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16-03-02: Summary Of Essay Three Part Two -- Abstraction, Science On the Cheap
These are Introductory Essays, which have been written for those who find the main Essays either too long, or too difficult. They do not pretend to be comprehensive since they are simply summaries of the core ideas presented at this site. Most of the supporting evidence and argument found in each of the main Essays has been omitted. Anyone wanting more details, or who would like to examine my arguments and evidence in full, should consult the Essay for which each is a précis. [In this particular case, that can be found here.]
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2) The 'Problem' of Universals
3) Appearance Ain't What They Used To Be
4) Appearance Contradicts 'Essence'
Abbreviations Used At This Site
Despite appearances to the contrary, the observations made in Part One are in fact good news; if abstractions could be used to state truths about the world, it would mean that reality was rational, and thus Ideal.
Why this is so will become clearer when we try to answer this question: What exactly could there be in material reality for a single abstraction to reflect?
According to Lenin, scientific abstractions are supposed to reflect nature more truly and deeply:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171. Emphases in the original.]
And yet, if that were the case, there would surely have to be extra-mental abstractions in reality for the mind to reflect. But, abstractions would not exist had human beings not invented them -- they are fundamentally products of mind. This suggests that the idea that abstractions can reflect nature "more deeply" commits believers to the view that nature is either Mind, Mind-like, or the product of Mind.
Small wonder then that it was Ancient Greek thinkers who invented the process of abstraction -- because that is exactly how they saw things. [The details supporting that assertion are given in Essay Twelve, and summarised here.]
The only way to avoid this conclusion must involve, it seems, a denial that abstractions actually reflect anything in nature, but which dialectician would want to admit that?
Of course, it could be claimed that abstractions help us to reflect nature, but how they are capable of doing that if they do not exist (or are only 'mental constructs') is entirely obscure. How are they different from the "useful fictions" of Positivism?
And anyway, what exactly do they help reflect? However, in order to answer that particular question, such abstractions would have to be imposed on nature. If abstractions do not reflect anything that actually exists in nature (if there are no material correlates of abstract ideas in the physical world), they cannot have been be read from it, but must have to be imposed on it. But, that is precisely what DM-theorists say they do not do. Now we find they have to do it.
As ancient mystics once pictured things, the inner microcosm must reflect the outer macrocosm; or as they put it: "as above, so below". In its more modern incarnation in DM, abstractions therefore reflect "essences" that supposedly exist in nature: as outside, so inside. But, then again, what exactly are these "essences" if they do not exist, but are still somehow the alleged referents of these equally puzzling abstractions?
[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Once more, this quandary is no surprise given the influence Hermetic ideas had on Hegel. No surprise either then that, according to Lenin, each and every proposition is capable of reflecting the dialectical structure of the entire universe. This could only happen if nature were in some way linguistic, or Mind-like, and the sentential 'microcosm' that was examined in detail in Essay Three Part One (i.e., "John is a man") is indeed able to reflect the entire macrocosm -- i.e., in this case, the "eternal development of the world" in at least Lenin's mind (Lenin (1961), p.110).
Unfortunately, however, Lenin unwisely let slip that Hegel had "divined" these mysteries into existence for us -- perhaps not noticing the significance of that particular dialectical gaffe:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Emphases in the original.]
In order to account for the similarities we find around us, and to provide a reference for general terms, Greek Philosophers from Plato onwards invented a whole series of Abstract Particulars (variously called "Forms", "Ideas", "Universals", "Essences", etc.). However, as we saw in Essay Three Part One (summary here), this move was itself the result of a crass interpretation of contingent grammatical forms found almost exclusively in Indo-European grammar. These Abstract Particulars were accessible to thought alone, and were based on a mysterious process of abstraction, which defies description even to this day.
[It is important to note that in Plato's work, the Forms are best viewed as heavenly exemplars (a bit like the Standard Metre in Paris, only immaterial) and not just as Abstract Particulars. In that case, it is possible to re-interpret these Forms as the abstract embodiment of reified social norms, which were then projected into 'heaven', roughly along the same lines envisaged by Feuerbach.]
Rationalist Philosophers tended to view such Universals variously as abstract ideas -- apprehend by the "natural light of reason" (etc.) as the mind surveyed the diversity the material world presented to it by the senses --, or, alternatively, as law-like idealisations applied to nature by the mind (which also supposedly reflected the logical structure of reality), as 'concrete universals'. In contrast, Empiricists tended to argue that the mind is somehow able to organise the 'impressions' the senses send its way by means of such Universals, which it had somehow cobbled-together from past experience --, all the while denying such abstractions exist outside the mind. [I omit here all consideration of the Nominalist tradition.]
