't exist (i.e., the prospect of wealth under Capitalism, where that is meant to be 'wealth for all') and something that does exist (i.e., the mixed fortunes of those who have to endure conditions as they are).

 

Despite this, it might still be felt that the situation isn't as bad as the above remarks make out. The emphasis in F49 is on what Capitalism actually delivers, not on what it genuinely (or otherwise) offers. If "wealth" and "poverty" are real opposites, F49 would still be a viable option in the way DM-theorists intend -- or, so it might seem.

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

Unfortunately, that rather desperate alternative reading diverts attention away from supposedly 'contradictory forces' and onto their effects, once more. In that case, the nature of the direct relation between whatever forces there are in the system that produce such effects is still obscure. Nor are they the least bit contradictory.

 

Nevertheless, even when consideration is given to effects like these (or the relation between them), a nagging question still remains: Just what is so contradictory about wealth and poverty existing side by side? Admittedly, for any half-decent socialist such a state of affairs is as intolerable as it is indefensible, but there still doesn't seem to be a literal contradiction involved here. Admittedly, it may be paradoxical (but not to a Marxist), but, the truth of an assertion that of one of these alleged opposites exists doesn't entail that an assertion that the other opposite also exists is false, as would have to be the case if a literal contradiction were intended. Again: they don't appear to imply one another, like the proletariat and the capitalist class supposedly do, either.71

 

If, on the other hand, we wish to re-define the word "contradiction" so that it becomes the equivalent of "paradoxical", "unjust", "contrary to expectations", "deplorable" (etc., etc.), all well and good. But that would merely concede a point that has been made several times in these Essays: that social reality only turns out to be 'contradictory' because of repeated examples of linguistic tinkering, which once again means the claim that DM-'contradictions' haven't been imposed on the facts will have to be withdrawn. Viewed this way, DM-'contradictions' would, at best, either be figurative or they would depend on the use of a word ("contradiction") that has been 'redefined' in order to produce the 'right result'.72

 

Interlude Thirteen: Ordinary Language

 

[RL = The Present Author; FL = Formal Logic; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

Of course, on a similar basis, someone might (foolishly) try to 're-define' their financial status by declaring that their bank balance of Ł5 ($7) was really one of Ł1,000,000 ($1,300,000). While a recklessly audacious ploy like that might make an ideal millionaire out of a fake one, it will have no real impact on their finances -- except, perhaps, negatively, when they are found out.

 

Since the ordinary word "contradiction" already has a meaning -- or, even a range of meanings -- in everyday life, redefining it in ways that are unconnected with the latter (as DM-theorists try to do) similarly has no real effect on the world, no matter how ideal a temporary 'fix' it might provide for an ailing theory -- or even for desperate theorists.

 

In response, it could be argued that Dialectical Marxists are at liberty to use (and/or re-define) words as they see fit; it isn't up to the 'thought-police' (represented here by RL) to try to stop them.

 

As we have seen, DM-theorists can certainly use words as they please (not that they require anyone's permission), but they can't then appropriate meanings for these newly re-configured words that apply to other words that already have an established use, which they then try to emulate, import, borrow, co-opt, purloin, or replace. So, Dialectical Marxists aren't at liberty to claim their use of "contradiction" is in any way connected with its ordinary use, or even with the role it occupies in FL --, not without causing confusion, but, mercifully (so far) only to themselves.

 

In that case, the novel and idiosyncratic use of "contradiction" by Dialectical Marxists (and, indeed, Hegelians, when they too finally make up their minds what they mean by this word!) requires an explanation, since the connections this word once enjoyed with its supposed vernacular-, or FL-'twin' have long since been severed, leaving it adrift and hence meaningless. The semantic role it supposedly occupies, concerning which DM-theorists have so far failed to specify -- not that they have been trying too hard to provide one for well over a hundred and fifty years -- seems to be permanently locked in obscurity.

 

[In fact, rather too many DM-fans become abusive when asked to explain themselves. On that, see here and here.]

 

And, that is why I have repeatedly asked for such clarification in this Essay.

 

However, as a matter of fact, it turns out that Dialectical Marxists aren't using "contradiction" in 'any way they please'. Their (rather distinctive) jargon has a chequered history and an even more suspect origin, which means much of it already has a specific (if vague and confused) meaning, which DM-theorists had no part in establishing. Just like those who use terminology associated with, say, The Christian Trinity -- which, unsurprisingly, slithered out of the same Neo-Platonic cesspit that also helped give birth to Hegel's dialectical daydreams --, DM-theorists have imported this particular word (i.e., "contradiction") from the Hermetic/Hegelian Tradition -- fortified by the confused ramblings of other Mystics --, which means DM is a direct descendant of Mystical Christianity and obscure Neo-Platonism --, their poor relation, in fact.

 

Dialectical Marxists should feign no surprise, therefore, when they are accused of being covert mystics; they certainly can't explain what their words mean in comprehensible terms -- using the vernacular (as Marx enjoined, quoted below) -- which means their jargon is as big a mystery to them as it is to the rest off us!

 

Those who think that ordinary language is far too vague, ambiguous, and limited to be of any use (in such rarefied philosophical/theoretical contexts) should read this and this, and then perhaps think again.

 

Failing that, then they should perhaps take issue with Marx himself:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world...." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites; LIE = Linguistic Idealism; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context; FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

Returning to the main feature, once again: on the other hand, if the word "contradiction" possessed a technical, unique or special, 'dialectical meaning' -- which supposedly allows for its (legitimate) use in DM and HM -- then Dialectical Marxists need to come clean, and, for the first time in over two centuries -- i.e., if we include Hegel and his Groupies in on this -- explain in ordinary terms exactly what this key term does mean.

 

Sceptical anti-DM-ers (like the present author) won't be holding their breath waiting for an answer...

 

However, in response it could be argued that the dialectical use of "contradiction" implies opposition or tension, which is what the accumulation of wealth (alongside increasing poverty) actually induces.

 

But, even though "wealth" and "poverty" are opposites (in an ordinary sense), they don't seem to oppose each other in an active way, as one would expect should be the case if they genuinely illustrated the equation of 'dialectical contradictions' with 'opposing forces'. Admittedly, poverty acts as brake on the productive forces at certain points in history (warping both the development of, and the opportunities for, those who have to endure it, etc.), which stokes up resentment, class hatred and (as a result) foments 'labour unrest'. But, over and above the influence such circumstances have on human agents, these lifeless concepts appear to have no active connection with each other. Without doubt, the material conditions such concepts might be used to express or 'reflect' could very well create tension in those who have to endure them, but none of the latter would describe what they feel by using the word "contradiction" -- unless, of course, a fast-talking DM-Evangelist had already sold them on the idea. In ordinary language, the word can't be given any such meaning without altering the sense it already has.73

 

Furthermore, if the above considerations are meant to be read as a new gloss on F49 (by way of illustrating the alleged 'contradiction' between E1-, and E2-type events discussed earlier) then this, too, reduces to a consideration of the effects of effects as 'contradictory', not the original effects themselves. Down that road lies, I fear, yet another "bad infinity" --, which ends "who knows where?"

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

The second difficulty with this 'alternative reading' is that although wealth and poverty are genuine opposites (again, in an ordinary sense), they don't appear to form a 'dialectical-UO' (even if we knew what one of those actually is!). Under Capitalism, the wealth of one class is connected with the poverty of others (which is a structural and dynamic outcome of that economic and social system), but this is a causal connection. They aren't internally-, or logically-related, despite claims to the contrary. That this is so can be seen from that fact that were it not the case, we would find we couldn't agree (with Engels) that under Capitalism poverty exists "where it need not be".

 

If there were a 'dialectical' (or "internal") "unity in difference" connecting poverty and wealth (like that which Dialectical Marxists imagine exists between capitalist and worker (as classes)), then we couldn't argue that socialism will eliminate one at the same time as generalising the other. But, the whole point of a socialist society is that all should become as wealthy as the productive forces will allow. If there were a logical link between these two states (poverty and wealth), they would be inseparable in all modes of production and we would have to temper our slogans somewhat. [It's not as if female foxes weren't also vixens in Ancient Greece! That logical connection is history-proof, as it were. The same isn't the case with wealth and poverty.] Otherwise we might have to argue that by eradicating poverty, workers would be eradicating wealth, too! That we do not so argue -- we actually claim the opposite, that socialism can eradicate poverty while producing wealth (for all) -- shows that the relation between wealth and poverty isn't a logical (or internal) connection, it is causal.

 

Of course, it could be argued that there is an internal/logical link between "wealth and poverty under capitalism". The above treats these two terms abstractly. This isn't at all like the link between female foxes and vixens!

 

Or so it might be countered...

 

That objection will be dealt with presently.74

 

A genuine example of an "internal relation" might help here: if the Prime Meridian at Greenwich were to be abolished, the whole system of longitudes would automatically go with it. Moreover, anyone employing the current system correctly is able to determine precisely where they are on the planet in relation to the Prime Meridian. Where they are located in terms of longitude is therefore 'internally related' to that Meridian, by a series of inferences based on a set of measurements and a series of conventions established by international agreement. Of course, these days this is all done automatically, augmented by GPS guidance systems. But the point is still valid. This isn't at all like the elimination of poverty. Poverty will be eradicated not by destroying wealth, but by extending wealth production, establishing workers' power and equitable forms of distribution -- and, of course, by abolishing class division (etc., etc.).

 

Again, it could be argued that this completely misconstrues the nature of the link between poverty and wealth under Capitalism, turning it into something abstract that supposedly exists (abstractly) between two unchanging concepts. Contrary to this, Dialectical Marxists hold that wealth and poverty are dialectically inter-linked, and not just to each other. They are related to, and are constituted by, the Mode of Production in which they both exist. This affects the meaning of both terms. Hence, under Capitalism, wealth can't exist without the creation of poverty. To eradicate the latter, Capitalism itself must be abolished. In a fully socialist society, the present (internal) connection between wealth and poverty will disappear.

 

But, that still fails to derive one of these factors (e.g., wealth) from the other (e.g., poverty), or the other way round. At least with the proletariat and the capitalist class Dialectical Marxists make some attempt to show that these two classes imply one another, such that neither can exist in splendid isolation and that the existence of one implies the existence of the other (often that conclusion is based on the 'Master-Slave Dialectic' in Hegel's work -- although that will be subjected to considerable doubt later on). But, no one even gestures in the direction of trying to show that this is the case with wealth and poverty under capitalism. Of course, it is (always) assumed to be the case that wealth for some implies poverty for others, but even for die-hard DM-fans, the link is still causal -- wealth creates poverty under capitalism, and it does so for well-known historical, economic and social reasons. Dressing these terms in pseudo-logical/'dialectical' finery can't change that fact -- even if it does succeed in mystifying something that has clear social and material roots.

 

But, even if that weren't so, none of it makes sense in DM-terms, since wealth and poverty don't "struggle" with one another, nor do they change into each other, which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed. So, and once again: whatever else the link between wealth and poverty (under capitalism) actually is, it can't be 'dialectical'. Dialectical Marxists' own classic texts confirm it!

 

The basic problem here, of course, revolves around the anthropomorphism implicit in the idea that concepts can enter into struggle with one another (which they will have to do if they form a 'dialectical contradiction' or are 'dialectical opposites' -- again if the DM-Classicists are to be believed). This form of mystification (i.e., this anthropomorphism) surfaces as part of the belief that because wealth and poverty are opposites they are actively oppositional and cause or initiate struggle, in and of themselves. On this account, it is the opposite/oppositional nature of concepts that creates or induces struggle; they become agents in their own right, as if they were human beings themselves. But, in reality material conditions are what motivate the individuals/class-fractions/unions affected by them to enter into struggle. Only by confusing a causal with a conceptual connection can DM even seem to gain some purchase -- that is, if this is what Dialectical Marxists mean by any of this. But, as we have seen, this entire thesis is a consequence of the RRT and LIE (which was also a conclusion reached in Part One of this Essay).75

 

It could be objected that DM-theorists don't disagree with this, even though they would add that these material forces are "dialectically inter-linked". Hence, no Dialectical Marxist of any sophistication thinks that concepts can, of themselves, cause change or initiate struggle, only that the material roots of struggle are mediated by the ideas people form of their circumstances and the contradictory interests these generate, or even from which they emerge.

 

Worded differently (with reference to 'dialectics' excised), this wouldn't be inconsistent with anything written in these Essays or at this site, since it involves concepts drawn from HM.

 

Nevertheless, if the above is meant to illustrate the real meaning of F50, we would once more have an example of the effects of the effects being used to illustrate the action of a force or set of forces. That impasse was criticised at length earlier.

 

F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.

 

However, Dialectical Marxists might further object to the accusation that they also believe that concepts enter into conflict with one another. They would surely point out that that might vaguely represent how Hegel saw things (if worded more carefully -- or, to be honest, more obscurely!). By way of contrast, they emphasise the fact that it is real people, and real forces in the material world that enter into conflict.

 

But, when the language Dialectical Marxists use is examined, the allegation that they anthropomorphise nature and society by projecting human qualities onto both forces itself upon us (no pun intended). [On this, see Interlude Thirteen.]

 

An animated contrast of some sort that is imagined to exist between such dead concepts seems plausible only because they are viewed as the idealised equivalents of the real relations between human beings, reified in an inappropriate metaphysical or linguistic form. Human beings give life to the concepts they use, but under circumstances not always of their own choosing, and they do so as a result of their practical activity modified and shaped by contemporaneous class and social relations. The reverse process doesn't take place (at least not for those who aren't born again Hegelians!). 'Concepts' don't give life to human relations, although their use by human agents can affect the roles they play or assume in everyday life. They can certainly modify the ideas that individuals from antagonistic classes form of their own material interests, etc. Unless we suppose concepts are agents in their own right (in an inverted Hegelian form of some sort or description -- whereby they perhaps walk the earth in place of human beings, or they take over human minds like a virus!), they can't 'reflect' anything that human beings haven't already sanctioned for them as a result of their own social relations (and by means of the above constraining factors). History is, after all, the result of the class war; it isn't a result of the struggle between concepts.

 

[Dialectical Marxists might be tempted to object that the above is a travesty of their theory; once again: no Dialectical Marxist of any intelligence believes that concepts enter into struggle with each other. That objection has already been tackled.]

 

As should seem clear, these remarks are based on theoretical considerations drawn from HM, which is precisely where that scientific theory can provide the interpretative sophistication that DM obscures and inverts in an idealised, fetishised form.76

 

This shows, once again, that the inversion DM-theorists say they inflicted on Hegel's system was, at best, merely formal --, at worst, completely illusory.

 

In which case, it seems their theory can only 'work' in an Ideal or Mystical 'universe', one where concepts are agents and we are merely their puppets.

 

Nevertheless, it could be objected once more that the above accusations are totally unfair because it was in fact Hegelian and Marxist dialecticians who first pointed out that FL is itself based on fixed and lifeless concepts, which means it can't explain change or account for the fluid nature of reality. Quite the opposite in fact.

 

Unfortunately, the truth is that it is DM-theorists who employ concepts that come to life only when they are anthropomorphised and then viewed as the abstract expression of conflict (i.e., in effect they become the fetishised analogues of social forms, as we have seen -- for example, in Interlude Thirteen). This unwelcome fact is revealed, for example, by the activity of Dialectical Marxist themselves -- i.e., by their the profligate use of words like "contradiction" and "negation" in connection with natural processes, and now in relation to social change (on that, see Interlude Ten).

 

By way of contrast, a rejection of this fetishistic approach to language (promoted at this site) re-humanises concepts by revealing them for what they are: the conditioned products of social relations among human beings. So, in HM, in place of the fetishised theories/concepts we find in DM, we have concepts enlivened by human practice, expressed in the material language of ordinary life (indeed, as Marx enjoined). In this way, it is possible for our description and analysis of the social world itself to become fully humanised -- a small but important step in the fight to make it fully human.

 

Once again, if this is regarded as unfair or inaccurate, the reader is referred back to:

 

(i) Essay Three Part One (for example, here and here), where the linguistic moves in Ancient Greece that underlie this pernicious form of Idealism were exposed;

 

(ii) Essay Three Part Two, where the roots of the abstract DM-approach to theory were traced back to traditional ruling-class, Idealist forms-of-thought;

 

(iii) Essay Two, where the dogmatic and Idealist nature of DM was laid bare;

 

(iv) Essay Four, where the anthropomorphic nature of DL was revealed;

 

(v) Essay Five, where the confused nature of the language Engels used (to depict motion) was debunked;

 

(vi) Essay Seven, where it was shown that the 'Three Laws of Dialectics' are based on a fetishised view of discourse, compounded by a heavy dose of Mickey Mouse Science and Minnie Mouse Philosophy;

 

(vii) Essay Eight Part One, where further aspects of this anthropomorphic doctrine were unmasked;

 

(viii) Earlier sections of this Essay, where the imposition of Hegelian concepts on nature was shown to be openly animistic; and,

 

(ix) Essay Seven Part Three, where is was shown that DM itself can't cope with change, and that, if per impossibile, it were true, change would be impossible.

 

(x) Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here), where these sordid ideas are traced back to ancient, ruling-class forms-of-thought that no self-respecting socialist (or historical materialist) should want to touch, even with someone else's bargepole.

 

Indeed, it has been a theme underlying every Essay posted at this site that the application to nature of concepts drawn from Hermetic Philosophy (via Hegel) has branded DM as an irredeemably Mystical and Idealist Theory; and, further, that this has only succeeded in compromising the scientific status of HM. Anyone who still takes exception to the claim that Dialectical Marxists use animistic concepts drawn from Hermetic Philosophy (where conflict was openly re-configured in linguistic terms, subsequently projected back onto nature and society) should feign no surprise when that is where this sorry tale has in fact been heading all along.

 

[This will be one of the main issues tackled by Essay Twelve Part Four.]

 

The solution is, therefore, for recalcitrant comrades to stop complaining and then begin pointing their fingers in the right direction: at the DM-classicists who imported these "ruling ideas" (upside down or 'the right way up') into Marxism.

 

Interlude Fourteen: 'Contradiction' In Das Kapital?

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context; HCD = High Church Dialectician -- follow the link for an explanation; LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]

 

[This used to form part of Note 70.]

 

Scott Meikle makes a valiant attempt to argue that some sort of sense can be made of the idea that there are 'dialectical contradictions' operating in capitalism. His case revolves around a short and relatively clear account of the alleged 'contradiction' between use-value and exchange-value -- or, more specifically, between the "relative form" and the "equivalent form" of value -- found in Volume One, Chapter One, of Das Kapital.

 

Now, I don't want to enter into whether or not Meikle's interpretation of Marx is accurate; my only concern here is whether he can explain how and why the relation between the relative and the equivalent form of value is a 'dialectical contradiction'. Moreover, since Meikle's comments are typical of the way that many Dialectical Marxists both argue and use language in this area -- and, indeed, how they conceptualise 'contradictions' supposedly at work in HM (this is especially true of characters drawn from the HCD-tendency) --, an detailed examination of his argument will help illustrate where many of them descend into a irredeemable confusion.

 

[Of course, in what follows I am well aware that many will take issue over Meikle's specific interpretation of Marx, or with some of the more detailed points he makes -- or even with his entire approach. I will, however, be looking at the work of others who have tried to make sense of a 'dialectical' interpretation of Das Kapital (with the word "dialectical" understood, not in its classical, but in its post-Hegelian sense) in a later re-write of this Essay. Until then, readers are directed to the discussions here and here.]

 

Here is how Meikle initially approaches the topic:

 

"All the contradictions of capitalist commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form.... The simple form of value itself contains the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value.... [Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.' This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original; paragraphs merged.]76a

 

But, what evidence (or argument) is there to show that these are "polar opposites", let alone that they are 'dialectically-united'? Or, indeed, that there is a distinction here with a difference? And, why call this a "contradiction" to begin with? But, like so many others, Meikle neglected to say; he was nevertheless happy to help himself to the use of that word.

 

[There is, however, a relatively clear attempt to justify its use in Heilbroner (1980), pp.29-58, but more specifically, pp.41-42). I have examined Heilbroner's interpretation, below. Readers should note that I am not questioning Marx's use of non-dialectical terms, such as "relative form" and "equivalent form" [RF and EF, henceforth]. I have also discussed his use of the word "contradiction" here.]

 

Nevertheless, as we will see in Essay Eight Part Three, this way of talking is based solely on Hegel's egregious misconstrual of the 'negative form' of the LOI as equivalent to the LOC. [The bogus nature of Hegel's 'derivation' was exposed in that Essay, here.] So, what has Meikle got to offer the bemused reader that stands some chance -- any chance -- of filling the gaping hole Hegel himself left in his misbegotten 'theory'?

 

Apparently, only this:

 

"Marx's absolutely fundamental (Hegelian) idea [is] that the two poles united in an opposition necessitate one another ('belong to and mutually condition each other')...." [Ibid., p.19. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Apart from the fact that Meikle signally fails to explain how the LOI and a 'negative form of the LOC' are in any way connected (according to Hegel), the question arises: what precisely is the source of this necessitation? Well, after a brief discussion of Quine's ill-considered theory of 'logical necessity' -- which, it is worth pointing out, confuses 'logical necessity' with extremely well-confirmed empirical veracity, thereby running-together epistemology with logical (a startling error for a leading logician to commit!). But, the inference between these two 'concepts' -- RF and EF -- is surely immune from the reduction of logical necessity to empirical confirmation in the above manner, since that inference itself can hardly be a well confirmed empirical truth, Quine having dreamt it up only a few generations ago, and upon which few, if any, scientists have done any work. Certainly Meikle offers none. In that case, we are still owed an explanation of the necessity involved here that does not depend on mere assertion.

 

By way of response, Meikle rejects the idea that the source of necessity can be found in logic as such:

 

"So, 'logical necessity' does not promise to account for the necessity that unites opposites within a contradiction. The unity of use-value and exchange-value within the commodity is certainly not something which, despite all necessitation between the two poles, may be abrogated (on Quine's conventionalist account). Not, that is, without 'abrogating' the commodity itself; for the commodity is precisely the unity of use-value and exchange-value. Use-value can exist alone. But exchange-value can't; it presupposes use-value because only what has use-value can have exchange-value. What has exchange-value, a commodity, is, thus, necessarily use-value and exchange-value brought into a unity. The commodity-form of the product of labour has as its essence the unity of the two. That is what it is. Their conjunction or unity constitutes its essence." [Ibid., p.22. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

However, Meikle has just admitted that "Use-value can exist alone". But that means it can't be a 'dialectical concept'. Unlike the paradigmatic 'dialectical relation' between the proletariat and the capitalist class -- neither of which can't exist alone and both of which imply each other (so we are told) -- here we have use-value which can exist in splendid isolation. In what way is the relation between use-value and exchange-value 'dialectical' if one of these (use-value) can exist without the other, and hence one of which (use-value) doesn't imply the other? But Meikle also claimed that these two, use-value and exchange-value, necessitate each other, "the two poles united in an opposition necessitate one another". But, if use-value can exist alone it clearly doesn't necessitate exchange-value.

 

Meikle might not have noticed this, but he has just torpedoed Marx's theory!

 

More to the point: Can exchange-value exist where there is no use-value? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange-value but many don't have a use-value. Same with most works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins). And can't criminals exchange useless items in order to launder money?

 

[I have raised these and similar objections in more detail, here. Readers are invited to see how the Dialectical Marxists (with whom I was discussing this) disagree with each other (like Christians disagreeing over 'Holy Communion'), and flounder in their attempt to respond to me on this topic. Added on Edit: I have now posted the relevant sections of that 'debate' to Appendix C, where I also manage to substantiate my claim that use-value and exchange-value can both exist in splendid isolation from each other. That doesn't mean Marx's theory crashes and burns; it does mean that in the hands of DM-fans it very well could!]

 

Ignoring those fatal defects, too, even if Meikle were 100% correct, why isn't this just a de dicto (that is, why isn't this merely a verbal) necessity? Like the connection between the meaning of "week" and the meaning of "seven days".

 

Fortunately, Meikle seems to have that particular base covered:

 

"Use-value and exchange-value are, therefore, not 'merely' abstractions arrived at in thought about reality; they are constituents of reality in partaking in the essence of the commodity. And the opposition or contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

But, whatever else is true of these value-forms, how can they 'contradict' one another if they can't co-exist -- i.e., if they can't "act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value"?

 

As we saw earlier:

 

"'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.' This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Ibid., pp.16-17. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]

 

In fact, this is what Marx actually wrote:

 

"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed. No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx and Engels (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [
Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
 

[I have dealt with what Marx had to say about elliptical motion earlier in this Essay, taking into account a recent article by Tom Weston -- on that, see here, here, here, here, here, and here. I have also criticised the "mutually exclusive" criterion below. I will be tackling Weston's claim that this passage can be recruited in support of the belief that Marx accepted the idea that there is a 'dialectic in nature', in a future re-write of Essay Seven Part One.]

 

If EF and RF "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at the same time? And this mutual exclusion isn't just logical, it is ontological; here is Marx again:

 

"[T]he commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed" [Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]

 

So, EF and RF can't co-exist. If so how can they 'contradict' (in the sense that they actively oppose) each other?

 

On the other hand, if both somehow manage to co-exist, so that they can 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "exclude" the other?

 

[We have already seen this insurmountable barrier block earlier attempts to explain what 'dialectical contradictions' are, how they are supposed to inter-relate and interact.]

 

Of course, it could be argued that the concept of one of these forms both implies and excludes that of the other, perhaps by definition. But to do that we would have to ignore the ontological point Marx made!

 

If we ignore this latest 'difficulty', and it is argued that mutual exclusion here follows from some sort of logical or definitional principle, this would still only be a de dicto, not a de re, necessity. That is, this would simply be a verbal necessity. But, in that case, it might well be wondered how a merely verbal necessity can have an effect on the economy. That would be like imagining that the linguistic fact that there are fifty-two weeks in a year can have a physical effect on the speed the Earth orbits the Sun! If that were so, and we now stipulated there were only fifty-one weeks in a year, it would mean the Earth would have to speed up as a result! As should seem obvious, it is the orbital speed of the Earth around the Sun that affects the number of weeks we say there are in a year, not the other way round. Undeniably, these two factors are connected (i.e., how many weeks we say are in a year is connected with how fast the Earth travels around the Sun), but that connection isn't two-way. Indeed, had human history unfolded differently, a week (or whatever might have replaced it) could have been defined as lasting fourteen days, and a year twenty-six weeks. These are verbal conventions humans adopted, and they were based on a range of contingent factors (religious, agricultural, mathematical, and scientific, to name just four); none were determined by nature even if they are constrained by it. Hence, they are de dicto, at best. [Some might wonder how mathematical and scientific factors could (correctly) be described as contingent. The contingency here follows from the other factors involved. For instance, had the religious input been different, ten might have been preferred to seven when the length of a week was determined. While mathematics isn't itself contingent, the choice of numbers is -- as we have just seen, it is contingent on the development of human history. Something similar (but far more complex) also affects scientific input -- as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Two. See also the comments about Saul Kripke, below.] 

 

[A de re necessity is one that is supposed to 'exist in reality', not merely in thought or simply in language. Ruben (1979), wrestles manfully, but unsuccessfully, with recent attempts to argue there is a 'third type of necessity', which is weaker than de re necessity but stronger than mere regularity/constant-conjunction (and/or Humean attempts to explain causal necessity along what can only be called psychological lines, on 'habits of mind' and 'expectations'); i.e., so-called "physical necessity" -- and which isn't de dicto necessity. An analogous theory is also aired in Madden and Harré (1975). I will cover this topic (and these authors) in detail in Essays Three Part Five and Thirteen Part Two. See also here.]

 

Otherwise, this would be a real exclusion and not merely verbal, in which case the two halves couldn't co-exist -- indeed, as Marx clearly indicated, earlier. Consider a different example: the class of proletarians and capitalists mutually condition and exclude one another, but one of these can't exist without other, so we are told. However, this sense of "exclude" isn't one of opposition (even though it can and does lead to opposition), which is what was required. This use of "exclude" here means that no member of one class can belong to the other class; that is, there is no one who is a member of both classes at the same time. [This alleged 'contradiction' will be examined in a future re-write of Essay Eleven Part Two.] Once more, this sort of exclusion doesn't imply opposition. In order to derive that conclusion -- i.e., opposition from exclusion -- more is required than mere exclusion. After all, if an organism is a tulip, that excludes it from being an elephant. But does that imply opposition? Or conflict? Hardly.

 

Of course, this introduces issues connected with Kant's concept of "real negation", a theory subsequently adopted but then rendered completely obscure by Hegel's introduction of 'determinate negation' (covered in Essay Three Part One). However, as we have already seen, Hegel dropped the ball on this one (to put it mildly!), so his contribution no help at all. Quite the reverse in fact. [I have dealt with Kant's rather confused ideas on this topic in Appendix A. I will return to consider "real exclusion" when I focus on Heilbroner's arguments later in this Essay.]

 

Even so, none of this is the case with commodities (so we are told), where the same factor can and must be present in each instance: as relative form of value and as equivalent form of value -- but apparently not at the same time. That is, this simply means these two are both forms of value -- i.e., they belong to the same category, whether or not they co-exist:

 

"'[T]he relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.'... [T]he opposition or contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value)." [Meikle (1979), pp.17, 22, quoting Marx, loc cit. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]

 

So, the implication of the phrase "mutually exclude", applied in the present case, is that these two factors are not just mutually exclusive, they can't co-exist -- otherwise the phrase itself does no work or fails to mean anything in such a context. Hence, "mutually exclude" used this way refers to what does or does not exist at the same time (or even what can or can't co-exist simultaneously), not just "must belong to different categories or sets". But that is totally unlike the relation between capitalist and worker, who have to co-exist, so we are told.

 

[Marx is quite clear: "A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms." [Loc cit.] So, for Marx, these two forms of value can't co-exist.]

 

Once again, if the EF and the RF can't co-exist, how can they possibly 'contradict' one another in a 'dialectical' sort of sense? How can they struggle with and then turn into each other? Meikle neglected to say.

 

[I have yet to encounter a single DM-fan who is prepared to address this gaping hole in their theory -- not that any of them have even spotted it! And, as far as can be determined, no one else has addressed it, either. In fact, I have raised this incongruity with several comrades, including one prominent Marxist Professor of Economics (as noted earlier), who, in an email response told me to "Eat sh*t and die!" Or, failing that, "Drink some Hemlock" -- for the heinous crime of even thinking to ask such 'blasphemous' questions! Questions he clearly couldn't answer, and which had never so much as occurred to him! Who says 'dialectics' paralyses the brains of those whom it colonises? At this point, Max Eastman's words come to mind, again:

 

"Hegelism is like a mental disease -- you cannot know what it is until you get it, and then you can't know because you've got it." (Eastman (1926), p.22.)]

 

Meikle has either failed to notice this serious flaw in his theory -- or he thinks the answer is so obvious he needn't bother covering it.

 

It isn't.

 

Putting this 'difficulty' (also!) to one side for now, why is this 'necessity' not merely the result of a determination to use the relevant words in certain ways? Why is this not simply a de dicto necessity?

 

[In fact, it is a bit rich of Meikle to employ the ideas he drew from Quine's theory to criticise logical necessity -- all the while still promoting de re (real world) necessity -- when Quine himself would have taken an even dimmer view of such necessities himself. (On Quine's ideas in this area, see the references listed here).]

 

Of course, this has become a hot topic ever since Saul Kripke upset the de dicto apple cart a generation or so ago. [Kripke (1977, 1980).] Hence, it is no surprise to see Meikle appeal to Kripke's work to buttress his claim that these aren't merely de dicto, but are also de re, necessities.

 

Unfortunately, Kripke's arguments aren't quite as sound as Meikle seems to think. [On this see, Dupré (1993), Ebersole (1982), Hallett (1991), and Hanna and Harrison (2004), pp.278-88. See also this entertaining article by Jerry Fodor -- Fodor (2004). There will be much more on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published sometime in 2027.]

 

Nevertheless, in support, Meikle draws attention to a (by now) hackneyed series of examples:

 

"The commodity is the unity of use-value and exchange-value, in precisely the same way that water is H2O, that light is a stream of photons, and that Gold is the element with atomic number 79. All these statements are necessarily true. They state truths that are true of necessity, not in virtue of any logical or 'conceptual' connexions, but in virtue of the essences or real natures of the entities in question. Water is necessarily H2O. Anything that is not H2O can't be water..., and the 'can't' is ontological not epistemic.... We did not always know this, of course; it was a discovery people made about the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical development requires it)." [Meikle (1979), pp.22-23. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

The Gold example isn't too clever, either, since its Atomic Number depends on our counting system (and on the number of protons/electrons the element possesses -- and Gold has many different isotopes which have variable numbers of neutrons). So why isn't this 'necessity' simply de dicto? It could be argued that the Atomic Number of an element defines it as a "natural kind". Hence, in this case, only Gold has Atomic Number 79. Once again, Gold has at least 19 isotopes -- 18 of which are radioisotopes (i.e., they are radioactive and varyingly unstable -- one is stable), so, unless we are prepared to classify all 19 of these isotopes (all of which have different properties) as part of the same natural kind, an appeal to the Atomic Number is of little use in this respect.

 

It could be argued in response that all and only Gold atoms have an Atomic Number 79. In that case, we might just as well include, say, all vertebrates in the same natural kind on the grounds that all and only vertebrates have vertebra. Moreover, as with all the other elements, Gold doesn't exist anywhere in an absolutely pure state (since, in all known cases it appears in its ionic form (on that, see below), and with various 'impurities'), but that doesn't stop us calling it "Gold". Hence, there are substances that even scientists call gold, all of whose ions don't have an Atomic Number 79, since any such sample will contain other ions with different Atomic Numbers.

 

Of course, this won't stop determined necessitarians from insisting that Atomic Numbers still define natural kinds -- the only 'problem' here is that this 'natural kind' appears nowhere in nature, so far as we know. A 'natural kind' that isn't natural. That makes sense! If Pure Gold doesn't exist in nature (so far as we know), how can it be a natural kind? It is only in the abstract world of Traditional Philosophy that Gold is Absolutely Pure Gold.

 

Not too natural then, is it?

 

The 'light' example isn't too convincing, either, since there are scientists who question the existence of photons. They could hardly do that if light was necessarily a de re, or even a de dicto, stream of photons. And, of course, light is also a wave (so we are told), hence it isn't true that light is a stream of photons. And now we are told that there are no such particles; they are all just "disturbances in the field"!

 

[However, there are other, far more serious problems than this when defining 'theoretical objects', like photons, electrons and protons. They will be explored in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

The water example is even worse, since water isn't even contingently H2O! Hydrogen bonding means its structure is far more complex. Indeed, because both Hydrogen and Oxygen, like Gold, also have several isotopes (Hydrogen, for example, exists as Deuterium and Tritium, and there are three stable isotopes of Oxygen), not even these elements are 'natural kinds'. Furthermore, just like Gold, no elemental atom of Hydrogen actually exists in its atomic form in nature (as far as we know). Hydrogen atoms invariably exist in ionic form -- again, so far as we know.

 

The theory (that Kripke and Putnam advanced) is that the word "water", for example, "rigidly designates" H2O, even though the overwhelming majority of those who have ever lived on this planet were totally unaware of this supposed fact. However, as a result of the above considerations (and those outlined below) not even chemists are actually referring to H2O when they use the word "water"! Because of the aforementioned isotopes and hydrogen bonding they tell us water is H2nOn -- or it is also  D20, D4O2, D6O3,..., D2nOn, etc., etc. ["D" is the abbreviation for "Deuterium".]

 

Moreover,

 

(i) Because of impurities and ionisation (etc.), pure water (as H2O) is nowhere to be found on earth, or anywhere else for that matter (as far as we know!);

 

(ii) Much that isn't water is also H2nOn, etc. -- for instance, ice, steam, and the liquid usually comes out of your tap or the contents of the bottle of water you just bought at the store -- both contain 'impurities', as well as other atoms/molecules that aren't hydrogen-, or oxygen-based, or which are compounds of still other elements). Moreover, the liquid in most ponds, lakes, seas and oceans is also water, but it definitely isn't just H2O; and,

 

(iii) A molecule of H2O possesses none of the physical properties of water: (a) it isn't a liquid, (b) it doesn't boil at 100oC, (c) it doesn't have a density of 0.99707, (d) it has no surface tension, (e) it can't extinguish a fire, wash your clothes, hose your car, water your lawn, quench your thirst or entertain your kids in a water-pistol fight or in a paddling pond. So, a lone molecule of H2O isn't water in any sense of the term. Hence, not only does the word "water" not refer to H2O, it can't refer to it!

 

It could be argued that Kripke merely claimed that the following is the case:

 

K1: If water is H2O, then water is necessarily H2O.

 

However, K1 would be true even if its antecedent were false -- and we already know it is false. [Just as the hypothetical, "If 2 is odd, then 2+2 is necessarily odd" is true even though the antecedent is false.]

 

But, despite Kripke, even if the above weren't the case, why this isn't just a de dicto necessity is still far from clear.

 

[On this and other serious difficulties confronting Essentialism -- versions of which theory Kripke and Putnam were trying to sell -- see VandeWall (2006). See also van Brakel (2000), and Hacker (2007), pp.29-56.]

 

It could be argued that Meikle actually had this base covered, too, when he added the following remarks:

 

"[I]t was a discovery people made about the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical development requires it)." [Meikle (1979), loc cit. Italics in the original.]

 

But, if such things can be revised, that just makes them epistemic truths and not the least bit essential or de re, 'ontological' (unless we also allow trivial revisions to count -- on that, see here). [And, as we have just seen, there is in fact no 'essence' of water!]

 

However, let us assume for the moment that these 'difficulties' can be 'ironed out' in some way, somehow -- although, in Essay Thirteen Part Two we will see even that isn't a viable option. There it will be shown that contemporary Essentialism is a confused dead end, at best.

 

[In addition, Essentialism also faces the serious objections I have raised against all forms of 'Ontology' in Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

So, and once again, even if we assume the above 'problems' can be defused in some way, Meikle's theory faces further difficulties, not the least of which is the fact that in order to work, the sort of Essentialism he lionised depends on at least one from of Possible World Semantics [PWS] itself being true. Admittedly, Meikle hade some attempt to down-play this untoward implication (pp.23-25), but in so doing he only succeeded in undermining the case he had just constructed in support of his strain of Essentialism.

 

That is because PWS turns de re necessities into super-duper empirical, extensional truths, and, as a result, each putative de re 'essence' simply de sappears.

 

[In other words, this turns de re necessities into empirical, contingent, non-necessary, truths! In that case, they would simply be true in all possible worlds, not that they have to be true in those worlds -- the latter of which conditions would apply if they were de re necessities. They just happen to be true across all possible words, which means there would be no contradiction if in some possible world they just so happened not to be true. A de re necessity, if this were one such, would rule that out conclusively. But that would be to assume what was to be proved!]

 

This latest fatal defect will also be put to one side (for the present).

 

[However, interested readers might like to consult this paper, which outlines several serious objections to modern-day Essentialism -- but, it comes with a health warning attached: the article defends an Aristotelian version of the same doctrine!]

 

In addition, I won't be asking (here) other awkward questions about the precise origin of 'natural necessities' like this -- or how they can possibly cause change -- but the following passage (taken from Part One) will provide the reader with some idea of how it is to be tackled, later:

 

A passage from Baker and Hacker (1992) underlines the futility of this aristocratic approach to knowledge (although they don't use that particular word, and are not making any political points) -- which, incidentally, also reveals why dialecticians (like Rees and the others quoted here) have become fixated on a futile search for a metaphysical (and thus ultimately rational) "why" of things:

 

"Empirical, contingent truths have always struck philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained…. Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere, e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in quantum mechanics today. One feature that explains philosophers' fascination with truths of Reason is that they seem, in a deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential relations of Simple Natures; mathematical truths are apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build upon them mythological structures.

 

"We think of necessary propositions as being true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as the truth-functions or (in Frege's case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics. So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a supra-empirical domain (a 'third realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however these authors record this erroneously as p.139 -- RL] or the 'mineralogy of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g., Pascal, admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal. Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again, these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41 -- RL]. Logic seems to investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….

 

"In our eagerness to ensure the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent 'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell (1937), p.xv (this links to a PDF); again these authors record this erroneously as p.v; although in the edition to which I have linked, it is p.xliii -- RL], then the mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of physical theorising, such as Planck's constant." [Baker and Hacker (1992), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original have been altered to conform with those adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; links added. This passage doesn't appear in the 2nd edition of this book -- i.e., Baker and Hacker (2014), pp.241-370 -- even though similar ideas are expressed there.]

 

As should be clear from all that has gone before, DM-theorists have bought into this view of 'necessary truths' (even if few of them use that particular phrase -- although Lenin and Dietzgen seem to have been rather fond of it; more on that in a later Essay).

 

For example, Dialectical Marxists in general locate the cause of change in the relation they believe holds between 'internally-linked' (logically?) opposite  properties of objects and processes. But, why this should cause change is left entirely unexamined. Indeed, it is left as a brute fact, and, as the above passage suggests, it must remain brute. In which case, it is just a fathomless fact about the world that 'contradictions' cause change. No further explanation is necessary. Move on...

 

This account of change is plainly a consequence of a certain way of describing the world (and in a fetishised form, too), as we will discover in Essay Twelve Part One.

 

[I have explained the term "brute fact", here.]

 

Nevertheless, as we have already seen, there is no reason why contradictory states of affairs should cause change any more than there is a reason to suppose that non-contradictory states should, either. Both options rely on certain descriptions of the presumed, or even the imposed, relations that are imagined to exist between objects and processes -- but not on evidence since: (i) No further explanation is possible, and (ii) It is impossible to verify or confirm their existence. Such descriptions supposedly capture or picture processes in nature and society that are thought capable of making other objects or processes change or 'develop'. Again, how or why they are able to do that is permanently left as a brute fact.

 

Even an appeal to 'contradictory forces' -- in order to explain why things change -- simply involves yet more objects and processes, more brute facts, none of which adds anything to the 'necessitation' that such an account promised, and now requires. In the end, these forces depend on certain descriptions of them being translated into the vocabulary of QM (or some other branch of Physics), and hence into another set propositions expressing even more brute facts! When asked why forces must do what they do (or even why a Field, for instance, is capable of making anything happen) the only response possible is: "They just do.... It's just a fact about forces/fields/...". Indeed, as should seem plain, Differential Equations, Hamiltonians, Matrices and the Kronecker Delta can't actually move anything about the place, or even deflect a single particle from its path.

 

[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

 

Moreover, the infinite regress (or even the "bad infinity") DM-theorists hoped to avoid by appealing to 'internal contradictions' now reappears elsewhere in their theory. When the details are filled-out, DM just connects 'objects and processes' to yet more 'objects and processes' -- or, to be more honest, this is achieved via yet more obscure words about 'objects and processes' -- as well as 'negations', 'opposites', and 'interpenetrations', and the like (i.e., yet more "brute facts", either about the world or about how human beings are supposed (by dialecticians) to think and talk), 'internal' to still other 'objects and processes'.

 

In all this, the necessitation that had originally been sought simply vanishes in an impenetrable fog of jargon (which leads "who knows where?"). In this regard, the logical or 'rational' foundation for knowledge (supposedly offered by Dialectical Marxists) turns out to be no different in form from any other concocted by Traditional Metaphysicians. In place of the reasons we were promised (i.e., the "why and the how" of things), all we find are yet more DM-'objects and processes' (or, again, yet more obscure words about what they think are 'objects and processes') -- except, these have now been shunted off into a mysterious, 'abstract realm', fluffed-up with a handful of vague terms-of-art (such as "mediation", "unity in difference", "internally related", "thing-in-itself"), of convenient and permanent unintelligibility, all of which possess impressive Idealist credentials.

 

While DM-theorists promised the world a brand new set of explanations, all they end up delivering is a batch of shop-soiled goods imported from Traditional Philosophy, comprised almost entirely of jargonised expressions, masking the 'brute facts' hidden beneath -- indeed, as Lenin himself acknowledged:

 

"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]

 

Despite this, how does Meikle address the problem of change? Indeed, how does he introduce (active, not passive) opposition?

 

"The poles of an opposition are not just united. They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and exchange-value within it." [Meikle (1979), p.26.]

