Essay Eight Part Two: Opposing Forces And 'Contradictions'
Readers should take note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
It's also worth pointing out that a good 50% of my case against Dialectical Materialism [DM] has been relegated to the End Notes. Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence is to be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate fully my case against DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have raised objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments -- which I have then answered. [I explain why I have done this in Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any objections they might have to my arguments will be missed. [Since I have been debating this theory with comrades for over 25 years, I have heard all the objections there are! Many of the more recent debates are listed here.]
This Essay is just over 78,500 words long; a summary of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections. [If your Firewall has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the "Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!]
(a) Gravity Is Annoyingly Undialectical
(a) Are Forces Merely 'Dialectical Figures Of Speech'?
(b) Are 'Contradictions' Merely Mathematical Models?
(c) Are They Properties Of Totalities?
(3) What Exactly Do Forces 'Contradict'?
(a) Different Types Of Force Couples
(c) First Attempts At Clarification
(d) AR-Forces
(a) Literal Forces In Opposition
(b) The Revenge Of The Non-Existent
(c) Prevention And Its Discontents
(d) A Balanced Account Of Prevention?
(e) S&M?
(f) Hole To Let
(g) Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth
(5) Real Material Contradictions -- Or Are They?
(b) John Rees And Concrete Forces
(c) The Impertinent Explanation
(f) Not What The System Ordered
(g) An Apparent Contradiction At Last!
(6) Last Rites
(a) Dialectics In ER
(c) Dialectics And The Revival Of Teleology
(d) Coup De Grace
(e) For Dialecticians Truth Is Indeed The Hole -- And It's Six Feet Deep
(8) Contradictions In Das Kapital?
(9) Notes
(10) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
In Part Two of this Essay, I intend to substantiate a claim made in Part One, which was that it's not possible to equate 'contradictions' with 'opposing forces', either literally or figuratively.
DM-theorists frequently assert that "contradictions" (in nature or society) may be understood as the inter-relationship between "opposing forces". These forces condition one another, operating either in equilibrium or in disequilibrium, depending on circumstances (and on who is telling the tale) -- but, only if this is backed-up by careful scientific analysis, with the results tested in practice.1
Citations like those listed in Note 1 -- that make this point -- can be multiplied almost indefinitely. To be sure, such passages are often accompanied by extensive qualifications, depending on the context, but the overall message is reasonably clear.2
Nevertheless, my concern here is not so much with whether these passages are consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has (ever) been made to substantiate the sweeping statements they contain with adequate evidence3 -- or any at all --, but with whether the idea that forces can model contradictions itself makes any sense to begin with.
Gravity Is Annoyingly Undialectical
As we will see, the identification of forces with contradictions is thoroughly misguided.4 There are several obvious initial difficulties with the whole idea. For example, if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are hence 'contradictory' -- there would clearly have to be at least two of them both operating and oppositional for that to be the case. But, when we consider one of the most important and general examples of motion found in the universe -- the orbital trajectory of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in classical Physics, at least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in question toward the centre of mass of the system. So, if classical Physics is correct, it's not easy to see how such forces could be viewed as 'contradictions'.5
Even post-classical Physics offers little comfort to DM-theorists. There, such motion is either a function of the topology of Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been edited out of the picture), or it's the result of a body being situated in a tensor, vector and/or scalar field, in as many dimensions of phase space as are deemed necessary.6
And this is not just true of gravity; as physicist Max Jammer notes:
"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....
"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]6a
Even comrades Woods and Grant acknowledge this fact:
"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]
However, and despite what these two say, it's reasonably clear that a mere "relation" between two bodies is incapable of making one or both of them move, unless there were a force there (or something else consequent on that relation -- such as a time-based trajectory along a "world-line", perhaps?) to bring it about.6b
Unfortunately, this now means that most (if not all) of the bulk motion in the universe can't be accounted for by DM (that is, if it's viewed as the result of 'contradictions' interpreted as opposing forces). Plainly, if there is only one force present (or perhaps none at all), there can't be any dialectical 'contradictions' to begin with.
Hence, it would seem that DM can't explain much -- if any -- of the bulk motion found in nature.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Admittedly, Engels made a weak attempt to solve the orbital 'problem' by inventing a repulsive force, which he implausibly identified with "heat"; this fanciful notion is discussed in Note 7.7
Is This An Apt Analogy?
Are Forces Merely 'Dialectical Figures Of Speech'?
In view of the above, it might be wise to interpret "opposing forces" as figurative 'contradictions' -- or, maybe, the other way round, interpreting 'contradictions' as figurative "forces". Either or both of these could then form part of an analogical or perhaps metaphorical (but non-literal) depiction of nature and society. Alternatively, forces could be described as 'contradictions' as a sort of shorthand, which would then enable the modelling of different types of accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right. Indeed, Engels seems to have had this in mind in the quotation below, where he argues that attraction and repulsion should not be regarded as forces, but as simple forms of motion. This retreat was perhaps recommended to him by his admission that the concept "force" was derived from ancient animistic/mystical views of nature, hence its use in DM could smack of anthropomorphism:8
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Ibid., p.82. Bold emphasis added.]
However, this revision has two untoward consequences Engels appears not to have noticed:
(1) It makes his version of DM look even more positivistic that it already seems (at least in DN). If the appeal to forces in nature is no more than a shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then forces will have no real counterpart in nature. The whole idea would then be little more than a "useful fiction", introduced to account for the phenomena instrumentally. This would make the identification of forces with contradictions even more problematic (as will be demonstrated below); plainly, and once again: if there are no forces, there can be no DM-'contradictions'.
[DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954); UO = Unity of Opposites.]
(2) Given this re-write of the word "force", the contradictory relationship between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative motion. [Woods and Grant seem to be thinking along these lines, as we saw earlier.]
Unfortunately, in that case, there would be no interconnection between such bodies -- which is an essential factor required by other DM-theses. This seems to mean that causal interactions of this sort are externally-motivated, not mediated by forces, and thus can't be internally inter-conditioned. On this account, the 'unity-in-opposition' between antagonistic elements of the Totality will have been broken; the thesis that change is the result of 'internal contradictions' would then be left without any sort of internal, mediating factors. [This confusion was analysed in detail in Part One.]
Not even the relative motion between bodies travelling in opposite directions could supply a credible dialectical connection here, should there be an interaction. Clearly, this would fail to capture the "internal relations" that DM-theorists claim exist between such bodies. Once more, objects behaving like this wouldn't be internally interrelated (as part or parts of a UO), since the connection or mediation between moving bodies would clearly be missing. Hence, any subsequent interaction would be difficult to account for dialectically, which would not be good news for dialecticians, to state the obvious.9
As already noted, with events and processes sealed-off from each other in this way DM would begin to resemble CAR and 'crude materialism' all the more. Indeed, if this is how DM is supposed to be interpreted, it would differ from 'crude mechanical materialism' in name only.
Of course, even if Engels's version of DM could account for motion occurring along a certain line of action -- but in diametrically opposed directions --, it would be of little help because most of the bulk motion in the universe is not of this sort; it is either orbital motion under the action of a central force, or movement along a geodesic (depending on which version of modern Physics one attends to). In fact, as we will see, matter in general moves in complex ways which are difficult if not impossible to depict in such crude oppositional terms.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
Like it or not, DM-theorists need real material forces acting between bodies so that the "Totality" has the holistic/mediated integrity we are told it requires. A theoretical fiction is no use at all. Forces must exist, and reference to them as 'contradictions', 'internally-related' to one another, must be concrete and literal.10
Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as 'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by dialecticians that they are offering an 'objective' account of nature. It's not at all easy to see how figurative language could fill the gaps in an explanation of objects and processes in the material world, any more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:
"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun." [Romeo
and Juliet, Act Two, Scene Two.]
Or, at least, no more than would describing a man as a "pig" imply he has a curly tail and is a potential source of bacon.
Despite this, in view of the above difficulties -- and in addition to those that will be detailed below --, interpreting forces figuratively might prove to be the only viable way that contradictions could be regarded as 'forces', even if this compromises DM's avowedly 'objective' picture of reality.11
Of course, if this view of the nature of forces were adopted by dialecticians, it would be difficult to distinguish their theory from Instrumentalism or Conventionalism.
On the other hand, it's not easy to see how 'figurative forces' could account for anything; what sort of explanation would it be to say that contradictions -- already suspiciously figurative themselves -- can be modelled by forces, which are figures of speech to begin with? Describing a man as, say, a "pig" might perhaps account for his crude behaviour (but not on the basis of his anatomy or physiology as a literal pig), but the utility of this metaphor would be virtually nil if it were now admitted that the word "man" was figurative too. Unlike iterated negations, multiple tropes do not undo each other.
Nevertheless, even if this proved to be an acceptable resolution of Engels's problem, it would still fail to provide DM-theorists with a viable way out of their difficulties. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation of DM-'contradictions' with forces in nature or society can't work. This is so for several reasons.
Contradictions As Mathematical Models?
The first of these is connected with the way that forces are already represented in Mathematics and Physics, for example, which doesn't appear to be even remotely appropriate for use in depicting contradictions as literal forces. Consider the following:
(A) Forces often operate according to an inverse square law. It is not easy to see how the same could be true of contradictions. Presumably, two objects, states of affairs or processes contradict each other in nature or society or they do not.12 Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a contradiction could operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its oppositional elements were doubled. Do bosses really become more conciliatory if workers walk away from them? Or if the local trade union offices are located in a distant town? Does wealth cause less conflict if the rich move their money to the Cayman Islands? Do appearances 'contradict' reality any the more, or less, if someone uses a microscope, or presses his/her face against the surface of an object?13
Indeed, little sense can be made of the idea that there is a literal separation distance between the elements of a DM-'contradiction' -- for instance, that there is, or could be, a separation distance between Capital and Labour, or that there might be one such between the "forces and relations of production", or even one between a body and itself as it moves in a 'contradictory' sort of way. What could it possibly mean to suggest, for example, that the "contradiction between use value and exchange value" changes if these two items are further apart? Clearly, these two 'entities' can't be separated (except perhaps in thought), but even if they could, they would still be just as contradictory as they were before (one presumes?). And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote magnitude unaffected by such changes.
Sure, dialecticians speak about the "contradictions" in the capitalist system "intensifying", but this is not because the 'separation distance' between the classes has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists in fact mean by "intensification" here (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions" become more obvious, intractable, or crisis-ridden), they certainly do not mean it in the same way that physicists mean it when they talk about, say, the strength of a force field intensifying. Nor is there any mathematics involved. So, while a technician, say, might be dispatched to measure the intensity of forces in the earth's crust prior to an earthquake as part of a genuine scientific research programme, no one, it seems, has ever been asked to do the same with these "intensifying" 'dialectical contradictions'. They (or at least their 'strength') appear to be permanently locked in subjective space, stubbornly impervious to scientific investigation.
(B) Forces in nature can be represented by vectors, the use of which is governed by well-understood rules. As such, for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added, subtracted and multiplied (to give inner, vector or scalar triple products, and the like) -- and by means of which diverse quantities, such as areas, volumes, field densities, boundary fluxes (etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors may be parallel or orthogonal to one another, or to previously defined axes, just as they can be decomposed into their components and projected onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can also be used to identify and classify the mathematical properties of various manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined in a given vector space, providing it with a base and spanning set. Modulii can be ascertained for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can also be calculated or determined. Furthermore, matrices can be employed to represent vectors more efficiently, their determinants and inverses thus ascertained. The ordinary and partial derivatives of vectors can be calculated, and they can be integrated (as part of line, surface or volume integrals), and so on.
It's difficult to see how any of these (and a many others) could possibly be true of a single DM-'contradiction' interpreted (literally or metaphorically) as a force. What, for example, is the angle between the 'contradictions' mentioned on the opening pages of TAR:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction….
"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line?
"The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]
And what is the cross product between these found in Socialist Worker:
"Elvis's career illuminated a contradiction at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism needs to generate profits in order to survive. But to suck profit out of workers it also needs an ideology to ensure that workers know their place in society...." [Ian Birchall, Socialist Worker, 14/08/07.]
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.
"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting "you're breaking the law" to the strikers....
"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence.
"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, "Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out."
"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Simon Basketter, Socialist Worker, 01/09/07.]13a
Is it possible to find the inner product of the 'contradiction' between freedom and necessity? Is there an eigenvector applicable to the 'contradiction' between 'appearance' and 'underlying essence'? Is there any way of specifying the extent to which bosses and workers -- Capital and Labour -- contradict one another, individually or as a class? If so, what is the modulus of the 'contradiction' between boss NN and worker MM (or that between the classes to which they belong)? Is the 'contradiction' between ice and water orthogonal to…, well what?
But, what of the div, curl and grad of the 'contradiction' between a grain of barley and the plant that grows from it? Can we ascertain the Jacobian for the contradictory relationship between wealth and poverty? Is the 'contradiction', between "John" and his "manhood" normal to a given direction or manifold?
In her otherwise excellent book, Lindsey German says the following:
"The Working class has to have a party to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle by an organised minority…." [German (1996), p.87.]
But, if contradictions were literal forces, we would be able to ascertain, say, the i, j and k components of "the contradiction between [the] potential revolutionary role [of the working-class] and its actual situation", differentiate them, and find out how quickly the said link was changing, and in what direction.14 The fact that we can't do this -- and no sane Marxist has ever even so much as attempted to do it (nor yet even theorised about the possibility for doing this) -- suggests perhaps that in practice not even DM-fans think this analogy is at all apt, or, indeed, all that literal.
Hence, if 'contradictions' could be interpreted literally as forces, it would be possible to construct a vector algebra depicting them in nature and as part of the class struggle. Do we possess such a 'Vector Algebra of Revolution'? Has anyone ever bothered to construct one? Given the title of his book, the author of TAR was strangely silent on this issue.14a
The second reason why this is an inappropriate way to depict 'contradictions' arises from a consideration of the sort of response that could be made to the objections outlined above; it could be claimed that it's the inter-relationship between contradictory forces that explains change, and hence that it is only within a network of forces situated in a Totality of some sort that the contradictory inter-play between them becomes clear. Indeed, it could be argued that the above interpretation of contradictions (which pictures them as seemingly isolated entities) completely misconstrues both their role in DM and their operation in nature and society.
This volunteered objection was in fact considered in Part One of this Essay -- but from a slightly different angle (no pun intended) -- where it was pointed out that there is a serious ambiguity in DM/'Materialist Dialectics' on this issue. That is because DM-theorists are unclear whether 'contradictions' are (1) internal to objects and processes (causing them to change as a result of an internal dynamic), or whether they (2) merely arise externally between objects (as they form part of a mediated system, group of systems or processes), or (3) if it is just our description of objects and processes which is 'contradictory' (this resulting from our partial knowledge of reality, etc.), or (4) if it's a combination of all three -- or indeed (5) whether something else is true of these elusive DM-'contradictions'. This confusion is compounded by the fact that, in the hands of DM-theorists, the meaning of "internal" oscillates uncontrollably between "spatially internal" and "logically internal".
And, as we also saw in Part One, while each of these options faces serious difficulties of its own, they all fail to explain change -- since they merely re-describe it, and they do so in a thoroughly obscure manner -- which is why these alternatives fall apart so easily when they are examined closely (as we will soon see is also the case with respect to forces and 'contradictions').
In response, it could be argued that the problem with the sort of analysis of dialectical systems presented in these Essays is that it attempts to 'objectify' contradictions (i.e., it endeavours to make objects out of them). Hence, it could be countered that in Materialist Dialectics it's not 'objects' that are subject to contradictions -- or which contain them, or which are them --, but systems/totalities in change that reveal their inner contradictions, and which motivate development. In that case, it could be maintained that contradictions are properties of systems/totalities in the process of change, not of 'objects' as such.
In reply to these volunteered DM-responses it is worth asking where this leaves forces if contradictions are no longer to be viewed as 'objects' or as 'object-like'. Forces presumably have a physical form of some sort; they are not just relations, are they? In addition, this response makes a mockery of many things the DM-classicists say about change. For example, here is Lenin:
"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Italic emphasis added.]
Many more similar quotations can be found in Part One of this Essay.
But, even if forces were just relations, it's far from easy to see what it is that could possibly physically relate objects and processes in nature and society, that is, over and above a few Hegelian 'concepts' of suspicious provenance and even more dubious content.
Indeed, in all this, it seems that the idea that objects change because of an 'inner dynamic' has been lost sight of again. If objects change only because of a set of external forces -- albeit, which forces are internal to a "Totality", mediated, or not, by the yet-to-be-explained 'influence' of that "Totality" --, this can only mean that "external" has now become the new "internal". In that case, "internal contradictions" are in effect those which an object merely experiences in its external relations with other objects and processes (which are internal to the "Totality"). But, once more: what is the point of arguing that change is "internally-motivated" if external mediation is the only show in town, and forces are merely "relations"?
[As we will see in Essay Four Part Two, when it is published, these "relations" are 'logical' anyway, and no less bogus for all that.]
In addition, the proffered DM-response outlined a few paragraphs back fails to resolve the problems mentioned earlier. First of all, as we will also see in Essay Eleven Part One, there is good reason to question the nature of the nebulous DM-"Totality" -- or, to be more honest, there would be if we knew what 'it' was (and there was some sign that dialecticians themselves knew what 'it' was!). Its re-appearance here can only cloud the issues, therefore.
Secondly, even if a clear account of the "Totality" were forthcoming, this way of depicting forces would still not work. If contradictions are properties of totalities -- and not of their parts -- then the parts could not change, since, on this account, contradictions would not belong to them, but to the whole, taken as a whole. In that case, while the whole might change, it would do so only as a result of the rearrangement of its changeless parts. Given this way of thinking, the "Totality" (or, indeed, any sub-system of the "Totality") would be composed of (1) infinitely small changeless elementary particles, or it (they) would be composed of (2) infinitely complex (further) sub-systems, which enjoyed no interconnections themselves. [The reader is referred back to Part One for a more detailed explanation of this point.]
Again, it could be objected that a Totality is constituted by its own internal contradictory processes; that is precisely what a Totality is -- a contradictory, differentiated unity. The account given above seems to want to separate the parts from the whole.
However, this reply will still not do, for on that basis it would now seem that it is part and whole which are contradictory (and in a manner that is still unclear). And yet, such parts can't be contradictory in the same way that wholes are. That is because, on this account, parts mutually condition one another; this, presumably, is the nature of their mediated 'unity in contradiction'. However, the "Totality" is related to nothing else that could condition it. So, if the "Totality" is a contradictory whole, then it would have to be so in a new and-as-yet-unspecified sense.
In fact, as seems obvious from what little DM-theorists themselves have said about the "Totality", it looks like 'it' must be an Unconditioned Absolute. It certainly can't be conditioned from the 'outside', otherwise it would not be the Whole. If, on the other hand, it were conditioned from the 'outside', an infinite 'exgress' (inflation -- i.e., the opposite of an infinite regress) would be implied, for, plainly, we should want to know if and how this 'external' object/process (about which we know even less) was itself conditioned, and by what -- and so on. But we have been here already...
And it seems these observations must apply otherwise, for the "Totality" to be contradictory, it would have to 'contradict' its parts. [Ex hypothesi it would have to do this anyway, since there is nothing else for it to condition.] Moreover these parts must then contradict each other in turn in the same way, after all. [The opposite supposition will be considered presently.]
And yet, if the "Totality" is composed solely of its parts (unless it is "more than the sum of its parts" -- that Wholist cliché is exposed for what it is, a dead end, in Essay Eleven Part Two), the contradiction between the "Totality" and its parts must be (1) The same as the contradiction between each of the aforementioned parts, or it must be (2) More than that between its parts (since, as we have just seen, dialecticians believe that the whole is more than the sum of its parts).15
As far as (1) is concerned, it seems that the "Totality" must drop out of the picture as a sort of shorthand for the sum total of parts in contradictory change -- thus becoming a mere fiction, only this time a useless one.16
On the other hand, if (2) were the case, we would be owed an explanation of the alleged 'contradiction' between that 'more' and this 'less' -- i.e., between this 'more-of-a-"Totality"' and its 'lesser parts'. But, as things stand, we have no idea whether this new 'contradictory' relation between whole and part is the same as that which operates between the parts, or if it is different.
