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16-03-01 -- Summary Of Essay Three Part One -- Abstraction, The Heart Of The Beast
These are Introductory Essays, which have been written for those who find the main Essays either too long, or too difficult. They do not pretend to be comprehensive since they are simply summaries of the core ideas presented at this site. Most of the supporting evidence and argument found in each of the main Essays has been omitted. Anyone wanting more details, or who would like to examine my arguments and evidence in full, should consult the Essay for which each is a précis. [In this particular case, that can be found here.]
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3) Abstraction: Its Own Gravedigger
Abbreviations Used At This Site
In ancient Greece, the idea took hold that there was an invisible world underlying nature, which was accessible to thought alone and which was more real than the material universe we see around us.
[These ideas did not grow in a vacuum; the political and ideological background to these developments will be examined in Essay Twelve (summary here).]
However, thinkers in the ancient world found they had to concoct an entire lexicon of jargonised expressions if they were to account for the secret structure of 'reality' -- terms such as "The Forms", "Being", "Substance", "Essence", and the like --, which jargon has entered and dominated 'western' intellectual life ever since. This is because ordinary language was unsuitable to this end, as they themselves acknowledged. The 'fundamental truths' they cobbled together in this way were then imposed on nature in an a priori and dogmatic manner.
As we saw in the Summary of Essay Two, Dialectical Marxists are keen and enthusiastic traditionalists in this regard, content, too, to impose their a priori theses on nature. This means that every dialectician without exception has adopted this 'time-honoured' approach to a priori knowledge -- the aim of which is to uncover these hidden "essences" and "abstractions" by the operation of thought alone.
[These comments are not aimed at criticising the legitimate use of abstract terms in the vernacular.]
It's worth adding at this point that the usual justification for assuming philosophical abstractions exist -- that is, that they account for general features of the world, and thus for our ability to understand nature -- turns out to be the very thing that prevents us from doing this, as we will soon see.
The idea that ordinary language has been distorted for ideological reasons, and that abstractionism is at its very heart, is not just the invention of the present author, Marx and Engels themselves refer to it:
"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….
"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'" [Marx and Engels (1975), p.75. Bold emphases added.]
"For philosophers, one of the most difficult tasks is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they had to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.
"...The philosophers would only have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis only added.]
One particular example of linguistic distortion that was central to the formation of Hegelian, and later 'materialist' dialectics focussed on the analysis of a seemingly innocuous set of indicative sentences found almost exclusively in the Indo-European family of languages: the subject-predicate form. In fact, it was a limited sub-group of this set, too: where the copula is a cognate of the verb "to be".
Consider an example Hegel himself employed: "The rose is red". Here the subject is clearly the rose, and the predicate is what it is said to be, i.e., red. The verb "is" merely connects the two parts of the sentence. As readers will no doubt appreciate, sentences like this are used to describe things, and no one thinks for a minute that our ancestors buried in them a secret code, waiting to be uncovered by work-shy Philosophers thousands of years later.
The logical form of such propositions may be expressed in several different ways, depending on the sentence in question; for example: (1) "The F is G", (2) "A is G", (3) "Some F is G" or (4) "Every F is G" (or "All Fs are Gs"), and so on.
[Here "F" and "G" stand for various sorts of nouns (e.g., "man", "horse", "mortal", "red", or "rose"), and "A" for a proper name (e.g., "John" or "Julius Caesar"). Clearly, this is to over-simplify greatly -- but this is a summary!]
From Aristotle's day onwards, it became increasingly common to interpret the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity, so that (1)-(4) above would become (5) "The F is identical with G", (6) "A is identical with G", (7) "Some F is identical with (some/every) G", or as (8) "Every A is identical with (some/every) G".
In the Middle Ages, this approach came to be known as the "Identity (or Essential) Theory of Predication", which 'allowed' philosophers and logicians to argue that predicates were in fact the names of "Universals", "Forms" or "Essences", which could be 'abstracted' into existence in the minds of anyone with enough leisure time to perform the trick.
To cut a long story short, this is the theory that motivated Hegel, and provided him with the core rationale for his 'logic'. Since no subject could be identical with a predicate, all such sentences must secretly allude to a contradiction lying at the heart of thought and reality: the subject both is and is not identical with the predicate. It never occurred to Hegel to draw the obvious conclusion that this way of looking at such an unrepresentative class of sentences, found in only one family of languages, was not perhaps a very clever way to proceed.