In the ancient and medieval world, the over-arching organisation of these abstract ideas was hierarchical, mirroring the dominant Aristocratic and Feudal class structures of the time. In early capitalist society, at least among empiricist thinkers, such abstractions were individualised and shared out equally between each bourgeois head, reflecting the fragmentation the market had introduced into the formation of knowledge.
The earlier hierarchical order might have been dismantled, but the appeal to abstraction was still alive and still corrupting ruling-class thought. Same form, different content.
More recently still, rationalist and quasi-rationalist theorists (like Kant and Hegel) sought to restore order among such unruly ideas by imposing on them a priori categories and concepts; these recently liberated abstractions were now back in chains. The liberated ideas of the early bourgeoisie were now corralled, and thus controlled, by a centralised bureaucratic Mind. The Invisible Hand did not just work in the marketplace.
However, in order to solve the 'problem' of generality, it is not a good idea to begin by destroying it. But, as we saw in Part One (summary here) this was precisely the effect that the fractured logic of traditional thought had on general terms, which were thereby transformed into the names of Abstract Particulars.
Indeed, it is an even worse idea to double your problems, for if there is a difficulty explaining how ordinary general terms work, there is an even bigger one determining how these abstractions are able to regiment unruly ideas -- especially if they are now dispersed across the heads of all those capable of entertaining them. If abstractions are required in order to account for the similarities we think we detect between ideas (or between the objects these ideas 'reflect'), then a puzzle immediately arises over what accounts for the similarity between any given abstraction and the ideas it supposedly regiments. On the other hand, if there is no similarity, then how do novice abstractors determine which of their ideas a given abstraction is capable of regimenting correctly?
In short, if ideas just sort themselves into handy classes, what need have we of abstractions? But, if they do not do this, how can abstract ideas be of any use if there is no commonality between abstractions and the ideas they supposedly regiment?
And this brings us to the heart of the problem, for this approach to language in fact fragments knowledge. This is because it is surely impossible for Abstractor A to decide whether or not he or she possesses the same general idea (of anything) as Abstractor B -- or even as he/she had yesterday, or last week? This is not just because no one has access to the thoughts of another, but because it has yet to be established that one and all share the same abstract idea of whatever the word "same" represents. And how might that be determined, for goodness sake?
And this quandary is not helped by the further problem that no one has access to their own ideas from the past -- except those ideas also need regimenting by another set of general ideas, and so on.
The problem, of course, began much earlier. Traditional theorists saw language as fundamentally representational (that is, they assumed its primary role was to re-present either the thoughts of the 'gods' or the 'rational order'). This then created a whole series of seemingly insoluble philosophical 'problems' -- which have remained unsolved to this day.
Even so, in Ancient and Feudal society, only the elite could in fact abstract the 'correct' divine representations for us (except they did this merely by inventing jargon), and generality was imposed on them by divine fiat -- the task fortunately delegated to those authorised to do so by 'legitimate' authority (the State or the Church).
Later, in nominally 'equal', bourgeois society, theorists manifestly couldn't appeal to such hierarchical crudities, but it then became impossible for its theorists to guarantee that the thoughts represented in each bourgeois skull would agree with those rattling around in any other. This abstract Humpty Dumpty -- fragmented by representationalism --, could not easily be put back together again. Not even the 'objective' or 'inter-subjective' concepts invented by Kant or Hegel could repair the damage, since it is impossible to tell if one Kantian/Hegelian means the same by the words they use to depict the contents of their privatised skulls as any other. Just calling such fragmented concepts "objective", as if this were a magic word, would have no more effect on the problem than posting a "keep off sign" would have on a swarm of locusts.
Hence, abstractionism could provide no secure or 'objective' foundation for knowledge. But worse, it threatened subjectivity too, for Abstractor A would not now be able to tell if the fresh deliverances of today's abstractions were the same as, or were different from, the increasingly stale ones arrived at only yesterday in his/her 'consciousness'. Memory would be little help here, for it too is subject to the same insurmountable problems (as we saw above).