[Anyone impatient with this nit-picking should re-direct their complaints to their local Dialectical Magus; such pedantry is forced upon us because even now, after more than 140 years, we still have no idea what these 'forces' are, how they can possibly 'contradict' one another, or what the mysterious "Totality" is. The first two of these allegations will be substantiated as this Essay unfolds; the third will be considered in detail in Essay Eleven Part One.]
However, independently of the above 'difficulties', this 'theory' still faces other serious problems. If the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts is the same as (and no more than) that which exists between the parts, then manifestly the whole would not then be more than the sum of the parts (in at least this respect), since the whole would in that case be the entire 'contradictory' ensemble, all of whose elements (whole and part) operate alike. But, this would be contrary to the DM-hypothesis that wholes (whether these are wholes made of 'contradictory' parts or not) are more than the sum of their parts, whose natures (including the nature of their "internal contradictions") are said to be determined entirely by (while not being reducible to) the nature of their parts and the interconnection between these parts. Conversely, if the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts were not the same as that between the parts, then we would still have an unexplained type of 'contradiction': that which exists between a mysterious whole that is "more than the sum of the parts" and those parts themselves.17
Anyway, the idea that the whole 'contradicts' the parts in the same way that the parts 'contradict' one another does not appear to be a viable option for DM-theorists. The parts relate to each other by "mediation", apparently; but how can the part-whole relation be one of "mediation"? The mutually 'contradictory' nature of the parts in development constitutes the whole; if now the whole has its own 'contradictory' relation with the parts over and above this (if, as we are told, it is more than the sum of the parts), then this new 'contradictory' relation can't be one of part on part. But, if it isn't, then what is it?
Hence, as noted in Part One of this Essay, it seems that a literal interpretation of 'contradictions' as forces lapses either into some form of CAR, or it inflates alarmingly into HEX and/or AIDS. Conversely, if the identification of forces with contradictions is merely figurative, then DM would be indistinguishable from, say, metaphysical poetry.
[HEX = Hegelian Expansionism; AIDS = Absolute Idealism; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
Notwithstanding all this, in order to examine this issue more thoroughly, let us suppose that some sort of solution to all the above 'difficulties' can be found -- by someone, at some point, somehow.
However, even if we assumed this, the analogy between forces and contradictions would still not work.
The substantiation of the above claim brings this discussion to the third reason for questioning the connection between forces and 'contradictions'.
Different Types Of Force Couples
In a physical system there may be several different combinations of interacting attractive and/or repulsive forces. If we abbreviate "attractive" and "repulsive" to "A" and "R", respectively, there appear to be only three types of combinations of just two of these: "AA-", "AR-" and "RR-forces".18
Many of the quotations given in Note 1 seem to imply that only AR-forces are 'contradictory' in DM. This sort of combination will be examined later. However, AA- and RR-forces were not explicitly ruled out, and in a thoroughgoing analysis of every conceivable option available to DM-theorists, they clearly need to be considered. Hence, it is to these that I now turn.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how an AA-force could be interpreted as a unity of opposites -- let alone as 'contradictory'. They are the same type of force, so they can hardly be opposites. But, such forces abound in nature. For example, as noted earlier, the centre of gravity of any conglomeration of matter in the universe is the result of countless such AA-forces. Plainly, in systems like this, kinematic (or rather dynamic) changes are caused by non-opposites. So, when, say, a planet is in the process of formation, particles begin to gravitate together under the operation of forces of mutual attraction --, i.e., these aforementioned non-opposites.19
Similarly, it is not easy to see how RR-forces could be interpreted as 'contradictory' -- or even as opposites -- , either, and yet these are also found throughout nature. For example, intra-atomic forces of repulsion prevent nuclei from approaching one another.20
One objection to the above immediately springs to mind: it ignores the fact that such forces operate in the manner they do because they work in opposition to one another -- that is, they do so in ways that bring them into, or out of equilibrium. However, this response in fact concerns forces acting as AR-couples, which option will be examined later. It can't therefore assist us in our attempt to analyse AA- and RR-forces.
Despite this, even if it were true that A-forces are opposites of each other, in order for them still to be regarded as 'contradictory' they could not also be regarded as the opposite of R-forces -- unless, that is, A-forces are now permitted to have two sorts of "opposites": other A- and other R-forces. But, in that case, this would make a mockery of the notion that there are "polar opposites" at work here in natural systems of forces (implicated in change, equilibria and in 'contradictions'):
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
It is difficult to see how a particular A-force could be the "polar opposite" of another A-force while at the same time being the polar opposite of an R-force -- i.e., how A- and R-forces could have two "polar opposites" without altering the meaning of the phrase "polar opposite". Even then, if the meaning of "polar opposite" were adapted to neutralise this 'difficulty', it would succeed in doing that only because of a subjective linguistic adjustment. In that case, any 'truths' that sprang into existence as a result would plainly be a by-product of yet another piece of terminological juggling, and not because of the way the world happens to be (which would mean, of course, that dialectics had been read into nature).21
However, there are dialecticians who claim that objects and processes possess many "opposites"; for example Gollobin (1986), p.122 (but even he says these are "paired").
Of course, this whole metaphysic originated in the twisted 'logic' that one finds in Hegel's work, who posited a unique opposite (an "other") for each and every item implicated in change, in order to forestall the criticism that if everything changes into 'what-it-is-not' (i.e., its 'opposite'), then, since everything else in the universe is 'what-it-is-not' to any given object or process, every object/process would change into that anything-else-whatsoever. [On this, see here.]
In which case, instead of growing into barley plants, seeds, for example, could turn into volcanoes, unexploded bombs, Stalin's moustache or your left hand, and much else besides.
[In Part Three of this Essay we will see that Hegel had to abandon the idea that objects and processes were somehow linked to a logical(?), or unique, 'opposite'/"other". In Essay Seven Part One, it will be shown that this concession fatally damages Hegel's attempt to respond to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation (reposted below).]
But, if objects and processes are allowed to have many (and possibly an infinite number of) 'opposites' -- all of which they could change into --, that would further demolish Hegel's already crumbling system, which postulates that everything is paired with its own unique "other". Naturally, if true, this idea would mean that the Empire State Building, for instance, could change into, say, a T Rex, and the Pacific Ocean could develop into George W Bush, and a host of other things into the bargain. Since this sort of thing does not happen, so far as we know, we must conclude that:
(1) Hegel was right: objects and processes have only one unique "other", which is either:
(a) Dialectically/logically 'internal' to that object or process, which would in turn mean that no object or process could turn into this unique 'other' since the latter already exists, or,
(b1) 'External' to that object or process, meaning that the cause of change can't be internal to objects and processes -- or perhaps even,
(b2) 'external' to that object or process, which object or process turns into that 'other', meaning that change can't have been caused by that 'other' -- and the whole point of accepting this 'logical' exercise will now have vanished;
Or:
(2) Forces have only one opposite, not many.21a
Nevertheless, it could be argued that in this context the word "opposite" really means "oppositional". This change of emphasis now underlines the active inter-relation that exists between forces rather than their passive interconnection, which is something the above discussion seems to have ignored. Hence, it could seem perfectly natural to speak of RR- or AA-forces as contradictory in this sense --, i.e., in the sense that all and only those forces that are oppositional (i.e., which engage in, or are part of some sort of "struggle") should be classed as contradictory.
Or, so it might be claimed.
However, this latest revision seems to be inconsistent with the claims made in several of the passages quoted in Note 1. These appear to suggest that only certain forces were to be regarded as inseparable from matter. Others indicated that forces were merely the consequence of the complex inter-play between quanta of energy (or of motion). For example, Engels claimed that:
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
Once again, this seems to lose sight of internally-connected oppositionality, since Engels appears to edit out of the picture the dialectical interrelation between forces, replacing it/them with mere "forms of motion".
Now, "forms of motion" are not in any obvious way interconnected if the relevant forces are edited out. But, DM requires bodies in motion to be inter-related; that is why intermediary forces seem to be so useful. Forces and 'contradictions' were clearly supposed to assume just such a role --, i.e., forming part of the 'connective tissue' of reality, as it were. If they are now re-classified as little more than "useful fictions" -- i.e., as relative "forms of motion" --, there would seem to be nothing physical left in nature to act as either the bearer, or the mediator of these interconnections. Without a material substrate, 'contradictions' could only operate on bodies or processes magically, or, perhaps supernaturally, it would seem.
Ignoring again for the present the above serious difficulties, perhaps the above objection means something like the following:
F1: All and only those forces that are oppositional -- or are implicated in struggle -- are contradictory.
But, if F1 were true, motion itself couldn't be regarded as a product of 'contradictory forces' -- unless we confine our attention solely to accelerated motion -- since, ex hypothesi, no net forces operate in cases where there is no acceleration (in post-Aristotelian Physics, that is). Even then, accelerated motion (under gravity, say) is subject to only one force (or, rather, one resultant force) in classical Physics, and none at all in relativistic Physics.
At best, therefore, taking a classical view, most of the accelerated motion in the universe (which covers, as far as we know, all of the bulk, non-rectilinear movement in nature) is the product of only one force. Given F1, it's not easy to see how such motion could be viewed as part of a 'contradictory' Totality, if the 'classical view' is correct. So, if F1 does indeed express what DM-theorists mean, then most (perhaps all) of the motion in nature could not have been induced, caused, changed or sustained by a set of DM-'contradictions'. With that observation, much of classical DM falls apart.22
It could be objected to this that, as a matter of fact, all motion in the universe is the result of a disequilibrium between oppositional forces; that is precisely what a resultant force is. In that case, therefore, bodies would move (or their state of motion would change) because of just such an imbalance between forces. Hence, for example, the planets -- which move in apparently steady orbits around the Sun -- actually have their trajectories determined by resultant forces internal to the Solar System, the Galaxy and beyond, all of which are induced by complex inter-relating systems of forces.
Or, so it could be argued, once more.
This objection will be considered in more detail later, but for present purposes it's sufficient to point out that it's difficult to see how such forces could be regarded as oppositional. Presumably, these forces do not affect each other; they simply change whatever motion is already present in the system. At best, then, such forces would only oppose the impressed motion already present -- which motion would itself have been the result of still other forces operating earlier in the system. This can be seen from the fact that if the moving bodies in question had not been in the said 'force field', these forces would have had nothing on which they could act. In 'empty space', plainly, we would see no new motion.23 Forces without bodies to operate on do not interfere with each other, as far as we know -- unless they are themselves regarded as particulate somehow (or are carried by particles), which would, of course, mean they weren't forces but bodies to begin with.24
Classically, forces seem to work only on bodies by altering their motion. In which case, the supposed opposition is not between bodies, nor is it between bodies and forces, nor even between forces and forces -- it is between forces and the (already) impressed motion of bodies in the system. But, this picture is difficult to square with the idea that there is a UO at work here -- nor does it seem to tally with the claim that dialectically polar opposites ultimately induce all motion and change. This is because (once more) forces do not oppose each other; they oppose or augment whatever motion is already present in the system, however it was caused.
In short, on this 'revised' view, the term "contradiction" would not apply to opposing forces (i.e., to forces that oppose one another), nor to bodies; on the contrary, 'contradictions' would connect forces with movement already present. But, as yet, no DM-theorist has given any clear sense to the idea that a force could 'contradict' the impressed motion in a system. And rightly so; there are no opposites here for a DM-'contradiction' to latch onto. How could a force be the 'opposite' of a change of place?
It could be objected that as a matter of fact forces in nature oppose (in the sense of change) motion. Indeed, it could be argued that dialecticians examine forces as they actually operate in nature (as opposed to those abstracted from it); such opposites objectively exist and can't be analysed away.
This much will not be disputed here (even if its wording might). But, in what way can this set-up be said to involve the interconnection of opposites? And, what sense can be given to the idea that motion in one direction is the opposite of a force that affects it? Certainly they are not unified opposites (i.e., opposites on the same type, so they are not logically connected, in the Hegelian sense of this word).
At best, the force concerned might tend to produce an opposite motion (or change in motion, perhaps) to that which has already been impressed (or even none at all). But, to describe force and motion as "opposites" would appear to make about as much sense as claiming that "left" was the opposite of "television", even if as a matter of fact someone moved a television to the left. Their actual linkage in reality has nothing to do with whether it is sensible to describe such items as unified opposites, or even as oppositional. These terms are categorically different -- as are "force" and "motion". Hence, it is not a question of whether or not DM-theorists are dealing with 'objective' facts; it's whether asking why this objection can only be made to work by mis-describing things.25
Only those who feel confident that they can provide a clear sense to the idea that forces and motion are opposites may reject the above objection with anything more than a wave of the hand. Moreover, as we will see, forces often augment motion, they do not always "oppose" it; indeed, most of the bulk motion in the universe is of this sort, as was pointed out earlier.26
However, even if this could be done, it would still be bad news for DM. That is because any other allegedly oppositional force in the system could not then also be the opposite of the original pairing between this force and that motion. And that in turn would mean that systems of opposing forces could not function in DM as is currently supposed. In that case, it wouldn't be forces that opposed one another (as had originally been claimed); in such a set-up, forces would oppose impressed motion (not other forces), and the idea that change was the result of systematically inter-related forces would have to be abandoned.
As should now seem obvious, each item in a complex ensemble of this sort would have to be viewed as the opposite of every other. Given such an arrangement, any moving body would have countless 'opposites' (i.e., any other forces and/or moving bodies in the system).27 This would put a strain on the meaning of the word "opposite", once more, which would remain until the meaning of that word had been altered accordingly, so that several items could be regarded as the "opposite" of any one or more others. Under such circumstances, as we have already seen, the notion of a polar opposite would lose its key role in DM. In fact, it would become meaningless if everything possessed innumerable "polar opposites". [This is quite apart from the fact that this would undermine the DM-theory of change.]
Not only that, as we have also seen several times, given such ad hoc linguistic tinkering, dialectics would apply to nature and society only because of a new and subjectively applied linguistic convention.
Unfortunately, this jellyfish-of-a-theory can't be squeezed anywhere without some of it slipping through our fingers somewhere else. What had been touted all along as a grand theory that could explain change as a consequence of the 'contradictory' nature of reality -- or, as the result of the interplay between opposite forces -- on this interpretation now seems to amount to little more than a few vague ideas about the relation between a force and the impressed motion in a system, and now fatally implicated with the admission that the DM-Totality is a mediated system of forces only because the definition of a "polar opposite" had been 'adjusted' accordingly. If this is what DM-theorists mean when they asserted their impressive sounding 'dialectical' theses then it seems that their theory can only be rescued by making reality Ideal -- i.e., making its 'truth' sensitive to such ad hoc linguistic 'surgery'.
However, even if the above objections are incorrect in some way, in DM-terms, none of it makes any sense, since none of these opposites (force and motion) could turn into one another, as the DM-classics say they should:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62. Bold emphasis added.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Engels (1976) p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Bold emphasis added.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]…. [Ibid., pp.221-22. Last set of parentheses in the original; bold emphasis added.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead,
rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one
another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is
that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or
rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given
conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are
referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete
transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves
into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the
mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is
absolute." [Mao (1937),
pp.340-42. Bold emphases added.]
[Plenty more of the same here.]
Force does not change into movement, nor does movement change into force.
Someone could object that indeed they do change into one another (perhaps via an exchange of energy, or as part of an equal and opposite reaction, etc.).
But, if that were so, another problem would immediately assert itself. If force F were to turn into new movement M, then the one would follow upon the other: F would create M at a later instant in time, otherwise it could not turn into it. Plainly, if M already exists, F could not turn into it. Unfortunately, in that case, F and M can't 'struggle' with one another, for the two would not exist simultaneously in order for this to happen. If, on the other hand, F were to change as a result of some as yet unspecified factor, say F*, then F*, not M, would now to be the opposite of F, and F would turn into F*, not into M.
Alternatively, consider force F and movement M, the first supposedly opposing, or 'contradicting' the second -- perhaps F is the reaction force of a body that has just collided with another moving body. It could be argued that in this case the motion M of the second body produced the reaction F, and the reaction F then alters the motion M.
To that end, let us imagine two bodies, A and B, in collision. Let the motion of both be MA1 and MB1, respectively, before the collision, and MA2 and MB2 after. Further, let the reaction force produced in each body be FA and FB. Hence, MA1 produces FB and MB1 produces FA. In turn FA then produces MB2 and FB then produces MA2. But, according to the DM-classics, an object or process turns into that with which it 'struggles', its dialectical 'opposite'. So, since MA1 turns into MA2 it must have 'struggled' with it. The same applies to MA1 and MA2. But this can't happen since neither of MA2 and MB2 exist yet for MA1 and MB1 to 'struggle' with! If they did, MA1 and MB1 could not change into them.
On the other hand, if FA 'struggles' with MB1, then, according to the DM-classics, it must change into it. The same applies to FB and MA1. But, MB1 changes into MB2 not FA and MA1 changes into MA2 not FB. Once more, we hit the same brick wall.
Even worse, there is an equal and opposite reaction force in both A and B, namely RA and RB, produced by FA and FB, respectively. That is: RA = -FA and RB = -FB. Exactly how these are supposed to fit into the 'dialectical' picture is even less clear. DM-fans are invited to play around with them as much as they like, the result will be no less disconcerting.
Howsoever we try to re-package this badly formulated 'theory', none of it seems to make any sense.
[This is just a particular example of a more general, but fatal defect that lies right at the heart of the DM-'theory' of change, exposed in much more detail here. Nevertheless, this point can be generalised, as it will be below, to show that no two (or more) forces could 'contradict' one another in the way that dialecticians imagine.]
Nevertheless, in order to examine every possible alternative, I propose to analyse this option in more detail. To that end, I will offer a clarification of what it might mean.
First Attempts At Clarification
Perhaps, then the following re-write might succeed in repairing this part of DM, at the same time as avoiding undermining the thesis that UOs operate everywhere in nature:
F2: A UO involves the opposition between a force P1 and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has produced (or would have produced) in a body B (had P1 never existed). The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this struggle.
F2 appears to link the operation of one force (P1) with that of another set of forces (Q). However, it's difficult to distinguish what F2 says about these two from the vector resultant of two forces if we subjected this system to the usual mathematical analysis. If so, the word "struggle" would amount to little more than an anthropomorphic re-write of the functional relations that exist within the vector calculus, only now applied to just one force, the resultant. In that case, if and when P1 and Q interact, they will produce just one resultant force R, which would alone induce the recorded change in motion.28
But, if at is so, a contradiction between forces can't arise: if there is only one force operating in the system, no contradiction can arise. In that case, F2 threatens to undermine this interpretation of DM by killing it for want of forces.29
This failure suggests we should reconsider an option left unexplored earlier; i.e., the one which argued that forces are the only legitimate candidates to be placed in such oppositional couples, but not the motion they change/induce -- contrary to what Engels seems to have believed when he tried to replace forces with relative motion.
On this view, forces are 'contradictory' only of other forces, and not of bodies or of already impressed motion in the system. The following might, therefore, bring out more clearly this latest alternative:
F3: Given a body B, and a system of forces P, comprising n vectors p1-pn operating on B, a resultant force vector R represents the outcome of the struggle between these n contradictory force vectors. In this, R need not be fixed, but could itself be subject to countless changes as body B moves under the influence of P, which would also change accordingly.
One immediate problem with this is that the specification of the forces belonging to P depends on the choice of co-ordinate system and inertial frame.30 This indicates that the representation of forces as 'contradictions' is perhaps more convention-sensitive that it is reality-driven -- which would mean, of course, that 'dialectical contradictions' are no more 'objective' than, say, latitude and longitude are.
However, even if this latest difficulty is put to one side, it's still worth asking whether any sense can be made of F3.