 

Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted, it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, at best, this appears to be just another brute fact and hence not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe.

 

Unfortunately, there are so many metaphors in the above passage it isn't easy to make much sense of it (are we really supposed to conclude this is all so 'scientific' because of the use of terms like "centripetal force", even if they are metaphors?). Anyway, it is clear that Meikle has reified the products of social relations (e.g., use-, and exchange-value, etc.), and, in this reified state, they have become the actual agents, with human beings (or, perhaps, even commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the word "repel", here? Do these factors actually repel each other (like two North Poles of a magnet, or two positive electric charges)? Or, do we do all this 'repelling' because of the way we manufacture use-values and then exchange them?

 

[Incidentally, I am using the word "patient" here in its older sense; that is, it relates to that which is acted upon, not that which acts.]

 

More to the point, do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into each other? Does use-value struggle with, and then change into, exchange-value -- as the DM-classics assure us they must?

 

Independently of this, it is also worth asking: How can the forms that underpin use-, and exchange-value (i.e., EF and RF, from earlier) provide any sort of analogue of the forces Meikle requires? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial pre-conditions, the most important of which is that they should at least have the decency to exist (or even co-exist). But, as we have seen, EF and RF can't co-exist. So, other than conceptually, how can they possibly repel, or provide the wherewithal for other objects and processes to repel, anything?

 

That is, of course, the non-dialectical rock upon which we have seen all such Idealist flights-of-fancy repeatedly flounder.

 

It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thought about the simple commodity form. But, even then, they still can't co-exist, for if they could, they wouldn't "mutually exclude" one another! On the other hand, if they genuinely do "exclude" one another, we can't even think of them acting on one another, for if we were to think of both at once, we would of necessity be misconceiving them -- i.e., according to Marx. We saw earlier that mutual exclusivity here isn't like that which supposedly exists between two classes -- for instance the proletariat and the capitalist class -- which have to co-exist. According to Marx, mutual exclusivity means they can't co-exist.

 

Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling match taking place in our heads such that, when we think of one of these factors it elbows the other out of the way? [Or is that out of existence?] Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we could declare EF the winner over RF by two falls to a submission (UK rules)?

 

 

Figure Twelve: EF Slam Dunks RF

In A Skull Near You

 

Furthermore, even if, in thought, EF and RF could co-exist, that would be of little help since it would make a mockery of Meikle's appeal to de re necessity. This retreat into the Ideal leaves him with two 'seriously undernourished de dicto skeletons' shadow boxing each other instead of the 'robust de re pugilists' we had originally been promised.

 

Of course, it could be objected that the fact that something is an RF excludes it from being an EF. That is where the opposition arises; the one is the opposite of the other. [That objection was fielded earlier.]

 

But, "opposite" isn't the same as "oppositional", as we have also already seen.

 

Despite this, it could be maintained that these are opposite poles of the same kind -- that is they both qualify the commodity form. But, "commodity" isn't a specific term (unlike "domestic cat", which is species-specific), it is generic (that is, it is a general term applying to many different kinds of use-values, just as "mammal" relates to many different families, genera and species).

 

And we have also seen: if an organism is a tulip, that excludes it from being an elephant, but it does so without implying (active or passive) opposition -- and "organism" is a generic term, too.

 

So, we still lack a derivation of opposition from exclusion; the mere assertion that the former implies the latter clearly doesn't constitute proof. Furthermore, even if, contrary to Marx, they do co-exist, EF and RF don't confront and then fight it out inside each and every commodity. They would have to co-exist to "repel" one another, too; RF can't "repel" EF if EF fails to show up. And RF isn't capable of preventing EF from existing, either.

 

[Any of my readers who think something that does exist is capable of preventing something that doesn't yet exist from beginning to exist is invited to explain to me (in detail) how that is possible.]

 

Of course, it could be argued that RF might block a series of events that would, if left alone, lead to EF coming into existence. However, that supposition takes us back to an earlier line-of-thought (here repeated):

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the normal course of events, let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

However, if the above were now revised to accommodate that pro-DM rejoinder, we would now seem to have the following:

 

Δ1: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had RF not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Δ2: In the normal course of events, let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1. Let these events also be stages in the development of the very last event/stage.

 

Δ3: Let the Ei+1 event/stage be where EF would have emerged (i.e., when and where it might begin to exist). 

 

Δ4: However, Ei+1 and hence EF, failed to occur because RF prevented Ei causing it.

 

Δ5: Hence, RF contradicted Ei, thereby "repelling" EF.

 

But, as we saw earlier, there is no way this could be a 'dialectical development' -- whatever else it turns out to be --, otherwise RF would have to change into Ei -- i.e., into that with which is has 'struggled' and thereby 'contradicted' (according to the DM-classics, link below) --, and Ei would similarly have to change into RF -- if the DM-classics are to be believed. Furthermore, do any of these 'struggling' and "repelling" factors imply each other, like the proletariat and the capitalist class are supposed to do, and which has to be the case with a 'dialectical relation'? If so, Dialectical Marxists have been unwisely secretive about such details for well over a century.  

 

Is there a way out of these Dialectical Quicksands? Meikle thinks there is:

 

"But in its simple form, the commodity is an unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities, or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Meikle (1979), p.26. Bold emphases added.]

 

It now turns out that metaphor is all Meikle has to offer his bemused readers in support of his attempt to make this mysterious process comprehensible. Apparently, commodities are like embryos that 'self develop' (what else can the above 'pregnancy' metaphor mean?), in the right circumstances, and outside the womb. But, surprisingly, in this case commodities give birth to money, not human beings! Or, is it that the commodity form succeeded in mesmerising human beings into inventing money? Once again, if that were the case, we would be the patients while those metaphorical beings (i.e., these disembodied 'commodities'/'embryos') would be the agents of social change!

 

In which case, given this approach to the economy, 'self-developing concepts' do finally constitute the Real and power is development, just as Idealists have been trying to tell us for centuries...

 

How else is it possible to understand the above passage?

 

[There is a faint echo of Leibniz's "monads" in what Meikle has to say (which he (Leibniz) regarded as a logical extension to Aristotle's concept of substance (ousia) -- on that see here, here, here, and here). Given Leibniz's theory, while we might think we control various objects and the events they cause (or the processes in which they find themselves embroiled --, or even the bodies with which they interact), the truth is they control themselves. That is because, deep down, all bodies are composed of countless self-motivated, self-propelled (logical) beings, miniature intelligences whose 'necessities' follow from the fact that they 'contain' every predicate that is, has been, or ever will be true of them. (This is a call-back to the containment metaphor Leibniz also utilised.) So, in relation to the issues at hand in this Essay, while we might think that commodities posses or imply exchange-, and/or use-values because of their relationship to human activity, in reality (according to Meikle's metaphor) commodities possess an intrinsic value that forces us to employ them in the way we end up utilising and conceptualising them. But, in order to do that, it looks like these 'self-motivated commodities' must have coerced or bamboozled our ancestors into inventing money, and now control how we use commodities and theorise them! As we will soon see, that interpretation of Meikle's theory isn't as crazy as might first seem.]

 

Is there any way of re-configuring this theory so it can be rescued from the jaws of the 'concept shredder' before the switch is thrown? Well, Meikle turns to Aristotle for assistance; but before he does, he (in effect) concedes the truth of the above observations, for it seems that these value forms do indeed force humans to do their bidding; or, if we take note of the last sentence, it looks like money actually managed to reach back in time (clearly operating as some sort of final cause) to force, cajole, con or bamboozle humans into viewing and exchanging commodities the way we now do. [More on that presently.]

 

"This line of development is not accidental or fortuitous; it is not a process of aggregating contingent and extraneous additions. It is, rather, a process of development of the potentialities within, and the increasing differentiation of, an original whole. If history does not block the growth of exchange activity, then that growth will find out the inadequacy of the simple form of value. Then, looked at from the point of view of efficient causation, those engaged in that activity, being rational and inventive in the face of the problems thrown up by their developing class interests, will act so as to solve their practical difficulties by measures that overcome that insufficiency to the requirements of their developing commerce. The solution to their practical problems is the money-form.... Looked at from the point of view of final causation, money is the final cause of this phase of social development." [Ibid., pp.26-27. Bold emphases added.]

 

Now, this either means that:

 

(i) Those involved in the invention of money were hapless puppets of these (pre-existing) value forms; or,

 

(ii) The above individuals had a clear understanding of the nature of use-, and exchange-value, which must at least have been the equal of Marx's -- but more than two-and-a-half thousand years before he was born --, so that they could make the 'correct' series of rational choices that sent the economy off in the 'right direction'.

 

Otherwise, how could these value forms exercise any sort of causal influence on those who invented money? As we have already seen:

 

"But in its simple form, the commodity is an unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities, or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Ibid., p.26. Bold emphases added.]

 

At this point, it might well be asked: doesn't this 'embryonic pantomime' make dangerous concessions to teleology, to 'final causation'?

 

No problem; as we have just seen, Meikle tackled that unexpected difficulty head-on:

 

"Looked at from the point of view of final causation, money is the final cause of this phase of social development. This is not to say that final causation is a form of efficient causation in which the future acts on the past, such that the developed form beckons from the future to the past less developed form; rather, the embryonic entity has a structure that develops, if it develops, along a certain line. Thus, final causation and efficient causation, here, are not mutually exclusive but mutually supportive: the one explaining the emergence of the other, and the other the success and development of the one. What we have here is a development that, barring accidents, will take its course -- an evolution that is necessary; its final form immanent as a potentiality within its original one." [Ibid., p.27.Bold emphases added.]

 

Fine words, but merely asserting that final and efficient causes are "mutually supportive" won't cut mustard. How is it possible for "the future [to act] on the past"? Meikle resolves this conundrum by telling us that "the embryonic entity has a structure that develops, if it develops, along a certain line".

 

And yet, this solves nothing, for, as we saw earlier, it seems to mean some sort of plan must have been programmed into these commodities that 'determined' how they should --, indeed, must -- develop, rather like a fertilised seed or egg has a genetic code that does likewise (so we are told) -- suspicions concerning which have only been strengthened by Meikle's frequent use of embryonic language and rather peculiar references to pregnancy.

 

[When were these commodities fertilised? That, of course, implicates this view of social development with other, well known ancient and mystical ideas connected with belief in the Cosmic or Orphic Egg (a topic briefly mentioned in Part One of this Essay, and again in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two, but more fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here)). And, as we will see in a later re-write of Essay Eight Part Three, this represents a core anthropomorphic (Leibnizian/Hegelian) principle of development, which is, of course, part of the reason why Dialectical Marxism itself is inherently teleological. Flipping Hegel through 180ş (even supposing that is what happened, and is ven possible) in no way neutralises the teleology that suffuses his entire system -- Hegel (1999), pp.735-54. (The first of these links to a PDF.)]

 

But, perhaps we are once again being a little too hasty, since Meikle now introduces the aforementioned Aristotelian concepts in order to neutralise these 'untoward difficulties':

 

"The necessity that Marx sees in the line of development of the value-form is that which Aristotle contrasts with events that are 'accidental' and it is bound up with organic systems and Aristotle's conception of ousia. Where there is constant reproduction there is a whole system, an ousia." [Ibid., p.27. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

Meikle then quotes Stephen Clark in support:

 

"[E]verything that happens phusei, 'by nature', happens always or for the most part, but nothing that happens apo tuches, by 'chance', or apo tautomatou, 'just of itself', happens thus frequently. Therefore, no natural events are thus purely accidental, and therefore all natural events are non-accidental. But all non-accidental events are heneka tou, 'serve some purpose', are given sense by their ends.... The fact that rain is always being produced makes it impossible to doubt that there is an organic system here, and such systems are 'finalistically' identified. To answer the question 'what is it?' we must reply in terms of its natural line of development...genesis, the process of coming-to-be, is what it is because ousia is what it is, and not vice versa." [Clark (1975), pp.60-61, quoted in Meikle (1979), pp.27-28. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

In this we see several indirect but unmistakable references to 'divine providence', accompanied by a quite distinct, but nonetheless nauseating, stench of Christian Mysticism, which once again helps explain why so many DM-fans (especially those who hale from the HCD-wing of Dialectal Mayhem) revert to open and honest mysticism so often and so readily. Indeed, this tendency (to drift into some form of disreputable 'god-seeking' among erstwhile revolutionaries) is no big surprise given Marx's opinion of Philosophy in general:

 

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Unfortunately, such linguistic chicanery -- of the sort we find in Meikle's article (and in DM-literature in general) -- fails to solve the problem, for the necessities required by Dialectical Marxists only work if we are prepared to anthropomorphise nature. That is because, as soon as it is asked why events can't proceed otherwise than they in fact do, it becomes obvious (from the above) that certain objects and events exercise some sort of control over other objects and events that do not yet exist -- which is problematic in itself, clearly since the latter don't exist to be acted upon or be controlled(!) --, thereby directing them, ensuring they develop along the right "natural line" (which is why Meikle found he had to use that phrase). Either that, or objects and events develop in "line" with their 'entire concept', in accordance with the complete list of predicates that has somehow been programmed into them (ŕ la Leibniz).

 

The bottom line to all this Mystical Musing is that "no natural events are...purely accidental, and therefore all natural events are non-accidental" (Meikle, loc cit). And this, too, is quite clearly the point of all that talk about "ends" and "purposes" in both Aristotle and Leibniz's theories; they formed part of an overtly mystical doctrine -- the nature of which Meikle totally ignores -- that only works if nature is controlled by some sort of 'Mind', as Aristotle certainly believed. [Or, it is populated with 'tiny minds', 'programmed' by 'God' to behave the way they do -- as Leibniz himself imagined.] So, for both theorists (and hence also for Hegel), there are no accidents in nature (or society); everything is 'totally determined' -- even your thoughts and actions, dear reader.

 

[But this is just Hegel's 'Cosmic Calvinism', again! Philosophy and religion neatly paralleling one another -- again, just as Marx tried to tell us. (I have covered this in more detail in Essay Three Part Two, here.)]

 

So, it is worth emphasising, once again: Dialectical Marxists can only make their 'theory' even seem to work if they adopt the a priori thought-forms concocted by earlier ruling-class hacks and card-carrying Mystics. [Aristotle and Plato are in fact the two most important figures in this respect, with Leibniz and Hegel on the substitutes' bench.] Meikle has plainly nailed his colours to this 'mystical mast'; hence, if nature has a purpose (set by some 'Deity'/'Mind', or other) -- as it has for Hegel, Aristotle and Leibniz -- then that implies the status quo must be in harmony with that purpose, or, it is perhaps developing toward it. And, if that is so, the status quo can't legitimately be challenged. Indeed, if that were the case, the future would be as completely determined as any self-respecting Second International devotee could ever have dreamt. In which case, the rule of the elite isn't 'accidental', either, but serves some rational, 'God-ordained end' (and we all know what that is), which, again, implies human beings are merely puppets of 'history', there being no such thing as 'human agency' in such a universe. History, money, or the commodity itself, is the agent here; we are simply helpless marionettes:

 

 

Figure Thirteen: Are We Controlled By 'Embryonic Commodities'?

Are We Just 'The Playthings Of History'?

 

Or, so Meikle's ill-conceived metaphors would seem to suggest.

 

The reader will no doubt now appreciate more fully why I asserted this back in Essay Two:

 

As will soon become apparent, for all their claims to be radical, when it comes to Philosophy DM-theorists are surprisingly conservative -- and universally incapable of seeing this even after it has been pointed out to them!

 

[An excellent example of this phenomenon, and one that has been highly influential on how DM-theorists receive and then respond to such criticism, has been posted here.]

 

At a rhetorical level, this conservatism is camouflaged behind what at first sight appears to be a series of disarmingly modest denials --, which are then promptly flouted.

 

The quotations listed...in Note 1 show that DM-theorists are anxious to deny that their system is wholly or even partly a priori, or that it has been imposed on the world, not merely read from it. However, the way that dialecticians actually phrase their theories contradicts these superficially modest-looking claims, revealing that the opposite is in fact the case.

 

This inadvertent dialectical inversion -- whereby what DM-theorists say about what they do is the reverse of what they actually do with what they say -- neatly mirrors the distortion to which Traditional Philosophy has subjected ordinary language over the last two millennia (outlined in Essays Three Parts One and Two, and Twelve Part One), a point underlined by Marx himself:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

However, unlike dialecticians, Traditional Metaphysicians were quite open and honest about what they were doing; indeed, they brazenly imposed their a priori theories on reality, and hung the consequences.

 

But, because dialecticians have a novel (but nonetheless defective) view of both Metaphysics and FL (on that, see here and here), they are oblivious of the fact that they are just as eager as Traditional Theorists have always been to impose their ideas on the world, and equally blind to the fact that in so-doing they are aping the alienated thought-forms of those whose society they seek to abolish.

 

Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked before they were even loaded; with such weapons, it is no wonder that DM-theorists fire nothing but philosophical blanks.

 

[FL = Formal Logic; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

DM is a conservative theory precisely because its adherents have imported, and then adopted, the distorted methods, a priori thought-forms, theories and obscure jargon of Traditional Philosophy.

 

[This topic was discussed at length in Essay Three Part Two; the reader is referred there for further details. It will be covered again in Essay Three Part Five, but from a different angle. (No pun intended!) The theoretical background to all this will be analysed more fully in Essay Twelve Parts Two and Three (summary here).]

 

Of course, Meikle (along with Dialectical Marxists in general) should have paid closer attention to Marx's word, when he warned us not to take philosophical jargon too seriously (which is also why he told us he merely "coquetted" with Hegelianisms in Das Kapital):

 

"[A]nd even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, [I] coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him [Hegel]." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added. I have used the punctuation that appears in Marx and Engels (1996), p.19.]

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

[There is more on this, here and here.]

 

Now, there are far better ways than this to make sense of Das Kapital; there is no need to appeal to Leibnizian, or even mystical Hegelian, concepts to make it work. [I will, however, leave that to another time. One attempt has already been made in that direction: Rosenthal (1998).]

 

It might seem to some that an effective response to the above could be constructed along lines suggested, for example, by Roslyn Bologh:

 

"A contradiction occurs when a term refers to two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A. This is the case with the category, exchange value. It is both a use value and not a use value. A commodity has a calculable exchange value regardless of the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of any use value. Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a use value." [Bologh (1979). Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

However, Bologh's 'definition' of "contradiction" leaves much to be desired; in fact, it looks suspiciously like it was tailored to fit the examples chosen. In other words, this is a Persuasive Definition. Independently of that, the definition itself is defective in its own right, not the least because, and once again, we aren't told what these As are. Furthermore, Bologh seems rather confused, since this 'contradiction' occurs when a "term" refers to letters "A" and "not-A", as opposed to 'dialectical opposites' in 'reality':

 

"A contradiction occurs when a term refers to two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A." [Ibid.]

 

Nevertheless, Bologh's chosen example might help resolve that 'minor difficulty':

 

"This is the case with the category, exchange value. It is both a use value and not a use value." [Ibid.]

 

So, the contradiction here appears to be the following:

 

B1: Exchange-value is both a use-value and not a use-value.

 

From this it looks like these As are noun phrases (in this instance -- but we have seen the denotation of 'dialectical' letters change faster than a set of traffic lights on speed, so this particular denotation might need riveting in place) -- or they are what such phrases supposedly designate/'reflect'. Earlier we had occasion to point out that when these As are interpreted as phrases (or, again, when they are what is supposedly designated by them), no contradiction is implied. But, Bologh might have avoided this difficulty by situating them in a propositional context.

 

However, the other things Bologh says only succeed in undermining the status of B1 as a genuine contradiction:

 

"A commodity has a calculable exchange value regardless of the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of any use value. Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a use value." [Ibid.]

 

This means that B1 actually becomes this:

 

B2: An exchange-value isn't a use-value when it is being determined as an exchange-value, but it is a use-value when that exchange-value has to be realised.

 

In other words, B1 becomes:

 

B3: Exchange-value is A at t1 and not A at t2 (t2 > t1). [Here ">" here again means "later than".]

 

But, that is no more a contradiction than this would be:

 

B4: Tony Blair was the UK Prime Minister but he no longer is.

 

For B1 to be a contradiction it would have to be something like this:

 

B5: Exchange-value is both a use-value and not a use-value, at the same time and in the same respect.

 

It could be objected that this completely misrepresents Bologh's argument, since she explicitly says this (here the "it" refers to an exchange-value):

 

"...A and not-A. It is both a use value and not a use value." [Ibid., bold emphasis added.]

 

So, Bologh's interpretation is the equivalent of B5 above. Hence, she is right to call this a contradiction.

 

Or so it might be claimed...

 

However, this latest pro-DM rejoinder failed to take account of the phrase at the end of B5, namely: "at the same time and in the same respect". This isn't a contradiction for two important reasons

 

[1] Bologh herself admits that an exchange-value can't be regarded as a use-value and not a use-value at the same time, when she says this:

 

"Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a use value." [Ibid; bold emphasis added.]

 

If "all consideration of use-value is excluded", that in no way implies use-value has vanished or ceased to exist. It is just ignored or no account is taken of it. It isn't to be imagined that a hammer, for instance, becomes totally useless when its exchange-value is being ascertained. If that were so, it would have no exchange-value! A useless hammer will have no exchange-value (as a hammer). Indeed, Bologh admits this herself: "[I]n order to realize its exchange-value, the commodity must have a use value." Exchange-value is determined by other considerations, but not by use-value. But use-value still exists! In that case, Option One shows this this can't be a contradiction.

 

[2] For something to count as a contradiction the letter "A" Bologh uses has to have the same meaning when it is on its own and when it is prefixed by a "not". That is the point of the "in the same respect" codicil.    

 

The following remarks might assist the reader more fully appreciate this point (re-quoted from here, slightly edited):

 

Added by a supporter of this site ('Nemesis'): At Marxism 1990, in separate meetings on dialectics I was given two, three minute impromptu slots in the discussion period at the end. It is only possible to make highly superficial points in such short intervals, which, because they challenge fundamental ideas, are quite easy to dismiss. However, the level of argument advanced in response to what I had said was quite lamentable.... In the refectory [later], I engaged in debate with Andy Wilson...who attempted unsuccessfully to explain what a 'dialectical contradiction' is. His example (that the revolutionary party both is and is not a part of the working class) was easy to dispose of as an undischarged ambiguity. That is, the revolutionary party is part of the working class in so far as..., while it isn't part of the working class in so far as.... (Readers can fill in the blanks according to their own theory of the party.) But this is no more a contradiction, let alone a 'dialectical contradiction', than this would be: Das Kapital is part of my personal library and not part of my personal library. It is part of my library in so far as I have a copy of the book on my shelves. But, it isn't part of my library in so far as this particular book (i.e., the original) isn't identical with any of its copies. So, the actual book Marx wrote (in his own hand-writing) isn't on my shelves.... [Paragraphs merged. Compare this with the examples Rosa gives of ambiguous pseudo-contradictions in Essay Five, or those given later on in this Essay.] [Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

Filling in the missing "in so far as..." that Bologh omits, her example is really of this form:

 

B6: Exchange-value is an A that is F, but not an A that is G.

 

Where the phrase "in so far as..." expands as follows:

 

B6a: Exchange-value is an A in so far as it is F, but not an A in so far as it is G.

 

Here, while the letter "A" stands for "use-value", the letter "F" would go proxy for something like "a necessary condition for a commodity to have an exchange-value", and the letter "G" would stand for something like "non-determinate of exchange-value" (or even "irrelevant when calculating exchange-value"). In that case, B6a would become B6b (or something like it):

 

 B6b: Exchange-value is a use-value in so far as it is a necessary condition for a commodity to have an exchange-value, but not a use-value in so far as the latter is irrelevant when calculating exchange-value.

 

Consequently, as soon as the ambiguity (and the confusion!) in Bologh's original Persuasive Definition has been discharged (via B6/B6a/B6b), we can see no contradiction is implied.

 

Later in the book, Bologh repeated the above 'definition' in a slightly modified form:

 

"A contradiction occurs when a term means two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A. A contradictory form of life is a totality of opposing moments, moments that negate each other. This is the case with the commodity in the form of capital." [Ibid., p.64.]

 

As we saw earlier, it isn't too clear how these "moments" succeed in "negating" each other. Does exchange-value "negate" use-value? Do objects actually become useless at any point in this process? Do objects that have a use cease to be exchangeable? Do they 'oppose' one another like the two wrestlers we met a while back? But, they would have to do one or more of these if what Bologh has to say were the case. We can go further: do use-values imply exchange-values, like the proletariat implies the capitalist class (so we are told)? Do they change into each other? I have yet to encounter a Dialectical Marxist who thinks they do any of these. But, they would have to so if the relation between them is 'dialectical' (and if the DM-classicists were to be believed). So, for the nth time, whatever else this is, it can't be a 'dialectical relation', which means it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction', either.

 

In the next few paragraphs following on from the above passage, Bologh did make an attempt to explain what she meant, but those passages merely repeat what we have already seen, only with more obscure jargon thrown in for good measure. [Readers are invited to check this for themselves, if they can access her book!]

 

In fact, this work is a classic example of the way that Marxist intellectuals and academics think and reason: they all haphazardly throw Hegelian jargon, unintelligible phrases and dogmatic assertions at the page. Convoluted prose like this is de rigeur in HCD circles. HCDs dote on it and, as a result, they adamantly refuse to regard anything that isn't drenched in such verbiage, that hasn't been drowned in prolix jargon, as 'genuine theory'. [A recent classic example of this (aristocratic) intellectual malaise can be found in this exchange. (I have used the word "aristocratic" here for reasons that will become clear in Essay Twelve Parts Two and Three.)]

 

In which case, it is still far from clear what either Meikle or Bologh (or Rees from earlier) mean by "dialectical contradiction", or, even if such ill-conceived and ill-defined 'entities' actually exist, or how they can possibly make anything change -- unless, that is, they think we should anthropomorphise nature and society at every turn and read human traits into inanimate objects and processes as the mood takes us.

 

[I return to this theme in Essay Thirteen Part Three. On Quine, see Arrington and Glock (1996), Glock (2003), Hacker (1996), pp.189-227. See also this PDF (which is an article about Quine's method, written by Peter Hacker).]

 

Heilbroner To The Rescue?

 

[FL = Formal Logic; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

Having said that, a genuine attempt was made a few years ago [Heilbroner (1980)] to try to render the term "dialectical contradiction" at least comprehensible. Heilbroner's account, although not always sympathetic to Marxism, has the distinct advantage of being much clearer and than the vast majority of Dialectical Marxists (who write on such issues) care to be -- or even seem capable of being(!) --, especially when it comes to explaining what a 'dialectical contradiction' is. To his credit, Heilbroner also does so in a much less jargon-cloaked way, too.

 

However, after making a rather poor stab at defining a logical contradiction, Heilbroner added the following thoughts:

 

"This kind of logical contradiction is not, however, the meaning of contradiction that applies to dialectics. In dialectics, the word does not refer to the simultaneous assertion and denial of the existence of static things; instead it refers to the nature of those conflicting elemental processes that are believed to constitute the essence of reality itself. As a first rough description of what such a 'contradiction' implies, we can resort to another famous Hegelian phrase -- 'the unity of opposites'. Contradictions therefore refer to the idea that all of reality is changeful because it consists, in its very innermost being, of the unstable coexistence and successive resolution of incompatible forces.... Hegel gives us a famous example of this...in his discussion of the terms Master and Servant. The very concept of Master, he shows, implies the opposite of such a concept in the Servant, one who is mastered. Without the idea of one, we cannot form the idea of the other, although each idea 'by itself' is the contradiction (the 'negation,' in Hegel's terminology) of the other. Note that this use of contradiction does not assert that a Master 'is' and 'is not,' which would involve us in the same absurdity as making that assertion about a stone. [This is a call-back to an earlier remark: "Thus, we cannot say that a stone exists and that it does not exist, referring to the same stone at the same instant." (p.34) -- RL] Rather, the point is that a Master is a being who can only be defined or described by using a concept that is its meaningful opposite or negation. Without Servants there are no Masters, and vice versa." [Heilbroner (1980), pp.35-36. Italic emphasis in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]

 

What we are still owed, however, is some sort of explanation why any of this constitutes a contradiction. It isn't as if the following is true (as Heilbroner himself acknowledges), "MM is a master and not a master"; or even, "SP is a servant and not a servant". [Where, as usual at this site, pairs of capital letters in bold, such as "MM" and "SP", for proxy for Proper Names.]

 

Admittedly, as part of our understanding of the word "master" (used in this way) we associate the word "servant", just as we understand that a servant isn't a master (although, as we will see, that isn't as clear cut as DM-theorists seem to think). In that sense then it would be true to say: "SP isn't a master" -- or more generally "A servant isn't a master". But, not even that is a contradiction, so why such things have been called 'dialectical contradictions' is still far from clear. [This is clearly connected with Kant's concept of 'real negation', covered in Appendix A. See also below.]

 

 

Figure Fourteen: Is DM Un-Roadworthy? Are You Serious! It's 'Dialectically' Held Together

By Baling Wire And Duct Tape, And Hence Perfectly Safe On The Road To Truth...

 

Of course, DM-theorists are perfectly at liberty to call anything they like a 'dialectical contradiction' (not that they need my permission or acquiescence -- but, on that, see here); however, what they aren't entitled to do is claim this ramshackle theory of theirs -- held together as it is by baling wire and duct tape -- represents a 'superior form of logic' (compared with FL). That is because this term ("dialectical contradiction") has been introduced by means of a stipulation -- i.e., it amounts to an imposition on the facts (by any other name). As such, it bears no connection with the criticism of Aristotle's concept of a contradiction (which was at least supposed to be a point of departure for 'Hegelian dialectics'). Of course, this means that Hegel and DM-theorists might just as well have chosen "coffee grinder", and then have called their 'dialectical contradictions', "dialectical coffee grinders" for all the good that would have done. There seems to be just as much justification for calling these 'manufactured contradictions', "coffee grinders", as there is for calling them "dialectical contradictions".

 

[If we throw in Kant's comments about 'real opposition', it might seem we could construct an acceptable rationale for linking these terms together, and hence for calling such things "dialectical contradictions". That seemingly promising 'dialectical life-line' has been permanently cut, the rope incinerated, the noose-tying manual trashed, in Appendix A (link above),]

 

But, Heilbroner adds the following thoughts which might appear to clarify things somewhat:

 

"...[T]he presence of conflicts within social processes does not in itself suffice to establish these conflicts as contradictions. The social world, like the natural world, is full of opposing forces, most of which have no more 'contradictory' significance than the chance encounter of two particles.... Contradictions refer to those oppositions that are both necessary for, and destructive of, particular entities." [Ibid., p.39. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

Quite apart from still failing to explain exactly why the word "contradiction" is appropriate here, we have already seen in this Essay that no sense can be made of attempts to equate 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions', at any level. So, the above words turn out to be no help at all.

 

Heilbroner now gets to the heart of the problem (which might seem to be an effective response to many of the points made in the last few paragraphs):

 

"The difficulty arises, I believe, because many critics continue to interpret 'contradiction' in its logical, Aristotelian sense in which the contradiction (sic) of A is not-A. This easily reduces dialectical usage to violations of sense and meaning.... But that is not the meaning that contradiction holds as a relational view of the world. The logical contradiction (or 'opposite' or 'negation') of a Master is not a Slave but 'not-Master', which may or may not be a slave. But the relational opposite of a Master is indeed a Slave, for it is only by reference to this second 'excluded' term that the first is defined." [Ibid., p.41.]

 

Once again, the above is a caricature even of Aristotle's understanding of "contradiction", as we saw in Essay Four, but we can let that annoying 'niggle' slide for now. Independently of that, A can only be part of an alleged contradiction (A and not-A) if it stood for a proposition or a clause; but we can see that, according to Heilbroner, "A" stands for "Master" and "not-A" for "not-Master", two phrases! So, we don't even have a contradiction here, let alone an example of the mutant 'dialectical' strain.

 

However, Heilbroner's use of "excluded" calls to mind the words Marx used to characterise the connection between RF and EF, we met earlier:

 

"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed. No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx and Engels (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [
Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]

 

But, this 'exclusivity' falls foul of what Hegel and Engels argued elsewhere:

 

"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphasis added. The serious problems this dogmatic and a priori diktat creates for Hegel, which he nowhere tries to justify, are detailed here.]

 

"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.

"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Engels (1954), pp.212-13. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Plainly, this would make Marx's economic and social theory metaphysical, since his distinction between these two forms of value is a hard and fast dichotomy!

 

If RF and EF are mutually exclusive -- "A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive...." -- we would have here a reasonably clear 'either/or'! On the other hand, if there is no exclusivity in this case, the sort of 'dialectical relationalism' that Heilbroner described falls apart. If no slave can exist without a master -- which would mean that MM, say, was either a slave or a master, not both -- then a core principle of 'Hegel's dialectic' disintegrates. On the other hand, if a worker can be a boss as well as a worker, and a boss can be a worker as well as a boss, too -- if the two main classes under capitalism aren't mutually exclusive -- then Marx's social theory bites the very dust left behind by Hegel's decomposed corpse.

 

The distinct advantage of attempts to clarify Hegel (like Heilbroner's) is that it is easy to see where they go wrong -- which, ironically, explains why Hegel and his progeny (and that includes Dialectical Marxists) prefer obscurity over clarity -- it is so much easier to 'hide the bodies' that way!

 

Is the Supposed 'Contradiction Between The Proletariat And The Capitalist Class' Even 'Dialectical'?

 

[RF = Relative Form of Value; EF = Equivalent Form of Value; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context..]

 

This brings us to a consideration of a 'problem' that has been touched on several times throughout this Essay, but left unresolved: if the capitalist class and the proletariat imply each other, such that one can't exist without the other, and both are mutually exclusive classes, then:

 

(a) Engels should have labelled Marx's economic work "metaphysical" since, as we saw (at the end of the last sub-section) it is based on an overt use of an 'either'/'or', a hard-and-fast dichotomy -- for example, between RF and EF;

 

And,

 

(b) There is a very clear distinction between the two classes such that, concerning any given wage-, or salary-earner, it should be clear to which class they belonged -- the proletariat or the bourgeoisie.

 

If this were a logical question the answer to (b) would be crystal clear, but it isn't. That is why -- for decades -- Marxists have spilt gallons of ink attempting to define the proletariat and the capitalist class, trying to specify exactly who falls into which category, often markedly disagreeing with each other. So, is every white collar worker a proletarian? What about the unemployed or the families of proletarians? Their children, their partners, their retired grandparents? What about strike-breakers, security guards, community police, those on zero-hour contracts, unpaid interns or carers, 'self-employed' gig-economy workers (Über and Lyft drivers, etc., etc.), or those who are perennially between jobs? What about individuals on long-term stay in hospital or the terminally ill? What are we to say about those who have taken a year off to do charity work in, for example, Borneo? To which class do public servants belong if their job tasks them with pressuring the unemployed or the disabled to 'find work'? What about members of the military (squaddies and those below officer rank)? What are we to say about, cops, prison guards, immigration workers, or junior managers who perhaps have a second job as bar-tenders or salespersons? What about professional footballers, entertainers, rock-, media-, and film-stars? What about pensioners? What do we say about those who work in public relations, marketing, or advertising? What about workers who own shares? How do we classify debt-collectors? What about bloggers and those who now earn part, most or all their income from social media (YouTube, TikTok, etc.)? And how do we classify part-, or full-time sex workers? How does the unpaid housework of "homemakers" (male, female or trans) fit into this paradigm? Or students who have part-time jobs? What do we even say about 'professional revolutionaries' and party full-timers?

 

If the class to which any -- or, indeed, all -- of the above belong were simply a logical question, and the connection between them and the capitalist class were even a 'dialectical-logical relation', the answer should be perfectly clear, just as it is clear to which set of numbers, π, for instance, belongs, or which grammatical category "to run" is to be assigned. But, it isn't. Deciding which class a group or an individual belongs is one of the thorniest areas of Marxist Theory and Practice. Any who doubt this should check out Callinicos (1983), and Callinicos and Harman (1987). I happen to agree with much of what Callinicos and Harman have to say, but there will be many who don't. Indeed, Callinicos even admitted that readers of Socialist Worker, many of whom were his own party comrades(!), objected to his analysis! [Callinicos (1983), p.87.] Clearly, it wouldn't be necessary to write such articles -- or even publish books like Wright (1985/1998, 1989/1998) -- if this were a plain-and-simple, logical distinction. How many books and/or articles are there that tackle the knotty problem whether vixens are, or aren't, female foxes -- or whether an hour lasts for sixty or seventy minutes?

 

[Update October 2023: See also this excellent video (and my response to it in the comment section).]

 

As Dominic Alexander recently admitted:

 

"Class is not a fixed and positivistic position that can be defined by exact boundaries. Rather, it is a social relationship, and individuals are always bound within a mesh of different such connections. The result is a complex of social tendencies, not static categories." [Quoted from here; accessed 20/02/2021.]

 

But, not even Alexander attempted to derive one class 'logically' from any other, or, indeed, from anything else. His reference to "positivism" was slightly misleading since even he will have to refer to empirical evidence at some point in order to identify the relevant classes -- indeed, as Callinicos and Harman did (in the studies mentioned earlier) -- and even if the classes or the individuals concerned change while he is doing so.

 

Unfortunately, Marx left us with no clear or comprehensive guidance on this issue. Notoriously, Volume Three of Das Kapital breaks off at this point, with the section devoted to Classes left unfinished:

 

"The owners merely of labour-power, owners of capital, and land-owners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and ground-rent, in other words, wage-labourers, capitalists and land-owners, constitute then three big classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of production. In England, modern society is indisputably most highly and classically developed in economic structure. Nevertheless, even here the stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere (although incomparably less in rural districts than in the cities). However, this is immaterial for our analysis. We have seen that the continual tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of production is more and more to divorce the means of production from labour, and more and more to concentrate the scattered means of production into large groups, thereby transforming labour into wage-labour and the means of production into capital. And to this tendency, on the other hand, corresponds the independent separation of landed property from capital and labour, or the transformation of all landed property into the form of landed property corresponding to the capitalist mode of production. The first question to he answered is this: What constitutes a class? -- and the reply to this follows naturally from the reply to another question, namely: What makes wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords constitute the three great social classes? At first glance -- the identity of revenues and sources of revenue. There are three great social groups whose members, the individuals forming them, live on wages, profit and ground-rent respectively, on the realisation of their labour-power, their capital, and their landed property. However, from this standpoint, physicians and officials, e.g., would also constitute two classes, for they belong to two distinct social groups, the members of each of these groups receiving their revenue from one and the same source. The same would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into which the division of social labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and landlords -- the latter, e.g., into owners of vineyards, farm owners, owners of forests, mine owners and owners of fisheries. [Here the manuscript breaks off.]" [Marx and Engels (1998), pp.870-71. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Engels edited this volume for publication after Marx had passed away, but not even he was confident enough to add a few thoughts on this issue.

 

In which case, the question now becomes: To whom does this comment apply: "Unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of the direct producers"? [Marx, quoted in Callinicos (1983), p.82.] But, not every worker produces "surplus value" -- or do they? That, too, is controversial! It is connected with what Marx called "productive labour". Here is Callinicos, again:

 

"Marx defines productive labour as follows: 'Productive labour, in its meaning for capitalist production, is wage-labour which, exchanged against the variable part of capital...reproduces not only this part of capital (or the value of its own labour-power), but in addition produces surplus-value for the capitalist.' Productive labour is thus labour productive of surplus-value. Unproductive labour, on the other hand, 'is labour which is not exchanged with capital, but directly with revenue, that is, with wages or profit.' The distinction between productive and unproductive labour is, therefore, one between labour which contributes to the self-expansion of capital and labour which does not. Marx's main example of the latter is that of domestic servants, the largest single category of workers in Victorian Britain, employed out of the revenue of the middle and upper classes. The precise implications of Marx's theory of productive and unproductive labour are not wholly clear. However, the interpretation most consistent with the version of the theory expounded in Capital volumes 2 and 3 suggests that only those wage-labourers involved in the production of commodities (including their transportation to the point of final consumption) are seen by Marx as productive labourers.

 

"Marx argues, for example, that time devoted to the circulation of commodities -- buying and selling, book-keeping and so on -- is a pure cost to capital, creating no surplus-value. A commercial capitalist who invests in these activities merely creates a claim to the surplus value created elsewhere, and thus reduces the general rate of profit. If the capitalist employs wage-labourers 'this advance of capital creates neither product nor value. It reduces pro tanto [to such an extent -- RL] the dimensions in which the advanced capital functions productively.' However, wage-labour employed to transport goods does create surplus-value, since 'the use-value of things is only materialised in their consumption, and their consumption may necessitate a change of location of these things, hence may require an additional process of production in the transport industry.' If we accept productive labour thus conceived as defining the working class, then only wage-labourers in extractive, manufacturing, and freight industries would form the proletariat. On such a view, the working class would apparently be narrowed down to its nineteenth-century stereotype of male manual workers.... This approach contradicts that pursued by Marx in Capital. Marx himself insisted that many white-collar workers were themselves productive labourers. This was a result of the increasing socialisation of production, which meant that:

 

'the real lever of the overall labour-process is increasingly not the individual worker. Instead, labour-power socially combined and the various competing labour-powers which together form the entire production machine participate in very different ways in the immediate process of making commodities.... Some work better with their hands, others with their heads, one as a manager, engineer, technologist, etc, the other as overseer, the third as manual labourer or even drudge. An ever-increasing number of types of labour are included in the immediate concept of productive labour, and those who perform it are classed as productive workers, workers directly exploited by capital and subordinated to its process of production and expansion.' [Callinicos is here quoting from the Results of the Immediate Process of Production -- Productive and Unproductive Labour, published in the Appendix to the Penguin edition of Capital Volume One, i.e., Marx (1976), pp.1039-1040, although the version on-line is clearly a different translation. Italic emphasis in the original published version, although Callinicos has emphasised sections of this passage differently.]

 

"Thus, all those who form part of what Marx called 'the collective worker', the complex division of labour involved in producing commodities, are productive workers, even if they do not work with their hands. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Marx regarded only productive workers as forming the proletariat. On the contrary, his analysis of commercial employees, whom we have already seen he did not believe produced surplus-value, suggests the opposite. Marx writes:

 

'In one respect a commercial employee is a wage-worker. In the first place, his labour-power is bought with the variable capital of the merchant, not with money expended as revenue, and consequently it is not bought for private service, but for the purpose of expanding the capital advanced for it. In the second place, the value of the labour-power, and thus his wages, are determined as those of other wage-workers, i.e., by the cost of production and reproduction of his specific labour-power, not by the product of his labour-power.' [Callinicos is here quoting Capital Volume Three; i.e., Marx (1998), p.291 -- RL.]...

 

"As Erik Olin Wright puts it:

 

'both productive and unproductive workers are exploited; both have unpaid labour extorted from them. The only difference is that in the case of productive labour, unpaid labour-time is appropriated as surplus-value; whereas in the case of unproductive labour, unpaid labour merely reduces the costs to the capitalist of appropriating part of the surplus-value produced elsewhere. In both cases, the capitalist will try to keep the wage-bill as low as possible; in both cases the capitalist will try to increase productivity by getting workers to work harder; in both cases, workers will be dispossessed of control over their labour-process. In both cases, socialism is a prerequisite for ending exploitation. It is hard to see where a fundamental divergence of economic interests emerges from the position of unproductive and productive labour in capitalist relations of production.' [Callinicos is here quoting Wright (1985), pp.49-50 -- RL.]

 

"If we accept this reasoning, then we must reject the 'narrow' definition of the proletariat as comprised only of productive workers. Ernest Mandel offers the following broad definition: 'The defining structural characteristic of the proletariat in Marx’s analysis of capitalism is the socio-economic compulsion to sell one's labour-power. Included in the proletariat, then, are not only manual industrial workers, but all unproductive wage-labourers who are subject to the same fundamental constraints: non-ownership of means of production; lack of direct access to the means of livelihood (the land is by no means freely accessible!); insufficient money to purchase the means of livelihood without more or less continuous sale of labour-power'. [Callinicos is here quoting Ernest Mandel's 'Introduction' to the Penguin Edition of Capital Volume Two -- RL.]... The implication of the previous section is that the proletariat should broadly be identified with the mass of wage-labourers. It follows that the present century has seen a considerable expansion, rather than a decline in the size of the working class...." [Callinicos (1983), pp.87-94. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

Of course, if we don't accept this definition --, or, indeed, the reasoning behind it -- then everything is up for grabs, again. The point is that if this were a 'dialectical-logical relation', it would be much clearer cut and wouldn't depend on a contestable definition, a long and tortuous argument, or the collection of data. Who needs to collect data to establish the truth of the claim that that all regicides are king-killers? Who needs to engage in detailed empirical research to decide if "to run" is a verb, adjective, adverb, noun or conjunction?