Naturally, the importation into Marxism of traditional thought-forms like these (representationalism and abstractionism) had a disastrous effect on dialecticians, too. This is because, on this view, it is equally impossible to decide if dialectician A means the same as dialectician B about anything whatsoever, let alone in relation to their respective 'abstractions'.
While, on the one hand, dialecticians tell us they accept Marx's view that language and knowledge are social products, on the other, every single one of them has adopted a bourgeois-individualist theory of knowledge. According to this approach, we all represent the world to ourselves first (by means of "images" and/or abstractions), then we try to share our ideas with others second. Unfortunately, this view of language and knowledge would prevent communication. On this view, except by sheer coincidence, no two humans, let alone dialecticians, could share the same ideas about anything, making communication impossible -- and even if they did, no one would/could know it.
Of course, had dialecticians not made the mistake of buying into traditional thought, and had they adopted instead the communicational model of language proposed by Marx and Engels (wherein each of is socialised in the use of language and are all taught what our words mean, so that when we try to represent the world to ourselves, we already have a common medium by means of which we can share things with others), none of this would have happened.
Which is, of course, why one of the aims of this site is to return Marxist theory to the above social/anthropological view of language and thought, in accordance with the ideas expressed by Marx and Engels, and along lines detailed in Wittgenstein's work.
That also explains the emphasis placed here on the ordinary language of the working-class, for the vernacular is not representational -- but inherently communicational -- having been invented by working people in collective labour precisely to facilitate communication.
In addition -- and this is something else that recommends it -- the vernacular actually stands in the way of the formation of metaphysical theories, including those found in DM, which is just one reason why it has been denigrated and depreciated by ruling-class hacks since Ancient Greek times.
[The above is the subject of Essay Twelve (Part One can be found here here; a summary of the rest, here). The alleged limitations of the vernacular are neutralised here.]
Appearances Ain't What They Used To Be
Dialecticians have also bought into the traditional division of the world into "appearance" and "reality". Even if it were valid, this metaphysical dichotomy would fatally undermine science, and not just DM, since it makes validation impossible.
This is because we are told that science and DM are confirmed in practice, but if the latter takes place anywhere, it takes place at the phenomenal level in the world of appearances. That being the case, the deliverances of practice would be no less unreliable than any other superficial feature of empirical reality supposedly is. If a possibly suspect theory can only be confirmed by phenomenologically-challenged practice, what is there left to exonerate practice? More suspect practice? More unconfirmed theory?
But, each and every theory has to make its shaky entrance in this world as an appearance of some sort: they all have to be written paper or broadcast in the air as words, as phenomenal objects. Each infant theory, born in this way, would be quite incapable of fighting its corner, and thus totally incapable of lending any support to its equally unreliable epistemological cousins: those questionable appearances, again.
On this view, knowledge would remain forever trapped in sceptic-land.
The solution here is of course to reject in its entirety the metaphysical dichotomy "appearance/reality", and the theoretical approach to knowledge which was invented by Aristocratic Greek thinkers who held the material world (and the labour that bought them enough leisure-time to concoct such brainless ideas) in open contempt.
Now, a 'dialectical' response to all this might include the claim that science/materialist dialectics is in fact converging on absolute (or less relatively-challenged) truth, a target which presumably lends to knowledge its objective clout. Indeed, Engels himself asserted that DM/science is converging "asymptotically" on just such a target (which he calls "being"):
"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), pp.457-58.]
Unfortunately, this analogy is in fact inimical to DM-epistemology.
First of all Engels neglected to tell his correspondent how he knew all this, that knowledge is indeed convergent. Of course, if what he said were true, his words would thereby be infinitely incorrect. That is because, when asserted, his claim would itself be infinitely far away from absolute truth, and thus infinitely unreliable. In which case, the probability that this claim was itself incorrect would be infinitely high. An appeal to practice would be to no avail here, for practice cannot confirm that knowledge is an infinitary process, or that it is even convergent. Nor can practice discriminate the good from the bogus. [More on that in Essay Ten Part One.]
Second, Engels failed to show that there is such a limit for knowledge to converge upon (in fact, he did not even attempt such a demonstration, and, as far as can be ascertained, no dialectician has bothered to supply one since). In that case, this mathematical metaphor is doubly inappropriate: if there is no limit, human knowledge must be divergent. And if that is so, then at any point in human history, knowledge must be infinitely far from this supposed epistemological goal -- which still hasn't been shown to exist. On this view, given Engels's inapt metaphor, humanity will always be infinitely ignorant of anything and everything.
