Book of Secrets
16-11-01 -- Summary of Essay Eleven Part One -- The Mysterious "Totality"
These are Introductory Essays, which have been written for those who find the main Essays either too long, or too difficult. They do not pretend to be comprehensive since they are simply summaries of the core ideas presented at this site. Most of the supporting evidence and argument found in each of the main Essays has been omitted. Anyone wanting more details, or who would like to examine my arguments and evidence in full, should consult the Essay for which each is a précis. [In this particular case, that can be found here.]
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1) So What Exactly Is the 'Totality'?
b) The "It's Everything" Gambit
c) Well, What Do The Dialectical Prophets Have To Say?
2) Where The Shoe Originally Pinched
d) Dialecticians In Wonderland
f) Interconnected -- Or Hermetically Sealed -- Units?
Abbreviations Used At This Site
Essay Eleven Part One is concerned mainly with the word "Totality" applied to the natural world. The application of holist ideas to human history and social development will not be called into question here, or anywhere else for that matter, by the present author.
Imagine, if you will, Hamlet without the Prince, or at least without a single description of 'him' -- such as, whether 'he' is indeed a Prince, male or female, or even whether 'he' is a human being. Questions would rightly be asked about what that character's role could possibly be in a play supposedly about 'him', just as similar questions would be asked about the competence of its author, William Shakespeare.
Fortunately, we need not so indulge our fancies.
But, imagine now, if you can, a theory that tells us, among other things: (1) that it is the "world-view" of the proletariat, (2) that it is the general theory of all that exists and how it changes, (3) that everything is interconnected in something called the "Totality", and (4) that the latter is one if its centrally-important concepts, so much so that nothing can be fully understood without it.
Imagine, too, the unlikely event that every single one of its theorists studiously refused to say what this "Totality" actually is, or what those interconnections are --, or even how they know so much about such a perennially empty notion.
Imagine no more! For that theory is DIM, and its theorists are Olympic Standard prevaricators.
[DIM = Dialectical Marxism/Marxist, depending on the context; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Anyone who still harbours doubts is invited to search through the writings of the above prevaricators. Even if you are the slightest bit interested, you will find precious little to help you decide what DIM is about, for its most avid supporters have yet to tell anyone (least of all one another) what their mysterious "Totality" actually is.
So, this is not so much Hamlet without the Prince, as it is Hamlet without the, er...well, what?
Indeed, over the last twenty years or, I have made it a point of asking the many DM-fans I know, or have met, what they think the "Totality" is. Most were either slightly puzzled or somewhat miffed that I even dared to ask such an impertinent question. Some responded with "Nature, what else?", but refused to say anymore (perhaps because, as we will soon discover, there is no more to be said). Others gestured airily toward the heavens and said "All that!", rather like parents who try to explain to little children where 'God' is with an "He's up there, in heaven", wafting their hands vaguely skywards. Still others confessed they did not know, but declared that they still believed in it, just like those tiny children with hand-waving parents.
Now, readers of a more kindly disposition might be tempted to respond as follows: "This can't be so. Surely someone has specified clearly what the DM-'Totality' is. After all, dialecticians have had at least 150 years to come up with something!"
To be sure, a few of the DM-faithful have proffered a handful of vague ideas about the "Totality" --, but beyond that, they have sat on their hands or looked the other way.
Dialecticians are remarkably coy about their "Totality", and it's not difficult to see why: there isn't one.
Or rather: there is in fact no way of referring to whatever it is they think they want to refer to, and which they call "The Totality".
At this point, some might be tempted to respond with the "Everything" ploy (as in "Sod it, it's perfectly clear what that the "Totality" is: it's everything!").
[This is the "Look, no hands!" version of the hand-waving parents option above.]
Unfortunately, that reply is no use either since it just prompts this further question: "And what does that include?"
As we will soon also discover, there is no way to answer that particular query which fails to sink DM one millimetre per second slower than it does Theology.