 

So, because the decision about which class an individual or group belongs requires in-depth analysis, complex argument, evidence and debate, the distinction between the proletariat and the capitalist class can't be 'dialectical-logical'. Like much else in science, this distinction is convention-based, dependent on decisions theorists make, in tandem with the discussions, arguments and negotiations that take place between the relevant parties as they collectively arrive at some sort of consensus (that is, if they do --, which, in the entire history of Marxism, is, alas, all too rare!). So the relation between workers and capitalists isn't in the end de re it is, if anything, de dicto -- and the de dicto bit isn't even settled or agreed upon!

 

[Hillel Ruben (1979) has a few things to say about this; they will be examined Essay Three Part Five.]

 

This means that the best example of a 'dialectical relation' in a DM-theorist's box of tricks -- the link between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie -- isn't 'dialectical' after all! Workers and capitalists don't imply one another existentially -- at best, they do so conceptually, and even then they do that only after much argument, re-definition, stage-setting, debate, data collection and analysis!

 

But, the question remains: Can one of these classes exist without the other? Plainly not, but that is only because the two main classes in Capitalism have been inter-defined, and that definition turns out to be about as clear as mud. Which explains all the accompanying theory, compounded by decade after decade of debate in an attempt to come to some sort of consensus -- which, it is worth reminding ourselves, has yet to be achieved! Now, as I noted above, I largely accept Callinicos's conclusions, but I had to be persuaded to that end. My agreement wasn't to be had by asking me to think really, really hard about 'the definition of each class' or to reflect solely about 'the meaning' of the relevant words.

 

Contrast that with deciding to which set of numbers the fraction, 2/5, uniquely belongs, or whether $1 = 100 cents.

 

[As a side note, if readers want to provoke a 'lively' (and interminable) debate online, in a meeting, in a journal or even down the pub, just try asking a Dialectical Marxist for a definition of productive labour or even surplus value. Even better, ask exactly who belongs to the proletariat and/or the capitalist class. You will be hard pressed to find two such comrades who concur, or even agree about how to decide the answer. But if this were a dialectico-logical or a dialectico-conceptual question (on a par with deciding whether or not a stag is a male deer, or even if 2 + 3 = 5) there would be almost 100% consensus, not the interminable confusion or perennial disagreement we still see concerning such issues across the one-hundred-and-fifty or so years since Das Kapital was published! A small clue as to how such a discussion might go can be gleaned by checking out the comment section below the video to which I linked earlier. Or even better: the 'discussion' I have reproduced in Appendix C, concerning use-value and exchange-value. Readers will no doubt notice how easy it was for me is to sow confusion in the minds of the Dialectical Dogmatists who tried to take me on. In both cases, conceptual chaos doesn't quite capture the nature, tone or mood of that 'debate'. It was rather like asking a group of Christians (drawn from different denominations) what the meaning of The Eucharist is -- or even, whether or not Christians should obey 'Jesus' and give all they have to the poor!]

 

All this is quite apart from the fact that we have yet to be told why it is appropriate to call such things, or such relations, "contradictions", to begin with. After well over a century-and-a-half (or two centuries if we include Hegel), we are still owed a clear, non-question-begging, explanation. Just as it also quite apart from the fact that none of this is of any help explaining how Hegel's 'relationalism' could conceivably apply to objects and processes in the natural world. As we have seen in Essay Eleven Part Two, it isn't at all easy to identify a 'Master-Slave sort-of-dialectic' at work anywhere in the universe outwith human society. How, for example, could the Sun 'imply' the planet Mercury as part of its 'concept'/'definition', or vice versa? While employees (as employees) might not be able exist without employers (as employers), the Sun can surely exist without Mercury or Neptune. [While those two planets would, of course, change dramatically if they were somehow forced out of the Solar System -- perhaps by the gravity of a passing star -- they would/could still exist.] Hegel tried to justify the application of the 'dialectic' beyond the social sphere by appealing to a link that supposedly exists between acids and bases, but we have already seen that not even that can be made to work. In which case, whatever one thinks of Hegel's 'logic' applied to social development, its application to nature looks about as convincing as a UK Tory or a US Republican Party election video.

 

And this, too, is quite apart from the extra fact that, if the DM-classicists are to be believed, and such things were actually related to one another as 'dialectical opposites', they should struggle with and then turn into each other! Has anyone noticed Mercury locked in a life-or-death struggle with the Sun and then turn into it? Or: the Sun turn into Mercury? Or, indeed, every master turn into a slave, and vice versa?

 

Heilbroner's 'life-line' thus turns into a much less helpful anvil:

 

 

Figure Fifteen: Hey! Comrades! Catch This! It Will 'Dialectically'

Prevent You From Drowning!

 

Hegelian Quandary

 

In view of the above, and much that has been discussed elsewhere at this site, there is a more fundamental question that needs to be addressed connected with what Hegel had to say about the supposed relation between masters and slaves. As we will see in Essay Twelve Part Six, in the end it is difficult to see how the sort of Absolute Idealism promoted by Hegel is significantly different from materialist or pragmatist versions of Scientific Realism/Naturalism. [On this, see Stove (1991), pp.83-133.] The struggle to sanitise Hegel continues apace (and on a par with 19th century attempts to sanitise the Bible -- in relation to which, the reader is referred to Magee's remarks, quoted below), even if the result of this latest attempt to 'decontaminate' Hegel -- along with the reaction of critics -- looks rather more like an 'ivory tower dog-pile'.

 

[On this, see Brandon (2002), pp.45-57, 178-234, Engelhardt and Pinker (1994), Hartmann (1976), Pinkard (2012), Pippin (1989, 2018) and Redding (2007). In fact, in the Introduction to his book, Redding has published a brief and relatively clear account of the 'return to Hegel' among Analytic Philosophers, why they are busy sanitising this Mystic (not Redding's words, mine!). This is not the place to enter into this unforgivable sell-out by fellow Analytic Philosophers, but I will say much more in Essay Twelve Parts Six and Seven. In advance of that Stove's work (part of which is referenced above) is the best explanation why philosophers (and others) find some sort of solace in Idealism -- or in sanitised versions of it, that now appear to attracting the attention of several prominent Analytic Philosophers.]

 

The above attempts to 'launder' Hegel have been collectively, if somewhat misleadingly, labelled the "Non-Metaphysical Reading" about which Hegel scholar, Glenn Magee had this to say:

 

"The phrase 'non-metaphysical reading' seems to have originated with Klaus Hartmann who, in his influential 1972 article 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View,' [Magee is here referring to Hartmann (1976) -- RL] identified Hegel's system as a 'hermeneutic of categories.' Other well-known proponents of Hartmann's approach include Kenley Royce Dove, William Maker, Terry Pinkard, and Richard Dien Winfield. The non-metaphysical/anti-theological reading relies on ignoring or explaining away the many frankly metaphysical, cosmological, theological, and theosophical passages in Hegel's writings and lectures. Thus the non-metaphysical reading is less an interpretation of Hegel than a revision. Its advocates sometimes admit this -- Hartmann, for instance -- but more often than not they offer their 'reading' in opposition to other interpretations of what Hegel meant. It is, furthermore, no accident that the same authors finish out their 'interpretation' by tacking a left-wing politics onto Hegel, for they are, in fact, the intellectual heirs of the nineteenth-century 'Young Hegelians' who also gave non-metaphysical, anti-theological 'interpretations' of Hegel. The non-metaphysical reading is simply Hegel shorn of everything offensive to the modern, secular, liberal mind. This does not, however, imply that I am offering an alternative 'right Hegelian' reading of Hegel. I am simply reading Hegel. In so doing, I hope to contribute to the 'nonpartisan, historical and textual analysis' of Hegel's thought called for by Louis Dupré." [Magee (2008), pp.14-15, reproduced from here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link added; paragraphs merged.]

 

As noted earlier, topics like this will be examined in greater detail in later Essays. In fact, a others have pointed out, it is far from clear whether Hegel meant to construct a purely logical system or one that was sensitive to scientific fact. John Burbidge summarises this dilemma in the following terms:

 

"These positions [i.e., the approaches to Hegel's work Burbidge had briefly covered in the previous page -- RL] agree in that the clue to any systematic philosophy lies in its logic: the patterns of reasoning that lead disciplined thought from one stage to the next. Yet Hegel included the philosophy of nature within the total purview of his vision. This, too, was to be organised in a coherent and integrated way. Nature is the realm of human experience and scientific investigation. For all that humans might exploit it for their own purposes, it presents a given that is not completely malleable to the preconceptions of thought. To comprehend nature philosophically is to take this realm of contingent experience and organise it according to logical principles. So what Hegel said about nature could be simply be the product of second-order reflection on natural science and natural phenomena. Once nature became the object of philosophy, what was said about it had to be systematic. This demand poses the primary puzzle for interpreters of Hegel's philosophy of nature. How much is driven by logical concerns, and how much responds to empirical fact? If it is primarily logical, then it is claiming the ability to derive natural phenomena from strictly a priori principles; there is no need to appeal to experience. But then new scientific evidence may well falsify the theory. If, however, it is empirical, then it is in danger of losing its systematic status. For, as time passes and scientific investigation uncovers new information about the natural order, any logical structure will be broken into pieces. In either case, philosophy will have to abandon its claim to systematic knowledge. This dilemma underlies the examination of Hegel's philosophy of chemical phenomena undertaken here. He appears to be conscious of both the Scylla of a priori deduction and the Charybdis of simple observation of facts." [Burbidge (1996), p.4. Link added; paragraphs merged.]

 

Reader will have to decide if Burbidge manages to show whether Hegel succeeded in crossing this minefield with all his limbs still attached, but it is clear from Essay Two that DM-theorists certainly haven't. The question is, how does this affect the interpretation of the 'master-slave dialectic' covered, but left unresolved, earlier? While Burbidge links the above dilemma with concerns connected with Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, similar questions might well be asked about his Theory of History and hence what he had to say about the 'mater-slave dialectic': Are his ideas in this area 'purely logical' or are they, too, sensitive to empirical investigation?

 

First of all, it is far from certain that Marx himself referred to or used the master-slave dialectic. Here is what Chris Arthur concluded about the following:

 

"There is a widely held view that Marx was profoundly influenced by the Master-Servant...dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. [Arthur is here referring to Hegel (1977) -- RL.] This view was first popularized by Jean-Paul Sartre, who refers in his Being and Nothingness (1943) to 'the famous Master-Slave relation which so profoundly influenced Marx'. [Arthur is here referring to Sartre (2018) -- RL.] Sartre does not explain how he knows this. Probably this remark reflects the influence of Alexandre Kojčve's lectures on Hegel in the nineteen-thirties. Kojčve presents a reading of the Phenomenology which centralizes the place of the Master-Servant dialectic in it, in a quasi-Marxist interpretation. (Kojčve may have assumed that Marx himself read it in the same way. However, it is one thing to read Marxism back into Hegel, it is another to generate it out of Hegel.) Three years after Sartre we find Jean Hyppolite again saying that the dialectic of domination and servitude is the best-known section of the Phenomenology because of 'the influence it has had on the political and social philosophy of Hegel's successors, especially Marx'. As a matter of fact, despite the assertions of numerous commentators to the contrary, Sartre and Hyppolite did not attend Kojčve's lectures. The myth that they sat at the feet of the 'unknown superior' is now well-established, but the secondary literature concerned does not give any evidence for it. Let us turn then to first-hand accounts. Kojčve's disciple Raymond Queneau, who was responsible for collecting and publishing Kojčve's lectures in 1947, has given a list of participants which does not include Sartre or Hyppolite. As far as Hyppolite is concerned we have the additional testimony of [Madame] Hyppolite that he did not attend 'for fear of being influenced'.

 

"However that may be, by the time Sartre and Hyppolite made their equations between Hegel and Marx a crucial document of Kojčve's was already in the public domain. In the 14 January 1939 issue of Mesures Kojčve published a free translation, with interpolated glosses, of the section of the Phenomenology entitled 'Autonomy and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Mastery and Servitude'. Still more interesting for our purposes is that Kojčve includes as an epigraph the following words of Marx: 'Hegel...grasps labour as the essence, as the self-confirming essence of man'.... No reference is given, but in fact this is quoted from Marx's 1844 Paris Manuscripts, which remained unpublished until the nineteen-thirties. Kojčve is the first person, therefore, to make a direct connection between this famous judgement of Marx's on Hegel and the Master-Servant dialectic in the Phenomenology. Today it is dogmatically asserted in numerous books that Marx was inspired by Hegel's analysis of the labour of servitude. This view is completely false. The present note attempts to show that this is so and to explain the real significance of Marx's critical appropriation of the Phenomenology.

 

"If we are to consider the influence of Hegel's Phenomenology on Marx, the crucial text to examine has to be Marx's manuscripts of 1844, in which he introduces his theory of alienation, and then devotes considerable space to a penetrating critique of the Phenomenology. In this latter section Marx praises Hegel for having grasped man as the result of his own labour. Nearly all commentators, innocently assuming that material labour is meant here, turn to the Phenomenology and find that there is indeed a fascinating discussion in the 'Master-Servant' section of the significance of material labour; in and through this the servant 'finds himself'. Furthermore, the fact that this labour is seen by Hegel as actualized in the context of servitude, leads some commentators to make the more extravagant claim that in his theory of alienation Marx draws on this same section. Herbert Marcuse was probably the first to do so; he says in his Reason and Revolution (1941) [Arthur is here referring to Marcuse (1973) -- RL.]: 'In 1844, Marx sharpened the basic concepts of his own theory through a critical analysis of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. [This is the same book as the Phenomenology of Spirit -- RL.] He described the alienation of labour in the terms of Hegel's discussion of master and servant.' The only difficulty with these presuppositions of the secondary literature is that Marx never refers to this section of the Phenomenology -- never mind giving it any importance! -- when, in his 1844 manuscripts, he embarks on a 'critique of Hegel's dialectic'. He discusses the Phenomenology as a whole and draws attention to its last chapter especially; he singles out three other sections for praise; but not one of them is on the master-servant dialectic. This should make us suspicious, therefore, of the claims made for the 'master-slave'..... Does Marx, as Marcuse claims..., follow in his theory of alienation the terms of Hegel's Master-Servant relationship? We have already said enough to cast doubt on this. Furthermore, not only does Marx himself not refer us to this section, but Hegel's own discussion in it does not mention alienation." [Chris Arthur, quoted from here. Italic emphases in the original; several paragraphs merged. Links added.]

 

This sub-section is still under construction...

 

Last Chance Saloon

 

In that case, the only options left open to us in our endeavour to understand what John Rees had to say are F50 and F51. They were:

 

F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.

 

F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A, as well as B and C.

 

However, since these two are clearly variations on F48 and F49, they don't appear to be viable alternatives. DM-apologists are free to make of them what they can.

 

True Contradictions?

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic; MFL = Modern FL; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; PB = Principle of Bivalence. I have linked to Wikipedia for the definition of "Bivalence" even though I am steadily removing the vast majority of such links (as I explained in the Preface). I have done so since the Wikipedia definition is actually quite good, and certainly much better than many others I have seen on the Internet, and that includes several logic textbooks (where it is regularly conflated with the LEM!). For a brief explanation of the difference between the LEM and the PB, see Purtill (1999); LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]

 

Nevertheless, Dialectical Marxists maintain that there are indeed actual, honest-to-goodness, 'true contradictions' in nature and society. By far and away the most sophisticated attempt to establish this (as a 'sort-of fact') is currently to be found in the work of Graham Priest. However, it is far from clear whether the 'contradictions' upon which he focuses are actually 'dialectical' -- that is, should we ever be told with any clarity what a 'dialectical contradiction' actually is!

 

[Priest's work will be considered in more detail in an Additional Essay to be posted at this site at a later date. In the meantime, readers should consult this and this.]

 

Veteran communist theoretician, the late Maurice Cornforth, also attempted to argue that there are 'true contradictions' in the natural and social world, contrary to the view endorsed at this site, which is that a contradiction (in its simplest form, in logic and ordinary life) is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, which has nothing to do with 'what exists':

 

"The contradiction in things is a very familiar state of affairs. There is nothing in the least abstruse about it, and it is often referred to in everyday conversations. For example, we speak of a man as having a 'contradictory' character, or as being 'a mass of contradictions'…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-93.]

 

In which case, based on the above reasoning, when we describe someone as a "bit of a puzzle" what we really mean is that he or she can be purchased in a magic store or toy shop! Or that when we read this:

 

"All the world's a stage,

 

"And all the men and women merely players;

 

"They have their exits and their entrances". [William Shakespeare, As You Like It, 2/7.]

 

what Shakespeare meant was that we should all try to remember our lines and stage cues, pay attention to the director, make sure the audience can hear us, and ignore the reviews...

 

Clearly, Cornforth has never heard of metaphor.

 

[Why the above isn't a literal use of "contradiction" will be considered in more detail below, where we will also see that "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradict"/"contradiction".]

 

It is worth recalling that Hegel attempted to show that logical contradictions, and not so much ordinary contradictions, were far too one-sided, abstract and philosophically limited. His 'reconfiguration' of this 'troublesome word' was intended to transcend the supposedly 'Aristotelian' view of contradiction. (As far as I am aware, he was silent about the everyday use of "contradict", and its cognates.) Of course, DM-theorists might aim to use "contradiction" in a way that is different to Hegel -- and that might still be the case whether or not his theory, along with its 'contradictions', has been turned "the right way up" or left upside down --, but, if that is so, their 'contradictions', the 'DM-strain', might not (obviously) 'transcend' FL-contradictions, as had been intended. On the other hand, if Dialectical Marxists use of this word is meant to be the same as Hegel's, that would render their criticisms of FL entirely vacuous -- since they would be addressing neither the same term nor the same concept that logicians had been using for centuries. Nevertheless, Dialectical Marxists certainly intend their use of this word should transcend the use of "contradiction" in FL, which is attention has largely been restricted to the latter area of contention in this Essay.

 

However, it is also clear from the examples they themselves give that DM-theorists -- like Cornforth and the others mentioned below -- focus on what certainly look like ordinary contradictions (as opposed to FL-contradictions, or even 'dialectical contradictions') when they try to argue that there are 'true contradictions' in nature and society. It is also clear why they do this: FL-contradictions are totally uninteresting (even when translated into the vernacular), and, what is worse, they are politically useless, too. Who, for example, is going to get too excited about the following (these have been taken from a letter sent to Socialist Review a few years ago by a supporter of this site):

 

A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate and there isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

A2: Capitalism is governed by a blindly competitive market and it isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

Even these two are merely discursive equivalents of FL-contradictions. As should seem rather obvious, they are totally useless and exceedingly boring.

 

As we saw in Essay Four Part One, DM-theorists concentrate their attention on the simplest form of FL-contradiction, namely: p & ¬p (which they often get wrong!). Seldom (in fact never) do they consider more complex FL-contradictions. Here are just two of the latter:

 

V1: ¬[(p q) v (p → r) ↔ (p (q v r))].

 

V2: ¬[¬(Ǝx)(Fx & ¬Gx) (x)(Fx Gx)].

 

[In the above, "(Ǝ...)" is the existential quantifier (and often stands for "There is at least one...", or even just "There is..."); "" is a biconditional sign (and stands for "if and only if", often abbreviated to "iff"); "(x)" is the universal quantifier (and often goes proxy for "All..." or "Every..."); "&" stands for "and"; "v" is the inclusive "or" (i.e., "and/or"); "¬" stands for the negation operator ("It is not the case that..."); "" is the conditional sign (i.e., "If...then"); "p", "q", and "r" are propositional variables; "F" and "G" are one-place, first-level predicate letters; and "x" is a second-level predicate-binding variable.]

 

Here is what V1 and V2 translate out as:

 

V1; "It isn't the case that [(if p then q or if p then r) if and only if (if p then q or r)]."

 

V2: "It isn't the case that [(there isn't something which is F and not G) if and only if (everything which, if it is F, is also G)]."

 

V2a: "It isn't the case that [(there isn't anything which is F and not G) if and only if (everything which, if it is F, is also G)]."

 

[V2a is perhaps a more colloquial, semi-translation of V2. DM-fans will be hard pressed to find place for contradictions like these in their quirky, 'right-way up', quasi-Hegelian universe -- i.e., once they have been interpreted.]

 

Some might wonder when sentences like V1 and V2 would ever be used. In fact, theorists employ and study propositions like these all the time, in Mathematical Logic, the Foundations of Mathematics, Discrete Mathematics, Number Theory and Cryptography -- to mention just a few subject areas --, and, indeed, in several other disciplines. [This links to a PDF.] V1 and V2 are, of course, just two examples of the potentially infinite number of logical contradictions that can be generated with ease in MFL

 

Moreover, dialecticians often conflate the LEM, PB and the LOC with one another -- and, indeed, all of them regularly and ignorantly with opposites, inconsistencies, absurdities, contraries, paradoxes, puzzles, quandaries, oddities, irrationalities, oppositional processes, antagonisms, interacting forces, events that go contrary to expectations -- alongside a whole host of other idiosyncrasies and irrelevances. In fact, they are so eager to see "contradictions" everywhere that they find they have to tinker with the meaning of the word so that (for them) it becomes synonymous with "struggle", "conflict", "opposition", or even "antagonism", as we will see. [I have used the word "ignorantly" here since it is perfectly clear that Dialectical Marxist really don't care about precision or consistency, and are totally unaware of the extent to which that attitude torpedoes their own theory and their credibility as promoters of 'cutting-edge philosophy, logic and science'. (See here for evidence supporting the above accusations -- here is a particularly egregious example of this nescient frame-of-mind (published in 2025), and from two academic Marxists!)]

 

[Concerning the PB, see Maury (1977) and Mezzadri (2013).]

 

Indeed, in debate DM-acolytes are often genuinely surprised to be confronted with actual examples of discursive FL-contradictions -- like those repeated below (i.e., A1 and A2) --, or even the more formal examples posted above (i.e., V1 and V2). From this it is clear they are totally oblivious of genuine contradictions (like these), and when they see them they hastily reject them as irrelevant, and not the sort of examples of what they mean when they use "contradiction". [As we didn't know already!]

 

A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate and there isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

A2: Capitalism is governed by a blindly competitive market and it isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

[Here is a recent example of this sort of 'dialectical-consternation' (in the comments section at the bottom -- unfortunately, these comments are no longer available!). When confronted with a discursive FL-contradiction (rather like A1), the comrade with whom I was debating -- Mike Rosen, no less(!) -- denied that it was what he meant by the use of this contentious word. He had wanted to show that there is a perfectly ordinary use of "contradiction" that picked out what Marx and other Marxists meant by it. And yet none of his examples were 'dialectical contradictions', either, which rendered the whole exercise rather futile -- as, indeed, I pointed out to him. There are many more examples like this that appear in the debates listed here. See also, here.]

 

On the one hand, whatever else DM-'contradictions' are supposed to be, they appear to be totally unrelated to FL-contradictions, which means they can hardly surpass them -- at least no more than The Dogger Bank is capable of 'surpassing' Barclays Bank. On the other hand, they have to be related to FL-contradictions, otherwise Dialectical Marxists will have to abandon any pretence that DL is superior to FL.

 

In that case, and in what follows, I will continue to refer to FL-contradictions in my criticism of 'dialectical contradictions'. If DM-fans mean something different by their quirky use of "contradiction", they should tell the rest of us exactly what they do mean by it.

 

[There is much more on this topic here and here.]

 

Returning to what Cornforth had to say, he concedes the point that describing someone as "contradictory" involves a reference to their dispositions (or "tendencies"):

 

"This means that [they evince] opposed tendencies in [their] behaviour, such as gentleness and brutality, recklessness and cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice." [Cornforth (1976), p.93.]

 

Unfortunately, that prevents Cornforth's own choice of examples from counting as literal contradictions. In which case, he seems not to have noticed he had just torpedoed his own argument.

 

Be this as it may, if the above passage is meant to commit Cornforth to a dispositional account of contradiction (in that they are now supposed to be tendencies to behave in specific ways), then much of classic DM would become obsolete by default. The fact that someone might have, for instance, a disposition/tendency to be brave in certain circumstances, but cowardly in others, in no way suggests he/she can be both of these at once -- that both could be activated at the same time and in the same way. What indeed could that possibly amount to? Standing one's ground while running away? Putting oneself in harms way to rescue someone while refusing to do it?

 

What is open to question, however, is whether the simultaneous actualisation of these dispositions (as certain states or performances) may be expressed by means of true propositions (without ambiguity), and which both are, or could be, true at the same time and in the same respect.

 

Consider a different example: the fact that an iron bar can be red hot at one end and icy cold at the other (at the same time) isn't a contradiction -- even though, plainly, an iron bar is at any time disposed to be either of these, and much else besides, at all times. But, no one supposes (it is to be hoped!) that such a bar could actually be red hot and freezing cold all over, and in the same respect, at the same time.

 

[Admittedly, the supposition that an entire iron bar could be both of these at the same time might be thought by some to be a contradictory assumption; and yet even that would merely be an inconsistency, not a contradiction, since both could be false: if the said bar was just warm.]

 

The same is the case with respect to an individual who might be brave under certain circumstances but act cowardly under others (both at different times, of course!). Cornforth never once attempted to provide an example where two supposedly 'contradictory' dispositions had, or could even be, activated/instantiated at the same time.

 

Anyway, as noted above, the emotions Cornforth imagines capable of being expressed by contrary suppositions turn out to be inconsistent, not contradictory. For example, if NN was said to be both angry and calm at the same time, that would only be a contradiction if it couldn't be false to assert NN was both. But, it would be false to assert both if NN were only slightly agitated (in which state, clearly, NN would be neither angry nor calm), for instance.

 

[Recall, two propositions are contraries, or are inconsistent, if they can't both be true, but they can both be false, at once. By way of contrast, two propositions are contradictory only if they can't both be true and they can't both be false, at once. As noted several ties, DM-fans ignore or a blithely unaware of this.]

 

So, even if both of the said states were actualisable at the same time (which is, of course, a rather difficult scenario to imagine, to put it mildly!), it still wouldn't be a contradiction!

 

On the other hand, if NN could be described (without ambiguity) in the following way:

 

N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger,

 

we might have a genuine contradiction in such circumstances (even if it has yet to be established that this is a 'dialectical contradiction' -- more on that presently). But, it is unlikely that Cornforth meant his words to be understood this way; and it is even more doubtful whether he would have been able to say under what conditions he, or anyone else for that matter, would or could hold N1 true -- or, indeed, under what conditions he/they could or would attribute to NN such (simultaneous) odd dispositional actualisations.

 

Consider the following (more precise) example of the above (imaginary) scenario (which turns out to be a little more complex than at first sight might seem):

 

N2: At time, t, NN is angry with MM for lying to her at t, and not angry with MM for lying to her at t. [Where "t" is a temporal variable.]

 

 Or, perhaps even more precisely:

 

N2a: At times, t1 and t2, NN is angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1. [t2 > t1 (Recall, ">" here means "later than".)]

 

The following is N2a in more ordinary terms:

 

N2a1: NN is angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday and not angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday.

 

Naturally, there are several other possibilities allowed for in logic and ordinary language, such as the following:

 

N2b: At time, t1, NN is angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1.

 

Or, in ordinary (if somewhat stilted) terms:

 

N2b1: NN is currently angry with MM for lying to her just now and currently not angry with MM for lying to her just now.

 

N2b1 certainly looks contradictory and, as a result, someone could argue that it is possible to have mixed emotions at one and the same time (in this case, anger and a lack of anger at the same time). But there are no emotions as such, there are only emotions that have an object. One can't just be angry (except in circumstances covered below). Anger has to be directed at someone or something; i.e., it has to have an object. The same is the case with all the emotions.

 

In that case, this might mean the following (confining our attention to variations on N2, not N2a or N2b, for simplicity's sake):

 

N3: At time, t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she fully understands the pressures on MM when he lied).

 

In that case, N3 is really this:

 

N4: At time, t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.

 

Here, we have two different 'actions', or emotional states, involving different objects of a particular emotion (this is an example of the sort of ambiguity mentioned earlier): i.e., anger at MM because it was a violation of trust (i.e., "φ-ing"), and lack of anger at MM because of extenuating circumstances (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was mentioned:

 

N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger. Here, the object of the said anger also explains its motivation. That isn't always the case.

 

[Greek letters like "φ" and "ψ" are used in MFL and Analytic Philosophy to help distinguish action-, or state-predicates (like "...walks", "...sits", or "...has refuted DM") from others (such as, "...is a man" or "...is a confused dialectician"). Naturally, several of these might overlap somewhat.]

 

As soon as we fill in the details concerning the nature of the emotion involved we can see that we have here two different objects of the said anger, or two different states/actions, and hence no contradiction.

 

DM-fans might still object, but (like Cornforth) they will find it hard to say what the actual content of that objection amounts to without ignoring or editing out of the picture some object or other of the said emotion, thus misrepresenting the intended situation.

 

[Which is, perhaps, why DM-fans dislike precision (i.e., they call it 'pedantry' or 'semantics'). Indeed, attempts to state precisely what Dialectical Marxists might mean always wind up undermining the (confused) doctrines they unwisely borrowed from Hegel -- as we can now see happening with these 'contradictions'.]

 

In fact, by his use of the word "tendencies", Cornforth himself seems half ready to concede this point. But, not even he will want to describe the same action (performed by the same person) as, say, literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (without equivocation). While it is possible to ascribe contrary properties to the same object (e.g., one part of the aforementioned iron bar could be hot while another part is cold, as we have seen), a 'contradiction' may only be extracted from such familiar facts by someone who has never heard of ambiguity, or, of course, who is terminally confused -- or, as is the case with far too many DM-fans, who has no idea (or cares even less!) about the difference between contraries and contradictories. No one would think they had been contradicted by someone who asserted that the far end of an iron bar was red hot just after they themselves had asserted the near end was ice cold. Nor would they think they had been contradicted if someone had said they were angry today, but calm the next day -- or, indeed, that they were angry and calm about different things, at the same time.

 

Anyway, as noted above, any description of the same action as literally and simultaneously both gentle and brutal -- in the same respect and without equivocation -- would merely be an inconsistency; since both alternatives would be false if the said act was in fact neutral (i.e., if it was neither gentle nor brutal, but performed, or displayed, with equanimity or indifference).

 

In addition to this, and once more, are any of these alleged 'contradictions' actually 'dialectical'? In answer to that it is worth asking: Do these emotions imply each other such that they must co-exist (like the proletariat and the capitalist class, so we are told)? Unfortunately for Cornforth, and anyone who agrees with him, such emotions, activities and states don't imply one another, and they can all exist independently of each other. Nor do they struggle with and then turn into one another, which they would have to do if they were 'dialectically related' -- if the DM-classics are themselves to be believed.

 

So, whatever else they are, these aren't 'dialectical opposites', which once again means they can't be, nor can they form part of, a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

However, the slow disintegration of the Communist Block finally caught up with Cornforth; in one of his last works [Cornforth (1980)], he systematically began to retract many of the theories he had once declared were cornerstones of the "world view of the proletariat".

 

Another rather benighted comrade remained undeterred by such contradictory antics and vainly tried to defend the use of this obscure term (i.e., "dialectical contradiction"). To that end, he appeal to (yes, you guessed it!) an everyday use of "contradiction" (re-posted below), in connection with contradictory behaviour, when it isn't at all clear that the examples he himself gave were even 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with! One can only sympathise with this individual, who, like other show take Hegel seriously, has such poor material to work with.

 

Anyway, what did this comrade think he meant by "contradictory behaviour"? Perhaps this term applies to those who stand and sit all at once? Or, maybe to those who only have a 'tendency' to do both? A 'tendency' to stand and sit all at once? Or, is it maybe to those who just threaten/promise to do both? But what sort of threat/promise would that be if it is impossible to carry out? Or even imagine how it could be carried out? Maybe it applies to someone who goes on strike and refuses to go on strike at the same time and in the same way?

 

We aren't told. As usual, DM-fans offer their bemused readers what amount to less than half-formed thoughts -- or which turn out to be what can only be described as 'brain burps'.

 

This benighted comrade actually tried to argue along these lines in a 'debate' he had with me concerning the 2006/07 UK Prison Workers' Strike (that link is now dead, but I have reproduced much of the discussion here):

 

"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it. Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?" [Paragraphs merged. Quoted from here.]

 

Now, in relation to the aforementioned strike, it looks like this comrade meant his comments to apply to workers who support the state (and/or its laws) one minute, but act against it/them the next. [Or perhaps even those who hold what appear to be inconsistent beliefs about one or both of the latter.] But, put that way, this isn't even a contradiction (ordinary or otherwise)! On the other hand, if these workers both supported and refused to support this strike at the same time (and without ambiguity), that would at least have been a contender for consideration as a contradiction, but he plainly didn't mean that. Of course, as we have seen, contraries aren't contradictions, and "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradiction". As indicated earlier, and as reiterated below: two contrary propositions can't both be true, but they can both be false at the same time -- so, in the present case, at best these two propositions (i.e., the said workers (i) support and (ii) refused to support the strike) would merely be inconsistent with (or contrary to) one another. That is because both propositions would be false if the said strikers offered no opinion about the strike or expressed sublime indifference toward it.

 

For example, concerning these two inconsistencies/contraries: (a) "All swans are white", and (b) "No swan is white", can't both be true (in a non-empty domain), but they can both be false. That would happen for instance, if both (c) "Some swan is not white", and (d) "Some swan is white" were true. [As we now know (c) turned out to be the case when black swans were discovered in Australia, and (d) is (currently) always true).] But, two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at the same time. For example, concerning: (e) "All swans are white" and (f) "Some swan is not white", both can't be true and both can't be false, at the same time. When (e) is true, (f) is false, and if (f) were ever true (e) would then be false. They always have opposite truth-values (in a non-empty domain). [Why a domain has to be non-empty is to prevent certain propositions becoming vacuously true. So, if there are no swans at all (and there never had been any), (b) would be vacuously true while (d) would be false. But, the inference from "No swan is white" to "Some swan is not white" is valid (if the first is true the second has to be true in a non-empty domain), but here in this empty domain where there are no swans, the first is true and the second is false! So, in order to prevent this, logicians soon learnt to restrict these propositions to non-empty domains. For more on this, see Quine (1954) -- or this much more expansive Rutgers University PDF.]

 

Again, Dialectical Marxists invariably ignore such "pedantic" details -- that is, where they are even aware of them!

 

But when has that minor detail ever prevented them from pontificating on the subject?

 

Moreover, if someone were presented with these two propositions: "All swans are white" and "Some swan is not white", they will have be asked to consider two contradictory propositions. However, we would only have a contradiction if these two sentences were conjoined to give: "All swans are white and some swan is not white". "Contradictory" applies to propositions or clauses that could be conjoined to form a contradiction (or, one of which could be used to contradict someone who asserted the other), whether or not they are so conjoined, or so used. "Contradictory" also applies to states and performances (among other things), which, if expressed in propositional or clausal form, could also be conjoined to yield a contradiction, whether or not they are so conjoined. [Compare this with the word "breakable": a vase, for example, can be described as breakable -- that is, it can be broken, whether or not it is actually broken. There are analogous distinctions and complications that also apply to "contradict" and "contradiction". See also here. We will see later how Kant succeeded in confusing himself and his readers by failing to notice such fine distinctions. Indeed, we have already seen how Hegel also fell headlong into this trap.]

 

[The term "contradictory" can also apply to imperatives. Hence, the actioning of one imperative would countermand the actioning of another, such as: "Open the door!" (i.e., "Bring it about that the door is open!") and "Do not open the door!" (i.e., "Do not bring it about that the door is open!"), which are contradictory imperatives. By way of contrast, "Open the door!" (i.e., "Bring it about that the door is open!") and "Close the door!" (i.e., "Bring it about that the door is closed!") are merely contraries. That is because these two imperatives would both be countermanded by the following: "Leave the door alone!" (i.e., "Bring it about that the door isn't even touched!"). Clearly, much more could and should be said about Imperative Logic [on this, see Hamblin (1987)], but further consideration would take us too far from the main aim of this Essay and this site.]

 

But even if the above response is misguided in some way, do any of the paired items (that the benighted comrade came out with) imply the other in that pair, such that they both couldn't exist without one another (like the proletariat and the capitalist class, so we are told)? But that would have to be the case if they were 'dialectical contradictions'. Do any of them struggle with and then change into the other? Once again, they would have to do so if the DM-classics are to be believed. The aforementioned comrade was, unsurprisingly, silent on such issues.

 

In that case, and to repeat: whatever else these examples are, they aren't 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

There is another excellent example of 'dialectical confusion' like this in Simon Basketter's article in Socialist Worker (unfortunately that link is now dead!) about the same strike:

 

"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers. It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to the strikers.... Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence. Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.' Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Paragraphs merged; link added.]

 

[Update July 2026: I have just located the new address for the above article.]

 

But, what exactly is the 'contradiction' here meant to be?

 

Maybe, it has something to do with the following (at least, according to Basketter)?

 

P1: Prison officers uphold the law.

 

P2: This either results from, or leads them into, holding right-wing ideas.

 

P3: But, this strike has forced some to defy or disrespect the law.

 

P4: However, later, when some prisoners protested, the same officers rushed back to work in order to re-establish control.

 

Now, I have already commented on the loose, indeterminate, often careless and indiscriminate way that Dialectical Marxists like to use "contradiction", but even given such conceptual sloppiness, what precisely is the contradiction here?

 

Let us try again -- using "NN" this time to stand for the name of a randomly-selected prison guard who thinks and acts along the above lines, and "L1" to stand for a law he rejects, opposes, or defies even if only temporarily, and "L2" for other laws, not including L1:

 

P5: NN upholds the law.

 

P6: NN has adopted a number of right-wing ideas.

 

P7: One day, as a result of the strike, NN says "Screw law, L1!" [No pun intended.]

 

P8: Later that day he acts in support of a totally different law, or set of laws, L2.

 

Once more, where is the contradiction?

 

Now, if NN had said, "Screw all laws!" we might be able to cobble-together an inconsistency of some sort in this case. The inconsistency that would emerge here might be something like: "All laws ought to be screwed!" and "No laws ought to be screwed!". They are inconsistent since both of the latter can't be true at the same time but they can both be false. [They would be false if both of these were true: "Some law shouldn't be screwed!" and "Some law should be screwed!" -- plainly both of those can be true together (taking "ought" and "should" to be equivalent in such circumstances).] But not even that is implied by the above story.

 

Of course, a contradiction in this case could emerge as a result of something like the following two alternatives:

 

(a) "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that shouldn't be screwed." Or, maybe even:

 

(b) "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed."

 

Is that what the above comrade meant?

 

Admittedly, people say all sorts of odd things and it is relatively easy to utter contradictory sentences. Who has ever denied it! [I have just posted several contradictory sets of propositions in the last few paragraphs!] The question is, can both be held true, or held false (or, in this case, advocated and repudiated, asserted and denied, as a practical, moral or political code), at the same time and in same respect? Well, did anyone from Socialist Worker try to ascertain from the aforementioned prison guards if any of them would have assented to and rejected the following, at the same time: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that shouldn't be screwed"; or, "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed"? Apparently not.

 

Indeed, if NN had assented to "No laws should be screwed", we could safely infer from his later course of action that he no longer held it true. Plainly, as a result of the strike he must have come to accept something like the following in its place: "I now think there is at least one law (namely, law, L1) that should be screwed".

 

And that would still be the case even if tomorrow NN went back to holding his former beliefs about every law. Dialectical Marxists, least of all, shouldn't need reminding that people and things change!

 

Unless, that is, we think NN holds this odd belief: "I don't believe that there is at least one law that should be screwed and I also believe there is at least one law that should be screwed!" (referring to the same law each time). Or, perhaps more perspicuously, "Screw L1 and do not screw L1!"

 

Even so, it is also reasonably clear that we could only attribute schizoid beliefs like this to NN if he were about to go insane, had quaffed a few too many at the local bar, or had suffered a recent blow to the head. We certainly couldn't rely on such a confused character to help win a strike -- nor should we depend on him to report his genuine beliefs with any accuracy or consistency, either! He is just as likely to tell anyone who asks him: "Yes I believe this and I do not...". Would Socialist Worker have even quoted such a confused individual? There is considerable room for doubt.

 

[No wonder 'dialectical reasoning' has (rightly) been described as a form of "mental confusion", with one recent variant of DL labelled "Logic for equivocators". On the latter, see Lewis (1982) -- this links to a PDF.] 

 

Elsewhere at this site, I argue that 'dialectics' was itself originally based on little more than a series of egregious logical blunders committed by Hegel (whether such blunders are those that are now 'on their feet', the 'right way up', or remain steadfastly 'upside down', it matters not), but I also pointed out that DM-fans repeatedly base their assertions on half-formed thoughts, egregiously garbled caricatures of logic (both formal and informal), backed-up by laughably thin evidence -- which is why I have called their theory Mickey Mouse Science and Minnie Mouse Philosophy.

 

Simon Basketter's obscure claims amply confirm such accusations. For example, do these odd beliefs, held by prison officers, imply each other -- like the proletariat implies the capitalist class, such that one can't exist without the other? Clearly not. Do they struggle with and then turn into one another, which they should do, according to the DM-classics? Again, no, they don't. If not, and for the nth time: they can't be 'dialectical contradictions', whatever else they are.

 

Did, Basketter even ask himself these questions? Apparently not. In that case, why on earth did he use the word "contradiction"?

 

In answer to that question, the Impertinent Explanation (from earlier) gains increased credibility. He did do since it is traditional (among DM-fans) to use "contradiction" in this loose and indiscriminate manner.

 

But, let us re-examine the words of the benighted comrade (quoted above) and try to determine if anything useful can be extracted from them:

 

"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it. Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?" [Paragraphs merged. Loc cit.]

 

Consider this, first:

 

"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it." [Ibid.]

 

Well, who can honestly blame theorists for wanting to use certain words in novel ways? However, the examples alluded to by this comrade already seem to be expressed in perfectly ordinary language. If so, why then the following question?

 

"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"

 

Of course, the examples themselves relate to what humans beings do, or can think, so they aren't much use in showing how there are, or can be, 'true contradictions' in nature.

 

This benighted comrade might not have noticed (but it was staring him in the face in the example I gave him, as it was in those he himself listed) that contradictions often relate to the inner workings of one proposition (for example, when someone might say "The Nile is and isn't longer than the Amazon") just as they can apply to the connection between several propositions (like interpreted versions of those listed earlier) -- both in ordinary language and FL. In which case, neither the complexities of logic nor the confused state of this comrade's thought processes can be used to defend him from his self-inflicted errors -- since he provides his own counterexamples!

 

Consider this remark of his, for instance:

 

"Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."

 

Unfortunately, that is far too vague to do much with. Perhaps he meant something like the following (if we take an example drawn from Astronomy)?

 

D1: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D2: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.3 million light years.

 

But, these don't contradict each other, since the true distance to YY could be 4.5 million light years, making both D1 and D2 false.

 

And, it is irrelevant whether the true distance to YY is actually 4.8 million or even 4.3 million light years. The fact is that it might not be, or might not have been, either of these. If they could both be false, they can't be contradictories of each other.

 

It is worth recalling that if this were a genuine contradiction, D1 and D2 couldn't both be true and couldn't both be false at once (whether or not one of them was either of these). At best, therefore, D1 and D2 are inconsistent; they are contraries not contradictories. So, even if D1 were true, it is still the case that both D1 and D2 couldn't both be true, but could both be false, at once. That couldn't happen if they were contradictories -- unlike the following two, which are:

 

D3: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D4: It isn't the case that the measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D4a: The measured distance to star, YY, isn't 4.8 million light years. [This is just a more colloquial version of D4.]