Now, it could be argued that Engels actually claimed that:
"The identity of thinking and being...run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting." [Ibid.]
This indicates that human thought does indeed converge on something that does exist, "being"; in that case, Engels did not need to show it existed.
Unfortunately, the word "being" (derived from traditional thought) is no less vague a term than any other that has been imported into dialectics. [More on this in Essay Twelve.] But, even if that were not the case, the conclusion that "being" exists must itself be infinitely far from its target, if what Engels says is correct. It cannot just be assumed to be true, otherwise at least one truth (namely this one) would coincide with its object, falsifying Engels's claim. So, if this conclusion (that "being" exists) is itself infinitely far from the truth, then Engels has yet to show that "being" exists.
Once again, it is no use appealing to practice to bail this theory out; given the truth of what Engels said, the claim that practice confirms theory is itself infinitely far from the truth -- which target, once more, still hasn't been shown to exist.
Appearance Contradicts 'Essence'
Connected with this is the DM-idea that there is a "contradiction" between appearance and reality (or between "appearances and underlying essences"), which thesis itself is surprisingly ill-considered.
First, if things only appear to be so, then they surely cannot contradict a true proposition that they are not so -- not unless, of course, appearances are themselves propositional, which alternative would mean that reality was Mind-like, after all -- as we suspected earlier.
[Of course, if appearances were linguistic agents, and were capable of arguing their corner, they could contradict whomsoever they liked; but they aren't and so they can't.]
Second, given the DM-theory of change, this must mean that appearances must be "struggling" with underlying "essences" -- and indeed turning into them, and vice versa! [Anyone who doubts these conclusions should read this, and then think again.]
Third, the distinction itself rests on yet another superficial 'thought experiment', and one which, as soon as it has been uttered, or written down (as a phenomenal object), must fend for itself in this supposedly untrustworthy phenomenal world, and which world this theory has just impugned -- but which phenomenal object (i.e., the linguistic expression of this thought) must somehow remain miraculously unscathed in like manner.
In that case, the Immaculate Conception is not just a feature of Roman Catholic Theology, for here we have the Immaculate Concepts of DM-Epistemology. On this basis, while such dialectical objects of thought ply their trade in material reality as phenomenal objects, they somehow manage to remain stain-free and above epistemological reproach -- indeed they appear to be capable of self-justification -- having been born without the usual inherited character defects shared by all other delinquent appearances and errant phenomenal objects.
Hence, when delivered into the world of appearances, these materially-embodied dialectical concepts are surely appearances themselves, with an equally suspect pedigree. Despite that, they are somehow supposed to be miraculously free from epistemological stain: Immaculate Concepts.
Failing that, it is entirely mysterious how and why a single DM-proposition should be trusted when it is written down or uttered (since, in that case, they must all become part of appearances). Whether they have been written in ink, or emerge as vibrations in the air, one and all must surely come under immediate suspicion, and be contradicted by the (underlying) reality they so rashly tried to picture.
And it will not do to be told that dialecticians do not believe that appearances cannot be trusted. The fact that the 'dialectical' view of appearances means just this is confirmed by the way that DM-theorists themselves depict them. For example, when the distinction between appearances and reality is applied to Capitalism, we are told that while it might appear to be fair, in reality it isn't; underlying reality 'contradicts' this superficial view. In that case, appearances must be deceptive, and dialecticians must believe that they deceptive. Otherwise, why would Dialectical Marxists find they have to inform everyone of the underlying exploitative nature of Capitalism?
Why try to change a system that is in fact fair, and appears to be what it really is?
In that case, if appearances are deceptive then any statement to that effect must be no less misleading.
Which is, of course, why it was alleged earlier that this set of traditional doctrines self-destruct when its consequences are examined.
It's worth noting that this is not my belief (i.e., that appearances are deceptive), but it is an implication of the philosophical distinction between reality and appearance, and hence it is a belief dialecticians hold. But, just try getting one of them to admit this. No worries; we can apply some 'dialectics' to sort this out: DM-fans appear not to accept this, but in reality they do!
Of course, this argument is far too quick and superficial -- or so it appears. Again, no problem: in reality it must contradict this appearance. So despite its trite appearance, in reality that argument is 100% water-tight.
Isn't Diabolical Logic amazing!