Well, What Do The Dialectical Prophets Say?
The short answer is "Not a lot"; the long answer is "Not a lot." A selection of the vague sorts of things they have said can be found in Essay Eleven Part One, here and here.
A few years ago, Martin Jay published an excellent book entitled Marxism And Totality. The Adventures Of A Concept From Lukács To Habermas [Jay (1984)], but in over 500 pages he managed to avoid telling us what the title of his book was actually about!
To be sure, in Chapter One, Jay very helpfully summarised classic and early modern Holist theories of nature and society, but those theories were themselves equally vague. And despite the fact that he found little material in the DM-classics (or in the writings of 'systematic' and other academic dialecticians) to help him, Jay simply ducked the question whether Greek and early modern ideas of nature, or of 'the Whole', were the same as, or were different from each other --, or, indeed, were the same as, or were different from the DM-"Totality".
In fact, how would anyone be able to tell?
How would it be possible for anyone to decide whether Hegel's ideas in this area were the same as or different from, say, Plato's? Or those of Plotinus? Or, the "Wholes" that feature in most mystical systems -- in fact, in all of them?
Now, if the use of certain words, which boast the same letters, were enough to identify the items allegedly so depicted, we would be able to conclude that, for example, Plato's "Forms" were the same as those complicated sheets of paper you have to fill out to get a driving licence. Fortunately, most of know the difference.
Furthermore, does anyone possess an identikit picture of the "Totality", which would allow them to pick this mysterious object out in a Cosmic line-up? Has anyone seen its likeness in the sand, in the clouds, or on Mars --, as some claim to have seen those of Jesus or Mary?
Indeed, what is the criterion of identity for mystical Totalities?
Of course, this puzzle is not helped at all by the fact that none of the ancients were all that specific about what they meant by 'The Whole' -- and neither were the mystics, and for obvious reasons. After all, a crystal clear mystic would lose his/her licence to confuse.
But, if honours were dished out fro vagueness, the Dialectical Mystics would surely win by a few lengths. Prevarication taken way beyond the call of duty.
So, this is not so much a line-up as a Dialectical-Mystery tour.
The rest of Jay's book is devoted to expounding what various prolix and eminently incomprehensible DM-authors thought about history, society, and the economy as sub-"totalities". But, as far as can be ascertained, the "Totality" itself is conspicuous by its absence from Jay's book. That in itself is quite remarkable; in fact it is decidedly odd -- just as odd as if Darwin had forgotten to mention natural selection, or had omitted all talk of species in his masterpiece, On the Origin of the Species.
This is not to pick on Jay, since his book is an excellent guide -- a sort of Dialectician's Alice, as it were. To be sure, if anyone wants to know what modern day DIMs think of social wholes (albeit, expressed in what looks like an obscure Venusian dialect), this is the book to consult.
Even so, we are still missing the Prince of Denmark.
Some in the audience are getting restless.
They want their money back...
Where The Shoe Originally Pinched
As a matter of fact, this project began years ago as a lengthy review of John Rees's book The Algebra Of Revolution [Rees (1998a), or TAR], which, for all its faults, is widely influential in one of the most geographically-extensive Trotskyist tendencies on the planet (the IST). In that case, it is well-placed to do real damage. [However, now that Rees has resigned from the UK-SWP, this may no longer be true.] Moreover, since Rees is one of the most recent DM-authors to put the "Totality" at the centre of his thought --, it seems reasonable to start with his account.
In view of the foregoing, it's no surprise therefore to find that even though Rees clearly believes that the "Totality" is a centrally-important DM-concept [Rees (1998a), pp.5-8], and apart from a few rather vague gestures at defining this term, he never really tells us what it is!
One of the only attempts made in TAR to explain this notion is the following:
"Totality refers to the insistence that the various seemingly separate elements of which the world is composed are in fact related to each other." [Rees (1998a), p.5.]