 

Now, D3 and D4 have to have opposite truth values (assuming, of course, that there is such a star); they both can't be true and they both can't be false. Given what we mean by "star", YY has to be some distance or other from the earth. One or other of D3 and D4 has to be true, and they have to have opposite truth-values. Either YY is 4.8 million light years from earth or it isn't (otherwise the meaning of the words just used must have changed -- or the star itself has ceased to exist, etc., etc.).

 

Some might object that the above is misleading; the star will have moved while its distance is being measured so the above 'either-or' is misguided. FL can't cope with such changes, whereas DL can.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

However, even though this star might have moved, all that that would mean is that D3 used to be true, and now it is false; and that in turn will imply that D4 used to be false, now it is true. My point remains valid; even in circumstances where the star in question has moved, D3 and D4 will still have opposite truth-values.

 

[Again, always assuming the star still exists! Any who object to a use of the LEM in the above should check this out, and then perhaps think again.]

 

Undeniably, an inconsistency might end up implying a contradiction, but it is far from clear that the benighted comrade meant this. But, even if he did, who has ever denied two propositions can contradict each other (if conjoined or uttered at the same time by two individuals engaged in an argument)? I have posted two such contradictions above -- D3 and D4! The point is, they can't both be true and they can't both be false, at once.

 

As seems clear, DM-fans appear to want such contradictory propositions to be true, or at least for that to be a viable possibility.

 

But, if that were so, it would automatically prevent any such propositions from being contradictory, or from forming a contradiction.

 

It might imply they weren't even propositions, to begin with!

 

On the other hand, the aforementioned, rather confused comrade might have meant that raw data (not yet expressed in a propositional context or form) might contradict some theory or other. In that case, perhaps he meant something like the following examples of raw data (i.e., they were reports of raw data):

 

D5: 4.8 million light years.

 

D6: 4.3 million light years.

 

But, neither of these is capable of being true or capable of being false -- since they aren't even indicative sentences. And, if that is so, they can't contradict anything (since in order to do that they would both have to be capable of being true or false -- D5 and D6 are noun phrases). Anyone not convinced of this claim (that D5 and D6 can't be true or false, might like to contact me and tell me whether or not "4.8 million light years" is true or not (without confusing it with, say, D1).

 

These two noun phrases (i.e., D5 and D6) require an indicative sentential context for them to be capable of being true (or false) -- for instance, as we saw with D1 and D2. But, even then, they would merely be inconsistent, once more.

 

D1: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D2: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.3 million light years.

 

But, couldn't D3 and D4, or even D5 and D6, contradict the predictions of some theory or other (expressed by D7 or D8)? Perhaps this is what was meant?

 

D3: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D4: It isn't the case that the measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D7: Theory, TT, predicts that star, YY, is 5.7 million light years away.

 

D8: Observation tells us that YY is 4.8 million light years away.

 

And yet, the proposition "YY is 5.7 million light years away" (embedded in D7) is merely inconsistent with D8. The star could really be 4.4 million light years away, which would make both D7 and D8 false. So, with D7 and D8 we are once again dealing with contraries.

 

In which case, we still don't have a contradiction!

 

Hence, until the benighted comrade comes up with clearer or more precise details about what he means, little more can be done with his rather vague remarks. [He was asked several times, but he just ignores material he doesn't like or can't answer.]

 

[I will, however, be looking in detail at how data can 'contradict' a scientific theory, alongside the confused things DM-fans have to say about that, in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

Be this as it may, the question remains: is it possible for an individual to have, or to entertain, contradictory interests and goals (in a relationship, or elsewhere, perhaps), as this comrade asserts?

 

Perhaps by that he meant the following (for simplicity's sake, I will concentrate on potential or actual interests an individual might have; the argument can easily be extended to cover actual or potential goals -- those details will be left for the reader to fill in):

 

B1: MN has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

B2: It is not the case that MN has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

That appears to be a genuinely contradictory pair. If B1 and B2 were conjoined they would form a contradiction -- always assuming they both applied simultaneously and with no equivocation -- and MN were a genuine Proper Name, the individual so named actually existing, and there also is someone with whom they were in such a relationship!

 

B2a: MN has interest, A, in relationship, R, and it is not case that MN has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

But, did the benighted comrade mean this?

 

According to his own wording, apparently not:

 

"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it." [Loc cit.]

 

B2a simultaneously attributes a certain interest to an individual and then promptly denies the same interest of them, which doesn't seem to be what this comrade is trying to say. An interest and a lack of the same interest doesn't appear to be a contradiction in any straight-forward sense (certainly not in a dialectical sense, since, concerning one of those, the factors involved both have to co-exist, which isn't the case here!). But even supposing it is a contradiction, do these factors struggle with each other and then turn into one another? Does one of them imply the other's existence? It looks like neither of those is the case. Does an interest struggle with a lack of interest and then turn into it? It is hard to see how anything can struggle with a lack of something. Nor does an interest imply the existence of a lack of interest (or vice versa)! But, both would have to be the case if this were 'dialectical contradiction', as we have repeatedly seen. [Follow the above link for proof.]

 

Maybe that is being a little unfair; in which case, it might be worth examining this specific option in more detail.

 

What about the following alternatives (and assuming all the background conditions mentioned earlier)?

 

B3: MN has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

B4: MN has interest, B, in relationship, R.

 

B5: Interest, A, in relationship, R, contradicts interest, B, in relationship, R.

 

There is no 'lack of an interest' for us to worry about here, so this looks a little more promising.

 

But, our hopes are soon dashed. In B5, if we are talking about a literal contradiction (and not the loose and ill-defined, dialectical-sort-of-contradiction we have come to know and loathe), then A and B in relationship R can only contradict one another if they are expressed in propositions (or in clauses -- i.e., in something capable of being true), as indicated in B5a-B7:

 

B5a: Interest, A, contradicts interest, B.

 

B6: "A" stands for "I, MN, must love my partner".

 

B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I, MN, must love my partner".

 

It is hard to see how anything could be called an interest (as opposed to it being a vague sort of non-linguistic 'feeling') unless it were expressed in this way, or some sort of equivalent.

 

The question before us now is: Can anyone simultaneously assent, or give expression, to such conflicting interests? Well, as we saw with NN earlier, people can assent to, or express, all manner of odd ideas and feelings, so there is nothing to prevent B6 and B7 from forming the content of someone's overall psychological make-up.

 

However, before we hastily label this a 'contradiction' ('dialectical' or otherwise), it is plain that it can, and should be, disambiguated along lines that were suggested, and attempted, above (in relation to N3 and N4, reproduced again below), providing we supply plausible background details (ignoring, however, the complexities mentioned in N2a and N2b). That is because people don't just have interests simpliciter, at least no more than they have emotions or beliefs simpliciter.

 

[For something to be an emotion it has to have a motivating factor and be object directed; so, we are angry with someone or something, fearful of something or someone, proud of someone or something, etc., etc., -- all for specific reasons or causes. Of course, an individual could just be in a fearful state with no (apparent) object of that fear, but that would be enough to diagnose them as (acutely or chronically) mentally disturbed or mentally ill (in this case, they would be said to be in the grip of an irrational fear or experiencing an anxiety attack). This wouldn't count as a genuine emotion, otherwise a mental disturbance wouldn't have been diagnosed. We can tell the difference between a genuine emotion and a mental disorder by the fact that the latter don't have clear objects (that aren't also delusional) -- or have what are deemed irrational cases. This can be seen from the fact that if someone tells us they are afraid, the normal response would be to ask what they are afraid of and why they are afraid. (On this, see here, as well as Kenny (2003) and Hacker (2018).) Of course, someone could just be depressed but not about anything in particular, which would mean their depression had no specific object or readily apparent cause. Further psychological investigation might find a particular reason for that state of mind, and hence identify its object (and cause), in some cases. But, since any such state might end up having no object or relevant cause -- and it could even last for weeks, months or years --, it is better described as a mood, or even a psychiatric condition, not an emotion. On this, see Frijda (1994) and Stephan (2017). Anyway, it is highly doubtful that the benighted comrade currently being discussed had such 'emotions'/'moods' in mind.]

 

As with most things connected with intentional behaviour, such episodes are goal-, or object-directed (which is why we use transitive verbs in order to give expression to them). We wouldn't be able to make sense of someone who was just in love, but with no one or nothing in particular.

 

But, here are N3 and N4 again:

 

N3: At time, t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she fully understands the pressures on MM when he lied).

 

N4: At time, t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.

 

[The reader is directed here for an explanation of these symbols.]

 

Hence, in the present case, we would have something like the following:

 

N3c: NN feels she must love MM because of his caring for her, and NN feels she mustn't love MM for sleeping with her best friend.

 

[I have left N3c in a slightly stilted form so that it is much clearer what is being said.]

 

In that case, N3c is in fact a variant on N4, now labelled N5:

 

N5: NN feels she must love MM for φ-ing, and not love MM for ψ-ing.

 

As before, we have in effect two different objects of NN's love: MM's caring for her (i.e., "φ-ing") and MM's violation of her trust (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was added earlier (now re-written as N1a):

 

N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.

 

N1a: NN both loves and does not love MM at the same time, and with respect to the same object of, or motivations for, that love.

 

Plainly, in N5, we have two different objects of, or motivations for, the said love, and therefore no contradiction -- or, at least, no more than there would be one here:

 

N6: NN saw MN in the distance with her binoculars.

 

N7: NN saw MM in the distance with her binoculars.

 

Here we have two different objects of NN's sight, MN and MM. If anyone thought these two propositions were contradictory (or were even inconsistent), that would be enough evidence to suggest they were in the grip of some form of linguistic confusion, not that they were the discoverer of a significant breakthrough in the science of optics -- or even philosophy.

 

[In fact, N6 and N7 aren't even inconsistent with one another. NN might be able to see both MN and MM, after all!]

 

It could be argued that the above examples in fact express the cause of those emotions -- or they express whatever it was that occasioned them -- not their objects. In fact, it isn't too clear that this is a distinction with a difference, any more than these are:

 

N8: MN in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.

 

N9: MM in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.

 

So, whatever the cause happens to be, the aforementioned emotions had different objects -- linked in with different motivating factors (in N3 and N4, for instance) --, and so aren't contradictory.

 

N3: At time, t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she fully understands the pressures on MM when he lied).

 

N4: At time, t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.

 

Of course, if this benighted comrade meant something different, he should perhaps learn to be a little clearer. Ditching his infatuation with The Caliph of Confusion, Hegel, might help.

 

However, it could be objected that it is reasonably clear what the contradiction is here, this:

 

B7a: NN: "I must love my partner and it isn't the case that I must love my partner".

 

Once more, even if this turns out to be a contradiction, it is far from clear how it qualifies as a 'dialectical contradiction' -- that is, should we ever be told with any clarity what one of these is! So, and once more: do these two contradictory states turn into each other, as the DM-classics insist they should? Do they imply one another, as the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are supposed to?

 

Ignoring that 'minor niggle' for now, it is undeniable that human beings experience conflicting emotions like this all the time (and they even say rather odd things, too!), but when faced with B7a, for instance, the normal reaction would be to respond with: "Er..., what on earth do you mean by that?". And, we wouldn't be surprised if NN found it impossible to say why she felt this way or what she meant -- without, at the very least, some form of disambiguation or clarification, perhaps along the following lines:

 

N3d: "I love MM because of his caring for me and I don't love MM for sleeping with my best friend."

 

Or some such (even if the above example is still rather odd).

 

If so, and once more, no contradiction is implied.

 

But, even if B7a turned out to be an unambiguous contradiction, that would simply confirm the fact that contradictions in ordinary language and in logic are built around the content of propositions and the logical links we hold between clauses and indicative sentences -- undermining the benighted comrade's point:

 

"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?" [Loc cit.]

 

The question now is: Has anyone ever held the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true or both false at the same time? Or anything like them? Perhaps they have (who can say?), but how that shows that there are in fact 'true contradictions' in nature and society still remains far from clear.

 

B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".

 

B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I must love my partner".

 

[B5: Interest, A, in relationship, R, contradicts interest, B, in relationship, R.]

 

As should seem obvious, the fact that someone believes (or holds) something to be true, or even believes something to be false, doesn't automatically make what they believe true or make what they believe false!

 

[Once again, it is worth recalling here that two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once. So, if someone does assent to two contradictory propositions, they must believe both can be true or both can be false, at the same time and in the same respect. That is they must (implicitly, or possibly even, explicitly) deny the following: "Two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once." But, that would mean they had misunderstood the word "contradiction" -- or they had perhaps been led astray by a persuasive definition of some sort. We certainly can't build a new science of human behaviour (or update any old science we might have inherited) on the basis of such (linguistic) confusion. Still less can we base revolutionary theory and practice on it, either.]

 

However, it could be argued that because NN holds the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true -- and when that is coupled with the fact that NN is an individual who exists in the real world --, that shows it is at least possible to assert the existence of true contradictions. Once that possibility is allowed, the objections set out in this Essay can be seen for what they are: empty rhetoric.

 

B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".

 

B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I must love my partner".

 

Or, so it might be claimed...

 

Indeed, an argument somewhat like this was aired by Roy Edgley a few years ago:

 

"Since thought and theory are also part of reality and thus real objects that can be thought about, contradictions in thought, though not true of reality, certainly exist in reality; and it is only because they do exist in reality that they can be the object of criticism -- criticism for failing to be true of reality. Moreover, it is because two contradictory theories can't both be true that each bears a critical relation to the other: instantiated in actual thought this relation of logical opposition is in fact a critical relation of real opposition, Kant notwithstanding. It is no less logical opposition and no more simply natural 'conflict of forces' for taking the form of real historical and social struggle." [Edgley (1979), pp.24-25. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

The following would presumably be one such contradiction and existential claim (although Edgley himself was apparently interested in more overtly scientific propositions):

 

B8: Let "p" be "I must love my partner and it is not the case that I must love my partner".

 

B9: In so far as p exists, contradictions exist in reality.

 

Edgley's argument appears to be the following: While a proposition like p wouldn't actually be true, it would still exist, and hence contradictions exist (at this minimal level, at least). Admittedly, it is an entirely different matter whether p is true or false. [I will return to consider that option later on.]

 

So, what about the claim that this argument shows that contradictions actually exist?

 

Well, certainly those words exit, but that is no more illuminating than the following would be:

 

B10: Let "G" = "God". [I.e., "G" stands for the word, "God".]

 

B11: In so far as G exists, God exists in reality.

 

The question would still remain as to whether there is a 'God' or not.

 

[As those who know their logic will also appreciate, Edgley has confused a propositional sign with a proposition (and perhaps also use with mention). B10 and B11 partially expose that muddle.]

 

Someone might object: the above argument (expressed in and by B10 and B11) confirms that the word "God" exists just as Edgley's argument shows that contradictions exist.

 

Well, all it shows is that a propositional sign -- or a simple sign -- exists in some form or other, but the details become rather unclear when we look to Edgley to tell us where he thinks such signs actually do exist. Anyway, who has ever denied this? Put another way, Edgley's argument is no more illuminating than would be an argument that had originally been aimed at trying to show that 'God' exists but which instead showed that the word "God" exists!

 

Once more, no one has ever questioned the existence of inscriptions of contradictions (indeed, these Essays contain scores of them!), but that sheds no light at all on the claim that there are 'real contradictions', or 'true contradictions' (let alone 'dialectical contradictions'!), in nature and society. If the mere thought of a contradiction, or an actual inscription on the page (or screen), were enough to show that DM-contradictions exist in the real world, then we should have to admit that there were 'real tautologies', too. But worse, we should have to accept LIE -- that is, the doctrine that from thought or from words alone substantive ontological conclusions (as opposed to trivial inscriptional conclusions) may be deduced.

 

[There will be more on this in Essay Twelve.]

 

[The word "inscription" above applies to physical marks on a page/screen/wall/blackboard/whiteboard/placard/cavewall that aren't considered random but are held to be the product of intentionality, part of a natural-, or even a formal-language -- or perhaps even a work of art, no matter how 'primitive' or 'advanced' it is.]

 

But, signs and inscriptions don't have such existential implications. If they did, we should all have to believe in the actual existence of The Tooth Fairy and Bigfoot. At best, therefore, all that Edgley's argument shows is that inscriptions of contradictory sentences exist. How that idea helps DM-fans is a mystery.

 

Edgley then argues:

 

"Though a system of thought that is contradictory can't be true of its real object, this isomorphic relation between the structure of a society's thought and the structure of its material life thus gives sense to the idea that such thought is true to that material life: in being contradictory it 'reflects', and so discloses, though its content does not explicitly assert, the contradictory structure of the material life of that society." [Ibid., p.25. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

Unfortunately, some writers are a little careless over their use of words like "isomorphic". How, it might be wondered, can a set of words be isomorphic to objects or processes in the world that they don't in any way resemble. Especially since some of those words are abstract common nouns, and many aren't even referential terms? With what are "if" and "or", for example, isomorphic?

 

Putting this 'niggle' to one side, too, we might further wonder how Edgley knows this is indeed an "isomorphism" if none of his 'contradictions' are true of capitalism, as even he concedes. Moreover, his claim that this theory is "true to" capitalism is far from clear; how something can be "true to", but not "true of", a social system is something Edgley failed to explain.

 

Edgley also asserts that these linguistic contradictions (or at least the more theoretical examples to which he refers) are a "reflection" of "real oppositions" in society. That claim has been partly defused below, and will be further laid to rest throughout this Essay. [See also here.]

 

Independently of this, Edgley makes a serious mistake (one that all DM-fans are prone to committing): the confusion of contradictions in FL with what might or might not exist. As noted above, and again in Essay Four Part One, FL makes no existential claims. To be sure, logicians as individuals might make such claims, but logic itself is neutral in this regard (since logic isn't an agent, and as such isn't capable of making assertions, still less any about the world). While it is true that certain logical systems might need an ontology (or even a model) in order to work, even then, contradictions don't make existential claims. The background 'ontology' -- if there is one -- does 'all the heavy lifting' in that regard.

 

To repeat: in its simplest form, a contradiction in logic is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, such that both can't both be true and both can't be false at once. So, the fact that inscriptions of contradictions exist has no bearing on that logical principle. Furthermore, FL doesn't rule out the existence of contradictions. That is because FL isn't a science, nor is it an agent (as already noted). It neither rules in, nor rules out, the existence of anything. In fact, in the construction of indirect proofs, logicians and mathematicians make use of contradictions all the time! The study of logic, in this specific respect, revolves around the truth-functional implications that hold between a proposition and its negation. So, FL isn't about existence in any shape or form.

 

In that case, contradictions can't "reflect" anything, for they represent one form of the disintegration of the expressive power of language, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

 

[Admittedly, there are many different definitions of "contradiction" in FL and Philosophical Logic. That topic has been covered in Essay Eight Part Three, here and here. Readers are directed there for more details. There is also more on this here, here and in Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

But, wait! The benighted comrade from earlier has a powerful ally -- none other than that intellectual bully and charlatan, Freud:

 

"Perhaps someone is in the midst of an unhappy love affair and says 'I love him but I also hate him'. It's not just the statement but the feeling which is a contradiction surely? If Freud is held to describe the human individual not as a unified subject but a bundle of contradictory drives and desires, might one not imagine contradictory drives (if not desires) in a particular social system? Can I not have contradictory emotions about a subject, situation or person (I know I do about all sorts of things!)." [Loc cit. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Thus, on the back of some rather egregious Freudian Pseudo-Science, this comrade is content to build his 'case'.

 

But, is there anything in these fraudulent Freudian fantasies -- even if we put to one side all the lies, deceit, client abuse, intellectual bullying, cocaine-induced whimsy, paranoia, and fabricated evidence that marked Freud's entire career?

 

Well, once more, the question is: Can people have, or be subject to, contradictory emotions?

 

Perhaps these will suffice?

 

B12: NN hates Tony Blair.

 

B13: It is not the case that NN hates Tony Blair.

 

I suspect the benighted comrade didn't mean a contradictory pair like that.

 

Maybe, then, he intended the following?

 

B14: NN both hates and loves Tony Blair.

 

Such a situation is entirely possible -- if unusual -- but it can surely be disambiguated along lines suggested earlier.

 

However, it is worth noting that love and hate aren't automatically contradictory (when put in a propositional context), unless, say, hating someone implies not loving them; but, as the above quotation shows, it doesn't imply this! [That must be so unless by "contradiction" this comrade meant something entirely different. If so, what?]

 

Moreover, we have already seen that B14 isn't even a contradiction, since it could be false -- that would happen if NN were totally indifferent toward Blair.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth drawing the reader's attention to the following comment:

 

The reader is advised to re-read the caveats posted here. He or she should note that in order to give content to the above ideas (if that is what was meant by the benighted comrade, or if his ideas actually mean anything at all), we had to use a propositional context to make their implications clear, once more.

 

That rather makes a mess of the following rather rash remarks, courtesy of the aforementioned comrade:

 

"I'm just very puzzled about what it means to restrict the meaning of the term contradiction to a rule of formal logic. It's always been the least compelling of your arguments it seems to me. I don't understand the linguistic scandal that is supposed to be involved in talking about the human subject as a 'bundle of contradictory drives and desires' or talking about the capitalist system as encompassing contradictory tendencies (how TRPF [the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall -- RL] is held to operate inside a concrete capitalist social formation for example).... I don't see how there can be anything ipso facto absurd or meaningless about such statements to anyone familiar with ordinary language." [Loc cit. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]

 

There is no "scandal" here at all. This comrade's badly garbled and ill-considered examples themselves imply the conclusions reached earlier -- that is, when we try to make sense of them. Even he had to use propositions to inform us of these Freudian Foibles.

 

[Supposedly contradictory drives and emotions were disambiguated earlier. The alleged 'contradictions' in capitalism have been dealt with here and here. Finally, it has already been pointed out, just as it was pointed it out to this comrade, several times (since he tended to develop selective blindness and an intermittent, highly suspicious, convenient case of amnesia whenever it suited him): my concerns aren't solely with FL-contradictions! We have been reminded time after time of the many that can occur in ordinary discourse (and not just in this Essay).]

 

Of course, it could be argued that certain 'brain states' (which, at some level, provide a material basis for psychological or social forces) are what lie behind these contradictory emotions and tendencies -- details concerning which seem to have exercised this benighted comrade -- and it is perhaps here that these contradictions are to be found. [This also appears to be what motivated Professor Edgley's remarks examined earlier. By the way, this doesn't imply I accept these comments, or the next, as facts about 'brain states' capacity to provide a material basis for psychological or social forces -- let alone for thought. On that, see here.]

 

Unfortunately, the theory that there are such things as 'contradictory forces' has been laid to rest in this Essay; but, the overall idea is susceptible to the next series of objections, anyway.

 

[The argument below also applies to the claim that there might be certain brain states, process, or psychological 'drives' -- or even social forces and tendencies -- at work, about which we are as yet unaware, that constitute 'material contradictions', or which cause or 'mediate' them. They could even turn out to be those mythical Freudian Fantasies mentioned earlier. Who knows?]

 

To that end, let us define "Φ" as the brain states, processes, psychological 'drives' (conscious or unconscious), and/or social forces/tendencies that result in, 'mediate', or from which "emerges", the following:

 

B15: NN loves Tony Blair.

 

Or, which could be expressed in the first person:

 

B15a: "I, NN, love Tony Blair."

 

Let us also define "Φ*" as the brain states, processes, psychological 'drives' (conscious or unconscious), and/or social forces/tendencies, that result in, 'mediate', or from which "emerges", the following:

 

B16: NN hates Tony Blair.

 

Or, which can also be expressed in the first person:

 

B16a: "I, NN, hate Tony Blair."

 

So, "Φ" stands for the social or psychological forces (etc., etc.) that 'mediate' (etc., etc.) "NN loves Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent), and "Φ*" stands for the social forces (etc., etc.) which 'mediate' (etc., etc.) "NN hates Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent). We can also stipulate that Φ and Φ* aren't fixed and immutable, but change in accord with whatever 'dialectic laws or processes' DM-fans care to throw into the pot.

 

Let us further assume that Φ 'contradicts' Φ* -- i.e., that they are 'dialectically-united/identical-but-also-different opposites'.

 

Now, even with such a generous give-away, coupled with a range of recklessly profligate and highly congenial assumptions, this theory still can't work!

 

According to the DM-classics, all things change into their opposites, and they do so because of a "struggle" on-going between them. If so, in this case, Φ must change into Φ*, and vice versa. But, Φ can't change into Φ* since Φ* already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this theory, Φ couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with which it could 'struggle' in order to make it do just that!

 

And, it is no good propelling Φ* into the future so that it is instead what Φ* will change into, since Φ* will do no such thing unless Φ is already there to make that happen!

 

Now, it could be objected that love can surely turn into hate, and vice versa. Indeed, it can, but the whole point of introducing Φ and Φ* was to show that if and when that happens, DM can't account for it -- and for the above reasons! This is quite apart from the fact that Φ and Φ* aren't the abstractions love and hate, they are real material states and processes (etc., etc.). So, and once more, Φ can't turn into Φ* since Φ* already exists! 

 

[For those interested, this argument has been developed in extensive detail here, where 'social contradictions' have also been taken into account. Several objections -- some obvious, some not so obvious -- have also been neutralised.]

 

Of course, if these aren't 'dialectically-united opposites' to begin with, then the above comrade's objection fails by default.

 

Additionally, and once more: do these brain states (etc., etc.) imply each other, such that neither can exist in its own (like the proletariat can't exist on its own -- so we are told)? But one item of this pair can surely exist without the other. If so, these states (etc.) can't 'interpenetrate' one another -- again, unlike, say, the capitalist class and the proletariat -- which (for (n+1)th time), imply one another such that one can't exist without the other.

 

So, we see yet again that none of this makes sense, even in DM-terms!

 

Finally, the following represents an edited version of an exchange between myself and a far more reasonable comrade (whose name has been withheld at their request):

 

Comrade M (commenting on the dialectical use of the word "contradiction"): I mean what most people mean -- conflict, inner tension...

 

Rosa: Do they really? Give me one sentence drawn from ordinary language (the vehicle most people do in fact use, so what you say should appear there, somewhere) where such an interpretation could be put on the word "contradiction" -- i.e., one not infected with the sort of idealist guff you read in Hegel. An idealist will have no problem with asserting such things; if reality is Mind it can surely argue with itself. Not so a materialist who bases his/her science on the language of ordinary workers (ordinary language).

 

But, even then, why call such things "contradictions"? What link does this particular use have with the "gainsaying" of someone, which is what the word usually means? How is a conflict in society a contradiction?

 

Sure, you can re-define the word to mean whatever you like, but if we all did that we could re-define anything to mean anything, and we'd lose touch with meaning altogether.

 

Apart from that, you'd be forcing a view onto reality (contrary to what 'dialecticians' tell us they never do), not reading one from it. Linguistic Idealism -- as I asserted in those parts of my work I sent you -- would then automatically have raised its ideal head. Society would be 'contradictory', not because it really is so, but because we have re-defined it to be so. A linguistic dodge would have created a few empirical 'truths'; this is 'science' on the cheap...

 

Comrade M: Rosa said: "Give me one sentence..." Okay, what about "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!" Or "That's a contradiction in terms".

 

Suppose someone says "military intelligence" is a contradiction in terms. What they mean is that there is a conflict or a tension between the first and the second word, thus conjugated.

 

At any rate, you are berating a new convert. I can't be expected to know everything at once, much less know it as wisely as the central committee (you).

 

Rosa: First, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is either a misnomer or a rhetorical device. Why? Well, since contradiction has to do with truth and falsehood as much as it has to do with "gainsaying", and since one term on its own can't be true or false (only sentences and clauses can be), and since single words do not say anything, no term can contradict another.

 

In that case, "contradiction in terms" means something like "incompatible phrase(s)", as in "round square". Now, "A is round and it is square" would only be a contradiction if "A is round" were taken to mean "A is not square", but then you would not now have a contradiction in terms, just a sentential contradiction with no "conflict (or) inner tension" anywhere in sight.

 

And, if the above conclusion were rejected (for some reason), you still wouldn't have a "contradiction in terms" that expressed some sort of "conflict (or) inner tension", since, once more, words can't conflict (or be tense, or be in tension) because they aren't agents. Moreover, anyone who uttered a "contradiction in terms" would not necessarily be in "conflict (or) inner tension", just confused. And even if they weren't confused, the "contradiction in terms" they uttered wouldn't necessarily indicate "conflict (or) inner tension"; it could be a sign of all manner of things (ranging from lack of clarity, through puzzlement, to playfulness).

 

As to the idea that such a phrase could indicate the presence of "conflict (or) inner tension" I have no doubt, but if a "contradiction in terms" meant that a "conflict (or) inner tension" had to be present, it would mean this, and not merely could mean this, just as the truth of "not p" would mean the falsehood of "p" (as opposed merely to "not p" could mean the falsehood of "p"). So they can't be synonymous, as you allege.

 

[Apologies for the prolixity of that paragraph, but logic is a pain in the dictionary!]

 

But, even if this weren't so, "contradiction" here still wouldn't mean "conflict (or) inner tension", it would mean "gainsaying oneself or another", which could be true without an inner conflict being implied. It might be a joke, an attempt to puzzle, part of a game, a mistake, etc. The possibilities are endless. The attempt to squeeze this into an idealist boot can only succeed if the almost endless possibilities allowed for by ordinary language are ignored, or can be ruled out.

 

As for "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!", the verb "to contradict" in this command (it isn't in fact a proposition, so it can't itself be a contradiction, literally speaking -- not that you suggested it was) clearly means "gainsay". No quibble there. But, if it meant "conflict, inner tension", you would have:

 

"Don't you conflict/inner tension me you little bastard!", which is meaningless.

 

Even if we were to edit this down to:

 

"Don't you conflict with me you little bastard!",

 

it wouldn't mean the same as:

 

"Don't you contradict me you little bastard!"

 

One can conflict with someone without contradicting them, and vice versa (e.g., two friends could contradict each other (out of fun) without conflicting with each other, say). Hence these can't mean the same.

 

However "Don't you inner tension with me you little bastard!" can't be beaten into shape at all.

 

Of course, I should have also pointed out that if we already have words (such as "conflict") that adequately capture what we mean, why do we need to repurpose the word "contradiction" in this way, especially since it brings in its train such unwelcome political baggage? [I have explained just what this 'baggage' is in Essay Nine Part Two -- to which we can now add the multiple confusions exposed in this Essay.]

 

Final Round-Up

 

Because Dialectical Marxists have so far neglected to explain with any clarity, or in any detail, what it means to equate 'opposing forces' in nature and society with 'contradictions', I have been forced to offer several of my own attempts at clarification (no pun intended). All have so far failed. In this final sub-section I will endeavour to present what I think is the only viable interpretation of the presumed link between such forces and 'contradictions'.

 

Dialectics In ICU

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

We have seen that the concepts DM-theorists have imported from Mystical Christianity and Hermetic Philosophy have badly failed them when any attempt is made to apply them, or relate them to forces operating in nature and society. In that case, other than the ideological reasons outlined in Essay Nine Part Two (summarised below), the impertinent answer -- to the question why hard-nosed revolutionaries insist on using such obscure, mystical jargon (which terminology they struggle to explain, anyway) -- is the only one left standing:

 

Dialecticians use obscure jargon like this simply because it is traditional to do so.

 

That means this part of DM (which has now been hooked up to a heart monitor, in Intensive Care) is ready to be measured for a nice pine overcoat and lowered six feet closer to the Earth's Core:

 

 

Figure Sixteen: DM -- An Aging Theory On Its Last Legs

 

[This is an AI Image generated using the free software available at this site.]

 

A Last Desperate Attempt

 

However, before we call for The Hermetic High Priest to read DM its Last Mystical Rites, in all fairness we need to make one last attempt to resuscitate this moribund 'theory'.

 

In fact, we are now in position to reconsider several abandoned alternatives from earlier in an attempt to rescue this part of DM from its long overdue appointment with a mortician.

 

Back To The Drawing Board

 

Below, I present another re-interpretation of the supposed connection between 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions', based on F6-F9, from earlier (which can be widened to encompass social forces):

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity, let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2, taken pair-wise respectively from each set, form oppositional couples.

 

To this we can now add the following:

 

F58: Force, P1, contradicts P2 in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (internally, or with one another).

 

Unfortunately, this latest re-interpretation can't work, either. That is because if one or both of E1 and E2 don't exist (as a result of the operation of P1 and P2 again!) there can be no contradiction. As we have seen several times already, F58 would imply a 'contradiction' between sets of events not all of which co-exist.77

 

Fortunately, there are other ways of re-interpreting the above, which I will now explore.

 

'Internally Contradictory'

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

Another way of proceeding involves events that are 'internally contradictory', perhaps along the following lines:

 

F58: Force, P1, contradicts force, P2, in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (internally, or with one another).

 

F58a: Force, P1 contradicts force, P2, in so far as the event set that one or other of them produces (i.e., E3) is internally contradictory.

 

Given that one or more of the elements of E3 (or even E3 itself) could be 'internally contradictory', F58, or perhaps F58a, might allow the interpretation of 'contradictions' as 'opposing forces' to stage a late, semi-miraculous recovery.

 

Unfortunately, even if sense could be made of 'contradictory contemporaneous events', the link between 'opposing forces' and 'internally contradictory sets of events' would once again have been severed. Hence, even if F58 and F58a were completely acceptable, they would still fail to connect 'contradictions' with 'opposing forces', merely with the inter-relationship between the effects of forces.

 

Alternatively, let us suppose P1 and P2 operate as the above propositions suggest. In that case, plainly, given the truth of F58a, only E3 would now exist. But, if E3 were 'internally contradictory', presumably parts of it (i.e., sub-events of E3 -- for instance, E3i and E3k) would constitute the imagined 'internal contradiction'. In that case, F58a would simply become a variant of F58.

 

[Of course, if, as we were told, 'dialectical contradictions' are "mutually exclusive", they can't co-exist. In which case, E3i and E3k can't co-exist, either, and so they can't 'contradict' one another!]

 

On the other hand, if all of E3 (i.e., all its sub-events) were in this state because of its 'internally contradictory' dispositional properties, then that, too, would be a non-viable alternative, and for reasons that have already been aired. [On that, see the discussion of F57 earlier this Essay.]

 

Unfortunately, as far as F58 itself is concerned, if one event prevents another from happening, no contradiction is implied anyway, since such a 'conflict' would have only one real term -- as we have seen several times already. [See, for example, Interlude Nine.]

 

[Nevertheless, this might allow for the consideration of more complex examples/situations supposedly drawn from HM. On that, see another earlier discussion.]

 

Anyway, as far as events being 'internally contradictory' is concerned, we saw that that was a dead-end, too (in Part One of this Essay).

 

It might be felt that "mutually exclusive" doesn't imply that the items involved can't, or don't, co-exist. After all, the capitalist class and the proletariat are mutually exclusive, but plainly they can and do co-exist.

 

However, as we also saw earlier, Dialectical Marxists simply assume there is a link between "mutually exclude" and "oppositional" and/or "contradictory". But, many things in nature and society mutually exclude one another without implying a contradiction, or even "opposition". The reader is referred to Interlude Fourteen for more details --, where it was shown that this entire approach is hopelessly vague and seriously misguided (that is, where any sense could be made of it).

 

It looks, therefore, like this particular interpretative seam has been thoroughly worked-out. There is no 'gold' to be mined from it. Unfortunately, what little apparent 'gold' there appeared to be -- foolishly mined long ago by Hegel & Co. -- turned out to be nothing but Iron Pyrites (i.e., 'Fools Gold').

 

We need to find a new approach to save this rapidly fading 'theory' from being sent to the Knackers Yard.

 

DM And The Revival Of Teleology

 

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

The last remaining escape route left open to Dialectical Marxists relies on reviving yet another interpretation postponed from earlier (no pun intended), wherein 'contradictions' were said to exist between (i) the effects of 'opposing forces' (or between such forces and the effects of other 'opposing forces'), rather than (ii) between the forces themselves. This alternative involved taking Engels's suggestion seriously: that forces should be edited out of the picture leaving behind only the relative motion between bodies --, in order to give some content to the idea that 'contradictions' can cause change.

 

As we saw earlier, the first of these had to be abandoned because it meant that such forces 'contradicted' prevented effects, involving this part of the theory with the idea that 'opposing forces' could 'contradict' non-existent entities. The second appeared to undermine the dialectical unity of nature. All this was established earlier.

 

Nevertheless, I now propose to examine a re-vamped version of the first of these alternatives -- i.e., Option (i) -- , aimed at circumventing these persistent and annoying 'problems'.

 

The good news is that this new alternative solves the problem created by the second option.

 

The bad news is that this step simply introduces far worse difficulties of its own.

 

The aforementioned earlier attempt was based on the following set of propositions:

 

F17: Event, E, consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.

 

F18: E1-En form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.

 

F19: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.

 

F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist, will never exist, or do not take place.

 

["T" stands for "The Totality".]

 

As we saw above, an existing force, P1, appears to 'contradict' a non-existent event (or series of events), which rendered this particular interpretation useless. The following re-vamped version seems to fix that 'glitch':

 

F59: Event, E, consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.

 

F60: E1-En form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.

 

F61: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.

 

F62: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist, will never exist, or do not take place.

 

F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.

 

Since, an expectation can exist alongside a realisation that that expectation has been thwarted (in some cases), this appears remove the 'difficulty'.

 

The bad news is: F63 is clearly of little use since, not only would it be inapplicable throughout the Universe at all times, it doesn't even record a contradiction.

 

[That is because the propositions it implicates are of the form "p and q" not "p and not p", which is what was required -- where "p" is, say, "Ek has been prevented", and "q" is, say, "Ek was expected" --, when the following were needed: "Ek has been prevented" and "Ek has not been prevented", etc.]

 

F63 might now be modified to avoid this new set-back, perhaps along the following lines:77a

 

F64: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En from taking place contradict propositions that depict the dispositional properties of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.

 

One immediate problem with F64 is that it isn't at all clear what the "dispositional properties" of forces are. Objects certainly have dispositional properties as a result of their microstructure and their relationship with other bodies -- if, that is, the term "dispositional" is read in its traditional sense. [More on that in a later Essay. In the meantime, on 'dispositions', see Choi and Fara (2018).]

 

Even so, since forces aren't obviously body-, or particle-like (although they can apparently be carried by bodies/particles -- if certain theories in Contemporary Physics are accepted --, but even then this would now be explained in terms of transferred momentum, i.e., along neo-Engelsian lines!),78 the ascription of dispositions to forces themselves amounts to a disguised reference to the affect that forces could or would have on certain bodies under certain circumstances. In that case, we would have here an explanation of "contradiction" that appealed to the effect of effects, once more.

 

[Anyway, F64 doesn't even record a contradiction since the propositions it expresses, once more, are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p", as indicated earlier.]

 

Nevertheless, perhaps F64 can be re-jigged -- maybe in the following way?

 

F65: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En from taking place contradict propositions that depict the normal operation of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.

 

Unfortunately, not only does F65 fail to record a contradiction (yet again: the propositions it expresses are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p"), hence what it says turns out to be yet another re-run of the (direct) inter-relationship between forces as a way of understanding 'contradictions', instead of the present model, which sought to interpret 'contradictions' as the relationship between forces and the effects of other forces.

 

Anyway, F65 is of little use: if the normal operation of Pn is prevented (so that it doesn't take place), there would be nothing for P1 to 'contradict'. This annoying, but recurring, 'problem' is precisely what prompted a turn to the current approach -- the actual effects of forces -- since they do exist, as opposed to the prevented effects of forces -- or even forces which cease to operate --, which don't.

 

It now seems that unless we can specify how the effects of forces can 'contradict' other forces (or other effects), this part of DM will be as good as dead -- even if not yet buried/cremated. Maybe the following option will help resuscitate it:

 

F66: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that express the operation of Pn, such that the presence of E1 (i.e., an effect of P1) excludes some or all of E2-En.

 

However, this is no use, either, since it matters not how effectively some or all of E2-En are excluded; E1 may only 'dialectically contradict' that which exists, and, ex hypothesi, once excluded, some or all of E2-En would no longer be around to be 'contradicted' in this or in any other way.

 

The next suggestion constitutes, in my view, the only way to keep this critically ill part of DM from joining The Choir Invisible:

 

F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.

 

[However, F67 will need to be re-written in 'propositional' form, but since that would make this example even more unwieldy than it already is, that tedious task has been left to the reader. (No thanks required!)]

 

The good news is that since aims can exist where results and effects do not, we seem at last to have a genuine 'contradiction'.

 

The bad news is that this seemingly life-restoring tonic soon turns into a dose of Strychnine. That is because, of course, not only does F67 fail to record a contradiction (for reasons given several times already -- the propositions it expresses to are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p"), we can't attribute aims to forces unless we wish to introduce teleology and anthropomorphism into nature and society.

 

F67 can therefore only apply to forces under the control of human agents -- or to their animistically projected counterparts in nature -- that is, if we are determined to go down this route and picture nature and society in such mystical terms.

 

It is therefore no surprise that the only interpretation that appears to make this part of DM viable is one that reveals the anthropomorphism implicit in the concepts its theorists have imported from Hegel and Mystical Hermeticism.

 

Alternatively, it is equally unsurprising that this is the only option that underlines an approach that works in HM, one that puts forces under human control (but still with no 'contradictions' anywhere in sight).79

 

Unfortunately, this now means that F67 can't help revivify the lifeless DM-corpse.

 

Coup De Grace

 

It was argued earlier that there were insurmountable problems facing any attempt to identify 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' -- i.e., if they are viewed as, or were based on, 'dialectically-united opposites'. In connection with that we have seen that the DM-classicists maintained that all such opposites inevitably turn into each other, into that with which they have struggled. Is it even plausible to suppose forces are capable of doing this? Is it credible that a gravitational force, for example, can turn into a magnetic force, or an electrical force? Do all R-type forces turn into A-type forces? Where in Physics has it been established, or even proposed, that gravity can become a repulsive force, its opposite? Admittedly, Physicists have invented something they call 'Dark Energy' to try to explain how the expansion of the universe seems to be accelerating (since this new 'energy' opposes the effects of gravity, which would tend to slow that expansion), but do these two (gravity and 'dark energy' struggle with, and the turn into, each other? I have yet to see a single scientist claim they do. If so, they can't be 'dialectical opposites', whatever else they are. In that case, 'Dark Energy' is no friend of DM.

 

Do any of the other forces 'struggle' with each other? Undoubtedly, electricity and magnetism are inter-linked in modern Physics (via Maxwell's Equations; and are in fact manifestations of one of the four fundamental forces, so we are told), but they certainly don't 'struggle' with one another, and neither do the particles on which they depend. According to current theory, such forces are "carried" by Exchange Particles, which aren't (by any stretch of the imagination) an expression or result of a 'struggle' going on between such particles. [It turns out that if Quantum Field Theory is correct, there are no particles anyway! That surprising denouement was covered in more detail Essay Seven Part One.]

 

Admittedly, magnetic fields (such as the Earth's)  are reversible (that is, the North and South Poles can sometimes flip), as are electrical fields, but that isn't true of all fields (even though all four of the above forces can and do change in a variety of ways), but it is far from clear that this is because of any 'struggle' going on in or between them. For example, the origin of the reversal of the Earth's magnetic field may lie deep inside the planet's core, or, perhaps, inside the crust --, or it may even have an external cause (with one set of theorists even blaming meteor impact)  --currently, scientists aren't too sure. But, to my knowledge not one single Geophysicist is investigating the alleged 'contradiction', or even 'struggle', between the North and South Poles (of the Earth's magnetic field) to find the 'real' cause of any such flip. And even when electric currents reverse, the question naturally arises: What exactly has been 'struggling' with what?

 

[Of course, the above magnetic phenomenon is a consequence of the direction of a field carried by certain particles, which simply reverses. But, it doesn't turn into its 'opposite'. It could be argued that the direction of that field does indeed turn into its opposite; maybe so, but that isn't the result of one direction struggling with the other! Anyone who disagree with that conclusion might like to email me with their best explanation of how two directions can possibly struggle.]

 

Hence, even if it should turn out that every single one of the objections aired in this Essay is misguided in some (as-yet-to-be-determined) way, the 'dialectical' equation of 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions' doesn't work even in its own terms!

 

Do the Relations of Production really turn into the Forces of Production? Does a use-value struggle with and then change into an exchange-value? Do any of these factors imply the other like the proletariat implies the bourgeoisie (so we are told)?