Nevertheless, the normal, descriptive mode of predication was put to one side because Hegel wanted to discover in (suitably doctored) language a hidden allusion to these "essences", which would then allow him to derive an endless series of fundamental truths about reality -- valid for all of space and time -- in the comfort of his head.
Of course, this approach to discourse has been at the heart of traditional thought since Ancient Greek times, where language was regarded as secret code of some sort, capable of revealing the inner structure of "Being" to work-shy thinkers.
They could do this because the 'gods' themselves had (1) called the world into existence by means of language, and they had (2) bestowed language on humanity so they could re-present their thoughts to us. But there were clear ideological reasons why such theorists adopted this dogmatic approach to 'knowledge': it 'allowed' them to rationalise and 'justify' the structure and authority of the State by linking it with the fundamental structure of reality and thus with the 'will of the gods'.
Language was thus seen, not as a social product created by collective labour in order to facilitate communication, but as a cipher invented by the 'gods' for the above reasons, a representational device. That is, of course, why truths about "Being" (or 'reality') could be ascertained by thought alone -- since to do so was to re-think 'god's' thoughts, which, as we have seen, structure reality --, and it is also why they could be imposed on reality, dogmatically.
The handy trick that bound these ideological moves together was the 'mental' process of 'abstraction', for this allowed traditional thinkers to access nature's "hidden secrets", inaccessible to the senses, by thought alone. This approach to knowledge has dominated Western (and, in a different, way Eastern) thought ever since. Through Hegel's influence, it now dominates DM and 'Materialist Dialectics'.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Small wonder then that Marx and Engels said the following:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]
Abstraction: Its Own Gravedigger
As it turns out, this ancient thought-form is inimical to DM, anyway. This is because the process of abstraction radically alters key features of language, robbing indicative sentences of their capacity to say anything at all. This in turn is because this process changes general terms (i.e., "universals" -- which are outwardly general in form, but which are in fact either 'general' nouns or reified linguistic functions) -- into abstract particulars, each named by an abstract noun (which turns it into a Proper Name).
[A linguistic function is an expression that allows for the formation of true or false indicative sentences when combined with singular terms (Proper Names, etc.), quantifier expressions (such as "Every", Some", "None"), and the like. For example, the sentence forming fragment "...is a socialist" yields a true sentence if the gap is completed with "Karl Marx" (as in "Karl Marx is a socialist"), but "false" for "Margaret Thatcher" or "The President of the USA in 2008" (as in "Margaret Thatcher is a socialist", for instance).
Except, linguistic functions are generally represented like this: "x is a socialist". The Greek letter, "x", is essential here, for by suitably defining it (in use), legitimate substitution instances may be specified clearly for each sentence type. An actual gap, " ", (or even "...") will not do, since, of course, gaps cannot be defined. So: " is a socialist" is no good. I have not used "x" here since it suggests untoward mathematical and other connotations.
These ideas are summarised here, but that particular author tends to use an "x" in place of "x". (Warning, the linked article is not easy!)
There is in fact no necessity to view language like this, but it prevents many of the bogus moves traditional Philosophers pull from being made. (There is more on this in Essay Three Part One, here, and here.)
An abstract particular is like a real particular (such as a book or a chair), except we can't physically interact with 'it', only think about 'it', theoretically.]
The traditional re-write of such propositions (via The Identity Theory of Predication) in fact prevents language from expressing generality, since it actually destroys predication, and turns general terms into singular expressions -- i.e., into the names of abstract particulars. Plainly, this fatally undermines DM-epistemology -- whose theorists at least pretend to begin with the general in order to give concrete substance to the particular --, since it annihilates generality.
As such, these seemingly innocent moves kill DM faster than anything written at this site.
Ironically, too, DM self-destructs because of the introduction of such internal contradictions.
We can see how and why this is so by examining Lenin's comments about a simple sentence: "John is a man".
The Gospel Of John: In The Beginning Was The Word "Is"
In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin attempted to derive the entire dialectic from a single sentence: "John is a man." Lenin was quite happy to construct several tall stories on this alarmingly weak foundation, claiming to know what must be the case for all of reality, for all of time -- from a single sentence -- and thus in the thoroughly traditional manner exposed above:
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.359-60. Emphases in the original.]