This passage does not appear to be worded correctly, for it tells us that the "Totality" is in fact an "insistence".
Can this be what "everything" is: an "insistence"?
Is this what the Big Bang ushered forth? An ever-expanding "insistence"?
Worse: if the "Totality" were in fact an "insistence", it would have to be foisted on nature, something DM-theorists like Rees tell us they never do.
When pressed, dialecticians sometimes appeal to "nature" (or perhaps "the Universe") as a physical embodiment of the "Totality", but this is of little help. As we will soon see, such vague gestures initiate an open season, allowing in far too many things one would normally prefer to keep out, as we will soon see.
However, one thing DM-theorists all seem to agree on is that this "Totality" is an integrated whole in which everything is interconnected. On that, see here.
Nevertheless, an examination of the dialectical Holy Books will fail to tell the curious reader whether or not the "Totality" includes the past. The past is surely part of nature, and the universe, one supposes. And yet, the past does not actually exist (except, perhaps, for those with a novel understanding of the word "exist"). But, if that is so and if the past is included as part of the "Totality", it must contain many things that do not exist. This might make it difficult to explain how everything in the "Totality" is interconnected. Clearly, no matter how big the Universe now is, most things that have featured in it at some point did so in the past. If so, items in the present must be interconnected with far more non-existent things than existents. The word "interconnected" would then become rather difficult to account for in anything other than Idealist terms.
If it is now responded that the past is interconnected with the present because of certain processes that stretch from the past into the present, then that would mean that while the present is indeed connected with the past, the past is not actually interconnected with it (unless, of course, we allow 'backwards' causation, whereby the present is back-connected, as it were, with the now non-existent past). Hence, at best, this would mean that the vast bulk of the "Totality" is not interconnected, as we were led to believe.
On the other hand, if the past is said to exist (as part of a sort of Einsteinian four-dimensional manifold) then that would scupper the dialectical belief in change. This is because there is no objective change in such a world. On this view, change is merely the result of our subjective perception of how successive orthogonal hyperplane slices through this manifold seem to us to be related to one another.
And even if that option is rejected, most of the Totality would still be changeless. Even if the past does exist somehow, it could not change (into what?). That would mean that the vast bulk of the "Totality" would be frozen like Plato's Forms.
Alternatively, if the existence of the past is rejected once more, then dialecticians might find it difficult to account for the present. How can anything non-existent create all that now exists?
Of course, the same sort of problems afflict the "Totality" in relation to both the present and the future. Given that the present lasts only a moment (easily less than a yocto second, i.e., 10-24 seconds), it is surely far too ephemeral to be interconnected with anything -- if the "Totality" consists of only the present state of the Universe. It is hard to see how such a ghostly entity could account for anything. Moreover, if the present is indeed interconnected with something, what is it? As we saw, it can't be the past; that does not exist. It can't be the future either, for the same reason.
It rather looks like the DM-"Totality" is even less substantial than the Cheshire Cat's smile.
[Possible responses to these and other objections are considered in detail in Essay Eleven, Part One.]
Furthermore, the word "everything" is a little too loose a word to use in political company, since it would allow the "Totality" to contain some rather odd items. [On that, see below.]
Some might want to refer us to scientists to tell us what the "Totality" is or what it contains; but that might not be such a good idea. If we naively relied on what scientists have at some point or other told us exists then the "Totality" would contain things like Caloric, Phlogiston, Piltdown Man and the Crystalline Spheres (as well as numerous other peculiar objects and processes scientists used to believe existed).
On the other hand, if the "Totality" does not contain these things (any longer?) then either (1) the "Totality" must have changed in the past in line with our ideas about it, or (2) scientists shouldn't be allowed the sole right to decide what its contents are.