 

But they should if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

For Dialecticians, Truth Is 'The [W]hole' -- Alas, it's Six foot Deep

 

Since there appears to be no way that DM-'contradictions' can be given a literal, or even a figurative, interpretation that equates or identifies them with 'opposing forces' (in nature or society, in an abstract or in any sort of concrete form) and which is capable of surviving scrutiny, this area of DM can at last be given a decent burial.

 

We can even call its time of death: August 27th, 1770.80

 

 

Figure Seventeen: Sadly, DM Won't Be Missed. Send No Flowers...

[This is another AI Image generated using the free software available here.]

 

Notes

 

1. Much of the material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

One of the more recent Dialectical Marxists attempting to connect 'opposing forces' with 'dialectical contradictions' is Thomas Weston [Weston (2012)]. I have added several thoughts about his badly failed attempt: here, here, here, here, here, and here.

 

Here also is Maoist, Lenny Wolff (who has clearly used different editions of the works quoted to those referenced at this site; I have nevertheless provided links to their more usual on-line sources):

 

"To begin with, the method forged by Marxism -- materialist dialectics -- is the most systematic concentration of the scientific method ever achieved, the most accurate and critical tool of inquiry into the world (indeed, the universe) and how it works. Marxism is materialist: it focuses on the material world for the ultimate causes and directions of every event and phenomenon in nature or society. And it is dialectical in that it comprehends all phenomena in their changingness (sic) and development and in their interaction with other phenomena, and because it studies the struggle of opposites within a thing or process as the underlying basis of its motion and change.... (p.12)

 

"Constant development and transformation, explosiveness and changeability, all based on the struggle of opposites, drives forward not only the sun but the entire material universe; and this fundamental law forms the basis of materialist dialectics. 'Marxist philosophy,' Mao wrote, 'holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man's thinking.' ('On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,' MSR, pp.442-443). [Wolff is here quoting from Volume Five of Mao's Selected Works, but this passage occurs on p.392 -- RL.]

 

"To grasp the contradictory properties within a phenomenon and the character of their constant struggle and mutual transformation, to understand how that struggle in turn gives rise to qualitatively new things -- that is the heart of the dialectical method.... The struggle and interpenetration of opposites that actually give a thing or process its character generally goes on beneath the surface. Dialectics uncovers the hidden mainsprings not apparent to 'sound common sense,' which as Engels once remarked, while a 'respectable fellow...in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures' when he enters 'the wide world of research.' (Anti-Dühring, p.26) [Wolff is here quoting Marx and Engels (1987), p.22 -- RL.]

 

"...[After quoting Lenin -- RL] Note that Lenin underscores 'All phenomena' in his opening sentence. Can this be true? Is everything driven forward by internal contradiction?... Contradiction is universal, propelling every process and thing. But universality also means that in the development of each thing, a movement of opposites goes on from beginning to end. The growth of a child, for instance, unfolds in contradictions between bursts of rapid growth and periods of relative consolidation, dependence and independence, learning the old ways and forging and trying out (their own) new ideas. Where, at any point in the process, is there not contradiction and struggle?... Lenin lays great stress on internal contradictions as the 'driving force' of development; but this does not mean that external causes play no role at all. Ice, when heated enough, changes into water, which is certainly a change in quality, and not just degree (as one can test by diving into a swimming pool full of ice cubes, or pouring water into a Coke). Still, this does not make external causes principal; no amount of heat can transform ice into chocolate milk, or molten Iead. The ability of ice to undergo certain qualitative changes and not others results from its internal contradictions, in this case the contradictory properties of hydrogen and oxygen in their simultaneous interdependence and struggle with each other. Yet that example alone doesn't sufficiently address the question of the relation between internal and external contradictions. Can it not be said, for example, that the transformation of water into steam is the result of the contradictory struggle between heat and water -- in other words, that on a different level (e.g., considering a steam engine) the contradiction between water and heat is internal and not external? And that ultimately the very concept of external cause is meaningless?

 

"No, it is not meaningless...but it is relative. This is bound up with the fact that there are qualitatively different levels to the structure of matter (speaking here of all matter, whether subatomic particles, human societies or galaxies). Water molecules, for example, contain atoms. These atoms, however, are not 'mini-molecules,' but qualitatively different organizations of matter with distinct contradictory characteristics, properties and structures. Their combination into a molecule is conditional -- and in the absence of certain underlying conditions, the molecule will break down. But, at the same time, the behaviour of these atoms when they are integrated into the structure of a molecule will be more determined by the contradictions of the molecule than by their own internal particularities as atoms.... The point here is that the concrete character of the process or thing being analyzed must be kept to the forefront. There are different levels of structure to matter, and any level is both relatively autonomous and at the same time linked to and influenced by other levels. Therefore clarity on what exactly is under study, and on that basis which contradictions should be considered internal and which external, and how they relate, is critically important to dialectical analysis. Mao emphasized understanding the 'law of contradiction in things in a concrete way.' ('On Contradiction,' MSR, p.90) The actual opposites which constitute and push forward the development of a thing or process must be ascertained, their interaction and struggle studied and understood.... [Wolff is here quoting from Volume One of Mao's Selected Works, but this passage occurs on p.315 -- RL.]

 

"To begin with, identity has both a popular and a philosophical meaning. Philosophically, the identity of opposites does not mean that the two aspects of a contradiction are the same as each other, or can't be told apart; it refers instead both to the coexistence of opposites within a single entity, and to their property under certain circumstances of transforming into each other, thereby qualitatively transforming the character of the thing or process at hand. To begin with the first aspect of the philosophical meaning of identity, the coexistence of opposites: while every entity or process is a contradiction composed of opposing forces, through most of their existence entities exist in a relatively stable state. To put it another way, within any entity or process there are new and rising forces struggling against the framework of the thing, striving to negate its character and bring something new into being; nevertheless, at any given time a thing is still more itself than 'not itself.'... The opposites in a contradiction coexist with one another, and this (temporary) coexistence is one aspect of what is meant by the 'identity of opposites.' Such coexistence, however, is not static; it's more in the character of a relatively stable framework within which the ceaseless struggle of opposites goes on. And this ongoing struggle of opposites partially alters the character of the identity itself even before it reaches a point of intensity which fundamentally ruptures the identity (or the framework). Let's look at a few other cases of mutual coexistence and interdependence of opposites. Life is obviously diametrically opposed to death -- but really, wouldn't the very concept of life be meaningless without death, and vice versa? Death only has meaning as a limit to life, and life itself only continues so long as organisms break down and synthesize elements from dead plants and animals (and simultaneously expel the dead cells and toxic waste from their own selves).

 

"Such coexistence, however, is not static; it's more in the character of a relatively stable framework within which the ceaseless struggle of opposites goes on. And this ongoing struggle of opposites partially alters the character of the identity itself even before it reaches a point of intensity which fundamentally ruptures the identity (or the framework). Let's look at a few other cases of mutual coexistence and interdependence of opposites. Life is obviously diametrically opposed to death -- but really, wouldn't the very concept of life be meaningless without death, and vice versa? Death only has meaning as a limit to life, and life itself only continues so long as organisms break down and synthesize elements from dead plants and animals (and simultaneously expel the dead cells and toxic waste from their own selves). Or take war; war is qualitatively different from peace -- still the two have identity as well. Peace treaties turn out to be nothing but the framework within which rival bourgeoisies compete with each other and prepare for new wars, while war itself is not conducted for its own sake, but to set the terms for new (and more favourable) peaceful arrangements. And there is identity and struggle in the contradiction between just and unjust wars, too -- as when the Russian proletariat transformed the unjust, imperialist war waged by its own bourgeoisie in World War 1 into a revolutionary civil war in Russia. Further, wars waged by oppressed classes and nations for their liberation develop as a qualitative leap out of the -- relatively -- nonmilitary struggle of the oppressed against the oppressor.

 

"But the matter, does not end with the dependence of opposites upon each other for their existence. As Mao wrote:

 

'...what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction. ("On Contradiction," MSR, p.119)' [Wolff is here quoting from Volume One of Mao's Selected Works, but this passage occurs on p.338 -- RL.]

 

"While the struggle between its two aspects goes on throughout the life of the contradiction, and both aspects undergo partial transformations through different stages as a result of this (as well as other contradictions influencing the process), there inevitably comes a point when the old identity can no longer comprehend the contradictory aspects in their changed character. The subordinate aspect bursts forth, overcomes the formerly principal aspect, and brings a qualitatively new and different entity into being. The shell of the egg is destroyed and replaced by ifs opposite, the chicken; the shell of capitalist society is ruptured by the proletarian revolution and a new society begins to be created.... (pp.24-31)

 

"The identity of opposites in the preceding examples resides not only in their coexistence, but also in their change of place in their relationship within the contradiction. In the leap from water to ice, the contradictory identity between the energy of the individual molecule (which tends to random motion) on the one hand, and the bonding force between molecules on the other, goes from a state in which the molecular energy is dominant enough to permit a degree of fluidity to one in which the molecular bonding force becomes principal, and the molecules are frozen. Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie (as noted) does not vanish immediately after the socialist revolution but continues to exist and wage struggle (speaking here specifically of the internal makeup of socialist countries) as a dominated and subordinate aspect of the contradiction (as long as the society remains on the socialist road); what has changed is the respective position of the two aspects in the contradiction. This transformation of opposites into each other changes the qualitative character of the entity as a whole and the forms assumed by its contradictory aspects - from water to ice, or capitalism to socialism. In the latter case, the period in which the bourgeoisie is dominated (first in various countries, later on a world scale) will eventually result in its full disappearance -- at which point the proletariat itself will also go out of existence (after all, how could there be a proletariat without its opposite?) and another new entity, communist society, with its own contradictions and struggle, will arise.... Identity, to sum up, is contradictory: opposites both coexist and transform themselves into one another. Their coexistence is itself a process of mutual transformation, and their transformation into each other is generally not absolute but goes on in wave-Iike, or spiral-like, development (more on this later).... Further, in the relationship between the opposite aspects of a contradiction, identity and struggle do not exist on a par. Struggle is principal over identity. Identity, or relative order, is a temporary condition, but struggle never ceases; it permeates a process from beginning to end and leads to the transformation of opposites and the eventual annihilation of the process (and its replacement by something new). In fact, when struggle ceases, identity goes out of existence as well, since the process itself has come to an end....

 

"The stars, the planets, different organisms -- all are forms of matter in motion in which the constituent opposites coexist for a time in one form, only to eventually be severed through struggle and dissolve (and become in different forms the elements of new entities). Each individual person, for example, is nothing but a particular and conditional combination of matter...matter which existed in different forms previously and will exist in other forms in the future.... Again, Lenin's warning to take the identical opposites in a thing or process 'not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another' ('Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic,' LCW, Vol.38, 109) rings home; and his characterization of socialism (in another work) as a combination of dying capitalism and nascent communism is an important application of just this principle of the identity and struggle of opposites.... (pp.32-35) [Wolff is here quoting from Volume Thirty-Eight of Lenin's Collected Works, p.109 -- RL.]

 

"At the same time, contradictions do not necessarily develop in a predetermined path; different processes and things interpenetrate and influence one another, and relatively external contradictions (in one context) can alter a process' direction of development and even eliminate it altogether.... (p.47) Change does not proceed by simple addition, nor simply from within a given process. While internal causes are principal over external, contradictions cannot be viewed simply as 'things unto themselves.'... (p.59)

 

"But back to the central point -- the opposition of materialism to idealism. The basic split between idealism and materialism concerns the nature of the contradiction between matter and consciousness. Matter has existed eternally, in an infinite and everchanging variety of forms; but through it all it exists, whether as mass or energy, a block of steel or an exploding supernova. As life on earth developed, matter began to give rise to its opposite, consciousness. The rudiments of this are found in the earliest, most primitive organisms and their ability to respond to environmental stimuli. This reaches a qualitatively higher state in the more intelligent animals, who can draw conclusions about their immediate environment and make decisions, and it takes another leap with human consciousness. Humans have the capacity to analyze their experience, dream up different ways the future might be, and work to make reality conform to their ideas and dreams, constantly comparing one to the other. Still, developed as it is, consciousness is nevertheless based on material reality and the product and property of a highly organized form of matter, the brain. This much is basic to all materialism." (p.61) [Wolff (1983), pp.12-61. (This links to a PDF.) Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered, and in some cases they have been added in order to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

Fortunately, fellow Trotskyist, Peter Mason, was a little more concise:

 

"Dialectics is a holistic philosophy, which always considers things in their relations and their development, as Lenin said.... [The development of Ionian philosophy] emerged from internal conflict, a war of opposing forces within all things, a 'unity of opposites' as Lenin called it, an 'interpenetration of opposites' as Engels termed it. These warring opposites were what drove the eternal flux of change. Dialectics is a philosophy born of revolution. Marxists have a unique definition [of materialism]. For Marxists, in this context, materialism can be described as the philosophy that the world is primary, and thought is secondary." [Mason (2012), pp.114, 116. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Here are few others taken from off the Internet (what was that again about the mind-numbingly repetitive nature of Dialectical Marxism...?):

 

[1] "Dialectics was initially a particular kind of dialogue invented in Ancient Greece in which two or more people holding different points of view about a subject seek to establish the truth of the matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments.... Today dialectics denotes a mode of cognition which recognizes the most general laws of motion, contradiction and new development. There exist four 'laws' to the dialectical method. They are:

 

"1) Everything is in a constant state of motion, development and change.

 

"2) [In] everywhere there exist opposing forces which are mutually exclusive yet cannot exist without the other. Their conflict results in movement.

 

"3) Change occurs suddenly, all at once. A quantitative amount of something results in a qualitative change (a 'breaking' point).

 

"4) Development moves in spirals, from lower to higher planes of development....

 

"Dialectical materialism is the recognition of a transient nature -- a physical reality in constant motion and change. What makes dialectical materialism a revolutionary scientific method is that it excludes all static states, all metaphysical views of reality, all one-sidedness and inflexibility. Because it recognizes the concrete and present side of things, at the same time it acknowledges that this present state is bound to end. For dialectal materialism, the only absolute is that there are no eternal absolutes.... Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. As we mentioned earlier, everything in nature is transient, finite, and in motion. Matter cannot exist without motion. Everything has its beginning and its end. People are born, grow and eventually pass away. Stars such as our sun eventually begin to die, either slowly burning out or self-destructing. Species evolve, adapt, or go extinct. Rain falls from the clouds, evaporates back into the clouds where it will once again rain. Human society is also part of nature and is therefore subject to the same laws.... The principle governing all growth and development is the idea of opposition and contradiction. Two mutually exclusive forces which at the same time cannot exist without each other has been a common theme in many philosophies for a long time (i.e. yin and yang) exactly because such processes occurring around us reflect this concept upon our minds...." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typos corrected; several paragraphs merged. Minor typographical alteration.]

 

[2] "The modern materialist dialectical method developed by Marx is much more definite and therefore, able to provide us with a much clearer understanding. Materialist dialectics goes beyond just seeking the truth of a statement, beyond just understanding that contradictions are present in statements, into understanding that contradictions exist throughout nature and the whole material world. The Marxist dialectical method has four basic features. First, all phenomena of nature (or simply put, all real things) are connected. Second, everything is in constant motion. Third, all phenomena are undergoing constant change. Fourth, the change and development of things is the result of the interaction of opposing forces or internal contradictions within everything. All this is in opposition to what is called metaphysics. Metaphysics sees the world and things in it as static, isolated, one-sided. It views any change there is as simply one of magnitude, a mere increase or increase in quantity on a set stage. Metaphysics is the common philosophy advanced by capitalist thinkers and is taught in U.S. schools. In general it is the type of world outlook the capitalist system tries to foist on us so we stay in the dark about what's really going on....

 

"[B]esides all the outside influences on a thing (and let us remember we are talking about everything that exists), the thing in question has internal contradictions. Everything has two opposing aspects (internal contradictions) and each set of these opposite aspects forms a contradiction. When we speak of a thing we are really talking about a set of opposites that struggle with each other, yet coexist and combine to form the thing itself. There is no up without down, no cold without hot, no victory without defeat, no capitalist class without a working class, etc. When a ball is thrown in the air two contradictory forces are at work simultaneously -- the force propelling the ball upward and the force of gravity. While gravity is weaker, the ball goes up. When gravity becomes stronger the ball changes direction and comes down.... This last point, then, says that there is a constant movement, constant struggle, between the two opposing aspects of the thing in question and this conflict of the internal contradictions is the most important single force that leads the thing to change. Or, to put it briefly, there is an internal contradiction in every single thing and this, more than all else, causes its motion and development. External forces are also important, but dialectics understands that external causes are the condition of change, while internal causes are the basis of change. For example, a chicken sitting on an egg will lead to a baby chick, while the same chicken can sit on a rock forever and hatch nothing -- the internal contradictions are the most important factor in the development and motion of not just the egg, but all things...." [Quoted from here; accessed 22/02/2014. Minor typos corrected. Bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]

 

[3] "The world is full of opposing forces. In philosophical language we would say that the world is full of contradictions. But opposing forces always exist together. For example, the positive pole of a magnet attracts the negative pole of another magnet. But every magnet has both a positive and negative poll (sic). If you cut the magnet up it always has a positive and negative poll (sic). These opposites exist together -- they 'interpenetrate'. Let's examine the apple. The chemical bonds that hold its atoms together are being opposed by chemical processes causing those bonds to break leading to the rotting of the apple. The forces are in opposition to each other. They contradict each other but are contained within the same object." [Quoted from here; accessed 22/12/2016. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

[4] "Fundamentally, everything that exists is a combination of opposites. It is in the nature of existence for things to occur as a synthesis of opposite entities. In fact, it is said that development occurs only where opposites do exist. Therefore, the way of nature presupposes that in everything material which exists, there must be a unity of opposites. Taking the human being as an example, man is a conglomerate of numerous opposites. It is in the nature of man to be a moral being i.e. to be inclined towards the doing of virtuous deeds, for the sake of peace in society. However, it is also presupposed in the nature of man that he should desire to carry out some acts that are vicious. Paradoxically, man is a contradictory; a synthesis of both good and evil, virtue and vice. It is a natural law that both these elements must exist in man, without these, no development can occur. This is what the unity of opposites mean. As it is a fact that opposites necessarily presuppose each other, it is also a fact that they must clash. The very fact that they are contradictories implies their destiny to struggle with each other. Thus, two sides of a dilemma cannot exist peacefully; no way! They must move, and in doing so, clashes must occur between them. There is usually a continued struggle between them as to which one must prevail over the other. So, when one of them prevails, then we can say development has taken place. For example; as usual, it is when one willingly refuses to do vice and embrace virtue, that one is said to be exhibiting a virtuous character and vice-versa. Thus, without the existence and clashing of opposites, there can be no movement, change and development. Therefore, development is when an element moves against the influence of its opposite. This is what the struggle of opposites mean. The conclusion of all this is that, every material system in reality by default, contains within it, elements that would certainly lead to its disfunctionality; and this is based on which has the stronger force or power...." [Quoted from here and here; accessed 22/12/2016; paragraphs merged.]

 

[5] "...Marxist materialism makes use of dialectics -- a way of thinking which explains how things develop and change. The laws of dialectics can be summarised as follows:

 

"Everything is part of the whole, interconnected, an element in the material unity of the universe. So we should not be partial, blinkered or narrow in our outlook and analysis. Everything is in flux, in motion, in the process of changing. Movement or change may be dramatic, sudden, obvious -- or small, gradual, virtually invisible. Although on the surface nothing appears to be happening, underneath elements are growing or declining, moods are changing -- sometimes through connections with things happening elsewhere. So nothing is unchanging forever. No form of human society is infinite and unchangeable. Movement and change occur through the conflict of opposites. Within any particular thing there are elements, forces and tendencies opposed to one another. They give rise to the internal contradictions within a given thing. At the same time, these conflicting elements, forces and tendencies are parts of the whole of that particular object or phenomenon, co-existing within it as a 'unity of opposites'. However, this object also exists in a wider context or environment, thereby giving rise to external contradictions between it and other particular things, and between the object and its environment as a whole. Internal or external contradictions which reflect conflicting interests that cannot be reconciled are said to be fundamentally antagonistic. Such conflicting elements and forces will not be able to co-exist permanently in the same unity or environment. Something has to give. Eventually, an antagonistic contradiction sharpens to the point where one force has to vanquish the other. The old unity is broken, and a new unity has to be constructed under the leadership of the victorious force.

 

"In the process of struggle, the opposing forces have an impact on one another, changing each other to a greater or lesser degree. This is what Marxism calls the 'interpenetration of opposites'. The struggle itself will also have an impact on the contending forces. At the conclusion of the struggle, the victorious force is not the same as it was at the beginning. It may, for example, have absorbed some features of the contrary force, themselves transformed in the conflict. Changes of degree -- of quantity -- will at some point produce a fundamental change in the quality of something -- a change in its essence or character. For instance, a workplace may begin with just a few workers in a trade union. But as the level of unionism increases and the employer is compelled to negotiate collective terms and conditions, so the whole character or quality of industrial relations in that workplace will change. Recruitment to the union multiplies—an example of qualitative change in turn producing quantitative change. The same processes can come to embrace whole industrial sectors and whole national economies." [Quoted from here. Accessed 18/05/17. Underlining removed. Bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged.]

 

We have already seen that one on-line dictionary 'defines' contradiction in somewhat similar terms -- as 'opposing forces' -- but since that has already been covered no more will be said about it here.

 

2. Engels, for example, went to great lengths to qualify what he meant by "force" -- cf., Engels (1954), pp.69-86 -- but he doesn't even once consider the classic problems associated with such interactions (which had been highlighted by Leibniz, and echoed, for example, by Schelling).

 

3. This was established in Essay Two.

 

Nevertheless, as we saw in that Essay (as well as Essay Twelve Part One), DM-theories (like those quoted in the main body and Note 1) actually function as a "form of representation", not as a summary of the available evidence. Indeed, in many cases, sweeping DM-generalisations like these were almost invariably first advanced on the basis of little or no evidence at all! For example:

 

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211.]

 

"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…[is] the negation of the negation…. [This is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976), pp.179-80.]

 

Engels was quite happy to call such sketchy, half-formed, and what can only be called sub-hypotheses (or, to be more honest, guesses and hunches!), "laws", even though they were solely based on a cursory survey of a limited range of examples -- each one of which had been specially-selected and then highly simplified to the point of distortion -- drawn from his idiosyncratic interpretation of the science of his day. And, even then, they were all either superficially described or were amateurishly misconstrued -- indeed, as we saw in Essay Seven Part One. No wonder then that his odd ideas, and those of his epigones, were labelled, "Mickey Mouse Science".

 

[Their role as a "form of representation" will be further analysed in the section dealing with the RRT in Essay Twelve Part Four.]

 

[RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory; follow that link for a brief explanation.]

 

[The phrase "form of representation" is taken from Wittgenstein's work; a concise outline of its meaning can be found in Glock (1996), pp.129-35. We will see Engels employing one of these in Note 7, below. Also, follow the link to "norm of representation" given in Interlude Two.]

 

4. However, in one of his comments in DN, Engels openly questioned the identification of 'contradictions' with 'opposing forces' (traditionally understood):

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Even though Engels elaborated on this idea in the succeeding pages of DN, this passage alone completely undermines the subsequent equation of 'opposing forces' with 'contradictions' -- or, at least, with attraction and repulsion.

 

[Of course, those remarks were taken from unpublished notebooks, so it might not have represented Engels's more considered views. But, as far as can be determined, he nowhere repudiated them.]

 

[DN = Dialectics of Nature; i.e., Engels (1954).]

 

Nevertheless, this re-interpretation of the word "force" as a sort of shorthand for "simple forms of motion" is consistent with contemporary approaches to the nature of forces, which sees them as an expression of the exchange of momentum between 'force-carrier particles' (which are themselves interpreted as 'disturbances in the field', as we saw in Essay Seven Part One). Even so, Engels's 'revised view' itself presents Dialectical Marxists with serious problems he at least appears not to have noticed. Several of the latter are examined in the main body of this Essay, and again in Interlude Two.

 

5. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

As pointed out earlier, Thomas Weston has recently attempted to identify a 'second force' (or cause) in such circumstances -- which he locates in..., 'inertia'(!). But, inertia isn't a force. [I have considered other aspects of Weston's ill-advised article here, here, here, here, and here, as well as in the material that used to be in this Note -- but has now been moved to the main body (link in the previous paragraph).]

 

6. Not that these two aren't complementary.

 

Admittedly, this is an oversimplification, but the point is still valid. Even if it could be shown that gravity is a property/effect of (a) matter (as a result, perhaps, of the activities of the by now legendary graviton), (b) 'warped' Spacetime, or, indeed, (c) something else, 'motion' through Spacetime would still fail to be a function of attractive and repulsive forces. [On that, see Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi. It is also worth noting that this view has recently been challenged by, for example, Wilson (2007). (This links to a PDF.) There is more on this topic here.]

 

[In the previous paragraph, the word "motion" has been put in 'scare' quotes, since it is a moot point whether anything actually moves in four-dimensional Spacetime.]

 

6a. However, there are alternative versions of Classical Physics (for example, Newton-Cartan Theory -- this links to a PDF) in which the force of gravity has been "geometrised" and hence edited out of the picture, in like manner. [On this, see Malament (2012), Manchak (2012) and Trautman (1965).]

 

Anyone who wants to pursue this topic further might like to consult the following (although a knowledge of contemporary Philosophy of Science, Modern Logic and Applied Mathematics will be required in order to follow the argument fully in many of them): Bigelow, et al (1988), Cartwright (1983), Chao and Reiss (2017), Coelho (2021), Cohen (1970), Creary (1981), Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976), Hanson (1965a, 1965b), Hesse (1961), Hunt and Suchting (1969), Jammer (1999), Massin (2009, 2012), Moore (2012), Rowbottom (2017), Spurrett (2001), Stinner (1994), Williams (1980), and Wilson (2002, 2007, 2009, 2010). [These all link to PDFs.] 

 

I will return to consider several of the above when we have occasion to examine the 'ontological status' of component forces, later on in this Essay and in Note 57. [See also Note 30.]

 

Much of the material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

6b. Despite this, it could be argued that it is the relation between bodies that determines any subsequent change in motion, which supports the theory that there is a contradiction in this case. But, in relativistic physics, it is the 'relation' between a body and the gravitational field in which it is embedded that changes its motion. However, once that is admitted we will have left far behind the idea that there are "contradictory forces" at work in any meaningful sense of the term.

 

Again, it could be objected that even if the above is accepted, there will still be a relation between bodies in such circumstances, since planets and stars (etc.) deform the gravitational field (or they "warp spacetime") surrounding them. That will in turn change the motion of a secondary orbiting body, for example.

 

Or so it might be maintained...

 

 Maybe so, but exactly how this is a 'contradiction' has yet to be explained. There seems to be no "struggle" going on here --, or are we to imagine that such bodies 'struggle' with tensor fields, or even with abstract spaces (i.e., with mathematical structures), which factors then turn into each other -- which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed? There is no 'unity' or 'identity in opposition' here; one body just happens to be situated in the deformed/"warped" results of another body's effect on the relevant field, and, as a result, moves in a trajectory that follows the local geodesics. Once again, if anything -- and if we absolutely have to employ fanciful metaphors here --, the regular and smooth (non-developmental) nature of the subsequently altered motion looks more like a 'dialectical tautology'! [I am being deliberately ironic here!]

 

7. I return this topic again, here and here.

 

The material that used be here has been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

8. In that case, for once (what was that about a stopped clock telling the right time twice a day?), Engels's views would appear to be consistent with Contemporary Physics -- indeed, as indicated by Max Jammer! Engels also pointed out the anthropomorphic origin of the force concept (something W&G, for example, clearly failed to spot -- even though they quoted this very passage!):

 

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Engels (1954), p.82. Bold emphasis added.]

 

[On the animistic and anthropomorphic origin of the concept of force, see Hesse (1961), Jammer (1999), and Agassi (1973), who references Francis Bacon's Novum Organum (Book One: Aphorisms; Aphorisms XXXVII-LXVIII) as the locus classicus of this idea.]

 

Dialectical Marxists aren't alone in finding their theories embarrassed by an over-ambitious and incautious use of anthropomorphic terminology; the theories of 'metaphysically-ambitious' Philosophers and scientists who 'dabble with in little philosophising' have been similarly compromised for far too many centuries.

 

[The ideological origin of theories like this is exposed in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here). That material has been summarised here and here. The word "dabble" was used above in order to highlight a minority of scientists who engage in amateur, off-the-cuff Metaphysics, typically when they try to explain their theories in ordinary-ish terms or in popularisations of the subject.]

 

9. Of course, not all objects that collide would be, or would have been, moving in opposite directions. Many will be on trajectories inclined at some angle or other to the rest. Indeed, many will move in the same direction, only at different speeds. It isn't easy to see how any of these can be seen as 'contradictory'.

 

[Classical problems associated with the 'ontology of interaction' have now been posted to Interlude One. See also Note 6a. This topic was also dealt with at greater length in Essay Eight Part One.]

 

10. It could be argued that forces are 'abstractions' constructed to assist in the scientific study of nature and society, the comprehension of which assists revolutionaries in their struggle to change the world.

 

But, that would mean the concept, "force", is little more than a "useful fiction", except it is now located in a 'metaphorical' universe all of its own, situated somewhere between genuine fantasies (such as ghosts and apparitions) and mathematical fictions (such as the centre of mass of the Galactic System to which ours belongs -- the Virgo Supercluster). If that were indeed the case, the 'objective' status of forces, and hence of 'contradictions', would be seriously undermined. Forces and 'contradictions' would now have no physical counterpart, which would in turn mean that the real material correlates of DM-'contradictions' would be non-existent (or even fictional), too. I am far from sure many DM-fans will want to adopt that interpretation of "force" too enthusiastically.

 

All this is quite apart from the fact that if forces were 'abstractions', no two individuals would agree about their nature. [That result was established in Essay Three Parts One and Two.]

 

11. Once more, this isn't a problem specifically confined to DM-circles. Scientific theories are themselves shot-through with metaphor, and scientists use analogical reasoning all the time. Not that that is a problem in and of itself.

 

On the nature and use of metaphor and analogy in the sciences, cf., Baake (2003), Brown (2003), Benjamin, et al (1987), Guttenplan (2005), Hesse (1966), Ortony (1993), and White (1996, 2010). [Several of these base their ideas on Max Black's work in this area, which has been effectively criticised in White (1996).]

 

However, there is as yet no satisfactory or definitive treatment of the nature and significance of figurative language used in science. Unfortunately, this means that the precise nature of scientific knowledge is, as yet, poorly understood. [I hope to say more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

12. This might be one particular use of the LEM that DM-fans would be wise not to question. If objects, states of affairs and processes were held to be both non-contradictory and contradictory at the same time, little sense could be made of the theory, even before it was examined or tested in practice.

 

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; FL = Formal Logic.]

 

Nevertheless, in relation to the 'laws' of FL (but I prefer to called them rules), their application to complex situations requires no little sensitivity. In that case, it could be argued that Dialectical Marxists are only committed to the view that parts of one system or process 'contradict' parts of another, while still others do not.

 

To be perfectly honest, it is impossible to give a clear or definitive answer to the above proffered pro-DM response since the latter is far too vague and sketchy for anyone (supporter or critic alike) to decide whether or not it is a legitimate reading. Perhaps it is both and neither at the same time?

 

Nevertheless, DM-theorists actually do speak about contradictions "growing" or "lessening" in intensity; they even speak about them being "resolved". [Indeed, Thomas Weston covers this topic in detail, explaining how 'contradictions' can 'intensify' or be 'resolved', in Weston (2012), pp.19-25 (this links to a PDF).] But, that is clearly a subjective opinion on his part since Weston nowhere supplies, or even suggests, any units by means of which these supposed changes to assorted 'contradictions' may be measured and no data to support his contentions or make comparisons. Nor do other DM-theorists even attempt to quantify them in any way at all (which, on its own, is a rather odd thing to have to say about those who claim that DM is the very epitome of scientific and philosophical knowledge). The thought never even occurs to them!

 

However, if DM-apologists ever do get their act together and decide to invent a unit applicable to all those (lessening and/or 'intensifying') 'contradictions' they see everywhere, we might at last begin to make some progress.

 

Until then, may I suggest the 'Neg' as just such a unit?

 

So, 1 neg could be defined as the strength, level, or 'intensity' of a 'contradiction' required to make either (i) a stick look bent in water, (ii) an object look smaller as it recedes from the viewer -- or maybe even necessary to make (iii) at least one employer look fair to a randomly-selected trade union bureaucrat (or, indeed, an ordinary individual who might have been misled by 'banal commonsense' and/or 'formal thinking').

 

In that case, a Nano-neg would be enough to make an electron move and a Pico-neg would enable it to be both a wave and a particle at the same time. Extending this idea: a Milli-neg would be strong enough to move a millipede. [The reader can decide for herself what a Centi-neg would be capable of setting in motion.] A Deci-neg would be sufficient to initiate a formal contradiction in logic, while a Deca-neg (colloquially, "A Blair") would be enough to spin a pack of lies (about the affordability of, say, pensions), or even publish and endorse at least one 'dodgy' Iraq dossier.

 

Perhaps then, a Hecto(r)-neg would be sufficient to set off a factional dispute in yet another Dialectically-Debilitated Trotskyist, Communist, or Maoist sect, while the class war itself would need a Kilo-neg to cause a strike, a Mega-neg would be required to motivate a massive anti-war movement, and a Giga-neg to set off a proletarian insurrection. Moving up the scale, a Tera-neg would be enough to keep the Earth in orbit around the Sun, and, of course, a Yotta-neg sufficient to kick-start the 'Big Bang'.

 

We could even introduce a special unit to measure or record the stench reaching the nostrils of most working-class individuals as a result of the oppression, mass murder, counter-revolutionary antics and sectarian in-fighting in which this misbegotten theory has helped motivate generations of Dialectical Marxists to engage for much of the twentieth century: the Rotta-neg.

 

All we would need then is an intrepid DM-fan (perhaps one of those who claim to be able to derive fundamental scientific truths about 'Reality' from thought alone -- simply by throwing a few obscure Hegel-inspired words at the page) to invent a "Neg-ometer" -- which they would surely be able to cobble-together if they stopped wasting time writing yet another boilerplate 'Introduction to DM' -- in order to help facilitate the measurement of these super-scientific, 'dialectical contradictions', along with their 'intensifications'. That done, Dialectical Marxism might at least begin to look a little more scientific. After all, if Scientologists have their E Meter, DM should at least have a Neg-ometer.

 

[To be honest, I would have suggested the "Con" instead of the "Neg" as a suitable unit with which to measure the changing strength of DM-'contradictions', but when I typed "Mega-con" into an earlier version of the above, it seemed to me to be a little too on-the-nose, a little too facetious. (Readers might like to compare these remarks with somewhat similar comments about dialectical "nodes"/"leaps", posted here.)]

 

13. This assumes, of course, that 'contradictions' have (metaphorical) 'geometric centres' and possess (figurative) 'separation radii'. [Well, maybe they can also be photographed, weighed, have their toe-nails clipped and be given a new hair-style?]

 

Cheap debating points? Maybe so; but if all parts of nature (animate and inanimate, macroscopic or microscopic) behave as if they can argue amongst themselves -- which is how things are depicted in DM when its theorists try to sell us the idea that objects and processes are capable of 'contradicting' one another, bickering away (that is, if the words "contradiction" and "contradicting" are understood literally, "contra-dict" = "gain-say") --, the above 'cheap shot' is hardly worth mentioning in comparison. So, instead of the 'gods' being credited with human characteristics (ŕ la Feuerbach), DM-acolytes expect us to believe that this is instead true of inanimate objects (ŕ la Hegel, Engels and Lenin)!

 

By such moves, Dialectical Marxism takes the p*ss out of itself. It needs little assistance from me.

 

13a. Indeed, when asked to explain why this is a 'contradiction', Ian Birchall [aka "Grim and Dim" -- his choice of pseudonym, not mine -- and I am not 'outing' a comrade here!] failed to respond. However, in a later thread he made another unsuccessful attempt to reply, as did a few other confused comrades. Readers are encouraged to read this lengthy exchange on the topic. [Unfortunately, all these links are now dead!]

 

My thoughts on the 'arguments' of one of the more egregious participants in this debate ("JohnG") can be found here and here, and now in a revised form here. [In general on this deeply confused comrade, see here.]

 

The same always seems to happen whenever I ask Dialectical Marxists to explain why these are 'contradictions'; even knowledgeable comrades soon begin to flounder!

 

As I noted in Essay One:

 

One wonders, therefore, what would become of us Dialectical Dissidents in the unlikely event that fellow Trotskyists ever managed to secure real power. The vitriol, hostility, lies and smears I have had to face now for many years suggest I, for one, wouldn't last long in such circumstances!

 

[Please note, once more, I am not complaining about this; I expect this level of vitriol. If I hadn't received it, I would have concluded I had gone wrong somewhere!]

 

For example, in an email exchange a few years ago, one prominent Marxist Professor of Economics -- Andrew Kliman, no less -- expressed the fervent hope that I should "Eat sh*t and die!" -- either that or quaff some Hemlock -- simply because I had the temerity to question the 'sacred dialectic'. This was prompted by my asking him to explain exactly what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, which he signally failed to do. His DM-inspired vitriol was subsequently repeated in October 2013, here (in the comments section -- again, this link is now dead!), but his remarks were deleted by the moderators because of the violent and intemperate nature of the language the good Professor thought to use. Another UK-SWP comrade (implicitly) accused me of being worse than the Nazis (yes, you read that right!), and for the same reason -- questioning DM. Incidentally, this particular comrade has now left the SWP. Apparently, he still thinks that 'truth is tested in practice'. And, in 2020, I engaged in a lengthy (but fruitless) 'discussion' with a fan of 'Systematic Dialectics', who soon resorted to type, posting personal abuse and barefaced lies. Another recently compared me to the Coronavirus!

 

I have also critically evaluated what I consider (so far!) to be the best ever (published) response to the question 'Exactly What is a Dialectical Contradiction?', here.

 

February 2009 Update: Another attempt to define the indefinable term, "dialectical contradiction", can be found here (unfortunately, this link is also now dead!). In fact, the owner of that site (a Marxist economist) deleted my remarks and replies since he found it far too 'challenging' to defend his own use of "contradiction".

 

Autumn 2009 Update: Several other attempts to find out what DM-supporters mean by the odd words they use -- but, this time involving Academic Marxists, which began here (this link is dead, too!), continued here, here, here, here, here, and here -- were no less unsuccessful.

 

December 2011 Update: Here is another discussion (in the comments section), mainly between myself and Mike Rosen, on the nature of these (perennially) obscure DM-'contradictions'. [Unfortunately, when Disqus -- the hosting service for the site to which the first of these links will take the reader -- was re-organised a few years ago, older comments sections to the linked site were lost.]

 

[And here are another three attempts. (These links are also now dead!)]

 

Several more examples of this tendency to label anything and everything "contradictory" (a slight exaggeration!) can be found here and here.

 

Indeed, a recent (March 2013) example of such profligacy further illustrates the cavalier attitude shown by DM-fans toward the use of this word:

 

"In the Communist Manifesto Marx makes two contradictory assertions: 1. The ruling ideas in any epoch are the ideas of the ruling class. 2. The emancipation of the working class is the act of the working class itself." ['Mark', quoted from here, p.24. Italic emphasis in the original. In fact, Marx said this: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas...", and it wasn't in the Manifesto, it was in the German Ideology. While there are passages in the Manifesto that can be pressed into service in support of Claim 2, it is in fact something Marx asserted years later. (This link is also now dead!)]

 

But, why are these contradictory? As usual, we aren't told. (The comrade involved just assumes it is uncontroversial to throw this word at the screen.) Even so, it isn't hard to guess the answer -- as Tony Cliff pointed out:

 

"The fact that the working class needs a party or parties is in itself a proof of the cleavages in the working class. The more backward culturally, the weaker the organisation and self-administration of the workers generally, the greater will be the intellectual cleavage between the class and its Marxist party. From this unevenness in the working class flows the great danger of an autonomous development of the party and its machine till it becomes, instead of the servant of the class, its master. This unevenness is a main source of the danger of 'substitutionism'...." [Cliff (1960), p.126.]

 

In other words, the working class can't emancipate itself since it is dominated by ruling-class ideology -- and yet it must emancipate itself if socialism is to be won. This seems to be the 'contradiction' that was meant here. Indeed, as 'Mark' from earlier went on to argue:

 

"When workers fight back they find that some of the ideas once held, ruling class ideas, are challenged in the very process of struggle. Workers discover they can make speeches and organise solidarity. Racist or sexist ideas are challenged as people unite and fight back together. People change their ideas in struggle. Consciousness is contradictory. Those fighting back make up the vanguard of the class. The uneven nature of the class struggle across the class means we need a revolutionary party, one that orients on those engaged in struggle, the 'vanguard' of the class. Unevenness in the Party, as well as the need to totally reject ruling class ideology, means we need a central leadership in the Party." ['Mark' quoted from here, p.24. Paragraphs merged. (This link is still dead!)]

 

Hence, the "self-emancipation of the working class" can only take place with the active intervention of the party, which is somehow (miraculously) capable of freeing itself from bourgeois ideology. Or, rather its "central leadership" is capable of performing this 'magic trick', while the working class itself isn't! Of course, in struggle, as 'Mark' points out, workers often do change their ideas and opinions, but nowhere does 'Mark' suggest that they can free themselves completely from ruling-class ideology. If they could, there would be no real need for the party! 

 

Well, this conundrum is doubly ironic in view of the fact that Bolshevik-style parties -- and especially their "central leadership", and, indeed, Dialectical Marxists in general -- have themselves been held in thrall to ruling-class thought-forms (upside down or 'the right way up') for well over one hundred and fifty years, as these Essays have amply demonstrated.

 

But, and once more, it is worth asking again: Why is the above example a contradiction, as opposed to it merely being an impossibility? Or, even better, an example of confused thought?

 

Again, we are left in the dark.

 

Here is another typical example of DM-profligacy in this respect, which surfaced in a letter sent to Socialist Worker at the end of August 2011:

 

"China's elite is contradictory

 

"I'm writing regarding Charlie Hore's article on economic growth during the reform period in China (Socialist Worker, 20 August). It doesn't mention the powerful contradictions that emerged within the ruling bureaucracy as a result of the reforms. Not all sectors of the bureaucracy have benefited from the reforms. There has been a shift from ideological campaigns towards a performance-based notion of state legitimacy. This has meant that many officials have experienced anxiety about their relevance in Chinese politics and have been dragged into protest movements. A socialist analysis has to make sense of these contradictions." [Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Again, no one (in the movement) ever bothers to explain why such things should be called "contradictions" when they are far better described as "tensions" or "conflicts". For example, do the above factors imply one another? No. Can one exist without the other? Yes. That is quite unlike the alleged 'contradiction' between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, where one supposedly implies the other, and neither can exist without the other (although I have thrown even that widely accepted inference into considerable doubt, here).

 

Some might conclude that this is just another example of Ms Lichtenstein's pedantry, but that isn't so. [On 'pedantry', see here.] There are important political reasons for rejecting the use of "contradiction" in the way it is deployed by Dialectical Marxists. [On that, see Essay Nine Part Two.]

 

Specifically:

 

(1) It 'allows' Dialectical Marxists to argue in favour of anything they like and its opposite (often this is done by the very same DM-supporter -- on the same page or even in the same speech!), no matter how anti-Marxist or counter-revolutionary this "anything" might otherwise prove to be. These moves are then often 'justified' on the basis that since 'everything is contradictory', Marxist theory and practice should be contradictory, too! [I give several examples of this in Essay Nine Part Two (links above).]

 

(2) The words "contradiction" and "contradictory" are used to rationalise a whole range of substitutionist strategies, tactics and policies -- for instance, on the basis that even though Marx insisted on the self-emancipation of the working class, we can substitute one or more of the following for that class: (i) The Party, (ii) The Red Army, (iii) 'Third World' guerrillas, (iv) 'Progressive' nationalists, (v) Students, (vi) Sympathetic, left-leaning politicians, and/or (vii) An assortment of social forces, 'rainbow coalitions', and minority rights movements, no matter how contradictory this might otherwise seem. And any who object to this? Well they just don't 'understand dialectics' or the 'contradictory nature of Marxism', the class war, the former USSR..., etc., etc. Anyway, who has ever heard of 'pure socialism'? What are you? Some sort of anti-dialectical perfectionist?!