As noted above, F3 seems to bring us back full circle to the idea that forces -- not bodies, or the motion of bodies -- are mutually 'contradictory'. And yet, as we have just seen, it is not possible to depict AA- and RR-forces as 'contradictory', unless their effects are involved in some way.
Unfortunately, as we have noted several times, if "force" is just a convenient shorthand for relative motion, it would mean that this part of DM was more consistent with a CAR-like picture of reality -- in so far as elements of the "Totality" would now be externally- (not internally-) related to one another.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
To repeat: it is not easy to see how the motion of one body could be internally-related to that of others without re-introducing the idea that bodies exercise an effect on one another independently of how they are moving -- and while that might subsequently affect their movement, it wouldn't internally-link such bodies. And yet, this is precisely the difficulty that exercised traditional philosophers as part of the classical metaphysical problem of the nature of forces; DM has merely reproduced it in an obscure form.31
Perhaps the slide into CAR may be prevented by the following re-wording of F3:
F4: Given a system of forces P, comprising n vectors p1-pn, a resultant force vector R represents the outcome of the struggle between these n force vectors.
F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.
F5 is clearly one aspect of the thesis that the whole determines the nature of its parts, and vice versa. Hence, F4 and F5 appear to restore the dialectical unity that earlier paragraphs seem to have sundered.
Unfortunately, this just brings us back in full circle to a consideration of the relationship between the "Totality" and its parts. This is because F5 introduces its own pernicious version of HEX, for it seems impossible (on this account) to determine whether or not anything is 'contradictory' unless the nature of the whole was ascertained first. But, since the latter is always changing, no element in this 'cosmic wild-goose chase' will ever be hunted down and trapped, as it were. We encountered this dilemma in several forms in other Essays at this site; on this see, for example, here and here.
The most relevant aspect of this latest quandary centres on the idea (voiced by some dialecticians) that as scientific understanding grows, the 'contradictions' that now plague our knowledge of the world ought to diminish. Presumably, this must mean that, in the limit (i.e., in an ideal state where human beings possess (in theory) the Absolute Truth about everything), there would be no contradictions at all in or between scientific theories. But, in order to be true, a theory must faithfully reflect the world (given the traditional account of scientific theories). This can only mean that the world itself can't contain any contradictions, otherwise they would be reflected in theory (which we have just discounted). In its turn, this appears to mean that even if humanity never actually reaches this blessed state, we can in the here-and-now make that very inference: the Absolute truth is that not only is the world not contradictory, the motion of bodies and the operation of forces isn't either.32
In fact, this predictive proposition must be true now, for if it were not now true that there were no 'contradictions' in the ultimate future state of our knowledge of the "Totality" then either the DM-view of the limit of knowledge (as ideally contradiction-free) must be wrong, or the DM-belief that humanity is converging on that limit is incorrect, since there is no such limit.33
Again, if this is what dialecticians mean by 'contradictory forces',34 then nothing may be so described until everything has been so described. But, this reverses the dialectical picture, for, as we have just seen, some DM-theorists appear to believe that things only look 'contradictory' because we do not possess the Big Picture, an Absolute view of reality, and that if we were ever to attain to such a synoptic view, 'contradictions' would disappear (or largely disappear -- the story gets a little vague on this point). Here, in contrast, the idea seems to be that we may only depict forces in nature as absolutely 'contradictory' after the dialectical bell on judgement day has finally tolled. But, the problem with this is that we may only do so when all (or most) 'contradictions' have been resolved! Paradoxically, this means that 'objectively' these 'contradiction' both exist and they do not -- or, we do not know whether they do!
So, one horn of this dilemma suggests that 'dialectical contradictions' don't exist -- and if they don't, they can have nothing to do with change. The other suggests we can't now assert that they do exist (since we are not in possession of Absolute Knowledge), so we can't now claim to know whether they cause change.35
At any rate, to return to the main theme, if AA-, and RR-forces are mutually oppositional, change would still be caused by resultant forces. But, as we saw in Essay Seven, this scenario is just as easy to interpret as 'tautological', rather than as 'contradictory' -- that is, if we insist on viewing nature in such anthropomorphic/animistic terms.
Of course, if we resist such primitivism, as we should, then both descriptors (i.e., "contradictory" and "tautological") should be fed into the 'obsolete-concept-shredder'. [More on that here.]
Perhaps, then, it would be wise to draw a veil over this self-imposed dialectical impasse, and turn to a more likely source of DM-'contradictions': AR-force couples.
In the previous section, it became clear that little sense can be made of AA- or RR-forces being equated with 'dialectical contradictions', and this turned out to have nothing to do with the difficulty of seeing whether such couples contained opposites or not -- which they manifestly don't. An A-force is not the opposite of another A-force; the same is true R-forces, too.
However, a prima facie case could be made for regarding AR-force couples as the polar opposites that DM-theorists require in order to depict 'contradictions' in DM and HM.
Unfortunately, as we will see, this slender straw once clutched soon turns into a millstone, drowning this doomed 'theory'. Quite apart from the considerations outlined above, no clear sense can be made of the idea that AR-forces can model 'contradictions', anywhere or anyhow.36
An initial serious difficulty this idea faces is that AR-couples do not appear to operate in nature in quite the manner this handy prefix seems to suggest: i.e., as AR-forces.
Consider a straightforward case: the accumulation of matter that formed the stars, planets and their moons (etc.). Here, R-forces (operating at the nuclear level) apparently prevent(ed) (for a time) the catastrophic collapse of these growing masses into 'singularities' by balancing-out the A-forces that presumably set the whole thing in motion.
The problem with these R-forces is that, while they look as though they oppose any other A-forces in the system, they aren't their polar opposites (in the way that, say, the North and South poles of a magnet are said to be) -- that is, they are not opposite manifestations of the same force type. So, the inter-atomic forces preventing the above collapse are not the same type of force as the gravitational forces that initiated the process.37 While a case might be made for depicting North and South poles of a magnet as polar opposite magnetic forces (or perhaps as 'creating' them -- but on this see below), gravitational and nuclear forces are not 'interpenetrated' opposites of the same type, and so can't, it seems, 'contradict' each other.
However, even if they were opposites of the same type, these forces change the motion of bodies; they do not directly confront each other as opposing forces. Admittedly, they can be represented in a vector calculus, but we have already seen that this translation is of little assistance to DM -- that is because the relevant forces disappear, to be replaced by a single resultant force which causes all the action.
It could be argued that these initial difficulties can be neutralised if emphasis is placed once more on the oppositional nature of AR-forces, as a way of explaining change.
Unfortunately, this detour is no more successful than it was when it was considered above in relation to AA- and RR-forces.
Even if this further difficulty is shelved for now, it would still be difficult to see how AR-forces could be interpreted literally (or figuratively) as 'contradictions' (especially in HM). This is because of the way in which they can combine and augment one another.
For example, consider, two forces operating in diametrically opposite directions tangentially placed around a rotating body. These two forces -- although 'opposites' at their point of action -- exercise a combined and augmented effect on the angular acceleration of that body, thus ceasing to be oppositional.38
This is a familiar feature of force vectors. In some instances, they seem to 'oppose', in others they appear to 'augment' one another, while in still others they look like they do both at once.39
Cases like these illustrate that forces are not rigidly fixed as permanent opposites, nor are they always oppositional, even when they are classified as opposites. Hence, it's difficult to see how regarding forces only as polar oppositional pairs could accommodate this property of natural forces.40 In that case, this is unwelcome news, for little sense can be given in DM to the idea that opposites can switch in this way.41
It could be objected here is a gross distortion since the above phenomena are actually consistent with DM. Dialecticians themselves reject the idea that there are fixed and unchanging forces in nature. Hence, the recognition that forces can change and operate in 'opposite directions' is one of DM's strengths, not one of its weaknesses.
Or, so it could be maintained.
However, this volunteered reply does achieve one thing: it helps focus on what has been a recurring problem throughout the Essays posted at this site: DM is so vague and equivocal that it is impossible to say exactly what its consequences are, or even if it has any. The claim that 'contradictions' in nature must be understood as opposing forces has under close examination turned out to mean that such forces might not actually oppose each other -- indeed, according to Engels, the concept of a force could simply be a convenient shorthand for the complex relative motion of bodies. Now, it seems that even this is incorrect, for oppositional forces may actually augment one another, but only if they are not now viewed as shorthand for the relative motion of bodies.
It is thus impossible to decide which DM-type forces are genuine opposites (or, indeed, which are polar opposites, if any are), or distinguish any that are from those that aren't. But, if every force can work in any manner whatsoever, then it becomes deeply mysterious why only some are depicted as opposites. And, what has become of the AR-typology Engels regarded as fundamental?
Given such vague and ambiguous terminology, little meaning may be given to a single DM-concept in this area; still less to the idea that DM force 'laws' operate anywhere in nature.
Imagine a Chemist, say, who identified an element as having just so many protons in its nucleus, except it didn't really have this number, and these alleged protons weren't really protons, and the element rarely if ever had a nucleus, and anyway it wasn't an element in the first place. Suppose further that this chemist claimed that she knew what she was talking about (even if no one else did) because she was an expert player of the 'Nixon Card', and thus skilled in the art of "grasping contradictions", which unfortunate lack of 'flexibility' prevents her critics from seeing the truth as she sees it.
Few, I think, would take her seriously.
Unfortunately, such discursive and theoretical 'contradictions' are grist to the DM-mill, but this is not something about which dialecticians should feel proud. For if Capitalists, say, (as a social force) can indeed operate in such a contradictory manner, who is to say whether a revolution is necessary to overthrow them? Perhaps -- as result of a 'dialectical inversion' -- the class enemy could become the strongest ally of the working class? In such a topsy-turvy dialectical universe anything might happen. Capitalism might disappear by being reformed away; Imperialists could assist in the abolition of injustice; the Nazi's might one day help create 'racial' harmony; and the Ku Klux Klan could wind up advancing the struggle for Black Liberation. Who knows? The boss-classes might even overthrow themselves!42
If it's a central postulate of the theory that 'contradictions' are oppositional forces, and that these can change in 'contradictory' ways to become 'non-oppositional', then reformism, centrism, class collaboration (and the prospect of having the Fascists (etc.) as allies) can't be ruled out. On the other hand, if these possibilities are to be rejected (as surely they must), then the importation of such 'contradictory' DM-ideas into HM must be resisted no less forcefully.
In fact, as we will see in Essay Nine Part Two, this is indeed how class collaborationists have argued: the allegedly 'contradictory' nature of the Guomindang, for example, 'allowed' the CCP to 'justify' forming alliances with them. As we will also see, this contradictory theory can be, and has been used to defend practically anything at all, and its opposite, in the same breath -- often by the same dialectician.
Of course, it could be pointed out that forces operate in history in more complex ways than those that work in nature, so the above analogy with natural forces (and the KKK, etc.) is inapt -- especially if it's applied in the crude manner illustrated above. Unfortunately, if this rebuttal were itself successful then it would be misleading to describe natural and social forces as 'contradictory', for if the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' is inapt, it's inapt. End of story. Of course, that admission would amount to the abandonment of this unhelpful analogy in its entirety: that 'contradictions' may be depicted as oppositional forces.43
Nevertheless, even if all of the above points turn out to be misguided in some way, there are other, more fundamental reasons for ruling-out the identification of opposing forces with 'contradictions'.
It is to these that I now turn.
'Literal Forces' In Opposition
Most of the above criticisms were aimed at demonstrating that the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' was seriously misguided. Despite this, it could be argued that this does not affect the view that the identification of forces with 'contradictions' is in fact literal, not figurative.
However, it's worth remarking that despite its centrally-important role in DM, and as far as can be ascertained, the precise details of the literal connection between forces and 'contradictions' have never been worked-out by dialecticians. One reason for this might be that they consider this identification to be so obvious that the specifics either do not matter or they are deemed trivial.
On the other hand, it could turn out that nothing could have been said in this regard that was aimed at defending this DM-thesis, which would more obviously explain the long-term and deafening silence. As will soon become clear, the latter indeed seems to be the case: this omission is not the least bit surprising, for the imagined connection between forces and 'contradictions' turns out to be entirely illusory.
In order to substantiate this claim, it might help if we back-tracked a little. Part of the argument in favour of the identification of forces and contradictions appears to depend on an analogy drawn between literal contradictions and conflict (which view, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), is a throw-back to ancient and animistic beliefs about the origin of social and natural conflict in the activities of various 'gods' and/or other personified forces at work behind the scenes, or beneath 'appearances').
Mere contradictions are ostensively verbal wrangles, which can look oppositional. When one person asserts "p", and another person denies it (or asserts "not p", where "p" stands for a spoken token indicative sentence), then at the level of discourse at least some sort of opposition seems to be implied (but on that, see here). So, analogously, it seems that a 'contradiction' in nature signals the existence of real material opposition -- but, alas, only to those who are happy to fetishise social relations as if they represent real relations in the non-social world.
Clearly, DM-theorists view material 'contradictions' as their primary concern when compared with the secondary examples that feature in verbal wrangles. [These are not really of interest to DM-fans.] Even so, this idea is no less analogical, for we were certainly aware of the latter sort of contradiction well before we were informed of the former (by Hegel). In that case, the argument must have proceeded from the social to the natural world, which is indeed what the history of the subject reveals: Hegelian and/or 'Materialist Dialectics' did not exist in pre-historic times (or even before the 18th century), but people have been arguing and contradicting one another for tens of thousands of years. Hence, social interaction has plainly been projected analogically onto nature --, DM-theorists have relied on an analogy drawn between the way human beings argue (and/or fight) and the way conflict appears in the natural and social world. Unfortunately, this makes the literal interpretation of forces as 'contradictions' unavoidably dependent on analogical and figurative language, leaving the non-believer with no clue what literal meaning could possibly be attributed to this way of picturing conflict in nature and society. Even to this day, we still lack the material grounding DM requires.
Now we certainly have a clear grasp of the use of contradictions in language and (arguably also in) logic, but we have none at all when it comes to those that allegedly occur in nature -- or, as we will see, in society.
Nevertheless, this would at least account for the figurative way that contradictions continually appear in DM (and are seriously overused in HM), and why dialecticians regularly conflate social with material forms.44
Once more, even if we ignore this latest problem, one thing is clear: for DM-theorists verbal contradictions represent perhaps the least significant type of opposition. Changes in nature and society are (for them) the result of much more fundamental 'contradictions' than those occasioned by the mere gainsaying of another person's words. In many cases, discursive contradictions might turn out be a 'reflection' of more basic conflicts in the real world, and it is the latter that are of interest to DM-theorists.
However, once this 'neat' picture is examined a little more closely much of it falls apart.
The Revenge Of The Non-Existent
As has already been noted, DM-theorists have so far failed to provide a clear account of the precise nature of the connection between 'contradictions' and opposing forces. In that case, once again, one will have to be supplied for them.45
Presumably, when DM-theorists claim that 'contradictions' are represented in nature by opposing forces they have something like the following in mind (if they but knew it):
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.46
[Here, the content of C1 could include any other local or distant forces and processes operating in the system; alternatively, the forces themselves may even be 'edited out' on the lines envisaged by Engels (as a sort of shorthand for relative motion, etc.). In addition, all the internal "mediations" between these forces and/or events in the Totality (T) may also be incorporated into the picture. Other 'dialectical' caveats could, of course, be stirred into the mix, as seems necessary and/or appropriate.]
It's worth emphasising at this point that P1 or P2 must operate 'independently' in C1.47 This seems to be an essential assumption to make so that sets E1 and E2 may be determinate themselves.
[Anyway, this 'independence' need not suggest a CAR-like scenario since it could form part of the 'dialectical development' of new forces and processes as C1 and the rest of T develop. Naturally, this simplifying assumption could be modified at a later stage, as the need arises.]
The first problem with the above account centres on the term "opposites", in F9. Something a little more precise than merely an "opposite" seems to be required here in order for DL to surpass FL in its ability to account for change, etc.48
Unfortunately, the difficulty here lies in seeing whether even this minimal condition is actually implied by F6-F9, and whether the rather weak concept of an "opposite" is capable of bearing all the weight that is usually put on it.
However, quite independently of these annoying niggles, far more problematic is the fact that given F6-F9, it would be impossible to say what the 'contradictory' state-of-affairs here is meant to be.
That is because F6-F9 imply that E1 and E2 do not in fact obtain together, for if just one of P1 or P2 is in fact operative, then just one of E1 or E2 will be instantiated.
Clearly, in such circumstances there could be no 'contradiction' -- even given the loose DM-notion of one -- since, at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction would not actually exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented from occurring by the operation of either one of P1 or P2!49
I will examine later the question whether E1 and E2, even though 'opposites', can legitimately be described as 'contradictory'. In what follows, I will simply assume that they are.50
Prevention And Its Discontents
Despite this, it could be claimed that the following propositions are all that DM really requires:
F10: P1 prevents E2, and P2 prevents E1.
F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.
F12: Therefore, P1 and P2 contradict each other's effects.
If this is so, then plainly P1 and P2 do not actually contradict each other, just each other's effects. In that case, it's not too clear whether or not DM-theorists who are keen to maintain the orthodox view that forces contradict each other will want to embrace F10-F12 too enthusiastically.
In addition, it has already been conceded (for the purposes of the argument) that E1 and E2 are 'contradictories'. But, it now appears from the above, and from F10-F12, that not only does E1 'contradict' E2, but also that P1 'contradicts' E2, and P2 'contradicts' E1, as well. I shall return to consider these added complications, later.
However, there appears to be no good reason for accepting F11, and every reason for rejecting it. Consider the following scenario -- aimed at illustrating why F11 is unacceptable (even given the truth of other DM-theses):
F13: NN saved child MM from drowning.
F14: NN prevented the drowning.
F15: So, NN contradicted the drowning (by F11).
[F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.]
The problem here lies not so much with the non-standard use of language these sentences contain, but with the fact that if a drowning (or if anything) is prevented from happening then it never actually took place. In that case, if the said incident did not happen it could not have been 'contradicted' by any of the forces or events doing the preventing, since there would be no 'it' for anything to contradict. Unless we are prepared to envisage forces 'contradicting' things that do not exist, or we allow them to 'contradict' unrealised possibilities -- or even 'contradict' ideas (perhaps those in the mind of NN above) --, the word "contradiction" can gain no grip here, even in DM-terms.
Of course, it could be objected that this hypothetical action did indeed contradict the said drowning by stopping it from happening. But, to repeat, the said drowning was prevented, hence it did not take place, so it never existed to be contradicted.
One obvious fall-back position for dialecticians to occupy would be to argue that the actions mentioned above halted a series of events that would have led to the said drowning. In that sense, those actions contradicted that series of events. This objection will be looked at more closely later, and presently, below.
However, just in case this latest counter-example is considered prejudicial, or contentious (in that it doesn't deal with real forces, or with the sort of forces DM-theorists are interested in), then perhaps the following considerations might prove more acceptable. Let us begin with this obvious sentence:
F16: Any process that is prevented from occurring does not exist (or take place).51
It's clear that while F16 is a truism, it seems to ignore extended events and processes, so it might not be acceptable as a clarification of the 'contradictions' that are of interest to DM-theorists. Consider, then, the following emendations:
F17: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F18: Events E1-En form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.
F19: Let P2 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or do not take place.
It's quite plain from this that because of the operation of P2, certain events failed to materialise. But, that simply generalises the point made in the drowning example above. Even if it were assumed that the vague notion of a 'contradiction' employed by DM-theorists is viable, it's difficult to see how something could 'contradict' something else if the latter does not exist/take place (and perhaps never will). Hence, in the example above, if P2 halted certain unspecified elements of the series of events that would have led to the said drowning, then those prevented events never happened, and so did not exist, and so can't have been 'contradicted'.
This objection appears to be fatal to DM; if anything, forces actually prevent 'contradictions' from arising, and so can't be equated with what they thwart.