But, if scientists are now denied exclusive rights in this area, then one can only sympathise with the poor comrade who has to sit on the 'revolutionary selection panel' charged with deciding whether or not any of the following belong to the "Totality":
Vacua, mirages, illusions, holes, surfaces, corners, shadows, the 'Unconscious', mirror and lens images, para-reflections, the perspectival properties of bodies, phantom limbs, dreams, rainbows, refractions, pains, hallucinations, memories, the mysterious powers of the echeneis fish, emotions, the Ether, N Rays, The Odic Force, Orgone, the Fifth Force, Bioenergy, Polywater, Superstrings, branched time zones, Axions, Branes, the Higgs Boson, virtual particles, particles themselves, selfish genes, I.Q., race, Morphogenic Fields, homeopathic phenomena, 'Mitochondrial Eve', the Placebo effect, gravitons, tachyons, Gaia, singularities, geodesics, gravitational waves, electrons travelling 'backward' in time, magnetic monopoles, tetraneutrons, phase space, photinos, dark matter, the Field, world-lines, Strange Attractors, Cold Fusion, MACHOs, WIMPs, spinors, the future, the past and the specious present. [References to what many of these are can be found in Essay Eleven Part One, here.]
However, without such a panel, the DM-"Totality" would be as Ideal as Hegel's Absolute ever was (or it would be largely empty). On the other hand, even with such a panel, the "Totality" would be sensitive to human choice -- and thus as conventional as other areas of science are.
Moreover, if Lenin is right and all knowledge is provisional (and it is worth recalling here that Lenin himself described the existence of the Ether as "objective" [Lenin (1972), pp.50, 312, 314, 329]), then the "Totality" would have to change whenever its contents list was revised (as indeed it might have to do soon, given the fact that the Higgs Boson is barely clinging onto its theoretical life right now, as it seems is 'Dark Matter', too). Once more, that would mean that this supposedly 'objective' "Totality" must change in line with the decisions we take, making it even more identical to Hegel's Absolute. On the other hand, if the "Totality" does not change in line with our decisions about it, what the dickens is it?
But worse, if we can't decide on what basis to include or exclude things from this avowedly contradictory "Totality", then perhaps it includes things that not only do not exist, but things that cannot exist?
This latest possibility now poses far more serious problems for any attempt to construct a definition of the "Totality". This is because several DM-theses indicate that the 'perimeter fence' (as it were) encircling the "Totality" is full of holes.
While rival ontological systems operate with some sort of closed-border policy -- admitting the existence of certain entities, but disallowing others -- it turns out that DM-theorists may not reject anything at all, since they openly admit (if not adamantly insist upon) the existence of contradictions -- and countless trillions of them (indeed, possibly hundreds, if not thousands, in each atom in the entire universe)!
Hence, the 'DM-boundary fence' is not so much porous as non-existent. The "Totality", it seems, could contain anything, including impossible objects -- not just contradictory objects and processes, but mythical and imaginary ones, too. Maybe it includes four-edged hexagons, the round square, the golden mountain, unicorns, all the Olympian Gods, the end of the rainbow and the Adhedral Triangle?
Anyone tempted to respond here that the above list is absurd since it contains contradictory items, which can be ruled out in advance, should once more consult their local DM-Oracle before they pontificate quite so hastily in future. In fact, given well-known DM-principles, it is not easy to see how any of the above (and more) could be rejected on such an a priori basis.
Thus, if the DM-"Totality" is to be rescued from absurdity some way must be found to halt these and countless other 'impossibles' before they invade across its leaky border.
It could be objected once more that this is ridiculous; dialecticians only acknowledge the existence of contradictions that can be empirically verified. Hence, they do not countenance the actuality of 'theoretical' contradictions, nor do they admit the mere existence of all 'contradictory', imaginary, and impossible objects.
But, this counter-claim is demonstrably incorrect. [That allegation is substantiated in detail in Essay Seven and Essay Eleven Part One.] And, even if DM-theorists do not admit that these entities exist, there is nothing in their 'logic' to rule them out.