 

(3) The use of such language 'allows' DM-fans to cast their eyes over the history of long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism and fail to see it for what it is: a profound and protracted refutation of their core theory, 'Materialist Dialectics'. It also 'allows' them to interpret this abysmal record as the opposite of what it is -- on the basis that 'appearances contradict underlying essence'. So, even if Dialectical Marxism looks hopelessly unsuccessful and a catastrophic failure, the exact opposite is in fact the case. This then encourages Dialectical Marxists to stick their heads in the drifting 'dialectical sands' while our movement slowly runs into the real sands.

 

(4) Because of (3), the word "contradiction" provides Dialectical Marxists with a source of consolation for the long-term ineffectiveness of the entire movement, along with its serial divisiveness and its ever present internecine warfare -- "Well, what else can you expect in a contradictory universe? Marxism should look the opposite of what it really is! Dialectics allows us to grasp this contradiction." Indeed, as Lenin himself pointed out, splitting lies at the heart of everything (which must include the party!).

 

DM thus becomes a coping mechanism.

 

So, none of this is a result of the present author's 'pedantry', nor is it merely 'academic' point-scoring. The use of "contradiction" has had, and continues to have, disastrous political and ideological implications for the entire movement.

 

14. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

14a. It could be argued that in so far as forces in nature can be represented as vectors, that is also the case with contradictions. That response will be considered presently.

 

15. E.g., Rees (1998), pp.5-8.

 

Any who object to my presumed use of the LEM at this point should check this out, and then perhaps think again.

 

16. It might be felt that this completely misconstrues the relationship between parts and wholes in DM, wherein it is claimed that "the whole is more than the sum of the parts", etc., etc. However, that Dubious Dialectical Doctrine has been subjected to sustained and microscopic examined in Essay Eleven Part Two, where it was shown to be no less vague and confused as other areas of DM are.

 

17. Of course, it could be argued that this objectifies the "Totality", thereby distorting it. But, if the "Totality" isn't a kind of object (even though it might be a changing 'object' of some sort), how can 'it' have any relation to 'its' parts, and how could 'contradictions' be properties of 'it'?

 

It might be objected in response that the "Totality" is in fact a process, and hence it would be an 'it' (or, a sort of 'it') only in that sense. Naturally, the answer to these (and other) questions concerning this mysterious entity/process, the "Totality", will have to be put to one side until DM-theorists tell us (if ever!) what (if anything!) they think 'it' is.

 

[They might find a few useful ideas (consistent with much else we find in DM) set out here.]

 

Despite this, it could further be objected that abstract reasoning we find at this site demonstrates nothing since DM is concerned with verifiable, concrete, material contradictions, which do exist in the real world. That response has been examined in detail here and here, as well as Essay Five.

 

18. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

19. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

20. Of course, this rather simple picture will very likely be 'muddied' to some extent by the introduction of the complexities we actually find in nature. However, the more complications there are, the less applicable DM-concepts seem to be. In the present case, we would have here an RARA-system-of-forces. Again, a choice would then have to be made whether we should widen the meaning of the word "opposite" in order to accommodate DM, or change DM in order to accommodate the facts. To date, with respect to DM, Dialectical Marxists have generally opted for the former tactic, not the latter. As the reader will no doubt agree, this amounts to imposing DM on the facts -- the exact opposite of what its theorists claim to be doing.

 

Since AR-forces are discussed below, I will postpone further comment until then.

 

21. This needn't be as serious a problem as appears to be suggested in the main body of this Essay. It was pointed out elsewhere that scientists do this sort of thing all the time -- i.e., modify the meaning of certain words to accommodate new discoveries. Unfortunately, that is bad news for Dialectical Marxism since it confirms the view that science is a conventionalised social practice, just as it further substantiates the claim made at this site that metaphysical theories are based on, and arise out of, a misconstrual of conventionalised linguistic forms as if they were, or 'reflected', 'fundamental features of reality'. In short: metaphysicians conflate the conventions we use to represent the world with facts about it.

 

This is about as egregious an error as would be an assumption that 'Reality' itself must have an edge simply because every photograph or painting does.

 

[This topic is examined in detail In Essays Twelve Part One and Thirteen Part Two.]

 

21a. Or, perhaps even:

 

(iii) This way of looking at the world is indeed as crazy as it seems!

 

[This topic is examined more extensively in Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

22. It might be felt that this site is so heavily biased against DM and any way of interpreting 'opposing forces' as 'contradictions' that scientific facts and theories are being twisted and slanted so that they begin to appear prejudicial to DM -- this latest assertion (that much of DM has fallen apart) merely being the most recent example. Accelerated motion in the real world is often the result of several forces operating on a body. The ensuing motion simply follows as a result of the oppositional nature of those forces themselves.

 

Or so it might be objected...

 

That volunteered, pro-DM response will be examined presently in the main body of the Essay.

 

23. Once more, it could be objected that there is no such thing as "empty space". But even if that were so, and the objects referred to in the main body of this Essay weren't situated in the said force field, any forces present would still fail to operate on each other, but only on any bodies (and/or their motion) already present in the system. In which case, forces seem to affect bodies, not each other. [See Interlude One on this.]

 

24. It could be argued that force fields do in fact interact, and they certainly alter one another. That objection will also be examined presently.

 

The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude One (link above).

 

25. The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Two.

 

26. Those who still think that forces are capable of opposing motion, and can therefore be said to contradict it, should consult the material presented in Interlude Two (link above), and presently in the main body of this Essay, where this rather peculiar idea will finally be laid to rest.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that if it were correct to say that forces were capable of opposing motion, and could therefore be said to "contradict" it, the theory that forces 'contradict' each other will have already gone the non-dialectical tubes. Plainly, if forces oppose motion, they can hardly also oppose one another directly. [Unless, of course, we agree with Engels that the concept of "force" should be ditched and replaced with talk about "relative motion".]

 

27. In which case, it might be wondered whether only those bodies that approach each other along the same line of action (where the angle between their trajectories is (initially) 180°), or which operate in a force field (where the 'lines of action' of that field are similarly orientated (initially), at 180°) are to be counted as 'opposites'.

 

If not, will any angle (other than 90°) work?

 

However, since forces and velocities are vectors -- or, rather, may be represented by vectors -- they can be resolved to circumvent this difficulty. Even so, any solution sought along those lines (no pun intended) would clearly be conventional, since the components of vectors don't exist in nature in any meaningful sense; they are merely integral to the calculating procedures we use to help us make sense of any changes that result (etc.).

 

[On this, see Interlude One and Interlude Two (links above) -- as well as Note 30, below.]

 

28. Anyone who thinks that the vector calculus is a description of reality would be suffering from the same sort of confusion as someone who, for example, thought that weather actually is the wavy lines, or even the tangent fields, drawn on a map, which show, for example, wind direction and speed, simply because a TV weather forecaster uses them. [On this see Interlude Two (link above) and Interlude Six.] Moreover, for reasons that were set out earlier, mathematics, while large sections of it are undeniably based on models, isn't a 'model of reality'.

 

29. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Three.

 

30. Admittedly, some vectors are invariant under certain transformations, but the physical interpretation of the operation of forces isn't a given; it is set by convention. On this, see Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976), as well as the books and articles listed in Note 6a.

 

[Ellis (1976) was written in reply to Hunt and Suchting (1969). See also Hanson (1965a, 1965b), and Jammer (1999). Mysteriously, however, Ellis has backtracked on his earlier views (and for what appear to be instrumentalist reasons); cf., Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter (1988), and the response to this in Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi.]

 

The difficulty with finding a physical analogue of, or a correlate for, vector spaces (or, even worse, for any tensor extensions to them) is examined in Cartwright (1983), pp.54-73; see also Hesse (1961). A recent challenge has been registered to this way of seeing forces by Wilson (2007); on that, see here.

 

[A response to Smith (2007) will appear here in a future re-write of this Essay.]

 

31. On this, see Interlude One, Interlude Two (links above), as well as Note 30.

 

32. This topic was discussed in much greater detail in Essay Seven Part One, where I have called it "The Dialecticians' Dilemma". [See also, here. The supposed 'contradictory nature of motion' was destructively criticised in Essay Five.]

 

33. On this, see, for example, here.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Four.

 

34. As pointed out in Interlude Four (link above), it is entirely possible that this isn't what DM-fans mean by "contradictory forces"; but then again it is equally doubtful that they have ever subjected their own theory to this level of scrutiny. Naturally, this means that even they would be in no position to accept or reject this interpretation (or at least not until they begin to ask and answer to sort of questions raised in this Essay and at this site). Hence, as things now stand, there would be little point asking a Dialectical Marxist for a clear and well-thought-out answer to the following question: "Is this what you mean by 'contradictory force'?".

 

And good luck to anyone who doubts my assessment of DM-supporters' knowledge of their own theory! Personal experience, now stretching across over thirty-five years, has taught me that anyone foolish enough to ask any of them to devote even so much as one minute to this topic will face deflection, no little personal abuse and misrepresentation -- often followed by a barrage of 'scatological invective' -- at best, for even thinking to ask. (Here is the latest example -- unfortunately that link is now dead! Here then is the next example in line.)

 

Added on Edit: I have now included an even more recent example of this in Appendix C. See also here for the most recent 'debate'.

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context.]

 

Compare this slipshod, amateurish approach to theory with the care and close attention to detail devoted by other Marxists when they try to analyse concepts employed in HM -- such as "the forces and relations of production", "ideology", "racism", "class", or "the tendency of the rate of profit to fall". Whole books and articles have been written about many of those topics (and others). Not one single book has ever been written about 'opposing forces' interpreted as 'contradictions' -- not even so much as one chapter of a book has been devoted to it! Just the odd paragraph or two...

 

35. It is worth repeating that these assertions are aimed neither at affirming nor denying DM-theorists' claims about the "Totality", and that includes its supposedly 'contradictory' parts, since both of those reactions would themselves be metaphysical -- hence non-sensical and incoherent. [That is because the 'negation' of non-sense is also non-sense. The reasons for saying that take up most of Essays Twelve Part One and Eleven Parts One and Two.] As pointed out earlier, the intention here is simply to make patent the latent non-sense that DM-theorists' ideas contain/imply.

 

Moreover, an appeal to 'relative truth' would be of little use, either. Surprising as it might seem, that option was (inadvertently) torpedoed by Lenin himself!

 

36. As we saw earlier, these 'difficulties' revolve around the question whether it is:

 

(a) A force's effects;

 

(b) The relative motion between objects; or,

 

(c) The interrelationship between bodies and/or processes,

 

that are supposed to be 'contradictory'.

 

37. This is so on Hegelian and Aristotelian grounds.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Five.

 

38. So, this appears to be yet another ironic "dialectical inversion". The forces involved don't actually 'contradict' each other, they augment one another -- even though they are still supposed to be 'opposites'! Perhaps then we should gesture in the direction of greater honesty and call such configurations "dialectical tautologies"?

 

On that basis, therefore, we might be able to construct an entirely new -- and, it must be admitted, a wholly insincere -- theory of universal harmony, not struggle. This is especially so if we recall that forces 'naturally combine' to form resultants, and opposites more often than not attract rather than repel each other (on that, see Interlude Six, and here), both of which phenomena are also connected with motion and change. As a result of such an 'inversion' -- putting DM 'back on its heels', as it were -- change would be an expression of cooperation, not conflict. We could even re-introduce the idea of an 'Immanent Deity' (a suitable -- but no less mysterious -- analogue of the DM-"Totality") to give this wholly insincere 'theory' the unity and cohesion it requires, all the while claiming that these ideas haven't been imposed on nature, merely 'read from it'.

 

Since this insincere, 'mock-theory' is based on a more 'realistic/honest appraisal' of the interplay between forces themselves, who could reasonably object? We could even call this 'theory' "Annihilectics" (in that it annihilates dialectics). Any subsequent 'contradictions' implied by this 'theory' could, of course, be Nixoned away along familiar DM-lines.

 

We could even declare -- with equal arrogance, pomposity and 'justification' -- that anyone who rejects this new 'theory' simply doesn't "understand" Annihilectics, thus ending all discussion. On the positive side, this 'theory' enjoys much more evidential support than the average DM-theory -- given the fact that resultant forces govern every example of change of motion in the entire universe, so far as we know.

 

On the negative side, however, Annihilectics would mean that class collaboration and harmony will 'inevitably' usher in the 'revolution'. [We saw that this was an inherent implication of DM, anyway, here and here.]

 

Anyone critical of the above wholly insincere, fanciful and off-the-wall 'mock-theory' should now point an equally censorious and accusatory finger at DM -- and for the same reason.

 

39. Even so, and once again, howsoever it is imagined that forces finally manage to combine, change itself isn't initiated by contradictory forces, but by the above annoyingly 'harmonious' resultants -- i.e., all those 'dialectical tautologies'.

 

40. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Six. [Link above.]

 

41. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

42. At this point, it is worth recalling how the Stalinists attempted to 'justify' the frequent, sometimes overnight tactical and strategic 180° changes of direction -- which they regularly performed in the 1930s -- on the basis that they were 'dialectical', when they had in fact been made for hard-headed political reasons. So, a pact with the Nazis appeared to make eminently good, 'dialectical' sense. Anyone who disagreed with this zig-zag approach to 'diplomacy' and real-politic clearly didn't "understand" dialectics. Indeed, the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was as good an example of a 'UO' as one could wish to find. Who could possibly complain? Except, perhaps, 'Trotskyite Wreckers' or those motivated by "bourgeois" prejudice, compounded by an antiquated reliance on 'formal thinking'? Or maybe even those in the grip of an excessive "tenderness" toward treaties with fascists?

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

 

[Dozens of examples of topsy-turvy, 'dialectically-inspired' political U-turns and somersaults like these have been illustrated in Essay Nine Part Two. Except, of course, the above pact wasn't a 'dialectical UO', since the existence of the Soviet State didn't imply the existence of the Nazi State, or even the signing of a 'non-aggression treaty' with them. In DM-terms this made no sense, but that is just par for the course with this screwy theory and that deeply fractured and ideologically-compromised movement, Dialectical Marxism.]

 

Nevertheless, any number of equally incongruous and counter-revolutionary UOs have been rationalised by means of, or by an appeal to, this theory. For instance, John Rees attempted to justify the "united front of a special kind" -- entered into by the UK-SWP a few years ago -- by appealing to yet another 'UO argument'. But, as we have seen over and over, neither factor in this 'UO' implied the other, unlike the supposed connection between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Hence, that, too, didn't make any sense in DM-terms. But, because DM glories in contradiction it can be, and has been, used to 'justify' any conclusion deemed expedient and its opposite (like the above move of Rees's) -- this con-trick often performed by the same individual (or party hack) in the same speech, book or article. In which case, DM has proved itself to be an invaluable tool in the hands of substitutionists, opportunists, counter-revolutionaries, and sectarians of every stripe.

 

[Again, more details and substantiating evidence can be found in Essay Nine Part Two (link above) and Essay Ten Part One.]

 

43. Is this yet another 'dialectical tautology'?

 

43a. Of course, Hegel's ideas were themselves inspired by countless generations of Mystical Thought, but the explicit use of "contradiction", alongside the key role it assumed in his work, is unique and, except perhaps for its occurrence in Zen Buddhism, it is almost without precedence. This isn't to claim that philosophers and mystics had never before appealed to 'oppositional forces' (and UOs) in order to account for change or stability in nature and society, but they, too, found they had to co-opt words and concepts drawn from the vernacular -- as the late Professor Havelock pointed out (quoted earlier):

 

"As long as preserved communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is gods. Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas, mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be --  the copula of analytic statement. The history of early philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it.... Nevertheless, the Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference." [Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links added; paragraphs merged.]

 

[On this, see Essay Twelve and Essay Fourteen Part One (summaries here, here and here). Cf., also Barnes (2009), Kahn (1994, 2003), Lloyd (1971), and Seligman (1962).]

 

44. This insurmountable obstacle blocks the path of all forms of Metaphysical Realism, so it isn't just a problem for Dialectical Marxists. [There is more on this in Essays Twelve Part One and Thirteen Part Two.]

 

45. Admittedly, as pointed out earlier, this could turn out to be a complete distortion of DM, but, as we have repeatedly seen over the last hundred years or so, Dialectical Marxists proved far more intent on reproducing, almost word-for-word, yet another repetition of the dogmas handed down to them by the Dialectical Classicists (on that, see Essay Two) than they have been analysing them with the critical eye they so readily and enthusiastically aim at other forms of ruling-class ideology. But, far worse, there is precious little in the DM-Classics that lends much assistance to Dialectical Marxists themselves, so that even they would be hard-pressed trying to specify exactly if, how, or where the points raised in this Essay misrepresent their theory. The following more accurately pictures contemporary Dialectical Marxists:

 

 

Figure Eighteen: Dialectical Monkeys -- See No Problems, Hear No Problems

And Speak No Problems

 

Once again, there is an simple solution: DM-supporters are invited to produce their own clear account of the precise nature of the link between 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions', thus making this area of DM perspicuous for the very first time in its history.

 

Wisely, though, neutral bystanders won't be holding their breath on this one, and for reasons set out in Essay One.

 

45a. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

46. Of course, this initial attempt at clarification is unclear itself! We should normally want to distinguish the opposition between forces, P1 and P2, from the opposition between event sets, E1 and E2, or indeed any pair-wise combination of all four (and/or their elements). Complications like these will be examined in what follows (in fact, some of them have already been checked).

 

47.  The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

48.  The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

No, this doesn't contradict what has been argued elsewhere at this site that FL isn't, nor does it represent, a 'theory of reality'. I am dealing with the erroneous ideas promoted by Dialectical Marxists who think that that is not only what Logic in general is, it is also what it should be. Hence, they believe that FL is a limited theory of 'the laws of thought' that supposedly reflects (in an abstract, formal or even ideological sense) 'reality' -- which is why they offer their readers DL as a 'superior theory'.

 

49. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Seven.

 

50. It could be objected that forces actually make things happen, as opposed to preventing them from taking place. But even then, that would be the case if only one force were to 'win out', as it were -- also called "The Resultant". Furthermore, making something happen is even less easy to interpret as a 'contradiction' than opposing or preventing something from occurring. In that case, once more, calling this a 'dialectical tautology' would be far more appropriate.

 

Be this as it may, the analysis developed in the main body of this Essay was based on the idea that one of P1 or P2 brings about, or causes, its own event set, as opposed to initiating the other set. So even then, these forces do "make things happen".

 

Finally, it is rather odd arguing in one breath that forces don't prevent things while in the next asserting that forces oppose one anther! [On this, see the next sub-section.]

 

Maybe this DM-inspired conundrum should simply be Nixoned...

 

50a. The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Eight.

 

51. The terminology I have used here isn't what I should prefer to employ (for reasons also set out in Essay One), but tinkering around with it won't make the conclusion any clearer or any more favourable to Dialectical Marxism. Nevertheless, the following is, perhaps, a little more 'correct':

 

F16a: Anything that is prevented from occurring does not happen.

 

But, F16a is just a discursive 'tautology' -- although I should prefer to call it a "grammatical remark" (on this, see McGinn (2012)), since it expresses a linguistic convention -- a rule for the use of certain words. [I have covered this in more detail in Essay Twelve Part One, mainly here.]

 

52. It should be pointed out (once again!) that this 'new' account of the connection between 'opposing forces' and 'contradictions' (advanced in the main body of this Essay) is only being tentatively presented since DM-theorists are as hopelessly unclear in this area as we have seen they are elsewhere -- but perhaps even more so, if that were possible!

 

53. The phrasing of F24 might be considered prejudicial; in which case, F24a is perhaps a slightly more acceptable alternative:

 

F24:  P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

 

F24a: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.

 

That option will be considered presently in the main body of the Essay as F27.

 

54. We saw (in the passages quoted at the beginning of this Essay) that several DM-theorists regard disequilibria in nature and society as just as important as corresponding equilibria, and hence also in need of explanation. [Indeed, Weston also seems to accept that reading, at least in so far as it pertains to the orbit of one object (i.e., a planet) around another (e.g., a star), etc.]

 

54a. In order to appreciate the point, compare F27 with the following:

 

S1: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the M1.

 

[F27: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.]

 

S1 is a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition, so it doesn't rule out S2 or S3:

 

S2: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the A1.

 

S3: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the M40.

 

Since there are many different ways to travel to most cities -- even though none of them is necessary, they could each still be sufficient. None is unique in this regard, which they would have to be if they were necessary.

 

So, S1-S3 are sufficient, not necessary, conditions. Of course, if there were, and could only ever be, one way to get to London (or any other city), it would be both a necessary and sufficient condition (all things being equal).

 

[Often the former is expressed by the use of "only if". Unfortunately, the Wikipedia article on this topic isn't a model of clarity; the Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article is much better (to which I have linked above), but it is easily the more complicated of the two. However, this is perhaps the best article on-line about the distinction itself, especially for those new to modern logic.]

 

The verb phrase "All things being equal" (also called a ceteris paribus clause) is required, here, since it is assumed that other (adventitious) events or circumstances fail to intervene to prevent NN reaching her destination -- such as a crash, a breakdown, a phone call cancelling the trip, an illness, a robbery, etc., etc. If the ceteris paribus caveat is allowed, then S1-S3 would all be sufficient conditions -- otherwise, plainly, they wouldn't! To state the obvious: simply travelling along a road doesn't guarantee you'll arrive at your destination! [Which it would do if these were cast iron, super guaranteed, sufficient conditions. But, as pointed out above, they aren't even necessary, since there are other ways than by car of travelling to every city on earth -- on foot, or by bike, train/boat/ship/air, etc., etc.]

 

There are in fact several suppressed ceteris paribus clauses in most of the (futile) attempts I have made to render this part of DM clear. I have omitted them in order to reduce complexity -- and, of course, the irritation quotient.

 

55. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Nine.

 

56. Admittedly, this is to use dialectical-terminology (of obscure meaning and even more dubious provenance); that doesn't imply I accept any of it makes the slightest sense.

 

In fact, this whole idea is an echo of Kant's concept of "real negation" [Kant (1763, 1998)], which we met in Essay Seven Part One. I have critically evaluated his theory in Appendix A.

 

57. Of course, in an analysis of situations where the smallest angle between these two forces lies between 0°and 90°, or, indeed, between 90°and 180°, the components of the forces involved could be put in the required relation.

 

Unfortunately, the prospects for a realist, or even a metaphysical, account of forces do not look at all promising. Indeed, it is worth asking the following question: Are the components of such forces in effect really shadow forces -- that is, are they just mathematical fictions? Are they genuine forces in the first place? And how might we distinguish them from 'real forces'?

 

Does anyone think that these components actually exist? [As we will see, many do!] But, if they don't exist, how can the decomposition (i.e., the splitting) of forces into such non-existent components help in any way? On the other hand, if they do exist, and we can split such forces in a potentially infinite number of ways (as we rotate the relevant axes, or utilise other coordinate systems), then does every single one of these (other) component forces co-exist with all the rest (before or after decomposition) along with the original force? Or, do they exist only when we think about, or actually decompose, them? [I have discussed this further in Note 58.]

 

In fact, as suggested in this and other Essays at this site, it is more fruitful and less problematic to regard such mathematical structures as an expression of the rules we use to make sense of, or manipulate, nature for our own purposes. That being the case, the above 'difficulties' simply vanish.

 

[This topic is discussed in more detail in Interlude One, Interlude Two, Note 27 and Note 30.]

 

[I will add a few more thoughts about 'component forces' to this Note in a future re-write of this Essay. On this, see the books and articles listed in Note 6a.]

 

58. Hegel-fans mightn't object too much at this point since they have become inured to the hypnotic, if not the narcoleptic effect of such opaque and obscure terminology -- indeed, just as they seem inured to the Word Magic upon which it depends. That verbal scam is based on a series of verbal tricks that attempt to derive 'fundamental truths' about 'Reality', valid for all of time, solely from the supposed meaning of a few jargonised expressions. Anyone who doubts this only has to leaf through a few academic studies of, or commentaries on, Hegel's Logic to be convinced that these Captains of Confusion will happily swallow, whole, guff like this even before breakfast, seldom blinking as they comment (favourably) on Hegel's ability to conjure 'Nothing' out of 'Being', and then 'Becoming' out of both -- miraculously 'deriving' all three from a quirky re-configuration of the diminutive verb "to be"!

 

Philosophical Snake Oil peddlers the lot!

 

However, at this point consistent (historical) materialists will no doubt call a halt and see the above 'derivation' for what it is: Idealist word-juggling at its best -- as, indeed, George Novack (inadvertently) conceded:

 

"A consistent materialism can't proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added. "Inadvertently", since Novack was himself an expert at "proceeding" from "abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source", as we discovered in Essays Two and Four.]

 

And, as Engels himself emphasised (this time in relation to Dühring's a priori 'system'):

 

"The general results of the investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

But, as we have seen, that is precisely what Engels also ended up doing.

 

[Hegel's attempt to 'derive' Nothing and Becoming from Being will be destructively criticised in Essay Twelve Part Five.]

 

This latest twist once again brings into question the 'ontological' status of forces, -- and whether 'resolved forces' actually exist. And if they don't, what are we to say about the forces that were their source -- i.e., those that had just been resolved to create those very components? Again, if resolved forces don't exist, then what are we to say about resultant forces that have in effect been 'reverse resolved' (i.e., combined) from them? How can a resultant be the result of combining component forces that don't exist? If we now conclude that resultant forces do exist, then when we try to resolve them back into their components, so that those components are now themselves resolved forces, do they thereby cease to exist? But, that can only mean that the original forces that had been combined to make that resultant must both exist and not exist!

 

It could be argued, as it is on many Internet Physics sites, that such components can be measured, so they must exist. But, so can the original force, the decomposition of which 'created' these components, and that can be ascertained at the same time. Does this mean all three forces co-exist (the original force and its components)? After all, they can all be measured. If so, that can only mean a single force will now have doubled its strength, since the magnitude of the original force must exist, as must the magnitude of its components. But, what are we to say if different axes or co-ordinate systems are used? Do those new components also exist? If so, the original force seems to be growing in strength all the time.

 

Now it might be that these magnitudes can't be added in the above rather crude manner -- so that when the original force has been measured we can't also add the magnitude of its components, they have to be ignored, and vice versa. But that reply only succeeds in nullifying the argument that all these forces (the original force and its components) can be measured -- which was taken to mean the component forces must also exist. If we have to ignore the magnitude of the components while the magnitude of the original force is measured, and then we have to ignore the magnitude of the original force while the magnitudes of its components are measured, then those magnitudes must be mathematical fictions (even if they are only such temporarily). That in turn must mean one or other of these forces (the original or its components) physically cease to exist when all this measuring is being carried out! On the other hand, if they (all) still physically exist, there seems no way any of these magnitudes can legitimately be ignored. If they exist, so do their magnitudes, which means they can be added, which, as we have just seen, simply doubles the strength of the original force!).

 

There seems to be no other way of interpreting this phenomenon.

 

[On this, see also the comments and links added to Note 57 above. I also return to this topic when I consider the nature of resultant forces.]

 

59. How have revolutionaries managed to overlook this vitally important 'third force' for so long?

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

59a1. In fact, we have been considering real material forces since the beginning of this Essay! After all, what are gravity, magnetism and other fundamental forces if not real and material? What we haven't done yet is consider in detail forces at work in class society, but that is all. They will be dealt with presently, in Interlude Fourteen. See also, here.

 

59b. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Ten.

 

60. Several examples of 'real material forces' that are supposed to comprise 'contradictions' (such as those between the forces and relations of production, or between use-, and exchange-value) will be analysed in Interlude Fourteen (link above). [See also, here.]

 

60a0. Bertell Ollman has a somewhat similar story to tell:

 

"Marx’s approach to the future could not be more different. Like virtually everyone else in his day, Marx was astounded by the scope and rapidity of the changes that were occurring all around him, but also by their contradictory nature. The enormous growth in the production of wealth, for example, came along with an increase in the worst forms of poverty; progress in science and technology that had a potential for making work much easier only succeeded in speeding up the pace of work and lengthening the working day; even the increase of personal freedom due to the abolition of various feudal ties came on the back of an even greater decrease in freedom due to the unforgiving conditions in which people were forced under pain of starvation to live and work (or what Marx was later to call the 'violence of things'). Meanwhile, more and more of the world was becoming privatized, commodified, fetishised, exploitable and exploited, and alienated as 'all that is solid melts into air.'" [Quoted from here. Accessed 22/12/2017. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis added; spelling modified to agree with UK English.]

 

True to form, Ollman helped himself to the word "contradictory" without even once thinking to explain why what he claims is contradictory is contradictory.

 

60a. Anyone tempted to reject these two questions (as prejudicial/misleading):

 

Had Hegel died of Cholera (or whatever it was that finally killed him) 45 years earlier than he actually 'left our presence', does anyone really think we would be using this term -- "contradiction" -- in the way DM-theorists do? Would we even be bothering with 'dialectics'?

 

should perhaps inform the rest of us where else could the DM-classicists have derived their odd use of "contradiction" or its equivalent? Other than a long line of Mystics, who else employed that word this way?

 

61. As pointed out above, if this phrase is to assume a viable role in HM, it must be understood analogically.

 

[The details surrounding my own interpretation of such a key HM-concept will have to wait on another occasion.]

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

In the main body of this Essay, however, I am questioning both the literal and the metaphorical application of the word "contradiction" to situations that present themselves in HM and DM.

 

61a0. In relation to the first alternative interpretation (i.e., F46), I will offer what I take to be a plausible HM-reinterpretation (i.e., F46a). I won't, though, do so for the other alternatives.

 

F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.

 

F46a: Capitalism offers abundance, but delivers only scarcity (i.e., 'not-abundance').

 

61a. The material that used to be here has been now moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

62. The negation of wealth might appear to be poverty, but that is so in only a very loose and figurative sort of sense. Recall that something could fail to be wealth without automatically becoming a cause of, or being identical with, poverty. Naturally, that is because the two words have a complex set of application conditions and connotations. So, for example, Ł10,000 ($13,000) (invested as capital, or held in cash) doesn't constitute wealth in and of itself, and the lack of it doesn't automatically amount to poverty, either. Both options obviously depend on the surrounding historical and social circumstances.

 

Of course, in Marxist economic theory, wealth is associated with the production of use-values (or, in class society, their monetary equivalent, etc.).

 

[That isn't being denied here. It is unclear, anyway, whether or not the introduction of that technicality at this stage would significantly alter things. However, on this see Interlude Thirteen.]

 

Someone might interject at this point and argue that the contradiction here is between the forces that create wealth and those that produce poverty -- or, perhaps, the contradictions inherent in the processes that operate toward either or both ends. Furthermore, social forces like this are inextricably interlinked and work in opposite directions in capitalist society. [On this, see the material that used to be in Note 61a, above, but which has now been moved here.]

 

Or, so it might be argued...

 

But, do the above forces turn into each other? They should do if the DM-classics are to be believed. I have yet to read, meet, or engage in discussion with a single DM-supporter who claims they either do, or will one day, turn into one another.

 

Be this as it may, why call these "contradictions", to begin with? The only apparent reason seems to be that the word itself was borrowed from Hegel, who based his use of it on some seriously garbled 'logic'. [There is much more on this in Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

Anyway, this specific topic has also been covered in greater detail in this Essay, here and in Interlude Fourteen.

 

63. Earlier, we encountered similar problems over the simplistic interpretation of schematic letters Dialectical Marxists like to use (such as "A" and "not A"), in connection with Trotsky's criticism of the LOI (i.e., in Essay Six), as well as part of an extended and detailed analysis of DL and FL (in Essay Four). There, it was demonstrated that these apparently simple-looking schematic letters are deceptively complex.

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

I have also ignored the couplet "A and non-A" here, which has a different logic, even though Dialectical Marxists don't appear to be aware of the difference between "A and non-A" and "A and not A". [On that, see here.]

 

I have done so because:

 

(i) The use of predicate-term negation (as this use of "non-" is itself called) isn't generally colloquial; and,

 

(ii) It is even less easy to derive a contradiction from this particular use of the negative particle.

 

[This topic will be explored at greater length in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six. Anyway, the comments in the main body of this Essay aren't affected by the above distinction.]

 

It is also worth adding that it is only the sloppy, it not slap-dash and amateurish way these letters are regularly used by Dialectical Marxists (who take their cue, of course, from Hegel) that 'allows' their 'theory' even to appear to be viable. [More on that, here. A recent (2025) example of the careless DM-use of symbols -- and from two Academic Marxists -- can be accessed here.]

 

64. Unfortunately, F52 requires the use of some rather stilted language if it is to remain literal. Anyway, the "poverty" reading will be adopted presently (in connection with F49).

 

F52: Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.

 

[F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.]

 

A much more detailed analysis of the alleged 'contradiction' between use-value and exchange-value can be found in Interlude Fourteen. [See also here.]

 

65. F52a has to be interpreted this way otherwise it might suggest that Capitalism had in fact made the very same person (or group of people) both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time! Not even Mad Dog Dialecticians, I presume, would want to accept that as a valid interpretation of their theory.

 

F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not wealth.

 

66. This would, of course, be a contradiction if the first person in the fictional conversation aired at this point in the main body of the Essay had said "There are no defective Widgets", while the second came out with "There are some defective Widgets", or if the first had said "Every Widget is defective!", and the second retorted "Some Widgets aren't defective". But, plainly, these aren't the examples at issue -- mainly because there is no way any of them can be regarded as an interpretation of A and not A, in F47:

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

[Since Aristotle, logicians have recognised that (in a non-empty universe) "Every F is G" is the contradictory of "Some F is not G", and "No F is G" is the contradictory of "Some F is G". Concerning each pair of sentences both can't be true and both can't be false at the same time; they have opposite truth-values. (Why the universe of discourse has to be non-empty was explained earlier.)]

 

Someone might object that these are rather trite examples and aren't at all the sort of contradictions of interest to Dialectical Marxists. Maybe so, but since the nature of the 'contradictions' that are of interest to them has been left obscure for well over a hundred years, they will have to do for now. And that will continue to be the case until such objectors manage to say clearly, and for the first time ever, what they do mean by their odd use of "contradiction". Moreover, if this DM-concept/word fails to work with respect to these allegedly 'trite' examples, it stands no chance in relation to more complex objects and processes.

 

However, on that, see here, here and Interlude Fourteen (link above).

 

66a. On that, see here and here.

 

67. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Eleven.

 

68. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Twelve.

 

69. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

70. If, say, an abundance of money in one pocket (or even a large horde of "use-values" in, for example, a warehouse somewhere), per impossibile, did manage to 'contradict' another empty warehouse, locally or remotely, it would make no sense, even in DM-terms. Presumably, since such lifeless objects have no effect on each other they couldn't cause any changes (in each other), nor could they develop into one another (as DM-'contradictions'/UOs are all supposed to do). Even worse, the existence of one of them does not imply the existence of the other; so they aren't 'interpenetrated opposites', either.

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

 

So, even in DM-terms, it is unclear what sense it makes to say that such factors are part of, or could even constitute, a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Thirteen.

 

71. Naturally, and once again, these comments will have to remain tentative until we are told what (if anything) DM-theorists mean by the term "dialectical contradiction". Since this ground has been raked over scores of times already, yet another pass here will be avoided.

 

72. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Fourteen (link in Note 64, above).

 

73. On this, see Interlude Thirteen and Interlude Fourteen. [Links above.]

 

74. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

75. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

76. The details underlying this allegation will be set out in Essay Fourteen Part Two, when it is published.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

76a. For those not too familiar with the terms "relative form" and "equivalent form, the following remarks might be of some help:

 

"In the simple expression of value the two types of commodities, linen and coat, obviously play two different roles. The linen is the commodity which expresses its value in the body of a commodity different from it, the coat. On the other hand, the commodity-type coat serves as the material in which value is expressed. The one commodity plays an active, the other a passive role. Now we say of the commodity which expresses its value in another commodity: its value is represented as relative value, or is in the relative value-form. As opposed to this, we say of the other commodity, here the coat, which serves as the material of the expression of value: it functions as equivalent to the first commodity or is in the equivalent form." [Quoted from here. Italic emphases in the original. Accessed 01/11/2021.]

 

77. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

77a. The reference to "p and q" and "p and not p", in relation to F63, might seem a little obscure:

 

F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.

 

If "p" stands for, say, "E1 has been prevented from taking place", then "not p" will stand for "It is not the case that E1 has been prevented from taking place". "Not p" can't therefore stand for "E1 is expected to take place". Since the latter clearly isn't of the form "not p", "q" was recruited in order to represent that logically unconnected sentence. So, that is why reference was made to "p and q", but not to "p and not p", in relation to F63.

 

78. The import of this particular claim is obscure, at best, even if many physicists believe this theory to be true (i.e., the one that has replaced certain forces with a transfer of momentum). However, since that idea seems to have no real bearing on the issues at hand, no more will be said about it here.

 

79. This alternative provides us with a clue as to why it is that HM works -- and why it does so even while DM self-destructs. Clearly, only human beings (as individuals or as members of a class) can form contradictory aims and intentions -- even if they and the connections between them are often only dimly perceived, or aren't perceived at all. Plainly, therefore, this would allow F67 to be re-written in a way that rendered it conducive to HM -- the exposition of which will not be attempted here.

 

F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.

 

[HM = Historical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]

 

80. To be fair, analogous problems afflict every account of causality concocted by Traditional Philosophers and Metaphysicians. So, this isn't a conundrum confined to DM-theorists alone. [This topic is discussed in more detail in Essays Thirteen Part Three and Three Part Five.]

 

Nevertheless, DM is clearly the runt of this ruling-class litter.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Appendix A: Kant And 'Real Negation'

 

Hegel scholars have tried to argue that 'dialectical contradictions' (partially) originated in Kant's concept of 'real negation'/'opposition' (a concept first aired in Kant (1763)). In this Appendix I propose to examine only those sections of Kant's work that are relevant to the aims of this Essay and this site.

 

[Some of the background to this topic can be found in Redding (2007), Chapter Three.]

 

Kant begins by distinguishing between two types of opposition:

 

"Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is to say, without contradiction.

 

"The first opposition, namely logical opposition, is that upon which attention has been exclusively and uniquely concentrated until now. The opposition consists in the fact that something is simultaneously affirmed and denied of the very same thing. The consequence of the logical conjunction is nothing at all [nihil negativum irrepraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is incapable of being represented' -- translation on p.439 -- RL], as the law of contradiction asserts. A body which is in motion is something; a body which is not in motion is also something [cogitabile -- 'Capable of being thought' -- translation on p.439 -- RL]; but a body which is both in motion and also, in the very same sense, not in motion, is nothing at all.

 

"The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile). The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body. The consequence of such an opposition is rest, which is something [repraesentabile -- 'Capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439 -- RL]. It is, nonetheless, a true opposition. For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously. The consequence of the opposition is also nothing, but nothing in another sense to that in which it occurs in a contradiction [nihil privativum, repraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439 -- RL]. We shall, in future, call this nothing: zero = 0. Its meaning is the same as that of negation (negatio), lack, absence -- notions which are in general use among philosophers -- albeit with a more precise determination which will be specified later on." [Kant (1763), p.211. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

Already, we see Kant conflating what words themselves as such mean (not whatever they 'reflect' or refer to in 'reality') with what we can do with them; that is he runs together, (a) linguistic meaning with speakers' meaning, and (b) talk about talk with talk about things. Those two type of confusions won't form the main focus of what follows (except in connection with what I have to say presently about 'cancellation'), since I have said much more about (a) in Essay Thirteen Part Three. For (b), follow these links: this and this. I will also refrain from commenting about Kant's attempt to define 'opposition through contradiction' (or the example he cites -- concerning motion). I have said enough about this in Essays Four, Five, Eight Part Three and Eleven Part One, as well as throughout this Essay.

 

Unfortunately for Kant, contradiction has nothing to do with 'cancellation', nor has opposition. If, for example, you and others oppose the fascists on the streets, they aren't thereby cancelled. Would that it were so easy to 'cancel' fascists! Furthermore, as already noted, just like many other Traditional Philosophers Kant has confused talk about talk with talk about things (that is, talk about language with talk about the world). This is obvious enough from the opening sentence:

 

"Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is to say, without contradiction." [Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Things", of course, can't "posit" anything, nor can predicates "oppose" one another,  since they possess neither brain, intellect nor language. A similar muddle 'allowed' Hegel, for example, to confuse what we might say when we contradict one another with how the universe itself works! Hence, Kant's jumping-off point was ill-conceived and confused from the start. That is because he began with a 'definition' of opposition that was itself based on two serious errors (i.e., the conflation of opposition with cancellation, and his confusion over the nature of language -- illustrated below). We have also seen that two opposing forces do not 'cancel' each other, even when one force nullifies, or partially nullifies, the effects of the second force. Kant felt he could do this since he ran-together the meaning of "cancel" with that of "oppose" -- or perhaps, "fully oppose". This means that because Hegel derived his ideas in this area (in whole or in part) from Kant's ruminations about opposing forces, his [Hegel's] theory was defective before he even began!

 

[However, we have already noted that Hegel's 'logic' was seriously flawed for other reasons -- on that, see here and here.]

 

Despite this, we can see from the above passage where the idea that opposing forces are 'contradictory' probably originated:

 

"The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile). The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body." [Ibid. Italics in the original.]

 

Exactly how predicates can be 'opposed' to one another Kant neglected to say. Nevertheless, it turns out that the examples he subsequently offered his readers only succeeded in undermining other points he wanted to make about this type of opposition -- as we are about to discover.

 

Indeed, this entire approach to opposition derives from ancient, mystical ideas about its nature and origin -- explored in Essay Two --, except in Kant's case they were translated into what predicates are now capable of doing, which unfortunately pictures them as agents in their own right! That in turn connects these antiquated notions with religious doctrines about the creation of the world by the 'Word' of 'God'. If the world (or if 'things') are fundamentally linguistic and mind-like, they can surely 'posit' whatever they like, and, in that sense, they can be said to 'oppose' one another. Otherwise they can't. Kant has clearly run together "opposite meaning" with "opposition", a linguistic slide that allowed him then to equate a feature of our use of language (i.e., that it possesses antonyms) with what happens in the world (i.e., that it is possible to nullify, undo, or even reverse, the effects of forces, actions or commands by their contraries).

 

As argued in another Essay published at this site (slightly edited):

 

Super-Scientific Truths, which Ancient Greek Philosophers 'derived' solely from the meaning of a set of specially-selected and 'surgically-enhanced' words, began to mirror the abstract view of reality adopted by this new layer of theorists, just as the theories they concocted also reflected their daily experience of class society. In this way, their mode of being mirrored their view of 'Being'. The lifestyle of these theoretical drones was largely dominated by leisure -- leisure bought (directly or indirectly) at the expense of the necessary labour-time of those whose language and experience they also denigrated. In order to give expression to this form of estrangement, they concocted obscure, Idealist-inspired 'jargon' that was deliberately set in opposition to the 'debased' and 'unreliable' language of those who had to work to stay alive and which kept them in the luxury to which they had become accustomed.

 

In earlier myths and Theogonies, conflict in this world was viewed as a reflection of the rivalries that existed between warring 'gods', struggles that took place in a hidden world beyond the reach of the senses. Their verbal wrangles and machinations became the model upon which later Idealist and Hermetic thinkers based their new and impressive, Super-Scientific Theories -- 'world-views' that attempted to explain all of 'Being' -- which they then happily and peremptorily imposed on nature and society.

 

As Marx and Engels argued, language was originally the product of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, but it is ill-suited when pressed into service as a means of representation (especially when it came to be viewed as a medium for representing the thoughts of 'God'). In order to transform the vernacular into just such a representational device, theorists found they had to take words that had grown out of, and which expressed, relations between human beings and apply them to the relations between objects in nature --, or, indeed, between those warring 'deities' --, as the late Professor Havelock noted:

 

"As long as preserved communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is gods. Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas, mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be --  the copula of analytic statement. The history of early philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it.... Nevertheless, the Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference." [Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links added; paragraphs merged.]