So, far from forces being DM-friendly, they appear to be among its very worst enemies.
In that case, if this fatal weakness is to be neutralised, a new and more consistent account of the relationship between 'contradictions' and forces must be found.52
A More Balanced Account Of Prevention?
In order to construct a more viable account, we need to return to a difficulty we met earlier, which was put to one side temporarily: the claim that forces (not forces and effects, or simply effects) are directly contradictory to one another. Consider then the following:
F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.
Again, this perhaps puts too much weight on the term "prevent"; it could prompt F21 to self-destruct just as fast as F17-20 did, for if one of these forces fails to operate (it having been prevented), no 'contradiction' could ensue.
[Whether or not the actual act of prevention is what constitutes the 'contradiction' here will be considered below, here and in Note 55.]
But, perhaps this conclusion is just a little too hasty. For example, both of the above forces could still exist even if one ceased to operate in an F21-style scenario, and no problem need arise because of that since no appeal would have been made to the non-existent effects of either one of them.
This means that even though one of P1 or P2 might have been prevented from acting, they could both still exist in some form or other. If so, F21 might appear to be the viable option that dialecticians require. One further advantage here would be that F21 connects forces directly with 'contradictions', rather than linking 'contradictions' to the effects of forces. Could this be the lifeline that DM requires?
Alas, upon closer examination, this lifeline soon turns into a noose.
The fatal consequences this option presents DM-theorists become apparent when we attempt to unravel what it means for a force to be 'prevented' from operating.
Despite disclaimers, it seems that if a force no longer operates, it no longer exists. Perhaps the problem lies not so much with the precise physical form that forces take (which form, even to this day, is mysterious in itself), but with the fact that the word "operate" is ambiguous. Consider the following examples of forces that are capable of being rendered inoperative:
F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate when worker NN threw the switch.
F23: An aerofoil produces the lift necessary to keep an aeroplane in the air provided that there is sufficient relative velocity between that aerofoil and the ambient medium to prevent the force of gravity from operating normally, pulling the aircraft to the ground.
In F22, the relevant force simply ceased to exist (or it was converted back into another force, 'potential' force, or form of energy, etc.) when the switch had been thrown. But, in F23, a second force (lift) 'cancels out' the effects of the first force (gravity) -- which, of course, still exists (perhaps as part of the resultant force in the system).
Could F21 now be interpreted along lines similar to those suggested in F23? This way of viewing the relation between P1 and P2 would see them both as still existing, even while they counterbalanced each other. In which case, it might prove helpful to re-write F21 in the following manner:
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.53
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]
Now, F24 does not seem to face any of the existential problems that F21 encountered since the relevant forces actually co-exist, counterbalancing each other. Perhaps then we have a clear statement of what DM-theorists require?
Alas not.
A new difficulty arises once we ask why only counterbalancing forces should be considered 'contradictory'. This is relevant since F24 simply restricts our attention to situations where there is an equilibrium between forces, and ignores dis-equilibria.54 But surely, it's largely as a result of the latter that change occurs (certainly changes of the sort that interest dialecticians) -- meaning that 'contradictions' should be connected with these rather than with equilibria. If so, F24 must be re-written in the following way:
F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.
Unfortunately, F25 can't now provide the clarity that was missing from previous attempts to explicate this part of DM. That is because F25 fails to distinguish between equilibria and disequilibria. F24 seemed to express a clear definition of 'contradictory' forces, but in order to make it applicable to the real world, F25 had to be recruited in support, completely undermining F24. F25 informs us that forces are 'contradictory' whether or not F24 is true. Worse still, F25 could be true even when F24 is false:
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.
Hence, if the following were true:
F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.
F25 would be true, but F24 would be false (and/or vice versa).
Now, anyone reading these three sentences (and taking them for an accurate exposition of this part of DM) would rightly complain that nothing had actually been explained, since there is nothing about the relationship between the forces mentioned that indicates what the overall theory is committed to.
In response, others could argue that this latest problem is not only spurious, it's solely the result of the phrase "only if" in F24. Its removal should eliminate the difficulty.
Unfortunately, the removal of the "only if" in F24 would plunge the theory back into all the existential problems it had been introduced to eradicate. This can be seen if we try to re-word F24 in the following manner:
F27: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.
Although F27 might look acceptable, it is merely a sufficient condition; hence, it does not rule out the following:
F28: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.54a
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]
But, F28 is just a resurrected version of F21, which we found did not rule out F22, and thus non-existent forces. What was required here instead was a description of 'contradictory' forces that does not imply that one of the forces operating ceased to exist as a result of the action of any other forces in the system. And we also required an account that does not rely on forces merely 'contradicting' the effects of other forces -- because of the serious difficulties that particular alternative encountered earlier.
That is why an appeal had to be made to forces that counterbalance one another, since (clearly) they must exist to do this -- hence, the "only if" had to be introduced, making this a necessary condition. But, as we discovered, this more restricted version ruled out forces that did not counterbalance one another, which DM seems to need; reintroducing these at a later stage simply ruined this neat picture.
Unfortunately, F24 and F26 seem to divorce 'contradictions' from equilibria, since the presence or absence of the latter is in no way affected by the former.
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.
This means that if F24 and F26 reflect the real nature of things, then 'contradictions' are in fact unrelated to the balancing effects of forces. As paradoxical as this might seem, DM-theorists must deny the truth of the conjunction of F24 and F26 if they want to maintain their belief that there is a connection between forces, 'contradictions', equilibria and disequilibria in nature and society. Alas, in order to account for the 'contradictory' nature of reality, DM-theorists can't afford to do this. For, as soon as F24 and F26 are adopted, DM ceases to be explanatory; but the minute these two are rejected, this attempt to understand the nature of DM-forces collapses.
Nevertheless, this annoying conclusion might appear to some to be a little too hasty and contrived. And yet, with so little in the writings of DM-theorists to guide us, how could anyone decide if the above attempt to understand DM is misleading and/or prejudicial? Indeed, how could dialecticians themselves arrive at a clear decision on this score without some form of theoretical innovation, an option that has so far been complete anathema to the 'Orthodox' (who are only too happy to wave the 'Revisionism' card)?
Nevertheless, if we adhere to the requirement that 'contradictions' explain change -- when pictured as opposing forces (that is, if we give 'contradictions' some sort of materialist bite) --, then this theory must self-destruct, by the above argument. That's because the theory maintains that forces are 'contradictory' whether what its theorists claim about them is true or not (if this is indeed what they claim, or what this theory implies!).
Naturally, all this is independent of the far more fundamental question whether the idea that 'contradictory' forces are capable of counterbalancing each other can itself be explicated without referring to the sort of 'prevented', or 'non-existent' effects we met earlier. If it can't, this latest detour would prove to be yet another dead end, since 'prevented' effects do not exist to be contradicted. On the other hand, if this theory can be explained without referring to such effects, then it would be difficult to say what impact such a scenario could possibly have in the real world. How could such forces be described as "material" if they had no effect on anything material --, except, that is, on those seemingly insubstantial 'non-existent' effects?
Well, this is another dialectical hole DM-fans can dig themselves out of. I am merely content to remind them that it is a hole, it's very deep, and it's one of their own making.
Perhaps even this is too hasty. Maybe we should begin again.
To that end, it might help to re-examine a passage from Cornforth, quoted in Part One of this Essay:
"The unity of opposites in a contradiction is characterised by a definite relation of superiority-inferiority, or of domination, between the opposites. For example, in a physical unity of attraction and repulsion, certain elements of attraction or repulsion may be dominant in relation to others. The unity is such that one side dominates the other -- or, in certain cases, they may be equal.
"Any qualitative state of a process corresponds to a definite relation of domination. Thus, the solid, liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic of the molecules of bodies....
"Domination relationships are obviously, by their very nature, impermanent and apt to change, even though in some cases they remain unchanged for a long time. If the relationship takes the form of equality or balance, such balance is by nature unstable, for their is a struggle of opposites within it which is apt to lead to the domination of one over the other....
"The outcome of the working out of contradictions is, then, a change in the domination relation characteristic of the initial unity of opposites. Such a change constitutes a change in the nature of a thing, a change from one state to another, a change from one thing to another, a change entailing not merely some external alteration but a change in the internal character and laws of motion of a thing." [Cornforth (1976), pp.97-98.]
Now, the above argument might appear to work when applied to human social systems, where agents (individually or in groups) can 'upset' any number of 'balanced' situations, and who do not need too much in the way of external motivation to do so (although, in order to be able to say even this much with any clarity, the reader will note that Cornforth found he found he didn't need to use any of the obscure jargon invented by Hegel). However, when this theory is applied to nature as a whole it can't work. Consider the following:
F29: Let FD be a set of force 'elements' in a 'dominant' relation to FS, which is 'submissive' accordingly (i.e., FD > FS), and let both operate in system S, however defined.
F30: Now, for this relation to change so that a qualitative transformation occurs in the overall system S, one or both of FD and FS will have to change first.
F31: If the change occurs in FD it will have to do so because of the latter's own 'internal contradictions', otherwise the theory must fail at least here. [The same applies to FS, or indeed to both taken severally or collectively.]
F32: But, if that is so, then the same analysis will apply one more level down, as it were: whatever causes FD to change will have to be the result of further dominance/submissive relations inside/internal to FD itself. In turn, the pre-conditions noted in F31 will also apply at, or to these 'lower level' relations; they must change because of their own 'internal contradictions'.
F33: Either this continues forever, or it will halt at some point.
F34: If it halts at some point, then there must be fundamental units that do not change through 'internal contradictions', and so the theory fails. [These fundamental units can have no effect on each other, for reasons spelt-out in detail in Part One of this Essay.]
F35: If this process continues forever, then there would be nothing to condition anything internal to anything else, just more and more layers, tailing off to infinity (i.e., to "who knows where?"). DM would thus have its own "bad infinity". [We saw that this was a non-viable option in Part One, too.]
F36: All this is independent of whether or not an external cause (or causes) initiated these internal changes in FD or FS. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to Cornforth), external causes can't bring about the internal qualitative changes required (again, according to Cornforth). The latter must be internally-generated in the last analysis.
It looks, therefore, like this 'theory' can't be rescued in this way.
Hole To Let -- Previous Occupant Self-Destructed
Howsoever we try, there seems to be no way of rescuing this self-destructing theory -- killed-off by its own internal obscurities.
In short: if a force prevents something from happening it can't contradict it; once prevented, the latter does not exist.55
On the other hand, if forces affect one another externally (as they seem to), then change can't be the result of 'internal contradictions'. Alternatively, if they have internal effects on one another (in some as-yet-unspecified way), and they change as a result of their own 'internal contradictions', then either they are composed of simple units that do not change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing internal to them can condition anything else 'internally', for there would be no such thing.
Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth -- Or Is It Too Few?
It could be objected that the above results have been deliberately tailored/skewed to fit a desired end: to malign DM come what may -- the choice of F24 being a prime example.
In that case, a much better way of representing the oppositional and contradictory nature forces might be the following:
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.
[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]
This means that the 'contradictory' relation between two or more forces would operate along a sort of continuum -- as it were -- with no fixed relation between them. The account given earlier clearly makes the link between 'contradictory' forces an "either-or", all-or-nothing, sort of affair.
Or so a counter-argument might go.56
At this point, an example from mechanics might help illustrate the complex relationship that is intended here: un-damped simple harmonic motion. [This link requires JAVA -- or try here if you have no JAVA installed.]
Consider a particle set in motion under the operation of two forces, such that its acceleration is proportional to its displacement from the point of equilibrium, and directed toward that point. Since the acceleration of this particle changes in proportion to its position, the net force operating on it must also change accordingly. This is due to the fact that the resultant force in this system is the vector sum of these two distinct but changing forces, which at the equilibrium point counterbalance one another, but at any other point they either augment or partially cancel each other out, depending on the physics of the situation. Because these two forces work in opposite directions and cause the impressed acceleration (achieving this by their 'dialectical interaction',-- let us say for now) we appear to have here an example of F37-type motion.
In this highly simplified picture of just one type of motion, the forces present in the system appear to 'contradict' one another in complex but changing ways, as DM seems to require. But, if this scenario actually does illustrate F24- (or F37-) type 'contradictions' then several untoward consequences follow:
(1) This analogy would mean that 'contradictions' (like forces) operate on a continuum. Hence, at any point along the path of the above particle the net force operating isn't equal to the net force at another point (in any one cycle). Hence, given a certain displacement, the modulus of the net force might be, say, only 1% of its maximum, at another it would be, say, 99% of it -- while at a symmetrical location past the point of equilibrium, the same would be true but in an opposite sense. Even so, it's not easy to see how such a picture may be fitted seamlessly into the DM-view of 'contradictions', and as we saw above, such a model would have unacceptable consequences in HM (involving, for example, the Nazis fighting racism!).
(2) This trope depends on forces being viewed as basic units of reality, as opposed to the product of the relations between bodies in motion.
[Recall that the latter option appears to have been one that Engels himself preferred when he spoke of relative velocities replacing forces. However, if the term "force" is just a shorthand for relative motion (or if it depends on the presence of a "field"), then, as we have also seen, the 'dialectical' unity of nature would be thrown into question. On that basis, the links between bodies and processes would be external, whereas DM requires them to be 'internal', with the existence of forces providing the 'connective tissue' of reality, as it were. If forces themselves depend on bodies in relative motion, then reality must be discrete, not continuous.]
But, DM-theorists have yet to tell us what the physical nature of a single force is. Physicists themselves have ceased to use this word (except as a sort of shorthand, as noted above). If forces have no physical nature, can they be part of material reality? How could such 'useful fictions' feature in a materialist account of nature?
(3) This neat picture, tailor-made for F37, obscures the complexity that occurs in nature. Even so, it's not easy to see how such a tidy model could cope with systems of forces, which, given this view, indicate that several things must be 'contradicted' all at once by countless others, or, indeed, which suggest that bodies and/or processes could have innumerable 'contradictories'. That would, of course, divorce DM-type 'contradictions' completely both from FL-contradictions and Hegelian 'contradictions'. While this might not be totally unacceptable to some, it would mean that the former sort of contradiction would be even more tenuously linked to the latter (or even with contradictions that appear in the vernacular). In that case, the meaning of the word "contradiction" when it's used in DM would be even more obscure than it already is. In addition, it would imply that any object or process in nature had more than one opposite at any point in time. The word "opposite" would cease to have any clear meaning, too. But, we have been here several times already.
Despite these niggling problems, it might be felt that F37 suitably modified could still capture essential features of the 'contradictory' nature of forces.
In order to investigate this alternative more closely, let us imagine that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57
F38: Let the first force be F1, and the second, F2.
F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.
F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.
F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0. [t3 > t2 > t1.]
[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.]
F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the system in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where no net force exists.
But, as we saw earlier, we face immediate problems with this way of depicting forces -- those encountered above in relation to the inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects like these -- such as, forces represented by vectors.
Ignoring this 'problem' too, it's worth pointing out once again that F40 in fact implies that there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only one force -- the resultant -- at work. On that basis, F37 would collapse for want of forces. No contradiction seems possible if only one force -- the resultant -- is present; still less if no forces are at work (as in F40).
It could be objected here that in the above, both of the original forces (F1 and F2) still exist, since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in the system (as they do in F39 and F41).
The problem with this reply is that it's not easy to see how the two original forces may also be said to exist alongside this third force -- the resultant --, whether the latter is zero or not. If they do exist in this way, we would plainly have three forces in the system, not one, or two.
This would, of course, create energy out of nowhere.58
To be sure, as part of our way of calculating resultants, we apply some mathematics to the relevant components, but that doesn't mean that nature does the same -- if it did, that would clearly imply nature was Mind, or the product of Mind! No one, it is to be hoped(!), thinks that in nature there are three forces here where once there were only two. And yet, it is this third force that does all the work.
Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or that between the forces and relations of production), say, produces a resultant third social force, the nature of which has to this day remained not only completely obscure, but totally unrecognised. Since, based on this model, all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this "third force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the utmost urgency!59
Moreover, on this view, forces are 'contradictory' when and only when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is triadic), but it would in fact sink the theory faster than a lead-lined diving suit sinks a diver. This is because change would then be a result not of contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.
And, as we have seen already, it's just as easy to depict such a set-up as 'tautologious' as it is to picture it as 'contradictory' -- even though both descriptors rightly belong in the 'mystical-concept-crusher' as hopelessly anthropomorphic.
Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of forces with 'contradictions' seems to be as misconceived as anything could be. When interpreted metaphorically, it turns out to be inappropriate (if not paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally, it crumbles into incoherence and inconsistency.
In order to avoid these difficulties we need to return to an alternative that was considered briefly, earlier -- one that could provide DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions'. However, before this alternative is aired, it's necessary to counter an objection that should by now have occurred to the reader:
This whole analysis is abstract and fails to consider "real material forces".59a
'Real' Contradictions
As noted above, considerations like these would stretch the patience of most dialecticians. Indeed, they would probably be the first to point out that this Essay fails to consider real material and empirically verifiable contradictions, and by this they generally (but not exclusively) mean the 'contradictions' that feature in HM, and which help account for the dynamic we see in class society.
However, it's worth pointing out that many of the examples considered earlier were typically concrete, and undeniably material!
Nevertheless, if no sense can be made of 'contradictory forces' in nature (as we have seen), then that automatically throws into question their appearance in HM.
Now, as is easy to demonstrate, revolutionaries seriously overuse the word "contradiction" in their endeavour to depict not just capitalism, but the class war in general. In fact, comrades seldom bother to justify their almost neurotically profligate application of this word to everything and anything they attempt to analyse.59b Indeed, it seems to operate almost as a sort of talisman, which serves merely to identify each user to others of like mind as belonging to the same 'speech community' (with its own unique jargon, defining an 'in-group', excluding those of the 'out-group'), rather than acting as a concept which genuinely applies in each and every case -- or in any case -- or, indeed, which in the end means anything at all.
[Why they do this will be revealed in Essay Nine Part Two and Essay Fourteen Part Two (when it's published).]
But, perhaps this, too, is unfair?
In order to substantiate the above allegations, therefore, it might be wise to consider a few examples of the "real material contradictions" which supposedly underpin and drive social development.60
[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998); HM = Historical Materialism.]
TAR, for example, opens with several apposite and well-observed examples of the irrational and destructive nature of Capitalism. As John Rees correctly points out, while life expectancy, for instance, has increased dramatically over the last century or so (even in the poorest regions of the planet), forces have grown alongside to countermand or undermine these developments:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction….
"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line?
"The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]
First of all, it needs emphasising that in what follows the validity of the above comparisons will not be questioned -- nor will the explanation given by Rees for these and other intolerable features of Capitalism. The sole aim here is to ascertain what if anything he (or any one else, for that matter) means by calling these irrationalities "contradictions", and why he and other dialecticians insist on linking this word with material forces in nature and society.
Of course, a trite and impertinent answer here would be that DM-theorists use the word "contradiction" simply because it's part of the 'Marxist tradition' to do so (and hence it helps define a dialectical 'in group', as noted earlier). From the record, it's easy to see that the use of this word is only part of 'Materialist Dialectics' because of contingent events in the lives of Marx and Engels (i.e., those related to when and where they were born, in which class they found themselves, and how they were educated).
Hence, as fate would have it, the view of the world adopted by these two would was conditioned by their own "social being" -- to use Marx's term.
In fact, had Hegel died of Cholera 45 years earlier than he did, does anyone actually think we would be using this term?60a
[The effect on dialecticians in general of their background will be examined in more detail in Essay Nine Parts One and Two.]
However, because of the towering authority Marx and Engels have assumed since, all subsequent dialecticians have been constrained to think and reason along similar lines. They have to use this obscure vocabulary or risk being be accused of 'Revisionism', branded 'anti-Marxist', and perhaps suffer expulsion, political isolation -- or worse. [And, of course, face ignorant and ritual abuse of the sort I constantly receive.]
In short, it's quite clear that revolutionaries like Rees use such obscure Hegelian terms because prominent comrades did, and they are merely conforming to tradition.