John's material insignificance did not prevent Lenin from uncovering a host of universal and omnitemporal truths concealed beneath this fictional character's imputed manhood. Thus, from this figment of the imagination, Lenin thought he could derive a number of seemingly eternal and all-embracing super-scientific facts.
[The phrase "Super-scientific" refers to fundamental truths about reality, which go way beyond anything the sciences could possibly confirm, invented by thought alone, and which are derived from contingent facts about language. These 'truths' are supposed to apply to all regions of space and time, and to every possible world. Indeed, in many cases, they express the 'logical form' of reality. [That is why Lenin thinks he is doing science when he is using DL -- see pp.92, 174, 182 of PN, for example.]
From sentences like these -- all of which were of the subject/predicate form, as noted earlier --, and scarcely giving a thought to the epistemological megalomania it implied, Lenin was able to claim that not just John, but everything in reality must be a UO, and thus that everything in existence must be contradictory. His evidence? Simply that John cannot be identical with the universal term "man", a subject cannot be identical with a predicate!
[DL = Dialectical Logic; UO = Unity of Opposites; PN = Philosophical Notebooks, i.e., Lenin (1961).]
While this is hardly impressive logic, it is quintessentially traditional.
Indeed, as also pointed out above, the imposition on reality of such 'truths' is thoroughly traditional. This largely goes un-remarked by dialecticians -- and that is still the case even after this has been pointed out to them --, and that in turn is because this approach is still deemed to be the only 'proper' way to do philosophy. Moves like this are part of the philosophical wallpaper, and have been employed by ruling-class hacks for thousands of years.
To change the image: this is the theoretically-poisoned chalice from which not a single DM-theorist has failed to quaff. In fact, they happily pass it around and commend its contents to others. In this way, therefore, the ideas of the ruling-class have also come to rule our movement. Dialecticians have been happy to copy these alien-class moves from traditional thought, internalising them -- even criticising any who reject the idea that Marxists should indulge in such a priori Superscience.
Hardly pausing for breath, Lenin was able to 'derive' several other universal theses from his 'innovative' understanding of the copula -- i.e., the predicate connective "is". In so doing, he uncritically accepted Hegel's "Identity Theory of Predication", confusing the "is" of predication with the "is" of identity.
[However, neither Hegel or Lenin so much as attempted to justify this innovative grammatical segue, and yet that did not stop them both from extracting substantive metaphysical truths from so diminutive a verb.]
This manoeuvre was then compounded by the belief that the subject/predicate form had profound ontological implications, it was indeed a secret code that could reveal profound truths about reality. This superficial grammatical feature was now transmogrified from a predicative into a relational form.
The "is" of identity is (uncontroversially) relational, not predicative. It serves to relate two ideas, individuals, words, or concepts (depending on which theory one adheres to). For example, the genuine identity statement "Cicero is Tully" ("Tully" was Cicero's other name) asserts a relation between two named individuals (or between an individual and himself), and is thus the equivalent of "Cicero is identical with Tully".
This legitimate use of "is" was now generalised across all sentences. Propositions of the form "A is G" (i.e., "John is a man") were now (illegitimately) re-written as "A = G" (i.e. "John is identical with Manhood"). Descriptive sentences now become relational.
But, where there is a relation, there must be objects to be related. This move now turned "man" into an abstract object, a particular -- Manhood --, referred to by the abstract noun "Manhood". This move now initiated a fruitless 2500 year search for the 'objects' to which such abstractions supposedly referred. [This will be the subject of Essay Three Part Two. Exactly why this was done will be explored there too]
It's no surprise, therefore, to find that from this serious misreading of a simple verb numerous 'contradictions' freely flowed. This meant -- so the story went -- that (1) ordinary language must be riddled with paradox (since it so readily collapses into 'contradictions'), and (2) that nature must be contradictory, too -- and thus (3) that the universe must be fundamentally dialectical, as well.
This also meant that (4) everything in reality is interconnected by various hierarchies of assorted "universals", that (5) change is powered by 'internal contradictions' (they are internal to sentences, and thus are logically 'internal' to objects and processes), and that (6) necessity and freedom are dialectically united as complimentary aspects of reality.
All this a priori superscience extracted from this simple verb!
[The details underlying the above moves are fully worked out in Essay Three Part One.]