 

Unfortunately, these (co-opted) ordinary expressions also carried with them into these new ideological surroundings connotations they possessed when they were used in everyday life -- in connection with inter-human communication, as an expression of our social nature. Predictably, these moves had the following untoward effect: when the ideas such words seemed to express were imposed on nature (in the above manner), traditional (metaphysical and quasi-religious) views of the world were inevitably caught up in this. Hence, this new use of language amounted to a projection of the human social relations the words involved originally expressed. This succeeded in anthropomorphising (and, indeed, enchanting) nature and society. This is how the RRT originally arose and took shape.

 

[RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory; follow the above link for an explanation.]

 

In which case, Marx was entirely correct when he said the following:

 

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. Bold emphasis and link added.]

 

As we will see in other Essays published at this site: because they appropriated and then elaborated upon these anthropomorphic concepts, later generations of thinkers (i.e., the vast majority of post-Renaissance Philosophers, including Dialectical Marxists) anthropomorphised nature in like manner. In this way, much of subsequent thought failed to break free from this ancient, animistic, enchanted view of the universe.

 

[This process has been analysed in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three (especially here, here, and here), but in relation to the anthropomorphisation of the human psyche, wherein the brain is pictured as 'seeing' things, sending 'messages' or conveying 'information' to other parts of the body, employing 'signals' and 'codes' in order to so do.... It will be further illustrated in Essay Three Part Five (when it is published), where it will be shown that this view of nature and humanity lends superficial plausibility to 'determinism' (and by default to metaphysical theories concerning the 'freedom of the will'), as nature and society are themselves attributed with capacities, 'laws', and powers that enable it to 'determine' the course of events with 'iron necessity'. Until that Essay is published, the reader is directed here and here for more details.]
 

Superstitious individuals had earlier tried to interpret natural processes as the work of various 'spirits' and 'deities', using anthropomorphic language to that end. Subsequently, in more developed class societies, priests and theologians indulged in these thought-forms for ideological reasons, in order to suggest that the natural and social order are 'divinely-ordained', the legitimacy of which not only couldn't it shouldn't be questioned, let alone resisted. Subsequently, as we can see from the record, Ancient Greek Thinkers began looking for increasingly secular ways of theorising about the world in order to construct a less animistic rationale for the new forms of class society beginning to emerge in the 6th century BC. However, they also retained use of this 'transformed language', not noticing they had in fact banished the aforementioned 'spirits' and 'gods' in name alone (as Feuerbach half recognised),' Despite their efforts, the anthropomorphic connotations still lingered on, and there they remain to this day.

 

Unfortunately for humanity, these developments also meant that it became 'natural' for theorists (like Anaximenes and Heraclitus) to see conflict in conceptual, logical and linguistic terms. And this is from where Hegel appropriated these archaic and terminally obscure ideas.

 

That, of course, set this new form of discourse in direct opposition to the language of everyday life. Again, as noted above, these alienated thought-forms were bequeathed to all subsequent generations of thinkers, since the latter largely shared the same privileged material conditions, ruling-class patronage and ideological predispositions that came with this slice of the intellectual territory.

 

In this artificially-constructed 'intellectual community', populated by indolent thinkers like these, words appeared to exert their own irresistible authority; commands, edicts and orders seemed to possess their own secret, magical power (which, of course, accounts for the ancient and early modern search for the original language that 'God' gave to mankind; on this, see Eco (1997), partially quoted here).

 

Words were, after all, capable of moving slaves, servants, and workers effortlessly about the place. Codified into law, words also appeared to possess genuine and effective coercive power, which helped mask the class domination on which this parasitic social form was predicated. Naturally, this entirely superficial aspect of official language would blind those who benefited from these social forms to its material roots in class society.

 

The very real social power that words seemed to possess would 'naturally' suggest to such theoretical 'drones' that if language underpinned the authority of the State, and if the State mirrored Cosmic Reality, then the universe must also run along discursive lines.

 

These theorists would now begin to misinterpret a conventionalised social form as a secret code that powered the universe -- mastery of which would help those inducted into its mysteries to grasp the 'essential' nature of 'Being', and then, perhaps, control it. [On this, see Kingsley (1997).]

 

In that case, Traditional Theorists would start to see reality not simply as 'rational', but as ultimately linguistic, constituted by the word of some 'god', or other. In ancient creation myths, the 'Deity' spoke and everything not only popped into existence, it sprang to attention and thereafter always did as it was told. Given this approach, seemingly inert matter actually had the capacity to obey orders (but only when addressed with 'the right sort of language'; hence a search was initiated as generations of sorcerers and mystics looked for these magical words), as if matter were intelligent and possessed a will of its own. Nature thus came to be viewed as an enchanted 'Being', with 'secrets' hidden 'beneath its surface'. Moreover, because of the distorted view of language that underpinned this theory, 'Being Itself' could be recruited to bolster the 'legitimation' and 'rationalisation' of class power.

 

Indeed, as these Ancient Theorists saw things, nature was governed by opposing forces: good and evil, light and dark, order and chaos, love and hate, hot and cold. All were either personified as good/evil intelligences, or they were re-configured as discursive principles (i.e., as 'logical' laws -- which weren't in fact just 'laws of thought', they were principles that governed all of 'Reality', stitched into the its 'fabric' by the supreme Logos, who made everything by the command of 'His' voice, by language).

 

Here is Hegel giving expression to this 'world-view':

 

"This objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind. Anaxagoras is praised as the man who first declared that Nous, thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic. What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.49-50, §53-54. Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original; paragraphs merged.]

 

These ideas feature in ancient creation myths, in Greek Philosophy, in Hindu, Buddhist and Chinese thought (appearing in the latter as Yin and Yang, for instance -- for more examples of this, see here). Hence, for such thinkers, the internal source of movement and development was ultimately linguistic, determined by these discursive opposites. Either that, or reality was founded on an Intelligence or Will of some sort (thus also on language), and, once again, all this was directly linked to the rationalisation of ruling-class power.

 

Therefore, material reality was not so much congealed energy as condensed language, no less the slave of 'God' than humans were subjects of the state. Hence, "ruling ideas" were derived either from the alienated thoughts of those who actually ruled or those who rationalised that rule on their behalf. "Ruling ideas" thus ruled society because, for such Idealists and Mystics, Hierarchical Ideas ruled the world. As above, so below; the microcosm mirrored the macrocosm; indeed, just as Traditional Thought supposedly mirrored the world.

 

Few Traditional Thinkers have strayed far from these 'metaphysical tram-lines', these archaic patterns-of-thought, even if they came to be expressed in different idioms as each Mode of Production rose and fell, and as each state altered its legal form or developed new ideological priorities....

 

Some might object that philosophical ideas can't have remained the same for thousands of years, across different modes of production. That claim runs counter to core ideas in Historical Materialism. But, we don't argue the same for religious belief. Marx put no time stamp on the following, for example:

 

"...Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man -- state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality.... Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people." [Marx (1975c), p.244. Italic emphases in the original; paragraphs merged.]

 

The above remarks applied back in Ancient Babylon and Egypt, just as they did thousands of years ago in China, India, Greece and Rome -- indeed, as they continued to apply in the Middle Ages and have done so right across the planet ever since. As Marx and Engels also said:

 

"[O]ne fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." [Marx and Engels (1968b), p.52. Bold emphases added.]

 

While these thought-forms represented a significant ideological leap for alienated mankind, they represented a major step backward for oppressed and exploited humanity.

 

That is because Traditional Theorists carved these "ruling-ideas" into the very fabric of the heavens -- by their continual, steadfast conflation of talk about talk with talk about the world, and by their long-standing adherence to the RRT. [I say more about this below.]

And, in one form or another, there those ideas remain to this day.

 

It is no surprise, therefore, to see Kant's thought processes travel along these well trodden intellectual paths. Indeed, as Wittgenstein pointed out:

 

"Language has the same traps ready for everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false paths. And thus we see one person after another walking down the same paths.... One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really doesn't make any progress, that the same philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who say that don't understand the reason this must be so. The reason is that our language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. So long as there is a verb 'be' that seems to function like 'eat' and 'drink', so long as there are the adjectives 'identical', 'true', 'false', 'possible', so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of space, etc., etc. humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove. And this, by the way, satisfies a longing for the transcendental [an alternative version of the manuscript has 'supernatural' here -- RL], for in believing that they see the 'limit of human understanding' they of course believe that they can see beyond it. I read '...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of 'Reality' than Plato got...'. What a strange state of affairs. How strange in that case that Plato could get that far in the first place! Or that after him we were not able to get further. Was it because Plato was so clever?" [Wittgenstein (2013), pp.311-12e. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

 

While Kant himself rejected the application of the word "contradiction" to 'opposing forces', it didn't take much effort for subsequent Idealists to do that for him and stretch the meaning of "opposition" so that it finally became synonymous with "contradiction" (or those described above, that are engaged in some form of real-world inter-action, and not just in language --, especially after Kant had also stirred the terms "real opposition" and "negation" into the pot). The 'intellectual' slide from one understanding to the other was further motivated by Kant's sloppy use of "cancel". If that word legitimately applies to both terms (i.e., if it applies to "contradiction" and "real negation" alike), then what had begin to look like 'passive opposition' -- for want of a better term -- could all the more easily be transformed into 'active opposition', and then later into 'dialectical contradiction' at the hands of a Hermetic Con-Artist called Hegel.

 

We can also see from the above passage where the equation of "forces" with "tendencies" -- an equivalence subsequently appropriated by Tom Weston, as we discovered earlier -- might have originated:

 

"The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile). The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body. The consequence of such an opposition is rest, which is something (repraesentabile -- 'Capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439 -- RL). It is, nonetheless, a true opposition. For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously. The consequence of the opposition is also nothing, but nothing in another sense to that in which it occurs in a contradiction (nihil privativum, repraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439 -- RL). We shall, in future, call this nothing: zero = 0. Its meaning is the same as that of negation (negatio), lack, absence -- notions which are in general use among philosophers -- albeit with a more precise determination which will be specified later on." [Kant (1763), p.211. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

We have already seen that Traditional Philosophers regularly confused predicates with properties; i.e., they interpret predicates one minute as linguistic expressions, the next as the properties of bodies, or even the properties of forces themselves. Hence, and once again, they too confused talk about talk with talk about things. And we find Kant doing likewise when he says, for instance:

 

K1: "The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other.... The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body." [Ibid. Bold added.]

 

K2: "For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously." [Ibid. Bold added.]

 

In K1, predicates are properties of bodies and forces --, like, say, colour and size are. But, in K2 they can truly be posited; so, they are now linguistic expressions, even while they are also the properties of 'things'.

 

Not content with that, Kant also confused "nothing" with "zero", which is another serious error. As Blaise Pascal pointed out, if zero (i.e., 0) and nothing were the same, then 10 would equal 1 since both are immediately followed by nothing!

 

Be this as it may, Kant expanded on what he thought he meant by appealing to a series of examples taken from elementary arithmetic (all the while confusing the displacement of a body from an origin or starting point with the distance travelled), and, for want of a better term, navigation:

 

"Mathematicians make use of the concepts of this real opposition in the case of mathematical magnitudes. In order to indicate them, the mathematicians designate them by means of the signs '+' and '−'. Since every such opposition is reciprocal, it can easily be seen that one magnitude cancels the other, either complete or in part.... Suppose that a ship sails from Portugal to Brazil. Let all the distances which it covers with the east wind be designated by '+', while those which it covers with the west wind are designated by '−'. The numbers themselves signify miles. The week's journey is +12 +7 −3 −5 +8 = 19 miles; this is the distance the ship has sailed westwards." [Kant (1763), pp.212-13. There is a similar argument advanced in Hegel (1975), pp.172-74, partially quoted below. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Several years later, Hegel simply regurgitated a garbled version of the same argument (and without attribution):

 

"If +W mean 6 miles to the West, and -W mean 6 miles to the East, and if the + and - cancel each other, the 6 miles of way or space remain what they were with and without the contrast. Even the mere plus and minus of number or abstract direction have, if we like, zero, for their third: but it need not be denied that the empty contrast, which understanding institutes between plus and minus, is not without its value in such abstractions as number, direction, &c." [Hegel (1975), p.172, §119. Good luck trying to understand what this Pope of Perplexity was trying to say -- i.e., without first having read Kant!]

 

If you walk 100 metres west from your home (or some other starting point), turn through 180ş, and then walk 50 metres east, you will have travelled a total of 150 metres, but your displacement from your home (or starting point) will now be 50 metres. Hegel and Kant confused these two ways of describing relative motion.

 

So, on the basis of this prime example of sophomoric confusion (fortified by a throw-away line Hegel found in one of Spinoza's letters -- i.e., 'Every determination is also negation') this Conceptual Con-Artist built his entire system!

 

[Details concerning Spinoza's 'throw-away line' referred to above -- and why it fails even in its own terms -- can be accessed here, here and here.]

 

As we are about to see, Kant's ship example undermines his (and Hegel's) claim that these mathematical operations "cancel" one another. If the ship in question has indeed sailed the above miles, then it has clearly travelled a total of 35 miles (not 19). Just because it has sailed 8 miles (west), that doesn't mean it hasn't then travelled those -8 miles to the east (i.e., the -5 and -3 distances). Of course, the ship has in the end sailed a net total of 19 miles west (and a gross total distance 27 miles west -- i.e., 12 + 7 + 8), which is now its displacement from the starting point. But, the 8 miles it also sailed west fail to cancel anything, nor do the -8 miles (i.e., -3 + -5) it has travelled east. The ship has still sailed those miles.

 

If you replace that ship with a car, then the odometer in that vehicle will show a total of 35 miles travelled (i.e., 12 + 7 + 3 + 5 + 8). The 'negative distances' still had to be covered, so they lose their negative signs when the total distance the car has travelled is to be ascertained. That will be so unless, of course, the car was driven backwards for the -3 and -5 distances. But, even then, that car will still have covered 35 miles, and its petrol/gas tank will have consumed a commensurate amount of fuel (or electricity, if it is battery-powered). [Henceforth, I will assume this is a petrol/gas-fuelled vehicle.] Consider a car with a full tank that will allow it to be driven, say, 400 miles (all things being equal). No one supposes that if it is driven 200 miles west, and then 200 miles east, the petrol/gas tank will miraculously re-fill itself on the second leg of the journey -- that is, that  the use of petrol/gas to travel in one direction is somehow 'cancelled' by the use of petrol/gas travelling in the opposite direction -- even though +200 −200 = 0 (if we use Kant and Hegel's rather confused symbols -- more on that presently).

 

As is the case with many others, Kant and Hegel have also muddled an operation that undoes another operation with cancellation. Cancellation would mean that the said operation wasn't carried out; an inverse operation on the other hand simply undoes whatever another operation had done. So, if the captain of a ship wants to cancel part of her journey, she will just not sail. In order to cancel it, what she wouldn't do is sail west and then sail the same distance east! If you cancel your holiday/vacation, you just don't go. What you don't do is go to Ibiza, Cancun, Florence, Costa Rica, or wherever, and then come straight back! Of course, if your holiday/vacation had been cancelled by someone else while you were on your way to your destination, that might involve you having to return, but no one in their left mind would cancel their own holiday/vacation by travelling to their destination, then promptly returning home.

 

Kant continues:

 

"The magnitudes preceded by '−' have this sign in front of them simply to signify opposition, for they are to be combined with those magnitudes which are preceded by '+'.... And since subtraction is a cancelling which occurs when opposed magnitudes are taken together, it is evident that the '−' cannot really be a sign of subtraction, as is commonly supposed; it is only the combination of '+' and '−' together which signifies subtraction. Hence the proposition '−4 −5 = −9' is not a subtraction at all, but a genuine increase and addition of magnitudes of the same kind. On the other hand, '+9 −5 = 4' does signify a subtraction, for the signs of opposition indicate that the one cancels as much in the other as is equal to itself. Likewise, the sign '+' on its own does not really signify addition itself. The sign '+' only signifies addition in so far as the magnitude which it precedes is supposed to be combined with another magnitude which is also preceded by '+', or is thought of as preceded by '+'. If, however, it is to be combined with a magnitude preceded by '−', this can only occur by means of opposition, and then both the sign '+' and the sign '−' signify a subtraction, one magnitude cancelling as much in the second magnitude as is equal, namely, to the first, as for example '−9 +4 = −5'. For this reason, the sign '−', as it occurs in the example '−9 −4 = −13', does not signify a subtraction but an addition, in exactly the same way as the sign '+', as it occurs in the example '+9 +4 = +13' signifies addition." [Kant (1763), p.213. Bold emphases added.]

 

First of all, Kant has again helped himself to the word "opposition" with no attempt to justify this odd use of that word in such a context. In what way is a "−" sign oppositional? Consider, for example, a temperature of -5°C. Is the sign in front to the "5" here actually in 'opposition' to anything? Someone might think it 'opposes' +5°C? But, when we turn these temperatures into Fahrenheit, we obtain 23°F and 41°F, respectively. [Something analogous occurs if we switch to degrees Kelvin.] Where has the alleged 'opposition' gone?

 

Second, Kant has plainly confused positive and negative integers with the operations of addition and subtraction. 7, for example, is a positive integer; adding 7 is what we do with it. Running the two together would be like confusing a pencil with what can be drawn with it. This muddle hasn't been helped either by mathematicians using the "−" to indicate both an operation and a sign attached to a numeral to map it onto an element in the set of negative integers. Hence, in order to distinguish these two different uses of what look like the same sign, novices in arithmetic are often taught to distinguish a number from an operation by the use of brackets. Hence, the integer 7 would be written as "(+7)", and the integer -5 as "(-5)"; so, when the latter is subtracted from the former that would be written as "(+7) - (-5)". However, even this is far from perspicuous, and often causes confusions of its own. In which case, I will henceforth distinguish the operation of subtraction from the negative integer sign itself in the following way: "─" (a long dash) signifies the operation of subtraction, and "-" (a short dash) indicates the negative sign, used to signify the number in question belongs to the set of negative integers. 

 

[Of course, Kant wrote at a time when mathematicians themselves were far less clear what they meant by numbers in general --, or, indeed, operations and functions. Subsequent philosophers who uncritically draw on Kant's ideas are less easy to forgive.]

 

Now, it isn't too clear how Kant would classify, for instance, the following: -8 ─ -3 = -5. Is this subtraction or addition? Well, according to Kant's comments above, since there are no '+' and '-' signs written together, this can't be subtraction!

 

Turning to money: consider an overdraft of Ł8 in a certain account. Suppose a bank manager discovers an error of Ł3 in the said account and wipes Ł3 off that overdraft in order to correct this mistake. The overdraft will now be Ł5. Plainly, the owner of that account won't have any more money in her account as a result (she is still overdrawn!) -- so, nothing has actually been added. All that has happened is that some of the debt has been subtracted -- i.e., removed.

 

This nicely illustrates what happens when operations are conflated with numbers --, or, for that matter, mathematical operations are muddled with cancellation (or, indeed, with "opposition"). "Mighty thinker" though he was, Kant's thought is confused from beginning to end on these issues. Hegel's doubly so. Despite this, at least Kant could write coherent (if sometimes rather difficult) sentences!

 

However, it is often said "Two negatives make a positive" and in this instance that might work out as follows (where we will see an operation is being confused with a number): 10 ─ -5 = 15. If "two negatives make a positive" were true, "─" is clearly being treated as a negative, the long dash, "─", being viewed as the same as the short dash, "-" -- which can be seen from the statement itself "Two negatives make a positive". They are both called "negatives"! But the former is an operation applied to a negative number, so these aren't two negatives! The first is the subtraction operation, the second forms part of the name of a number.

 

We can illustrate what is actually happening here by considering a simple transaction:

 

Suppose NN has Ł10 in her pocket but she owes MM Ł5. Further suppose MM says to NN: "You did me a favour last week; forget the Ł5 you owe me!". Here we would apparently have 10 ─ -5 = 15, where it now seems NN ends up with Ł15 -- Ł5 more than she started with. In this case, it looks like "Two negatives do make a positive", but the truth is that NN doesn't walk away with Ł15! Money can't be magicked out of thin air! NN actually walks away with Ł10. What has happened here is that NN's Ł10 at the beginning was in effect Ł5 + Ł5, the second Ł5 of which was owed to MM. So, the calculation should have been: 5 ─ -5 = 10, as MM cancelled the Ł5 debt. But, nothing has been added to NN's wealth; all that took place is that the part of the money that was owed to MM is no longer owed and can now be counted as NN's money. It only looks like something has been added if we fail to see what is actually happening in such a transaction. So, the popular saying "Two negatives make a positive" is highly misleading (in circumstances like these).

 

[Clearly this popular saying is based on an analogy drawn between the negation operator in language (and in formal system other than mathematics) and these two signs -- "─"and "-" -- in mathematics itself. While the following two sentences are equivalent (all things being equal) "It is not not raining" and "It is raining", where the first "not" maps the sentence "It is raining" onto "It is not raining", and the second "not" maps "It is not raining back onto "It is raining", this is not like the above examples of subtraction. Both "not"s here do not name anything, they indicate the carrying out of an operation of mapping -- where an indicate sentence is mapped onto its negation. (So, this use of "not" is no more a name than "and" or "or" are.) Often it is said that these two "not"s 'cancel' one another, but that would be to make the same mistake we have seen Kant and Hegel commit. The second "not" just undoes what the first "not" did. Of course, we often see these two words concatenated together in sentences like "It is not not raining", but that is just a typological or verbal convenience or shorthand. We can't now say these two cancel one another without compromising the mapping that brought us back to "It is raining". Not only that, such loose talk merely encourages sloppy thinking elsewhere, which, as we have seen, led Philosophers like Kant and Hegel into imagining that contradiction is some form of cancellation!] 

 

Someone might object that the bank manager mentioned earlier did in fact cancel part of the debt, but that isn't so. An error was rectified, that is all. Of course, debts can be cancelled, but the cancellation of a debt isn't itself a mathematical operation (you don't learn your 'cancellation tables' at school, nor are there 'cancellation theorems' in Number Theory). The cancellation of a debt involves one or more of the following: an act of goodwill (or of charity), a rectification, a humiliation, or, indeed, a host of other incidental social or interpersonal actions/relations -- as we saw with NN and MM earlier. We can certainly work out the mathematic result or consequences of a cancellation, but that doesn't remove the clear distinction between how we calculate and how we describe the causes or the results of such moves socially, should we so choose. If someone pays off a debt, that is different from cancelling it, and the same applies to errors that are put right -- although the end result in each case might be the same.

 

Finally, if a debt were to be cancelled simpliciter (that is, for no obvious reason), then someone else will have lost out (willingly or otherwise), which isn't the case with debts that have been paid off, or where an error has been rectified. So, let us assume that NN has Ł100 in her bank account and that she also owes MM Ł25; if MM cancels NN's debt, then someone other than NN will lose out (in this case MM will have voluntarily lost or forfeited Ł25). On the other hand, if NN pays MM the Ł25, only NN will lose out. The result in each case for NN will be the same in some respects but not in others. It will be the same in that NN will now no longer owe that money (this being the outcome whether the debt was paid or was wiped), but it will be different in that in the second instance (i.e., if NN pays the debt), NN will be Ł25 worse off, not MM. In the first instance, however, if the debt is wiped, NN will be free of the debt, but nothing will have been added to her bank balance, which remains at Ł100. The debt will just be forgotten and it is MM who will have lost out. So, as we can see, paying off a debt is significantly different from that debt being cancelled.

 

Kant once again ran these distinct notions together and only succeeded in confusing himself and others -- who should, perhaps, have known better.

 

It might help to consider a more perspicuous example: imagine a collection of eight marbles on a table all labelled with "-" signs. [So, here the "-" forms part of the name of, or label for, each marble.] If three of those marbles are removed from the collection, there will only be five of those labelled marbles left, in which case we would have: -8 ─ -3 = -5. Nothing has been cancelled -- and nothing added. We finish with five marbles on the table. [In this case, of course, "-8" means, for instance, "eight marbles each labelled with a '-' sign".]

 

Kant then proceeded to sink himself into even deeper confusion:

 

"In order to extract what is philosophically significant from this concept and to do so without particularly looking at magnitude, we shall begin by offering the following remark. The mathematical concept of negative magnitudes involves the opposition which we have above called 'real opposition'. Suppose there are +8 units of capital and -8 units of passive debt; no contradiction is involved in attributing them to the same person. However, one of these magnitudes cancels an amount which is equal to that which is posited by the other, and the consequence is zero." [Ibid., p.214. Bold emphasis added.]

 

But, Kant's is here running together of concepts that should be kept separate (e.g., he is confusing the repaying of a debt with cancelling that debt). But this now means he has to answer the following two (distinct) questions in the same way:

 

(i) Does the +8 cancel the debt of -8?

 

Or,

 

(ii) Does the -8 debt cancel the +8 of capital?

 

If he is consistent he will have to say "Yes" to both. These options are indistinguishable if, like Kant, you work with such confused ideas. For Kant, it seems that if the result is zero, it doesn't matter how we arrived at that result. So, we could say that we 'cancelled' a debt of -8 with +8 capital, or we could say that we 'cancelled' capital of +8 with a debt of -8! Or, more colloquially, someone might say (if he were a Kantian in this respect) "I paid off my bank balance of Ł8 with a debt of Ł8."(!) In reply to that, a neutral observer could only respond incredulously: "How can you pay off a bank balance of Ł8! You pay with the money in your bank account, surely? You can't pay with a debt. A debt isn't currency!"

 

Of course, one can pass a debt on so that someone else is paid instead (when that debt is finally discharged by the debtor); but, even then, no debt has been used as payment. It has merely been transferred.

 

Couldn't that be regarded as payment in such a case? Might this not be how an IOU could work? Sure, just as swapping cigarettes in prison, or bartering, say, an Ox for two wagons of hay can be so regarded. But, in the case of passing on a debt, what has in effect been transferred is a hold on someone else's money (the original creditor's), and that -- the hold -- is what has in the end made the payment. Debts and IOUs still fail to be currency, despite what Jim Carrey appears to believe:

 

 

Video Seven: Dumb And Dumber -- IOU's Are 'As Good As Money'

 

No one plans a bank heist to steal a load of debts! No mugger has ever demanded "Hand over your IOUs!" A robber might, indeed, steal someone's IOUs so that those debts can't be redeemed, but that still doesn't turn an IOU into currency. Next time you want to buy something, try paying for it with an IOU. See how far you get. While you are at it, check on Google what the exchange rate is for IOUs. Who has ever been banged up for counterfeiting an IOU?

 

Someone might point out that banknotes originally grew out of the use of IOUs, or promissory notes. That isn't quite right; they were originally introduced into Europe (from China by Marco Polo) as "value received" notes, as opposed to "sight bills", which were promissory notes. Even so, that doesn't elide the clear distinction that exists today between legal currency and an IOU. There is a world of difference between promissory notes issued by a public authority and an IOU written by a guy at the pub. Just as there is in bourgeois society a major difference between legally owing a house and squatting in one -- or, indeed, between hiring and hijacking a car.

 

Although we can see there is a real difference here between currency and debts, it seems Kant's confused analysis can't distinguish between them.

 

He continues -- and it is here where we see the implicit confusion above become explicit:

 

"I shall, accordingly, call the debts 'negative units of capital'. But in doing so I do not mean they are negations or mere denials of units of capital, for it they were they would themselves be designated by zero.... What I mean when I call debts 'negative units of capital' is this: debts are positive grounds of the diminishment of the units of capital. In order to make this clear, we shall adopt the method of the mathematicians and call descent 'negative ascent'; falling 'negative rising', retreat 'negative advance'. In this way, it is instantly apparent from the expression itself that, for example, falling is not to be distinguished from rising merely in the way in which 'not a' is distinguished from 'a'. It is rather the case that falling is just as positive as rising.... I can just as well call descent 'negative rising' and I can call rising 'negative descent'. Similarly, units of capital are just as much negative debts, as the latter are negative units of capital. But it is rather more appropriate to apply the name 'negative' to that on which the intention is primarily focused in a given case, if one wishes to designate its real opposite. For example, it is rather more appropriate to call debts negative (sic) 'negative units of capital' than to call units of capital 'negative debts', although there is no difference to be found in the reciprocal relation itself.... 'The negative of rising is setting'. What I intend to convey by this expression is not that the one thing is the negation of the other, but rather that there is something which stands in a relation of real opposition to something else." [Kant (1763), pp.214-15. Italic emphasis in the original. There is clearly a serious misprint in this passage, where the text has "negative 'negative units of capital'". I have however left the above as it is in the published version. Bold emphases added.]

 

Clearly, the confusion arises from Kant's rather careless attempt to connect certain noun phrases with other noun phrases (that can be used to describe operations, actions or states (and their inverses)), such as "negative units of capital" and "negative rising". This only succeeds in compounding Kant's confusion. For if we insist on calling debt, "negative capital", then the choice will become indifferent between the questions posed earlier -- so 'paying off a negative debt' or 'paying off capital' will make some sort of crazy sense --, which helps explain this rather odd comment:

 

"[D]ebts are positive grounds of the diminishment of the units of capital." [Ibid.]

 

Which isn't a million miles distant from this:

 

Z1: "I paid off my bank balance of Ł8 with a debt of Ł8."

 

In addition, while it might make some sort of rhetorical sense to call ascent "negative descent", even that won't work in every case. Is murder really "negative life-saving"? Is birth "negative death", or is it "negative burial"? When a mother gives birth does she really "negatively kill" her baby? What about painting a door red? What is that the negative of? Indeed, what is the negative of Kant writing the above comments?

 

But the more serious problem is that Kant has once again confused a name with an operation. We can see this when he says "we shall adopt the method of the mathematicians and call descent 'negative ascent'; falling 'negative rising', retreat 'negative advance'." Kant has here changed the verb "to descend" into the name "descent", and the verb "to ascend" into the noun "ascent" -- which then 'allows him' to equate the former with the name "negative ascent". But, this also means the negation operation has become a name, or part of an appositional name, "negative ascent", too. As we have seen that is about a intelligent as confusing a pencil with what can be done with one. But if negatio is supposed to cancel an operation, then according to Kant, descent must cancel ascent (since it is according to him, negative ascent). But as we have seen, an ascent is cancelled by not doing it, not by undoing what has already been done. If you want to cancel your ascent of the Matterhorn you don't climb it and the come back down again! You just don't set foot on the mountain.

 

 

Figure Nineteen: Our Guide Today, Her Kant, Has Cancelled Our Planned Ascent Of The Matterhorn --

So He Says We We'll Just Have To Climb It And Then Come Back Down Again!

 

It has been asserted many times at this site that DM -- indeed, much of Traditional Philosophy -- arose out of a careless and sloppy use, or indeed misuse, of language, and it looks like Kant's argument above hasn't strayed too far from that conceptual minefield -- as we saw Marx point out:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world...." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

 

Kant merely elaborates on these confusions throughout the rest of this work (except, he later attempts to derive several sweeping, if not decidedly odd, metaphysical conclusions from them), so there seems little point pursuing this Kantian detour into dialectical disaster any further, given the aims of this site.

 

More-or-less the same can be said about similar comments on this topic published in Kant's masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason [Kant (1998), pp.369, 373], which add nothing new to the above. [Readers are invited to check the veracity of that assertion for themselves.]

 

[None of these rather harsh remarks should be read as in anyway derogatory of the towering stature of Kant's mature work -- for example, his three Critiques -- which marked a significant advance in bourgeois philosophy (almost on a par with those made by Plato and Aristotle), even if sharp criticism of his writing style would be entirely justified.]

 

In which case, as we have seen, it is hardly surprising that Kant's many confusions found their way into the even more muddled ramblings of The Caliph of Confusion, Hegel. Hence, there is no good reason to suppose there are any 'real negations' out there that somehow power the universe -- even if sense could be made of the supposition that there could be.

 

Or, perhaps more accurately: it makes no sense to suppose such confusions power anything other than an overheated imagination.

 

As Bertrand Russell remarked:

 

"This illustrates an important truth, namely, that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise." [Russell (1961), p.715.]

 

One or two Dialectical Marxists, when confronted (by yours truly) with the above quote, thought Russell was somehow advocating the use of sub-standard logic on the basis that it results in "more interesting" consequences!

 

They failed to notice Russell was being sarcastic.

 

Appendix B: Plato's Allegory Of The Cave

 

This allegory appears in a 'discussion' between Socrates and a character called Glaucon (who was Plato's older brother and in effect merely a sounding board and nodding dog while he responded to much that Socrates just baldly asserted). Readers will no doubt recognise the right-wing and Aristocratic tone of this passage -- anyway, I have highlighted in bold those sections where that is the clearest. The text below was copied off the Internet, but I have made one or two minor changes to it in light of the published version.

 

The dialogue begins with Socrates, and each paragraph alternates between Socrates and Glaucon:

 

And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: -- Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.


And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

 
Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

 
And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true.

 
And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.


To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.


And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision -- what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them -- will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.


And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take and take in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he [would].

 
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

 
He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

 
Last of [all] he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

 
He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Certainly, he would.

 
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, 'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master', and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything [rather] than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such an [individual] coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

 
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

 
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

 

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

 
Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

 
And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

 
Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

 
But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

 
Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

Very true.

 
And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.


And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue -- how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness.

 

Very true, he said.

 
But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below -- if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

 
Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely. or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

Very true, he replied.

 
Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all -- they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean?

 
I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.

 

But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.


Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

 

Quite true, he replied.

 
And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after [their] own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

 
And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

 
And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question.


Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a better life than that of politics?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.


And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light -- as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.


The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell [tossing a coin -- RL], but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy? [Plato (1997b) Book VII, pp.1132-38, 514-521c. I have used the on-line version here, even though the edition I have cited is a far superior translation. Bold added.]
 

From this wild allegory -- that the world of common experience is in effect a play of shadows, which are themselves just reflected artefacts, not 'real objects', and that only those who have 'seen the light' after they have left the cave will know 'true being' -- Plato derives the elitist conclusion that only Philosophers are fit to rule! It is this ridiculous fantasy upon which Professor Tegmark, for instance, hoped to base his theory! Of course, he might be unaware of the connection this allegory has always enjoyed with the 'justification' of anti-democratic, aristocratic wealth, power and privilege, but that just highlights the insidious nature of the "ideas of the ruling-class" (of which class Plato wasn't just a card-carrying member, he remains to this day one of their leading ideologues).

 

Be this as it may, this allegory is still -- two thousand four hundred years later -- a powerful image underpinning the theory that the universe is a mathematical object, and the world of 'appearances' is but a shadow of a hidden world. Indeed, as we saw in Essay Three Part Two (here and here), this is a "ruling idea" that motivates also Dialectical Marxists. [on that, see Note 6a and Note 25 of the latter Essay, too.]

 

However, Plato's allegory doesn't work even in its own terms, not least because those trapped in this cave from birth will have no language, and hence won't be able to name anything, conclude anything or talk about anything, whether they are inside or outside the cave. This entire fairy-tale thus collapses like a cheap deckchair.

 

Exactly how this fantasy managed to influence so many and for so long, and why anyone took it seriously, is, therefore, a mystery we will just have to pass over in silence -- at least for now...

 

Appendix C: Dm Fans Struggle To Explain Use-Value And Exchange-Value

 

Here follows the relevant parts of a 'debate' I had with several DM-fans over at Libcom back in 2012.

 

This material has been slightly edited to remove spelling errors and typos, and the quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. In addition, many paragraphs have been merged. Material that isn't relevant to the relation between Use-Value and Exchange-Value [UV and RV] has largely been omitted (as have some of the off-topic disputes among the DM-fans themselves). Any other edits have either been explicitly acknowledged or they have been put in square brackets (often indicated by the addition of an "-- RL"). Other than the name abbreviations, all emphases are in the original (unless otherwise stated). Finally, spelling has been modified to agree with UK English. As noted in the preface, elsewhere in the Essay, as well as in what follows -- except where Marx is being quoted -- the words, "use-value" and "exchange-value" have been hyphenated, even where those in the debate failed to do so. This has been done to make the spelling of these two terms consistent with the rest of the Essay.

 

It is worth pointing out that in what follows I am not questioning the validity of Marx's distinction between UV and EV, merely pointing out that:

 

(i) We have as yet no clear idea concerning what we now mean by these two terms (that can be seen by the way that even my adversaries can't agree among themselves). The same indecision occurs in the DM-literature (which allegation I aim to substantiate in Essay Fourteen Part Two); and,

 

(ii) The connection between UV and EV can't be 'dialectical', whatever else it is. As we will see, UV and EV don't imply one another (unlike the proletariat and the capitalist class supposedly do), nor do they 'struggle' with and then turn into each other (which should happen if the DM-classics are to be believed).

 

Readers are encouraged to exercise patience until near the end, when the key philosophical point will be revealed (this takes place in the last debate I had with SA -- one of those involved in this discussion, identified below).

 

Finally, in this discussion, I am clearly RL. Others will be identified (where possible) below -- but only the basis of what they have called themselves elsewhere at Libcom or elsewhere on the Internet. I have also added a few brief comments (where relevant) explaining any past relationship I have had with those in this discussion, so that the reason for the tone adopted in my replies to them might correctly be understood), or where it might assist readers understand they lack of facility with colloquial English (i.e., if English wasn't their first language). Several other remarks have been added to help the reader understand to whom a given reply has been directed.

 

RL (the following short passage was in fact quoted from an earlier version of this Essay):

 

"Can't exchange-values exist where there is no use-value at all? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange-value but many do not have a use-value. Same with many works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins). And can't criminals exchange useless items in order to launder money?"

 

Jura (whose first language isn't English):

 

"This is laughable, but not that surprising in a 21st century Trotskyist. You don't even understand the basic relationships between value, exchange-value and use-value, i.e. the fundamental concepts of Marx's analysis (first five or six pages of Ch1 of Volume 1). How can anything you say be relevant to questions of the structure of Marx's theory -- which is exclusively what the Marxian dialectic relates to -- if you don't understand its actual content?..."

 

S Artesian (henceforth, SA -- who is one of those all too frequent DM-fans who liberally mix a stream of abuse with many of their responses to me --, and, in his case, not just in this particular debate but over at RevLeft and elsewhere -- which helps explain my dismissive and irreverent attitude toward him):

 

"This claim of Rosa's was answered long ago on revleft. Marx is concerned with the organization of social production, the dominant, determining mode. The accumulation of curios, pets, antiques is exactly what he is not talking about, no more than he is discussing a tailor who is 'kept' by a wealthy individual, producing suits only for that individual. Get rid of the troll."

 

Jura (replying to SA):

 

"That's not the issue at all. Marx would never deny that antiques, pets or works of art are use-values. It's right there on the first page."

 

SA (replying to Jura):

 

"The issue isn't if these objects are use-values, but are they commodities. Of course they can have a use-value; and they can even claim exchange-value when sold, but are they 'produced as commodities'? Are they values? Is the suit made by the private tailor a value? Absolutely not. There [They?] are objects of individual desire that are not results of social production, consequently their 'values' have nothing to do with the socially necessary labour time of their reproduction, just as the value of an artist's painting has absolutely nothing to do with the labour time embedded in its production. Marx is dealing with the organization of labour as abstract labour; an antique, curio, work of art claims its identity as an antique, curio, work of art precisely because it is not a product of abstract labour."

 

Jura (replying to SA):

 

"I agree with the substance of your posts, but you're not paying attention to what Rosa said. Rosa claims that some commodities (like some antiques) don't have use-value (how their value is determined is not important right now). I'm saying -- repeating Marx -- that this is nonsense: all commodities, regardless of whether their price is regulated by SNLT [Socially Necessary Labour Time -- RL] or not, must have a use-value in order to be sold to someone."

 

SA (replying to Jura):

 

"Well of course it has a 'use-value.' Somebody wants it, likes it, exchanges something for it -- represents or translates its use-value into an exchange-value. That very process, of finding the translation of use-value into exchange-value is what Marx is examining -- how is it that the use-value of one object can be expressed as an exchange-value with another object, a value in exchange with all other objects. But antiques, curios, etc. are not the organizing principle of commodity production and their status or magnitudes of use and exchange have nothing to do with Marx's explication of value and of the social fusion of use-value with exchange-value."

 

RL:

 

"What is the 'use-value' of an antique chair, stored in a cellar, which everyone has forgotten about? Perhaps: its use is to collect dust, or provide a framework for spiders to spin their webs? Or maybe its use is to puzzle you?"

 

Jura (replying to RL):

 

"You don't seem to understand Marx's definition of use-value at all (Jura now quotes Marx):

 

'The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity. A commodity, such as iron, corn, or a diamond, is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value, something useful.' [Quoted from here. Link added on edit.]

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"So, what is the use-value of that chair?"

 

Jura (replying to RL):

 

"My point is that as long as someone buys it, it has to have one. Marx is very clear about this. Perhaps the old chair satisfies a need for historical furniture associated with certain aesthetic or other properties (as with antiques). Or someone's need for just something solid to sit on (as with old shit sold at flea markets). As long as it is brought to market and sold (becoming a commodity), it must have a use-value (for at least one person, regardless of whether they end up actually using it or find out it's useless), otherwise it wouldn't have found a buyer in the first place."

 

SA (attempting to reply to RL's question about that chair; note the abuse; it gets worse):

 

"Says all that needs to be said about Rosa's supposed understanding of Marx, of the commodity, of value. What a display of ignorance. The chair that is stored in a cellar may have been produced in a factory, or it may have been produced by a craftsman working in a guild-type arrangement, or it may have been home-produced for home use. In any and all cases, in the first two cases it was produced as a [commodity?] in order to claim, receive an exchange-value; it was produced for the purpose of exchange. Such purpose can only be realized if the chair has a use. In the third circumstance, the chair is produced as a use-value, and only a use-value. There is no exchange-value in this case. It is produced for direct consumption, for self-subsistence. 100 years later the chair becomes an 'antique' -- antique is a market, and marketing designation. Does the chair have 'use'? Of course it does, as it satisfies the need of someone who will provide a value in exchange for the chair. Does the chair have use as a chair? Perhaps not, and that's not necessary. If a photographer buys the chair because he/she wants to photograph it for an article in the Sunday Times, does the chair have use? Of course it does. If a museum buys the chair to display the method and styles of chair construction 200 years ago, is that use? Of course it is. That our troll thinks of use only as simple, immediate, direct consumption shows how little she understands about social production, accumulation, use, and...Marx. It makes her, fundamentally, a peasant."

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"So, all the labour power congealed in that chair, which vanishes if it stays in that cellar, suddenly comes back, does it? Even so, I asked what use-value it has in that cellar, gathering dust -- not when it was being sold." [I have very slightly altered my last sentence to make its meaning clearer -- RL. The original was this: "Even so, I asked what use-value it has in that cellar, gathering dust -- not as it was being sold."]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"Where did I deny this? The question is what use-value has it got in a cellar, gathering dust, and forgotten about? Maybe this: to annoy SA? You seem to want to duck that question -- or raise side issues that have nothing to do with what I asked."

 

Jura (replying to RL -- and becoming irate):

 

"Now you're asking about value, which has nothing to do with the present problem. Even things that don't have value can be use-values. Even things that are not products of any labour can be use-values. For how much that chair is going to be sold at an antiques auction or at the flea market is irrelevant. You said (in your writings) that some commodities namely antiques, don't have use-value. I'm saying it's nonsense.... You're saying something which has (exchange) value does not have to have use-value. Utter nonsense!"

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"But, I thought all things were interconnected in that quirky dialectical universe of yours? So, what is the use-value of an antique chair, in a cellar, forgotten about and gathering dust? Maybe this: to get you to ignore the question?"

 

Jura (replying to RL):

 

"Anyway, it depends. It can be stored away as a memory of someone's old times as the chairman of the SWP. It can be stored away due to lack of space. You know, whether a thing has a use-value or not is a different question than whether this use-value is being realized in consumption (as long as the thing is not destroyed or does not decay). But remember: you said this (notice the lack of cellars and dust in the paragraph).

 

'Can't exchange-values exist where there is no use-value at all? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange-value but many do not have a use-value. Same with many works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins).'

 

"You're saying something which has (exchange-) value does not have to have use-value. Utter nonsense!" [Bold emphasis in the original.]

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"Jura:

 

'Anyway, it depends. It can be stored away as a memory of someone's old times as the chairman of the SWP. It can be stored away due to lack of space. You know, whether a thing has a use-value or not is a different question than whether this use-value is being realized in consumption (as long as the thing is not destroyed or does not decay).'