Naturally, the impertinent nature of this 'trite' explanation will not win over many dialecticians -- but since a less impertinent one stands no chance either, there is little to lose from advancing it here.
In that case, there's a pressing need to try to find a better reason why hard-headed materialists should want to anthropomorphise nature and society in this manner, using terms drawn from mystical theology in what is supposed to be a materialist theory.
Unfortunately, as we will soon find out, there isn't in fact a better explanation why confirmed materialists have allowed themselves to be conned into accepting Hermetic jargon like this, employing it indiscriminately.
We have already seen every attempt to render viable the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' fall apart, hence, it should come as no surprise to see the very same thing happen in HM.
To spoil the ending, the result will be that the impertinent reason is the only one left standing.
[The political background to all is detailed in Essay Nine Part Two, and more generally in Essay Twelve (summary here). In fact, there are ideological reasons over and above the impertinent excuse offered above for the use of this word. They are also explored in Essay Nine Part Two.]
The underlying cause of the many absurdities found in Capitalism is, as TAR rightly points out, the complex, changing interplay between the "material productive forces of society" and the ambient "relations of production". [Ibid., p.2, quoting Marx.] That account of the driving force of capitalism (but, interpreted humanistically, in terms of the class struggle), I fully accept.
However, this brings us no closer to understanding what it is about opposing (social) forces that merits calling them "contradictions". Why turn a clear deployment of an ordinary word, drawn from the vernacular, into an obscure doctrine peppered with impenetrable jargon lifted from mystical Idealism (such as "determinate negation", "identity of opposites", "negation of the negation", "mediate", and the like), which use undermines the capacity we have to explain change, anyway?
In HM, we can certainly make sense of the term "force" -- and even of "opposing" and "struggle" --; but what is there to gain by calling these "contradictions"?61
Some might regard this as a harmless use of a word, but, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), in this case there is no such thing, just as there is no such thing as a neutral use of the word "oppression". We will also see in Essay Nine Part Two that this particular word 'allows' DM-fans to impose contradictory policies, strategies and theses on the party faithful in order to 'justify', among other things, class collaboration, mass murder, splits and expulsions, based on the idea that if reality is contradictory, the Party should be, too.
[An excellent example of this is the way that Trotsky used dialectics to justify the revolutionary defence of the former USSR (on the basis of its contradictory nature as 'degenerated workers' state', in which workers exercised no power and were systematically oppressed and exploited), and hence the murderous invasion of Finland. Another is the way that Ted Grant, for instance, used 'Materialist Dialectics' to construct his confused and contradictory theory, 'Proletarian Bonapartism' (sic), which then 'allowed' him to rationalise the substitution of the Maoist ruling-class for the Chinese working class -- a topic I have debated here. (This link will fall dead soon.)]
So, these mystical concepts aren't simply 'innocent bystanders'; their use has helped turn Dialectical Marxism into a spectacularly unsuccessful disaster area.
Nevertheless, the relevant part of the argument in TAR appears to be the following:
F42: Capitalism seems to offer unprecedented possibilities for human development.
F43: But, in reality Capitalism delivers only partial or faltering progress.
F44: Alongside this progress we have witnessed major regression.
F45: Thus, Capitalism actually delivers a mixture of progress and regression.
For Rees, the "contradiction" appears to be based on the fact that Capitalism holds out certain possibilities, which it either can't fully deliver, or can't provide at all; almost invariably the opposite of what it promises actually unfolds.
Rees clearly believes that the involvement of opposites is important here: instead of peace we find war; in the place of prosperity we find poverty (where it need not be); the growth in human need is not catered for by the incessant search for profit; the waste of human potential conflicts with the increased capacity society has for augmenting and satisfying its members needs, and so on. 'Contradictions' seem to arise either from the incongruity that exists between what might be expected of Capitalism (by those who do not understand its nature, presumably) and what it actually delivers --, or from the yawning gap that exists between its potential to satisfy human need and its obvious inability to do so. In that case, forces that seem capable of freeing humanity from want seem to be inextricably combined with others that only succeed in intensifying it.
However, these by-now-familiar observations leave the import of the alleged equation between forces and 'contradictions' still unclear. In order to clarify Rees's point we perhaps need to consider various plausible interpretations of what he might have meant.
There appear to be several distinct possibilities:
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.
F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A as well as B and C.
Doubtless there are many other combinations that could be imagined along similar lines, but they would, I think, be elaborations on these six possibilities. I propose, therefore, to examine each of these in turn, beginning, naturally, with the first.
The first option was:
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.
But, F46 presents us with a scenario we have met already; it resembles several earlier unsuccessful attempts to solve this overall problem. As we discovered above, whatever forces there are in the system that actually produce "not A", no contradiction can arise between "A" and "not A" because "A" itself does not exist, since only "not A" will have been actualised in place of "A". Nor can any forces which are at work in the system contradict what they themselves actually produce (viz., "not A" in this case) --, especially if whatever they 'offer' does not exist.
F46 is of no use, therefore, in our search to find a viable way of equating forces and 'contradictions' in HM.
An Apparent Contradiction -- At Last!
The second alternative went as follows:
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.
This seems to be a little more promising since "A and not A" certainly looks like a genuine contradiction. However, because F48 appears to depict contradictory outcomes it can't illuminate the alleged contradictory connection between forces in society and nature that exist prior to their emergence. This is because F48 is manifestly not about the forces themselves, but about their results.
So, even here, we do not seem to have contradictory forces.61a
Nevertheless, this section is aimed at considering the last few remaining options left open to DM-theorists to make their ideas comprehensible, so F48 will not be abandoned just yet.
In fact, F48 corresponds to a relation depicted abstractly in an earlier section (i.e., that between E1 and E2, in F6 to F9, above, reproduced below) -- but interpreted here concretely (if schematically). Hence, it looks like we might at last have found a genuine interpretation of E1 and E2 that is undeniably 'contradictory'.
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
Unfortunately, this appearance is illusory since the conjunction of "A" and "not A" can't be considered contradictory until it is clear what interpretation is to be given to the schematic letter "A".
It's worth recalling at this point that we are looking for a literal interpretation of the term "contradiction" which will allow DL to surpass FL -- not a metaphorical or analogical use of this word -- still less one that possesses a secondary or derivative sense (or even the 'special' DM-sense that has yet to be explained). As should be obvious, this search is of the utmost importance if we are to rescue from oblivion the idea that forces and 'contradictions' may be equated objectively -- and not, for instance, poetically.
Clearly, there are several different ways of reading the expression "A and not A"; some of these will be contradictions, others not.
In what follows, I shall employ a further example taken from TAR (quoted above), which seems to many DM-theorists to be a genuine contradiction (i.e., between wealth and poverty). In that case, this involves interpreting "A" as "wealth", and "not A" as "not wealth" (it clearly can't be "not poverty"!). In that case, "A and not A" would cash out as "wealth and not wealth".62
Unfortunately, the problem with this way of taking "A and not A" is that it actually creates a phrase and not a clause, indicative sentence or proposition.63 As such, it can't be a literal contradiction.
[Most DM-fans miss this point since their knowledge of logic rivals even that of George W Bush. This, of course, does not stop them pontificating on the subject.]
The only apparent way to situate this phrasal conjunction in a propositional context would be to interpret it a little more loosely -- perhaps along the following lines:
F52: Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.64
As such, F52 is a paraphrase of:
F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not wealth.
Or perhaps even:
F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not wealth for others.65
Again, F53 itself is short for:
F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism produces not wealth for others.
None of these look at all promising; they are not only stylistic monstrosities, their import is rather unclear. Anyway, F53 and F53a aren't contradictory -- that is, no more than, say, a bottle would be contradictory if it supplied drink for some but not for others, or any more than the claim that "forces are contradictory" would itself be 'contradictory' if it convinced some but not others. No one would think they had been contradicted if they asserted that a certain factory, say, produced several batches of defective Widgets, and someone else clamed it also produced some that were not defective.66
Anyway, F52a is far too vague as it stands -- it is certainly no more of a 'contradiction' than F53 and F53a are, and probably for the same reason. If sentences like these have no clear meaning they can't possibly assist in an attempt to clarify DM. Hence, a further widening of the interpretation of "A and not A" is called for if we are to gain a clear view of the implications of F47. Perhaps the following will do?
F54: Capitalism produces capitalists who are wealthy and workers who are not wealthy.
As was the case with F53 and F53a, F54 isn't even a contradiction. Again, anyone asserting the first clause of F54 who was then confronted with the second would not feel that they had been contradicted -- this is plainly because the first clause is about Capitalists, while the second is about workers. To be contradictory F55 would have to be:
F55: Capitalism produces worker W1 (or Capitalist C1), who is both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.
But, quite apart from the fact that no one would assent to, or even want to assert F55, it possesses no clear sense. The situation would be no better if it were re-written as:
F55a: Capitalism produces a set of workers W (or Capitalists C), who are both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.
It's reasonably certain that Rees meant neither F55 nor F55a. [If he had intended either, it would be unclear what he could possibly have meant by one or both.] At best, F55 and F55a might be re-interpreted in a comparative sort of way, as follows:
F55b: Capitalism produces a set of workers W that is both wealthy (in comparison to a set of peasants P) and not wealthy (in comparison to a set of Capitalists C), at the same time and in the same respect.
But, F55b is no more contradictory than this would be:
F55c: John Rees wrote a book that is both long (when compared with a weekday print copy of The Independent) and not long (when compared with Das Kapital).
The observation that TAR is both long compared to The Independent and short compared to Das Kapital is not, one imagines, what most DM-theorists mean by "contradiction". If it were, their theory would be based on linguistic naivety, and little else. That, of course, is the whole point of the phrase "and in the same respect", tacked on the end of several of the above propositions. Consequently, it looks like F47 can't be shoe-horned into this particular dialectical boot after all.
More problematic: is either of these options going to turn into the other?
In the above example, is W going to turn into C, and C into W? Indeed, is wealth going to turn into poverty? But, if these were 'genuine' 'dialectical opposites'/'contradictions', they most surely will.66a
Further attempts to interpret "A and not A" can be extended almost indefinitely. DM-enthusiasts are welcome to play around with them as much as they like, the end result will be no different. There are no literally true contradictions that can be manufactured out of "A and not A", where these relate to the same person, persons, groups, forces, etc., in the same respect.
In addition to the reasons given above, that's because, if such a 'contradiction' were held true, it would cease to be a literal contradiction. As indicated in Essay Five, if and when such a 'contradiction' were encountered, it would normally be viewed as (1) figurative or (2) based on an ambiguity of some sort. There is no way around this convention this side of altering the meaning of the word "contradiction". And, even this would be of little help to DM-enthusiasts since that would 'solve' the problem by means of yet more subjective, question-begging, ad hoc linguistic reform.67
In that case, perhaps F48 is the reading we are searching for?
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.
Unfortunately, as we have seen several times already, since A does not exist -- Capitalism not having delivered it --, it can't 'contradict' B. This means that F48 is not a viable reading of Rees's intentions, either. Even if B 'contradicted' forces and/or processes which were already present, that would just return us to where we were when we considered several examples earlier, such as this (but substituting the word "society" for "nature"):
F6a: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in society.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
Yet another dialectical dead-end, it seems, for here we have even more non-existents 'contradicted' by existents.
Does, therefore, F49 provide DM with a lifeline?
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we would have the following:
F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.68
However, there are several problems with this paraphrase. One of these concerns the supposition that capitalism actually does offer wealth. Admittedly, for propaganda purposes, its ideologues often claim it does -- but who believes them? Certainly, blatant lies like this can't serve as part of a socialist analysis.69
Perhaps then we should re-interpret F49 in the following manner?
F57: Capitalism develops productive forces capable of delivering wealth to all, but it actually delivers wealth to a minority, and poverty to most of the rest, where wealth and poverty are opposites.
However, in F57 we are confronted with a subtle change in the way that the "A" of F49 has been interpreted in the opening clause: it now stands for something like the "capacity to develop productive forces capable of delivering wealth". But in the last clause it simply stands for "wealth", as before. Hence, F57 is actually equivalent to the following:
F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.
Or perhaps:
F49b: Capitalism develops D (which has the potential to produce B), but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.
Here, the 'contradiction' would seem to be that between either (1) Capitalism's capacity to deliver wealth and its actual deliverance of poverty, or (2) The wealth it delivers to some and the poverty it delivers to the rest.
In the first case, clearly we don't have a contradiction. That's because, as we have just seen, a capacity is an unrealised potentiality, and as such it can't contradict something which does exist -- no more than, say, a woman's un-actualised capacity to play the flute contradicts her actualised skill with the piano, or even her actualised state of living without a flute -- or, indeed, of not being able to play the flute while she has to make do with a piano.
The second option above is no contradiction either, however much it offends our sensibilities. (2) is no more a contradiction than, say, £10,000 ($20,000) in one pocket contradicts £0.01 ($0.02) in another, or no more than a £5 ($10) note in a millionaire's wallet (assuming this is all she has on her at the time) contradicts the £1000 ($2000) in a worker's pocket (who has just won a compensation claim, say) -- even if these two are sat next to each other at a UK Labour Party rally. To call these "contradictions" would be bizarre -- even on DM-terms. [Are they 'struggling' with each other? Do these turn into one another?]70
As we saw earlier, anyone who thought otherwise would be openly advertising their own linguistic naivety, if not perversity -- but not advancing the cause of science.
In any case, as we have also seen, there can be no literal contradiction between something that does not exist (i.e., the prospect of wealth under Capitalism, where this is meant to be wealth for all) and something that does exist (i.e., the mixed fortunes of the people who have to endure conditions as they are).
Despite this, it might still be felt that the situation is not as bad as the above makes out; the emphasis in F49 is on what Capitalism actually delivers, not on what it genuinely (or otherwise) offers. If "wealth" and "poverty" are real opposites, F49 could still serve in the way DM-theorists intend -- or, so it might seem.
Again, this rather desperate alternative reading diverts attention away from allegedly 'contradictory forces' and onto their effects. In that case, the nature of the direct relation between whatever forces managed to produce these effects is still obscure, and not the least bit contradictory.
Nevertheless, even when we consider such effects, a nagging question remains: just what is so contradictory about wealth and poverty existing side by side? Admittedly, to any socialist, this state of affairs is as intolerable as it is indefensible, but there still does not seem to be a literal contradiction involved here. True, this state of affairs may be paradoxical (but not to a Marxist); even so, the presence of one of these alleged opposites does not entail that an assertion that the other opposite also obtains is false, as it would have to do if a literal contradiction were intended.71
If, on the other hand, we wish to re-define the word "contradiction" so that it becomes the equivalent of "paradox", "unjust", "something contrary to expectations", "deplorable" (and so on), all well and good. But that would merely concede the point being made in these Essays that social reality is only 'contradictory' because of linguistic tinkering to that end, and the claim that DM-'contradictions' (in HM) are literal would have to be abandoned. Seen in this way, DM-'contradictions' would at best either be figurative, or they would depend on the use of a word ("contradiction") that has been 'redefined' in order to produce the right result.72
On the other hand, if the word "contradiction" possesses a special, literal DM-sense, which allows for its legitimate use here, then DM-theorists have yet to say what it is.
In response, it could be argued that one such sense is that their use of the word "contradiction" implies opposition and/or tension. But, even though "wealth" and "poverty" are opposites in the ordinary sense, they do not seem to oppose each other in an active way, as one would expect they should if they genuinely illustrated the validity of the equation of 'contradictions' with forces. Admittedly, poverty acts as brake on development of the productive forces at certain points in history (warping the development of those who have to endure it, etc.), it stokes up resentment, class hatred and foments struggle. But, over and above the influence these states of affairs have on human agents, these lifeless concepts appear to have no active connection with one another. Sure enough, the material situations they express might indeed create tension in those who have to endure them, but none of the latter would describe what they feel by using the word "contradiction", unless, of course, a fast-talking DM-fan had sold them on the idea. In ordinary language the word can't be given such a meaning without altering the sense it already has.73
Furthermore, if this set of consequences is meant to be taken as a new gloss on F49 (by way of illustrating the alleged 'contradiction' between E1- and E2-type events discussed earlier) then it too reduces to the claim that it's the effects of effects that are 'contradictory', and not the original effects themselves. Down this road there lies, I fear, yet another "bad infinity" --, which ends "who knows where?"
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
The second difficulty with this reading is that although wealth and poverty are genuine opposites (again, in the ordinary sense), they do not appear to be classic examples of dialectical-UOs (even if we knew what these are!). To be sure, under Capitalism the wealth of one class is connected with the poverty of others, but this is a familiar causal connection. They are not internally-, or logically-related in reality, despite claims to the contrary. That this is so can be seen from that fact that were this not the case, we would find we could not agree (with Engels) that under Capitalism poverty exists "where it need not be".
If there were a 'dialectical' (or "internal") "unity in difference" connecting poverty and wealth (like that which dialecticians allege between, say, the north and south poles of a magnet, or that between Capitalist and Worker (as classes), then we couldn't argue that socialism will eliminate one at the same time as abolishing the other. But, the whole point of a socialist society is that all should become as wealthy as the productive forces will allow. If there were a logical link between these two states (poverty and wealth) then they would be inseparable in all modes of production and we would have to temper our slogans somewhat. We might then have to point out that in eradicating poverty, workers would be eradicating wealth, too. That we do not so argue -- we actually claim the opposite that socialism can produce wealth for all -- indicates that the relation between wealth and poverty is not a logical (or internal) connection, but causal.
Of course, it could be argued that there is an internal/logical link between "wealth and poverty under capitalism". This objection will be dealt with below, and in Note 74.74
The basic problem here, of course, revolves around the anthropomorphism implicit in the idea that concepts can enter into struggle with one another. This mystification appears as part of the belief that because wealth and poverty are opposites they are actively oppositional and cause struggles, of themselves. On this account, it's the opposite nature of concepts that creates struggle, whereas in reality it is clearly material conditions that cause it. Only by confusing a causal with a conceptual connection can DM even seem to gain some grip -- that is, if this is what dialecticians mean! But, as we have seen, this idea is just one more consequence of LIE and the RRT (defined in Essay Twelve -- and which was a conclusion of Part One of this Essay).75
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]
The animated DM-contrast that is imagined to exist between dead concepts like these seems plausible only because they are viewed as the idealised equivalents of the real relations between human beings, reified in an inappropriate metaphysical/linguistic form. Human beings give life to the concepts they use, but under circumstances not always of their own choosing, doing so as a result of their practical activity, modified by ambient class and social relations. The reverse does not happen; 'concepts' do not give life to human relations -- although their use by human agents can affect the roles they play in life (and they certainly do modify the ideas that individuals from antagonistic classes form of their own material interests, etc.). Unless we suppose concepts are agents in their own right (in a sort of inverted Hegelian form, wherein perhaps they walk the earth in place of human beings), they can't 'reflect' things that human beings haven't already sanctioned for them, and by means of the above constraints. History is after all the result of the class war, not a consequence of the struggle between concepts.
As should seem obvious, the above comments are based on theoretical considerations drawn from HM, but that is precisely where this scientific theory can provide the interpretative sophistication which DM and/or 'Materialist Dialectics' obscures and inverts in an idealised/fetishised form.76
This shows, once again, that the inversion DM-theorists say they have inflicted on Hegel was at best merely formal, at worst, illusory.
Their theory can only 'work' in an Ideal/mystical universe.
In that case, the only options left open are F50 and F51. They were:
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A, as well as B and C.
However, since these two are clearly variations upon F48 and F49, they do not appear to be viable alternatives. DM-apologists are welcome to make of them what they can.
Because dialecticians have so far neglected to explain with any clarity, or in any detail, what it means to equate forces in nature and society with 'contradictions', I have been forced to offer my own attempts at clarification (no pun intended). All have so far failed. In this last main section I will endeavour to offer what I think is the only viable interpretation of the link between forces and 'contradictions'.