Moreover, if DM-propositions are phenomenal objects (if they are written down somewhere, or spoken aloud), what they appear to say must contradict what they really say -- that is, if all appearances contradict reality, as we have been led to believe. Hence, every DM-proposition that plies its trade in this material world, but which brashly asserts that appearances contradict reality, must, it seems, contradict itself. [Or, it must at least appear to do so.]
This is worth spelling-out in more detail: if appearances always contradict reality, then with respect to any true DM-proposition, "p", say, its contradictory, "not-p", must really be true (i.e., it must be "essentially" true). But, if "not p" is essentially true, "p" must be false. That means that no DM-proposition that appears to be true is in fact true. In that case, this particular DM-thesis (that appearances contradict reality) must be self-refuting: if it appears to be true, it must really be false.
[To be sure, the above argument employs the LOC, which dialecticians do not always trust. However, they can console themselves with the thought that if the LOC appears to to be defective sometimes, in reality it must be eminently sound!]
[LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]
This surprising result can, of course, be generalised until it falsifies every true empirical proposition, no matter how valid it might otherwise appear to be. Thus, it must in reality be false that Paris is in France, Hydrogen Cyanide is poisonous, and the Sun is hot.
Worse still: if, according to DM-theorists, appearances contradict reality, and the material world appears to change, then in reality it must be changeless!
Of course, it could be argued that dialectical logic holds that appearances and under-lying realities are both true. [But we saw that that was untenable earlier.]
In that case, both the following must be correct: (1) Nitric Acid appears to be corrosive; (2) Nitric Acid is not corrosive. Are both of these true? Manifestly, dialecticians are careful about which propositions they choose to apply their supposedly universal dialectical solvent, but for any apparently successful application of this suspect method, reality must say the opposite. Hence, if it appears to be the case that dialecticians think that reality contradicts appearances, in reality it does not. [Now: can both halves of that be true?]
However, for the purposes of argument, let us assume that appearances do indeed contradict reality, and that although Capitalism looks fair to some, in reality it is highly unfair and grossly exploitative.
But, as should now seem plain, no Marxist could actually assert that fact without compromising the objectivity of what had just been said, for as soon as any proposition saying that Capitalism is unfair is written down or asserted, it enters the shadowy world of appearances, and like the cat in the proverbial hot place, it stands zero chance of emerging unscathed.
It may, indeed, be true that capitalism appears to be fair, just as it is true that in reality it is the opposite, but adherence to this Aristocratic and metaphysical dichotomy means that no Marxist could ever risk asserting either of these facts (in written or verbal form) for fear that by doing so he or she would condemn both to oblivion -- by turning them into appearances.
[Again, it could be objected that this confuses the physical form of a sentence with what it refers to. Well, it certainly appears to do so, but, after another handy appeal to dialectics, we can conclude that in reality this is not so.]
Furthermore, this ancient distinction would completely undermine scientific knowledge. This is because, scientific theory and practice not only take place in the phenomenal world, they can only be confirmed there, too. To select just one example: if light appears to bend when it passes between media, and all appearances are contradicted by underlying "essences", then it must be true that light does not really bend when it passes between media. Clearly, both of these cannot be true -- no matter how many dialectical prayers are said over this rapidly dying theory.
In addition, dialecticians have hitherto applied the distinction between "appearance" and "reality" without giving much thought to the effect this has on social and economic phenomena. Although it is undeniable that workers hold many false beliefs (as do others), the claim that this is because of "false consciousness" cannot be attributed to Marx. Not only did he not employ the term, Engels himself only used it once, and then only in a letter, written late in life. This is not a solid base on which to build a reliable theory of ideology. [On this, see here.]
DM-theorists have been recklessly unwise to rely on ideas and bogus distinctions they imported from traditional defenders of class society -- i.e., on theorists who based their concepts on a denigration of ordinary material language and common understanding, and thus on a dismissal of the collective experience of working people.
This means, of course, that DM is not even a materialist theory.
It also implies that any revolutionary party that taps into this Aristocratic tradition must cease to be the genuine "memory of the class". By relying on distinctions that actually undermine the language and collective experience of workers, such a group would become, in effect, the amnesia of the class.
In order to rescue HM from this immaterial black hole, the metaphysical dichotomy between appearance/reality and essence/accident must be rejected in its entirety.
In fact, anyone asserting the opposite of this can safely be ignored on the grounds that whatever they say, it must be a mere appearance, and cannot therefore be real.
[A rather nice negation of a rash prospective negator that, one feels.]
[HM = Historical Materialism.]
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