Again, it could be argued that 'contradictory objects' are easily excluded because they are not material and do not represent verifiable material forces. But who says? How do we know that scientists might not one day discover weird and wonderful things like these? They already have a few of their own to contend with; several of them were listed above. Electrons travelling backwards in time, and events happening before they occur seem pretty absurd.
[UO = Unity of Opposites; DL = Dialectical Logic; FL = Formal Logic.]
Worse still, as noted above: such possibilities cannot be ruled out by anyone wielding principles found only in DL, But, because of those, DM-theorists openly admit the existence of countless contradictions and other assorted impossibilities. [On this, see below.]
In fact, if everything in existence is a UO (as Lenin claimed) then there should be as many contradictions in reality as there are elementary particles (possibly more). In that case, the above 'impossibilities' cannot be ruled out in advance of all the evidence having been considered, certainly not on principles exclusive to DL.
Indeed, DM-theorists already acknowledge the actual existence of contradictory objects, processes and assorted impossibilities prior to all (or even most) of the evidence having been collected (and, in many cases, in abeyance of any evidence at all), since those among them who agree with Lenin and Hegel insist that everything, and every process, is, or contains, a UO.
If so, then for all even they know, the "Totality" could contain countless as-yet-undiscovered absurdities. [And that is all the more especially so if DM-theorists themselves already confuse contradictions with absurdities, and a host of other things, too.]
Furthermore, if, according to Engels and Lenin, an infinite amount of knowledge still awaits discovery, then at any point in history (such as the present), humanity must be infinitely ignorant of the final contents of -- and of the principles governing -- the universe, or, indeed, the "Totality" (that is, if there is such a 'thing'). In which case, those who rely on DL are in no position to rule such absurdities out with anything other than almost infinite uncertainty. The only way they could be excluded would be on the basis of an a priori appeal to principles exclusive to FL -- or, perhaps, to ordinary language --, and thus on the basis of rules that are incompatible with those found in DL. [On that, see Essay Four.]
As we have already seen (in connection with Engels's analysis of motion, and several other core DM-theses, here, here and here), DM-theorists already admit the existence of contradictory objects and events. Examples of these include the unity of opposite poles in a magnet, 'contradictory' opposing forces throughout nature, contradictory moving objects, contradictory numbers and mathematical concepts, seeds which negate themselves, the existence of actual infinities (that is, the existence of something which both terminates (so that it is a determinate existent), and which does not), the fundamentally contradictory nature of matter (in that it is both wave and particle, continuous and discontinuous, all at once), and contradictory cells (in that they are both alive and dead at the same time), and so on.
This means that DM-theorists cannot consistently exclude any of the contradictory and unlikely entities listed earlier solely on the basis of their contradictory natures. Theorists who postulate contradictions everywhere, and who suddenly become fastidious just when it suits them, should not be expected to be taken seriously.
But, what could be more contradictory than a "Totality" that admits among its denizens things that not only do not exist (like the past), but also those that cannot exist (like DM-abstractions, since if they exist they must be concrete)?
Unfortunately, once this metaphysical roller-coaster starts to move, it takes something a little more substantial than DL to stop it.
If DM is not to be imposed on the world, but read from it -- as its supporters constantly intone -- then dialecticians cannot consistently stipulate what their "Totality" does or does not contain ahead of an empirical investigation to that end.
Others might be able to do this, but they cannot.
It's their millstone; they should wear it with pride.
Hence any attempt to rule out of existence one or more of the contradictory/absurd objects listed above would trap DM-theorist between their millstone and yet another hard place: FL.
Now, those of us who are not committed to such a crazy system of logic -- i.e., DL -- not only can, but do rule out of existence certain things because of principles expressed in FL or in ordinary language. And we are right to do so.
[In fact, it is better to say that it makes no sense to suppose such things exist. More on that here.]