Dialectics In ER
We have seen that the concepts DM-theorists have drawn from Hermetic Philosophy have failed them badly when any attempt is made to apply them to, or connect them with the forces operating in nature and society. In that case, the impertinent answer to the question why hard-nosed revolutionaries continue to use such mystical terms in HM (offered earlier) is the only one left in the ring: dialecticians use obscure jargon like this simply because it's traditional to do so.
This means that this part of DM (already under intensive care in the Emergency Resuscitation Ward) is now ready to be measured for its pine overcoat and lowered 6 feet closer to the Earth's core.
A Last Desperate Attempt
However, before we call for a Hermetic High Priest to read DM its last mystical rites, we should, I think, make one last desperate attempt to resuscitate this moribund 'theory'.
In fact, we are now in a position to reconsider several earlier abandoned alternatives in an attempt to rescue this part of DM from its long overdue burial.
Below, I present another re-interpretation of the alleged connection between forces and 'contradictions', which is based on F6-F9, above:
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity, let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
To these we can add the following:
F58: Force P1 contradicts P2 in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (either internally, or with one another).
Unfortunately, this latest re-interpretation can't work, either. That is because if one or both of E1 and E2 do not exist (as a result of the operation of P1 and P2) there can be no contradiction. As we have seen several times already, F58 would imply a 'contradiction' between sets of events that do not co-exist.77
It looks, therefore, like this particular interpretative seam has been thoroughly worked-out; there's no gold in it, only slag. Indeed, what little 'gold' there was, mined by Hegel & Co., unfortunately turned out to be nothing Iron Pyrites.
We need to find a new approach to save this rapidly fading 'theory' from being sent to the knackers yard.
DM And The Revival Of Teleology
The last remaining escape route left open to DM-theorists relies on yet another interpretation which was postponed from earlier, wherein 'contradictions' were said to exist between the effects of forces (or between forces and the effects of other forces), rather than between forces themselves. One such alternative involved taking Engels's suggestion seriously that forces should be edited out of the picture, leaving behind only the relative motion between bodies to give some content to the idea that 'contradictions' can cause change.
However, the first of these had to be abandoned because it meant that forces 'contradicted' prevented effects, implicating this part of the theory with the idea that forces could 'contradict' non-existent entities. The second appeared to undermine the dialectical unity of nature.
Nevertheless, I now propose to examine a re-vamped version of the first of these alternatives, one aimed at circumventing the difficulties noted above.
The good news is that this new option solves the problem created by the second alternative.
The bad news is that it introduces far worse difficulties of its own.
The aforementioned earlier attempt was based on the following:
F17: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F18: Events E1-En form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.
F19: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or take place.
["T" stands for "The Totality".]
As we saw above, an existing force P1 appears to 'contradict' a non-existent event (or series of events), which rendered this interpretation useless. The following re-vamped version is aimed at fixing this bug:
F59: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F60: Events E1-En form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.
F61: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F62: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or take place.
F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.
Since, an expectation can exist alongside the realisation that it has been thwarted (in some cases), this appears to solve the problem.
However, F63 is clearly of little assistance since, not only would be inapplicable throughout the Universe at all times, it does not even record a contradiction.
[That is because the propositions expressed are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p", as required -- where "p" is, say, "Ek has been prevented", and "q" is, say, "Ek was expected" --, when what was required was "Ek has been prevented and "Ek has not been prevented", etc.]
Now, F63 could be altered to circumvent this difficulty.77a
F64: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that depict the dispositional properties of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.
One immediate problem with F64 is that it's not at all clear what the "dispositional properties" of forces are. Objects certainly have dispositional properties as a result of their microstructure and of their relationship with other bodies -- if, that is, the term "dispositional" read in a traditional manner. [More on that in a later Essay.]
Even so, since forces are not obviously bodies (although they can apparently be carried by them -- if we accept certain aspects parts of modern Physics --, but even then this is apparently cashed out in terms of transferred momentum, i.e., along neo-Engelsian lines),78 the ascription of dispositions to forces themselves perhaps amounts to a disguised reference to the affect forces could or would have on such bodies in certain circumstances. In that case, we would have here an explanation of contradictions that appealed to the effect of effects, yet again.
[Anyway, F64 does not even record a contradiction since the propositions it expresses are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p", once more.]
Nevertheless, perhaps F64 can be re-jigged -- maybe along the following lines:
F65: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that depict the normal operation of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.
Unfortunately, not only does F65 fail to record a contradiction (since, yet again, the propositions it expresses to are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p"), what it says brings us back once more to a consideration of the inter-relationship between forces as a way of understanding 'contradictions', as opposed to the present model, which sought to interpret 'contradictions' as the relationship between forces and the effects of other forces.
Anyway, F65 is of little use: if the normal operation of Pn is prevented (so that it does not take place) there would be nothing for P1 to 'contradict'. This annoying but recurring fact is precisely what prompted the current consideration of the actual effects of forces, since they do exist -- as opposed to the prevented effects of forces, or even forces which cease to operate, which don't.
It now seems that unless we can specify how the effects of forces can 'contradict' other forces (or other effects), this part of DM will be as good as dead -- but not yet buried. Maybe the following option will help revive it:
F66: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that express the operation of Pn, such that the presence of E1 (the effect of P1) excludes some or all of E2-En.
However, this is no use, either, since it matters not how effectively some or all of E2-En are excluded; E1 may only 'contradict' that which exists, and, ex hypothesi, once excluded, effects E2-En would no longer be around to be 'contradicted'.
The next suggestion constitutes, in my view, the only way to keep this dangerously ill part of DM alive:
F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.
[However, F67 will need to be re-written in a 'propositional' form, but since that would make this example even more unwieldy than it already is, that task has been left to the reader.]
The good news is that since aims can exist where results and effects do not, we seem at last to have a genuine 'contradiction'.
The bad news is that this belated tonic soon turns into yet another dose of strychnine. That is because, of course, not only does F67 not record a contradiction (for reasons given several times already -- the propositions it expresses to are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p"), we can't attribute aims to forces unless we wish to introduce teleology and anthropomorphism back into nature and society.
F67 can therefore only apply to forces under the control of human agents -- or to their animistically projected counterparts in reality -- that is, if we genuinely want to go down that route and regard nature in such a mystical light.
It is therefore no surprise that the only interpretation that appears to render this part of DM viable is one that reveals the anthropomorphism implicit in the concepts its theorists have imported from Hegel and mystical Hermeticism.
Alternatively, it's equally unsurprising that this is the only option that underlines the reading that works in HM, one that puts forces under human control.79
Unfortunately, this now means that F67 can't help revive the DM-cadaver.
It was noted earlier that there is a general problem that afflicts any attempt to identify forces with 'contradictions' -- i.e., if these are viewed as dialectically-united 'opposites'. In connection with that, we have also seen that DM-classicists have argued that such opposites all turn into one another. But, is it even plausible to suppose forces can do this? Is it credible that a gravitational force, say, can turn into a magnetic force, or into an electrical force? Do all R-type forces turn into A-type forces? Where in Physics is it postulated that gravity can become a repulsive force?
Undoubtedly, electricity and magnetism are inter-linked in modern Physics (and are in fact manifestations of one of the four fundamental forces in nature), but they do not struggle with one another, and neither do the particles on which they depend. Such forces, so we are told, are "carried" by exchange particles, but they aren't an expression of a 'struggle' going on between particles.
To be sure, magnetic fields are reversible, as are electrical fields, but this is not true of all fields (even though all four forces can change in many different ways), but it is far from clear that this is because of any 'struggle' going on between them, either. For example, the origin of the reversal of the Earth's magnetic field may lie deep inside its core, or, perhaps, inside the crust --, or it may even have an external cause (with one set of theorists blaming meteor impact); scientists are not sure. But not one single geophysicist, to my knowledge, is investigating the 'contradiction' between North and South to find its cause.
If that is so, then should all of the objections voiced in this Essay be misguided in some way, the 'dialectical' equation of forces and contradictions does not work even in its own terms!
Do the Relations of Production really turn into the Forces of Production?
For Dialectics, Truth Is A Hole --, And it's Six foot Deep
Since there appears to be no way that DM-'contradictions' can be given a literal or figurative interpretation as forces that survives a moment's scrutiny -- when applied in nature or society, in abstract or concrete form --, this part of DM can at last be given a decent burial.
Indeed, we can even call its time of death: August 27th, 1770.
Send no flowers.80
1. For example, Engels declared:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter…. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or another form of motion…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter…. Each separate movement strives toward equilibrium, and the total motion puts an end to the equilibrium.... [Engels (1976), pp.74-77.]
"So long as we consider things at rest and lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force...." [Ibid., pp.152-53.]
"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…. [This is] the negation of the negation…. [which is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Ibid., pp.179-80.]
"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable…go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…. [T]he transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature -- mechanical force and its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy -- are different forms of manifestation of universal motion…. [W]e have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on the whole…by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself." [Engels (1888), pp.609-11.]
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.]
"All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else…. Hence, all attraction and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another…. Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on each other, that the separation and opposition of these poles exist only within their mutual connection and union...." [Ibid., p.72.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance...." [Ibid., p.82.]
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature...." [Ibid., p.211.]
"[A]ttraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that the true theory of matter must assign a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a theory of matter based on mere attraction is false…. Equilibrium is inseparable from motion…. All equilibrium is only relative and temporary…. Motion of the heavenly bodies [is an] approximate equilibrium of attraction and repulsion in motion." [Ibid., pp.243-46.]
This is how Bukharin put things:
"[T]he world consists of forces, acting many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of 'rest', i.e., their actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces, immediately the ‘internal contradictions’ will be revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the 'conflict,' the 'contradiction,' i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in various directions, determines the motion of the system…." [Bukharin (1925), p.74.]
And here are Lenin's thoughts:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]
Comrade Cornforth argued as follows:
"If we consider the real, complex movements and interconnections of real complex things, then we find that contradictory tendencies can and do exist in them. For example, if the forces operating in a body combine tendencies of attraction and of repulsion, that is a real contradiction…. [C]ontradiction is the driving force of change…. [O]nly the presence of contradictions in a process…provides the internal conditions making change necessary…. The real universe is…full of contradictions –- the contradictions of attraction and repulsion studied by physics…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-95.]
The author of TAR had this to say:
"The conservatism of Hegel's system is thus buried in his notion of contradiction. Contradictions in Hegel are merely intellectual contradictions to be resolved by merely intellectual methods…. The dialectic is therefore only a pseudo-dialectic; its contradictions are never those of opposed material forces capable of doing real damage or of effecting real progress…. Marx was, however, obliged to transform completely the terms of the dialectic when he altered its starting point from abstract concepts to real material forces…. The contradictions are no longer simply between concepts but between real, material forces…. Marx and Engels's dialectic is utterly different from Hegel's. It starts from real, material, empirically verifiable contradictions." [Rees (1998), pp.67-69, 83.]
Woods and Grant put things as follows:
"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....
"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....
"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....
"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls.
"Attraction and Repulsion
"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest. At the base of the atom are immense forces of attraction and repulsion....
"Engels points out the universal role of attraction and repulsion:
"'All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else. Otherwise in time one side would get the preponderance over the other and then motion would finally cease. Hence all attractions and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another. Thus the law of the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion is expressed in the form that each movement of attraction in the universe must have as its complement an equivalent movement of repulsion and vice versa; or, as ancient philosophy -- long before the natural-scientific formulation of the law of conservation of force or energy -- expressed it: the sum of all attractions in the universe is equal to the sum of all repulsions.'
"In Engels' day, the prevailing idea of motion was derived from classical mechanics, where motion is imparted from an external force which overcomes the force of inertia. Engels was quite scathing about the very expression 'force,' which he considered one-sided and insufficient to describe the real processes of nature. 'All natural processes,' he wrote, 'are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world, and further from terrestrial mechanics, implies that only one part is active, operative, the other part being passive, receptive.'
"Engels was far in advance of his time in being highly critical of this notion, which had already been attacked by Hegel. In his History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks that 'It is better (to say) that a magnet has a soul (as Thales expresses it) than that it has an attractive force; force is a kind of property that, separate from matter, is put forward as a kind of predicate -- while soul, on the other hand, is this movement itself, identical with the nature of matter.' This remark of Hegel, approvingly quoted by Engels, contains a profound idea -- that motion and energy are inherent to matter. Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 71-72. Their reference (38) is to Engels (1955), pp.95-96, 110. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
It's interesting to note that Woods and Grant blithely record Engels's approving reference to Hegel's depiction of magnets as having 'souls' while failing to notice its mystical implications. How could this notion -- i.e., 'having a soul' -- be given a 'materialist spin', aimed at putting Hegel's theory back on its feet/'the right way up'? Presumably a soul is a soul, upside down or not.
We have already noted that one on-line dictionary 'defines' contradiction in somewhat similar terms, but since that is has already been commented upon, no more will be said about it here.
[This forms part of Note 1.]
Even so, several dialecticians have tried to argue that there are indeed 'true contradictions' in reality. By far and away the most sophisticated of these is Graham Priest. However, it's far from clear whether the 'contradictions' he considers are indeed 'dialectical' -- that is, should we ever be told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is!
[Priest's work will be considered in more detail in an Additional Essay to be posted at this site at a future date.
In the meantime, the reader should consult this.]
Despite this, veteran communist theoretician, Maurice Cornforth, attempted to show that there are 'true contradictions'. He did so as part of an argument intended to demonstrate that contradictions actually 'exist' in the natural and social world -- contrary to the view endorsed here that a contradiction (in its simplest form in logic) is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, which has nothing to do with 'what exists':
"The contradiction in things is a very familiar state of affairs. There is nothing in the least abstruse about it, and it is often referred to in everyday conversations. For example, we speak of a man as having a 'contradictory' character, or as being 'a mass of contradictions'…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-93.]
In which case, presumably, when we describe someone as a "bit of a puzzle" Cornforth thinks we mean that he or she can be purchased in a magic store or toy shop. Or that when we read this:
"All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances." [William Shakespeare, As You Like It, 2/7.]
we should all try and remember our lines and cues, pay heed to the director, make sure the audience can hear us, and ignore the reviews.
Clearly, Cornforth has never heard of metaphor.
[Why this is not a literal use of "contradiction" is considered below, and throughout this Essay. Moreover, we will soon see that "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradict", or even "contradiction".]
It's worth recalling that Hegel was concerned to show that logical contradictions, and not so much ordinary contradictions, were far too one-sided and limited. His sense of this word was, therefore, intended to transcend the former. (As far as I am aware, he was silent about the latter.) Now, DM-theorists might not aim to use "contradiction" in the same way as Hegel -- whether or not these have been turned "the right way up" or left upside down --, but if that were so, their use of this word wouldn't transcend its use in FL, which would make their criticisms of FL rather empty. In which case, they must mean to transcend FL-contradictions, and that is why I have largely concentrated on the latter in this and other Essays.
However, it's also clear that comrades like Cornforth, and the others considered below, focus on (what they take to be) ordinary contradictions (as opposed to FL-contradictions) when they try to show that there are 'true contradictions', or that 'contradictions' exist. And it's clear why they do this: FL-contradictions are totally uninteresting. Who, for example, is going to get excited about the following (these were in fact used in a letter sent to Socialist Review a few years back by a supporter of this site):
A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate and there isn't.
A2: Capitalism is governed by a blind competitive market and it isn't.
In debate, DM-fans are often surprised to see examples of FL-contradictions like these. From this it's plain they are totally unaware of such contradictions, and when they see them they reject them as examples of what they intend when they use this word. [Here (in the comments section at the bottom) is a recent example of this. When confronted with an FL-contradiction, the comrade with whom I was debating -- Mike Rosen -- denied that this was what he meant. He wanted to show that there was a perfectly ordinary use of this word that picked out what Marx, etc.) meant. And yet none of his examples were 'dialectical contradictions', which rendered the whole exercise rather futile, as I pointed out. There are plenty more examples of this sort of thing in the debates recorded here. Also see Note 61a.]
On the one hand, whatever else DM-'contradictions' are, they are totally unrelated to FL-contradictions, and so can't surpass them. On the other, they have to be related to FL-contradictions, otherwise dialecticians will have to drop the pretence that DL is superior to FL.
In that case, in what follows I will continue to refer to FL-contradictions in my criticism of DL-'contradictions'. If DM-fans mean something different by their use of this word, they should tell us -- and for the first time in over 150 years -- what that is.
[There is more on this here and here.]
However, Cornforth concedes that describing someone as "contradictory" involves a reference to their dispositions (or "tendencies"):
"This means that [they evince] opposed tendencies in [their] behaviour, such as gentleness and brutality, recklessness and cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice." [Cornforth (1976), p.93.]
This automatically prevents these examples of his from being literal contradictions. But Cornforth seems not to have noticed this.
Be this as it may, if this is meant to commit Cornforth to a dispositional account of contradictions, then much of classic DM would become obsolete as a result. The fact that someone might have, say, a disposition to be brave in certain circumstances, but cowardly in others, in no way suggests he/she can be both of these at once. What is open to question is whether the simultaneous actualisation of these dispositions (in certain states or performances) may be expressed by means of true propositions (and without ambiguity).
Indeed, the fact that an iron bar, for example, can be red hot at one end and icy cold at the other at the same time is not a contradiction (even though, plainly, an iron bar is at any time disposed to be either of these at all times), but no one supposes that such a bar could actually be red hot and freezing cold at the same end, at the same time.
To be sure, the supposition that the entire bar could be both of these at the same time might be thought by some to be contradictory; and yet even this would merely be an inconsistency, since both descriptions could be false if the said bar were in fact merely warm.
Anyway, as noted above, the emotions Cornforth considers are expressed by contrary suppositions and as such are inconsistent, not contradictory. For example, if NN was said to be both angry and calm at the same time, that would only be a contradiction if it couldn't be false to assert NN was both. But, it would be false to assert both if NN were slightly agitated (in which state NN would be neither angry nor calm), for instance.
So, even if both of these states were actualisable at the same time (which is, of course, highly dubious), this would still fail to be a contradiction!
On the other hand, if NN could be described (without ambiguity) as follows:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger,
we might have a genuine contradiction here. But, it's unlikely that Cornforth meant what he said to be taken this way --, and it's even more doubtful whether he would have been able to say under what conditions he, or anyone else for that matter, would/could hold N1 true -- or under what conditions he could attribute to NN such odd actualisations.
Consider the following more precise example:
N2: At time t, NN is angry with MM for lying to her at t, and not angry with MM for lying to her at t.
Or, perhaps even more precisely:
N2a: At times t1 and t2, NN is angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1. [t2 > t1]
Or, in ordinary terms:
N2a1: NN is angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday and not angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday.
[Naturally, there are several other possibilities allowed for in logic and ordinary language, such as the following:
N2b: At time t1, NN is angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1.
Or, in ordinary (if somewhat stilted) terms, again:
N2b1: NN is currently angry with MM for lying to her just now and currently not angry with MM for lying to her just now.]
Someone could object and argue that it is possible to have mixed emotions at one and the same time. Perhaps, then, they might mean the following (confining our attention to N2, not N2a or N2b, for simplicity's sake):
N3: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it is a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she understands the pressures on MM when he lied).
In that case, N3 is really this:
N4: At time t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.
Here, we have two different actions/states (involving different objects of this particular emotion): anger at MM because it's a violation of trust (i.e., "φ-ing"), and lack of anger at MM because of extenuating circumstances (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was included earlier:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.
[Greek letters like "φ" and "ψ" are used in FL to help distinguish action- or state-predicates (like "walks", "sits", or "has refuted DM") from others (such as, "is a man" or "is a confused theorist").]
As soon as we fill in the details concerning the nature of the emotion involved, we can see that we have two different objects of the said anger, or two different states/actions, and so no contradiction.
To be sure, someone might still object, but they will (like Cornforth) find it hard to say what the content of that objection amounts to without ignoring/editing out of the picture some object or other of the said anger/emotion, thus misrepresenting the intended situation.