These ideas are amplified by comrade Novack:
"It is logically true that A equals A, that John is John…. But it is far more profoundly true that A is also non-A. John is not simply John: John is a man. This correct proposition is not an affirmation of abstract identity, but an identification of opposites. The logical category or material class, mankind, with which John is one and the same is far more and other than John, the individual. Mankind is at the same time identical with, yet different from John." [Novack (1971), p.92.]
Here, as elsewhere in traditional Philosophy, the re-interpretation of a seemingly insignificant grammatical feature 'permits' Novack to ignore and bypass the clear distinctions ordinary humans (i.e., workers) have built into material language.
'Innovative' logic of this sort 'showed' that the LOI cannot be of any use to 'speculative thought' (again, this was supposedly because subject terms are not identical to predicate terms -- this can be seen in the quotation from Novack, above), and that contingent reality is not only ruled by dialectical logic, the entire world is an interconnected Totality, just as mystics have always claimed.
Luckily, these amazing facts are easy to discover. No boring, time-consuming experiments and observations are required. Indeed, they can be 'extracted' in a few seconds by means of a 'dialectical analysis' of any given subject/predicate proposition, which shows that every part of reality is implied by, and is linked to, each and every other part. This is because John is identical with but different from a universal, which linguistic fact connects him with all of reality -- as it does every other object and process.
There are several other Super-scientific facts that can, with ease, be obtained from this 'analysis'. For instance, 'appearances' must 'contradict' underlying 'essence' (since the essential logic of the relation between John and his universal cannot be accessed by the senses, but only by a process of thought, 'abstraction', which reveals this contradiction between his appearance as a man and his 'essence' as a Man). Paradoxically, such 'logic' also guarantees freedom of the will in the face of 'natural necessity' -- which is yet another DM-contradiction that just has to be "grasped" -- since John is both contingently and necessarily a man.
[LOI = Law of Identity]
These bogus moves then 'allowed' dialecticians to blame the vernacular and 'commonsense' for discursive faults that were entirely of their own making.
On this basis, therefore, and on this alone, Lenin felt justified in imposing dialectics on the entire universe, just like traditional thinkers have always done.
These moves were clearly regarded as safe because (1) discourse itself has dialectics built into it, and (2) we all have to use language to depict nature. In that case, nature cannot fail to be dialectical. Hence, dialectics could now be imposed on reality, and the earlier bluff denial that this is never done blithely ignored.
This secret code buried in subject/predicate sentences provided Lenin with the key to unlock all of reality:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphasis added.]
It's also worth noting, that the metaphor of the Key was central to Hermetic mysticism, a core component of Hegel's thought.
"A key tenet of Hermeticism is the Unity of the Cosmos and the sympathy and interconnection of all things." [Quoted from here.]
The Idealism implicit in all this is not easy to miss, for on this view, nature is dialectical because language can be made to say so at the flick of a verb.
However, if the predicative form is descriptive, then predication cannot be confused with reference to an abstract idea/concept (in this case, allegedly, all men) -- since description is not reference. Aristotle saw through that 'difficulty' 2400 years ago; for him predicates applied to individuals designated by subject terms -- "Redness applies to the rose" for example. So, there's no "is" anywhere in sight for anyone to magic into an identity.
If every journey starts with a small step, this particular mystery tour began with just such a misreading of this diminutive word (i.e., "is" of predication). Traditional Philosophers (like Parmenides and Plotinus -- and their latter-day clone, Hegel) have been doing this sort of thing for centuries.
Over time, linguistic tricks like these, and their 'justification', became more complex and increasingly baroque -- and their content was modified as each Mode of Production required --, but their form remained the same: fundamental and abstract truths about reality can be derived from thought alone.
Dialecticians, are thus mere parvenus in this regard; late-comers who have slotted rather nicely into this conservative groove.
In fact you can't even see the join.
So, if discourse ('properly so viewed') has dialectics programmed into it, then no language-user could possibly deny the 'truths' DM-theorists have so effortlessly wrung from it. Super-verities like these can now be pulled straight out of Hegel's hat since these theses are hidden in all our predicative sentences. DM can now be read into nature (on the pretence that it hasn't been, since it's already there!) -- and this can be sold to the gullible as a 'materialist inversion' of Hegel, because any reading of anything must have dialectics built into it. The need for supporting evidence can be waved aside since the seemingly obvious nature of the 'truths' obtained from such linguistic trickery is all the proof anyone could possibly need.
Mickey Mouse Science now had a licence to practice.