However, this defence is unavailable to DM-theorists, who claim that humanity has to wait upon the deliverances of an infinite meander through epistemological space (and along the yellow brick road toward 'Absolute Knowledge'), before anyone could be in a position to decide whether such propositions are fully true (or, as it turns out, true at all).
If so, dialecticians can't consistently complain about the allegation that their "Totality" might contain some or all of the odd things listed above -- the possible existence of which is predicated on the cavalier rejection of the protocols of FL and ordinary language.
The dilemma that DM-theorists now face is quite stark: either they continue to disdain FL -- the repudiation of which partially created this problem --, thus admitting the possible existence of all manner of contradictory objects, events and processes; or they reject the existence of such things (along with the idea that contradictions exist in nature and society) because of rules codified in FL and expressed discursively in ordinary language.
What seems certain, however, is that the unwise rejection of certain principles of FL has left the DM-"Totality" wide open to infestation by countless weird and wonderful 'entities', the elimination of which requires belated inoculation with a dose of those very same principles -- and the adoption of a believable/workable theory of knowledge.
Hence, as a result of yet another dialectical inversion, FL would be required to rescue DM-theorists from the contradictory "Totality" they rashly summoned into existence; a Whole that could include, for all we know -- or for all they know -- characters from Alice in Wonderland.
Other themes examined in detail in Essay Eleven Part One include the following: (1) DM-theorists' confused use of the word "contradiction", and (2) the doctrine that everything is interconnected.
Part of my criticism of (1) based on the observation that if nature is fundamentally contradictory then any evidence drawn from the world must simultaneously refute and confirm the predictions of whatever theory is being tested. The options available to DM-theorists to paint their way out of this corner are examined in detail; all are shown to fail.
The very best spin that can be put on this is that DM-propositions containing the word "contradiction" must be figurative -- unless, that is, we are to suppose that objects and processes in nature and society literally argue with one another, thus anthropomorphising reality to suite.
Moreover, contrary to what is usually claimed, the LOC makes no existential claims; it merely says that if one proposition is true its contradictory is false. To be sure, dialecticians reject this (where it suits them), but they can do so only on the basis of the above figurative extension to the content of sentences using the word "contradiction".
[LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]
In response, it is of little help being told that "contradiction" really means "conflict" or "struggle" since those words gain whatever sense they have from their use in connection with agents. In which case, unless we are prepared to populate the entire universe with literal agents, sentences containing the words "conflict" or "struggle" can only be understood figuratively, too. In which case, it's not possible to make literal sense of the DM-use of the word "contradiction" (as we also saw in Essay Eight Parts Two (here, here, and here) and Three).
The etymology of the word "conflict", from the Latin, supports this view: conflictus: 'a contest', is defined here.
[Of course, this is not to deny that there are profound and fundamental conflicts in class society; but here there are agents -- and they can contradict one another, just as they can enter into conflict with one another, powering the class war.]
Finally, it is difficult to see how such figurative "contradictions" could actually cause change -- any more than, say, the depiction of an uncouth man as a "pig" can create rashers of bacon.
Interconnected -- Or Hermetically Sealed -- Units?
As far as (2) above is concerned, serious questions are raised over to how DM-theorists can possibly know (a) that everything in reality is interconnected, (b) what the boundaries or extent of this claim are (e.g., Is the past included? If not, how can the present be explained?) and (c) what the exact nature of these interconnections is.
Concerning (c): are they instantaneous, across all regions of space and time? If so, how might this be confirmed? If not, what are their limits, too? Are they transmitted faster than light?
These worries are then linked to concerns raised in Essay Eight Part One: if everything is indeed interconnected, change cannot arise from "internal contradictions", as DM-theorists insist. Conversely, if change does indeed result from such "internal contradictions", nothing in the universe could be interconnected (except in the most trivial of senses). [More details can be found here.]
Latest Update: 04/03/11
Word Count: 4890
© Rosa Lichtenstein 2011
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