In fact, by his use of the word "tendencies", Cornforth himself seems half ready to concede this point. But, not even he would want to describe the same action (performed by the same person) as, say, literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (without equivocation). While it is possible to ascribe contrary properties to the same object (e.g., one part of the aforementioned iron bar could be hot while another part is cold, as we have seen), a 'contradiction' may only be extracted from such familiar facts by someone who has never heard of ambiguity -- or, who is terminally confused. No one would think they had been contradicted by someone who asserted that the far end of an iron bar was red hot just after they themselves had asserted the near end was ice cold. Nor would they think they'd been contradicted if someone had said they were angry today, but calm the day before.
Anyway, as noted above, any description of the same action (that asserted it was literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (in the same respect and without equivocation)) would merely be an inconsistency -- since both alternatives would be false if the said act was in fact neutral (i.e., if it was neither gentle nor brutal).
[Even so, the disintegration of the Communist Block finally caught up with Cornforth; in one of his last works [Cornforth (1980)], he systematically retracted most of the theses he had once declared were cornerstones of the "world view of the proletariat".]
Another benighted comrade has emerged, unscathed from such contradictory antics, and has vainly tried to defend the employment of this obscure notion (i.e., "dialectical contradiction") by appealing to an everyday use of "contradiction" in connection with contradictory behaviour, when it's not at all clear that the examples he considered are themselves 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with.
Even so, what does he mean by "contradictory behaviour"? Perhaps someone who stands and sits all at once? [Or, who has a tendency to do this? Or, who threatens to do one or both?] Or, maybe someone who goes on strike and refuses to go on strike at the same time?
We aren't told. As usual, DM-fans offer their bemused readers less than half-formed thoughts.
This benighted comrade also tried to argue along similar lines in a 'debate' with me over the recent UK Prison Workers' Strike:
"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it.
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Now, in relation to the aforementioned strike, this benighted comrade seems to have meant workers who support the state one minute, but act against it the next (or who hold what appear to be inconsistent beliefs about one or both). But, put this way, this is not even a contradiction! On the other hand, if these workers both support and didn't support this strike at the same time (without ambiguity), that would be a contradiction, but he plainly didn't mean this.
Of course, as we have seen, contraries are not contradictions, and "contradictory" is not the same as "contradiction". As indicated earlier, concerning two contrary propositions, both can't be true, but they can both be false (i.e., in this case, they would merely be inconsistent with one another).
For example, the contraries "All swans are white" and "No swan is white" can't both be true (in a non-empty domain), but they could both be false -- for instance, if either or both of "Some swan is not white", or "Some swan is white" were true. But, two contradictory propositions can't both be true and they can't both be false, at once. Again, dialecticians invariably ignore such "pedantic" details.
Moreover, if someone were presented with these two propositions: "All swans are white" and "Some swan is not white" they will have been presented with two contradictory propositions, but this would only be a contradiction if they were conjoined to give: "All swans are white and some swan is not white". "Contradictory" applies to propositions or clauses that can be conjoined to form a contradiction (or which can be used to contradict someone), whether or not they are so conjoined. "Contradictory" also applies to states and performances (among other things), which, if expressed in propositions or clauses, can also be conjoined to yield a contradiction, whether or not they are so conjoined -- in the same way that a drug can be described as hallucinatory; it has the potential to cause hallucinations whether or not it is so used. Or, it can apply to imperatives which undo one another, or would do so, if acted upon. [There are similar distinctions that apply to "contradict" and "contradiction". See also here.]
Now, in relation to the August 2007 UK Prison Officers' strike, this comrade seems to have meant workers who support the state one minute, but act against it the next (or who hold what appear to be inconsistent beliefs about one or both). But, put this way, this isn't even a contradiction! If these workers both supported and didn't support this strike at the same time, that would be a contradiction, but he plainly didn't mean this.
In fact, there was a rather good example of this sort of confusion in Simon Basketter's recent article in Socialist Worker:
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.
"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to the strikers....
"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence.
"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.'
"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest."
Once more, what is the 'contradiction' here? Maybe, it has something to do with the following:
P1: Prison officers uphold the law.
P2: This either results from, or leads them into holding right-wing ideas.
P3: But, this strike has forced some to defy and/or disrespect the law.
P4: However, later, when some prisoners protested, the same officers rushed back to work to control them.
Now, I have already commented on the loose, indeterminate and often indiscriminate way that dialecticians like to use "contradiction", but even given such conceptual profligacy, what precisely is the contradiction here?
Let us try again (using "NN" this time to stand for the name of a randomly selected prison guard who thinks and acts along the above lines, and "L1" to stand for a law he/she rejects, or opposes, even if only temporarily):
P5: NN upholds the law.
P6: NN has adopted a number of right-wing ideas.
P7: One day, as a result of the strike, NN says "Screw law L1!" [No pun intended.]
P8: Later that day he acts in support of a totally different law.
Once more, where's the contradiction?
Now, if NN had said, "Screw all laws!" we might be able to cobble-together an inconsistency here (such as "Screw all laws!" (i.e., "All laws ought to be screwed!") and "No laws ought to be screwed!"), but not even that is implied by the above story.
In fact, a contradiction in this case could be formed from be something like: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed." Or, perhaps: "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed."
To be sure, people say all sorts of odd things, and it's relatively easy to utter contradictions. Who has ever denied that! [Look, I have just posted two contradictory sets of propositions in the previous paragraph.] The question is, can both be held true, or held false (or, in this case, advocated and repudiated as a moral or political code), at the same time and in same respect? Well, did anyone from Socialist Worker try to ascertain from the aforementioned prison guards if any of them would have both assented to and rejected the following at the same time: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed", or, "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed"? Apparently not.
Indeed, if NN had assented to "No laws should be screwed", we could safely infer from his later strike action that he no longer held it true. Plainly, as a result of the strike he must have come to accept the following alternative in its place: "I now think there is at least one law (namely, law L1) that should be screwed".
[And this would still be the case even if tomorrow NN went back to holding his former beliefs about every law. Dialecticians, least of all, shouldn't need reminding that people and things change!]
Unless, that is, we think NN holds this odd belief: "I do not believe that there is at least one law that should be screwed and I also believe there is at least one law that should be screwed." Or, perhaps "Screw L1 and do not screw L1!"
Even so, it's also reasonably clear that we could only attribute schizoid beliefs like this to NN if he were about to go insane, or had suffered a blow to the head. We certainly couldn't rely on such a confused character to help win a strike -- nor could we depend on him to report his genuine beliefs with any accuracy, either! He/she is just as likely to tell us: "Yes I believe this and I do not...". Would Socialist Worker have even quoted such a confused individual? Hardly.
[No wonder 'dialectical reasoning' has been described as a form of "mental confusion".]
Elsewhere in my Essays, I allege that dialectics is based on little other than Hegel's egregious logical blunders (either on their feet, the 'right way' up --, or, upside down --, it matters not), but I also added that DM-fans often base their assertions on half-formed thoughts, seriously garbled caricatures of logic (formal and discursive) and laughably thin evidence (which is why I branded it Mickey Mouse Science).
Simon Basketter's obscure claim amply confirm these allegations.
But, let us re-examine what the benighted comrade had to say to see if anything useful can be extracted from it.
"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it.
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Considering this first:
"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."
Well, who can blame theorists for wanting to use old words in new ways? But, the above examples seem to be framed in ordinary language already. So why then the following claim?
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Of course, these examples relate to what humans beings do or can think, so they aren't much use in showing how there are or can be 'true contradictions' in nature.
Now this benighted comrade might not have noticed (but it was staring him in the face in the example I gave, and in the ones he listed) that contradictions can relate to the inner workings of one proposition just as they can apply to the connection between several propositions at once, both in ordinary language and in logic. In which case, the complexities of logic can't be used to defend him from his self-inflicted errors -- for he himself provided his own counterexamples!
Considering this next:
"Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."
Unfortunately, this is far too vague to do much with. Perhaps this benighted comrade meant something like the following:
D1: The measured distance to star YY is 4.8 million light years.
D2: The measured distance to star YY is 4.3 million light years.
But, these do not contradict one another, since the true distance to star YY might be 4.5 million light years, making both D1 and D2 false.
And, it's irrelevant whether the true distance to star YY is actually 4.8 or even 4.3 million light years. The fact is that it might not be, or might not have been, either.
It's worth recalling that if this were a genuine contradiction, D1 and D2 couldn't both be true and couldn't both be false at once (whether or not one of them was either). At best, therefore, D1 and D2 are inconsistent. So, even if D1 were true, it's still the case that both D1 and D2 couldn't both be true, but could both be false, at once. This couldn't happen if they were contradictories -- unlike the following two, which are:
D3: The measured distance to star YY is 4.8 million light years.
D4: It's not the case that the measured distance to star YY is 4.8 million light years.
Now, these two have to have opposite truth values (assuming, of course, that there is such a star); they both can't be true and they both can't be false. Given what we mean by "star", YY has to be some distance or other from the earth. One or other of D3 and D4 has to be true. Either YY is 4.8 million light years from earth or it isn't (or the meaning of the words used has changed, or the star has ceased to exist, etc., etc.).
To be sure, an inconsistency here might imply a contradiction, but it's not too clear if this benighted comrade meant this. But, even if he did, who has ever denied two propositions can contradict one another? [Look, I have posted two more above!] The point is, they can't both be true and they can't both be false at once. DM-fans seem to want them both to be true -- but that would automatically prevent them from being contradictory.
Now, this comrade might have meant that raw data (not in a propositional context or form) could contradict some theory or other. Perhaps then he meant this:
D5: 4.8 million light years.
D6: 4.3 million light years.
But, neither of these is capable of being true or false since they aren't even indicative sentences. **And, if that is so, they can't contradict anything (since to do so, they'd both have to be capable of being true or false). Moreover, as soon as a (sentential) context is given them, they would merely be inconsistent, once more.
But, couldn't D3 and D4, or D5 and D6 contradict the predictions of some theory/enquiry or other -- perhaps this:
D7: Theory T predicts that star YY is 5.7 million light years away.
And yet, the proposition "YY is 5.7 million light years away" is merely inconsistent with D3 and D4, if they are put in a propositional context, that is. So, we don't have a contradiction even here.
[They have to be put in such a context or the point made above (**) would kick in.]
So, until the benighted comrade supplies us with greater detail, little more can be done with his comments.
[I will however, be looking in detail at how data can 'contradict' a scientific theory, and the confused things DM-fans have said about this, in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
Be this as it may, is it possible, therefore, for an individual to have contradictory interests or goals in a relationship, as this comrades asserts? Perhaps by this the benighted comrade meant the following (for simplicity's sake, I will concentrate on potential or actual interests an individual might have; the argument can easily be extended to cover goals -- that detail will be left to the reader):
B1: NM has interest A in relationship R.
B2: It's not the case that NM has interest A in relationship R.
This would seem to be a genuine contradiction (if the two are conjoined, assuming they applied simultaneously and with no equivocation):
B2a: NM has interest A in relationship R and it's not the case that NM has interest A in relationship R.
But, did Mr G mean this?
Apparently not. Well, what about the following?
B3: NM has interest A in relationship R.
B4: NM has interest B in relationship R.
B5: Interest A in relationship R contradicts interest B in relationship R.
But, if we are talking about literal contradictions here (and not the loose and ill-defined 'dialectical contradictions' we have come to know and loathe) then A and B in relationship R can only contradict one another if they are expressed in propositions (or in clauses), as indicated in B5a-B7:
B5a: Interest A contradicts interest B.
B6: "A" stands for "I, NM, must love my partner".
B7: "B stands for "It's not the case that I, NM, must love my partner".
It's hard to see how anything could be an interest (as opposed to a vague sort of 'non-linguistic feeling') unless it were expressed in this way.
The question is can anyone assent to such conflicting interests all at once? Well, as we saw with NN above, people can assent to all manner of odd ideas and feelings, so there is nothing to prevent B6 and B7 from forming the content of someone's overall intentional/emotional make-up.
However, before we reach too hastily for the 'contradiction' label, it's plain that this alleged contradiction can be disambiguated along the lines attempted above (in relation to N3 and N4, reproduced below) -- providing we supply plausible background details (ignoring, however, the complexities mentioned in N2a and N2b). That's because people do not just have interests simpliciter any more than they just have emotions simpliciter. [For something to be an emotion it has to be object directed; we are angry with someone or something, fearful of something or someone, in love with someone or something, etc. Of course, an individual could just be in a fearful state, with no object of that fear, but that would be enough to diagnose him/her as (acutely or chronically) mentally disturbed and/or ill. This wouldn't count as a genuine emotion, otherwise mental disturbance would not have been diagnosed.] As with most things connected with intentional behaviour, such things are goal-, or object-directed (which is why we use transitive verbs to characterise them). We'd not be able to make sense of someone who was just in love, but with no one or nothing in particular.
N3: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it is a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she understands the pressures on MM when he lied).
N4: At time t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.
[The reader is directed back here for an explanation of these symbols.]
Hence, in this case, we would have something like the following (in slightly abbreviated form, for clarity's sake):
N3c: NN feels she must love MM because of his caring for her, and NN feels she must not love MM for sleeping with her best friend.
[I have left N3c in a slightly stilted form so that it is clear what is being said.]
In that case, N3c is in fact this:
N5: NN feels she must love MM for φ-ing, and not love MM for ψ-ing.
As before, we have in effect two different objects of NN's love: his caring for her (i.e., "φ-ing") and his violation of her trust (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was included earlier (now re-written as N1a):
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.
N1a: NN both loves and does not love MM at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that love.
Plainly, in N5, we have here two different objects of the said love, and thus no contradiction, again -- or, at least, no more than these would be:
N6: NN saw MM in the distance with her binoculars.
N7: NN saw MN in the distance with her binoculars.
Here we have two different objects of NN's sight, MM and MN. If anyone thought these two propositions were contradictory, that would indicate they were the victim of serious linguistic confusion, not the author of a breakthrough in the science of optics.
It could be argued that the above express the cause of those emotions, or whatever occasioned them, not their objects. In fact, it's not too clear that this is a distinction with a difference, any more than these are:
N8: MM in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.
N7: MN in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.
So, whatever the cause, the aforementioned emotions had different objects, and so aren't contradictory.
Of course, if this benighted comrade meant something other than this, he should perhaps learn to be a little clearer.
However, it might be felt that it's reasonably obvious that the contradiction here is this:
B7a: NN: "I must love my partner and it's not the case that I must love my partner".
Once more, it's far from clear how this qualifies as a 'dialectical contradiction' -- that is, should we ever be told what one of these is. [Do they turn into one another, as the DM-classics tell us they should? And even if they did, how could anyone tell!]
Ignoring this minor niggle for now, it's undeniable that human beings experience conflicting emotions like this all the time, but when faced with B7a, the normal reaction would be to respond with: "Er..., what on earth do you mean by that?", and we'd be surprised if NN found it impossible to say why she felt this way. We'd certainly expect some form of disambiguation or clarification of what she meant, perhaps along the lines expressed in N3a:
N3a: NN feels she must love MM because of his caring for her, and NN feels she must not love MM for sleeping with her best friend.
If so, and once more, no contradiction would be implied.
But, even if B7a were an unambiguous contradiction, that would simply confirm the fact that contradictions in ordinary language and in logic are built around the content of propositions, and the logical links we hold between them -- undermining this benighted comrade's point:
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
The question now is, has anyone ever held the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true or both false at the same time? Or anything like them? Perhaps they have (who can say?), but how that shows that there are in fact 'true contradictions' in nature and society is still somewhat unclear.
B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".
B7: "B stands for "It's not the case that I must love my partner".
[B5: Interest A in relationship R contradicts interest B in relationship R.]
As should seem obvious, the fact that someone believes (or holds) something to be true or believes something to be false does not automatically make it true or make it false!
[Once again, it's worth recalling here that two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once. So, if someone does assent to two contradictory propositions, then they must believe both can be true or both can be false. (That is they must deny the following: Two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once.) But, that would just mean they had misunderstood the word "contradiction", or they were as confused as this benighted comrade.]
However, it could be argued that because NN holds the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true -- when coupled with the fact that NN is an individual who exists in the real world --, that shows that it's at least possible to assert the existence of true contradictions. Once this possibility is allowed, the objections set out in this Essay can be seen for what they are: empty rhetoric.
Or, so it might be claimed.
Indeed, an argument somewhat like this was rehearsed by Roy Edgley a few years back:
"Since thought and theory are also part of reality and thus real objects that can be thought about, contradictions in thought, though not true of reality, certainly exist in reality; and it is only because they do exist in reality that they can be the object of criticism -- criticism for failing to be true of reality. Moreover, it is because two contradictory theories can't both be true that each bears a critical relation to the other: instantiated in actual thought this relation of logical opposition is in fact a critical relation of real opposition, Kant notwithstanding. It is no less logical opposition and no more simply natural 'conflict of forces' for taking the form of real historical and social struggle." [Edgley (1979), pp.24-25. Italic emphases in the original.]
The following would presumably be one such contradiction (although Edgley himself was apparently interested in more overtly scientific propositions), and one such existential claim:
B8: Let "p" be "I must love my partner and it's not the case that I must love my partner".
B9: In so far as "p" exists, contradictions exist in reality.
As Edgley admits, while a proposition like p would not actually be true, it would still exist, and hence contradictions certainly exist (at this minimal level, at least). To be sure, it's an entirely different matter whether or not p is true; I will return to consider this option later. But, what about the claim that this argument shows that contradictions at least exist? Well certainly those words exit, but that is no more illuminating than the following would be:
B10: Let "G" = "God".
B11 In so far as G exists, God exists in reality.
The question would still remain as to whether there is a 'God' or not.
[As those who know their logic will also know, Edgley has confused a propositional sign with a proposition (and perhaps also use with mention). B10 and B11 partially bring this out.]
Someone might object: the above argument in fact confirms that the word "God" exists just as Edgley's argument shows that contradictions exist.
Well, all it shows is that a propositional sign exists, but who has ever denied that? Put another way, Edgley's argument is no more illuminating than would be an argument aimed at showing 'God' exists, but which instead showed that the word "God" exists!
Once more, no one has ever questioned the existence of inscriptions of contradictions (indeed, these Essays contain scores of them), but that sheds no light at all on the claim that there are 'real contradictions' in nature and society. If the mere thought of a contradiction, or its actual inscription on the page (or screen), were enough to show that DM-contradictions exist in the real world, then we should have to admit that there were 'real tautologies', too. But worse, we should have to accept LIE, that is, the doctrine that solely from thought, or from words alone, substantive ontological conclusions (as opposed to trivial linguistic/inscriptional conclusions) may be deduced. [More on that in Essay Twelve.]
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; FL = Formal Logic.]
But, signs and inscriptions do not have such existential implications; plainly, if they did we should all have to believe in The Tooth Fairy and Bigfoot.
Edgley goes on to argue:
"Though a system of thought that is contradictory can't be true of its real object, this isomorphic relation between the structure of a society's thought and the structure of its material life thus gives sense to the idea that such thought is true to that material life: in being contradictory it 'reflects', and so discloses, though its content does not explicitly assert, the contradictory structure of the material life of that society." [Ibid., p.25. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Unfortunately, theorists are often careless over their use of the word "isomorphic"; how, it might be wondered, can a set of words be isomorphic to items in the world they do not in any way resemble, some of which are abstract common nouns, and many of which aren't referring expressions to begin with?
Putting this to one side for now, we may further wonder how Edgley knows this is indeed an "isomorphism" if none of his contradictions are true of capitalism, as he concedes. And his claim that this theory is "true to" capitalism is far from clear; how something can be "true to", but not "true of" a social system is something Edgley failed to explain.
Now, Edgley asserts that these linguistic contradictions (or at least the more theoretical examples to which he refers) are a "reflection" of "real oppositions" in society. That claim is partly defused below, and will be further laid to rest throughout this Essay. [See also here.]