 

"Sure, but that wasn't my example, it's yours. If you don't like, and can't answer, that one, try this: What is the use-value of an antique chair, washed up on a desert island, hidden under tons of sand?

 

"[Or another:] Imagine this scenario: An antique dealer buys a house with its contents, and pays $1,000,000 for it. In the cellar (which she never visits) there is an antique chair, forgotten about, and gathering dust. Ten years later, after still not visiting the cellar, she sells the house and contents for $1,500,000. The new owner, a fan of Hegel, also never goes into that cellar. Ten years later, the house burns down, and all the contents are destroyed. So, the chair has an exchange-value (part of the $2,500,000), but no use-value (before it was burnt). Plenty more examples like that to keep you busy...."

 

SA (replying to RL; note the continued abuse):

 

"You are so completely ignorant. Clearly you never bothered to read the 1st volume of Capital, or at least beyond the afterward to the 2nd edition. Whether it sits in a cellar, or on the floor of the NYSE [New York Stock Exchange -- RL], or in the National Academy of Design, it's still a chair. Whether the queen's bum graces it or it is used simply as a place to stack old magazines, or it's forgotten about completely, it's a chair with a use-value. The question is in the transformation, the expression of the use-value as an exchange-value -- in the chair establishing itself as an object that can command labour, or the expression of labour as it exists in all other objects, as value.

 

"Does scrap metal sitting in a junkyard have use-value? Of course it does, even if it is not being consumed at the moment. Does a 1958 Chevrolet Corvette have a use-value? Of course it does. Even if it sits in its owners garage and he only looks at it on national holidays? Yes, even then. You've claimed antiques have an exchange-value without a use-value. Clearly you're the one who thinks Marx was an imbecile to point out that the commodity must have a use-value to carry, circulate, forward the value the capitalist seeks to realize from its exchange. Even without realizing that value, however, the commodity still retains its use-value.

 

"Do the fleets of jets stored in the desert due to the downturn in 2008 still have a use-value? Of course they do. Does the 10% of the world's maritime capacity currently at anchor have a use-value? Of course those ships have a use-value; but that utility can only be expressed under certain economic conditions -- when a profit can be had. This is why Marx refers to the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value; at some point the production of one, which is the production of the other, negates the impulse, and the ability, for the accumulation of capital. I'd like to thank you for exposing the full range of your ignorance regarding Marx's critique of capital....

 

"Tell us again Rosa why chairs not being directly and continuously sat upon have no use-value. According to you, every night when the lights are turned out, and people are in bed, the chairs in the dark have no use-value. And in the day when people awake? Then the beds have no use-value, clearly. Dunce. Or Ignoramus. Or both."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"From this it seems that it's not the object itself, but the intention to treat something as a chair that gives it a use-value. In that case, if the chair in question has been forgotten about, locked away in that cellar, so that no one knows it's there and can thus form no intention toward it, it has no use-value. In which case, you agree with me! Alas, the rest of what you say, fascinating though it was, does not seem to address my point."

 

Kambing (who now enters the debate, replying to RL):

 

"OK, I'm going to agree with you that it doesn't really make sense to talk about the 'use-value' for an object that no people are relating to in any way, but nor does it make any sense to talk about such objects having 'exchange-value' or any other sort of value for that matter. 'Value' is not a static quality of an object, but refers to the social relations in which an object is embedded. So without people 'relating' to the objects in some fashion, they do not have value. Furthermore, the value categories and relationships that Marx establishes in Capital refer specifically to the social relations of generalised commodity production, so they have relatively little utility with respect to objects that are not mediating the capital-labour relation.

 

"'Use-value' loses most of its utility as a coherent category if you are talking about an object outside of a market relation -- it is really more of a catch-all category for all the various qualitative ways that people relate to objects (or to other people through objects), which really only has analytical applicability in distinction from (and as a necessary precondition for) 'exchange-value', in the context of market exchange. I think that the way you have framed your discussion on value demonstrates that if you attempt to remove the dialectical logic from Marx's concepts of value (value as a dynamic, contradictory social relation) you evacuate those concepts of their useful meaning."

 

RL (replying to Kambing):

 

"Kambing, I largely agree with what you say, but I'm not too sure about this:

 

'I think that the way you have framed your discussion on value demonstrates that if you attempt to remove the dialectical logic from Marx's concepts of value (value as a dynamic, contradictory social relation) you evacuate those concepts of their useful meaning.'

 

"Well, I deny these relations are 'contradictory', to begin with, and I don't see how dialectics helps in any way at all. Indeed, I argue that it gets in the way, mystifying Marx's work for no gain at all. After all you tried, largely successfully, to explain yourself in the first two paragraphs of your reply without any dialectics at all (except perhaps that vague reference to 'mediating'). And there is no need to use 'dialectics', either, since, as I have shown, Marx abandoned this way of looking at things in Das Kapital." [That refers to earlier pages in this debate. I have omitted the rest of the discussion I had with Kambing since it drifted off into other, off-topic issues.]

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"First, it's your claim that the chair, locked away in the cellar and forgotten about has NO use-value but...retains exchange-value. Remember? Your claim is that antiques have exchange-value with no use-value, right? So Rosa, do the fleets of airplanes in the desert, or the ships at anchor, or the rail cars in storage maintain their use-value, or does it disappear? Do they have an exchange-value without a use-value?

 

"This issue, BTW, is one of the reasons Keynes 'make 1/2 dig holes, and the other 1/2 fill them back up' theory falls apart...no use-values are being created. To be a commodity the object must have a use-value. Use-values can exist without being commodities, but commodities in order to be values must have a use-value. Try reading more than just the afterward to volume 1. It might help you. Then again it might not."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"My answer is that this is a problem for you, not me. I'm not going to try to solve it for you. Read the Afterword again, yourself -- you seem to have missed the section where Marx endorses a summary of 'the dialectic method' (the only one he published in his entire life) which contains not one atom of Hegel." [Link added -- RL.]

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"Problem for me? No, it's not a problem for me, because I assert that the old chair has a use-value, whether it's in a cellar or in the kitchen or in a museum or a flea market; just as wood has a use-value even when it simply lays on the ground in a forest with no one 'knowing' it's there or looking for it, much less collecting it. Wood burns; its combustibility is a physical characteristic, independent of the social relation that harvests, processes, distributes the wood. In any case, your ignorance of Marx's most fundamental categories, and the relations of those categories has been exposed for all to see. That's a fair day's work."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"Once more: so it's the intention to use an object in a certain way that gives it a use-value, not the object itself. In other words, it's not an intrinsic property (or an 'essential property') of the object in question, but an extrinsic property -- one we supply to the object concerned. We can see this from the way you word your reply:

 

'just as wood has a use-value even when it simply lays on the ground in a forest with no one 'knowing' it's there or looking for it, much less collecting it.'

 

"This either means that wood had a use-value long before human beings existed, or it only assumed a use-value when we evolved sufficiently enough to form an intention to use it. Otherwise you might be committed to the view that wood can have a use-value for lightning, since it can set wood on fire. However, given the fact that you also want to regard use-value as a social concept, it seems that the latter is the case: only when something can be used intentionally in a certain way is it a use-value. Which is it to be? Do objects have an intrinsic use-value, or do they acquire one extrinsically when we form an intention to use them in some way?

 

"Think carefully before you reply. I have a rather nice trap waiting for you if your answer is pitched at your usual, sloppy and slapdash level. Alas, that [often] happens since you let your emotions rule your head. We can see that by the way you rapidly become abusive. So, this might be a good time to put away those childish traits we have come to know and loathe, and act like a man, for a change. Give it a go, you might get to like it. Tantrums don't win arguments...."

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"You're the one arguing that use-value is a matter of intent. You essentially have a version of the old 'If a tree falls in the forest and nobody's around to hear it, does the tree make a sound?' Your argument by intent is really nothing but childish idealism. A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire. Nature can certainly provide use-values without human intent. Wood does not have a telos, a purpose, to be burnt in its make-up; it has the intrinsic quality of combustibility whether or not it sits in the forest or is sold in the supermarket. It has the property of combustibility intrinsic to it. It does not need a human being to buy or sell it to provide warmth. If there's a fire in the forest, and nobody is there to see it, or feel it, is the fire hot? The chair retains its use-value even when not being used. Intent does not endow wood with its ability to provide warmth in combustion. Intent to sit in the chair does not make it useful. Its existence as a chair, as something of utility for sitting upon exists whatever your intent may be. As an antique, the chair can only claim value in exchange if it has use. The exchange is based upon the chair's usefulness in satisfying the need of a collector to collect, or as a representative of some form of craftsmanship, as a decorative piece, or even as a decorative piece to be used as a chair. It does not derive its utility from exchange in any of these cases; exchange is derived from the utility of the chair, the different utilities in these scenarios."

 

RL (replying to SA -- in what follows, emphases are in the original):

 

"SA (oh dear, into the trap this numpty falls -- I did try to warn him):

 

'You're the one arguing that use-value is a matter of intent. You essentially have a version of the old "If a tree falls in the forest and nobody's around to hear it, does the tree make a sound?" Your argument by intent is really nothing but childish idealism.'

 

"In fact, I have expressed no opinion about the nature of use-value. I have, though, posed several problems for you with your odd view of this subject, since it's not too clear whether you accept an intentional view of use-values or an essentialist view -- your social interpretation suggests the former, while your comments about wood suggest the latter.

 

"[As seems plain, you have not given this much thought, but have blundered around in the usual way, oblivious of this distinction -- until I kindly pointed it out to you.]

 

'If a tree falls in the forest and nobody's around to hear it, does the tree make a sound?" Your argument by intent is really nothing but childish idealism'

 

"Not at all. I posed a series of problems for you; if you now want to divert attention from your predicament, as I predicted you would (in that other thread), that's up to you. Now, if we adopt an unsympathetic interpretation of your views, wood had a use-value for lightning long before we evolved, since it can be set alight by it. (Before you complain I have ignored what you said about human need etc., be patient -- we'll get to that soon enough.) Is that your view? But it follows from what seems to be your essentialist view of wood. If wood has been flammable since it first evolved, then it must have acquired this essential property long before we emerged. In that case, if you do indeed hold an essentialist view of use-values, you must also believe that wood is a use-value for lightning. [Again, patience, please!] This has nothing to do with trees falling in forests unheard, since the hearing of sound is not an essential property of falling trees. But, as seems to be the case with your odd theory, the capacity of wood to burn is an essential property of that wood. And if that is so, it must be a use-value for lightning. (Again, patience, please!)

 

"[This isn't my belief, I hasten to add -- just in case you try to foist it on me, as you have several other things! -- but a consequence of your sloppy approach to HM [Historical Materialism -- RL]. (I blame dialectics. However, you can console yourself with the thought that you're not the first comrade to have his brains addled by Hegel -- upside down or the 'right way up'.)]

 

"On the other hand, if you hold an intentional view of use-values, then wood can't be a use-value until someone decides to use it, but not before. This would absolve you of the ridiculous belief that wood is a use-value for lightning. However, this option would create other problems for you -- since it implies that antique chairs are only use-values if someone decides to use them to sit upon. However, between episodes of sitting, they'd not be use-values -- unless there was someone always present with that intention. That's because, of course, intentions can't be stored in chairs. This is indeed why many prefer the essentialist view, since a chair, they hold, is essentially a chair, even if no one ever actually uses it. Hence it's always a use-value. But, as we have seen, a consistent application of this idea implies wood is a use-value for lightning -- and a field is a use-value for a worm that burrowed into it -- 50 million years ago. (Patience please!)

 

"Now I sympathise with the predicament you are in. The Hegelian tradition has bequeathed to the sad souls whose brains it has colonised far too few, and far too crude, conceptual tools to extricate you from it. But, hey, that's why I am here, to help you poor sods out. [This sentence has been slightly modified on edit in order to make its content clearer. The original was as follows: "The Hegelian tradition has bequeathed to the sad souls whose brains it has colonised far too few and crude conceptual tools to extricate you from it." -- RL.]

 

"Ah, but you now fall into the trap:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire.'

 

"So, you do favour the intentional interpretation, after all. In which case, wood isn't a use-value per se -- only if someone decides to use it. But then you back-sass and say this:

 

'Nature can certainly provide use-values without human intent.'

 

"This either means nature has intentions, or you favour the essentialist interpretation. So, 'nature' provided the earth with wood many million years ago, which one day humans would use. In that case it was a use-value 50 million years ago. And, its use-value, according to your earlier comments, is its capacity to burn. But that capacity is actionable by lightning, too. So it seems that wood is a use-value for lightning, also provided by nature. (Patience please!) Now the only way out of this predicament is to emphasise this clause:

 

'satisfies a human want, need, desire.'

 

"But if nature:

 

'can certainly provide use-values without human intent...'

 

"Then it looks like you are committed to a teleological/anthropomorphic view: that nature provides the intention here. But then you have this answer:

 

'Wood does not have a telos, a purpose, to be burnt in its make-up; it has the intrinsic quality of combustibility whether or not it sits in the forest or is sold in the supermarket. It has the property of combustibility intrinsic to it.'

 

"So, we are back to the essentialist view of use-values, again! But, this just means that anything that is capable of being burnt is a use-value. So, since it is possible to burn almost anything (if the energy input is high enough) then practically everything in the universe is a use-value! Hence, the moon is a use-value, so is the Kuiper Belt and Proxima Centauri. Hence your 'definition' is far too generous. You will thus have to modify it so that you include a reference to attainability (since most of the universe will be forever unattainable to us humans). I'll leave that to you.

 

"But, let us examine that definition again, to see how you fell into the trap:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"In which case, we are back full circle: if an object (like an antique chair) is in a cellar, forgotten about and gathering dust, it no longer 'satisfies a human want, need, desire', since no one knows about it.

 

"Now, I did tell you to frame your response carefully, and not in your usual slap-dash manner. Here we can see you ignored my good advice. You unwisely put your definition in the present continuous tense. That means that anything that isn't at the moment satisfying a "human want, need, desire" can't be a use-value. [Your definition, not mine!] Hence, if a piece of wood isn't actually being used, or lies unknown in the forest, it can't be a use-value after all. In trying to unite an intentional definition with an essentialist definition you end with an unworkable theory. The rest of what you say, interesting though it is, falls foul of this serious screw-up on your part. I did try to warn to warn you...

 

"Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines:

 

'A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire.' [These aren't SA's words; this is my suggestion -- RL.]

 

"Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use-value for lightning. Hence, it is.

 

"QED."

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"I agree. Use-value is relational. It cannot exist for the human relation without the human relation. Wood is combustible. Combustibility is not an intrinsic use-value. Combustibility is useful for human beings. Human beings purposefully utilizing objects makes use-values. So once again, do the fleets of jets stored in the desert have a use-value? The 10% or so of the world's container fleet at anchor...does it have use-value? If they're not being used, do they have a use-value? But more importantly, getting back to the original assertion...do they have value, exchange-value? The argument after all is that objects can have an exchange-value without a use-value. Remember, supposedly the antique chair in a cellar has no use-value, but has an exchange-value. As the warehoused jets and ships show us, the use-value continues to exist. Whether or not the use-value is expressed is determined by the needs of capital accumulation."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'Wood is combustible. Combustibility is not an intrinsic use-value. Combustibility is useful for human beings. Human beings purposefully utilizing objects makes use-values.'

 

"But, your definition of use-value:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire...',

 

"implies that if an object isn't at this moment satisfying a 'human want, need, desire', then it can't be a use-value. So, that chair, in that cellar, forgotten about, which is not now satisfying a 'human want, need, desire' can't be a use-value, contrary to what you assert elsewhere. And, if you relax your definition (which would make your theory a version of stipulative conventionalism -- that is, you'd be aiming to solve a scientific problem by means of linguistic tinkering), that would be no help either, as I pointed out earlier:

 

'Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines: "A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire."' [Again, these aren't SA's words; this is my suggestion -- RL .] Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use-value for lightning. Hence, it is. QED'"

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"And in your argument; everything loses its use-value, except the bed and the blankets, when humans go to sleep. Again, do the jets parked in the desert have use-value? Yes or no? Does a jet, not officially removed from the roster of equipment of an airline, not being utilized on any particular day, lose its use-value? In short, your argument becomes 'A chair is only a chair when being sat upon' -- which has nothing to do with Marx's analysis at all. Marx is talking about human appropriation of nature, through labour, and what factors determine the expression, the mode of that appropriation. In the case of capital that mode is value.

 

"And this:

 

'Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use-value for lightning. Hence, it is',

 

"is exactly what artists do. The wood can be used to represent lightning -- that's its use-value to the artist. That's the point. Wood can't be [useful to?] lightning, but it can, to an individual, satisfy a need to represent lightning. Now the artist can buy the wood, in which case the exchange-value cannot exist separate from the use-value. Or the artist may find the wood, in which case the use-value exists without a coincident exchange-value. The mode of appropriation for society, however, is determined by the social organization of labour."

 

[Added on edit: From this we can see that SA hasn't got the point about wood and lightning. There were no artists around 50 million years ago! -- RL.]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'And in your argument; everything loses its use-value, except the bed and the blankets, when humans go to sleep.'

 

"Well, in fact, that's a consequence of your definition. Or do you deny that you posted this?

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"Given this definition that chair can't be a use-value!

 

'Again, do the jets parked in the desert have use-value? Yes or no? Does a jet, not officially removed from the roster of equipment of an airline, not being utilized on any particular day, lose its use-value?'

 

"Given your defective definition, they don't appear to [have a use-value], either! May I suggest, therefore, that you re-think your definition? (And good luck with that one, given the impoverished conceptual tools Hegel dumped on all those who think he had anything of value to say!)

 

'In short, your argument becomes "A chair is only a chair when being sat upon" -- which has nothing to do with Marx's analysis at all. Marx is talking about human appropriation of nature, through labour, and what factors determine the expression, the mode of that appropriation. In the case of capital that mode is value.'

 

"Once more, this follows from your definition, not mine (since I haven't defined use-value).

 

'The wood can be used to represent lightning -- that's its use-value to the artist. That's the point. Wood can't be lightning, but it can, to an individual, satisfy a need to represent lightning. Now the artist can buy the wood, in which case the exchange-value cannot exist separate from the use-value. Or the artist may find the wood, in which case the use-value exists without a coincident exchange-value. The mode of appropriation for society, however, is determined by the social organization of labour.'

 

"But, what about a lump of wood that is lying in a forest, unknown to any artist, or to anyone at all, 50 million years ago? Given your defective definition, it can't be a use-value -- since it is not now:

 

'an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"But if you relax your useless definition, then it can be a use-value to lightning, if I want it to be:

 

[RL from earlier] 'Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines:

 

[SA from earlier, my words in his mouth] "A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire...."

 

[RL from earlier] "'Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use-value for lightning. Hence, it is. QED.'"

 

SA (replying to someone else -- but note the fatal admission -- I have only included this passage here because of that):

 

"I agree that the assertion that there can be exchange-value without use-value is nonsense.... [B]ut moreover the 'pretence' of exchange-value without use-value is indicative of fraud, swindling, scams...all those things that accompany capital like pilot fish accompany the shark. We can look at the flim-flam scams of the emerging US railroad industry in the 1830s and 1840s to see all sorts of examples of 'exchange-value' without use-value -- every single occurrence collapsed leaving the holders of the paper values, exactly that: holders of the value of the paper and nothing else." [Bold emphasis added.]

 

SA (replying to RL -- SA has a habit of ignoring anything he can't answer (he has just ignored my last comment in its entirety(!)), a trait he perfected over at Revleft):

 

"Tell us again how antiques have exchange-value without use-value."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"I see that you have once again ducked a question you can't answer:

 

[RL from earlier] 'But if you relax your useless definition, then it can be a use-value to lightning, if I want it to be.... Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines: "A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire...." Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use-value for lightning. Hence, it is. QED.'

 

"But, to answer your (spurious) question: A woman buys a house and contents for $1,000,000. In the cellar there is an antique chair which she knows nothing about, and neither does anyone else. Five years later she sells the house and contents for $1,500,000, still knowing nothing of that chair. Now according to your defective definition of use-value (which, despite being warned [about being] careful, you unwisely put in the present continuous tense):

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"That chair isn't a use-value -- since it does not satisfy, and has not (for at least five years) satisfied a: 'human want, need, desire....'

 

"And that's because no one knows about it. Even so, it has an exchange-value. Now it's all the same to me if this has stumped you, but when, in x months or years time, you claim yet again to have answered all my questions, I will quote this conundrum back at you (and this page, too) to show you are just as full of hot air now as you were at RevLeft."

 

Kambing (replying to RL):

 

"While the ownership of the chair may have legally changed hands due to the 'contents' being included in the sale, it clearly hasn't actually been specifically factored into the exchange-value. By your logic, used tissues that got left under the bed would also have an exchange-value. Besides, typically in a home and contents sale the exchange-value of the contents is not all precisely determined, presumably because the owner (or their agent) has decided that the time it would take to sell off the contents individually is worth more than the lost income.

 

"Regardless of its legal status, unknown contents don't really factor into it at all. I mean, what if there was a lost $10,000,000 work of art hidden in the attic? Or several million dollars in cash? Has their 'exchange-value' suddenly plummeted and then risen again? (Ok, presumably there may be laws that may exclude such things from the sale itself, I'm not sure). But the point is that exchange-value and use-value are both ascribed by human beings, they are social phenomena. It seems like your 'non-dialectical' approach is a bit metaphysical and fetishistic, with objects being magically imbued with value without any human action or thought whatsoever."

 

L Bird (replying to RL -- L Bird is henceforth LB):

 

"Rosa, my tentative answer to your question would be that this issue of 'use-value/exchange-value' can't be addressed at the level of individual objects, whether 'known about' or not. The theory is intended to explain exploitation at the level of society, and is not intended to compete with psychological theories of what individuals think of isolated objects. I suppose the simple answer to your question is that 'it is immaterial' (poor joke)."

 

RL (replying to Kambing):

 

"Kambing:

 

'While the ownership of the chair may have legally changed hands due to the 'contents' being included in the sale, it clearly hasn't actually been specifically factored into the exchange-value. By your logic, used tissues that got left under the bed would also have an exchange-value. Besides, typically in a home and contents sale the exchange-value of the contents is not all precisely determined, presumably because the owner (or their agent) has decided that the time it would take to sell off the contents individually is worth more than the lost income.'

 

"Not my 'logic': it follows from the sloppy wording being bandied about by SA and one or two others."

 

'Regardless of its legal status, unknown contents don't really factor into it at all. I mean, what if there was a lost $10,000,000 work of art hidden in the attic? Or several million dollars in cash? Has their 'exchange-value' suddenly plummeted and then risen again? (Ok, presumably there may be laws that may exclude such things from the sale itself, I'm not sure). But the point is that exchange-value and use-value are both ascribed by human beings, they are social phenomena. It seems like your 'non-dialectical' approach is a bit metaphysical and fetishistic, with objects being magically imbued with value without any human action or thought whatsoever.'

 

"This is a problem for the mystics here, not me. I have attempted to define nothing, nor have I posted a single theoretical statement about use- and/or exchange-value. So pick a fight with SA, not me."

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB, thanks for at least trying to answer my question:

 

'Rosa, my tentative answer to your question would be that this issue of "use-value/exchange-value" can't be addressed at the level of individual objects, whether 'known about' or not. The theory is intended to explain exploitation at the level of society, and is not intended to compete with psychological theories of what individuals think of isolated objects.'

 

"Well, with all due respect, that's a bit like arguing that Newton's theory of gravitation, say, is not intended to deal with single objects (like that apple, for example), but the solar system/the galaxy etc. as a whole. The only reason I aired this example was to embarrass the intentional definition of use-value SA here was trying to sell us, since that does introduce psychological factors. Recall, I am not offering my own views here, merely putting pressure on SA by drawing out the ridiculous consequences of his characteristically sloppy approach in this area. (True to form, he has gone rather quiet. If he replies, expect more prevarication and delaying tactics from him.)"

 

LB (replying to RL):

 

"I think you've chosen a poor counter-example, Rosa. Gravity does work at the level of single objects, as well as at the level of systems like the solar system. I think a better example is the property of 'dog protection', which works at the level of 'walls', not at the level of wall components, like bricks. One can't find a mysterious property of 'dog protection' in a brick, no matter how hard one looks!...

 

'Recall, I am not offering my own views here, merely putting pressure on SA by drawing out the ridiculous consequences of his characteristically sloppy approach in this area.'

 

"Hmmm... well, since I don't believe in 'objective positions' from which to view the world (social or physical), I think you are 'offering your own views', because this is an inescapable component of criticism, but your views have always remained unspoken, in this debate, at least. Well done, for arguing from a hidden position, like the good sniper you are! The troops in the open trying to attack you are taking a terrific mauling!"

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB:

 

'I think you've chosen a poor counter-example, Rosa. Gravity does work at the level of single objects, as well as at the level of systems like the solar system.'

 

"In that case, this seems to mean that SA's version of Marx's theory can't explain a single thing.

 

'I think a better example is the property of "dog protection", which works at the level of "walls", not at the level of wall components, like bricks. One can't find a mysterious property of "dog protection" in a brick, no matter how hard one looks!'

 

"Sorry, but I can't see what this has got to do with my example -- my choice of example doesn't depend on being able to see a property in anything. So, I'll stick to my example, if that's Ok with you."

 

'Hmmm... well, since I don't believe in "objective positions" from which to view the world (social or physical), I think you are "offering your own views", because this is an inescapable component of criticism, but your views have always remained unspoken, in this debate, at least.'

 

"Well, I don't pretend to be arguing from an 'objective' position (in relation to this, or anything else, for that matter), since I do not accept this use of 'objective' -- and that's because I reject all philosophical theories of 'objectivity' as non-sensical. And, of course, my views have remained unspoken, but if you adopt this line, then you will be forced to argue, for instance, that my view of the taste of butter is part of my argument here, since it too was unspoken -- just as your unspoken view of [the] history of, say, the Eiffel Tower motivated your choice of 'dog protection'. [Link added.]

 

'Well done, for arguing from a hidden position, like the good sniper you are! The troops in the open trying to attack you are taking a terrific mauling!'

 

"As I pointed out to SA, the reason for this is that the vast majority of comrades who have allowed 'dialectics' (in the post-Hegelian sense of that word) to colonise their brains, have also bought into an impoverished intellectual tradition. Unfortunately, that tradition in 'continental thought' has bequeathed to its acolytes 'logics' and methods that are far too weak, conceptually impoverished, and confused for them to be able defend themselves. This has been compounded by the fact that they also reject analytic philosophy and the advanced analytic techniques it has developed that expose the poverty of thought that has devolved from this mystical tradition. And they refuse to be told too. So, they only have themselves to blame..."

 

LB (replying to RL):

 

"RL:

 

'Sorry, but I can't see what this has got to do with my example -- my choice of example doesn't depend on being able to see a property in anything. So, I'll stick to my example, if that's Ok with you.'

 

"Yeah, sure, I was merely trying to point out that 'value', etc., work at the conceptual level of 'dog protection', not at the lower level of 'bricks'. You can 'stick to your example' in your debate with SA, et al, but if you do then I think you are missing the 'social' meaning: of course, if SA wants to fight you on that level, I think you'll triumph.

 

'And, of course, my views have remained unspoken, but if you adopt this line, then you will be forced to argue, for instance, that my view of the taste of butter is part of my argument here, since it too was unspoken -- just as your unspoken view of history of, say, the Eiffel Tower motivated your choice of "dog protection".'

 

"This is poor logic from you, Rosa. The fact that one relevant thing is unspoken doesn't logically lead to every unspoken thing being relevant.

 

'This has been compounded by the fact that they also reject analytic philosophy and the advanced analytic techniques it has developed that expose the poverty of thought that has devolved from this mystical tradition.'

 

"While I have a lot of sympathy for your characterisation of 'dialectics' as the 'mystical tradition', I also think that 'analytic techniques', 'advanced' or not, have to be located within some assumptions and axioms. I feel that, perhaps, it's in that discussion that I'll be revealed to be closer to our 'dialectics' experts. Perhaps, not. You say you think historical materialism, of some sort, is useful, and I think I, and even syndicalistcat [another character in this debate, whose comments I have omitted -- RL] and others, would agree with that."

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB:

 

'This is poor logic from you, Rosa. The fact that one relevant thing is unspoken doesn't logically lead to every unspoken thing being relevant.'

 

"I'm not too sure that is anything to do with logic, but even supposing it has, I don't think you will be able to advance a non-question-begging way to exclude my examples while maintaining the allegation that unspoken views lie behind my argument. And it wasn't part of the point I wished to make that 'every unspoken thing being relevant', only that you are guessing -- and without any evidence, too.

 

'While I have a lot of sympathy for your characterisation of "dialectics" as the "mystical tradition", I also think that "analytic techniques", "advanced" or not, have to be located within some assumptions and axioms. I feel that, perhaps, it's in that discussion that I'll be revealed to be closer to our "dialectics" experts. Perhaps, not. You say you think historical materialism, of some sort, is useful, and I think I, and even syndicalistcat and others, would agree with that.'

 

"Sure, in many areas of Analytic Philosophy there are just such assumptions, but there are no philosophical (in the traditional sense of that word) assumptions underlying the Wittgensteinian method I use. Indeed, if there are, and you can identify any to which I adhere, I will abandon them immediately, and apologise profusely."

 

LB (replying to RL):

 

"RL:

 

'And it wasn't part of the point I wished to make that "every unspoken thing being relevant", only that you are guessing -- and without any evidence, too.'

 

"But, Rosa, what counts as 'evidence' depends on one's conceptual schema, so to maintain I haven't supplied 'evidence' means that you must have a way of measuring 'evidence', to be aware of its absence. How do you measure 'evidence'?"

 

'Sure, in many areas of Analytic Philosophy there are just such assumptions, but there are no philosophical (in the traditional sense of that word) assumptions underlying the Wittgensteinian method I use.'

 

"You'll have to define 'traditional' for us, Rosa. I think Wittgenstein's method has philosophical assumptions, just like every other human method."

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"I think it would be helpful if Rosa could demystify the first three chapters of vol 1 [of Capital -- RL] for LB, who finds Marx's presentation 'magical, religious, mystical' in the mode of dialectics. All Rosa's nonsense about exchange-value without use-value is exactly that, nonsense from the perspective of Marx's examination of value, because Marx's explication is an analysis of how and why the use-value of any single commodity is expressed as, or translated into, the exchange-value of any and all other commodities. If Rosa's 'Anti-dialectics' has any validity, any practical consequences for Marx's analysis, then surely that consequence will become evident in Marx's examination of value.

 

"Now I certainly don't expect Rosa to engage such a challenge -- what we will get is more puffery about 'as soon as you answer my questions' blahblahblah...but I'm not the person asking for clarification of those chapters, LB, who substantially agrees with Rosa's 'critique'[,] is, and he thinks those chapters are examples of Hegelian obfuscation. So it would be nice to see, since clearly those three chapters are critical to Marx's work, to see them 'demystified.'

 

"Edit: Here's where Rosa takes the argument rather than deal with the concrete issue at hand:

 

'But, your definition of use-value: "A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire...", implies that if an object isn't at this moment satisfying a "human want, need, desire", then it can't be a use-value.'

 

"No such implication is contained in Marx's description of a use-value. The inference is particularly and peculiarly Rosa's. We can state Marx's definition this way: a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire." [Added on Edit: Readers will no doubt have noticed that my prediction -- "expect more prevarication and delaying tactics from [SA]" -- has been amply confirmed.]

 

SA (replying to LB -- whose comment I have omitted):

 

"But Rosa believes that Marx extirpated Hegel in volume 1 of Capital. So why then are these three chapters so mystifying and difficult for many people to grasp? Is it that Marx, 'flirting' with Hegel, like a moth flirts with a flame, got way too close? Is it possible that Marx, writing volume 1 for the 'general public' deliberately mystified this analysis of value and the commodity, of the basic unit of capital? There have been numerous explanations of Marx's first three chapters. Some have even been provided in the discussions at this site. Others in books by Rubin and many other writers. If the first 3 chapters have a significance for all that follows in the volume, and in capitalism, surely Rosa's anti-Hegelianism should be able to clarify Marx's analysis of value."

 

[I have also omitted several exchanges between SA and one or two others since they don't directly impact on my comments.]

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB:

 

'But, Rosa, what counts as "evidence" depends on one's conceptual schema, so to maintain I haven't supplied "evidence" means that you must have a way of measuring "evidence", to be aware of its absence.'

 

"Well, I don't have a 'conceptual scheme', and I doubt anyone else has, either. (The idea that we all operate with one is based on some highly dubious a priori psychology, which can be shown to be non-sensical, too.)

 

'How do you measure "evidence"?'

 

"Are you asking me what I mean by the word 'evidence'? I have to ask this since I am sure evidence can't be measured (except with a tape measure or weighing scales, etc.).

 

'You'll have to define "traditional" for us, Rosa. I think Wittgenstein's method has philosophical assumptions, just like every other human method.'

 

"By 'traditional', I mean, of course, philosophy as it has been practiced 'in the west', by the vast majority of philosophers since Ancient Greek times. And I challenge you to show us one philosophical assumption that Wittgenstein adopts. And even if per impossibile you succeed, I will promptly reject that assumption and criticise Wittgenstein for adopting it."

 

[I have omitted the rest of my reply to LB since it strays into areas that aren't relevant to the purposes of this Appendix.]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

[I have omitted most of my reply to SA since it concerns other matters unrelated to this specific discussion.]

 

"SA:

 

'Now I certainly don't expect Rosa to engage such a challenge -- what we will get is more puffery about "as soon as you answer my questions" blahblahblah... but I'm not the person asking for clarification of those chapters, LB, who substantially agrees with Rosa's "critique" is, and he thinks those chapters are examples of Hegelian obfuscation.'

 

"Which questions you have failed to answer [also in other discussions on other boards] -- and here at LibCom there are now two more: 1) You can't respond effectively to my demonstration that your definition of use-value implies that an antique chair, left in a cellar, and forgotten about, can't be a use-value; 2) That the only justification you can offer for your odd use of 'contradiction' is tradition.

 

'No such implication is contained in Marx's description of a use-value. The inference is particularly and peculiarly Rosa's. We can state Marx's definition this way: a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire.'

 

"This is your intentional definition again, and it implies that the aforementioned chair can't be a use-value. Or do you suppose that this chair, which no one knows about is satisfying 'a human, want, need, or desire'?

 

"But you now alter your earlier definition. It's no longer:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"But:

 

'a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire....'

 

"Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use-value for lightning. So, it is. QED."

 

[Again, I have omitted several more exchanges between myself and several others for the same reason.]

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"I haven't ducked a thing. I've refused to engage in your absurd, irrelevant discussions about whether or not a chair hidden in an attic that nobody knows about is a use-value. You have ducked all practical inquiries regarding your [assertion] -- that there are exchange-values without use-values...."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'I haven't ducked a thing. I've refused to engage in your absurd, irrelevant discussions about whether or not a chair hidden in an attic that nobody knows about is a use-value.'

 

"But my conclusions followed from your changing definitions of use-value. First you tried to palm this off on us:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"Then this:

 

'a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire....'

 

"The first, since it's in the present continuous tense, implies that if no one knows about that chair, then they can't want, need or desire it. So, it can't be a use-value. The second implies that if I want something to be a use-value, it is -- so if I want wood to be a use-value for lightning, it is. Your definitions sunshine; you deal with them."

 

[Again, I have omitted several paragraphs from my reply to SA for the same reason.]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"Whimped out, I see... No worries, SA, I'll just link to these threads the next time you try to con the members of [any other] board into thinking you have answered my questions."

 

SA (replying to RL -- and here comes the extreme abuse I generally receive from this 'comrade' (and others) -- indeed, on one board, he even accused me of being a cop in disguise!):

 

"GFY [Go F*ck Yourself -- RL] Rosa, nobody's whimped out. There's just no point engaging with a pathological shirker like you. I've answered every point you've raised.... Go troll somewhere else."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'There's just no point engaging with a pathological shirker like you.'

 

"In other words, you can't answer this question (which I have been asking you now for at least two years, here and at RevLeft):

 

"Assuming you are 100% right about Marx and the 'dialectic' -- in that case, other than merely copying his use of 'contradiction', what is your justification for using it? And I predict that you will deflect attention from it and/or avoid it some more -- since you can't answer it without admitting that the only reason you have for using 'contradiction' in the way you do is a slavish adherence to tradition.

 

'I've answered every point you've raised and showed how nothing you raise makes any practical difference to Marx's critique of capitalism.'

 

"Not [in] the above, nor have you shown how or why your intentional 'definition' of use-value does not imply that an antique chair, forgotten about in a cellar, has no use-value."

 

The discussion breaks off at this point -- with SA slinking away and retreating into a by-now-familiar dialectical sulk.

 

Reference

 

Several of Marx and Engels's works listed below have been linked to the Marxist Internet Archive -- MIA --, but since Lawrence & Wishart threatened legal action over copyright infringement, several of them might fail to work.

 

However, all of their published works can now be accessed here and here.

 

Hence, over the next few months I will be progressively linking directly to the first of the above sites.

 

Agassi, J. (1973), 'Anthropomorphism In Science', in Weiner (1973), pp.87-91.

 

Anonymous, (2005), Kybalion. By The Three Initiates (Digireads).

 

Arrington, R., and Glock, H-J. (1996) (eds.), Wittgenstein And Quine (Routledge).

 

Audi, R. (1999), (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary Of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed.).

 

Baake, K. (2003), Metaphor And Knowledge. The Challenges Of Writing Science (State University of New York Press).

 

Baker, G., and Hacker, P. (1992), Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity. Volume Two Of An Analytic Commentary On The Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, Corrected Edition).

 

--------, (2014), Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity. Volume Two Of An Analytic Commentary On The Philosophical Investigations. Essays And Exegesis Of §§185–242 (Blackwell, 2nd Extensively Revised Edition).

 

Barnes, J. (2009), Truth, Etc. Six Lectures On Ancient Logic (Oxford University Press).

 

Benjamin, A., Cantor, G., and Christie, J. (1987) (eds.), The Figural And The Literal (Manchester University Press).

 

Béziau, J-Y., Carnielli, W., and Gabbay, D. (2007) (eds.), Studies In Logic Volume Nine: Handbook Of Paraconsistency (College Publications).

 

Bicchieri, C., and Alexander, J. (2006), (eds.), PSA 06 74, 5 (University of Chicago Press).

 

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

 

Bigelow, J., Ellis, B., and Pargetter, R. (1988), 'Forces', Philosophy of Science 55, pp.614-30.

 

Bologh, R. (1979), Dialectical Phenomenology: Marx's Method (Routledge).

 

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--------, (2025), 'Events', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2025 Edition). 

 

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--------, (1967b), 'Causal Relations', The Journal of Philosophy 64, pp.691-703; reprinted in Davidson (2001), pp.163-80, and Casati and Varzi (1996), pp.401-13. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (1969), 'The Individuation Of Events', in Rescher (1969), pp.216-34; reprinted in Davidson (2001), pp.149-62, Casati and Varzi (1996), pp.265-83, and Laurence and Macdonald (1998), pp.295-309. [This links to a PDF.]

 

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Mao Tse-Tung, (1937), 'On Contradiction', in Mao (1964), pp.311-47.

 

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Marquit, E., Moran, P., and Truitt, W. (1982) (eds.), Dialectical Contradictions And Contemporary Marxist Discussions, Studies in Marxism Volume 10 (Marxist Educational Press).

 

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--------, (1976), Capital, Volume One (Penguin Books); there is a different translation in Marx and Engels (1996). [This links to a PDF.]

 

[MECW = Marx & Engels Collected Works.]

 

Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1968a), Selected Works In One Volume (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

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Mepham, J., and Ruben, D-H. (1979a) (eds.), Issues In Marxist Philosophy, Volume Three: Epistemology, Science, Ideology (Harvester Press).

 

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Stalin, J. (1976a), Problems Of Leninism (Foreign Languages Press).

 

--------, (1976b), 'Dialectical And Historical Materialism', in Stalin (1976a), pp.835-73.

 

Stephan, A. (2017), 'Moods In Layers', Philosophia 45, 4, pp.1481-95.

 

Stern, R. (2025a), 'Luther's Influence On Philosophy', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2025 Edition). 

 

--------, (2025b), 'Notes To "Luther's Influence On Philosophy"', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2025 Edition).   

 

Stinner, A. (1994), 'The Story Of Force: From Aristotle To Einstein', Physics Education 29, pp.77-85. [This links to a PDF.]

 

Stove, D. (1991), The Plato Cult And Other Philosophical Follies (Blackwell).

 

Strawson, G. (2014). The Secret Connexion. Causation, Realism And David Hume (Oxford University Press, Revised Edition).

 

Tegmark, M. (2008), 'The Mathematical Universe', Foundations of Physics

 

--------, (2015), Our Mathematical Universe. My Quest For The Ultimate Nature Of Reality (Penguin Books).

 

Thalheimer, A. (1936), Introduction To Dialectical Materialism. The Marxist World-View (Covici Friede Publishers).

 

Trautman, A. (1965), 'Foundations And Current Problems Of General Relativity', in Deser and Ford (1965), and Trautman, et al (1964), pp.1-248. [This links to a PDF of Trautman's chapters only.]

 

Trautman, A., Pirani, F., and Bondi, H. (1965), Lectures On General Relativity, Volume One (Prentice-Hall). [This links to a PDF of Trautman's Chapters only.]

 

Truesdell, C. (1991), A First Course In Rational Continuum Mechanics, Volume One (Academic Press, 2nd ed.).

 

Van Brakel, J. (2000), Philosophy Of Chemistry. Between The Manifest And The Scientific Image (Leuven University Press).

 

VandeWall, H. (2006), 'Why Water Is Not H2O, And Other Critiques Of Essentialist Ontology From The Philosophy Of Chemistry', in Bicchieri and Alexander (2006), pp.906-19.

 

Weston, T. (2012), 'Marx On The Dialectics Of Elliptical Motion', Historical Materialism 20, 4, pp.3-38. [This links to a PDF.]

 

Weiner, P. (1973) (ed.), Dictionary Of The History Of Ideas: Studies Of Selected Pivotal Ideas, Volume One (Scribner).

 

White, R. (1996), The Structure Of Metaphor (Blackwell).

 

--------, (2010), Talking About God. The Concept Of Analogy And The Problem Of Religious Language (Ashgate Publishing).

 

Wilczek, F. (2006), Fantastic Realities. 49 Mind Journeys And A Trip To Stockholm (World Scientific).

 

Williams, L. (1980), The Origins Of Field Theory (University Press of America).

 

Wilson, J. (2002), 'Causal Powers, Forces, And Superdupervenience', Grazer Philosophische Studien 63, pp.53-77. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (2007), 'Newtonian Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, 2, pp.173-205. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (2009), 'The Causal Argument Against Component Forces', Dialectica 63, 4, pp.535-54. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (2010), 'Non-Reductive Physicalism And Degrees Of Freedom', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61, pp.279-311. [This links to a PDF.]

 

Wittgenstein, L. (1976), Wittgenstein's Lectures On The Foundation Of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, edited by Cora Diamond (Harvester Press).

 

--------, (1978), Remarks On The Foundations Of Mathematics, edited by Elizabeth Anscombe (Blackwell, 3rd ed.).

 

--------, (1998), Culture And Value, edited by G. H. von Wright (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).

 

--------, (2013), The Big Typescript: TS 213, edited and translated by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell).

 

Woit, P. (2006), Not Even Wrong. The Failure Of String Theory And The Continuing Challenge To Unify The Laws Of Physics (Vintage). [This links to a PDF.]

 

Wolff, L. (1983), The Science Of Revolution. An Introduction (RCP Publications). [This links to a PDF.]

 

Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995/2007), Reason In Revolt. Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications, 1st ed. 1995; 2nd ed. 2007). [The on-line version now appears to be the 2nd Edition.]

 

Wright, E. (1985/1998), Classes (Verso Books). [The version of this book published at Wright's homepage appears to be the first edition.]

 

--------, (1998) (ed.) The Debate On Classes (Verso, 2nd ed.) [The version of this book published at Wright's homepage appears to be the first edition.]

 

Zilsel, E. (2000), The Social Origins Of Modern Science (Kluwer Academic Press).

 

Word Count: 144,970

 

Latest Up-date: 12/05/26

 

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