This helps account for the relaxed ease with which all dialecticians constantly slip into the a priori mode, and why they all fail to notice when they are doing it -- even after it has been pointed out to them.
It all looks so 'obvious', so 'self-evident'...
To spoil the fun, the down-side is that the process of abstraction destroys the capacity language has for expressing generality. It achieves this by turning propositions into lists of names conjoined by the misconstrued identity sign (the hapless "is" again).
Consider again the sentence, "John is a man". Here, just as "John" undoubtedly names John, "man" supposedly names all men, or the abstract universal, Man. However, both this category and that abstract universal are now singular in nature, having had the generality that the ordinary predicate, "...a man", formerly expressed, neutralised. Singular terms, obviously, are not general.
To compound things further, the participle "is" (of the verb "to be") was also transmogrified into a referring expression, naming the identity relation.
So, "John is a man" becomes "John Identity Man."
Clearly, this can't be "John is Identity Man", or even "John is identical with all men", without awkward questions arising over the nature of the extra (and this time irremovable) "is" we would have to use. Now that "is" cannot be one of identity, for obvious reasons.
If it were, "John is identical with all men" would have to become "John is identical with identical with all men", as the underlined italicised "is" is itself replaced by an "is identical with", which this theory tells us is so. In turn, the bold "is" (in "is identical with") must now itself suffer a similar fate, and the whole thing would quickly spin off into infinity: "John is identical with identical with identical with all men", and so on.
Nevertheless, here we have two abstract terms which have been conjured into existence, and then related to one another in an ethereal sort of way, inaccessible to the senses.
[Well, can you see the identity here between John and Manhood? Can it be photographed, weighed, timed or painted? And this abstract particular (i.e., Manhood) is now thoroughly Ideal, too.]
This crass 'analysis' now turns DM-propositions into lists of concatenated names (which somehow name these abstract particulars), preventing them from saying anything true or false -- because, of course, lists say nothing at all. By re-interpreting the "is" of predication as an "is" that names abstract identity, nothing at all can now be said of John, or of anything else whatsoever. Hegel's defective logic thus denies all DM-propositions a sense, preventing them from communicating anything at all. They are thus not even propositions.
As Professor Lowe points out:
"What is the problem of predication? In a nutshell, it is this. Consider any simple subject-predicate sentence, such as..., 'Theaetetus sits'. How are we to understand the different roles of the subject and the predicate in this sentence, 'Theaetetus' and 'sits' respectively? The role of 'Theaetetus' seems straightforward enough: it serves to name, and thereby to refer to or stand for, a certain particular human being. But what about 'sits'? Many philosophers have been tempted to say that this also refers to or stands for something, namely, a property or universal that Theaetetus possesses or exemplifies: the property of sitting. This is said to be a universal, rather than a particular, because it can be possessed by many different individuals.
"But now we have a problem, for this view of the matter seems to turn the sentence 'Theaetetus sits' into a mere list of (two) names, each naming something different, one a particular and one a universal: 'Theaetetus, sits.' But a list of names is not a sentence because it is not the sort of thing that can be said to be true or false, in the way that 'Theaetetus sits' clearly can. The temptation now is to say that reference to something else must be involved in addition to Theaetetus and the property of sitting, namely, the relation of possessing that Theaetetus has to that property. But it should be evident that this way of proceeding will simply generate the same problem, for now we have just turned the original sentence into a list of three names, 'Theaetetus, possessing, sits.'
"Indeed, we are now setting out on a vicious infinite regress, which is commonly known as 'Bradley's regress', in recognition of its modern discoverer, the British idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley. Bradley used the regress to argue in favour of absolute idealism...." [Lowe (2006). Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
So, despite what they say, dialecticians do not in fact start with general terms in order to extend knowledge, they begin with the names of abstract particulars. This stalls the dialectical juggernaut on the starting grid, turning its propositions into lists.
In Essay Three, Parts One and Two, the process of abstraction is subjected to destructive analysis; not only is it psychologically impossible to carry out -- and in principle impossible to check inter-subjectively --, its results are incomprehensible. And that is because, once again, abstraction undermines generality, producing only the names of abstract particulars wedged into pseudo-propositions, concatenated with other transmogrified names -- preventing language from saying anything true or false, as noted above.
The young Marx and Engels are recruited in support of these claims because of their remarkably similar opinions in this area.
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Latest Update: 03/01/11
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