Independently of this, Edgley makes a serious mistake (one that all DM-fans seem to commit): confusing contradictions in FL with what might or might not exist. As noted above, and in Essay Four Part One, FL makes no existential claims. To be sure, logicians as individuals may make such claims, but logic itself is neutral in this regard (since logic is not an agent, and is capable of making no assertions). While it is true that certain logical systems might need an ontology (or even a model) in order to work, even there, contradictions do not make existential claims; the background 'ontology' does that.
To repeat: in its simplest form a contradiction in logic is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, such that both can't both be true and both can't be false at once. So, the fact that inscriptions of contradictions exist has no bearing on this logical principle. Furthermore, FL does not rule out the existence of contradictions, since FL is not a science, nor is it an agent. It neither rules in nor rules out the existence of anything. [In fact, in the construction of indirect proofs, logicians and mathematicians use contradictions all the time!] The study of logic, in this respect, revolves around the truth-functional implications that hold between a proposition and its negation. It's not about existence in any shape or form.
In that case, contradictions can't "reflect" anything, for they represent just one form of the disintegration of the expressive power of language.
[The fact that there are many different definitions of "contradiction" in FL and Philosophical Logic is discussed in Essay Eight Part Three. More on this here, here and in Essay Twelve Part One.]
But, wait! The benighted comrade mentioned earlier has a powerful ally, none other than that outright charlatan, Freud:
"Perhaps someone is in the midst of an unhappy love affair and says
'I love him
but I also hate him'. It's not just the statement but the feeling which is a
contradiction surely? If Freud is held to describe the human individual not as a
unified subject but a bundle of contradictory drives and desires, might one not
imagine contradictory drives (if not desires) in a particular social system?
"Can I not have contradictory emotions about a subject, situation or person (I
know I do about all sorts of things!)."
Thus, on the back of some egregious pseudo-science, this comrade is content to build his 'case'.
But, is there anything in these fraudulent Freudian fancies (even if we put to one side all the lies, deceit, client abuse, intellectual bullying, cocaine-induced fantasy, paranoia, and fabricated evidence that marked Freud's career)?
Well, once more, can people have contradictory emotions? Perhaps these will suffice:
B12: NN hates Blair.
B13: It's not the case that NN hates Blair.
However, I rather think that this comrade didn't mean a contradiction like this. Perhaps he intended the following?
B10: NN both hates and loves Blair.
This is entirely possible, if unusual (but it can surely be disambiguated along the lines examined above).
However, it's worth noting that love and hate are not contradictory (when put in a propositional context), unless, say, hating someone implies not loving them; but, as the above quotation shows, it doesn't imply this! [That is so unless by "contradiction" we mean something entirely new; if so, what?]
Moreover, we have already seen that B14 is not even a contradiction, since it could be false -- that is, if NN were indifferent to Blair.
Nevertheless, (1) The reader will need to re-read the caveats posted here, and (2) Note that in order to give content to this idea (if it is what was meant, or if these ideas mean anything at all), we had to use a propositional context to make things clear, once more.
This rather makes a mess then of the following rather rash assertions:
"I'm just very puzzled about what it means to restrict the meaning of the term contradiction to a rule of formal logic. It's always been the least compelling of your arguments it seems to me. I don't understand the linguistic scandal that is supposed to be involved in talking about the human subject as a 'bundle of contradictory drives and desires' or talking about the capitalist system as encompassing contradictory tendencies (how TRPF [the tendency of the rate of profit to fall -- RL] is held to operate inside a concrete capitalist social formation for example)....
"I don't see how there can be anything ipso facto absurd or meaningless about such statements to anyone familiar with ordinary language." [Bold emphasis added.]
No "scandal" here at all; this comrade's badly thought-out examples themselves imply the above conclusions -- that is, when we try to make sense of them. Even he had to use propositions to inform us of these Freudian foibles.
[Supposedly contradictory drives and emotions were disambiguated above. The alleged 'contradictions' in capitalism are dealt with here, and here. Finally, I have already pointed out, just as I pointed this out to this comrade, my concerns aren't solely with FL-contradictions.]
Now, it could be argued that certain brain states or underlying psychological and/or social forces are what lie behind the contradictory emotions/tendencies that exercised this benighted comrade, and it is here that the contradiction lies. [This seems to be what motivated Professor Edgley's comments above.]
Unfortunately, the thesis that there are such things as 'contradictory forces' has been laid to rest in this Essay; but, the overall idea is susceptible to the next series of objections, anyway.
[The argument below also applies to the claim that there might be certain brain states/process and/or psychological 'drives' -- and/or social forces/tendencies -- at work, of which we are as yet unaware, that constitute such 'material contradictions', or which cause/'mediate' them.]
Let us, therefore, call "F" the brain state/process and/or psychological 'drive' and/or social force/tendency that results in, 'mediates', or from which "emerges", the following:
B15: NN loves Tony Blair.
Or, in the first person:
B15a: I, NN, love Tony Blair.
Let us also label "F*" as the brain state/process and/or psychological 'drive' and/or social force/tendency that results in, 'mediates', or from which "emerges", the following:
B16: NN hates Tony Blair.
Or, in the first person:
B16a: I, NN, hate Tony Blair.
So, "F" stands for the social or psychological force (etc.) that 'mediates' (etc.) "NN loves Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent), and "F*" stands for the social force (etc.) which 'mediates' (etc.) "NN hates Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent).
Let us further assume that F 'contradicts' F*, i.e., that they are 'dialectically-united opposites'.
Now, given these assumptions, not even this will work!
[Of course, if they aren't 'dialectically-united opposites' to begin with (or, if there can be no such things as 'dialectically-united opposites'), then the above comrade's objection fails by default.]
According to the DM-classics -- where we are told that all things change into their opposites, and that they do so because of a "struggle" between those opposites -- F must change into F*, and vice versa. But, F can't change into F* since F* already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this theory, F couldn't change, for there would be no opposite to 'struggle' with to make it do just that!
And, it's no good propelling F** into the future so that it now becomes what F* will change into, since F* will do no such thing unless F** is already there to make it happen!
Now, it could be objected that love can turn into hate, and vice versa; sure enough, but the whole point of introducing F and F* was to show that if and when that happens, dialectics can't account for it -- and for the above reasons!
[For those interested, this argument is developed in greater detail here, where 'social contradictions' are also analysed.]
Finally, the following represents an (edited version of an) exchange between myself and a far more reasonable comrade (whose name has been withheld):
Comrade M (commenting on the dialectical use of the word "contradiction"): I mean what most people mean -- conflict, inner tension...
Rosa: Do they really? Give me one sentence drawn from ordinary language (the vehicle most people do in fact use, so what you say should appear there, somewhere) where such an interpretation could be put on the word "contradiction" -- i.e., one not infected with the sort of idealist guff you read in Hegel. An idealist will have no problem with asserting such things; if reality is Mind it can surely argue with itself. Not so a materialist who bases his/her science on the language of ordinary workers (ordinary language).
But, even then, why call such things "contradictions"? What link does this use have with the "gain-saying" of someone, which is what the word usually means? How is a conflict in society a contradiction?
Sure, you can re-define the word to mean whatever you like, but if we all did that we could re-define anything to mean anything, and we'd lose touch with meaning altogether.
Apart from that, you'd be forcing a view onto reality (contrary to what 'dialecticians' tell us they never do), not reading one from it. Linguistic Idealism -- as I asserted in those parts of my work I sent you -- would then automatically have raised its ideal head. Society would be 'contradictory', not because it really was so, but because we have re-defined it to be so. A linguistic dodge would have created a few empirical 'truths'; this is science on the cheap...
Comrade M: Rosa said: "Give me one sentence..." Okay, what about "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!" Or "That's a contradiction in terms".
Suppose someone says "military intelligence" is a contradiction in terms. What they mean is that there is a conflict or a tension between the first and the second word, thus conjugated.
At any rate, you are berating a new convert. I can't be expected to know everything at once, much less know it as wisely as the central committee (you).
Rosa: First, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is either a misnomer or a rhetorical device. Why? Well, since contradiction has to do with truth and falsehood as much as it has to do with "gain-saying", and since one term on its own can't be true or false (only sentences and clauses can be), and since single words do not say anything, no term can contradict another.
In that case, "contradiction in terms" means something like "incompatible phrase(s)", as in "round square". Now, "AB is round and it is square" would only be a contradiction if "AB is round" were taken to mean "AB is not square", but then you would not now have a contradiction in terms, just a sentential contradiction with no "conflict (or) inner tension" anywhere in sight.
And, if the above conclusion were rejected (for some reason), you still would not have a "contradiction in terms" that expressed some sort of "conflict (or) inner tension", since, once more, words can't conflict (or be tense, or be in tension), because they are not agents. Moreover, anyone who uttered a "contradiction in terms" would not necessarily be in "conflict (or) inner tension", just confused. And even if they weren't confused, the "contradiction in terms" they uttered would not necessarily indicate "conflict (or) inner tension"; it could be a sign of all manner of things (ranging from lack of clarity, through puzzlement, to playfulness).
As to the idea that such a phrase could indicate the presence of "conflict (or) inner tension" I have no doubt, but if a "contradiction in terms" meant that a "conflict (or) inner tension" had to be present, it would mean this, not merely could mean this, just as the truth of "not p" would mean the falsehood of "p" (as opposed to merely "not p" could mean the falsehood of "p"). So they can't be synonymous, as you allege.
[Apologies for the prolixity of that paragraph, but logic is a pain in the dictionary!]
But, even if this were not so, "contradiction" here would not mean "conflict (or) inner tension", but "gainsaying oneself or another", which could be true without an inner conflict being implied. It might be a joke, an attempt to puzzle, part of a game, a mistake… The possibilities are endless. The attempt to squeeze this into an idealist boot can only succeed if the almost endless possibilities allowed for by ordinary language are ignored.
As to "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!", the verb "to contradict" in this command (it's not in fact a proposition, so it can't itself be a contradiction, literally speaking -- not that you suggested it was) clearly means "gain-say". No quibble there. But, if it meant "conflict, inner tension", you would have:
"Don't you conflict/inner tension me you little bastard!", which is meaningless.
Even if we were to edit this to:
"Don't you conflict with me you little bastard!"
it would not mean the same as:
"Don't you contradict me you little bastard!"
One can conflict with someone without contradicting them, and vice versa (e.g., two friends could contradict each other (out of fun) without conflicting with each other, say). Hence these can't mean the same.
However "Don't you inner tension with me you little bastard!" can't be beaten into shape at all.
2. Engels, for example, went to great lengths to qualify what he meant by "force". Cf., Engels (1954), pp.69-86.
3. This was established in Essay Two.
Nevertheless, as we saw there, assertions like those listed in Note 1 function as a "form of representation", not as a summary of the available evidence. In many cases, such broad generalisations are made on the basis of little or no evidence at all. For example:
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211.]
"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…[is] the negation of the negation…. [This is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976), pp.179-80.]
Now, Engels was quite happy to call such sketchy, half-formed sub-hypotheses, "laws" even though they were based solely on a superficial examination of a limited range of examples -- all specially selected and highly simplified --, drawn from the science of his day. And, even then, they are often badly-described or misconstrued. No wonder I have called this Mickey Mouse Science.
[Their role as a "form of representation" will be outlined in the section dealing with the RRT, in Essay Twelve Part Four.]
[RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]
[The phrase "form of representation" is taken from Wittgenstein; a brief outline of its meaning can be found in Glock (1996), pp.129-35. We will see Engels employing one of these in Note 7, below.
Also, follow the link to "norm of representation" given in Note 25.]
4. However, in one of these quotations, Engels seems to question the identification of contradictions with forces:
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion….
"It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
Even though Engels elaborated on this theme in the succeeding pages of DN, this passage alone totally undermines the equation of forces with contradictions. [Of course, this quotation was taken from unpublished notebooks, so it might not have represented Engels's more considered views.]
[DN = Dialectics of Nature; i.e., Engels (1954).]
Nevertheless, this re-interpretation of the term "force" as a sort of shorthand for "simple forms of motion" is in fact in line with more modern approaches to the nature of force, which sees is an expression of the exchange of momentum. Even so, this 'revised view' has serious consequences for DM that Engels appears not to have noticed. Several of these are examined in the main body of this Essay, and below in Note 25.
5. Admittedly, this is a highly simplified picture, for even in such circumstances there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body -- the resultant motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting in the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of the orbiting body, motion isn't the result of two different sorts of forces -- those of attraction and repulsion -- but a consequence of just one resultant force. Hence, orbital motion (at least) is produced by the action of one force only (in Classical Physics) -- with only one force, there can be no 'contradiction'. Now, since orbital motion encompasses most of the bulk motion in the universe, most movement in nature can't be the result of any sort of 'contradiction'.
Furthermore, any secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the system), which happens to be superimposed on the primary action, only serves to complicate the picture, it doesn't alter it. This extra activity might also be the result of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces (in Classical Physics, once more), which admittedly affect the said resultant. While they might change that resultant, they do not turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic and several other options are examined again in more detail here.]
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the motion of such a body around another is determined by the operation of the two forces of attraction that pass between them: body A attracts body B, and vice versa.
Even so, it's difficult to see how two attractive forces could be regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories' (nor yet how they are supposed to be 'struggling'). Anyway, Engels himself argues that oppositional forces are those of attraction and repulsion, despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in nature these seem to have little or no part to play. Not only that, but the motion of, say, planet A around, say, star B, is caused by forces originating in B, not A. While, the forces originating in A may affect B, they do not affect A itself, or its motion around B.
It could be argued once more that the interconnected and reciprocal chain of effects in play between A and B shows that such forces are dialectically-linked. Hence, on this view, B would affect A's motion while A reciprocates; this in turn alters B's motion, which must then affect A's, and so on. But even here, these attractive forces do not confront each other as oppositional or as contradictory. At best, such forces affect the motion of the two bodies in tandem, which motion in turn then affects any other forces in play, and so on. In fact, they appear to augment one another. On that basis, if we insist on anthropomorphising nature, should we not say (and with more justification) that such forces aren't in fact contradictory, they are tautological? [On this, see Note 38, below. See also Note 6b.]
Anyway, and once more, these forces do not turn into each other, which either means that they aren't 'dialectical opposites', or the DM-classics were wrong.
6. Again this simplifies the picture considerably, but the point is still valid. Even if it could be shown that gravity is a property either of matter (as a result, perhaps, of the activities of the by now legendary "graviton"), of Spacetime, or of something else, 'motion' through the latter would still not be a function of attractive and repulsive forces. [On this, see Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi. However, it's also worth pointing that this view has recently been challenged in Wilson (2007). More on that below.]
[In the previous paragraph, the word "motion" is in 'scare' quotes, since it's a moot point whether anything actually moves in four-dimensional Spacetime.]
6a. This, of course, is not how things are pictured in school or college Physics textbooks, where "force" is still used for heuristic purposes. But, as Jammer notes, in higher Physics, "force" has been edited out of the picture, replaced by exchange particles.
This is re-iterated by Nobel Laureate, Professor Wilczek:
"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.
"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote
"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Quoted from here.]
[The above now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38.]
This view has been criticised quite effectively in Wilson (2007). More details on this will be added here at a later date.
6b. Despite this, it could be argued that it is the relation between bodies that determines subsequent changes in motion, and this supports the idea that there is a contradiction here. But, in relativistic physics, it's the 'relation' between a body and the gravitational field in which it finds itself that changes its motion, and once this is admitted we have left far behind the idea that there are "contradictory forces" at work in any meaningful sense of the term.
Once more, it could be countered that there is still a relation between bodies here, since the more massive body will deform the gravitational field that surrounds it, thus changing the motion of the second body. Maybe so, but how this is a 'contradiction' has yet to be explained. There seems to be no "struggle" here (or are we to imagine that bodies 'struggle' with tensor fields -- i.e., with mathematical structures?), nor is one term transformed into its opposite (as we were assured they must by the dialectical classics). There is no 'unity' or 'identity in opposition' here; one body just happens to be in the deformed results of another's field, and moves along the geodesics there. Once again: if anything, and if we absolutely have to use a metaphor here, because of the regular and smooth (non-developmental) nature of the motion, this is much more like a 'dialectical tautology'.
7. For example, see Engels (1954), pp.73-80. I pick up this topic again, here and here.
Nevertheless, it's far from clear what Engels was driving at in these passages. If he meant to say that heat operates as a repulsive force then that would have been a desperate and unconvincing move. Not only do cold bodies have satellites (e.g., Neptune), hot bodies swallow matter up all the time. It's possible that Engels simply copied this idea from theorists of the previous century. [Hesse (1961), Williams (1980).]
Admittedly, Engels also considered other repulsive forces that could operate in a planetary system, but his ideas were not just speculative and fanciful, they were clearly ad hoc. I can find no evidence that anyone else (DM-fan or otherwise) has followed up on -- or developed -- any of these ideas in any way in the intervening years.
For example, Engels appeals to the original repulsive properties of the "individual particles of the gaseous sphere" from which the Solar System was formed (as a result of "contraction"), to account for its origin by means of an "interplay of attraction and repulsion." [Engels (1954), pp.73-74.]
It would be difficult to find a better example than this of how the 'dialectical method' has been imposed on nature, not deduced from the phenomena. And we can say this with some confidence. Even if this 'theory' weren't so obviously fanciful, it certainly could not have been deduced from the phenomena since the alleged incidents took place billions of years ago. Admittedly, there might have been theoretical considerations that recommended this 'hypothesis' to Engels as a tentative 'explanation' of how the Solar System could have formed -- although even that is questionable since Engels explicitly based his ideas on the old Kant-Laplace model, itself nearly 100 years old at the time --, but even granted all this, Engels's account is superficial, impressionistic and lacks both mathematical and evidential support. It was clearly motivated by his desire to find some force -- any force -- to counterbalance gravity just because DM requires it, not because the phenomena dictate it. This is a classic example of Engels using the ideas he inherited from Hegel as a "form of representation", and a confused one at that.
To be sure, such formal devices are used all the time in science; Engels however turned this one into a metaphysical thesis.
[The difference between Metaphysics and science will be outlined in Essay Thirteen Part Two. On Metaphysics and DM, see Essay Twelve Part One.]
Indeed, Einstein himself was not above inventing forces to suit the requirements of his theory (the same was true of Newton, too), introducing "the cosmological constant" to account for the fact that the Universe hasn't collapsed in on itself. [Cf., Lerner (1992), pp.131-32.] There are countless examples of this sort of move in the history of science. Thomas Kuhn called these "paradigms". [On this, see Kuhn (1970, 1996), and Sharrock and Read (2002).]
Incidentally, an appeal to so-called 'centrifugal forces' (a bogus notion found in Classical Physics) won't save Engels's theory either, since such forces do not 'exist'. If anything they result from the application of a misleading shorthand for the way that rectilinear motion would tend to be re-asserted if forces responsible for centripetal acceleration cease to operate, subjectively experienced in certain rotating systems.
8. In that case, for once, Engels's views would appear to be consistent with modern Physics (as indicated by Max Jammer)!
Engels also noted the anthropomorphic origin of this concept (something Woods and Grant, for example, failed to spot -- even though they quoted this passage!):
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Engels (1954), p.82. Bold emphasis added.]
On the animistic/anthropomorphic origin of the concept of force, see Hesse (1961), Jammer (1999), and Agassi (1968), who references Francis Bacon's Novum Organum (Book One: Aphorisms; Aphorisms XXXVII-LXVIII) as a locus classicus of this point.
DM-theorists are not alone in finding their ideas embarrassed by an over-ambitious use of anthropomorphic concepts; the theses of metaphysically-motivated Philosophers and scientists have been similarly compromised for many centuries. The ideological origin of this phenomenon is discussed in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here, and here).
9. Of course, not all objects that collide would be moving in opposite directions; many would be on a trajectory inclined at some angle or other to those of the rest. Many would move in the same direction, only at different speeds. It's not easy to see how any of these can be seen as 'contradictory'.
Cl